

The World as Will and Representation, Volume I

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

Musean Translation

MOUSEIA

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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation of the three prefaces, the four books with paragraphs 1 to 71, and the appendix on Kant, made directly from the corrected German text of the third edition (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1859), with the printed page consulted wherever a reading was in doubt. Footnote numbers are this edition's own, assigned in reading order, so note calls and the notes they point to can differ; a few notes the scan cut short end where the printed page ends.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written 1819; third edition 1859 · Philosophy

SOURCE

Original text from archive.org.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The German follows the 1859 third edition, which Schopenhauer expanded by 136 pages over the second; the work's later volumes are not included. Head- and running titles, signatures, catchwords and printers' ornaments are omitted. Greek, Latin, French, Italian, Spanish and English quotations stand as Schopenhauer printed them. His notes keep the place the printed page gives them: their marks become bracketed numbers in reading order, counted once per unit, though the page restarts the series with *) on every page. A page's note therefore stands where its page breaks off, so a note can come down inside a sentence in all three editions, and a note call and the note it points to can carry different numbers. Where the page breaks a word to carry a note, the word is joined again and the note follows it. Six places merge two German paragraphs into one paragraph of English, all of them where a paragraph crosses a page break between reading units (Preface to the Second Edition, Book II paragraphs 24 and 29, Book III paragraphs 36, 50 and 51). Otherwise paragraphs follow the German one for one. The appendix keeps the printer's errata list and the Brockhaus colophon as printed in 1859. The printed figures are images copied from the page (public/images/): the four concept-sphere diagrams of Book I § 9, the plate of concept

spheres that § 9 refers to, the triangle of § 15, and the two formulas of page 90. The first formula reads seven plus nine, that sum times eight, minus two, all over three, equals forty-two; the second is a root sign over r minus a small raised letter that the print leaves unclear, so its image text says so rather than guess. A few leaves of the scan are damaged where the notes were trimmed, and those notes end without a mark: the English carries the printed fragment and picks the sentence up again. The German was transcribed leaf by leaf from the page images of a Fraktur scan; letters the scan left ambiguous were settled against the page or the Oxford witness where that was possible, and a residue remains, mostly in Books II and IV, together with the older tz spellings the 1859 page prints.

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Preface to the First Edition



I have set myself here to state how this book is to be read, if it is to have any chance of being understood.—What it is meant to communicate is a single thought. Yet for all my efforts I could find no shorter way of communicating it than this whole book.—I hold that thought to be what has been sought for so very long under the name of philosophy, and whose discovery is, for that very reason, held by the historically educated to be as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher's stone, although Pliny had already told them: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur? (Hist. nat., 7, 1.)

According to the side from which one regards that one thought to be communicated, it shows itself as what has been called metaphysics, as what has been called ethics, and as what has been called aesthetics; and indeed it would have to be all of these, if it were what I, as already admitted, take it to be.

A system of thoughts must always have an architectonic coherence, that is, one in which a part always supports another, but the other does not in turn support the first; in which the foundation-stone in the end bears all the rest without being borne by them, and the summit is borne without bearing. A single thought, on the other hand, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity. If, for the sake of communicating it, it nevertheless allows itself to be broken into parts, then the connection of these parts must again be an organic one, that is, one in which every part sustains the whole just as much as it is held by the whole; in which none is first and none last; in which

the whole thought gains in clarity through each part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless the whole has already been understood beforehand.—A book, meanwhile, must have a first line and a last, and to that extent will always remain very unlike an organism, however much its content may resemble one: consequently form and matter will here stand in contradiction.

It follows of itself that, in such circumstances, there is no other counsel for penetrating the thought set forth than to read the book twice, and the first time with great patience—a patience to be drawn only from the freely granted belief that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and likewise every earlier part the later almost as much as the later the earlier. I say "almost": for it is by no means altogether so; and whatever could possibly be done to place first that which is least in need of being elucidated by what follows, as indeed whatever could contribute to the greatest possible ease of comprehension and clarity, has been done honestly and conscientiously. Indeed, to a certain degree this might even have succeeded, if the reader, as is very natural, did not in reading think merely of what is said at any given moment but also of the possible consequences to be drawn from it. For then, in addition to the many contradictions that are really present with the opinions of the age and, presumably, of the reader, so many other anticipated and imaginary ones may be added that what is still mere misunderstanding must present itself as lively disapproval; and one recognizes it for misunderstanding all the less, since the laboriously achieved clarity of the presentation and distinctness of the expression, though they never leave the immediate sense of what is said in doubt, cannot at the same time state its relations to everything else. Therefore the first reading requires, as I said, patience, drawn from the confidence that on the second one will see much, or everything, in an entirely different light. Moreover, the earnest striving for complete and even easy intelligibility, in a very difficult subject, must justify my repeating myself here and there. The very structure of the whole, organic and not chain-like, made it necessary at times to touch on the same passage twice. This same structure, and the very close interconnection of all the parts, also did not permit the division into

chapters and paragraphs, otherwise so valuable to me, but compelled me to rest content with four main divisions, four viewpoints, as it were, of the one thought. In each of these four books one must be especially on guard against losing sight, over the particulars that must necessarily be treated, of the main thought to which they belong and of the progress of the whole exposition.—With this the first demand has now been made, and, like the following ones, an indispensable one, upon the reader who is ill disposed toward the philosopher, precisely because the reader is a philosopher too.

The second demand is this: that one read the introduction to the book before the book itself, although it does not stand in the book but appeared five years earlier, under the title "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Treatise."—Without acquaintance with this introduction and propaedeutic a real understanding of the present work is altogether impossible, and the content of that treatise is everywhere presupposed here as though it stood in the book. Moreover, had it not already preceded this work by several years, it would not properly stand before it as an introduction but would have been incorporated into the first book; and that book, now lacking what is said in the treatise, shows a certain imperfection through these very gaps, which it must always fill by appealing to that treatise. Yet my aversion to copying myself out, or to laboriously presenting once more in other words what had already been said sufficiently, was so great that I preferred this course, even though I could now give the content of that treatise a somewhat better presentation, above all by purging it of certain concepts that spring from my then excessive captivity in the Kantian philosophy, such as categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. Yet even there those concepts stand only as a side matter, because until then I had never really engaged deeply with them, and so quite out of contact with the main point; hence the correction of such passages in that treatise will come about of itself in the reader's thoughts, through acquaintance with the present work.—But only if one has fully recognized, through that treatise, what the principle of sufficient reason is and means, to what its validity extends and to what it does not; and that it is not the case that this principle comes before all things, and only in consequence and in con-

formity with it, as its corollary, so to speak, the whole world exists; but that it is rather nothing more than the form in which the object, of whatever kind, always conditioned by the subject, is everywhere known, insofar as the subject is a knowing individual: only then will it be possible to enter upon the method of philosophizing attempted here for the first time, a method wholly different from all that have gone before.

But the same aversion to copying myself out word for word, or else, having already taken the better words for myself, to say the very same thing a second time in other and worse ones, has occasioned a second gap in the first book of this work, in that I have left out everything that stands in the first chapter of my treatise "On Vision and Colors" and that would otherwise have found its place here verbatim. So acquaintance with this earlier little work too is presupposed here.

The third demand to be made upon the reader could in the end even be presupposed tacitly: for it is none other than acquaintance with the most important phenomenon to have appeared in philosophy for two thousand years, and one that lies so near to us: I mean the principal writings of Kant. The effect they produce in the mind to which they really speak I find indeed, as has been said before, to be very much comparable to the operation for cataract on the blind; and if we wish to carry the simile further, my aim may be described by saying that I wished to put a pair of cataract glasses into the hands of those on whom that operation has succeeded, and for the use of which that operation itself is therefore the most necessary condition.—Much as I therefore proceed from what the great Kant has achieved, the earnest study of his writings has nonetheless let me discover significant errors in them, which I had to sift out and present as untenable, in order to be able to presuppose and apply the true and excellent part of the teaching, freed from them and purified. But so as not to interrupt and confuse my own exposition with frequent polemic against Kant, I have put this in a separate appendix. Much as my work, in accordance with what has been said, presupposes acquaintance with the Kantian philosophy, so much does it also presuppose acquaintance with that appendix; hence in this respect it would be advisable to read the appendix first, all the more as its

content bears precisely on the first book of the present work. On the other hand, by the nature of the case, it could not be avoided that the appendix too should here and there refer to the work itself; from which nothing else follows than that it, just as much as the main part of the work, must be read twice.

Kant's philosophy, then, is the only one with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed in what is to be set forth here.—If, however, the reader has besides lingered in the school of the divine Plato, they will be the better prepared, and the more receptive, to hear me. But if they have even become partakers of the benefit of the Vedas, access to which, opened to us by the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage this still young century has to show over earlier ones, since I suspect that the influence of Sanskrit literature will penetrate no less deeply than the revival of Greek literature did in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also already received the consecration of primeval Indian wisdom and taken it up receptively, then they are best of all prepared to hear what I have to present. It will then not strike them as foreign, or even hostile, as it does many others; for I would like to maintain, if it did not sound too proud, that each of the individual and detached utterances which make up the Upanishads could be derived as a consequence from the thought I have to communicate, although by no means is the converse the case, that this thought is already to be found there.

But most readers have already started up impatiently and broken out into the reproach so laboriously held back for so long: how can I dare to lay before the public a book under demands and conditions of which the first two are presumptuous and quite immodest, and this at a time when there is such a general wealth of original thoughts that in Germany alone they are made common property each year by the printing press in three thousand substantial, original and wholly indispensable works, and besides in countless periodicals, or even daily papers? at a time when there is above all not the slightest lack of quite original and profound philosophers, but when in Germany alone more of them live at once than other ages could show in several centuries running? how, asks the indignant reader, is one ever to get through, if one must go to work so circumstantially with a single book?

Since I have not the slightest thing to set against such reproaches, I hope only for some thanks from these readers for having warned them in good time, so that they may lose no hour over a book whose perusal, without fulfillment of the demands made, could bring no profit and is therefore to be left off altogether; the more so as there is in any case every chance, indeed much to bet, that it cannot please them, that it will rather always be only paucorum hominum, and must therefore wait calmly and modestly for the few whose unusual way of thinking would find it palatable. For, quite apart from the prolixities and the exertion that it demands of the reader, what educated person of this age, whose knowledge has come close to that glorious point where paradoxical and false are quite one and the same, could bear to meet on almost every page with thoughts that flatly contradict what they have themselves once and for all settled as true and established? And then, how unpleasantly many a reader will find themselves disappointed, on finding here no mention at all of what they believe they absolutely must look for here, because their way of speculating coincides with that of a great philosopher still living [1], who has written truly touching books and whose one small weakness is to hold everything learned and approved before the age of fifteen to be innate fundamental thoughts of the human mind. Who would want to bear all this? Hence my advice is simply to put the book away again.

But I fear that even so I shall not get free of them. The reader who has got as far as the preface that turns them away has bought the book for cash, and asks what is to compensate them?—My last refuge is now to remind them that a book, even without actually reading it, can be put to use in many ways. It can, like many others, fill a gap in their library, where, neatly bound, it will certainly look well. Or they can lay it on the dressing table or tea table of their learned lady friend. Or, finally, they can—what is certainly the best of all, and what I particularly advise—review it.

2 F. H. Jacobi.

And so, having permitted myself the jest, to which in this thoroughly equivocal life hardly any page can be too serious to grant a place, I hand over the book in deep earnest, in the confidence that sooner or later it will reach those to whom alone it can be addressed, and for the rest calmly resigned that it too will meet in full measure the fate that in every kind of knowledge, and so the more in the most important, has always fallen to truth, for which only a brief festival of victory is ordained, between the two long periods in which it is condemned as paradoxical and slighted as trivial. The former fate, moreover, usually strikes its author as well.—But life is short, and truth works far and lives long: let us speak the truth.

(Written at Dresden in August 1818.)

Preface to the Second Edition



Not to my contemporaries, not to my countrymen—to humanity I commit my now completed work, in the confidence that it will not be without value for it, even if that value, as is the lot of the good in every kind, should be recognized only late. For it can only have been for humanity, and not for the passing generation, busy with its momentary delusion, that my head, almost against my will, has applied itself without pause to its labor through a long life. Meanwhile even the lack of sympathy could not make me doubt the worth of that labor; for I saw continually the false, the bad, and finally the absurd and nonsensical [1] held in universal admiration and veneration, and I reflected that if those who are capable of recognizing the genuine and the right were not so rare that one may look about for them in vain for some twenty years, those who are able to produce it could not be so few that their works should afterward form an exception [2] The Hegelian philosophy. to the transience of earthly things; whereby the refreshing prospect of posterity would be lost, which everyone who has set a high goal needs for strength.—Those who take seriously and pursue a cause that leads to no material gain must not count on the sympathy of their contemporaries. What they will mostly see, rather, is that in the meantime the semblance of such a cause asserts itself in the world and enjoys its day; and this is as it should be. For the cause itself must also be pursued for its own sake, otherwise it cannot succeed; since everywhere every design endangers insight. Accordingly, as the whole history of literature attests, everything of value has

needed much time to gain recognition, especially if it belonged to the instructive and not the entertaining kind; and meanwhile the false shone. For to unite the cause with the semblance of the cause is hard, if not impossible. That, indeed, is the curse of this world of need and necessity, that everything must serve and be subject to need; hence it is not so constituted that any noble and sublime striving, such as that after light and truth, could thrive unhindered and be permitted to exist for its own sake. Rather, even if such a striving has once managed to assert itself, and the concept of it has thereby been introduced, material interests and personal ends will promptly seize upon that too, to make of it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, after Kant had brought philosophy once more into esteem, it too very soon had to become the instrument of ends, of the state's from above, of personal ends from below;—or rather, strictly speaking, not philosophy itself, but its double, which passes for it. This need not surprise even us: for the incredibly large majority of people are, by their nature, capable of no ends but material ones, and indeed can conceive no others. The striving after truth alone is accordingly far too lofty and eccentric for it to be expected that all, or many, or even only a few should take a sincere part in it. If one nevertheless sees for once, as for example right now in Germany, a striking stir, a general bustle of doing, writing and talking in matters of philosophy, one may confidently presume that the real primum mobile, the hidden mainspring of such a movement, in spite of all solemn faces and assurances, is solely real, not ideal ends; that it is, namely, personal, official, ecclesiastical, political, in short material interests that one has in view; and that consequently mere party ends set the many pens of would-be sages in such vigorous motion; that designs, therefore, not insights, are the lodestar of these agitators, while truth is certainly the last thing thought of. Truth finds no partisans: rather it can make its way through such a philosophical turmoil of strife as quietly and unnoticed as through the winter night of the darkest century, bound fast in the stiffest church belief, when it is perhaps only imparted as a secret doctrine to a few adepts, or even entrusted to parchment alone. Indeed, I would say that no time can be more unfavorable to philosophy than one in which it is basely misused on the one side as an instrument of state, on the other as a means of earn-

ing a living. Or does one perhaps believe that amid such striving and such tumult truth too, which is not what is aimed at in the least, will come to light on the side, as it were? Truth is no whore who throws herself at the neck of those who do not desire her; rather she is such a coy beauty that even one who sacrifices everything to her cannot yet be sure of her favor.

Now if the governments make philosophy a means to their ends of state, the scholars on the other hand see in professorships of philosophy a trade that feeds its man like any other: they therefore crowd toward them, with assurances of their good sentiments, that is, of their intention to serve those ends. And they keep their word: not truth, not clarity, not Plato, not Aristotle, but the ends they have been appointed to serve are their lodestar, and at once become also the criterion of what is true, of what is valuable, of what deserves notice, and of their opposites. Whatever therefore does not accord with those ends, even if it were the most important and extraordinary thing in their field, is either condemned or, where that seems risky, smothered by sullen ignoring. Just look at their unanimous zeal against pantheism: will any simpleton believe it springs from conviction?—And how, indeed, should philosophy, degraded to a bread-winning trade, not degenerate into sophistry? Precisely because this is unavoidable, and the rule "Whose bread I eat, his song I sing" has always held, earning money by philosophy was among the ancients the mark of the sophist.—But now there comes besides this the fact that, since in this world nothing but mediocrity is anywhere to be expected, demanded, and had for money, one must put up with it here too. Accordingly we see, in all the German universities, dear mediocrity toiling to bring about, from its own resources, the philosophy that does not yet exist at all, and indeed according to prescribed measure and goal;—a spectacle at which it would be almost cruel to scoff.

While in this way philosophy has long been made throughout to serve as a means, on the one side for public, on the other for private ends, I, undisturbed by this, have for more than thirty years followed my own train of thought, likewise only because I had to and could not do otherwise, from an instinctive impulse, which was, however, supported by the confidence that whatever truth a person has thought and whatever hidden thing has been illuminated will at

some time be grasped by another thinking mind, appeal to it, gladden and console it: it is to such a mind that one speaks, as those like us have spoken to us and have thereby become our consolation in this desert of life. Meanwhile one pursues one's cause for its own sake and for oneself. Now with philosophical meditations the case is strangely such that precisely only what someone has thought through and investigated for themselves afterward benefits others too, but not what was originally destined for others. The former is recognizable first of all by the character of thoroughgoing honesty; because one does not seek to deceive oneself, nor hand oneself hollow nuts; whereby all sophistry and all verbiage fall away, and as a consequence every sentence set down at once repays the trouble of reading it. Accordingly my writings bear the stamp of honesty and candor so plainly on their brow that they stand out sharply by this alone from those of the three famous sophists of the post-Kantian period: one always finds me on the standpoint of reflection, that is, of rational deliberation and honest communication, never on that of inspiration, called intellectual intuition, or also absolute thinking, but which by its right name is windbaggery and charlatanry.—Working in this spirit, then, and seeing all the while the false and the bad in general currency, indeed windbaggery[3] and charlatanry[4] in the highest veneration, I long ago renounced the applause of my contemporaries. It is impossible that a body of contemporaries[5] Fichte and Schelling.

6 Hegel. that has for twenty years proclaimed a Hegel, this spiritual Caliban, as the greatest of philosophers, and so loudly that it echoed throughout Europe, should be able to make anyone who has looked on at that covetous of its applause. It has no more garlands of honor to bestow: its applause is prostituted, and its censure means nothing. That I am in earnest in this is evident from the fact that, had I sought the applause of my contemporaries at all, I should have had to strike out twenty passages which flatly contradict all their views and in part must even be offensive to them. But I would count it a transgression to sacrifice even a syllable to that applause. My lodestar has been, in all earnestness, truth: following it, I could at first aim only at my own approval, turned wholly away from an age sunk deep in regard to all higher strivings of the spirit, and

from a national literature demoralized save for the exceptions, in which the art of joining lofty words to base sentiments has reached its summit. The faults and weaknesses that necessarily cling to my nature, as to every nature its own, I can indeed never escape; but I will not increase them by unworthy accommodations.

As for this second edition, I am glad first of all that after twenty-five years I find nothing to retract, so that my fundamental convictions have at least proved themselves in my own case. The alterations in the first volume, which alone contains the text of the first edition, accordingly touch nothing essential anywhere, but concern partly only side matters, while for the most part they consist of generally brief, explanatory additions inserted here and there. Only the critique of the Kantian philosophy has received significant corrections and detailed additions; since these could not be put here into a supplementary book, as the four books that set forth my own doctrine have each received one, in the second volume. For these I chose the latter form of enlargement and improvement because the twenty-five years that have elapsed since their composition have brought about so marked a change in my manner of presentation and in the tone of delivery that it was hardly feasible to fuse the content of the second volume with that of the first into one whole; both would have suffered from such a fusion. I therefore give both works separately, and in the earlier presentation have often changed nothing even where I would now express myself quite differently, because I wanted to guard against spoiling the work of my younger years by the carping of age. Whatever may need correcting in this respect will, with the help of the second volume, set itself right of its own accord in the reader's mind. Both volumes stand to one another, in the full sense of the word, in a relation of supplementation, insofar as this rests on the fact that one stage of a person's life is, intellectually, the complement of the other; hence it will be found that not only does each volume contain what the other lacks, but also that the merits of the one consist precisely in what the other is without. If, accordingly, the first half of my work has the advantage over the second in what only the fire of youth and the energy of first conception can give, the second will in turn surpass the first in the maturity and com-

plete working-through of the thoughts, which falls only to the fruits of a long course of life and its diligence. For when I had the strength to grasp originally the fundamental thought of my system, to pursue it at once into its four branchings, to go back from them to the unity of their trunk, and then to present the whole clearly, I could not yet be in a position to work through all the parts of the system with the completeness, thoroughness and fullness of detail that are attained only through many years of meditation upon it—a meditation required in order to test and elucidate it on countless facts, to support it with the most varied proofs, to light it brightly from all sides, to set the different points of view boldly in contrast, and to separate the manifold materials cleanly and lay them out in good order. Therefore, although it would doubtless be more agreeable to the reader to have my whole work cast in one piece, instead of its consisting, as now, of two halves that must be brought together in use, let the reader consider that this would have required me to accomplish in one stage of life what is possible only in two, since I should have had to possess in one stage of life the qualities which nature has distributed between two quite different ones. The necessity of delivering my work in two mutually complementary halves is accordingly comparable to that by virtue of which an achromatic objective lens, since it is impossible to make it from one piece, is produced by composing it of a convex lens of flint glass and a concave lens of crown glass, whose united effect first accomplishes what is intended. On the other hand, the reader will find some compensation for the inconvenience of using two volumes at once in the variety and refreshment which the treatment of the same subject, by the same head, in the same spirit, but in very different years, brings with it. Meanwhile, for anyone not yet acquainted with my philosophy it is altogether advisable to read the first volume through first, without drawing in the supplements, and to use these only on a second reading; since otherwise it would be too hard to grasp the system in its coherence, in which alone the first volume sets it out, whereas in the second the main doctrines are founded one by one more fully and developed completely. Even one who should not resolve on a second reading of the first volume will do better to read the second only after it and by itself, in the straight order of its chapters, which

do stand in a connection with one another, though a looser one, whose gaps the recollection of the first volume, if it has been well grasped, will completely fill; besides, one finds everywhere the references back to the relevant places in the first volume, in which, for this purpose, I have in the second edition furnished with paragraph numbers the sections that in the first edition were marked merely by dividing lines.— Already in the preface to the first edition I declared that my philosophy proceeds from Kant's and therefore presupposes a thorough knowledge of it: I repeat that here. For Kant's doctrine produces in every head that has grasped it a fundamental change so great that it may count as a spiritual rebirth. It alone, namely, is able really to remove the realism innate in the mind, which springs from the original destination of the intellect—for which neither Berkeley nor Malebranche suffices, since these remain too much in generalities, whereas Kant goes into particulars, and indeed in a way that knows neither model nor imitation and has a quite peculiar, one might say immediate effect on the mind, in consequence of which it suffers a thorough disillusionment and henceforth sees all things in another light. Only through this, however, does it become receptive to the more positive disclosures that I have to give. Whoever, on the other hand, has not mastered the Kantian philosophy, whatever else they may have pursued, has remained, as it were, in the state of innocence, that is, caught in that natural and childlike realism in which we are all born and which fits one for everything possible except philosophy. Consequently such a person stands to the former as one under age to one of age. That this truth sounds paradoxical today, which in the first thirty years after the appearance of the Critique of Reason would by no means have been the case, comes from the fact that a generation has since grown up which does not really know Kant, since for that more is needed than a cursory, impatient reading or a report at second hand; and this again comes from the fact that this generation, owing to bad guidance, has squandered its time on the philosophemes of ordinary and therefore unqualified heads, or even of windbag sophists, whom it was inexcusably urged to admire. Hence the confusion in the first concepts and, in general, the unspeakably crude and clumsy element that peers out from the veil of preciousness and pretension in the philosophical

attempts of the generation so educated. But whoever supposes they can get to know Kant's philosophy from the expositions of others is caught in a hopeless error. Rather I must earnestly warn against such reports, above all from recent times: and in these very last years I have come across, in the writings of the Hegelians, expositions of the Kantian philosophy that really pass into the fabulous. And how, indeed, should heads already twisted out of joint and spoiled in fresh youth by the nonsense of Hegelry still be capable of following Kant's profound investigations? They are accustomed early to take the hollowest verbiage for philosophical thoughts, the most wretched sophisms for acuteness, and inane lunacy for dialectic, and through taking in maddening combinations of words, over which the mind tortures and exhausts itself in vain to think something, their heads are disorganized. For them no Critique of Reason is fit, for them no philosophy: for them a medicina mentis is fit, first as a cathartic perhaps un petit cours de senscommunologie, and then one must see further whether there can ever be talk of philosophy with them.—The Kantian doctrine, then, one will seek in vain anywhere other than in Kant's own works: and these are throughout instructive, even where he errs, even where he fails. Owing to his originality it holds of him in the highest degree what holds properly of all genuine philosophers: only from their own writings does one come to know them, not from the reports of others. For the thoughts of those extraordinary minds cannot bear filtration through the ordinary head. Born behind the broad, high, finely vaulted foreheads from beneath which radiant eyes shine forth, they lose, when transplanted into the narrow dwelling and low roof of narrow, compressed, thick-walled skulls, out of which dull glances bent on personal ends peer, all strength and all life, and no longer look like themselves. Indeed, one may say that heads of this kind work like uneven mirrors, in which everything is twisted and distorted, loses the symmetry of its beauty, and presents a grimace. Only from their originators themselves can one receive philosophical thoughts: hence whoever feels driven to philosophy must seek out its immortal teachers in the quiet sanctuary of their own works. The principal chapters of any one of these genuine philosophers will give a hundred times more insight into their doctrines than the lumbering and squinting

reports about them turned out by everyday heads, who moreover are for the most part deeply caught in the fashionable philosophy of the day, or in their own cherished opinions. But it is astonishing how decidedly the public reaches by preference for those expositions at second hand. Here elective affinity does indeed seem to be at work, by virtue of which the common nature is drawn to its like, and accordingly prefers to hear even what a great mind has said from its like. Perhaps this rests on the same principle as the system of mutual instruction, according to which children learn best from their like.

Now one more word for the professors of philosophy.—The sagacity, the right and fine tact with which they recognized my philosophy, at its very first appearance, as something wholly heterogeneous to their own endeavors, even dangerous, or, to speak popularly, something that does not suit their shop; as well as the sure and astute policy by virtue of which they at once found the only proper course toward it, the perfect unanimity with which they put it into practice, and finally the perseverance with which they have remained faithful to it—all this I have always had to admire. This procedure, which incidentally also commends itself by its extremely easy execution, consists, as is well known, in total ignoring and thereby in "secreting," to use Goethe's malicious expression, which properly signifies the suppression of what is important and significant. The effectiveness of this silent means is heightened by the Corybantic din with which the birth of the intellectual offspring of those in agreement is celebrated reciprocally, and which compels the public to look and to notice the important airs with which they greet one another over it. Who could fail to recognize the expediency of this procedure? There is, after all, nothing to object to in the maxim primum vivere, deinde philosophari. The gentlemen want to live, and indeed to live from philosophy: to it they are assigned, with wife and child, and have, despite Petrarch's povera e nuda vai filosofia, ventured upon it. Now my philosophy is not at all arranged so that one could live from it. It lacks for this the first requisites indispensable to a well-paid chair philosophy, above all, and entirely, a speculative theology, which—in spite of the wretched Kant with his Critique of Reason—is supposed to be, and must be, the main theme of all philosophy, even though this gives it the task of speaking continually of that of

which it absolutely cannot know anything; indeed mine does not even posit the fable, so cleverly devised by the professors of philosophy and become indispensable to them, of a reason that immediately and absolutely knows, intuits or apprehends, which one need only tie onto one's readers at the outset in order afterward to drive in, in the most convenient way in the world, as it were with four horses, to the domain beyond the possibility of all experience, entirely and forever closed by Kant to our knowledge, where one then finds precisely the basic dogmas of modern, judaizing, optimistic Christianity immediately revealed and laid out in the most beautiful fashion. What, in all the world, has my philosophy—lacking these essential requisites, heeding no considerations, yielding no bread, brooding, which has for its north star solely truth, naked, unrewarded, unbefriended, often persecuted truth, and steers straight for it without looking right or left—to do with that alma mater, the good, nourishing university philosophy, which, burdened with a hundred intentions and a thousand considerations, comes cautiously tacking along its way, keeping always before its eyes the fear of the Lord, the will of the ministry, the statutes of the established church, the wishes of the publisher, the attendance of students, the good friendship of colleagues, the course of the day's politics, the momentary direction of the public, and whatever else? Or what has my quiet, earnest inquiry after truth in common with the shrill school-squabbling of lecterns and benches, whose innermost springs are always personal ends? Rather, the two kinds of philosophy are heterogeneous to one another from the ground up. Therefore also there is with me no compromise and no comradeship, and with me no one finds their account unless it be one who sought nothing but truth; hence none of the philosophical parties of the day: for they all pursue their intentions; I, however, have only insights to offer, which fit none of those, because they have been modeled on none. For my philosophy itself to become fit for the lectern, quite other times would first have to have risen.—That would be a fine thing, then, if such a philosophy, from which one cannot live at all, were to win air and light, even general notice! This, therefore, had to be prevented, and all had to stand as one man against it. Disputing and refuting, however, is not so easy a game: and this is also a risky means for the

reason that it turns the attention of the public to the matter, and the reading of my writings might spoil the public's taste for the lucubrations of the professors of philosophy. For whoever has tasted earnestness will no longer relish the jest, especially of the tedious kind. Accordingly the silent system, so unanimously adopted, is the only right one, and I can only advise them to stay with it and to continue with it as long as it goes, namely until some day the ignoring is traced to ignorance: then there will still be just time enough to change course. Meanwhile it remains open to anyone to pluck a little feather here and there for their own use, since at home the superabundance of thoughts is not usually very oppressive. Thus the system of ignoring and silence can hold out a good while yet, at least for the span of time I may still have to live; with which much is already gained. Even if here and there in between an indiscreet voice has made itself heard, it is soon drowned by the loud lecturing of the professors, who know how to entertain the public, with an important air, about quite other things. I advise, however, holding somewhat more strictly to the unanimity of the procedure, and watching especially the young people, who are at times terribly indiscreet. For even so I cannot vouch that the lauded procedure will hold out forever, and cannot answer for the final outcome. It is a peculiar matter, namely, to steer the public, which is on the whole good and docile. Even if at nearly all times we see the Gorgiases and Hippiases on top, the absurd as a rule at its zenith, and it seems impossible that through the chorus of deceivers and deceived the voice of the individual should ever penetrate;—yet genuine works always retain a quite peculiar, quiet, slow, powerful effect, and as though by a miracle one sees them at last rise out of the tumult, like a balloon that floats up from the thick atmosphere of this earthly space into purer regions, where, once arrived, it stays, and no one can any longer pull it down.

Written at Frankfurt a. M. in February 1844.

Preface to the Third Edition



The true and the genuine would win room in the world more easily if those who are unable to produce it were not at the same time sworn to keep it from rising. This circumstance has already checked and delayed much that was meant to benefit the world, if it has not smothered it outright. For me its consequence has been that, although I was only thirty when the first edition of this work appeared, I live to see this third only in my seventy-second year. For this, however, I find consolation in Petrarch's words: si quis, tota die currens, pervenit ad vesperam, satis est (de vera sapientia, p. 140). I too have arrived at last, and I have the satisfaction of seeing, at the end of my course, the beginning of my influence, in the hope that, according to an old rule, it will last long in proportion as it began late.—

The reader will miss nothing in this third edition that the second contains, and will in fact receive considerably more, since through the additions made to it, in the same print, it runs to 136 pages more than the second.

Seven years after the appearance of the second edition I published two volumes, "Parerga and Paralipomena." What is comprised under the latter name consists of additions to the systematic exposition of my philosophy, and it would have found its proper place in these volumes; but I had to place it then wherever I could, since it was very doubtful whether I should live to see this third edition. It is to be found in the second volume of the said Parerga, and will be easily recognized by the chapter headings.

Frankfurt a. M., September 1859.

Book I



1 “The world is my representation”:—this is a truth that holds for every living and knowing being, though only man can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness; and if he really does so, philosophical clear-headedness has come upon him. It then becomes plain and certain to him that he knows no sun and no earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world surrounding him exists only as representation, that is, throughout only in relation to something else, the one who represents, which is he himself.—If any truth can be pronounced a priori, it is this one: for it is the statement of that form of all possible and conceivable experience which is more general than all the others, than time, space and causality; for all of these presuppose it already, and while each of these forms, all of which we have recognized as so many particular shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, holds only for a particular class of representations, the division into object and subject is, by contrast, the common form of all those classes, the form under which alone any representation, of whatever kind, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is in any way possible and thinkable. No truth, then, is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this: that everything that exists for knowledge, hence this whole world, is only object in relation to the subject, intuition of the one who intuits, in a word, representation. Naturally this holds of the present as of every past and every future, of the farthest as of the nearest;

for it holds of time and space themselves, in which alone all this is distinguished. Everything that belongs or can belong to the world is inescapably burdened with this conditionedness by the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is representation.

This truth is by no means new. It already lay in the skeptical reflections from which Descartes set out. Berkeley, however, was the first to state it decisively: he thereby earned an immortal merit in philosophy, even though the rest of his teaching cannot stand. Kant's first error was his neglect of this proposition, as is set out in the Appendix.—How early, on the other hand, this fundamental truth was recognized by the sages of India, appearing as it does as the basic proposition of the Vedanta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is attested by W. Jones in the last of his essays: on the philosophy of the Asiatics; Asiatic researches, Vol. IV, p. 164: the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms[1]. These words sufficiently express the coexistence of empirical reality with transcendental ideality.

Thus it is only from the side indicated, only insofar as it is representation, that we consider the world in this first book. That [2] The basic dogma of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability and extension (to deny which would be madness), but in correcting the common concept of it, by the assertion that it has no existence independent of cognitive apprehension, existence and perceptibility being interchangeable concepts. however this consideration, without prejudice to its truth, is one-sided, and is therefore called forth by some arbitrary abstraction, is announced to everyone by the inner resistance with which they accept the world as their mere representation—an acceptance which, on the other hand, they can never escape. The one-sidedness of this consideration, however, will be made good by the following book, through a truth that is not so immediately certain as the one from which we start here, but to which only deeper inquiry,

more difficult abstraction, the separation of the different and the union of the identical can lead—through a truth that must be very serious and, if not terrible, then at least disquieting to everyone, namely this: that they too can and must say, "the world is my will."—

Until then, however, that is, in this first book, it is necessary to contemplate unswervingly that side of the world from which we start, the side of knowability, and accordingly, without resistance, to regard all objects that are in any way present, even our own body (as we shall soon discuss more closely), only as representation, and to call them mere representation. What is abstracted from here is, as I hope will later be certain to everyone, always only the will, which alone constitutes the other side of the world: for this world is, on the one hand, representation through and through, and on the other, will through and through. A reality, however, that would be neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which Kant's thing in itself too has, unfortunately, degenerated in his hands), is a dreamed-up nonentity, and the assumption of it a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy.

2 That which knows everything and is known by none is the subject. It is accordingly the bearer of the world, the universal and always presupposed condition of everything that appears, of every object: for whatever exists, exists only for the subject. Everyone finds themselves as this subject, but only insofar as they know, not insofar as they are an object of knowledge. Their body, however, is already object, and from this standpoint we therefore call it representation. For the body is an object among objects and subject to the laws of objects, although it is the immediate object [3]. It lies, like all objects of intuition, in the forms of all knowing, in time and space, through which there is plurality. The subject, however, the knower, never the known, does not lie in these forms either, which on the contrary always presuppose it: neither plurality, then, nor its opposite, unity, belongs to it. We never know it; rather it is precisely that which knows, wherever there is knowing.

The world as representation, then, in which respect alone we consider it here, has two essential, necessary and inseparable halves. One is the object: its form is space and time, and through these, plurality. The other half, however, the subject, does not lie in space and time: for it is whole and undivided in every representing being; hence a single one of these, just as completely as the millions that exist, completes the world as representation together with the object; but if that single one vanished, the world as representation would be no more. These halves are therefore inseparable, even for thought: for each of the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other, is there with it and vanishes with it. They bound each other immediately: where the object begins, the subject ends. That this boundary is common to both shows itself precisely in the fact that the essential and therefore universal forms of every object, which are time, space and causality, can be found and fully known starting from the subject, even without knowledge of the object itself; that is, in Kant's language, they lie a priori in our consciousness. To have discovered this is a chief merit of Kant's, and a very great one. I now assert, moreover, that the principle of sufficient reason is the common expression for all these forms of the object which we are conscious of a priori, and that therefore everything we know purely a priori is nothing but the content of that principle and what follows from it, so that in it our whole a priori certain knowledge is really expressed. In my treatise on the principle of sufficient reason I have shown at length how every [4] On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 2nd ed., § 22. possible object is subject to it, that is, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on one side as determined, on the other as determining: this goes so far that the whole existence of all objects, insofar as they are objects, representations and nothing else, runs entirely back to this their necessary relation to one another, consists only in it, and is therefore wholly relative: of which more shortly. I have shown further that, according to the classes into which objects divide by their possibility, that necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in general appears in other shapes; whereby the correct division of those classes in turn

proves itself. I presuppose here throughout everything said there as known and present to the reader: for if it had not been said there already, it would have its necessary place here.

3 The chief distinction among all our representations is that between the intuitive and the abstract. The latter constitutes only one class of representations, the concepts; and these are on earth the property of man alone, whose capacity for them, distinguishing him from all animals, has always been called reason [5]. We shall consider these abstract representations by themselves further on, but first we speak exclusively of intuitive representation. This now embraces the whole visible world, or the entire body of experience, together with the conditions of its possibility. It is, as I said, a very important discovery of Kant's that these very conditions, these forms of experience, that is, the most general in its perception, what is common in the same way to all its appearances, time and space, can also, by themselves and separated from their content, not only be thought in abstracto, but also be directly intuited, and that this intuition is not, say, [6] Kant alone has confused this concept of reason; in this regard I refer to the Appendix, as also to my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics": Basis of Morals, § 6, pp. 148–154, of the first edition. a phantasm borrowed from experience through repetition, but so independent of experience that, on the contrary, experience must be thought of as dependent on it, since the properties of space and time, as intuition knows them a priori, hold for all possible experience as laws according to which it must everywhere turn out. For this reason I have, in my treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, regarded time and space, insofar as they are intuited purely and empty of content, as a special class of representations, existing for itself. However important this property of those universal forms of intuition, discovered by Kant, namely that they are intuitable by themselves and independently of experience, and knowable in all their lawfulness, on which mathematics with its infallibility rests, it is nonetheless an equally noteworthy property of them that the principle of sufficient reason, which determines experience as the law of causality and motivation, and thinking as the law of the grounding of judgments, appears here in an entirely pecu-

liar shape, to which I have given the name ground of being, and which in time is the sequence of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, which determine one another reciprocally to infinity.

Whoever has become clear, from the introductory treatise, about the complete identity of the content of the principle of sufficient reason, for all the diversity of its shapes, will also be convinced how important, for insight into its innermost essence, is precisely the knowledge of the simplest of its shapes as such; and that simplest shape, we have found, is time. As in time every moment is only insofar as it has annihilated the preceding one, its father, in order itself to be annihilated just as quickly; as past and future (apart from the consequences of their content) are as null as any dream, while the present is only the extensionless and unenduring boundary between the two: so shall we recognize the same nullity in all the other shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, and see that as time, so also space, and as space, so also everything that is in space and time at once, everything therefore that proceeds from causes or motives, has only a relative existence, is only through and for something else of its own kind, that is, something again existing just as it does. The essence of this view is old: Heraclitus lamented in it the eternal flux of things; Plato disparaged its object as that which is forever becoming but never is; Spinoza called it mere accidents of the one substance, which alone is and abides; Kant set what is thus known, as mere appearance, against the thing in itself; finally the primeval wisdom of the Indians says: "It is Maya, the veil of deception, which envelops the eyes of mortals and makes them see a world of which one can say neither that it is nor that it is not: for it resembles a dream, resembles the glitter of the sun on sand, which the traveler from afar takes for water, or the rope cast down, which he takes for a snake." (These similes are repeated in countless passages of the Vedas and Puranas.) But what all of these meant, and of what they speak, is nothing other than what we too are now considering: the world as representation, subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

4 Whoever has recognized the shape of the principle of sufficient reason that appears in pure time as such, and on which all counting and calculating rests, has thereby also recognized the whole essence of time. It is nothing further than precisely that shape of the principle of sufficient reason, and has no other property. Succession is the shape of the principle of sufficient reason in time; succession is the whole essence of time.—Whoever, further, has recognized the principle of sufficient reason as it rules in mere, purely intuited space has thereby exhausted the whole essence of space; since this is through and through nothing other than the possibility of the reciprocal determinations of its parts by one another, which is called position. The detailed consideration of this, and the laying down of the results that follow from it in abstract concepts, for more convenient application, is the content of the whole of geometry.—Likewise, whoever has recognized that shape of the principle of sufficient reason which governs the content of those forms (of time and space), their perceptibility, that is, matter, and therefore the law of causality, has thereby recognized the whole essence of matter as such: for matter is through and through nothing but causality, as everyone sees immediately as soon as they reflect. Its being, namely, is its acting: no other being of it can even be thought. Only as acting does it fill space, fill time: its action upon the immediate object (which is itself matter) conditions the intuition in which alone it exists: the effect of any other material object upon another is known only insofar as the latter now acts upon the immediate object differently than before, and consists only in this. Cause and effect, then, is the whole essence of matter: its being is its acting. (More on this in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21, p. 77.) Most aptly, therefore, is the sum of everything material called in German Wirklichkeit [7], a word far more expressive than Realität. That on which matter acts is always matter again: its whole being and essence thus consists only in the lawful change which one part of it produces in another, and is consequently wholly relative, according to a relation valid only within its own limits, hence just like time, just like space.

Time and space, however, each by itself, can be intuitively represented even without matter; matter, however, not without them. Even the form, which is inseparable from it, presupposes space, and its acting, in which its whole existence consists, always concerns a change, hence a determination of time. But time and space are not merely presupposed by matter each for itself; rather a union of the two constitutes its essence, precisely because this, as has been shown, consists in acting, in causality. For all conceivable, countless appearances and states could lie beside one another in infinite space without crowding each other, or follow one another in infinite time without disturbing each other; hence a necessary relation of them to one another, and a rule [8] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis notis signat. Seneca epist. 81. which would determine them according to this relation, would by no means be necessary, indeed not even applicable. Consequently there would then be, for all the juxtaposition in space and all the alternation in time, so long as each of these two forms had its subsistence and course for itself and without connection with the other, no causality as yet at all, and since this constitutes the real essence of matter, no matter either.—Now, however, the law of causality receives its meaning and necessity only from the fact that the essence of change consists not in the mere alternation of states in themselves, but rather in this, that at the same place in space there is now one state and thereafter another, and at one and the same determinate time here this state and there that: only this reciprocal limitation of time and space by each other gives meaning, and at the same time necessity, to a rule according to which change must proceed. What is determined by the law of causality is therefore not the succession of states in mere time, but this succession with respect to a determinate space, and not the existence of states at a determinate place, but at this place at a determinate time. Change, that is, the alternation occurring according to the law of causality, therefore concerns each time a determinate part of space and a determinate part of time at once and in union. Accordingly, causality unites space with time. But we have found that the whole essence of matter consists in acting, hence in causality: consequently space and time must be united in matter too, that is, it must bear in itself at

once the properties of time and those of space, however much the two conflict, and what is impossible in each of those two for itself it must unite in itself, hence the unenduring flight of time with the rigid, unchangeable persistence of space; its infinite divisibility it has from both. Accordingly we find that it first of all brings about simultaneity, which could be neither in mere time, which knows no juxtaposition, nor in mere space, which knows no before, after or now. The simultaneity of many states, however, really constitutes the essence of actuality: for through it duration first becomes possible, in that duration is knowable only by the alternation of what is present at the same time as the enduring; but also only by means of the enduring in the alternation does the latter receive the character of change, that is, of alteration of quality and form with persistence of substance, that is, of matter[9]. In mere space the world would be rigid and motionless: no succession, no change, no acting; but with acting the representation of matter too is canceled. In mere time, again, everything would be fleeting: no persistence, no juxtaposition and therefore no simultaneity, consequently no duration; hence again no matter either. Only through the union of time and space does matter arise, that is, the possibility of simultaneity and thereby of duration, and through this again of the persistence of substance amid the change of states [10]. Having its essence in the union of time and space, matter bears throughout the stamp of both. It attests its origin from space partly through the form that is inseparable from it, but especially (because change belongs to time alone, while in time alone and by itself there is nothing abiding) through its persistence (substance), the a priori certainty of which is therefore to be derived wholly from that of space [11]; its origin from time, however, it reveals in quality (accident), without which it never appears, and which is always, absolutely, causality, acting on other matter, hence change (a concept of time). The lawfulness of this acting, however, always relates to space and time at once, and has meaning only thereby. What state must occur at this time in this place is the determination to which alone the legislation of causality extends. On this derivation of the fundamental determinations of matter from the forms of our knowledge which we are conscious of a priori, it

rests that we ascribe to matter certain properties a priori, namely filling of space, that is, impenetrability, that is, efficacy[12] That matter and substance are one is set out in the Appendix.

13 This also shows the ground of Kant's explanation of matter, "that it is the movable in space": for motion consists only in the union of space and time.

14 Not from the knowledge of time, as Kant would have it, which is set out in the Appendix. then extension, infinite divisibility, persistence, that is, indestructibility, and finally mobility; gravity, on the other hand, notwithstanding its exceptionlessness, is rather to be reckoned as knowledge a posteriori, although Kant in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," p. 71 (Rosenkranz ed., p. 372) puts it forward as knowable a priori.

But as the object is there at all only for the subject, as its representation, so every particular class of representations is there only for an equally particular determination in the subject, which is called a faculty of knowledge. The subjective correlate of time and space by themselves, as empty forms, Kant called pure sensibility, an expression which, because Kant broke the trail here, may be retained, although it does not fit well, since sensibility already presupposes matter. The subjective correlate of matter or of causality—for the two are one—is the understanding, and it is nothing besides. To know causality is its one function, its sole power, and it is a great one, embracing much, of manifold application, yet of unmistakable identity in all its expressions. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, therefore the whole of actuality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest, ever-present expression of the understanding is the intuition of the actual world: this is throughout knowledge of the cause from the effect; hence all intuition is intellectual. It could nevertheless never come about if some effect were not known immediately and did not thereby serve as the point of departure. This, however, is the effect on animal bodies. To that extent these are the immediate objects of the subject: the intuition of all other objects is mediated through them. The changes which every animal body undergoes are known immediately, that is, sensed, and as soon as this effect is referred to its cause, the intuition

of the latter as an object arises. This reference is no inference in abstract concepts, does not take place through reflection, nor arbitrarily, but immediately, necessarily and surely. It is the mode of knowledge of the pure understanding, without which intuition would never come about; there would remain only a dull, plantlike consciousness of the changes of the immediate object, which would follow one another with entire lack of meaning, unless they had, perhaps, as pain or pleasure, a meaning for the will. But as with the rising of the sun the visible world stands there, so the understanding, at a single stroke, through its one simple function, transforms the dull, meaningless sensation into intuition. What the eye, the ear, the hand senses is not intuition: it is mere data. Only as the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world stand there, as intuition spread out in space, changing in shape, persisting in matter through all time: for the understanding unites space and time in the representation of matter, that is, of efficacy. This world as representation is, as only through the understanding, so also only for the understanding. In the first chapter of my treatise "On Vision and Colors" I have already set out how, from the data which the senses supply, the understanding creates intuition; how by comparison of the impressions which the different senses receive from the same object the child learns intuition; how this alone gives the explanation of so many phenomena of the senses: of single vision with two eyes, of double vision in squinting, or with unequal distance of objects standing one behind another which one fixes with the eye at the same time, and of all illusion produced by a sudden alteration in the sense organs. Much more fully and thoroughly, however, have I treated this important subject in the second edition of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21. Everything said there would have its necessary place here, and so would properly have to be said here once more; but since I have almost as great a repugnance to copying myself as to copying others, and am also not in a position to present it better than was done there, I refer to it instead of repeating it here, but now also presuppose it as known.

The learning to see of children and of the born-blind after an operation, the single vision of what is doubly sensed with two eyes, the double vision and double touch when the sense organs are displaced from their usual position, the upright appearance of objects while their image stands inverted in the eye, the transference of color, which is merely an internal function, a polar division of the activity of the eye, to external objects, and finally the stereoscope too—all this is firm and irrefutable proof that all intuition is not merely sensory but intellectual, that is, pure knowledge by the understanding of the cause from the effect, and consequently presupposes the law of causality, on the knowledge of which all intuition, hence all experience, depends as regards its first and whole possibility; not, conversely, the knowledge of the causal law on experience, which latter was Hume's skepticism, and is first refuted thereby. For the independence of the knowledge of causality from all experience, that is, its apriority, can be shown only from the dependence of all experience on it: and this in turn can be done only by demonstrating, in the manner indicated here and carried out in the passages just cited, that the knowledge of causality is already contained in intuition in general, in whose domain all experience lies, and thus subsists wholly a priori with respect to experience, is presupposed by it as a condition, and does not presuppose it: but the same cannot be shown in the manner attempted by Kant and criticized by me in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23.

5 But let us guard against the great misunderstanding that, because intuition is mediated by the knowledge of causality, the relation of cause and effect therefore holds between object and subject; for that relation holds, on the contrary, always only between immediate and mediate object, hence always only between objects. On precisely this false presupposition rests the foolish dispute over the reality of the external world, in which dogmatism and skepticism confront each other, and the former appears now as realism, now as idealism. Realism posits the object as cause, and its effect in the subject. Fichte's idealism makes the object the effect of the subject. Since, however—and this cannot be impressed too strongly—there is no relation at all between subject and object according to

the principle of sufficient reason, neither of the two assertions could ever be proved, and skepticism made victorious attacks on both.—For as the law of causality already precedes intuition and experience as their condition, and therefore cannot have been learned from them (as Hume thought), so object and subject precede all knowledge as its first condition, and therefore also the principle of sufficient reason in general, since this is only the form of every object, the universal manner and way of its appearance; the object, however, always already presupposes the subject: between the two, then, there can be no relation of ground and consequent. My treatise on the principle of sufficient reason is meant to accomplish precisely this, that it presents the content of that principle as the essential form of every object, that is, as the universal manner and way of all being an object, as something that belongs to the object as such; as such, however, the object everywhere presupposes the subject as its necessary correlate: the subject therefore always remains outside the domain of validity of the principle of sufficient reason. The dispute over the reality of the external world rests precisely on that false extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to the subject as well, and starting from this misunderstanding it could never understand itself. On the one side, realistic dogmatism, regarding the representation as the effect of the object, wants to separate these two, representation and object, which are precisely one, and to assume a cause wholly different from the representation, an object in itself, independent of the subject: something altogether unthinkable; for as object it presupposes the subject again and again, and therefore always remains only its representation. Against it skepticism, on the same false presupposition, maintains that in the representation one always has only the effect, never the cause, hence never the being, and that one knows only the acting of objects; that this, however, might perhaps have no similarity at all to that, indeed might perhaps be assumed quite falsely in general, since the law of causality is supposed to have been first taken from experience, whose reality is in turn supposed to rest on it.—To both of them now belongs the instruction, first, that object and representation are the same; then, that the being of intuited objects is precisely their acting, that in this the actuality of the thing consists, and that the demand for an existence of the object out-

side the representation of the subject, and also for a being of the actual thing different from its acting, has no sense whatever and is a contradiction; that therefore the knowledge of the mode of action of an intuited object exhausts it too, insofar as it is object, that is, representation, since for knowledge nothing else remains in it. To that extent, then, the intuited world in space and time, which makes itself known as pure causality, is perfectly real, and is throughout what it gives itself out to be; and it gives itself out wholly and without reserve as representation, coherent according to the law of causality. This is its empirical reality. On the other hand, however, all causality exists only in the understanding and for the understanding; that whole actual, that is, acting world is therefore as such always conditioned by the understanding, and without it nothing. But not only on this account, but already because no object without a subject can be thought without contradiction, we must flatly deny to the dogmatist, who explains the reality of the external world as its independence of the subject, any such reality of it. The whole world of objects is and remains representation, and precisely therefore wholly and for all eternity conditioned by the subject: that is, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not on that account lie or illusion: it gives itself out as what it is, as representation, and indeed as a series of representations whose common bond is the principle of sufficient reason. As such it is intelligible to sound understanding, even in its innermost meaning, and speaks to it a perfectly clear language. Only to a mind twisted by sophistry can it occur to dispute its reality, which always happens through an incorrect application of the principle of sufficient reason, which connects all representations, of whatever kind they may be, with one another, but by no means these with the subject, or with something that would be neither subject nor object, but merely ground of the object: a non-concept, because only objects can be grounds, and indeed again only of objects.—If one inquires still more closely into the origin of this question about the reality of the external world, one finds that besides that false application of the principle of sufficient reason to what lies outside its domain, there is added a special confusion of its shapes: namely, the shape which it has solely with regard to concepts or abstract representations is transferred to intuitive representations, real objects, and a ground of know-

ing is demanded of objects that can have no other than a ground of becoming. Over abstract representations, the concepts joined into judgments, the principle of sufficient reason does indeed rule in such a way that each of them has its worth, its validity, its whole existence, here called truth, solely and alone through the relation of the judgment to something outside it, its ground of knowledge, to which recourse must therefore always be had. Over real objects, on the other hand, intuitive representations, the principle of sufficient reason rules not as the principle of the ground of knowing but of becoming, as the law of causality: each of them has already paid its debt to it by having become, that is, by having arisen as effect from a cause; the demand for a ground of knowledge therefore has no validity and no sense here, but belongs to an entirely different class of objects. Hence too the intuitive world, so long as one stays with it, arouses in the beholder neither scruple nor doubt: here there is neither error nor truth; these are banished to the realm of the abstract, of reflection. Here, however, the world lies open for sense and understanding, gives itself out with naive truth for what it is, for intuitive representation, which develops lawfully along the bond of causality.

As we have considered the question of the reality of the external world so far, it had always arisen from an aberration of reason that went as far as misunderstanding itself, and to that extent the question could be answered only by clarifying its content. After investigation of the whole essence of the principle of sufficient reason, of the relation between object and subject, and of the real nature of sensory intuition, it had to cancel itself, because no meaning at all remained to it. But that question has yet another origin, wholly different from the purely speculative one indicated so far, a properly empirical one, though even so it is still raised with a speculative intent, and in this sense it has a much more intelligible meaning than in the former, namely the following: we have dreams; is not the whole of life perhaps a dream?—or more precisely: is there a sure criterion between dream and actuality? between phantasms and real objects?—The allegation of lesser vividness and distinctness in dreamed intuition than in real intuition deserves no consideration at all, since no one has ever held the two side by side for comparison; one could only compare the

memory of the dream with present actuality.—Kant resolves the question thus: "The connection of representations among themselves according to the law of causality distinguishes life from dream."—But in the dream too everything particular likewise hangs together according to the principle of sufficient reason in all its shapes, and this connection breaks off only between life and dream and between the individual dreams. Kant's answer could therefore be put only thus: the long dream (life) has throughout coherence in itself according to the principle of sufficient reason, but not with the short dreams, though each of these has the same coherence in itself: between these and that one, then, the bridge is broken off, and by this the two are distinguished.—However, to institute an inquiry whether something was dreamed or happened according to this criterion would be very difficult and often impossible; for we are by no means in a position to trace link by link the causal connection between every event we have experienced and the present moment, yet do not on that account declare it dreamed. Hence in real life, to distinguish dream from actuality, people commonly do not make use of that kind of inquiry. The only sure criterion for distinguishing dream from actuality is in fact none other than the wholly empirical one of waking, through which the causal connection between the dreamed events and those of waking life is indeed expressly and palpably broken off. An excellent proof of this is given by the remark Hobbes makes in the Leviathan, ch. 2: namely that we easily take dreams afterwards for actuality too when we have slept in our clothes without intending it, but especially when it is added that some undertaking or design occupies all our thoughts and busies us in dreams just as when awake: in these cases waking is noticed almost as little as falling asleep, dream flows together with actuality and is mingled with it. Then, to be sure, nothing remains but the application of the Kantian criterion: but if afterwards, as is often the case, the causal connection with the present, or its absence, is absolutely not to be ascertained, then it must remain forever undecided whether an occurrence was dreamed or happened.—Here, indeed, the close kinship between life and dream comes very near to us: nor shall we be ashamed to admit it, after it has been recognized and pronounced by many great minds. The Vedas and Puranas know no better comparison for the whole

knowledge of the actual world, which they call the web of Maya, and use none more often than the dream. Plato says repeatedly that men live only in a dream, the philosopher alone strives to be awake. Pindar says (II. η, 135): σκιας οναρ ανθρωπος (umbrae somnium homo) and Sophocles:

'Ορω γαρ ἡμας ουδεν οντας αλλο, πλην Ειδωλ', οσοιπερ ζωμεν, η κουφην σκιαν.

Ajax 125.

(Nos enim, quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio, quam simulacra et levem umbram.)

Beside which stands, most worthily, Shakespeare:

We are such stuff As dreams are made of, and our little life Is rounded with a sleep.—

Temp. A. 4, Sc. 1.[15]

16 We are such stuff as that of which dreams are made, and our short life is enclosed by a sleep.

Finally, Calderon was so deeply gripped by this view that he sought to express it in a drama, metaphysical to a certain extent, "Life a Dream."

After these many passages from the poets, may it now be granted to me too to express myself through a simile. Life and dreams are leaves of one and the same book. Reading in connection is called actual life. But when the particular reading hour (the day) has come to an end and the time of recreation has arrived, we often go on idly turning the leaves, and open, without order or connection, now here, now there, a page: often it is one already read, often one still unknown, but always from the same book. Such a page read singly is, to be sure, out of connection with the consecutive reading: yet it does not thereby fall so very far behind it, if one considers that the whole of the consecutive reading also begins and ends just as impromptu, and accordingly is to be regarded only as a larger single page.

Although, then, the individual dreams are separated from actual life by the fact that they do not engage with the connection of experience, which runs continuously through the latter, and waking marks this difference, yet that very connection of experience already belongs to actual life as its form, and the dream,

on its side, likewise has a connection within itself to show. If one now takes the standpoint of judgment outside both, one finds in their essence no definite difference, and one is compelled to concede to the poets that life is a long dream.

If we now return from this wholly self-subsisting, empirical origin of the question about the reality of the external world to its speculative one, we have indeed found that this lies, first, in the false application of the principle of sufficient reason, namely also between subject and object, and then again in the confusion of its shapes, in that the principle of the ground of knowing was transferred to the domain where the principle of the ground of becoming holds: yet that question could hardly have occupied philosophers so persistently if it were wholly without any true content, and if in its innermost core there did not lie some correct thought and meaning as its most proper origin, of which one must therefore assume that only when it entered reflection and sought its expression did it pass into those perverse forms and questions that do not understand themselves. So it is, in my opinion, indeed; and as the pure expression of that innermost meaning of the question, which it did not know how to hit, I put this: What is this intuitive world still besides being my representation? Is this world, of which I am conscious only once, and indeed as representation, like my own body, of which I am conscious doubly, on the one side representation, on the other will?—The clearer explanation and the affirmative answer to this question will be the content of the second book, and the consequences following from it will occupy the remaining part of this work.

6 Meanwhile, for the present, in this first book, we consider everything only as representation, as object for the subject: and like all other real objects, we regard our own body too, from which the intuiting of the world proceeds in each of us, solely from the side of knowability: and it is accordingly to us only a representation. The consciousness of each of us, to be sure, which already rebelled against the declaring of the other objects to be mere representations, resists still more when one's own body is supposed to be only a representation; which comes from this, that the thing in itself, insofar as it appears as one's own body, is known to everyone immediately, whereas insofar as it objectifies

itself in the other objects of intuition it is known to them only mediately. But the course of our inquiry makes this abstraction, this one-sided way of considering, this violent separation of what essentially subsists together, necessary: hence that resistance must for the time being be suppressed and quieted by the expectation that the following considerations will supplement the one-sidedness of the present one, toward a complete knowledge of the essence of the world.

The body, then, is for us here the immediate object, that is, that representation which forms the starting point of the subject's knowledge, in that it itself, with its immediately known changes, precedes the application of the law of causality and so supplies the first data for it. The whole essence of matter consists, as has been shown, in its acting. But effect and cause exist only for the understanding, which is nothing more than their subjective correlate. The understanding, however, could never come to application if there were not something else from which it starts. Such a thing is mere sensory sensation, the immediate consciousness of the changes of the body, by virtue of which the body is the immediate object. The possibility of knowing the intuitive world we find accordingly in two conditions: the first is, if we express it objectively, the capacity of bodies to act upon one another, to produce changes in one another, without which universal property of all bodies no intuition would be possible even by means of the sensibility of animal bodies; if, however, we want to express this same first condition subjectively, we say: the understanding above all makes intuition possible; for only from it springs, and only for it holds, the law of causality, the possibility of effect and cause, and only for it and through it, therefore, is the intuitive world there. The second condition, however, is the sensibility of animal bodies, or the property of certain bodies of being immediate objects of the subject. The mere changes which the sense organs undergo through the external influence specifically appropriate to them may indeed already be called representations, insofar as such influences excite neither pain nor pleasure, that is, have no immediate significance for the will, and are nevertheless perceived, hence exist only for knowledge: and to that extent I say that the body is known immediately, is immediate object; yet here the concept of object is not even to

be taken in its most proper sense: for through this immediate knowledge of the body, which precedes the application of the understanding and is mere sensory sensation, the body itself does not properly stand there as object, but only the bodies acting upon it; because every knowledge of a proper object, that is, of a representation intuitable in space, exists only through and for the understanding, hence not before but only after its application. Therefore the body as a proper object, that is, as an intuitive representation in space, is known, just like all other objects, only mediately, by application of the law of causality to the action of one of its parts on another, as when the eye sees the body, the hand touches it. Consequently the shape of our own body is not made known to us by the mere general bodily feeling; rather only through knowledge, only in representation, that is, only in the brain, does our own body too first present itself as something extended, articulated, organic: one born blind receives this representation only gradually, through the data that touch gives him; a blind man without hands would never come to know his shape, or at most would gradually infer and construct it from the action of other bodies upon him. It is with this restriction, then, that we are to understand it when we call the body the immediate object.

Moreover, according to what has been said, all animal bodies are immediate objects, that is, starting points of the intuition of the world, for the subject that knows everything and for that very reason is never known. Knowing, together with the movement upon motives that it conditions, is therefore the real character of animality, as movement upon stimuli is the character of the plant: the unorganized, however, has no other movement than that brought about by causes in the narrowest sense; all of which I have discussed more fully in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, 2nd ed., § 20, in the Ethics, first essay, III, and in "On Vision and Colors," § 1; to which I therefore refer.

From what has been said it follows that all animals have understanding, even the most imperfect: for all of them know objects, and this knowledge determines their movements as motive.—The understanding is the same in all animals and all human beings, has everywhere the same simple form: knowledge of causality, transition from effect to cause and from cause to effect, and nothing

besides. But the degrees of its acuteness and the extent of its sphere of knowledge are most various, manifold and variously graded, from the lowest degree, which knows only the causal relation between the immediate object and the mediate ones, and so suffices just to intuit, by the transition from the action which the body suffers to its cause, this cause as an object in space, up to the higher degrees of knowledge of the causal connection of the merely mediate objects among one another, which goes as far as the understanding of the most composite chains of causes and effects in nature. For this last too still belongs to the understanding, not to reason, whose abstract concepts can only serve to take up, fix and link what has been immediately understood, never to produce the understanding itself. Every force of nature and law of nature, every case in which they manifest themselves, must first be known immediately by the understanding, grasped intuitively, before it can enter, in abstracto, for reason, into reflective consciousness. Intuitive, immediate grasp by the understanding was R. Hooke's discovery of the law of gravitation and the reduction of so many and great phenomena to this one law, as Newton's calculations then confirmed it; the same was also Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and its important role in nature; and the same was Goethe's discovery of the mode of origin of physical colors. These discoveries are all nothing other than a correct immediate going back from the effect to the cause, which is soon followed by the knowledge of the identity of the force of nature manifesting itself in all causes of the same kind: and this entire insight is an expression, differing only in degree, of the same and sole function of the understanding through which an animal too intuits the cause that acts on its body as an object in space. Hence those great discoveries too are all, just like intuition and every expression of the understanding, an immediate insight and as such the work of a moment, an apperçu, a sudden idea, not the product of long chains of inference in abstracto; the latter, on the contrary, serve to fix the immediate knowledge of the understanding for reason, by laying it down in its abstract concepts, that is, to make it distinct, that is, to put oneself in a position to interpret it to others, to make it signify.—That acuteness of the understanding in grasping the causal relations of the objects known mediately finds its application not only in natural science (all of

whose discoveries are to be ascribed to it) but also in practical life, where it is called prudence; whereas in the former application it is better called acumen, penetration and sagacity: strictly speaking, prudence designates exclusively the understanding that stands in the service of the will. Yet the limits of these concepts can never be drawn sharply, since it is always one and the same function of the same understanding, already active in every animal in the intuition of objects in space, which, in its greatest acuteness, now correctly investigates in the phenomena of nature the unknown cause from the given effect, and so gives reason the material for thinking general rules as laws of nature; now, by applying known causes to intended effects, invents complicated, ingenious machines; now, applied to motivation, either sees through and frustrates fine intrigues and machinations, or itself places the motives, and the human beings who are susceptible to each of them, properly, and sets them in motion at will, like machines by levers and wheels, and guides them to its ends.—Lack of understanding is called, in the proper sense, stupidity, and is precisely dullness in the application of the law of causality, incapacity for the immediate grasping of the chains of cause and effect, motive and action. A stupid person does not see the connection of natural phenomena, either where they come forth left to themselves, or where they are purposely directed, that is, made serviceable in machines: on this account such a person readily believes in magic and miracles. A stupid person does not notice that different persons, apparently independent of one another, are in fact acting in concerted connection: such a person is therefore easily mystified and intrigued against, and does not notice the concealed motives of advice given, of judgments pronounced, and so on. But always there is lacking only the one thing: acuteness, quickness, ease in the application of the law of causality, that is, power of the understanding.—The greatest example of stupidity, and an instructive one in the respect under consideration, that has ever come my way was a wholly imbecile boy of about eleven years, in an asylum, who indeed had reason, since he spoke and understood speech, but was inferior in understanding to many an animal: for whenever I came he would look at an eyeglass that I wore on my neck and in which, by reflection, the windows of the room and the tree tops behind them

appeared: at this he had each time great wonder and joy, and never tired of gazing at it with astonishment; because he did not understand this wholly immediate causality of the reflection.

As among human beings the degrees of acuteness of the understanding are very different, so they are, probably still more, between the different animal species. In all of them, even those nearest to the plant, there is nevertheless as much understanding as suffices for the transition from the effect in the immediate object to the mediated one as cause, hence for intuition, for the apprehension of an object: for this is just what makes them animals, since it gives them the possibility of a movement according to motives, and thereby of seeking out, or at least seizing, food; whereas plants have only movement upon stimuli, whose immediate action they must await, or languish, unable to go after them or seize them. In the most perfect animals we admire their great sagacity: thus in the dog, elephant, ape, in the fox, whose prudence Buffon has described so masterfully. In these most intelligent animals we can measure fairly exactly how much the understanding can do without the aid of reason, that is, of abstract knowledge in concepts: in ourselves we cannot recognize this so well, because understanding and reason there always support each other reciprocally. We therefore find the expressions of understanding in animals now above, now below our expectation. On the one side the sagacity of that elephant surprises us who, after having already crossed many bridges on his journey in Europe, once refused to step onto one over which he nevertheless saw, as before, the rest of the train of men and horses pass, because it seemed to him built too lightly for his weight; on the other side we wonder again that the clever orang-utans do not keep up the fire they find, at which they warm themselves, by adding wood: a proof that this already requires a reflection which does not come about without abstract concepts. That the knowledge of cause and effect, as the universal form of the understanding, dwells even a priori in animals is already perfectly certain from the fact that it is for them, as for us, the preceding condition of all intuitive knowledge of the external world: if, however, one wants a special proof of it besides, one need only observe, for example, how even a quite young dog does not dare to jump from the table, however much it wishes, because it

foresees the effect of the weight of its body, without otherwise knowing this particular case from experience. In judging the understanding of animals, however, we must beware of ascribing to it what is an expression of instinct, a property wholly different from it, as from reason, but which often works very analogously to the united activity of those two. The discussion of it, however, does not belong here, but will find its place in the second book, in the consideration of the harmony or so-called teleology of nature; and the 27th chapter of the Supplements is devoted to it expressly.

Lack of understanding was called stupidity; lack of the application of reason to the practical we shall later recognize as folly; likewise lack of power of judgment as simplicity; finally partial or even entire lack of memory as madness. But each in its place.—What is correctly known through reason is truth, namely an abstract judgment with sufficient ground (treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff.); what is correctly known through the understanding is reality, namely correct transition from the effect in the immediate object to its cause. To truth stands opposed error as deception of reason, to reality illusion as deception of the understanding. The fuller discussion of all this is to be read in the first chapter of my treatise on vision and colors.—Illusion occurs when one and the same effect can be brought about by two wholly different causes, of which one acts very frequently, the other seldom: the understanding, which has no datum for distinguishing which cause is acting here, since the effect is entirely the same, then always presupposes the usual cause, and because its activity is not reflective and discursive but direct and immediate, this false cause stands before us as intuited object, which is precisely the false illusion. How double vision and double touch arise in this way when the sense organs are brought into an unusual position I have shown in the place cited, and thereby given an irrefutable proof that intuition exists only through the understanding and for the understanding. Examples of such deception of the understanding, or illusion, are further the stick immersed in water, which appears broken; the images of spherical mirrors, which with a convex surface appear somewhat behind it, with a concave far in front of it; to this belongs also the apparently greater extension of the moon at the horizon than at the zenith, which is not

optical; for, as the micrometer proves, the eye takes in the moon at the zenith even at a somewhat larger visual angle than at the horizon; but it is the understanding that assumes, as cause of the weaker brightness of the moon and of all stars at the horizon, a greater distance of them, estimating them like terrestrial objects by aerial perspective, and therefore takes the moon at the horizon to be very much larger than at the zenith, and the vault of heaven too to be more extended at the horizon, hence flattened. The same wrongly applied estimation by aerial perspective makes us take very high mountains, whose summit, alone visible to us, lies in clear transparent air, for nearer than they are, to the detriment of their height, for example Mont Blanc seen from Salenche.—And all such deceptive illusions stand before us in immediate intuition, which can be removed by no reasoning of reason: such reasoning can only prevent error, that is, a judgment without sufficient ground, by an opposite true one, as for example by knowing in abstracto that not the greater distance but the murkier vapors at the horizon are the cause of the weaker brightness of moon and stars: but the illusion remains immovably in all the cases cited, in defiance of any abstract knowledge: for the understanding is wholly and sharply separated from reason, as a faculty of knowledge added in man alone, and in itself, even in man, is indeed unreasoning. Reason can only ever know: to the understanding alone, free from its influence, intuiting remains.

7 With regard to our whole consideration up to now, the following is still well worth noting. We have started in it neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the representation, which already contains and presupposes both of them; since the division into object and subject is its first, most general and most essential form. This form as such we have therefore considered first, then (though here referring for the main part to the introductory treatise) the other forms subordinate to it, time, space and causality, which belong only to the object; yet because they are essential to this as such, while the object is in turn essential to the subject as such, they can also be found starting from the subject, that is, known a priori, and to that extent are to be regarded as the common

boundary of both. All of them, however, can be traced back to one common expression, the principle of sufficient reason, as is shown at length in the introductory treatise.

This procedure now distinguishes our way of looking at things wholly from all philosophies ever attempted, which all proceeded either from the object or from the subject, and accordingly sought to explain the one from the other, and indeed according to the principle of sufficient reason, whose dominion we, on the contrary, withdraw from the relation between object and subject, leaving it only the object.—One might regard as not comprised under the stated opposition the philosophy of identity, which arose in our days and became generally known, insofar as it makes neither object nor subject the real first starting point, but a third, the Absolute, knowable by intuition of reason, which is neither object nor subject but the sameness of both. Although, for total lack of all intuition of reason, I shall not venture to join the discussion of the said venerable sameness and the Absolute, I must nevertheless, resting solely on the records of the intuiters of reason, which lie open to all, even to us profane, remark that the said philosophy is not to be excepted from the opposition of two errors set up above; for in spite of the identity of subject and object, which is not thinkable but only intellectually intuitable, or to be experienced by one's own immersion in it, it yet does not avoid those two opposite errors, but rather unites both in itself, in that it itself falls apart into two disciplines, namely transcendental idealism, which is the Fichtean doctrine of the I and consequently lets the object, according to the principle of sufficient reason, be produced by the subject or spun out of it, and secondly the philosophy of nature, which likewise lets the subject gradually come to be out of the object, by the application of a method called construction, of which very little is clear to me, but still this much, that it is a progression according to the principle of sufficient reason in many shapes. The deep wisdom itself which that construction contains I renounce; for to me, to whom intuition of reason is wholly lacking, all those lectures presupposing it must be a book with seven seals; which is indeed so

much the case that—it is strange to tell—in those teachings of deep wisdom it always seems to me as if I heard nothing but dreadful and, on top of that, most tedious bluster.

The systems proceeding from the object always had the whole intuitive world and its order as their problem; yet the object they take as their starting point is not always this world, or its basic element matter: rather, a division of those systems can be made in accordance with the four classes of possible objects set up in the introductory treatise. Thus one can say that from the first of those classes, the real world, there proceeded: Thales and the Ionians, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno and the French materialists. From the second, the abstract concept: Spinoza (namely from the merely abstract concept substance, existing solely in its definition) and earlier the Eleatics. From the third class, namely time, hence numbers: the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophy in the Y-king. Finally, from the fourth class, namely the act of will motivated by knowledge: the Scholastics, who teach a creation out of nothing through the act of will of an extramundane, personal being.

The objective procedure can be carried through most consistently and furthest when it appears as actual materialism. This posits matter, and time and space with it, as absolutely subsisting, and leaps over the relation to the subject, in which all this alone exists. It further seizes the law of causality as a guiding thread along which it means to advance, taking it as an order of things subsisting in itself, veritas aeterna; hence leaping over the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. Now it seeks to find the first, simplest state of matter, and then to develop all others from it, ascending from mere mechanism to chemism, to polarity, vegetation, animality; and supposing this succeeded, the last link of the chain would be animal sensibility, knowing, which would consequently now appear as a mere modification of matter, a state of it brought about by causality. If we had followed materialism thus far with intuitive representations, then, having arrived with it at its summit, we should feel a sudden fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians, as, waking as from a dream, we should all at once become aware that its last result, so laboriously brought about, knowing, had already been presupposed at the very first start-

ing point, mere matter, as an indispensable condition, and that with it we had indeed imagined ourselves to be thinking matter, but in fact had thought nothing other than the subject representing matter, the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the enormous petitio principii would be unexpectedly unveiled: for suddenly the last link would show itself as the point of support on which the first already hung, the chain as a circle; and the materialist would be like Baron Münchhausen, who, swimming in water on horseback, draws the horse up with his legs and himself by his pigtail flung forward over his head. Thus the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in this, that it starts from the objective, takes something objective as the ultimate ground of explanation, be this matter, in abstracto, as it is merely thought, or that which has already entered into form, empirically given, hence a particular stuff, say the chemical elements with their nearest compounds. Such things it takes as existing in themselves and absolutely, in order to let organic nature and finally the knowing subject proceed from them and thereby to explain these completely;—while in truth everything objective, already as such, is conditioned in manifold ways by the knowing subject with the forms of its knowing and has them as presupposition, and therefore vanishes entirely if one thinks the subject away. Materialism is therefore the attempt to explain what is immediately given to us from what is mediately given. Everything objective, extended, acting, hence everything material, which materialism holds to be so solid a foundation of its explanations that a reduction to it (above all if it ended finally in push and counter-push) could leave nothing to be desired—all this, I say, is a thing given only most mediately and conditionally, hence only relatively present: for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain and so has entered into its forms, time, space and causality, by virtue of which it first presents itself as extended in space and acting in time. From something given in such a manner, materialism now wants to explain even what is immediately given, the representation (in which all that stands), and in the end even the will, from which rather all those fundamental forces, which manifest themselves along the guiding thread of causes and therefore lawfully, are in truth to be explained.—The assertion that knowing is a modification of matter is thus

always confronted, with equal right, by the converse, that all matter is only a modification of the knowing of the subject, as its representation. Nevertheless the goal and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a fully carried-out materialism. That we recognize this here as manifestly impossible confirms another truth that will result from our further consideration, namely that all science in the proper sense, by which I understand systematic knowledge along the guiding thread of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach a final goal, nor give a wholly sufficient explanation; because it never touches the innermost essence of the world, can never get beyond the representation, but at bottom teaches us to know nothing more than the relation of one representation to another.

Every science always proceeds from two chief data. One of them is invariably the principle of sufficient reason, in some shape, as organon; the other its particular object, as problem. Thus geometry, for example, has space as problem and the ground of being in it as organon; arithmetic has time as problem and the ground of being in it as organon; logic has the connections of concepts as such for problem, the ground of knowing for organon; history has the deeds of human beings that have occurred, in the large and in the mass, for problem, the law of motivation as organon; natural science now has matter as problem and the law of causality as organon: its goal and purpose is therefore, along the guiding thread of causality, to trace all possible states of matter back to one another and finally to one, and again to derive them from one another and finally from one. Two states therefore confront each other in it as extremes: the state of matter in which it is least, and that in which it is most, immediate object of the subject: that is, the deadest, crudest matter, the first elementary stuff, and then the human organism. Natural science seeks the first as chemistry, the second as physiology. But up to now both extremes are unattained, and only between the two has something been gained. The prospect, too, is rather hopeless. The chemists, on the supposition that the qualitative division of matter will not go on to infinity like the quantitative, seek to reduce ever further the number of their elements, now still about 60; and if they had got down to two, they would want to trace these back to one. For the law of homogeneity

leads to the supposition of a first chemical state of matter, which preceded all others, which are not essential to matter as such but only accidental forms, qualities, and which alone belongs to matter as such. On the other hand, it is not to be seen how this state, since no second was yet there to act upon it, could ever undergo a chemical change; whereby the same embarrassment arises here in the chemical sphere that Epicurus ran into in the mechanical, when he had to state how the one atom first got out of the original direction of its motion: indeed, this contradiction, developing quite of itself and neither to be avoided nor resolved, could quite properly be set up as a chemical antinomy: as it is found here in the first of the two sought extremes of natural science, so a corresponding counterpart to it will show itself to us in the second.—For the attainment of this other extreme of natural science there is just as little hope; since one sees more and more that a chemical can never be traced back to a mechanical, nor an organic to a chemical or electrical. Those, however, who today take this old wrong road anew will soon, like all their predecessors, creep back down it silent and ashamed. More will be said of this at length in the following book. The difficulties mentioned here only in passing confront natural science in its own domain. Taken as philosophy, it would moreover be materialism: this, however, as we have seen, carries death in its heart already at its birth; because it leaps over the subject and the forms of knowing, which are already presupposed in the crudest matter, from which it would begin, just as much as in the organism, which it wants to reach. For "no object without subject" is the proposition that makes all materialism forever impossible. Suns and planets without an eye that sees them and an understanding that knows them can indeed be said in words: but these words are for the representation a sideroxylon. Yet on the other hand the law of causality and the consideration and investigation of nature that follows it lead us necessarily to the certain assumption that, in time, every more highly organized state of matter has followed upon a cruder one: that animals, namely, were there before men, fishes before land animals, plants too before these, the inorganic before everything organic; that consequently the original mass had to pass through a long series of changes before the first eye could open. And yet the existence of that whole world always

remains dependent on this first eye that opened, even were it an insect's, as on the necessary mediator of knowledge, for which and in which alone it is and without which it cannot even be thought: for it is purely representation, and as such needs the knowing subject as the bearer of its existence: indeed that long series of time itself, filled with countless changes, through which matter raised itself from form to form until at last the first knowing animal came to be, this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness, whose succession of representations, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which it loses all meaning and is nothing at all. So we see on the one hand the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent on the first knowing being, however imperfect this may always be; on the other hand, just as necessarily, this first knowing animal wholly dependent on a long chain of causes and effects that preceded it, into which it itself enters as a small link. These two contradictory views, to each of which we are in fact led with equal necessity, one could indeed again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge, and set up as the counterpart of that found in the first extreme of natural science; while Kant's fourfold antinomy will be shown, in the critique of his philosophy appended to the present work, to be a groundless sham fight.—The contradiction necessarily arising for us here at last finds its resolution, however, in this, that, to speak in Kant's language, time, space and causality do not belong to the thing in itself but only to its appearance, whose forms they are; which in my language runs thus: the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world but only one, as it were its outer side; and the world has still a wholly other side, which is its innermost essence, its kernel, the thing in itself: and this we shall consider in the following book, naming it after the most immediate of its objectifications, will. The world as representation, however, which alone we consider here, indeed begins only with the opening of the first eye, without which medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore was not before. But without that eye, that is, apart from knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Nevertheless time does not for that reason have a beginning, but all beginning is in it; but since it is the most universal form of knowability, into which all appearances fit by means of the bond of causality, with the first

knowing, time too stands there, with its whole infinity in both directions, and the appearance which fills this first present must at once be known as causally linked with and dependent on a series of appearances stretching infinitely into the past, which past itself, however, is just as much conditioned by this first present as, conversely, this by that; so that, like the first present, so also the past from which it springs is dependent on the knowing subject and without it nothing, yet brings about the necessity that this first present should present itself not as the first, that is, as having no past for its mother and as the beginning of time, but as the consequence of the past, according to the ground of being in time, and likewise the appearance filling it as the effect of earlier states filling that past, according to the law of causality.—Whoever loves mythological interpretations may regard as the symbol of the moment here expressed, of the entry of time, yet without beginning, the birth of Kronos (χρονος), the youngest of the Titans, with whom, as he emasculates his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease, and now the race of gods and men takes the stage.

This exposition, to which we have come by following the most consistent of the philosophical systems proceeding from the object, materialism, serves at the same time to make intuitively clear the inseparable mutual dependence, with irremovable opposition, between subject and object; which knowledge leads us to seek the innermost essence of the world, the thing in itself, no longer in either of those two elements of representation, but rather in something wholly different from the representation, which is not burdened with such an original, essential and at the same time irresolvable opposition.

Opposed to the starting from the object that we have discussed, in order to let the subject arise out of it, stands the starting from the subject, which seeks to force the object forth out of that. However frequent and general the former has been in all philosophy hitherto, of the latter there is, on the other hand, really found only a single example, and that a very recent one, the sham philosophy of J. G. Fichte, who therefore must be noticed in this respect, little as his doctrine had of genuine worth and inner substance in itself, indeed though it was altogether nothing but a sham fight, which nevertheless, delivered with an air of the

deepest seriousness, a measured tone and lively zeal, and defended with eloquent polemic against weak opponents, was able to shine and seemed to be something. But genuine seriousness, which, inaccessible to all outward influences, keeps its goal, the truth, steadily in view, was wholly lacking in him, as in all similar philosophers who adapt themselves to circumstances. It could not, of course, have been otherwise. For one becomes a philosopher always through a perplexity from which one seeks to extricate oneself, and which is the θαυμαζειν of Plato, which he calls a μαλα φιλοσοφικον παθος. But what separates the spurious philosophers from the genuine here is this, that in the latter that perplexity grows out of the sight of the world itself, in the former, on the other hand, only out of a book, a system lying before them: and this was Fichte's case too, since he became a philosopher solely through Kant's thing in itself, and without it would most probably have pursued quite other things with much better success, as he possessed considerable rhetorical talent. Had he, however, penetrated at all deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a philosopher, the Critique of Pure Reason, he would have understood that its chief doctrine, in spirit, is this: that the principle of sufficient reason is not, as all scholastic philosophy would have it, a veritas aeterna, i.e. does not have an unconditioned validity before, outside of and above all the world; but only a relative and conditioned one, valid solely in the appearance, whether it present itself as the necessary nexus of space or of time, or as the law of causality, or as the law of the ground of knowledge; that therefore the inner essence of the world, the thing in itself, can never be found along its guiding thread; but everything to which this leads is itself again dependent and relative, always only appearance, not thing in itself; that it, furthermore, does not touch the subject at all, but is only the form of objects, which for that very reason are not things in themselves, and that with the object the subject is at once there, and with the subject the object; so that neither can the object be added to the subject, nor the subject to the object, afterwards as a consequence to its ground. But of all this not the least thing stuck to Fichte: to him the only interesting thing in the matter was the starting from the subject, which Kant had chosen in order to show as false the previous starting from the object, which thereby had become the thing in itself.

Fichte, however, took this starting from the subject for what mattered, supposed, after the manner of all imitators, that if he outbid Kant in it he would also surpass him, and now repeated in this direction the errors which the dogmatism hitherto had committed in the opposite one, and by that very fact had occasioned Kant's critique; so that in the main nothing was changed and the old fundamental error, the assumption of a relation of ground and consequent between object and subject, remained as before, the principle of sufficient reason therefore retained, just as formerly, an unconditioned validity, and the thing in itself, instead of being placed, as before, in the object, was now transferred into the subject of knowing, while the complete relativity of these two, which indicates that the thing in itself, or inner essence of the world, is to be sought not in them but outside of this, as outside of everything else that exists only relatively, remained, as before, unrecognized. As if Kant had not been there at all, the principle of sufficient reason is in Fichte still just what it was in all the Scholastics, an aeterna veritas. For just as above the gods of the ancients the eternal fate still ruled, so above the God of the Scholastics there still ruled those aeternae veritates, i.e. the metaphysical, mathematical and metalogical truths, with some also the validity of the moral law. These veritates alone depended on nothing: but it was through their necessity that God and world alike were. According to the principle of sufficient reason, as such a veritas aeterna, the I is therefore in Fichte the ground of the world or of the not-I, the object, which is precisely its consequence, its contrivance. He has therefore taken good care not to examine or check the principle of sufficient reason any further. Should I, however, name the shape of that principle along whose guiding thread Fichte lets the not-I proceed out of the I, as the web out of the spider, I find that it is the principle of the ground of being in space: for only in reference to this do those agonizing deductions of the manner in which the I produces and fabricates the not-I out of itself, which make up the content of the most senseless, and merely on that account the most tedious, book ever written, receive any kind of sense and meaning.—This Fichtean philosophy, otherwise not even worth mentioning, is therefore interesting to us only as the late-appearing real counterpart of the primeval materialism, which was the most

consistent starting from the object, as that philosophy was the most consistent starting from the subject. Just as materialism overlooked that with the simplest object it had at once posited the subject as well, so Fichte overlooked that with the subject (he might style it as he pleased) he had not only already posited the object as well, since no subject is thinkable without one; but he overlooked also this, that all derivation a priori, indeed all proof whatever, rests on a necessity, but all necessity solely on the principle of sufficient reason; because to be necessary and to follow from a given ground—these are reciprocal concepts[17], that the principle of sufficient reason, however, is nothing other than the universal form of the object as such, and thus presupposes the object already, and cannot, valid before and outside of it, first bring it about and let it arise in conformity with its legislation. Altogether, then, the starting from the subject has in common with the starting from the object presented above the same fault, that of assuming in advance what it only pretends to derive, namely the necessary correlate of its starting point.

From these two opposite mistakes our procedure now differs toto genere, in that we start neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the representation, as the first fact of consciousness, whose first and most essential basic form is the falling apart into object and subject, the form of the object being in turn the principle of sufficient reason, in its various shapes, each of which so thoroughly governs the class of representations proper to it that, as has been shown, with the knowledge of that shape the essence of the whole class is known too, since this class (as representation) is nothing other than that shape itself: so time itself is nothing other than the ground of being in it, i.e. succession; space nothing other than the principle of sufficient reason in it, that is, position; matter nothing other than causality; the concept (as will be shown directly) nothing other than relation to the ground of knowledge. This complete and thoroughgoing relativity of the world as representation, both according to its most general form (subject and object) and according to the form subordinate to it (the principle of sufficient reason), points us, as said, to seek the

innermost essence of the world in a wholly other side of it, utterly different from the representation, which the next book will demonstrate in a fact just as immediately certain to every living being.

18 On this see "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," 2nd ed., § 49.

Before this, however, we must still consider that class of representations which belongs to man alone, whose material is the concept and whose subjective correlate is reason, as that of the representations considered so far was understanding and sensibility, which are to be ascribed to every animal as well[19].

8 As from the immediate light of the sun into the borrowed reflection of the moon, we pass from the intuitive, immediate representation, which speaks for itself and vouches for itself, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which have all their content only from that intuitive knowledge and in relation to it. So long as we behave in a purely intuitive way, everything is clear, firm and certain. There is neither questioning, nor doubting, nor erring: one wants to go no further, cannot go further, finds rest in intuiting, satisfaction in the present. Intuition is sufficient to itself; hence what has sprung purely from it and remained true to it, like the genuine work of art, can never be false, nor be refuted by any time: for it gives no opinion, but the thing itself. But with abstract knowledge, with reason, doubt and error have entered in theory, care and regret in practice. If in intuitive representation illusion for moments distorts reality, in the abstract error can reign for millennia, cast its iron yoke on whole peoples, stifle the noblest stirrings of mankind, and have even him whom it is unable to deceive laid in fetters by its slaves, its deceived. It is the enemy against which the wisest minds of all times carried on the unequal fight, and only what they won from it has become the property of mankind. It is therefore good to draw attention to it at once, as we set foot on the ground on which its domain lies. Although it has often been said that one should track down truth even where no utility from it is to be foreseen, because this may be indirect and come forth where one does not expect it, I find here that I must still add that one should be just as much concerned to uncover and root out every

error, even where no harm from it is to be foreseen, because this too may be very indirect and some day come forth where one does not expect it: for every error bears a poison within it. If it is the mind, if it is knowledge, that makes man the lord of the earth, then there are no harmless errors, still less venerable, sacred errors. And for the consolation of those who devote strength and life to the noble and so difficult fight against error, in any field and concern, I cannot refrain from adding here that, so long as truth is not yet there, error can indeed play its game, like owls and bats in the night: but sooner might one expect owls and bats to chase the sun back into the east than that truth once recognized and distinctly and completely uttered should be driven out again, so that the old error might once more take its broad place undisturbed. This is the power of truth, whose victory is hard and toilsome, but, in return, once won, can no more be wrested from it.

20 To these first seven paragraphs belong the first four chapters of the first book of the Supplements.

For besides the representations considered up to this point, which by their composition could be traced back to time and space and matter if we look to the object, or to pure sensibility and understanding (that is, knowledge of causality) if we look to the subject, there has appeared in man alone, among all the inhabitants of the earth, yet another power of knowledge: a wholly new consciousness has dawned, which has been very aptly called, with a presaging rightness, reflection. For it is in fact a reflection, something derived from that intuitive knowledge, yet it has taken on a nature and constitution fundamentally different from that, does not know the forms of that knowledge, and the principle of sufficient reason as well, which rules over every object, has here a wholly different shape. This new consciousness, raised to a higher power, this abstract mirroring of everything intuitive in the non-intuitive concept of reason, is alone what gives man that deliberateness which so thoroughly distinguishes his consciousness from that of the animal, and through which his whole way of life on earth turns out so different from that of his unreasoning brothers. He surpasses them equally in power and in suffering. They live in the

present alone; he lives at the same time in the future and the past as well. They satisfy the need of the moment; he provides for his future by the most elaborate arrangements, indeed for times he cannot live to see. They are wholly given over to the impression of the moment, to the effect of the intuitive motive; abstract concepts determine him independently of the present. Hence he carries out considered plans, or acts on maxims, regardless of his surroundings and the chance impressions of the moment. He can therefore, for example, calmly make the elaborate arrangements for his own death, can dissemble to the point of inscrutability and take his secret with him to the grave, and finally has a real choice among several motives: for only in abstracto can these, present side by side in consciousness, carry with them the knowledge that one excludes the other, and so measure their power over the will against each other; whereupon the preponderant one, by deciding the issue, is the considered decision of the will and, as a sure indication, makes known its constitution. The animal, on the other hand, is determined by the present impression: only fear of present constraint can tame its desire, until that fear has at last become habit and now as such determines it: that is training. The animal feels and perceives intuitively; man in addition thinks and knows: both will. The animal communicates its feeling and mood by gesture and sound; man communicates thoughts to another by language, or conceals thoughts by language. Language is the first product and the necessary instrument of his reason; hence in Greek and in Italian language and reason are designated by the same word: ὁ λογος, il discorso. Reason (Vernunft) comes from *vernehmen*, which is not synonymous with hearing (Hören), but means the becoming aware of thoughts communicated through words. By the aid of language alone reason accomplishes its most important achievements, namely the concerted action of several individuals, the planned cooperation of many thousands, civilization, the state; further, science, the preserving of earlier experience, the summing up of what is common in a single concept, the communication of truth, the spreading of error, thinking and writing poetry, dogmas and superstitions. The animal comes to know death only in dying; man draws nearer to his death consciously with every hour, and this at times makes life questionable even to him who has not already

recognized in life as a whole this character of constant annihilation. It is chiefly on this account that man has philosophies and religions; whether, however, that which we rightly prize above everything in his conduct, voluntary right-doing and nobility of disposition, has ever been the fruit of either of the two, is uncertain. As sure products belonging to them alone, and as productions of reason along this path, there stand, on the other hand, the oddest, most fantastic opinions of the philosophers of different schools, and the strangest, at times also cruel, customs of the priests of different religions.

That all these so manifold and far-reaching manifestations spring from a common principle, from that special power of the mind which man has over the animal, and which has been called reason, ὁ λογος, το λογιστικον, το λογιμον, ratio, is the unanimous opinion of all times and peoples. All men, too, know very well how to recognize the manifestations of this faculty, and to say what is rational and what irrational, where reason appears in opposition to other faculties and qualities of man, and finally what, for want of it, is never to be expected even from the cleverest animal. The philosophers of all times also speak, on the whole, in agreement with this general acquaintance with reason, and moreover single out some especially important manifestations of it, such as the mastery of the affects and passions, the ability to draw inferences and to set up general principles, even such as are certain before all experience, and so on. Nevertheless, all their explanations of the real essence of reason are wavering, not sharply determined, diffuse, without unity and center, stressing now this manifestation, now that, and therefore often diverging from one another. To this it must be added that many of them start from the opposition between reason and revelation, which is wholly foreign to philosophy and serves only to increase the confusion. It is most striking that up to now no philosopher has strictly traced all these manifold manifestations of reason back to a single simple function, one that could be recognized in all of them, from which all of them could be explained, and which would accordingly constitute the real inner essence of reason. True, the excellent Locke, in the "Essay on human understanding," Book 2, Chap. 11, §. 10 and 11, very rightly gives abstract general concepts as the distinguishing character between animal and man; and

Leibniz repeats this with complete assent in the "Nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain," Book 2, Chap. 11, §. 10 and 11. But when Locke, in Book 4, Chap. 17, §. 2, 3, comes to the actual explanation of reason, he loses sight entirely of that simple chief character of it, and likewise falls into a wavering, indefinite and incomplete listing of fragmentary and derived manifestations of it; Leibniz too, in the passage of his work corresponding to that, conducts himself on the whole in the same way, only with more confusion and obscurity. How greatly Kant, however, has confused and falsified the concept of the essence of reason I have discussed at length in the Appendix. But whoever takes the trouble to go through, in this respect, the mass of philosophical writings which have appeared since Kant will recognize that, just as the faults of princes are atoned for by whole peoples, so the errors of great minds spread their pernicious influence over whole generations, even over centuries, and, growing and propagating themselves, degenerate at last into monstrosities: all of which is to be derived from the fact that, as Berkeley says: Few men think; yet all will have opinions [21].

As the understanding has but one function—immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and effect—and the intuition of the real world, like all prudence, sagacity and inventiveness, however manifold their application, are quite evidently nothing other than manifestations of that simple function; so reason too has one function: the forming of the concept; and from this single one all those phenomena cited above, which distinguish the life of man from that of the animal, explain themselves very easily and wholly of themselves, and to the application or non-application of that function everything points that has anywhere and at any time been called rational or irrational [22].

9 Concepts form a peculiar class, differing toto genere from the intuitive representations considered so far, a class that exists in the mind of man alone. We can therefore never attain an intuitive, a properly evident knowledge of their essence, but only an [23] Few men think, but all want to have opinions.

24 With this section compare §. 26 and 27 of the second edition of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason. abstract and discursive one. It would therefore be absurd to demand that they be demonstrated in experience, in so far as by this is understood the real external world, which is itself intuitive representation, or that they be brought before the eyes or before the imagination like intuitive objects. They can only be thought, not intuited, and only the effects which man produces through them are objects of experience proper. Such are language, deliberate, planned action, and science; then whatever results from all these. Speech, evidently, as an object of external experience, is nothing other than a very perfect telegraph, which communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest speed and finest nuance. But what do these signs mean? How does their interpretation take place? Do we, perhaps, while the other speaks, at once translate his speech into images of the imagination, which fly past us with lightning speed and move, link together, transform and paint themselves in, according to the words streaming in and their grammatical inflections? What a tumult there would then be in our heads while listening to a speech or reading a book! It does not happen so at all. The sense of the speech is directly apprehended, grasped exactly and determinately, without phantasms as a rule mingling in. It is reason that speaks to reason, keeps within its own domain, and what it communicates and receives are abstract concepts, non-intuitive representations, which, formed once for all and relatively few in number, nevertheless comprise, contain and represent all the countless objects of the real world. Only from this is it explicable that no animal can ever speak and apprehend speech, although it has the instruments of speech, and also the intuitive representations, in common with us: but precisely because words designate that wholly peculiar class of representations whose subjective correlate is reason, they are for the animal without sense and meaning. Thus language, like every other manifestation that we ascribe to reason, and like everything that distinguishes man from the animal, is to be explained by this one and simple thing as its source: the concepts, the abstract, non-intuitive, general representations, not individual in time and space. Only in isolated cases do we pass from concepts to intuition and form for ourselves phantasms as intuitive representatives of the concepts, to which, how-

ever, they are never adequate. These have been discussed in particular in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 28, so I do not wish to repeat the same here: with what is said there compare what Hume says in the twelfth of his "Philosophical essays," p. 244, and what Herder says in the "Metakritik" (a bad book, by the way), Part 1, p. 274.—The Platonic Idea, which becomes possible through the union of imagination and reason, forms the main subject of the third book of the present work.

Although concepts are, then, fundamentally different from intuitive representations, they nevertheless stand in a necessary relation to these, without which they would be nothing, and which relation consequently constitutes their whole essence and existence. Reflection is necessarily an imitation, a repetition, of the archetypal intuitive world, though an imitation of quite its own kind, in a wholly heterogeneous material. Hence concepts may quite fittingly be called representations of representations. The principle of sufficient reason has here likewise a shape of its own; and just as the shape under which it rules in a class of representations also always constitutes and exhausts the whole essence of that class, in so far as the members are representations, so that, as we have seen, time is through and through succession and nothing else, space through and through position and nothing else, matter through and through causality and nothing else: so too the whole essence of concepts, or of the class of abstract representations, consists solely in the relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in them; and since this is the relation to the ground of knowledge, the abstract representation has its whole essence solely and exclusively in its relation to another representation, which is its ground of knowledge. This can, to be sure, at first again be a concept, or abstract representation, and even this again have only such an abstract ground of knowledge; but not thus to infinity: rather, the series of grounds of knowledge must in the end close with a concept that has its ground in intuitive knowledge. For the whole world of reflection rests on the intuitive world as its ground of knowing. Hence the class of abstract representations has this distinguishing mark from the others: that in

these the principle of sufficient reason always demands only a relation to another representation of the same class, whereas with abstract representations it finally demands a relation to a representation from another class.

Those concepts which, as has just been stated, relate to intuitive knowledge not immediately but only through the mediation of one or even several other concepts have been called by preference abstracta, whereas those which have their ground immediately in the intuitive world have been called concreta. This latter name, however, fits only very improperly the concepts designated by it, since these too are still abstracta and by no means intuitive representations. Those names, moreover, arose only from a very indistinct consciousness of the difference meant by them, yet with the interpretation given here they may stand. Examples of the first kind, thus abstracta in the eminent sense, are concepts such as "relation, virtue, inquiry, beginning," and so on. Examples of the latter kind, or improperly so-called concreta, are the concepts "man, stone, horse," and so on. If it were not a simile a little too pictorial and thereby falling into the jocular, one could very aptly call the latter the ground floor, the former the upper stories of the edifice of reflection [25].


That a concept comprehends much under itself, that is, that many intuitive, or even themselves again abstract, representations stand to it in the relation of ground of knowledge, that is, are thought through it, this is not, as is mostly stated, an essential but only a derived, secondary property of it, which indeed need not always be present in fact, though it must always be present in possibility. That property flows from the fact that the concept is the representation of a representation, that is, has its whole essence solely in its relation to another representation; but since it is not this representation itself, indeed since this representation for the most part belongs to a wholly different class of representations [26] On this see Chaps. 5 and 6 of the second volume. so it, being intuitive, can have temporal, spatial and other determinations and in general many more relations which are not thought along in the concept at all, and hence several representations differing in what is inessential can be thought through the same concept, that is, subsumed under it. But this holding good of several things is not an essential but only an accidental property of the concept. There can therefore

be concepts through which only a single real object is thought, which are nevertheless abstract and general, and by no means individual and intuitive representations: such, for example, is the concept someone has of a particular city which he knows only from geography: although only this one city is thought through it, several cities, differing in some respects, would be possible, to all of which it would fit. It is not, therefore, because a concept is abstracted from several objects that it has universality; rather, conversely, because universality, that is, non-determination of the particular, is essential to it as an abstract representation of reason, different things can be thought through the same concept.

From what has been said it follows that every concept, precisely because it is an abstract and not an intuitive, and for that very reason not a thoroughly determined, representation, has what is called an extension or sphere, even in the case that there is only a single real object corresponding to it. Now we find throughout that the sphere of every concept has something in common with the spheres of others, that is, that in it, in part, the same is thought that is thought in those others, and in these again, in part, the same that is thought in the former; although, if they are really different concepts, each, or at least one of the two, contains something that the other does not have: in this relation stands every subject to its predicate. To know this relation is to judge. The representation of these spheres by spatial figures is an exceedingly happy thought. Gottfried Plouquet seems to have had it first, who took squares for the purpose; Lambert, although after him, still used mere lines, which he placed one under another; Euler first carried it out fully with circles. On what this so exact analogy between the relations of concepts and those of spatial figures finally rests, I cannot say. It is, however, a very favorable circumstance for logic that all relations of concepts, even as to their possibility, that is, a priori, can be exhibited intuitively by such figures, in the following manner:


1) The spheres of two concepts are wholly equal: for example, the concept of necessity and that of the consequent from a given ground; likewise that of Ruminantia and Bisulca (ruminants and animals with cloven hoof); also of ver-

tebrates and red-blooded animals (against which, however, something might be objected on account of the annelids): they are reciprocal concepts. Such are then represented by a single circle, which signifies both the one and the other.
2) The sphere of one concept wholly includes that of another:




Two circles: the larger one, Thier (animal), and inside it at the lower rim the smaller one, Pferd (horse).

3) One sphere includes two or more which exclude each other and at the same time fill the sphere:




A circle cut by three lines running from a single point into three sectors, marked rechter W., spitzer W. and stumpfer W., that is, right, acute and obtuse angle; the circle itself is lettered Winkel (angle), printed Win- in the left sector and kel in the right.

4) Two spheres each include a part of the other:



Two equal circles that overlap, Blume (flower) on the left and roth (red) on the right, the common middle left unlabeled.

5) Two spheres lie in a third, which they do not, however, fill:



A large circle, Materie (matter), holding two smaller touching circles in its lower part, Wasser (water) on the left and Erde (earth) on the right.

This last case holds of all concepts whose spheres have no immediate community, since there will always be a third, though often a very wide one, that includes both.

To these cases all combinations of concepts may be reducible, and the whole doctrine of judgments, their conversion, contraposition, reciprocation, disjunction (this according to the third figure), can be derived from them; likewise also the properties of judgments on which Kant founded the supposed categories of the understanding, with the exception, however, of the hypothetical form, which is no longer a combination of mere concepts but of judgments, and then with the exception of modality, concerning which, as concerning every prop-

erty of judgments laid at the basis of the categories, the Appendix gives a detailed account. As to the stated possible combinations of concepts, it remains only to remark that they can also be combined with one another in manifold ways, for example the fourth figure with the second. Only when a sphere that contains another wholly or in part is in turn wholly enclosed by a third do these together represent the syllogism in the first figure, that is, that combination of judgments by which it is known that a concept contained wholly or in part in another is likewise contained in a third that in turn contains this other; or also the converse of this, the negation, whose pictorial representation naturally can consist only in this, that two combined spheres do not lie in a third. If many spheres enclose one another in this way, long chains of syllogisms arise.—This schematism of concepts, which is already carried out fairly well in several textbooks, one can lay at the basis of the doctrine of judgments, as also of the whole of syllogistic, whereby the exposition of both becomes very easy and simple. For all the rules of these can be seen from it in their origin, derived and explained. To burden the memory with these, however, is not necessary, since logic can never be of practical use, but only of theoretical interest for philosophy. For although it might be said that logic stands to rational thinking as thorough-bass to music, and also, if we take it less exactly, as ethics to virtue, or aesthetics to art, it must on the other hand be considered that no artist has yet become one by the study of aesthetics, nor a noble character by the study of ethics, that long before Rameau music was composed correctly and beautifully, and also that one need not have mastered thorough-bass in order to notice discords: just as little need one know logic in order not to be deceived by fallacies. It must, however, be granted that, if not for judging, then at least for the practice of musical composition thorough-bass is of great use: even aesthetics, and ethics too, may, though in much lesser degree, have some use for practice, though chiefly negative, so that practical value is not to be denied them either; but of logic not even so much can be said in praise. For it is merely the knowledge in abstracto of what everyone knows in concreto. Hence, as little as one needs it in order not to assent to a false piece of reasoning, so little does one call its rules to one's aid in order to make a correct one, and even the most learned

logician sets them wholly aside in his actual thinking. This is explained as follows. Every science consists of a system of general, hence abstract truths, laws and rules, in reference to some kind of objects. The individual case subsequently occurring among these is then each time determined according to that general knowledge, which holds once for all; because such application of the general is infinitely easier than examining the individual case occurring, by itself, from the beginning; since the general abstract knowledge once attained always lies nearer to hand for us than the empirical examination of the particular. With logic, however, it is precisely the reverse. It is the general knowledge, gained by self-observation of reason and abstraction from all content and expressed in the form of rules, of the mode of procedure of reason. For reason, however, that mode of procedure is necessary and essential: in no case, therefore, will it deviate from it, once it is left to itself. It is therefore easier and safer to let it proceed in each particular case according to its essence than to hold up to it the knowledge of this, first abstracted from this procedure, in the shape of a foreign law given from outside. It is easier: because, although in all other sciences the general rule lies nearer to us than the examination of the individual case alone and by itself, conversely, in the use of reason the procedure necessary for it in the given case always lies nearer to us than the general rule abstracted from it, since that which thinks in us is itself that very reason. It is safer: because an error can much more easily occur in such abstract knowledge, or in its application, than a procedure of reason can enter that would run counter to its essence, its nature. Hence comes the singular fact that, whereas in other sciences the truth of the individual case is tested by the rule, in logic, conversely, the rule must always be tested by the individual case; and even the most practiced logician, if he notices that in an individual case he infers otherwise than a rule states, will always sooner seek a mistake in the rule than in the inference he has actually made. To want to make practical use of logic would thus mean to want to derive first, with unspeakable effort, from general rules what is immediately known to us in the particular with the greatest certainty: it would be exactly as if one wanted to consult mechanics before making one's movements, and physiology for digestion; and whoever learns logic for practical purposes is

like one who would train a beaver to build its lodge.—Although without practical use, logic must nonetheless be retained, because it has philosophical interest, as special knowledge of the organization and action of reason. As a closed discipline, subsisting by itself, complete in itself, rounded off and perfectly certain, it is entitled to be treated scientifically on its own and independently of all else, and likewise to be taught at universities; but it receives its real worth only in the connection of philosophy as a whole, in the consideration of knowing, and indeed of rational or abstract knowing. Accordingly its exposition should not have so much the form of a science directed to the practical, should not contain merely bare rules laid down for the correct conversion of judgments, inference, and so on, but should be directed more to this, that the essence of reason and of the concept be known and the principle of the ground of knowing be considered at length: for logic is a mere paraphrase of it, and indeed properly only for the case where the ground that gives judgments truth is not empirical or metaphysical but logical or metalogical. Beside the principle of the ground of knowing, therefore, the remaining three fundamental laws of thought so closely akin to it, or judgments of metalogical truth, are to be set out; from which, then, little by little the whole technique of reason grows. The essence of actual thinking, that is, of judging and inferring, is to be presented from the combination of the spheres of concepts, according to the spatial schema, in the manner indicated above, and from this all rules of judging and inferring are to be derived by construction. The only practical use that can be made of logic is that, in disputation, one shows one's opponent not so much his actual mistaken inferences as his deliberate fallacies, by calling them by their technical name. Through such pushing back of the practical tendency and bringing out of the connection of logic with philosophy as a whole, as a chapter of it, knowledge of it should nevertheless not become rarer than it is now: for nowadays everyone who does not want to remain crude in the main thing and be counted among the ignorant crowd, caught in dullness, must have studied speculative philosophy; and this because this nineteenth century is a philosophical one; by which it is not so much to be said that it possesses philosophy, or

that philosophy rules in it, as rather that it is ripe for philosophy and for that very reason in thorough need of it: this is a sign of highly advanced culture, even a fixed point on the scale of the culture of the ages[27].

However little practical use logic can have, it cannot well be denied that it was invented for a practical purpose. I explain its origin to myself as follows. When among the Eleatics, Megarians and Sophists the delight in disputation had developed more and more and had gradually risen almost to a mania, the confusion into which nearly every disputation fell must soon have made them feel the necessity of a methodical procedure, as guidance toward which a scientific dialectic was to be sought. The first thing that had to be noticed was that both contending parties had always to be agreed on some proposition to which the contested points were to be referred, in disputing. The beginning of the methodical procedure consisted in formally stating these commonly acknowledged propositions as such and placing them at the head of the inquiry. These propositions, however, concerned at first only the material of the inquiry. One soon became aware that also in the manner and way in which one went back to the commonly acknowledged truth and sought to derive one's assertions from it, certain forms and laws were followed, about which, although without previous agreement, one nevertheless never fell out, from which it was seen that they must be the peculiar course of reason itself lying in its essence, the formal element of the inquiry. Although this was not exposed to doubt and disagreement, yet some head systematic to the point of pedantry hit upon the thought that it would look very fine and be the perfection of methodical dialectic if this formal element of all disputing too, this always lawful procedure of reason itself, were likewise pronounced in abstract propositions, which one would place, just like those commonly acknowledged propositions concerning the material of the inquiry, at the head of the inquiry, as [28] On this see chap. 9 and 10 of the second volume. the fixed canon of disputation itself, to which one would always have to look back and appeal. In that one now wanted to recognize consciously as law and formally pronounce what one had hitherto followed as by tacit agreement, or practiced as if by instinct, one found gradually more or less perfect expressions for logical principles, such as the principle of

contradiction, of sufficient reason, of the excluded third, the dictum de omni et nullo, then the more special rules of syllogistic, such as ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil sequitur, a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia, and so on. That one nevertheless came to this only slowly and with great trouble, and that before Aristotle everything remained very imperfect, we see partly from the clumsy and long-winded manner in which logical truths are brought to light in some Platonic dialogues, but better still from what Sextus Empiricus reports of the quarrels of the Megarians over the easiest and simplest logical laws and the laborious manner in which they brought these to clarity (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. L. 8. p. 112 seqq.). Aristotle, however, collected, ordered and corrected what he found and brought it to an incomparably higher perfection. When one observes in this way how the course of Greek culture had prepared and brought about the work of Aristotle, one will be little inclined to give credence to the statement of Persian writers, which Jones, very much taken with it, communicates to us, namely that Callisthenes found a ready-made logic among the Indians and sent it to his uncle Aristotle (Asiatic researches, vol. 4, p. 163).—That in the dismal Middle Ages the Aristotelian logic had to be most welcome to the disputatious spirit of the Scholastics, which, for lack of all real knowledge, fed on formulas and words alone, that it was eagerly seized upon even in its Arabic mutilation and soon raised to the center of all knowledge, is easily understood. Though fallen since then in prestige, it has nevertheless maintained itself down to our time in the credit of a self-subsisting, practical and highly necessary science: indeed in our days the Kantian philosophy, which really took its cornerstone from logic, has again aroused a new interest in it, which in this respect, that is, as a means to knowledge of the essence of reason, it does indeed deserve.

As correct, strict inferences come about by considering the relation of the spheres of concepts exactly, and only when one sphere is contained wholly in a second, and this again wholly in a third, acknowledging the first as wholly contained in the third as well; so, on the contrary, the art of persuasion rests on subjecting the relations of the spheres of concepts only to a superficial consideration and then determining them one-sidedly according to one's intentions,

mainly by this, that when the sphere of a concept under consideration lies only partly in another but partly also in a quite different one, one gives it out as lying wholly in the first, or wholly in the second, according to the speaker's intention. For example, when passion is spoken of, one can subsume it at will under the concept of the greatest force, the mightiest agent in the world, or under the concept of unreason, and this under that of impotence, of weakness. The same procedure can then be continued and applied afresh to every concept to which the speech leads. Almost always several others divide up within the sphere of a concept, each of which contains a part of the territory of the first on its own, but itself also embraces still more besides: of these latter spheres of concepts, however, one lets only the one be illuminated under which one wants to subsume the first concept, while the rest are left unnoticed, or kept covered. On this device really rest all arts of persuasion, all finer sophisms; for the logical ones, such as the mentiens, velatus, cornutus, and so on, are obviously too clumsy for actual use. Since it is not known to me that the essence of all sophistication and persuasion has hitherto been traced back to this last ground of its possibility and demonstrated in the peculiar constitution of concepts, that is, in the mode of knowledge of reason, I will, since my exposition has led me to it, illustrate the matter, easy as it is to see, by a scheme on the accompanying table




Plate: Peregrinari and the circle Experientiae latissimus campus in the middle, with branching chains of circles of advantages on the left under Bonum and of disadvantages on the right under Malum, ending three times at Bonum and three times at Malum, all lettered in Latin

which is to show how the spheres of concepts interlock in manifold ways and thereby give scope to caprice to pass from every concept to this or that other. Only I do not wish that one should be misled by the table into attaching more importance to this small incidental discussion than it can have by its nature. I have chosen the concept of travel as the illustrative example. Its sphere reaches into the territory of four others, to any one of which the persuader can pass at will: these reach again into other spheres, some of them into two or more at once, through which the persuader takes his way at pleasure, always as if it were the only one, and then at last, according as his intention was, arrives at Good or at Evil. Only, in following out the spheres, one must always keep the direction from the center (the given main concept) to the periphery, and not go backward. The garb of such a sophistication can be continuous speech or also the strict form of inference, according as the weak side of the hearer advises. At bottom most scientific, especially philosophical demonstrations are not much oth-

erwise constituted: how else would it be possible that so much, at various times, not merely assumed erroneously (for error itself has another origin) but demonstrated and proved, has nevertheless later been found utterly false, for example the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, Ptolemaic astronomy, Stahlian chemistry, the Newtonian theory of colors, and so on and so on[29].

10 Through all this the question presses upon us more and more how certainty is to be attained, how judgments are to be grounded, in what knowing and science consist, which we extol, beside language and deliberate action, as the third great privilege given through reason.

Reason is of feminine nature: it can give only after it has received. By itself alone it has nothing but the contentless forms of its operating. Perfectly pure [30] On this see chap. 11 of the second volume.

rational knowledge there is, in fact, none other than the four propositions to which I have ascribed metalogical truth, that is, the propositions of identity, of contradiction, of the excluded third and of sufficient ground of knowledge. For even the rest of logic is no longer perfectly pure rational knowledge, because it presupposes the relations and combinations of the spheres of concepts: but concepts in general are there only after preceding intuitive representations, the reference to which constitutes their whole essence, and which they consequently already presuppose. Since, however, this presupposition does not extend to the determinate content of the concepts but only generally to an existence of them, logic, taken as a whole, can still count as pure science of reason. In all the other sciences reason has received the content from intuitive representations: in mathematics from the relations of space and time intuitively known before all experience; in pure natural science, that is, in what we know before all experience about the course of nature, the content of the science proceeds from the pure understanding, that is, from knowledge a priori of the law of causality and its connection with those pure intuitions of space and time. In all other sciences everything that is not borrowed from those just named belongs to experience. To know in general means: to have in the power of one's mind, for voluntary reproduction, such judgments as have their sufficient ground of knowl-

edge in something outside them, that is, are true. Abstract knowledge alone, then, is a knowing; this is therefore conditioned by reason, and of animals we cannot, strictly speaking, say that they know anything, although they have intuitive knowledge, and for this also memory and, for that very reason, imagination, which their dreaming moreover proves. Consciousness we ascribe to them, the concept of which consequently, although the word is taken from knowing, coincides with that of representing in general, of whatever kind it may be. Hence we ascribe to the plant life indeed, but no consciousness.—Knowing, then, is abstract consciousness, the fixing in concepts of reason of what has been otherwise cognized in general.

11 In this respect the proper opposite of knowing is feeling, whose discussion we must therefore insert here. The concept which the word feeling designates has throughout only a negative content, namely this, that something present in consciousness is not concept, not abstract knowledge of reason: for the rest it may be what it will, it falls under the concept feeling, whose immoderately wide sphere therefore comprises the most heterogeneous things, of which one never sees how they come together, so long as one has not recognized that they agree only in this negative respect, of not being abstract concepts. For the most different, indeed the most hostile elements lie peacefully side by side in that concept, for example religious feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling as touch, as pain, as feeling for colors, for tones and their harmonies and discords, feeling of hatred, of disgust, of self-satisfaction, of honor, of shame, of right, of wrong, feeling of truth, aesthetic feeling, feeling of strength, weakness, health, friendship, love, and so on and so on. There is absolutely no community among them but the negative one, that they are not abstract rational knowledge; but this is most striking when even the intuitive knowledge a priori of the relations of space, and above all that of the pure understanding, is brought under that concept, and of every knowledge, every truth of which one is as yet conscious only intuitively, but has not yet set down in abstract concepts, it is said that one feels it. Of this I will adduce, by way of illustration, some examples from recent books, because they are striking proofs

of my explanation. I remember having read in the introduction to a German version of Euclid that beginners in geometry should first be made to draw all the figures before one proceeds to demonstrating, because they would then feel the geometrical truth beforehand, before the demonstration brought them the completed knowledge.—Likewise in the "Critique of the Doctrine of Morals" by F. Schleiermacher there is talk of logical and mathematical feeling (p. 339), also of the feeling of equality or difference of two formulas (p. 342); further, in Tennemann's "History of Philosophy," vol. 1, p. 361, it says: "One felt that the fallacies were not correct, but yet could not discover the error."—So long as one does not consider this concept feeling from the right point of view and does not recognize that one negative mark which alone is essential to it, it must, on account of the excessive width of its sphere and its merely negative, wholly one-sidedly determined and very slight content, give constant occasion to misunderstandings and disputes. Since we have in German the fairly synonymous word Empfindung, it would be useful to take this into possession for the bodily feelings, as a subspecies. The origin of that concept feeling, so disproportionate to all others, is however without doubt the following. All concepts, and it is only concepts that words designate, are there only for reason, proceed from it: with them, then, one already stands on a one-sided standpoint. But from such a standpoint what is nearer appears distinctly and is posited as positive; what is farther merges together and is soon considered only negatively: thus every nation calls all others foreigners, the Greek all others barbarians, the Englishman everything that is not England or English, continent and continental, the believer all others heretics or heathens, the nobility all others roturiers, the student all others philistines, and the like. The same one-sidedness, one may say the same crude ignorance from pride, can, however strange it sounds, be laid to the charge of reason itself, in that it comprises under the one concept feeling every modification of consciousness that only does not belong immediately to its own mode of representing, that is, is not abstract concept. It has had to pay for this hitherto, because its own procedure had not become clear to it

through thorough self-knowledge, by misunderstandings and aberrations in its own domain, since one has even set up a special faculty of feeling and now constructs theories of it.

12 Knowing, whose contradictory opposite I have just discussed as the concept feeling, is, as said, all abstract knowledge, that is, rational knowledge. Since, however, reason always merely brings before knowledge again what has been received elsewhere, it does not properly widen our knowing, but gives it merely another form. For what was known intuitively, in concreto, it lets be known abstractly and universally. This, however, is incomparably more important than, so expressed, it seems at first glance. For all secure preservation, all communicability, and all secure and far-reaching application of knowledge to the practical depends on its having become a knowing, an abstract knowledge. Intuitive knowledge holds always only of the individual case, goes only to what is nearest, and stops there, because sensibility and understanding can properly apprehend only one object at a time. Every sustained, composite, planned activity must therefore proceed from principles, that is, from an abstract knowing, and be guided by it. Thus, for example, the knowledge which the understanding has of the relation of cause and effect is indeed in itself much more perfect, deeper and more exhaustive than what can be thought of it in abstracto: the understanding alone knows intuitively, immediately and perfectly the manner of action of a lever, a pulley, a cogwheel, the resting of a vault upon itself, and so on. But on account of the property of intuitive knowledge just touched on, that of going only to what is immediately present, the mere understanding does not suffice for the construction of machines and buildings: rather reason must step in here, put abstract concepts in place of intuitions, take these as the guideline of action, and if they were correct, the success will follow. Likewise we know in pure intuition perfectly the essence and lawfulness of a parabola, hyperbola, spiral; but in order to make secure application of this knowledge in actuality, it would first have to have become abstract knowing, in which it of course loses intuitiveness, but in return gains the certainty and definiteness of abstract knowing. Thus the whole differential calculus really does not widen

our knowledge of curves at all, contains nothing more than what the mere pure intuition of them already contains; but it changes the kind of knowledge, transforms the intuitive into an abstract one, which is so highly consequential for application. Here, however, a further peculiarity of our faculty of knowledge must be mentioned, one which probably could not be noticed before, so long as the difference between intuitive and abstract knowledge was not made quite distinct. It is this: that the relations of space cannot be transferred immediately and as such into abstract knowledge, but for this only temporal magnitudes, that is, numbers, are suited. Numbers alone can be expressed in abstract concepts exactly corresponding to them, not spatial magnitudes. The concept thousand differs from the concept ten exactly as both temporal magnitudes do in intuition: in thinking thousand we think a determinate multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at will for intuition in time, that is, count it. But between the abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot, without any intuitive representation of the two and without help of number, there is no exact difference at all corresponding to those magnitudes themselves. In both only a spatial magnitude is thought at all, and if the two are to be sufficiently distinguished, then either spatial intuition must absolutely be called in aid, and thus the domain of abstract knowledge already be left, or the difference must be thought in numbers. If one wants to have abstract knowledge of spatial relations, they must first be transferred into temporal relations, that is, into numbers: for this reason only arithmetic, not geometry, is the general doctrine of magnitude, and geometry must be translated into arithmetic if it is to have communicability, exact definiteness and applicability to the practical. A spatial relation as such can, to be sure, also be thought in abstracto, for example "the sine increases in proportion to the angle"; but if the magnitude of this relation is to be stated, number is needed. This necessity that space, with its three dimensions, must be translated into time, which has only one dimension, if one wants to have an abstract knowledge (that is, a knowing, no mere intuiting) of its relations—this necessity it is that makes mathematics so difficult. This becomes very clear when we compare the intuition of curves with their analytical calculation, or even only the tables of the logarithms of the trigonometric

functions with the intuition of the changing relations of the parts of the triangle which are expressed by them: what intuition here grasps in one glance, perfectly and with the utmost exactness, namely how the cosine decreases as the sine increases, how the cosine of the one angle is the sine of the other, the inverse relation of the decrease and increase of the two angles, and so on—what an immense web of numbers, what toilsome calculation was needed to express this in abstracto! How time, one may say, must torment itself with its one dimension in order to render the three dimensions of space! But this was necessary if we wanted to possess the relations of space, for the sake of application, laid down in abstract concepts: immediately those could not enter into these, but only through the mediation of the purely temporal magnitude, number, which alone joins itself immediately to abstract knowledge. It is still worth noting that, as space is so well suited to intuition and, by means of its three dimensions, lets even complicated relations be easily surveyed, while it eludes abstract knowledge, conversely time enters easily into abstract concepts, but on the other hand gives very little to intuition: our intuition of numbers in their peculiar element, mere time, without drawing in space, scarcely goes as far as ten; beyond that we have only abstract concepts, no longer intuitive knowledge of numbers: yet with every number-word and all algebraic signs we connect exactly determined abstract concepts.

Incidentally it is to be remarked here that some minds find full satisfaction only in what is known intuitively. Ground and consequent of being in space, set out intuitively, is what they seek: a Euclidean proof, or an arithmetical solution of spatial problems, does not appeal to them. Other minds, on the contrary, demand the abstract concepts, which alone are usable for application and communication: they have patience and memory for abstract propositions, formulas, demonstrations in long chains of inference, and calculations whose signs stand for the most complicated abstractions. These seek definiteness: those, intuitiveness. The difference is characteristic.

Knowing, abstract knowledge, has its greatest worth in communicability and in the possibility of being kept fixed: only thereby does it become so inestimably important for the practical. One may have an immediate, intuitive knowledge

in the mere understanding of the causal connection of the changes and movements of natural bodies and find complete satisfaction in it; but it becomes fit for communication only after one has fixed it in concepts. Even for the practical a knowledge of the first kind is sufficient, as soon as one also undertakes the execution wholly alone, and indeed in an action executable while the intuitive knowledge is still alive; but not when one needs the help of others, or even only an action of one's own occurring at different times, and therefore a considered plan. Thus, for example, a practiced billiard player can have a complete knowledge of the laws of the impact of elastic bodies on one another, merely in the understanding, merely for immediate intuition, and he gets on with it perfectly well; whereas only the scientific mechanic has a proper knowing of those laws, that is, a knowledge of them in abstracto. Even for the construction of machines that merely intuitive knowledge of the understanding suffices, if the inventor of the machine also executes it alone, as one often sees in talented craftsmen without any science; whereas as soon as several persons and a composite activity of theirs, occurring at different points of time, are needed for the execution of a mechanical operation, a machine, a building, the one who directs them must have drafted the plan in abstracto, and only with the assistance of reason is such cooperative activity possible. It is remarkable, however, that in that first kind of activity, where one alone is to execute something in an uninterrupted action, knowing, the application of reason, reflection, can even often be a hindrance to him, for example in billiard playing, in fencing, in tuning an instrument, in singing: here intuitive knowledge must guide the activity immediately; passing it through reflection makes it uncertain, in that it divides the attention and confuses the man. Therefore savages and crude men, who are accustomed to think very little, carry out many bodily exercises, the fight with animals, the shooting of an arrow, and the like, with a certainty and speed that the reflecting European never attains, precisely because his deliberation makes him waver and hesitate: for he seeks, for example, to find the right place or the right moment by taking the same distance from the two false extremes; the natural man hits it immediately, without reflecting on the wrong paths. Likewise it does not help me if I know how to state in abstracto the angle

at which I must set the razor, in degrees and minutes, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, have it in my grip. The application of reason is, furthermore, disturbing in the same way in the understanding of physiognomy: this too must happen immediately through the understanding: the expression, the meaning of the features can only be felt, one says, that is, precisely does not enter into abstract concepts. Every man has his immediate intuitive physiognomy and pathognomy: yet one recognizes more distinctly than another that signatura rerum. But a physiognomy in abstracto, to teach and to learn, cannot be brought about; because the nuances here are so fine that the concept cannot descend to them; hence abstract knowing stands to them like a mosaic picture to a van der Werff or a Denner: as, however fine the mosaic is, the boundaries of the stones always remain and therefore no continuous transition of one tint into another is possible; so too concepts, with their rigidity and sharp delimitation, however finely one might split them by closer determination, are always incapable of reaching the fine modifications of the intuitive, on which, in the physiognomy here taken as an example, everything just depends[31].

32 I am therefore of the opinion that physiognomy cannot go further with certainty than to the establishment of some quite general rules, for example such as these: in forehead and eye is to be read the intellectual, in the mouth and the lower half of the face the ethical, the expressions of the will;—forehead and eye elucidate each other reciprocally, each of the two, seen without the other, is only half intelligible;—a man of genius is never without a high, broad, beautifully arched forehead; but such a forehead is often found without genius;—from an intelligent look one may infer intelligence the more surely the uglier the face is, and from a stupid look stupidity the more surely the more beautiful the face is; because beauty, as conformity to the type of humanity, already in and for itself bears also the expression of mental clarity, ugliness behaves oppositely, and so on.

This very constitution of concepts, which makes them similar to the stones of the mosaic picture, and by virtue of which intuition always remains their asymptote, is also the reason why nothing good is achieved in art by means of

them. If the singer, or virtuoso, wants to guide his performance by reflection, he remains dead. The same holds of the composer, the painter, indeed the poet: for art the concept always remains unfruitful: it may guide only the technical element in it: its domain is science. We shall investigate more closely in the third book why all genuine art proceeds from intuitive knowledge, never from the concept.—Even with regard to conduct, to personal agreeableness in intercourse, the concept is of use only negatively, to hold back the coarse outbreaks of egoism and bestiality, as politeness is indeed its praiseworthy work; but the attractive, gracious, winning quality of conduct, the loving and friendly, must not have proceeded from the concept: otherwise "one feels the intention and is put out."—All dissimulation is the work of reflection; but for the long run and without interruption it is not sustainable: nemo potest personam diu ferre fictam, says Seneca in the book de clementia: also it is then mostly recognized and misses its effect. In the great urgency of life, where quick resolves, bold action, swift and firm seizing are needed, reason is indeed necessary, but if it gains the upper hand and confusingly hinders the intuitive, immediate finding-out, performed by the understanding alone, and at the same time seizing of what is right, and brings about irresolution, it can easily spoil everything.

Finally, virtue and holiness too do not proceed from reflection, but from the inner depth of the will and its relation to knowing. This discussion belongs in an altogether different place of this work: I may remark here only so much, that the dogmas relating to the ethical can be the same in the reason of whole nations, but the acting in each individual different, and so also conversely: acting happens, as one says, according to feelings: that is, precisely not according to concepts, namely as regards the ethical content. The dogmas occupy the idle reason: the acting in the end takes its course independently of them, mostly not by abstract but by unspoken maxims, whose expression is precisely the whole man himself. Hence, however different the religious dogmas of peoples are, with all of them the good deed is accompanied by inexpressible satisfaction, the evil by infinite horror: the former no mockery shakes; from the latter no absolution of the confessor frees. Yet it is not hereby to be denied that for the carrying through of a virtuous course of life application of reason is necessary: only

it is not its source; rather its function is a subordinate one, namely the preservation of resolutions taken, the holding up of maxims, for resistance against the weakness of the moment and for consistency of action. In the end it does the same in art too, where it can likewise do nothing in the main thing, but supports the execution, precisely because genius is not at one's command every hour, but the work must nevertheless be completed in all its parts and rounded into a whole[33].

13 All these reflections on both the use and the disadvantage of applying reason are meant to make clear that, although abstract knowledge is the reflex of intuitive representation and founded upon it, it is by no means so congruent with it that it could everywhere [34] On this see Chap. 7 of the second volume. take its place; rather, it never corresponds to it quite exactly. Hence, as we have seen, many human undertakings are accomplished only with the help of reason and deliberate procedure, yet some are accomplished better without applying them. —This very incongruity between intuitive and abstract cognition, by virtue of which the latter only ever approaches the former as mosaic work approaches painting, is also the ground of a most remarkable phenomenon which, just like reason, belongs exclusively to human nature, but of which all the explanations attempted anew up to now are inadequate: I mean laughter. On account of this origin we cannot evade a discussion of it here, although it once more holds up our progress. Laughter arises in every case from nothing other than the suddenly perceived incongruity between a concept and the real objects that had been thought through it in some respect, and it is itself merely the expression of this incongruity. It often comes to light when two or more real objects are thought through one concept and its identity is carried over to them; but then a complete difference between them in all other respects makes it striking that the concept fitted them only from a one-sided point of view. Just as often, however, it is a single real object whose incongruity with the concept, under which it has on one side rightly been subsumed, suddenly becomes palpable. Now the more correct, on the one hand, the subsumption of such realities under the concept is, and the greater and more glaring, on the other, their unsuitability to

it, the stronger is the effect of the ridiculous that springs from this contrast. All laughter, then, arises on the occasion of a paradoxical and therefore unexpected subsumption, no matter whether it expresses itself in words or in deeds. This, in brief, is the correct explanation of the ridiculous.

I shall not linger here to tell anecdotes as examples of it in order to illustrate my explanation by them: for the explanation is so simple and easily grasped that it needs none, and any ridiculous thing the reader remembers serves equally well as proof of it. But our explanation receives confirmation and illustration at once from the unfolding of the two kinds into which the ridiculous divides, and which proceed from that very explanation. For either two or more very different real objects, intuitive representations, have come first in cognition, and one has arbitrarily identified them through the unity of a concept embracing both: this kind of the ridiculous is called wit. Or else, conversely, the concept is there first in cognition, and one passes from it to reality and to action upon it, to conduct: objects that are otherwise radically different, but are all thought in that concept, are now regarded and treated alike, until their otherwise great difference comes to light, to the surprise and astonishment of the one acting: this kind of the ridiculous is called *folly*. Accordingly every ridiculous thing is either a witty notion or a foolish act, according as one has gone from the discrepancy of the objects to the identity of the concept, or conversely: the former always voluntary, the latter always involuntary and forced on one from without. To invert this starting point apparently, and to mask wit as folly, is the art of the court jester and the buffoon: such a man, well aware of the diversity of the objects, unites them with secret wit under one concept, and then, setting out from this, he gets from the diversity of the objects discovered afterward just that surprise which he had himself prepared.—It follows from this brief but sufficient theory of the ridiculous that, setting aside this last case of the merry-maker, wit must always show itself in words, folly, however, mostly in actions, though also in words, namely when it merely announces its intention instead of really carrying it out, or expresses itself in mere judgments and opinions.

To folly belongs also *pedantry*. It arises from having little confidence in one's own understanding, and therefore being unwilling to leave it to recognize directly what is right in the individual case; one accordingly places it wholly under the tutelage of reason and wants to make use of reason everywhere, that is, always to proceed from general concepts, rules, maxims, and to hold exactly to them, in life, in art, even in ethical conduct. Hence the clinging to form, to manner, to expression and word that is peculiar to pedantry, and that with it takes the place of the essence of the matter. Then the incongruity of the concept with reality soon shows itself; it becomes evident how the concept never descends to the particular, and how its generality and rigid definiteness can never fit exactly the fine nuances and manifold modifications of actuality. With his general maxims the pedant therefore almost always falls short in life, and shows himself imprudent, tasteless, useless: in art, for which the concept is unfruitful, he produces lifeless, stiff, mannered, spurious births. Even in the ethical respect the resolve to act rightly or nobly cannot everywhere be carried out according to abstract maxims; because in many cases the infinitely finely nuanced character of the circumstances makes necessary a choice of the right that proceeds directly from the character, since the application of merely abstract maxims partly gives false results, because they fit only by halves, and partly cannot be carried through, because they are foreign to the individual character of the one acting, and this can never wholly be denied: from which inconsistencies then follow. We cannot quite acquit Kant of the reproach of having occasioned moral pedantry, inasmuch as he makes it a condition of the moral worth of an action that it take place from purely rational, abstract maxims, without any inclination or momentary impulse; which reproach is also the sense of Schiller's epigram headed "Scruples of Conscience."—When, especially in political affairs, people speak of doctrinaires, theorists, scholars, and so on, pedants are meant, that is, people who know things well in abstracto but not in concreto. Abstraction consists in thinking away the closer determinations: but it is precisely on these that very much depends in practice.

To complete the theory, a spurious species of wit still has to be mentioned, the play on words, calembourg, pun, to which may also be reckoned ambiguity, l'équivoque, whose chief use is the obscene (the smutty jest). As wit forces two very different real objects under one concept, so the play on words, by making use of chance, brings two different concepts under one word: the same contrast arises again, but much feebler and more superficial, because it sprang not from the nature of things but from the accident of naming. In wit the identity is in the concept, the difference in reality; in the pun, however, the difference is in the concepts and the identity in reality, to which the sound of the word belongs. It would be only a somewhat too far-fetched comparison to say that the pun is related to wit as the parabola of the upper, inverted cone is to that of the lower. The misunderstanding of a word, however, or the quid pro quo, is the involuntary calembourg, and is related to it exactly as folly is to wit; hence the hard of hearing, as well as the fool, must often furnish matter for laughter, and bad writers of comedy use the former instead of the latter to excite laughter.

I have here considered laughter merely from the psychical side: with regard to the physical side I refer to what is adduced on the subject in Parerga, vol. 2, chap. 6, § 96, p. 134 (first ed.)[35].

14 Of all these manifold reflections, by which, I hope, the difference and the relation between the mode of knowledge of reason, knowledge proper, the concept, on the one hand, and immediate cognition in purely sensuous, mathematical intuition and apprehension by the understanding, on the other, have been brought to complete clarity, and also of the episodic discussions of feeling and laughter, to which the consideration of that remarkable relation of our modes of knowledge led us almost unavoidably—I now return to the further discussion of science, as the third advantage, next to language and deliberate action, that reason gives to man. The general consideration of science that falls to us here will concern partly its form, partly the grounding of its judgments, and finally also its content.

36 On this see Chap. 8 of the second volume.

We have seen that, apart from the foundation of pure logic, all knowledge in general has its origin not in reason itself; rather, gained elsewhere as intuitive cognition, it is deposited in reason, passing thereby into an entirely different mode of knowledge, the abstract. All knowledge, that is, cognition raised to consciousness in abstracto, is related to science proper as a fragment to the whole. Every man has, through experience, through contemplation of the particular that presents itself, acquired knowledge of many sorts of things: but only he who sets himself the task of attaining complete cognition in abstracto of some kind of objects strives after science. Only through the concept can he single out that kind; hence at the head of every science stands a concept, through which that part of the whole of all things is thought of which it promises a complete cognition in abstracto: for example, the concept of spatial relations, or of the action of inorganic bodies on one another, or of the constitution of plants, of animals, or of the successive changes of the earth's surface, or of the changes of the human race as a whole, or of the structure of a language, and so on. If science wanted to gain knowledge of its object by investigating separately all the things thought through the concept until it had thus gradually come to know the whole, then partly no human memory would suffice, partly no certainty of completeness could be attained. It therefore makes use of that peculiarity of concept-spheres, discussed above, of including one another, and goes mainly to the wider spheres that lie within the concept of its object in general: by determining their relations to one another, it has thereby also determined in general everything thought in them, and this can now, by singling out ever narrower concept-spheres, be determined more and more exactly. In this way it becomes possible for a science to embrace its object entirely. This path which it takes to knowledge, namely from the universal to the particular, distinguishes it from common knowledge: hence the systematic form is an essential and characteristic mark of science. The connection of the most general concept-spheres of every science, that is, knowledge of its supreme propositions, is the indispensable condition of learning it: how far one wishes to go from these to the more particular propositions is optional, and increases not the thoroughness but the extent of one's learning.—The number of the

higher propositions to which all the rest are subordinated is very different in the different sciences, so that in some there is more subordination, in others more coordination; in which respect the former call more on the power of judgment, the latter on memory. It was already known to the Scholastics[37] that, because the syllogism requires two premises, no science can proceed from a single highest proposition that is not further derivable; rather it must have several, at least two. The properly classifying sciences: zoology, botany, also physics and chemistry, insofar as these last reduce all inorganic action to a few fundamental forces, have the most subordination; history, on the other hand, really has none at all, since the universal in it consists merely in the survey of the main periods, from which, however, the particular events cannot be derived, and to which they are subordinated only in time, coordinated in concept: hence history, strictly speaking, is indeed knowledge but not science. In mathematics, to be sure, according to the Euclidean treatment, the axioms are the only indemonstrable highest propositions and all demonstrations are strictly subordinated to them step by step: yet this treatment is not essential to it, and in fact every theorem begins a new spatial construction, which is in itself independent of the preceding ones and can really also be cognized quite independently of them, out of itself, in the pure intuition of space, in which even the most complicated construction is really as immediately evident as the axiom: but of this at length below. Meanwhile every mathematical proposition remains a universal truth, valid for countless individual cases, and a stepwise progress from the simple propositions to the complicated ones that are to be traced back to them is also essential to it: so mathematics is in every respect science.—The [38] Suarez, Disput. metaphysicae, disp. III, sect. 3, tit. 3.

perfection of a science as such, that is, in respect of form, consists in there being as much subordination and as little coordination of propositions as possible. The general scientific talent is accordingly the capacity to subordinate the concept-spheres according to their various determinations, so that, as Plato repeatedly recommends, science may not consist merely of one universal with an unsurveyable multiplicity set side by side immediately beneath it; but that knowledge may descend gradually from the most general to the particular,

through intermediate concepts and divisions made according to ever closer determinations. In Kant's terms, this means satisfying equally the law of homogeneity and that of specification. But from the very fact that this constitutes the proper scientific perfection it follows that the aim of science is not greater certainty: for the most disconnected single piece of cognition can have that just as well; rather it is the facilitation of knowledge through its form, and the possibility of completeness of knowledge thereby given. It is therefore a current but mistaken opinion that the scientific character of cognition consists in greater certainty, and equally false is the assertion that has proceeded from it, that only mathematics and logic are sciences in the proper sense; because only in them, on account of their entire apriority, is there irrefutable certainty of cognition. This latter advantage itself is not to be denied them: only it gives them no special claim to scientific character, which lies not in certainty but in the systematic form of cognition, grounded in the stepwise descent from the universal to the particular.—This path of cognition peculiar to the sciences, from the universal to the particular, brings with it that in them much is grounded by derivation from preceding propositions, that is, by proofs, and this has occasioned the old error that only what is proved is perfectly true and every truth needs a proof; whereas on the contrary every proof needs an unproved truth that in the end supports it, or again its proofs: hence a truth immediately grounded is to be preferred to one grounded by a proof, as water from the spring to that from the aqueduct. Intuition, partly pure a priori, as it grounds mathematics, partly empirical a posteriori, as it grounds all other sciences, is the source of all truth and the foundation of all science. (Only logic is to be excepted, which is founded on reason's nonintuitive but still immediate knowledge of its own laws.) Not the proved judgments, nor their proofs, but those judgments drawn directly from intuition and founded upon it in place of any proof, are in science what the sun is in the universe: for from them all light proceeds, and illuminated by it the others in turn shine. To ground directly in intuition the truth of such first judgments, to lift such foundations of science out of the unsurveyable multitude of real things: that is the work of the power of judgment, which consists in the faculty of transferring what is known intuitively correctly

and exactly into abstract consciousness, and is accordingly the mediator between understanding and reason. Only an eminent strength of it, exceeding the ordinary measure, in an individual can really advance the sciences: but to deduce, prove, and infer propositions from propositions anyone can do who has only sound reason. On the other hand, to set down and fix what is intuitively known in suitable concepts for reflection, so that on the one hand the common element of many real objects is thought through one concept, and on the other their differing elements through just as many concepts, and thus what differs, despite partial agreement, is nonetheless known and thought as different, and again what is identical, despite partial difference, as identical, all in accordance with the purpose and the consideration that prevail in each case: all this the power of judgment does. Lack of it is simple-mindedness. The simple-minded man now overlooks the partial or relative difference of what is identical in one respect, now the identity of what is relatively or partially different. Incidentally, to this explanation of the power of judgment Kant's division of it into reflecting and subsuming can also be applied, according as it goes from the intuitive objects to the concept, or from the concept to those objects, in both cases always mediating between the intuitive cognition of the understanding and the reflective cognition of reason.—There can be no truth that could unconditionally be brought out by inferences alone; rather the necessity of grounding it merely through inferences is always only relative, indeed subjective. Since all proofs are inferences, one must for a new truth seek not a proof first but immediate evidence, and only so long as this is lacking is the proof to be set up in the interim. No science can be demonstrable throughout, any more than a building can stand in the air: all its proofs must lead back to something intuitive, and therefore no longer demonstrable. For the whole world of reflection rests and is rooted on the intuitive world. All ultimate, that is, original, evidence is intuitive: the word itself betrays this. Accordingly it is either empirical, or founded on the intuition a priori of the conditions of possible experience: in both cases it therefore furnishes only immanent, not transcendent, cognition. Every concept has its value and its existence solely in its relation, however mediated, to an intuitive representation: what holds of concepts holds also of the

judgments composed of them, and of the whole sciences. Hence it must somehow be possible to cognize immediately, without proofs and inferences, every truth that is found by inferences and communicated by proofs. This is certainly most difficult in the case of some complicated mathematical propositions, which we reach only by chains of inference, for example the calculation of the chords and tangents for all arcs, by inferences from the Pythagorean theorem: yet even such a truth cannot rest essentially and solely on abstract propositions, and the spatial relations underlying it too must be capable of being brought out for pure intuition a priori in such a way that their abstract statement is immediately grounded. Of proving in mathematics, however, we shall speak at length presently.

Much is indeed said, and in a lofty tone, of sciences that rest throughout on correct inferences from certain premises and are therefore irrefutably true. But by purely logical chains of inference one will never obtain, however true the premises, more than an elucidation and development of what already lies complete in the premises: one will thus only set out explicitly what was understood there implicitly. By those lauded sciences, however, one means especially the mathematical ones, in particular astronomy. The certainty of the latter, however, comes from this: that it is based on the a priori given, and thus infallible, intuition of space, while all spatial relations follow one from another with a necessity (ground of being) that yields certainty a priori, and so can be derived from one another with certainty. To these mathematical determinations there is added here only a single force of nature, gravity, which acts precisely in proportion to the masses and the square of the distance, and finally the law of inertia, assured a priori because it follows from that of causality, together with the empirical datum of the motion impressed once and for all on each of these masses. This is the whole material of astronomy, which, as much through its simplicity as through its certainty, leads to firm results, and, by virtue of the greatness and importance of the objects, very interesting ones. For example, if I know the mass of a planet and the distance of its satellite from it, I can infer with certainty the period of revolution of the latter, according to Kepler's second law: the ground of this law, however, is that at this distance only this veloc-

ity at once binds the satellite to the planet and keeps it from falling into it.—Thus only on such a geometrical foundation, that is, by means of an intuition a priori, and moreover with the application of a law of nature, can one get far with inferences; because here they are, as it were, merely bridges from one intuitive apprehension to another; but not in the same way with mere and pure inferences, on the exclusively logical path.—The origin of the first fundamental truths of astronomy, however, is really induction, that is, the gathering up of what is given in many intuitions into a correct, immediately grounded judgment: from this hypotheses are afterward formed, whose confirmation by experience, as an induction approaching completeness, gives the proof of that first judgment. For example, the apparent motion of the planets is known empirically: after many false hypotheses on the spatial connection of this motion (planetary orbit), the correct one was at last found, then the laws it follows (the Keplerian), finally also its cause (universal gravitation), and to all the hypotheses the empirically known agreement of all occurring cases with them and with the consequences drawn from them, thus induction, gave perfect certainty. The finding of the hypothesis was a matter of the power of judgment, which correctly grasped the given fact and expressed it accordingly; induction, however, that is, manifold intuition, confirmed its truth. But even immediately, through a single empirical intuition, it could be grounded, as soon as we could range freely through the spaces of the universe and had telescopic eyes. Consequently inferences are here too not the essential and sole source of cognition, but always really only a makeshift.

Finally, to set up a third, heterogeneous example, let us note also that the so-called metaphysical truths, that is, such as Kant sets up in the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science, do not owe their evidence to proofs. What is certain a priori we cognize immediately: as the form of all cognition, we are conscious of it with the greatest necessity. For example, that matter persists, that is, can neither come into being nor pass away, we know immediately as a negative truth: for our pure intuition of space and time gives the possibility of motion; the understanding gives, in the law of causality, the possibility of change of form and quality: but for an arising or vanishing of matter we lack

the forms of representability. Hence that truth has been evident at all times, everywhere, and to everyone, and has never been seriously doubted; which could not be if its ground of knowledge were no other than so difficult a Kantian proof, stepping along on needle points. Indeed, moreover, I have (as set out in the Appendix) found Kant's proof false, and have shown above that the persistence of matter is to be derived not from the share that time has, but from the share that space has, in the possibility of experience. The real grounding of all truths called metaphysical in this sense, that is, of abstract expressions of the necessary and universal forms of knowing, cannot again lie in abstract propositions; but only in the immediate consciousness of the forms of representing, which announces itself in a priori statements that are apodictic and fear no refutation. If one nevertheless wishes to give a proof of them, this can consist only in showing that in some undoubted truth the one to be proved is already contained as a part or as a presupposition: thus I have shown, for example, that all empirical intuition already contains the application of the law of causality, whose cognition is therefore the condition of all experience and so cannot first be given and conditioned by it, as Hume asserted.—Proofs are in general less for those who want to learn than for those who want to dispute. These stubbornly deny the immediately grounded insight: only truth can be consistent on all sides; one must therefore show them that under one shape and mediately they concede what under another shape and immediately they deny, that is, the logically necessary connection between what is denied and what is conceded.

Besides, the scientific form too, namely the subordination of everything particular to a universal and so on continually upward, brings it about that the truth of many propositions is grounded only logically, namely through their dependence on other propositions, thus through inferences that at the same time appear as proofs. But one should never forget that this whole form is only a means of facilitating cognition, not a means to greater certainty. It is easier to recognize the constitution of an animal from the species to which it belongs, and so upward from the genus, the family, the order, the class, than to investigate each animal given on its own; but the truth of all propositions derived by

inferences is always only conditional and ultimately dependent on some truth that rests not on inferences but on intuition. If this latter lay always as near to us as the derivation by an inference, it would be thoroughly preferable. For all derivation from concepts, on account of the manifold interlocking of the spheres shown above and the often wavering determination of their content, is exposed to many deceptions; of which so many proofs of false doctrines and sophisms of every kind are examples.—Inferences are indeed perfectly certain in form: but they are very uncertain through their matter, the concepts; because partly the spheres of these are often not sharply enough determined, partly they intersect in such manifold ways that one sphere is partly contained in many others, and so one can arbitrarily pass from it into one or another of these and from there on again, as already set forth. Or in other words: the terminus minor and also the medius can always be subordinated to different concepts, from which one chooses at will the terminus major and the medius, whereupon the inference turns out differently.—Everywhere, consequently, immediate evidence is far preferable to the proved truth, and the latter is to be accepted only where the former would have to be fetched too far, not where it lies as near, or even nearer, than the latter. Hence we saw above that in fact in logic, where immediate cognition lies nearer to us in every single case than the derived scientific one, we always guide our thinking only by the immediate cognition of the laws of thought and leave logic unused[39].

15 If now, with our conviction that intuition is the first source of all evidence, and that relation to it, immediate or mediated, is alone absolute truth, that further the nearest way to this is always the surest, since every mediation through concepts exposes us to many deceptions;—if, I say, with this conviction we turn to mathematics as Euclid set it up as a science and as it has remained on the whole down to this day, we cannot help finding the path it takes strange, indeed perverse. We demand that every logical grounding be traced back to an intuitive one; mathematics, on the other hand, with great effort strives wantonly to reject the evidence peculiar to it, everywhere near, intuitive[40] On this see Chap. 12 of the second volume. in order to substitute a logical one for it. We must

find that this is as if someone cut off his legs in order to walk on crutches, or as if the prince in the "Triumph of Sensibility" fled from real, beautiful nature to take delight in a stage decoration that imitates it.—I must here recall what I said in the sixth chapter of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, and I presuppose it as fresh in the reader's memory and wholly present; so that I connect my remarks here with it without setting out anew the difference between the mere ground of knowledge of a mathematical truth, which can be given logically, and the ground of being, which is the immediate connection of the parts of space and time, knowable only intuitively, insight into which alone affords true satisfaction and thorough knowledge, while the mere ground of knowledge always stays on the surface, and can indeed give a knowing that it is so, but none of why it is so. Euclid went the latter way, to the evident detriment of science. For example, right at the beginning, where he ought to have shown once for all how in the triangle angles and sides mutually determine each other and are ground and consequent of one another, in accordance with the form that the principle of sufficient reason has in mere space, and which there, as everywhere, gives the necessity that one thing is as it is because something wholly different from it is as it is; instead of giving in this way a thorough insight into the essence of the triangle, he sets up a few disconnected, arbitrarily chosen propositions about the triangle and gives a logical ground of knowledge for them, through a laborious proof conducted logically according to the principle of contradiction. Instead of an exhaustive cognition of these spatial relations one therefore receives only a few results from them, arbitrarily communicated, and is in the position of someone to whom the various effects of an artificial machine are shown but its inner connection and mechanism withheld. That all that Euclid demonstrates is so one must grant, compelled by the principle of contradiction: but why it is so one does not learn. One therefore has almost the uncomfortable feeling that follows a conjuror's trick, and in fact most Euclidean proofs are strikingly similar to one. Almost always the truth enters by the back door, by resulting per accidens from some incidental circumstance. Often an apagogic proof shuts all the doors, one after another, and leaves only the one open, into which one must now go solely for that reason.

Often, as in the Pythagorean theorem, lines are drawn without one's knowing why: afterward it turns out that they were nooses that suddenly tighten and take captive the assent of the learner, who now must wonderingly concede what, in its inner connection, remains wholly incomprehensible to him, so much so that he can study the whole of Euclid through without gaining real insight into the laws of spatial relations, learning by heart in their place only a few results from them. This really empirical and unscientific cognition is like that of the physician who knows the disease and the remedy for it, but not the connection between the two. All this, however, is the consequence when one capriciously rejects the mode of grounding and evidence peculiar to a kind of cognition and forcibly introduces in its place one foreign to its nature. Meanwhile, the way in which Euclid carried this through deserves all the admiration that has fallen to him for so many centuries, and which went so far that his method of treating mathematics was declared the model of all scientific exposition, according to which men even took pains to mold all the other sciences, though later they turned back from this without very well knowing why. In our eyes, however, that method of Euclid in mathematics can appear only as a very brilliant perversity. Now one can always show, of any great error that is pursued deliberately and methodically and is moreover accompanied by general applause, whether it concern life or science, that its ground lies in the philosophy prevailing in its time.—The Eleatics first had discovered the difference, indeed the frequent conflict, between the perceived, φαινομενον, and the thought, νοουμενον[41], and had made manifold use of it [42] Kant's misuse of these Greek expressions, which is censured in the Appendix, must not be thought of here at all. in their philosophemes, and also in sophisms. They were followed later by Megarians, dialecticians, sophists, New Academics and skeptics; these called attention to the illusion, that is, the deception of the senses, or rather of the understanding which transforms their data into intuition, and which often lets us see things whose reality reason denies with certainty, for example the broken stick in water and the like. It was recognized that sensuous intuition is not to be trusted unconditionally, and one concluded hastily that only rational, logical thinking grounds truth; although Plato (in the

Parmenides), the Megarians, Pyrrho and the New Academics showed by examples (in the way Sextus Empiricus did later) how on the other side too inferences and concepts lead astray, indeed produce paralogisms and sophisms that arise far more easily and are far harder to resolve than the illusion in sensuous intuition. Meanwhile that rationalism, which had arisen in opposition to empiricism, kept the upper hand, and in accordance with it Euclid worked out mathematics, resting on intuitive evidence (φαινομενον) only the axioms, under compulsion, but everything else on inferences (νοουμενον). His method remained dominant through all the centuries, and had to remain so, as long as pure intuition a priori was not distinguished from the empirical. To be sure, Euclid's commentator Proclus seems already to have fully recognized that distinction, as the passage of that commentator shows which Kepler translated into Latin in his book de harmonia mundi: but Proclus did not lay enough weight on the matter, put it forward too much in isolation, remained unnoticed and did not prevail. Only two thousand years later, therefore, will the doctrine of Kant, which is destined to bring about such great changes in all the knowing, thinking and doing of the European peoples, occasion one in mathematics also. For only after we have learned from this great mind that the intuitions of space and time are wholly different from the empirical, wholly independent of all impression on the senses, conditioning it, not conditioned by it, that is, a priori, and therefore not at all open to the deception of the senses, only now can we see that Euclid's logical treatment of mathematics is a needless precaution, a crutch for sound legs; that it resembles a wanderer who at night, taking a bright firm road for water, takes care not to tread it, and always walks beside it on rough ground, content to bump from stretch to stretch against the supposed water. Only now can we assert with certainty that what announces itself to us as necessary in the intuition of a figure comes not from the figure, perhaps very imperfectly drawn on paper, nor from the abstract concept we think in connection with it, but immediately from the form of all cognition that is known to us a priori: this is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason; here, as form of intuition, that is, space, it is the principle of sufficient reason of being: whose evidence and validity, however, are as great and as immediate as

those of the principle of the ground of knowledge, that is, logical certainty. We therefore need not, and may not, in order to trust the latter alone, leave the proper domain of mathematics so as to accredit it on a ground wholly foreign to it, that of concepts. If we hold to that soil peculiar to mathematics, we gain the great advantage that in it the knowledge that something is so is now one with the knowledge of why it is so; whereas the Euclidean method wholly separates the two and lets us know only the former, not the latter. Aristotle, however, says quite excellently, in the Analyt. post. I, 27: "Ακριβεστερα δ' επιστημη επιστημης και προτερα, ήτε του οτι και του διοτι ή αυτη, αλλα μη χωρις του οτι, της του διοτι." (Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est scientia, quâ quod aliquid sit, et cur sit una simulque intelligimus, non separatim quod, et cur sit.) In physics, too, we are satisfied only when the cognition that something is so is united with that of why it is so: that the mercury in the Torricellian tube stands 28 inches high is a poor piece of knowledge unless it is added that it is so held by the counterweight of the air. But in mathematics the qualitas occulta of the circle, that the segments of any two chords intersecting in it always form equal rectangles, is to suffice for us? That it is so Euclid, to be sure, proves in the 35th proposition of the third book: the why is still left open. Likewise the Pythagorean theorem teaches us to know a qualitas occulta of the right-angled triangle: Euclid's stilted, indeed sly proof leaves us in the lurch at the why, and the accompanying simple figure, already familiar, gives at a glance far more than that proof, insight into the matter and inner firm conviction of that necessity and of the dependence of that property on the right angle.




Figure for the Pythagorean theorem: one shaded right isosceles triangle; the square on its hypotenuse is made of four such triangles, the two tilted squares on its legs of two each

Even with unequal legs it must be possible to bring it to such an intuitive conviction, as with every possible geometrical truth, if only because its discovery always proceeded from such an intuited necessity and the proof was devised only afterward: one needs, therefore, only an analysis of the train of thought at the first discovery of a geometrical truth in order to cognize its necessity intuitively. It is, in general, the analytic method that I wish for the presentation of mathematics, instead of the synthetic that Euclid used. To be sure, this will have, with complicated mathematical truths, very great though not insurmountable difficulties. Already here and there in Germany people begin to change the presentation of mathematics and to go more by this analytic way. Herr Kosack, teacher of mathematics and physics at the Gymnasium in Nordhausen, has done this most decidedly, by appending to the program for the school examination on April 6, 1852, a detailed attempt to treat geometry according to my principles.

To improve the method of mathematics it is chiefly required that one give up the prejudice that proved truth has any advantage over truth known intuitively, or the logical truth, resting on the principle of contradiction, over the meta-

physical, which is immediately evident and to which the pure intuition of space also belongs.


The most certain thing, and everywhere inexplicable, is the content of the principle of sufficient reason. For this, in its various forms, designates the universal form of all our representations and cognitions. All explanation is reduction to it, demonstration in the individual case of the connection of representations expressed by it in general. It is accordingly the principle of all explanation and therefore neither itself capable of an explanation nor in need of one, since every explanation already presupposes it and receives meaning only through it. Now none of its forms has an advantage over the other: it is equally certain and unprovable as principle of sufficient reason of being, or of becoming, or of acting, or of knowing. The relation of ground to consequent is, in one of its forms as in another, a necessary one, indeed it is in general the origin, as well as the sole meaning, of the concept of necessity. There is no other necessity than that of the consequent when the ground is given, and there is no ground that would not bring about necessity of the consequent. As surely, then, as from the ground of knowledge given in the premises the consequent expressed in the conclusion flows, so surely does the ground of being in space condition its consequent in space: if I have cognized the relation of these two intuitively, this certainty is as great as any logical one. Every geometrical theorem, however, is the expression of such a relation, just as much as one of the twelve axioms: it is a metaphysical truth and as such as immediately certain as the principle of contradiction itself, which is a metalogical truth and the universal foundation of all logical demonstration. Whoever denies the necessity, intuitively displayed, of the spatial relations expressed in any theorem can with equal right deny the axioms, and with equal right the consequence of the conclusion from the premises, indeed the principle of contradiction itself: for all these are equally unprovable, immediately evident relations knowable a priori. If, therefore, one wants to derive the intuitively knowable necessity of spatial relations first by a logical demonstration from the principle of contradiction, it is no different than if the immediate lord of a land were to have another first grant it to him as a fief. This, however, is what Euclid has done. Only his axioms does he, under

compulsion, let rest on immediate evidence: all the following geometrical truths are proved logically, namely, on the presupposition of those axioms, from agreement with the assumptions made in the theorem, or with an earlier theorem, or also from the contradiction of the opposite of the theorem with the assumptions, the axioms, the earlier theorems, or even with itself. But the axioms themselves have no more immediate evidence than any other geometrical theorem, only more simplicity through lesser content.

When one examines a delinquent, one takes down his statements in the record in order to judge their truth from their agreement. This, however, is a mere expedient, with which one does not rest content if one can investigate directly the truth of each of his statements by itself; especially since he could have lied consistently from the start. That first method is nevertheless the one by which Euclid investigated space. To be sure, he proceeded from the correct presupposition that nature must be consistent everywhere, thus also in her basic form, space, and that therefore, because the parts of space stand to one another in the relation of ground and consequent, no single spatial determination can be otherwise than it is without standing in contradiction to all the others. But this is a very troublesome and unsatisfying detour, which prefers mediate cognition to the equally certain immediate cognition, which further separates the cognition *that* something is from that of *why* it is, to the great detriment of science, and finally withholds from the learner insight into the laws of space altogether, indeed weans him from the proper investigation of the ground and the inner connection of things, instructing him instead to be content with a historical knowledge that it is so. The exercise of acuteness so unceasingly lauded in this method consists, however, merely in the pupil's practicing inference, that is, the application of the principle of contradiction, but especially in his straining his memory to retain all those data whose agreement is to be compared.

It is, incidentally, noteworthy that this method of proof has been applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic: rather, in arithmetic one really lets truth become evident through intuition alone, which here consists in mere counting. Since the intuition of numbers is in *time alone* and can therefore be represented by no sensuous schema, like the geometrical figure, the suspicion fell away here


that the intuition was only empirical and therefore subject to illusion, a suspicion which alone could have brought the logical mode of proof into geometry. Counting, because time has only one dimension, is the sole arithmetical operation to which all the others are to be reduced: and this counting is nothing other than intuition a priori, to which one here makes no scruple of appealing, and by which alone all the rest, every calculation, every equation, is finally verified. One does not prove, for example, that



$$\frac{7+9\times 8-2}{3}=42;$$

Formula printed on page 90: seven plus nine, that sum times eight, minus two, all over three, equals forty-two, followed by a semicolon

but one appeals to pure intuition in time, counting, thus makes each single proposition an axiom. Instead of the proofs that fill geometry, therefore, the whole content of arithmetic and algebra is a mere method of abbreviating counting. Our immediate intuition of numbers in time reaches, to be sure, as mentioned above, no further than perhaps ten: beyond this an abstract concept of number, fixed by a word, must already take the place of intuition, which is therefore no longer really carried out, but only quite definitely designated. Yet even so, through the important aid of the numerical order, which lets larger numbers always be represented by the same small ones, an intuitive evidence of every calculation is made possible, even where abstraction is called to one's aid to such an extent that not only numbers but indefinite magnitudes and whole operations are thought only in abstracto and in this respect designated, as



Formula printed on page 90: a root sign over r minus a small raised letter that the scan does not resolve, followed by a comma

so that one no longer carries them out but only indicates them.

With the same right and the same certainty as in arithmetic one could also let truth in geometry be grounded solely by pure intuition a priori. In fact it is indeed always this necessity, intuitively known in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason of being, which gives geometry its great evidence and on which the certainty of its propositions rests in everyone's consciousness: by no means is it the logical proof stalking along on stilts, which, always foreign to the matter, is mostly soon forgotten, without detriment to conviction, and could be dropped altogether without any diminution of the evidence of geometry thereby, since this is wholly independent of it and it always proves only what one already has complete conviction of beforehand by another mode of cognition: in this respect it resembles a cowardly soldier who inflicts another wound on an enemy already slain by others, and then boasts of having killed him[43].

In consequence of all this, it will, I hope, be open to no further doubt that the evidence of mathematics, which has become the model and symbol of all evidence, rests in its essence not on proofs but on immediate intuition, which here, as everywhere, is thus the ultimate ground and source of all truth. Yet the intuition which underlies mathematics has a great advantage over every other, that is, over the empirical. Namely, since it is a priori, hence independent of experience, which is always given only partially and successively, everything lies equally near to it, and one can start at will from the ground or from the consequent. This now gives it complete infallibility, in that in it the consequent is cognized from the ground, which cognition alone has necessity: for example, the equality of the sides is known [44] Spinoza, who is always boasting of proceeding more geometrico, has really done so even more than he himself knew.

For what was certain and settled for him from an immediate, intuitive apprehension of the essence of the world he seeks to demonstrate logically, independently of that cognition. The intended result, however, which was certain to him beforehand, he attains of course only by taking arbitrarily self-made concepts (substantia, causa sui, etc.) as his starting point and allowing himself in proving all those arbitrarinesses for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres affords convenient opportunity. The true and most excellent part of his doctrine is therefore, in his case also, wholly independent of the proofs, just as in geometry.

On this see Chap. 13 of the second volume. as grounded in the equality of the angles; whereas all empirical intuition and the greater part of all experience goes only conversely from the consequent to the ground, which mode of cognition is not infallible, since necessity belongs only to the consequent, insofar as the ground is given, but not to the cognition of the ground from the consequent, since the same consequent can arise from different grounds. This latter kind of cognition is always only induction: that is, from many consequents that point to one ground, the ground is assumed as certain; but since the cases can never be all together, the truth here too is never unconditionally certain. This kind of truth alone, however, belongs to all cognition through sensuous intuition and to by far the most of experience. The affection of a sense occasions an inference of the understanding from the effect to the cause: but since the inference from the grounded to the ground is never certain, false illusion, as deception of the senses, is possible and often actual, as set out above. Only when several or all five senses receive affections that point to the same cause has the possibility of illusion become extremely small, yet it is still present: for in certain cases, for example by counterfeit coin, one deceives the whole sensibility. All empirical cognition is in the same case, and consequently the whole of natural science, its pure (according to Kant metaphysical) part set aside. Here too the causes are cognized from the effects: hence all natural science rests on hypotheses, which are often false and then gradually give place to more correct ones. Only in experiments deliberately made does cognition go from the cause to the effect, thus the sure way: but these themselves are first undertaken as a result of

hypotheses. For that reason no branch of natural science, for example physics, or astronomy, or physiology, could be found at a stroke, as mathematics or logic could; rather it needed, and needs, the collected and compared experiences of many centuries. Only manifold empirical confirmation brings the induction on which the hypothesis rests so near to completeness that for practice it takes the place of certainty, and the hypothesis's origin is considered as little prejudicial to it as the incommensurability of straight and curved lines is to the application of geometry, or the unattainable perfect exactness of the logarithm to arithmetic: for as one brings the quadrature of the circle and the logarithm infinitely near to exactness by infinite fractions, so also through manifold experience induction, that is, the cognition of the ground from the consequents, is brought to mathematical evidence, that is, the cognition of the consequent from the ground, not indeed infinitely near, but yet so near that the possibility of deception becomes small enough to be neglected. It is present, however, nonetheless: for example, an inference from innumerable cases to all, that is, really to the unknown ground on which all depend, is likewise an inductive inference. Now what inference of this kind seems surer than that all men have the heart on the left side? Yet there are, as most rare, wholly isolated exceptions, men whose heart is on the right side.—Sensuous intuition and empirical science have, then, the same kind of evidence. The advantage that mathematics, pure natural science and logic have over them as cognitions a priori rests merely on this, that the formal element of the cognitions, on which all apriority is grounded, is given entire and at once, and therefore here one can always go from the ground to the consequent, there, however, mostly only from the consequent to the ground. In itself, incidentally, the law of causality, or the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, which guides empirical cognition, is just as certain as those other forms of the principle of sufficient reason which the above sciences follow a priori.—Logical proofs from concepts, or inferences, have as well as cognition through intuition a priori the advantage of going from ground to consequent, by which they are in themselves, that is, in their form, infallible. This has contributed much to bringing proofs in general into such great esteem. But this infallibility of theirs is a relative one: they merely sub-

sume under the higher propositions of science: but these are what contain the whole fund of truth of the science, and they may not in turn be merely proved, but must be grounded on intuition, which in those few sciences named is a pure intuition a priori, but otherwise is always empirical and raised to the universal only by induction. If, then, in the empirical sciences too the particular is proved from the universal, the universal has yet again received its truth only from the particular, is only a storehouse of gathered supplies, no self-producing soil.

So much for the grounding of truth.—On the origin and possibility of error, many explanations have been attempted since Plato's figurative solutions of it, of the dovecote where one seizes the wrong dove, and so on (Theaetet., p. 167 ff.). Kant's vague, indefinite explanation of the origin of error, by means of the image of diagonal motion, is found in the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 294 of the first and p. 350 of the fifth edition.—Since truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of knowledge, it is certainly a problem how the one judging can really believe he has such a ground and yet has none, that is, how error, the deception of reason, is possible. I find this possibility wholly analogous to that of illusion, or deception of the understanding, which has been explained above. My opinion, namely (and this gives this explanation just here its place), is that every error is an inference from the consequent to the ground, which holds good where one knows that the consequent can have that ground and absolutely no other; but otherwise not. The erring man either posits for the consequent a ground that it cannot possibly have; in which case he shows a real lack of understanding, that is, of the capacity of immediate cognition of the connection between cause and effect: or else, which is more often the case, he assigns to the consequent a ground that is indeed possible, but adds to the major premise of his inference from the consequent to the ground that the said consequent always arises only from the ground he has stated, to which only a complete induction could entitle him, which, however, he presupposes without having made it: that "always" is thus too wide a concept, in place of which only "sometimes" or "mostly" should stand; whereby the conclusion would turn out problematic and as such not erroneous. That the erring man proceeds in

the manner stated is due either to haste, or to too limited a knowledge of the possibility, because of which he does not know the necessity of the induction to be made. Error, then, is wholly analogous to illusion. Both are inferences from the consequent to the ground: illusion always carried out according to the law of causality and by the mere understanding, thus immediately in the intuition itself; error, carried out according to all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, by reason, thus in thinking proper, most frequently, however, likewise according to the law of causality, as the following three examples attest, which one may regard as types or representatives of three kinds of errors. 1) Sense illusion (deception of the understanding) occasions error (deception of reason), for example when one takes a painting for a high relief and really believes it to be one; this happens through an inference from the following major premise: "If dark gray passes in places through all nuances into white, the cause is always light, which strikes elevations and depressions unequally: ergo —." 2) "If money is missing from my cash box, the cause is always that my servant has a skeleton key: ergo—." 3) "If the image of the sun refracted by the prism, that is, shifted up or down, appears, instead of round and white as before, now elongated and colored, the cause is once and for all that homogeneous rays of light, differently colored and at the same time differently refrangible, have been lodged in the light, which, moved apart by their different refrangibility, now show an elongated and at the same time many-colored image: ergo —bibamus!"—To such an inference from a major premise, often only falsely generalized, hypothetical, arising from the assumption of a ground for the consequent, every error must be traceable; only not, perhaps, errors of calculation, which are not really errors at all but mere mistakes: the operation which the concepts of the numbers indicated was not carried out in pure intuition, counting; but another in its place.

As for the content of the sciences in general, this is really always the relation of the world's appearances to one another, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, and along the guiding thread of the Why, which has validity and meaning only through that principle. The demonstration of that relation is called explanation. Explanation can therefore never go further than to show

two representations standing to each other in the relation that the form of the principle of sufficient reason prevailing in their class prescribes. Once it has reached this point, no further Why can be asked: for the relation demonstrated is the one that absolutely cannot be represented otherwise, that is, it is the form of all knowledge. Hence no one asks why 2 + 2 = 4; or why equality of angles in a triangle determines equality of sides; or why a given cause is followed by its effect; or why the truth of the conclusion is evident from the truth of the premises. Every explanation that does not lead back to a relation about which no further Why can be demanded comes to rest in an assumed qualitas occulta: and of this kind is every original force of nature. At such a force every explanation in natural science must finally come to a halt, that is, at something wholly dark: it must therefore leave the inner essence of a stone just as unexplained as that of a human being; it can account as little for the gravity, cohesion, chemical properties and so on that the former exhibits as for the knowing and acting of the latter. Gravity, for example, is a qualitas occulta: for it can be thought away, and so does not issue from the form of knowledge as something necessary; the law of inertia, by contrast, is another matter, since it follows from the law of causality, so that a reduction to it is a perfectly sufficient explanation. For two things are absolutely inexplicable, that is, cannot be traced back to the relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses: first, the principle of sufficient reason itself, in all its four forms, because it is the principle of all explanation, that in relation to which alone explanation has meaning; and second, that which this principle does not reach, but from which the original element in all appearances proceeds: this is the thing in itself, whose cognition is not at all of the kind that is subject to the principle of sufficient reason. This latter must here remain wholly uncomprehended, since it can become intelligible only through the following book, in which we shall also take up again this consideration of what the sciences are able to accomplish. But where natural science, indeed every science, leaves things standing, because not only its explanation of them but even the principle of that explanation, the principle of sufficient reason, leads no further than this point, there philosophy properly takes the things up again and considers them in its own manner, which is entirely different

from that of the sciences.—In the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 51, I have shown how in the different sciences one or another form of that principle serves as the chief guiding thread: indeed the most fitting classification of the sciences might perhaps be made on this basis. Every explanation given along such a thread is, however, as I said, only ever relative: it explains things in relation to one another, but always leaves something unexplained, which it already presupposes. In mathematics this is space and time; in mechanics, physics and chemistry, matter, the qualities, the original forces, the laws of nature; in botany and zoology, the diversity of species and life itself; in history, the human race with all its peculiarities of thinking and willing;—in all of them, the principle of sufficient reason in whatever form is applicable in each case.—Philosophy has this peculiarity, that it presupposes nothing whatever as known, but everything is equally strange to it and a problem: not only the relations of appearances but the appearances themselves, indeed the principle of sufficient reason itself, to which the other sciences are content to trace everything back, though by such a tracing back nothing would be gained for philosophy, since one member of the series is as strange to it as the next; moreover, that kind of connection is for it just as much a problem as what is linked by it, and the linked thing, again, is as much a problem after the connection has been shown as before. For, as I said, precisely what the sciences presuppose, and lay at the foundation of their explanations, and set as their limit, is the very problem of philosophy, which therefore begins where the sciences leave off. Proofs cannot be its foundation: for proofs derive unknown propositions from known ones, whereas for philosophy everything is equally unknown and strange. There can be no proposition in consequence of which the world with all its appearances would first exist: hence a philosophy cannot be derived by demonstration ex firmis principiis, as Spinoza wanted. Philosophy, moreover, is the most general knowledge, whose main propositions therefore cannot be consequences drawn from another, still more general one. The principle of contradiction merely establishes the agreement of concepts; it does not itself supply concepts. The principle of sufficient reason explains connections among appearances, not the appearances themselves: hence philosophy cannot set out

to seek a causa efficiens or a causa finalis of the whole world. The present philosophy, at least, by no means seeks *from where* or *to what end* the world exists, but merely *what* the world is. Here the Why is subordinate to the What: for it already belongs to the world, since it arises solely through the form of the world's appearance, the principle of sufficient reason, and only to that extent has meaning and validity. One might indeed say that what the world is, everyone knows without further help, being himself the subject of knowing, whose representation the world is; and to that extent this would be true. But that knowledge is intuitive, is in concreto: to reproduce it in abstracto, to raise the successive, changing intuition, and in general everything that the wide concept *feeling* embraces and designates only negatively, as not abstract, distinct knowledge, to raise all this precisely into such knowledge, into an abiding knowledge, is the task of philosophy. It must accordingly be a statement in abstracto of the essence of the whole world, of the whole as of all its parts. Yet in order not to lose itself in an endless multitude of particular judgments, it must make use of abstraction and think everything particular in the universal, and its differences too again in the universal: hence it will partly separate, partly unite, so as to deliver to knowledge the entire manifold of the world, according to its essence, gathered into a few abstract concepts. Through those concepts, however, in which it fixes the essence of the world, the wholly particular must be known as well as the universal, so that the knowledge of both must be bound together with the utmost exactness: hence the capacity for philosophy consists precisely in what Plato made it consist in, in knowing the One in the many and the many in the One. Philosophy will accordingly be a sum of very general judgments, whose ground of knowledge is immediately the world itself in its entirety, excluding nothing: that is, everything that is to be found in human consciousness: it will be *a complete repetition, as it were a mirroring, of the world in abstract concepts*, which is possible only by uniting what is essentially identical in *one* concept and setting apart what is different in another. Bacon of Verulam already set this task for philosophy when he said: ea demum vera est philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud est, quam ejusdem simulacrum et reflectio,

neque addit quidquam de proprio, sed tantum iterat et resonat. (de augm. scient., L. 2, c. 13). We take this, however, in a wider sense than Bacon could then have thought.

The agreement which all sides and parts of the world have with one another, precisely because they belong to one whole, must also be found again in that abstract image of the world. Accordingly, in that sum of judgments one could to some extent be derived from another, and always reciprocally. But for this they must first of all exist, and therefore be set up beforehand as grounded immediately in knowledge of the world in concreto, all the more because all immediate grounding is surer than mediate. Their harmony with one another, by virtue of which they even flow together into the unity of *one* thought, and which springs from the harmony and unity of the perceptual world itself, their common ground of knowledge, will therefore not be used as the first thing for their grounding, but will come in only as a confirmation of their truth.—This task itself can become perfectly clear only through its solution [45].

16 After this entire consideration of reason, as a faculty of knowledge belonging to man alone and special to him, and of the achievements and phenomena it brings about, which are peculiar to human nature, there would now remain for me to speak of [46] On this see chap. 17 of the second volume.

reason insofar as it guides the actions of human beings, and may therefore in this respect be called *practical*. But most of what is to be mentioned here has already found its place elsewhere, namely in the Appendix to this work, where I had to dispute the existence of the so-called practical reason of Kant, which he (very conveniently, to be sure) presents as the immediate source of all virtue and as the seat of an absolute (that is, fallen from heaven) Ought. The detailed and thorough refutation of this Kantian principle of morals I supplied later, in the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics."—I have therefore only a little more to say here about the real influence of reason, in the true sense of the word, upon conduct. Already at the entrance to our consideration of reason we remarked in general how greatly the doing and living of the human being differ from those of the animal, and that this difference is to be regarded solely as a consequence

of the presence of abstract concepts in consciousness. The influence of these on our whole existence is so thoroughgoing and so significant that it places us in relation to the animals in some measure as the seeing animals stand to the eyeless (certain larvae, worms and zoophytes): the latter know, through touch alone, only what is immediately present to them in space, what touches them; the seeing, on the other hand, know a wide circle of the near and the far. In just the same way the absence of reason confines the animals to the perceptual representations, that is, real objects, immediately present to them in time: we, on the contrary, by virtue of knowledge in abstracto, embrace, besides the narrow actual present, the whole past and future as well, together with the wide realm of possibility: we survey life freely on every side, far beyond the present and the actual. What the eye is, then, in space and for sensuous knowledge, reason is in some measure in time and for inner knowledge. But just as the visibility of objects has its value and significance only in that it announces their tangibility, so the whole value of abstract knowledge always lies in its relation to the perceptual. Hence the natural man too always sets much more value on what is known immediately and perceptually than on abstract concepts, on the merely thought: he prefers empirical knowledge to logical. The opposite is the disposition of those who live more in words than in deeds, who have looked more into paper and books than into the real world, and who in their extreme degeneration become pedants and men of the letter. Only from this is it comprehensible how Leibniz, together with Wolf and all their successors, could go so far astray as to declare, following the lead of Duns Scotus, that perceptual knowledge is only a confused abstract knowledge! To the honor of Spinoza I must mention that his truer sense declared, conversely, all general concepts to have arisen from the confusion of what is known perceptually. (Eth. II, prop. 40, Schol. 1.)—From that perverted disposition it also sprang that in mathematics the evidence peculiar to it was rejected, so that logical evidence alone might count; that every knowledge that is not abstract was comprised under the wide name feeling and held in low esteem; and finally that Kantian ethics declared the pure good will, which responds immediately upon knowledge of the circumstances and leads

to doing right and doing good, to be worthless and without merit, as mere feeling and a surge of emotion, and would grant moral worth only to action that has proceeded from abstract maxims.

The comprehensive survey of life as a whole, which man has over the animal through reason, may also be compared to a geometrical, colorless, abstract, reduced ground plan of his life's path. He stands to the animal as the navigator, who by means of chart, compass and quadrant knows his course exactly, and his position at any moment on the sea, stands to the ignorant crew that sees only the waves and the sky. It is therefore worth reflecting on, indeed wonderful, how man, besides his life in concreto, always leads a second one in abstracto. In the first he is delivered over to all the storms of reality and to the influence of the present; he must strive, suffer, die, like the animal. But his life in abstracto, as it stands before his rational reflection, is the quiet mirroring of the first and of the world in which he lives; it is the reduced ground plan just mentioned. Here, in the realm of calm deliberation, what there possesses him wholly and moves him violently appears cold, colorless, and for the moment foreign: here he is a mere spectator and observer. In this withdrawal into reflection he is like an actor who has played his scene and, until he must appear again, takes his place among the audience, from where he calmly watches whatever may be going on, even if it is the preparation for his own death (in the play), but then goes back and acts and suffers as he must. From this double life springs that human composure, so very different from animal thoughtlessness, with which a man, after previous deliberation, a resolution taken, or a necessity recognized, coolly lets happen to himself, or carries out, what is for him most important and often most terrible: suicide, execution, the duel, perilous ventures of every kind, and in general things against which his whole animal nature revolts. Then one sees to what degree reason becomes master of the animal nature, and calls out to the strong man: σιδηρειον νυ τοι ἦτορ! (ferreum certe tibi cor!) Il. 24, 521. Here, one can truly say, reason expresses itself practically: and so, everywhere that doing is guided by reason, where the motives are abstract concepts, where what determines is neither perceptual, particular representations nor the impression of the moment, which guides the animal, there practi-

cal reason shows itself. But that this is wholly distinct from, and independent of, the ethical worth of action; that acting rationally and acting virtuously are two quite different things; that reason is found united just as well with great malice as with great goodness, and by its accession first lends great efficacy to the one as to the other; that it is equally ready and serviceable for the methodical, consistent execution of the noble purpose as of the bad, of the prudent maxim as of the imprudent, which its feminine nature—receiving and preserving, not itself begetting—brings with it: all this I have set out at length in the Appendix and illustrated by examples. What was said there would stand here in its proper place, but on account of the polemic against Kant's alleged practical reason it had to be moved there; to which, therefore, I refer back again from here.

The most perfect development of practical reason, in the true and genuine sense of the word, the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of his reason, and on which his difference from the animal shows itself most clearly, is presented as an ideal in the Stoic sage. For Stoic ethics is originally and essentially not a doctrine of virtue at all, but merely instruction for the rational life, whose goal and purpose is happiness through peace of mind. A virtuous way of life enters into it only per accidens, as a means, not as an end. Hence Stoic ethics, in its whole nature and point of view, is fundamentally different from the ethical systems that press directly for virtue, such as the teachings of the Vedas, of Plato, of Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoic ethics is happiness: τελος το ευδαιμονειν (virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem), it says in the account of the Stoa in Stobaeus. (Ecl., L. II, c. 7, p. 114, and likewise p. 138.) Yet Stoic ethics demonstrates that happiness is to be found with certainty only in inner peace and tranquillity of mind (αταραξια), and that this in turn is to be reached only through virtue: this alone is what the expression means, that virtue is the highest good. If, however, the end is gradually forgotten in favor of the means, and virtue is recommended in a way that betrays an interest quite other than that of one's own happiness, since it contradicts that too plainly, this is one of those inconsistencies by which, in every system, the truth that is immediately known, or, as one says, felt, leads back to the right path, doing vio-

lence to the inferences; as one sees plainly, for example, in the ethics of Spinoza, which derives a pure doctrine of virtue from the egoistic suum utile quaerere by means of palpable sophisms. As I have grasped the spirit of Stoic ethics, its origin lies in the thought of whether man's great prerogative, reason, which indirectly, through planned action and what proceeds from it, so greatly lightens life and its burdens, might not also be capable of withdrawing him immediately, that is, by mere knowledge, from the sufferings and torments of every kind that fill his life, at one stroke, either entirely or at least almost entirely. It was thought unbefitting to the excellence of reason that the being endowed with it, who through it embraces and surveys an infinity of things and conditions, should nevertheless be given over, by the present and by the incidents that the few years of so short, fleeting, uncertain a life can contain, to such violent pains, such great anxiety and suffering as spring from the tempestuous urge of desiring and shunning; and it was held that the proper application of reason must be able to lift man above all this and make him invulnerable. Hence Antisthenes said: Δει κτασθαι νουν, η βροχον (aut mentem parandam, aut laqueum. Plut. de stoic. repugn., c. 14), that is, life is so full of torments and vexations that one must either, by means of corrected thoughts, set oneself above it, or leave it. It was seen that privation, suffering, did not arise immediately and necessarily from not having, but only from wanting to have and yet not having; that this wanting to have is therefore the necessary condition under which alone not having becomes privation and produces pain. Ου πενια λυπην εργαζεται, αλλα επιθυμια (non paupertas dolorem efficit, sed cupiditas), Epict. fragm. 25. It was recognized, moreover, from experience that it is merely hope, merely the claim, that begets and nourishes the wish; hence we are troubled and tormented neither by the many evils common to all and unavoidable, nor by unattainable goods, but only by the insignificant more or less of what a man can evade and attain; indeed, that not only the absolutely but even the relatively unattainable or unavoidable leaves us quite calm; that the evils which are once for all attached to our individuality, or the goods which must necessarily remain denied to it, are therefore regarded with indifference; and that, in accordance with this human peculiarity, every wish soon dies away, and so can no

longer produce pain, if only no hope gives it nourishment. From all this it followed that all happiness rests only on the relation between our claims and what we receive: how great or small the two magnitudes of this relation are is immaterial, and the relation can be established as well by reducing the first magnitude as by enlarging the second: and likewise that all suffering really proceeds from the disproportion between what we demand and expect and what comes to us, a disproportion which plainly lies only in knowledge [47] and could be removed entirely by better insight. Hence Chrysippus said: δει ζην κατ' εμπειριαν των φυσει συμβαινοντων (Stob. Ecl., L. II, c. 7, p. 134), that is, one should live with proper knowledge of the course of things in the world. For whenever a man in any way loses his composure, is struck to the ground by misfortune, or flies into a rage, or loses heart, he shows by this very thing that he finds things otherwise than he expected, and consequently that he was caught in error, did not know the world and life, did not know how inanimate nature, by chance, and animate nature, by opposed purposes and even by malice, crosses the will of the individual at every step: he has therefore either not used his reason to arrive at a general knowledge of this character of life, or else he lacks power of judgment, if what he knows in general he nevertheless fails to recognize in the particular case, and is therefore surprised by it and thrown off balance [48]. So too every lively joy is an error, a delusion, because no attained wish can satisfy permanently, and also because every possession and every piece of good fortune is lent by chance only for an indefinite time, and can therefore be demanded back in the very next hour. Every pain, however, rests on the disappearance of such a delusion: both therefore arise [49] Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα. (Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus opiniones.) Epictet., c. V.

50 Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοζειν ταις επι μερους. (Haec est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus.) Epict.

dissert., III, 26. from faulty knowledge: the sage therefore always remains aloof from jubilation as from pain, and no event disturbs his αταραξια.

In keeping with this spirit and purpose of the Stoa, Epictetus begins with, and constantly returns to, as the kernel of his wisdom, the point that one should consider well and distinguish what depends on us and what does not, and therefore should in no way count upon the latter; whereby one will reliably remain free from all pain, suffering and anxiety. But what depends on us is the will alone: and here a gradual transition to the doctrine of virtue takes place, in that it is observed that, just as the external world, which does not depend on us, determines good fortune and misfortune, so from the will there arises inner contentment or discontent with ourselves. Afterwards, however, the question was raised whether the names bonum et malum should be given to the former pair or to the latter. This was really arbitrary and a matter of preference, and made no difference to the matter. But the Stoics nevertheless disputed over it without end with the Peripatetics and Epicureans, entertaining themselves with the inadmissible comparison of two wholly incommensurable magnitudes and with the opposed, paradoxical pronouncements arising from it, which they hurled at one another. An interesting compilation of these, from the Stoic side, is furnished by the Paradoxa of Cicero.

Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have taken a somewhat different course. His starting point was this: that to attain the highest good, that is, blessedness through peace of mind, one should live in agreement with oneself. (ὁμολογουμενως ζην· τουτο δ' εστι καθ' ενα λογον και συμφωνον ζην.— Consonanter vivere: hoc est secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere. Stob. Ecl. eth., L. II, c. 7, p. 132. Likewise: αρετην διαθεσιν ειναι ψυχης συμφωνον έαυτῃ περι ολον τον βιον. Virtutem esse animi affectionem secum per totam vitam consentientem, ibid., p. 104.) Now this was possible only if one determined oneself throughout rationally, by concepts, and not by changing impressions and moods; but since only the maxim of our action, not the outcome or the external circumstances, is in our power, one had, in order to remain always consistent, to make the former alone, not the latter, one's aim; whereby the doctrine of virtue is again introduced.

But even Zeno's immediate successors found his moral principle—to live in agreement—too formal and empty of content. They therefore gave it material content by the addition: "to live in agreement with nature" (ὁμολογουμενως τῃ φυσει ζην.); which, as Stobaeus reports in the passage cited, was first added by Cleanthes, and pushed the matter very far afield, through the great sphere of the concept and the indefiniteness of the expression. For Cleanthes meant universal nature as a whole, but Chrysippus meant human nature in particular (Diog. Laërt., 7, 89). What alone is fitting for the latter was then to be virtue, just as satisfaction of animal drives is for the animal natures, whereby a forced turn back into the doctrine of virtue was again made, and, bend or break, ethics was to be grounded on physics. For the Stoics everywhere aimed at unity of principle: as indeed God and the world were by no means two different things for them.

Stoic ethics, taken as a whole, is in fact a very valuable and respectable attempt to use man's great prerogative, reason, for an important and salutary purpose, namely to lift him above the sufferings and pains to which every life is subject, by an instruction "Qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum: Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido, Ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes." and thereby to make him share in the highest degree in the dignity that belongs to him as a rational being, in contrast to the animal, and of which, in this sense, one can indeed speak, not in any other.—This view of mine of Stoic ethics made it necessary that it be mentioned here, in presenting what reason is and what it is able to accomplish. However far that aim can be attained to a certain degree by the application of reason and by a merely rational ethics—as experience also shows that those purely rational characters whom one commonly calls practical philosophers (and rightly, because, as the real, that is the theoretical, philosopher carries life over into the concept, they carry the concept over into life) are probably the happiest—yet it falls very far short of anything perfect coming about in this way, and of rightly used reason really being able to withdraw us from all the burden and suffering of life and lead us to blessedness. Rather, there lies a perfect contradiction in wanting to live without suffering, a contradiction which the often-used phrase "blessed life" therefore carries

within it: this will certainly be clear to anyone who has grasped my following exposition to the end. This contradiction already reveals itself in that ethics of pure reason itself, in that the Stoic is compelled to weave into his instruction for the blessed life (for that his ethics always remains) a recommendation of suicide (as among the splendid ornaments and furnishings of Oriental despots a precious little flask of poison is also found), namely for the case where the sufferings of the body, which no propositions and inferences can philosophize away, are overwhelming and incurable, his sole aim, blessedness, is thus frustrated after all, and nothing remains by which to escape suffering but death, which is then, however, to be taken with indifference, like any other medicine. Here a strong contrast becomes evident between Stoic ethics and all those mentioned above, which make virtue in itself and immediately the aim, even amid the severest sufferings, and do not want a man to end his life in order to flee suffering; although none of them all knew how to state the true ground for rejecting suicide, but laboriously scrape together all sorts of specious grounds: in the fourth book that ground will emerge in the connection of our consideration. But the above contrast reveals and confirms precisely the essential difference, lying in the fundamental principle, between the Stoa, which is really after all only a particular eudaemonism, and those doctrines mentioned, although the two often coincide in their results and have an apparent kinship. The inner contradiction mentioned above, however, with which Stoic ethics is afflicted even in its fundamental thought, shows itself further also in that its ideal, the Stoic sage, could never gain, in the very presentation given of him, life or inner poetic truth, but remains a wooden, stiff lay figure, with whom one can do nothing, who himself does not know what to do with his wisdom, whose perfect calm, contentment, blessedness flatly contradicts the nature of humanity and does not let us arrive at any intuitive representation of it. How wholly different, placed beside him, appear the world-conquerors and voluntary penitents whom Indian wisdom sets before us and has really produced, or even the Savior of Christianity, that excellent figure, full of profound life, of the greatest poetic truth and highest significance, who nevertheless, in perfect virtue, holiness and sublimity, stands before us in a state of supreme suffering [51].

[52] On this see chap. 16 of the second volume.

Book II



First Consideration of the World as Will: The Objectification of the Will.

Nos habitat, non tartara, sed nec sidera coeli: Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, illa facit.

17 In the first book we considered representation only as such, and so only according to its universal form. As for abstract representation, the concept, we did indeed come to know it in its content as well, in so far as it has all content and meaning solely through its relation to the intuitive representation, without which it would be worthless and empty. Referred thus wholly to the intuitive representation, we shall want to learn its content too, its closer determinations, and the shapes it sets before us. Above all it will matter to us to obtain an elucidation of its real meaning, that meaning of it which is otherwise only felt, by virtue of which these images do not, as they otherwise must, pass before us wholly strange and meaningless, but speak to us directly, are understood, and acquire an interest that lays claim to our whole being.

We turn our gaze to mathematics, natural science and philosophy, each of which lets us hope that it will give a part of the elucidation we desire.—But first of all we find philosophy a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a different language. They are not, to be sure, all at odds with one another on the point raised here, the meaning of that intuitive representation: for, with the exception of the skeptics and idealists, the others speak, in the main, fairly con-

sistently of an object that is supposed to underlie the representation, one that is indeed different from the representation in its whole being and essence, yet in all respects as like it as one egg is to another. But this will not help us: for we do not know how to distinguish such an object from the representation at all; we find, rather, that the two are only one and the same, since every object always and forever presupposes a subject and therefore remains representation; as we have, indeed, recognized being-an-object as belonging to the most universal form of representation, which is precisely the splitting into object and subject. Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason, on which people rely here, is likewise for us only a form of representation, namely the lawful connection of one representation with another, but not the connection of the whole series of representations, finite or endless, with something that would not be representation at all, and therefore cannot even be represented.—Of the skeptics and idealists, however, we spoke above, in discussing the dispute over the reality of the external world.

If now, for the closer knowledge we desire of that intuitive representation, which has become known to us only quite generally, according to its mere form, we turn to mathematics, it will speak to us of those representations only in so far as they fill time and space, that is, in so far as they are magnitudes. It will state the how-many and the how-great with the greatest exactness: but since this is always only relative, that is, a comparison of one representation with others, and indeed only in that one-sided respect of magnitude, this too will not be the information we mainly seek.

If we look, finally, at the wide domain of natural science, divided into many fields, we can first distinguish two main divisions of it. It is either description of shapes, which I call morphology, or explanation of changes, which I call etiology. The former considers the abiding forms, the latter the changing matter, according to the laws of its passage from one form into another. The former is what is called natural history, though improperly, in its whole extent: as botany and zoology in particular it makes us acquainted with the different organic shapes, abiding amid the ceaseless change of individuals and thereby firmly determined, which make up a great part of the content of intuitive representa-

tion: it classifies them, separates and unites them, arranges them in natural and artificial systems, and brings them under concepts which make an overview and knowledge of them all possible. There is further demonstrated an analogy among them, running through all and infinitely nuanced, in the whole and in the parts (unité de plan), by virtue of which they resemble very manifold variations on a theme that is not given. The passage of matter into those shapes, that is, the origin of individuals, is no main part of the inquiry, since every individual proceeds from one like itself through generation, which, everywhere equally mysterious, has so far eluded clear knowledge: the little that is known of it, however, finds its place in physiology, which already belongs to etiological natural science. Mineralogy, which belongs in the main to morphology, also already inclines toward this, especially where it becomes geology. Etiology proper comprises all those branches of natural science in which knowledge of cause and effect is the main thing: these teach how, according to an unfailing rule, one state of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other; how a certain change necessarily conditions and brings about another, definite one: which demonstration is called explanation. Here we find chiefly mechanics, physics, chemistry, physiology.

But when we give ourselves up to their instruction, we soon become aware that the information we chiefly seek is no more vouchsafed us by etiology than by morphology. The latter sets before us countless shapes, infinitely manifold and yet related by an unmistakable family likeness, which for us are representations that on this path remain eternally strange, and, if considered only in this way, stand before us like uncomprehended hieroglyphs.—Etiology, on the other hand, teaches us that, according to the law of cause and effect, this particular state of matter brings about that other, and with that it has explained it and done its part. In reality, however, it does nothing more than demonstrate the lawful order in which the states occur in space and time, and teach for all cases which appearance must necessarily occur at this time, in this place: it thus assigns them their position in time and space, according to a law whose definite content experience has taught, but whose universal form and necessity we are conscious of independently of it. About the inner essence of any one of those

appearances, however, we obtain thereby not the slightest elucidation: this is called a natural force, and lies outside the domain of etiological explanation, which calls the unchanging constancy with which the manifestation of such a force occurs, whenever the conditions known to it are present, a law of nature. This law of nature, these conditions, this occurrence in respect of a definite place at a definite time, are, however, all that etiology knows and can ever know. The force itself that manifests itself, the inner essence of the appearances occurring according to those laws, remains to it eternally a secret, something wholly strange and unknown, in the simplest appearance as in the most complex. For although etiology has so far achieved its aim most completely in mechanics and least completely in physiology, yet the force by virtue of which a stone falls to the ground, or one body pushes another away, is, in its inner essence, no less strange and mysterious to us than that which produces the movements and growth of an animal. Mechanics presupposes matter, gravity, impenetrability, communicability of motion by impact, rigidity and so on as unfathomable, calls them natural forces, calls their necessary and regular appearance under certain conditions a law of nature, and only then begins its explanation, which consists in stating faithfully and with mathematical exactness how, where and when each force manifests itself, and in referring every appearance that comes before it back to one of those forces. Physics, chemistry and physiology do the same in their own domains, except that they presuppose far more and achieve less. Accordingly even the most perfect etiological explanation of the whole of nature would really never be more than a catalogue of inexplicable forces, and a sure statement of the rule by which their appearances occur in time and space, succeed one another, and make way for one another: but the inner essence of the forces that thus appear it would have to leave always unexplained, because the law it follows does not lead to this, and it would have to stop at the appearance and its order. In this respect it could be compared to a section cut through marble, which shows many veins side by side, but does not let us trace the course of those veins in the interior of the marble up to that surface. Or if I may allow myself a jesting comparison, because it is more striking—with the etiology of the whole of nature completed, the philosophical inquirer would still

have to feel always like someone who, without knowing how, has fallen into a company wholly unknown to him, whose members, one after another, present each other to him as friend and cousin, and so make him sufficiently acquainted: but he himself, while assuring each person presented, every time, of his pleasure, has the question constantly on his lips: "But how the devil did I come to be in this whole company?"

Thus etiology too can never give us, regarding those appearances which we know only as our representations, the desired elucidation that would lead us beyond them. For after all its explanations they still stand before us wholly strange, as mere representations whose meaning we do not understand. The causal connection gives only the rule and the relative order of their occurrence in space and time, but does not teach us to know more closely what thus occurs. Moreover, the law of causality itself holds only for representations, for objects of a certain class, under whose presupposition alone it has meaning: it is, therefore, like these objects themselves, always there only in relation to the subject, and so conditionally; which is why it is known just as well when one starts from the subject, that is, a priori, as when one starts from the object, that is, a posteriori, as Kant has taught us.

But what now drives us to inquiry is precisely that it does not satisfy us to know that we have representations, that they are such and such, and are connected according to these and those laws, whose universal expression is always the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the meaning of that representation: we ask whether this world is nothing more than representation; in which case it would have to pass before us like an insubstantial dream, or a ghostly aerial structure, not worth our notice; or whether it is something else besides, something more, and what that then may be. So much is equally certain, that what is asked after must be something wholly and in its whole nature fundamentally different from representation, to which therefore its forms and its laws must be wholly foreign; that from representation, therefore, one cannot arrive at it along the guiding thread of those laws which connect only objects, representations, with one another; which are the forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

We see already here that the essence of things can never be got at *from without*: however one may inquire, one wins nothing but images and names. One is like a man who walks around a castle, seeking an entrance in vain and meanwhile sketching the facades. And yet this is the path that all philosophers before me have taken.

18 In fact, the meaning that is being sought of the world, which stands over against me solely as my representation, or the passage from it, as mere representation of the knowing subject, to whatever else it may be besides, would never be found if the inquirer himself were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged angel's head without a body). But as it is, he is himself rooted in that world; that is, he finds himself in it as an *individual*, which means that his knowledge, the conditioning supporter of the whole world as representation, is nevertheless mediated throughout by a body, whose affections, as has been shown, are for the understanding the starting point of the intuition of that world. For the purely knowing subject as such, this body is a representation like any other, an object among objects: its movements, its actions, are known to him thus far in no other way than as the changes of all other intuitive objects, and would be just as strange and incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not perhaps unriddled for him in a wholly different way. Otherwise he would see his acting follow upon presented motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, motives. But he would understand the influence of motives no more closely than the connection of any other effect that appears to him with its cause. He would then call the inner essence of those manifestations and actions of his body, which is incomprehensible to him, a force, a quality, or a character, as he pleased, but have no further insight into it. But none of this is so: rather, to the subject of knowing, who appears as individual, the word of the riddle is given: and this word is *will*. This, and this alone, gives him the key to his own appearance, reveals to him the meaning, shows him the inner workings of his essence, his doing, his movements. To the subject of knowing, who comes forward as individual through his identity with the body, this body is given in two

wholly different ways: once as representation in the intuition of the understanding, as an object among objects, subject to the laws of these; but then also at the same time in a wholly different way, namely as that which is immediately known to everyone, and which the word *will* designates. Every true act of his will is at once and inevitably also a movement of his body: he cannot really will the act without at the same time perceiving that it appears as a movement of the body. The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states, objectively cognized, which the bond of causality connects; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same, only given in two wholly different ways: once quite immediately, and once in intuition for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing other than the objectified act of will, that is, the act of will entered into intuition. It will be shown to us further on that this holds of every movement of the body, not merely of the movement following upon motives, but also of the involuntary movement following upon mere stimuli; indeed, that the whole body is nothing other than the objectified will, that is, will become representation; all of which will emerge and become clear in the sequel. I shall therefore call the body, which in the previous book and in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, from the standpoint deliberately taken there one-sidedly (that of representation), I named the *immediate object*, here, in another respect, the *objectivity of the will*. Hence one can also say in a certain sense: the will is the knowledge a priori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will.—Resolutions of the will that relate to the future are mere deliberations of reason about what one will some day will, not real acts of will: only the execution stamps the decision, which until then is always still a changeable intention and exists only in reason, in abstracto. In reflection alone are willing and doing different: in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is at once and immediately also an appearing act of the body: and correspondingly, on the other hand, every influence upon the body is at once and immediately also an influence upon the will: as such it is called pain when it is contrary to the will; well-being, pleasure, when it is in accord with it. The gradations of both are very various. But one is wholly mistaken in calling pain and pleasure representa-

tions: they are by no means that, but immediate affections of the will in its appearance, the body: a compelled, momentary willing or not-willing of the impression which the body suffers. Only certain few impressions on the body, which do not stir the will, and through which alone the body is immediate object of knowing, since as intuition in the understanding it is already mediate object, like all others, are to be regarded immediately as mere representations, and therefore to be excepted from what has just been said. What is meant here are the affections of the purely objective senses, sight, hearing and touch, though only so far as these organs are affected in the manner specially proper to them, specific and natural, which is so extremely weak a stimulation of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will; but, undisturbed by any stirring of it, merely furnishes the understanding with the data from which intuition arises. Every stronger or different kind of affection of those sense organs is, however, painful, that is, contrary to the will, to whose objectivity therefore they too belong.—Weakness of the nerves shows itself in this, that impressions which should have only the degree of strength sufficient to make them data for the understanding reach the higher degree at which they move the will, that is, arouse pain or a feeling of well-being, though more often pain, which is, however, partly dull and indistinct, and so makes not only single tones and strong light felt as painful, but also in general occasions a morbid hypochondriacal mood without being distinctly recognized.—Further, the identity of body and will shows itself, among other things, also in this, that every violent and excessive movement of the will, that is, every emotion, shakes the body and its inner workings quite immediately and disturbs the course of its vital functions. This is found set out specifically in the "Will in Nature," p. 27 of the second edition.

Finally, the knowledge I have of my will, though an immediate one, is yet not to be separated from that of my body. I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its essence, but I know it only in its single acts, thus in time, which is the form of appearance of my body, as of every object: hence the body is the condition of the knowledge of my will. This will without my body, then, I cannot really represent. In the treatise on the principle of suffi-

cient reason, to be sure, the will, or rather the subject of willing, is set up as a particular class of representations or objects: but already there we saw this object coincide with the subject, that is, cease to be object: we called this coinciding there the miracle κατ' εξοχην: in a certain sense the whole present work is the explanation of it.—Insofar as I really know my will as object, I know it as body: but then I am again at the first class of representations set up in that treatise, that is, at real objects. We shall see more and more in the further course that this first class of representations finds its elucidation, its unriddling, precisely only in the fourth class set up there, which no longer really wished to stand over against the subject as an object; and that we must, correspondingly, learn to understand, from the law of motivation governing the fourth class, the inner essence of the law of causality valid in the first class, and of what happens in accordance with it.

The identity of will and body now provisionally set forth can only be demonstrated, as has been done here for the first time and as is to be done more and more in the further course, that is, raised out of immediate consciousness, out of knowledge in concreto, into knowledge of reason, or transferred into knowledge in abstracto: on the other hand, by its nature it can never be proved, that is, derived as mediate knowledge from another, more immediate knowledge, precisely because it is itself the most immediate, and unless we grasp it and hold it fast as such, we shall wait in vain to get it back mediately, as derived knowledge. It is a knowledge of quite its own kind, whose truth for this very reason cannot even be placed under any of the four rubrics into which, in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff., I divided all truth, namely the logical, empirical, metaphysical, and metalogical: for it is not, like all those, the relation of an abstract representation to another representation, or to the necessary form of intuitive or of abstract representing; but it is the relation of a judgment to the relationship which an intuitive representation, the body, has to that which is not representation at all, but something toto genere different from it: will. I should therefore like to distinguish this truth above all others, and to call it κατ' εξοχην the philosophical truth. The expression of it can be turned in various ways, and one can say: my body and my will are one;—or, what I call my

body as intuitive representation, I call my will in so far as I am conscious of it in a wholly different way, comparable to no other;—or, my body is the objectivity of my will;—or, setting aside that my body is my representation, it is otherwise only my will; and so on [1].

19 If in the first book we declared, with inner reluctance, our own body, like all the other objects of this intuitive world, to be mere representation of the knowing subject, it has now become clear to us what it is that distinguishes, in everyone's consciousness, the representation of his own body from all other representations, which are otherwise quite like it: namely this, that the body occurs in consciousness in still another way, toto genere different, which is designated by the word will; and that precisely this twofold knowledge that we have of our own body gives us, about the body itself, about its acting and moving on motives, as also about its suffering through outward influence, in a word about what it is, not as representation, but besides, that is, in itself, that elucidation which we do not have immediately about the essence, acting and suffering of all other real objects.

The knowing subject is an individual precisely through this particular relation to the one body, which, considered apart from that relation, is for it only a representation like all the rest. But the relation by virtue of which the knowing subject is individual is, for that very reason, only between it and a single one among all its representations, which is why it is conscious of this single one not merely as a representation but at the same time in quite another way, namely as a will. But since, when it abstracts from that particular relation, from that twofold and wholly heterogeneous knowledge of the one and the same thing, that one, the body, is a representation like all others: in order to orient itself on this point, the knowing individual must either assume that what distinguishes that one representation lies merely in this, that its knowledge stands in this double relation only to that one representation, that only into this one intuitive object is insight open to it in two [2] On this see chap. 18 of the second volume. ways at once, and that this is to be explained not by a difference of this object from all others but only by a difference of the relation of its knowledge

to this one object from that which it has to all others; or else it must assume that this one object is essentially different from all others, that it alone among all is at once will and representation, whereas the rest are mere representation, that is, mere phantoms, so that its body is the only real individual in the world, that is, the only appearance of will and the only immediate object of the subject.—That the other objects, considered as mere representations, are like its body, that is, like it fill space (itself possibly present only as representation), and like it too act in space, this is indeed demonstrably certain, from the law of causality, which is certain a priori for representations and admits no effect without cause: but, apart from the fact that from the effect one can infer only a cause in general, not a like cause, one is with this still within the domain of mere representation, for which alone the law of causality holds, and beyond which it can never lead. Whether the objects known to the individual only as representations are nevertheless, like his own body, appearances of a will, is, as was already stated in the previous book, the real sense of the question about the reality of the external world: to deny this is the sense of theoretical egoism, which for that very reason holds all appearances apart from its own individual to be phantoms, just as practical egoism does exactly the same in a practical respect, namely regards and treats only its own person as really such, but all others as mere phantoms. Theoretical egoism can never be refuted by proofs: yet it has certainly never been used in philosophy otherwise than as a skeptical sophism, that is, for show. As serious conviction, on the other hand, it could be found only in the madhouse: as such it would then need not so much a proof against it as a cure. We therefore do not engage with it any further here, but regard it only as the last stronghold of skepticism, which is always polemical.

If our knowledge, then, being always bound to individuality and having precisely in this its limitation, necessarily brings with it that each can be only one thing, while he can know everything else, a limitation which is really what generates the need for philosophy; then we, who for that very reason strive by means of philosophy to extend the limits of our knowledge, shall regard the skeptical argument of theoretical egoism that confronts us here as a small fron-

tier fortress, which is indeed forever impregnable, but whose garrison also can never get out of it, so that one may pass it by and leave it without danger at one's back.

We shall accordingly use the double cognition, now raised to distinctness and given in two wholly heterogeneous ways, which we have of the essence and action of our own body, henceforth as a key to the essence of every appearance in nature, and judge all objects that are not our own body, which therefore are given to our consciousness not in a double way but solely as representations, by analogy with that body, and therefore assume that, as on the one hand they are, quite like it, representation, and in this homogeneous with it, so also on the other hand, if one sets aside their existence as representation of the subject, what then remains over must be, in its inner essence, the same as what we call will in ourselves. For what other kind of existence or reality should we ascribe to the rest of the corporeal world? From where take the elements out of which we would compose such a reality? Besides will and representation nothing at all is known to us, nor conceivable. If we want to ascribe to the corporeal world, which exists immediately only in our representation, the greatest reality known to us, then we give it the reality which for each person his own body has: for that is the most real thing to each. But if we now analyze the reality of this body and of its actions, we find in it, beyond its being our representation, nothing but will: with that, even its reality is exhausted. We can therefore find nowhere any other reality to ascribe to the corporeal world. If, then, the corporeal world is to be something more than merely our representation, we must say that outside representation, thus in itself and in its innermost essence, it is that which we find in ourselves immediately as will. I say, in its innermost essence: but this essence of the will we must first come to know more closely, so that we may know how to distinguish from it what belongs not to it itself but already to its appearance, which has many degrees: of such a kind is, for example, its being accompanied by cognition and the determination by motives conditioned thereby: this belongs, as we shall see in further progress, not to its essence but merely to its distinct appearance as animal and man. If I therefore say: the force that drives the stone to the earth is, in its essence, in itself and apart from all

representation, will; one will not read into this statement the mad opinion that the stone moves according to a cognized motive because in man the will appears thus[3].—But now we wish to demonstrate more fully and clearly, to ground, and to develop in its whole compass, what has so far been set forth provisionally and in general[4].

20 As the essence in itself of one's own body, as that which this body is besides being object of intuition, representation, the will, as was said, first of all makes itself known in the voluntary movements of this body, insofar, namely, as these are nothing other than the visibility of the individual acts of will, with which they enter immediately and wholly simultaneously, [5] We shall therefore by no means agree with Bacon of Verulam when he opines (de augm. scient. L. 4 in fine) that all mechanical and physical movements of bodies took place only after a preceding perception in these bodies; although a presentiment of the truth also gave this false proposition its existence. It is the same with Kepler's assertion, in his treatise de planeta Martis, that the planets must have cognition in order to hit their elliptical orbits so exactly and to measure the swiftness of their motion so that the triangle of the area of their orbit always remains proportional to the time in which they traverse its base.

6 On this see Chap. 19 of the second volume. as one and the same with them, distinguished from them only by the form of knowability into which they have passed, that is, become representation.

These acts of will, however, still have a ground outside themselves, in the motives. Yet these never determine more than what I will at this time, in this place, under these circumstances; not that I will in general, nor what I will in general, that is, the maxim that characterizes my willing as a whole. Hence my willing is not to be explained in its whole essence from the motives; rather these determine merely its manifestation at the given moment, are merely the occasion at which my will shows itself: this itself, on the other hand, lies outside the domain of the law of motivation: only its appearance at each moment is necessarily determined by this. Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a sufficient ground of explanation of my acting: but if I

abstract from my character and then ask why I in general will this and not that, no answer to it is possible, because only the appearance of the will is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, not the will itself, which in this respect is to be called groundless. Here I presuppose partly Kant's doctrine of the empirical and intelligible character, as well as my discussions bearing on this in the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics," pp. 48–58, and again p. 178 ff. of the first edition, and partly we shall have to speak of it more fully in the fourth book. For now I have only to point out that the groundedness of one appearance by another, here that of the deed by the motive, does not conflict at all with its essence in itself being will, which itself has no ground, since the principle of sufficient reason, in all its forms, is merely form of cognition, and its validity therefore extends only to the representation, the appearance, the visibility of the will, not to the will itself that becomes visible.

If now every action of my body is the appearance of an act of will, in which, under given motives, my will itself in general and as a whole, that is, my character, expresses itself anew; then the indispensable condition and presupposition of that action must also be appearance of the will: for its appearing cannot depend on anything that is not immediately and solely through it, which would therefore be only contingent for it, whereby its appearing itself would become only contingent: but that condition is the whole body itself. This body itself, then, must already be appearance of the will, and must be related to my will as a whole, that is, to my intelligible character, whose appearance in time is my empirical character, as the single action of the body is related to the single act of will. The whole body, therefore, must be nothing other than my will become visible, must be my will itself, insofar as this is an object of intuition, representation of the first class.—In confirmation of this it has already been adduced that every influence on my body immediately and at once also affects my will, and in this respect is called pain or sensual pleasure, in a lower degree agreeable or disagreeable sensation, and also that, conversely, every violent movement of the will, thus affect and passion, shakes the body and disturbs the course of its functions.—It is true that, though very imperfectly, an account of the origin, and somewhat better of the development and maintenance, of my body can

also be given etiologically, which is just physiology: but this explains its theme exactly as the motives explain action. As little, therefore, as the grounding of the individual action by the motive and its necessary consequence from this conflicts with the action's being, in general and in its essence, only the appearance of a will in itself groundless; just as little does the physiological explanation of the functions of the body detract from the philosophical truth that the whole existence of this body and the entire series of its functions is only the objectification of that very will which appears in the external actions of the same body according to the measure of the motives. Physiology indeed seeks to trace even these external actions, the immediately voluntary movements, to causes in the organism, for example to explain the movement of the muscle from an influx of fluids ("like the contraction of a rope that gets wet," says Reil in his Archiv für Physiologie, vol. 6, p. 153): but supposing one really arrived at a thorough explanation of this kind, this would still never cancel the immediately certain truth that every voluntary movement (functiones animales) is appearance of an act of will. Just as little, now, can the physiological explanation of vegetative life (functiones naturales, vitales), however far it may advance, ever cancel the truth that this whole animal life, thus developing, is itself appearance of the will. In general, as was explained above, every etiological explanation can never give more than the necessarily determined place in time and space of a single appearance, its necessary entrance there according to a fixed rule: the inner essence of every appearance, on the other hand, remains by this path always unfathomable, and is presupposed by every etiological explanation and merely designated by the names force, or law of nature, or, when actions are in question, character, will.—Although, then, every single action, on the presupposition of the determinate character, follows necessarily when the motive is presented, and although growth, the process of nutrition and all the changes in the animal body proceed according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli); yet the whole series of actions, consequently each single one, and likewise their condition, the whole body itself that performs them, consequently also the process through which and in which it subsists—is nothing other than the appearance of the will, the becoming visible, the objectivity of the will. On

this rests the perfect suitability of the human and animal body to the human and animal will in general, similar to, but far surpassing, that which a deliberately made tool has to the will of its maker, and appearing on this account as purposiveness, that is, the teleological explicability of the body. The parts of the body must therefore correspond perfectly to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself, must be the visible expression of them: teeth, throat and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals objectified sexual impulse; the grasping hands, the swift feet correspond to the already more mediate striving of the will which they represent. As the universal human form corresponds to the universal human will, so to the individually modified will, the character of the individual, corresponds the individual embodiment, which is therefore throughout and in all its parts characteristic and expressive. It is very remarkable that Parmenides already expressed this, in the following verses cited by Aristotle (Metaph. III, 5):

Ως γαρ εκαστος εχει κρασιν μελεων πολυκαμπτων, Τως νοος ανθρωποισι παρεστηκεν· το γαρ αυτο Εστιν, οπερ φρονεει, μελεων φυσις ανθρωποισι, Και πασιν και παντι· το γαρ πλεον εστι νοημα.

(Ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet, ita mens hominibus adest: idem namque est, quod sapit, membrorum natura hominibus, et omnibus et omni: quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.)[7]

21 Whoever has now, through all these reflections, gained also in abstracto, hence clearly and surely, the cognition which everyone possesses in concreto immediately, that is, as feeling, that the essence in itself of his own appearance, which presents itself to him as representation both through his actions and through the abiding substratum of these, his body, is his will, which constitutes the most immediate element of his consciousness, but as such has not wholly entered into the form of representation in which object and subject stand opposite each other; but makes itself known in an immediate way, in which one does not quite distinctly distinguish subject and object, yet also is recognizable to the individual himself not as a whole but only in its single acts:—whoever, I say, has gained with me this conviction, for him it will become, quite of itself,

the key to the cognition of the innermost essence of the whole of nature, in that he now also transfers it to all those appearances [8] On this see Chap. 20 of the second volume; as also, in my work "On the Will in Nature," the headings "Physiology" and "Comparative Anatomy," where what is here only hinted at has received its thorough treatment. which are given to him not, like his own, in immediate cognition alongside the mediate, but only in the latter, thus only one-sidedly, as representation alone. Not only in those appearances which are quite similar to his own, in men and animals, will he recognize that same will as their innermost essence; but continued reflection will lead him to recognize also the force that drives and vegetates in the plant, indeed the force by which the crystal shoots, that which turns the magnet to the north pole, that whose shock leaps at him from the contact of heterogeneous metals, that which appears in the elective affinities of substances as flying and seeking, separating and uniting, indeed finally even gravity, which strives so mightily in all matter, drawing the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,—to recognize all these as different only in appearance, but in their inner essence as the same, as that which is known to him immediately so intimately and better than everything else, and which where it appears most distinctly is called will. It is this application of reflection alone that no longer lets us stop at the appearance, but leads us across to the thing in itself. Appearance means representation, and nothing more: all representation, of whatever kind it be, all object, is appearance. The thing in itself, however, is the will alone: as such it is not representation at all, but toto genere different from it: it is that of which all representation, all object, is the appearance, the visibility, the objectivity. It is the innermost, the kernel of every particular and likewise of the whole: it appears in every blindly working force of nature: it also appears in the deliberate conduct of man; the great difference between these two concerns only the degree of the appearing, not the essence of what appears.

22 This thing in itself (we wish to keep the Kantian expression as a standing formula), which as such is never object, precisely because every object is already again its mere appearance, no longer it itself, had, if it was nevertheless to be

thought objectively, to borrow name and concept from an object, from something somehow objectively given, consequently from one of its appearances: but this, in order to serve as a point of mutual understanding, could be none other than, among all its appearances, the most perfect, that is, the most distinct, the most fully unfolded, illuminated directly by cognition: but this is precisely the will of man. It must, however, be well noted that we here indeed use only a denominatio a potiori, by which the concept will therefore receives a greater extension than it had hitherto. Cognition of the identical in different appearances and of the different in similar ones is, as Plato so often remarks, precisely the condition of philosophy. But hitherto the identity of the essence of every force striving and acting in nature with the will had not been recognized, and so the manifold appearances, which are only different species of the same genus, were not regarded as such, but considered heterogeneous: for this reason there could also be no word to designate the concept of this genus. I therefore name the genus after its most excellent species, whose nearer, immediate cognition leads to the mediate cognition of all the others. But whoever should be incapable of carrying out the extension of the concept here demanded, and at the word will should always still understand only that one species hitherto alone designated by it, the will guided by cognition and expressing itself exclusively according to motives, indeed perhaps even only according to abstract motives, thus under the guidance of reason, which, as said, is only the most distinct appearance of the will, would remain caught in a perpetual misunderstanding. The innermost essence, immediately known to us, of just this appearance we must now purely separate out in thought, then transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct appearances of the same essence, whereby we carry out the demanded extension of the concept will.—In the opposite way, however, I would be misunderstood by anyone who supposed that it was ultimately all one whether one designated that essence in itself of all appearance by the word will or by some other. This would be the case if that thing in itself were something whose existence we merely inferred and so knew only mediately and merely in abstracto: then one could indeed call it what one pleased: the name would stand as mere sign of an unknown quantity. But now the word will,

which is to unlock to us, like a magic word, the innermost essence of every thing in nature, designates by no means an unknown quantity, something reached by inferences; but something known wholly immediately and so well known that we know and understand what will is much better than anything else, whatever it may be.—Hitherto the concept will has been subsumed under the concept force: I, on the contrary, do exactly the reverse and want every force in nature to be thought of as will. Let no one think that this is a quarrel about words, or a matter of indifference: rather it is of the very highest significance and importance. For at the foundation of the concept force, as of all others, lies ultimately the intuitive cognition of the objective world, that is, appearance, representation, and that is where it has been drawn from. It is abstracted from the domain where cause and effect rule, thus from intuitive representation, and means just the being-a-cause of the cause, at the point where it is etiologically not further explicable at all, but is precisely the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept will, on the other hand, is the only one among all possible concepts that has its origin not in appearance, not in mere intuitive representation, but comes from within, issues from the most immediate consciousness of each, in which he cognizes his own individual, in its essence, immediately, without any form, even without that of subject and object, and at the same time is it himself, since here the knower and the known coincide. If, therefore, we trace the concept of force back to that of will, we have in fact traced something less known back to something infinitely better known, indeed to the only thing that is really immediately and wholly and entirely known to us, and have extended our cognition very greatly. If, on the other hand, as has hitherto been done, we subsume the concept will under that of force, we renounce the only immediate cognition that we have of the inner essence of the world, by letting it perish in a concept abstracted from the appearance, with which we can therefore never get beyond the appearance.

23 The will as thing in itself is wholly different from its appearance and entirely free from all the forms of it, into which it enters only by appearing, which therefore concern only its objectivity and are foreign to it itself. Already the

most general form of all representation, that of the object for a subject, does not touch it; still less those subordinate to this, which all have their common expression in the principle of sufficient reason, to which, as is well known, belong also time and space, and consequently also multiplicity, which exists and has become possible only through these. In this last respect I shall, with an expression borrowed from the old, proper Scholasticism, call time and space the principium individuationis, which I ask the reader to note once and for all. For it is time and space alone by means of which what is alike and one in essence and concept nevertheless appears as different, as a multiplicity alongside and after one another: they are consequently the principium individuationis, the object of so many subtleties and disputes of the Scholastics, which one finds brought together in Suarez (Disp. 5, sect. 3).—The will as thing in itself lies, according to what has been said, outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and is consequently utterly groundless, although each of its appearances is wholly subject to the principle of sufficient reason: it is further free from all multiplicity, although its appearances in time and space are countless: it itself is one: yet not as an object is one, whose unity is cognized only in contrast with possible multiplicity: nor as a concept is one, which has arisen only through abstraction from multiplicity: but it is one as that which lies outside time and space, the principium individuationis, that is, the possibility of multiplicity. Only when all this has become wholly clear to us through the following consideration of the appearances and various manifestations of the will shall we fully understand the sense of Kant's doctrine that time, space and causality do not belong to the thing in itself, but are only forms of knowing.

The groundlessness of the will has indeed been recognized where it manifests itself most distinctly, as will of man, and this has been called free, independent. But at once, over the groundlessness of the will itself, the necessity to which its appearance is everywhere subject has also been overlooked, and the deeds have been declared free, which they are not, since every single action follows with strict necessity from the effect of the motive on the character. All necessity is, as already said, relation of the consequent to the ground and absolutely nothing

more. The principle of sufficient reason is the universal form of all appearance, and man in his doing must, like every other appearance, be subject to it. But because in self-consciousness the will is cognized immediately and in itself, in this consciousness there lies also the consciousness of freedom. Only it is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as thing in itself, but already appearance of the will, as such already determined and entered into the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence comes the strange fact that everyone holds himself a priori to be wholly free, even in his single actions, and thinks he could begin another course of life at any moment, which would mean becoming another. But a posteriori, through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subject to necessity, that in spite of all resolves and reflections he does not change his conduct, and from the beginning of his life to the end must carry through the same character, disapproved by himself, and play to the end, as it were, the role he has taken on. I cannot develop this reflection further here, since as ethical it belongs in another place in this work. Here I wish meanwhile only to point out that the appearance of the will, groundless in itself, is nevertheless as such subject to the law of necessity, that is, to the principle of sufficient reason; so that the necessity with which the appearances of nature follow may be no stumbling block to our recognizing in them the manifestations of the will.

Hitherto only those changes have been regarded as appearances of the will that have no other ground than a motive, that is, a representation; hence in nature a will was ascribed only to man and at most to animals; because cognizing, representing, is indeed, as I have already mentioned elsewhere, the genuine and exclusive character of animality. But that the will also works where no cognition guides it we see most immediately in the instinct and the craft impulses of animals[9]. That they have representations and cognition does not come into consideration here at all, since the end toward which they work just as if it were a cognized motive remains wholly unknown to them; hence their acting here takes place without motive, is not guided by representation, and shows us first and most distinctly how the will is active even without any cognition. The one-year-old bird has no representation of the eggs for which it builds a nest; the

young spider none of the prey for which it weaves a web; nor the ant-lion of the ant for which it digs a pit for the first time; the larva of the stag beetle gnaws the hole in the wood, in which it will undergo its transformation, twice as large if it is to become a male as if it is to become a female beetle, in the first case to have room for horns, of which it has as yet no representation. In such doing of these animals the will is manifestly active, as in the rest of their doing: but it is in blind activity, which is indeed accompanied by cognition, but not guided by it. Once we have gained the insight that representation as motive is not a necessary and essential condition of the activity of the will, we shall also more easily recognize the working of the will in cases where it is less obvious, and then, for example, will ascribe the house of the snail no more to a will foreign to itself but guided by cognition than the house that we ourselves build comes into existence through a will other than our own; rather we shall recognize both houses as works of the will objectifying itself in both appearances, which in us works according to motives, but in the snail still blindly, as a formative impulse directed outward. In us too the same will works in many ways blindly: in all those functions of our body which no cognition guides, in all its vital and vegetative processes, [10] Chap. 27 of the second volume treats these specially.

digestion, circulation of the blood, secretion, growth, reproduction. Not only the actions of the body, but the body itself wholly and entirely is, as shown above, appearance of the will, objectified will, concrete will: everything that goes on in it must therefore go on through will, although here this will is not guided by cognition, does not determine itself according to motives, but, working blindly, according to causes, which in this case are called stimuli.

By cause, namely, in the narrowest sense of the word, I mean that state of matter which, in bringing about another with necessity, itself undergoes just as great a change as that which it causes, which is expressed by the rule "action and reaction are equal." Further, in the case of cause proper, the effect grows in exactly the same proportion as the cause, and so likewise the reaction; so that, once the mode of action is known, the degree of the effect can be measured and calculated from the degree of intensity of the cause, and conversely. Causes in this proper sense work in all the appearances of mechanism, chemism, and so

on, in short in all changes of inorganic bodies. By stimulus, on the other hand, I mean that cause which itself suffers no reaction proportioned to its effect, and whose intensity does not at all run parallel in degree with the intensity of the effect, which therefore cannot be measured by it: rather a small increase of the stimulus can occasion a very great one in the effect, or conversely wholly cancel the previous effect, and so on. All effect on organic bodies as such is of this kind: it is on stimuli, therefore, not on mere causes, that all properly organic and vegetative changes in the animal body take place. The stimulus, however, like every cause in general, and likewise the motive, never determines more than the point of entrance, in time and space, of the manifestation of each force, not the inner essence of the manifesting force itself, which we, in accordance with our preceding derivation, recognize as will, to which we therefore ascribe both the unconscious and the conscious changes of the body. The stimulus holds the mean, makes the transition between the motive, which is causality that has passed through cognition, and the cause in the narrowest sense. In individual cases it lies now nearer the motive, now nearer the cause, but is still always to be distinguished from both: thus, for example, the rising of sap in plants takes place on stimulus and is not to be explained from mere causes, according to the laws of hydraulics or of capillary tubes: yet it is probably assisted by these and is in general already very near to purely causal change. On the other hand the movements of the Hedysarum gyrans and the Mimosa pudica, although still following on mere stimuli, are nevertheless already very similar to those on motives and seem almost to want to make the transition. The contraction of the pupil with increased light takes place on stimulus, but already passes over into movement on motive; since it takes place because the too strong light would affect the retina painfully and we, to avoid this, contract the pupil.— The occasion of erection is a motive, since it is a representation; yet it works with the necessity of a stimulus: that is, it cannot be resisted, but one must remove it in order to make it ineffective. It is the same with disgusting objects, which excite an inclination to vomit. As a real middle term of quite another kind between movement on stimulus and acting according to a cognized motive we have just considered the instinct of animals. As yet another middle

term of this kind one might be tempted to regard breathing: for it has been disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or to the involuntary movements, that is, really whether it takes place on motive or on stimulus, according to which it might perhaps be declared a middle thing between the two. *Marshall Hall* ("On the diseases of the nervous system," § 293 sq.) declares it a mixed function, since it stands under the influence partly of the cerebral (voluntary), partly of the spinal (involuntary) nerves. Yet in the end we must nonetheless count it among the manifestations of will that follow on motive: for other motives, that is, mere representations, can determine the will to inhibit it or to accelerate it, and it has, like every other voluntary action, the appearance that one could omit it altogether and suffocate freely. This one could in fact do, as soon as some other motive determined the will so strongly that it outweighed the urgent need for air. According to some, Diogenes really ended his life in this manner (Diog. Laert. VI, 76). Negroes too are said to have done this (F. B. Osiander, "On Suicide" [1813], pp. 170–180). We should have in this a strong example of the influence of abstract motives, that is, of the superior power of properly rational willing over the merely animal. The fact that prussic acid kills first by paralyzing the brain and so indirectly inhibiting breathing speaks for breathing's being at least partly conditioned by cerebral activity: but if this is artificially maintained until that stupefaction of the brain has passed, no death occurs at all. At the same time breathing gives us here incidentally the most striking example that motives work with just as great necessity as stimuli and mere causes in the narrowest sense, and can be put out of effect only by opposing motives, as pressure by counterpressure: for in breathing the appearance of being able to omit it is incomparably weaker than in other movements that follow on motives; because there the motive is very urgent, very near, its satisfaction, owing to the indefatigability of the muscles that carry it out, very easy, nothing as a rule opposes it, and the whole is supported by the oldest habit of the individual. And yet all motives really work with the same necessity. The knowledge that necessity is common to the movements on motives and those on stimuli will make it easier for us to see that what takes place in the organic body on stimuli and wholly according to law is nevertheless in its inner essence

will, which, though never in itself, yet in all its appearances is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that is, to necessity[11]. We shall accordingly not stop at recognizing animals, as in their acting so also in their whole existence, embodiment [12] This cognition is firmly established by my prize essay on the freedom of the will, where (pp. 30–44 of the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics") the relation between *cause, stimulus and motive* has accordingly received its detailed discussion., and organization, as appearances of will; but shall transfer this immediate cognition of the essence in itself of things, which alone is given to us, to plants also, all of whose movements follow on stimuli, since the absence of cognition and of the movement on motives conditioned by it alone constitutes the essential difference between animal and plant. What appears to representation as plant, as mere vegetation, blindly driving force, we shall therefore, in its essence in itself, declare to be will, and recognize as just that which constitutes the basis of our own appearance as it expresses itself in our doing and already in the whole existence of our body itself.

There remains for us only the last step to take, the extension of our way of considering to all those forces also which work in nature according to general, unchangeable laws, in accordance with which the movements of all those bodies take place which, wholly without organs, have no receptivity for the stimulus and no cognition for the motive. We must therefore apply the key to the understanding of the essence in itself of things, which the immediate cognition of our own essence alone could give us, also to these appearances of the inorganic world, which of all stand at the widest distance from us.—If we now regard them with an inquiring gaze, if we see the mighty, irresistible urge with which the waters hasten down to the depths, the persistence with which the magnet turns again and again to the north pole, the longing with which the iron flies to it, the vehemence with which the poles of electricity strive for reunion, and which, just like that of human wishes, is heightened by obstacles; if we see the crystal shoot swiftly and suddenly, with such regularity of formation, which is evidently only a quite decided and exactly determined striving in different directions, seized and held fast by rigidity; if we observe the choice with which bodies, set free by the state of fluidity and withdrawn from the

bonds of rigidity, seek and flee one another, unite and separate; if we feel, finally, quite immediately how a weight, whose striving toward the mass of the earth our body hinders, presses and weighs on this ceaselessly, pursuing its one striving;—it will cost us no great effort of the imagination to recognize our own essence again even from so great a distance, that very same thing which in us pursues its aims by the light of cognition, but here, in the weakest of its appearances, strives only blindly, dully, one-sidedly and unchangeably, yet, because it is everywhere one and the same,—just as the first dawn shares with the rays of full noon the name of sunlight,—must here as there bear the name *will*, which designates that which is the being in itself of everything in the world and the sole kernel of every appearance.

The distance, however, indeed the appearance of a complete difference between the appearances of inorganic nature and the will which we perceive as the inner part of our own essence, arises chiefly from the contrast between the wholly determinate conformity to law in the one and the seemingly rule-less arbitrariness in the other kind of appearance. For in man individuality stands out powerfully: each has his own character: hence the same motive also has not the same force on all, and a thousand secondary circumstances, which have room in the wide sphere of cognition of the individual but remain unknown to others, modify its effect; for which reason the action cannot be predetermined from the motive alone, because the other factor is lacking, the exact knowledge of the individual character and of the cognition accompanying it. The appearances of the forces of nature, on the other hand, show here the other extreme: they work according to general laws, without deviation, without individuality, according to openly displayed circumstances, subject to the most exact predetermination, and the same force of nature manifests itself in the millions of its appearances in exactly the same way. In order to clear up this point, in order to demonstrate the identity of the *one* and indivisible will in all its so different appearances, in the weakest as in the strongest, we must first consider the relation which the will as thing in itself has to its appearance, that is, the world as

will to the world as representation, whereby the best way will open to us to a more profound investigation of the whole subject treated in this second book [13].

24 We have learned from the great Kant that time, space and causality, in all their conformity to law and the possibility of all their forms, are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects which appear in them and constitute their content, or in other words: that they can be found just as well if one starts from the subject as if one starts from the object; hence one can with equal right call them modes of intuition of the subject, or also characteristics of the object, *insofar as it is object* (in Kant: appearance), that is, *representation*. One can also regard those forms as the indivisible boundary between object and subject: hence all object must indeed appear in them, but the subject also, independently of the appearing object, possesses them completely and surveys them.—But if the objects appearing in these forms are not to be empty phantoms, but to have a meaning, they would have to point to something, be the expression of something, that was not again, like themselves, object, representation, something existing only relatively, namely for a subject; but which existed without such dependence on something standing over against it as essential condition and without its forms, that is, would be precisely *no representation*, but a *thing in itself*. Accordingly one could at least ask: are those representations, those objects, anything else besides and apart from being representations, objects of the subject? And what then would they be in this sense? What is that other side of them, toto genere different from representation? What is the thing in itself? —*The will*: has been our answer, which I nevertheless set aside for the present.

14 On this see Chap. 23 of the second volume, likewise, in my work "On the Will in Nature," the chapter "Plant Physiology" and the chapter "Physical Astronomy," which is exceedingly important for the kernel of my metaphysics. Whatever the thing in itself may be, Kant has rightly concluded that time, space and causality (which we have since recognized as forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and this as the general expression of the forms of appearance) are not determinations of it, but could attach to it only after and insofar as it had

become representation, that is, belonged only to its appearance, not to it itself. For since the subject cognizes and constructs them wholly out of itself, independently of all object, they must adhere to *being-representation* as such, not to that which becomes representation. They must be the form of representation as such, not properties of that which has assumed this form. They must be given already with the mere opposition of subject and object (not in concept, but in fact), consequently be only the closer determination of the form of knowledge in general, whose most general determination is that opposition itself. Now what in the appearance, in the object, is in turn conditioned by time, space and causality, in that it can be represented only by means of them, namely *multiplicity*, through side-by-side and succession, *change* and *duration*, through the law of causality, and matter, which can be represented only on the presupposition of causality, finally everything again representable only by means of this—all this taken together is essentially not proper to that which appears, that which has entered into the form of representation, but attaches only to this form itself. Conversely, however, that in the appearance which is *not* conditioned by time, space and causality, nor reducible to them, nor to be explained according to them, will be precisely that in which what appears, the thing in itself, directly makes itself known. In accordance with this, the most perfect knowability, that is, the greatest clarity, distinctness and exhaustive fathomability, will necessarily belong to that which is proper to cognition *as such*, thus to the form of cognition; but not to that which, in itself not representation, not object, became knowable, that is, representation, object, only through entering into these forms. Only that, therefore, which depends solely on being known, on being-representation in general and as such (not on what is known, and has become representation), which therefore belongs without distinction to everything that is known, which for this very reason is found just as well if one starts from the subject as from the object,—this alone will be able to afford, without reserve, a sufficient, entirely exhaustive cognition, clear down to the last ground. This consists, however, in nothing other than the forms of all appearance known to us a priori, which can be jointly expressed as the principle of sufficient reason, whose forms relating to intuitive cognition (with which

alone we are here concerned) are time, space and causality. On these alone the whole of pure mathematics and pure natural science a priori is founded. Only in these sciences, therefore, does cognition find no obscurity, does it not strike on the unfathomable (the groundless, that is, will), on what is not to be derived further, in which respect Kant also, as said, wished to call those cognitions, preeminently, indeed exclusively, along with logic, sciences. On the other hand, however, these cognitions show us nothing further than mere relations, relations of one representation to another, form, without any content. Every content they receive, every appearance that fills those forms, already contains something no longer fully cognizable in its whole essence, no longer to be explained wholly and entirely through another, thus something groundless, whereby cognition at once loses evidence and forfeits perfect transparency. But this which withdraws from fathoming is precisely the thing in itself, is that which is essentially not representation, not object of cognition, but has become knowable only by entering into that form. The form is originally foreign to it, and it can never become wholly one with it, can never be reduced to the mere form, and, since this is the principle of sufficient reason, can therefore not be completely *fathomed*. If, therefore, all mathematics gives us exhaustive cognition of what in the appearances is magnitude, position, number, in short spatial and temporal relation, if all etiology gives us completely the lawful conditions under which the appearances, with all their determinations, enter in time and space, but with all this teaches no more than in each case why each determinate appearance must show itself precisely now here and precisely here now; we still never penetrate by their help into the inner essence of things; there still always remains something on which no explanation may venture, but which it always presupposes, namely the forces of nature, the determinate mode of action of things, the quality, the character of every appearance, the groundless, which does not depend on the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason, to which this form is in itself foreign, but which has entered into it, and now comes forth according to its law, which law, however, again determines only the coming forth, not that *which* comes forth, only the how, not the what of the appearance, only the form, not the content.—Mechanics, physics, chemistry

teach the rules and laws according to which the forces of impenetrability, gravity, rigidity, fluidity, cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, elective affinities, magnetism, electricity, and so on, act, that is, the law, the rule, which these forces observe in regard to their entrance in each case into time and space: the forces themselves, however, remain, however one may behave, qualitates occultae. For it is precisely the thing in itself which, in appearing, presents those phenomena, wholly different from them, in its appearance indeed wholly subject to the principle of sufficient reason as the form of representation, but itself never reducible to this form, and therefore not to be explained etiologically down to the last, never to be completely fathomed; indeed wholly comprehensible insofar as it has assumed that form, that is, insofar as it is appearance; but in its inner essence not in the least explained by that comprehensibility. Hence the more necessity a cognition carries with it, the more there is in it of what cannot be thought and represented otherwise at all—as, for example, the spatial relations—, the clearer and more sufficient it therefore is; the less purely objective content it has, or the less real reality is given in it: and conversely, the more of it must be apprehended as purely contingent, the more of it forces itself upon us as merely empirically given; the more there is in such cognition of what is really objective and truly real; but also at the same time the more of the inexplicable, that is, of what is not further derivable from something else.

Of course, in all ages an etiology that mistakes its goal has striven to trace all organic life back to chemism, or electricity, all chemism, that is, quality, in turn to mechanism (action through the shape of atoms), but this again partly to the object of phoronomy, that is, time and space united for the possibility of motion, partly to that of mere geometry, that is, position in space (about as one rightly constructs purely geometrically the decrease of an effect according to the square of the distance and the theory of the lever): geometry is finally resolvable into arithmetic, which is, because of unity of dimension, the most comprehensible, most surveyable form of the principle of sufficient reason, fathomable to the last. Examples of the method here generally indicated are: Democritus's atoms, Descartes's vortices, the mechanical physics of Lesage, who, toward the end of the last century, sought to explain both the chemical affinities and gravi-

tation mechanically, by impact and pressure, as can be seen more closely in the "Lucrèce Neutonien"; Reil's form and mixture as cause of animal life also tends in this direction: of quite this kind, finally, is the crude materialism now just warmed up again, in the middle of the nineteenth century, which in its ignorance fancies itself original, which first, with stupid denial of the vital force, would explain the appearances of life from physical and chemical forces, but let these arise again from the mechanical working of matter, from position, shape and motion of dreamed-up atoms, and so trace all forces of nature back to impact and counterimpact, which are its "thing in itself." Accordingly even light is then to be the mechanical vibration, or even undulation, of an imaginary ether postulated for this purpose, which, when arrived, drums on the retina, where then, for example, 483 trillion drumbeats in a second give red, and 727 trillion violet, and so on: the color-blind would then be those who cannot count the drumbeats: is that not so? Such crass, mechanical, Democritean, clumsy and truly boorish theories are entirely worthy of people who, fifty years after the appearance of Goethe's theory of colors, still believe in Newton's homogeneous lights and are not ashamed to say so. They will learn that what is excused in the child (Democritus) is not forgiven in the man. They might even one day end ignominiously: but then everyone slinks away and acts as though he had not been there. We shall soon come to speak again of this false reduction of original forces of nature to one another: here only this much. Supposing this could be done, then indeed everything would be explained and fathomed, indeed finally reduced to a sum in arithmetic, which would then be the holy of holies in the temple of wisdom, to which the principle of sufficient reason would at last have happily guided. But all content of appearance would have vanished and mere form remained: that which appears would be reduced to how it appears, and this how would be what is also cognizable a priori, therefore wholly dependent on the subject, therefore only for it, therefore finally mere phantom, representation and form of representation through and through: no thing in itself could be asked about.—Supposing this could be done, the whole world would accordingly really be derived from the subject, and what Fichte wanted to seem to accomplish through his humbug would in

fact be accomplished.—But now it cannot be done: fantasies, sophistries, castles in the air have been brought about in that way, no science. It has succeeded, and each time it succeeded gave a true advance, to trace the many and manifold appearances in nature back to single original forces: several forces and qualities, at first held to be different, have been derived one from another (for example, magnetism from electricity) and so their number diminished: etiology will have reached its goal when it has recognized and set up all the original forces of nature as such, and has established their modes of action, that is, the rule according to which, along the guiding thread of causality, their appearances enter in time and space and determine their places among one another: but primal forces will always remain, there will always remain as an insoluble residue a content of appearance that is not to be reduced to its form, thus not to be explained from something else according to the principle of sufficient reason.—For in every thing in nature there is something of which no ground can ever be given, no explanation possible, no further cause to be sought: it is the specific mode of its action, that is, precisely the mode of its existence, its essence. Of every single effect of the thing a cause is indeed to be shown, from which it follows that it had to act precisely now, precisely here: but that it acts at all and precisely thus, never. If it has no other properties, if it is a mote of dust, it at least shows, as gravity and impenetrability, that unfathomable something: this, however, I say, is to it what his will is to man, and is, like this, in its inner essence not subject to explanation, indeed is in itself identical with this. For every manifestation of the will, for every single act of it at this time, at this place, a motive can indeed be shown, on which it, on the presupposition of the man's character, had necessarily to follow. But that he has this character, that he wills at all, that of several motives precisely this and no other, indeed that any motive at all moves his will, of this no ground can ever be given. What for man his unfathomable character is, presupposed in all explanation of his deeds from motives: that is to every inorganic body its essential quality, the mode of its action, whose manifestations are called forth by influence from without, while it itself is determined by nothing outside it, and therefore also is not explicable: its single appearances, through which alone it becomes visible, are

subject to the principle of sufficient reason: it itself is groundless. The Scholastics already had recognized this correctly in essentials and designated it as forma substantialis. (On which see Suarez, Disput. metaph., disp. XV, sect. 1.)

It is an error as great as it is common to suppose that the most frequent, most general and simplest appearances are those we understand best; they are rather only those to whose sight, and to our ignorance of which, we have grown most accustomed. It is just as inexplicable to us that a stone falls to the earth as that an animal moves. As mentioned above, it has been supposed that, starting from the most general forces of nature (for example gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability), one would explain from them those which work more rarely and only under combined circumstances (for example chemical quality, electricity, magnetism), and finally understand from these again the organism and the life of animals, indeed man's cognizing and willing. Men tacitly acquiesced in starting from sheer qualitates occultae, whose elucidation was wholly given up, since one intended to build upon them, not to undermine them. Such a thing cannot succeed, as said. But apart from that, such a building would always stand in the air. What good are explanations that in the end lead back to something just as unknown as the first problem was? But does one in the end understand more of the inner essence of those general forces of nature than of the inner essence of an animal? Is not the one as unexplored as the other? Unfathomable, because groundless, because it is the content, the what of the appearance, which can never be reduced to its form, to the how, to the principle of sufficient reason. We, however, who here intend not etiology but philosophy, that is, not relative but unconditional cognition of the essence of the world, take the opposite way and start from what is immediately known to us, what is known to us most completely and wholly familiar, what lies nearest to us, in order to understand what is known to us only remotely, one-sidedly and mediately: and from the mightiest, most significant, most distinct appearance we wish to learn to understand the more imperfect, weaker. Of all things, my own body excepted, only one side is known to me, that of representation: their inner essence remains closed to me and a deep mystery, even if I know all the causes on which

their changes follow. Only from comparison with what goes on in me when, a motive moving me, my body performs an action—what is the inner essence of my own changes determined by external grounds—can I gain insight into the manner and way in which those lifeless bodies change on causes, and so understand what their inner essence is, of whose appearing the knowledge of the cause gives me merely the rule of entrance in time and space and nothing more. This I can do because my body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of representation, but also the second, which is called will. Instead, therefore, of believing that I should understand my own organization, then my cognizing and willing and my movement on motives, better if only I could trace them back to movement from causes, through electricity, through chemism, through mechanism; I must, insofar as I seek philosophy, not etiology, conversely learn to understand even the simplest and commonest movements of the inorganic body, which I see follow on causes, first of all in their inner essence from my own movement on motives, and recognize the unfathomable forces that manifest themselves in all bodies of nature as identical in kind with what in me is the will, and as differing from it only in degree. This means: the fourth class of representations, set up in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, must become for me the key to the cognition of the inner essence of the first class, and from the law of motivation I must learn to understand the law of causality in its inner meaning.

Spinoza says (epist. 62) that the stone flying through the air from a blow, if it had consciousness, would think it flew of its own will. I add only that the stone would be right. The blow is to it what the motive is to me, and what appears in it as cohesion, gravity, persistence in the assumed state is, in inner essence, the same as what I recognize in myself as will, and what, if cognition were added in its case too, it also would recognize as will. Spinoza, in that passage, had directed his attention to the necessity with which the stone flies and wants, rightly, to transfer it to the necessity of the single act of will of a person. I, on the other hand, consider the inner essence which first gives meaning and validity to all real necessity (that is, effect from cause), as its presupposition, which in man is called character, in the stone quality, but in both is the same, where it

is immediately cognized is called will, and which in the stone has the weakest, in man the strongest degree of visibility, of objectivity.—Even St. Augustine, with a sound feeling, recognized this element in the striving of all things that is identical with our willing, and I cannot refrain from setting down his naive expression of the matter: Si pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejusdem est amaremus, idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc si esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item, si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur (de civ. Dei, XI, 28).

It also deserves notice that Euler already saw that the essence of gravitation must in the end be traced back to an "inclination and desire" (that is, will) peculiar to bodies (in the 68th Letter to the Princess). Indeed, just this makes him averse to the concept of gravitation as it stands in Newton, and he is inclined to try a modification of it in accordance with the earlier Cartesian theory, thus to derive gravitation from the impact of an ether on the bodies, which would be "more reasonable and more suitable to people who love clear and comprehensible principles." He wants to see attraction banished from physics as a qualitas occulta. This is indeed only in accordance with the dead view of nature which, as correlate of the immaterial soul, ruled in Euler's time: but it is noteworthy with regard to the fundamental truth I have set up, which, namely, this keen mind, already then seeing it glimmer through from afar, hastened to turn back in time and now, in his anxiety at seeing all the then fundamental views endangered, even sought protection in the old, already discarded absurdity.

25 We know that multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by time and space and is thinkable only in them, which in this respect we call the principium individuationis. Time and space, however, we have recognized as forms of the principle of sufficient reason, in which principle all our a priori cognition is expressed, but which, as set forth above, belongs just as such only to the knowability of things, not to them themselves, that is, is only our form of cognition, not a property of the thing in itself, which as such is free from every form of cognition, even from the most general, that of being object for the subject, that is, is something wholly and entirely different from representation. If now this thing in itself is, as I believe I have sufficiently demonstrated and made evident, the will; then it lies, as such and considered apart from its appearance, outside time and space, and accordingly knows no multiplicity, is consequently one; yet, as already said, not as an individual is one, nor as a concept is one; but as something to which the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, the principium individuationis, is foreign. The multiplicity of things in space and time, which are all its objectivity, therefore does not touch it and it remains, in spite of them, indivisible. It is not as though a smaller part of it were in the stone, a larger in man: since the relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space and has no more meaning as soon as one has departed from this form of intuition; but also the more and less touches only the appearance, that is, the visibility, the objectification: of this there is a higher degree in the plant than in the stone; in the animal a higher than in the plant: indeed its emergence into visibility, its objectification, has as infinite gradations as there are between the faintest twilight and the brightest sunlight, the strongest tone and the faintest aftersound. We shall return below to the consideration of these degrees of visibility, which belong to its objectification, to the image of its essence. Still less, however, than the gradations of its objectification touch it itself immediately, does the multiplicity of appearances on these different stages touch it, that is, the number of individuals of each form, or of the single manifestations of each force; since this multiplicity is immediately conditioned by time and space, into which it itself never enters.

It reveals itself as wholly and as fully in one oak as in millions: their number, their multiplication in space and time, has no meaning at all with regard to it, but only with regard to the multiplicity of the individuals who know in space and time and are themselves multiplied and scattered in it, whose multiplicity, however, is itself again only its appearance, and does not concern it. Hence one could also assert that if, per impossibile, a single being, were it the least, were wholly annihilated, the whole world would have to perish with it. In the feeling of this the great mystic Angelus Silesius says:

"I know that without me God cannot live a moment: Were I to come to nothing, He must of necessity give up the ghost."

Various attempts have been made to bring the immeasurable size of the universe nearer to the grasp of everyone, and then to take occasion for edifying reflections, such as on the relative smallness of the earth and indeed of man; then again, in contrast to this, on the greatness of the mind in this so small man, who can work out, comprehend, indeed measure that cosmic greatness, and the like. All very well! Meanwhile, for me, in contemplating the immensity of the world, the most important thing is this: that the essence in itself, whose appearance is the world,—whatever it may be,—cannot have its true self thus drawn apart and divided in boundless space, but this infinite extension belongs wholly to its appearance alone, while it itself, on the contrary, is present whole and undivided in every thing of nature, in every living being; hence one loses nothing by stopping at any single particular, and true wisdom too is not to be attained by measuring the boundless world, or, what would be still more to the purpose, by personally flying through endless space; but rather by thoroughly investigating some single particular, in that one seeks to learn to know and understand perfectly its true and proper essence.

Accordingly the following, which has already forced itself on every pupil of Plato of its own accord, will be the subject of a detailed consideration in the next book, namely that those different stages of the objectification of the will, which, expressed in countless individuals, stand there as the unattained models of these, or as the eternal forms of things, not themselves entering into time and space, the medium of the individuals; but standing fast, subject to no

change, always being, never having become; while those arise and pass away, always become and never are; that, I say, these *stages of the objectification of the will* are nothing other than *Plato's Ideas*. I mention it here provisionally, in order to be able henceforth to use the word *Idea* in this sense, which with me is therefore always to be understood in its genuine and original meaning, given to it by Plato, and in which one is by no means to think of those abstract productions of scholastically dogmatizing reason, to designate which Kant misused that word, already taken possession of by Plato and used most appropriately, as unsuitably as unlawfully. By *Idea*, then, I understand every determinate and fixed *stage of the objectification of the will*, insofar as it is thing in itself and therefore foreign to multiplicity, which stages are related to the single things indeed as their eternal forms, or their models. The briefest and most concise expression of that famous Platonic dogma is given us by Diogenes Laertius (III, 12): ὁ Πλατων φησι, εν τῃ φυσει τας ιδεας ἑσταναι, καθαπερ παραδειγματα· τα δ'αλλα ταυταις εοικεναι, τουτων ὁμοιωματα καθεστωτα. (Plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria dixit subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum similitudinem consistentia.) Of that Kantian misuse I take no further notice: what is necessary about it stands in the Appendix.

26 The most general *forces of nature* present themselves as the lowest stage of the objectification of the will; they partly appear in every matter without exception, like gravity, impenetrability, partly have divided among themselves the matter that exists at all, so that some rule over this, others over that matter, thereby specifically different, such as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties and qualities of every kind. They are in themselves immediate appearances of the will, just as much as the doing of man, are as such groundless, like the character of man, only their single appearances are subject to the principle of sufficient reason, like the actions of man, they themselves, however, can never be called either effect or cause, but are the antecedent and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects, through which their own essence unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore senseless to ask for a cause of gravity, of electricity: these are original forces, whose manifestations indeed take

place according to cause and effect, so that every single appearance of them has a cause, which itself again is just such a single appearance and gives the determination that here that force had to manifest itself, to come forth in time and space; but by no means is the force itself effect of a cause, nor yet cause of an effect.—Hence it is also false to say: "gravity is the cause that the stone falls"; rather the nearness of the earth is the cause here, in that it attracts the stone. Take away the earth, and the stone will not fall, although gravity has remained. The force itself lies wholly outside the chain of causes and effects, which presupposes time, since it has meaning only in relation to this, while the force lies outside time as well. The single change always has again an equally single change as its cause, not the force whose manifestation it is. For that very thing which always lends efficacy to a cause, however countless times it may occur, is a force of nature, is as such groundless, that is, lies wholly outside the chain of causes and in general the domain of the principle of sufficient reason, and is philosophically recognized as immediate objectivity of the will, which is the in-itself of the whole of nature; in etiology, here physics, however, it is demonstrated as original force, that is, qualitas occulta.

On the higher levels of the objectivity of the will we see individuality emerge significantly, especially in man, as the great diversity of individual characters, that is, as complete personality, already expressed outwardly by a strongly marked individual physiognomy, which takes in the whole bodily organization. No animal has this individuality to anything like such a degree; only the higher animals have a touch of it, and even in them the character of the species still wholly predominates, and for that very reason there is little individual physiognomy. The farther down we go, the more every trace of individual character is lost in the general character of the species, whose physiognomy alone remains. One knows the psychological character of the species, and from it knows exactly what is to be expected of the individual; whereas in the human species every individual has to be studied and fathomed by himself, which, if one is to predict his conduct with any certainty, is of the greatest difficulty, because of the possibility of dissimulation, which entered only with reason. It is probably connected with this difference between the human species and all others that

the furrows and convolutions of the brain, which are still entirely lacking in birds and still very faint in rodents, are, even in the higher animals, far more symmetrical on the two sides and more constantly the same in each individual than in man [15]. Further, it is to be regarded as a phenomenon of that true individual character which distinguishes man from all animals that in animals the sexual impulse seeks its satisfaction without noticeable selection, whereas in man this selection, and in a manner that is instinctive and independent of all reflection, is carried so far that it rises to violent passion. So while every human being is to be regarded as a particularly determined and characterized appearance of the will, even in a certain sense as an Idea of his own, in animals this individual character is on the whole lacking, since only the species still has a distinctive significance, and its trace vanishes more and more the farther they stand from man, and plants at last have no other peculiarities of the individual than such as can be fully explained by external, favorable [16] Wenzel, De structura cerebri hominis et brutorum 1812, ch. 3.—Cuvier, Leçons d'anat. comp. leçon 9, art. 4 and 5.—Vicq d'Azyr, Hist. de l'acad. d. sc. de Paris 1783, p. 470 and 483. or unfavorable influences of soil and climate and other contingencies; so finally, in the inorganic realm of nature, all individuality disappears entirely. Only the crystal can still in a certain sense be regarded as an individual: it is a unity of striving in determinate directions, seized by the solidification that makes the trace of that striving permanent; it is at the same time an aggregate of its nuclear form, joined into a unity by an Idea, just as the tree is an aggregate of the single sprouting fiber, which presents itself, repeated, in every rib of the leaf, every leaf, every branch, and lets each of these be regarded in a way as a plant of its own, feeding parasitically on the larger one, so that the tree, like the crystal, is a systematic aggregate of little plants, although only the whole is the completed presentation of an indivisible Idea, that is, of this determinate level of the objectification of the will. The individuals of the same species of crystals, however, can have no other difference than external accidents bring about; indeed one can make each species shoot into large or small crystals at will. But the individual as such, that is, with traces of an individual character, is no longer to be found at all in inorganic nature. All its appearances are expressions

of universal forces of nature, that is, of such levels of the objectification of the will as do not objectify themselves at all (as in organic nature) by means of the diversity of individualities, each of which expresses a part of the whole Idea, but present themselves in the species alone, and in each single appearance of it wholly and without any deviation. Since time, space, multiplicity and conditionedness by cause belong neither to the will nor to the Idea (the level of the objectification of the will), but only to the single appearances of the latter, in all the millions of appearances of such a force of nature, gravity or electricity for instance, it must present itself, as such, in exactly the same way, and only the external circumstances can modify the appearance. This unity of its essence in all its appearances, this unchanging constancy of their occurrence as soon as, on the guiding thread of causality, the conditions for it are present, is called a *law of nature*.

Once such a law is known through experience, the appearance of the force of nature whose character is expressed and deposited in it can be exactly predetermined and calculated. It is precisely this lawfulness of the appearances at the lower levels of the objectification of the will, however, that gives them so different a look from the appearances of the same will at the higher, that is, more distinct levels of its objectification, in animals, in men and in their actions, where the stronger or weaker emergence of individual character and the being moved by motives, which, because they lie in knowledge, often remain hidden from the spectator, have hitherto made us entirely fail to recognize the identity of the inner essence of both kinds of appearances.

The infallibility of the laws of nature, if one starts from the knowledge of the particular and not from that of the Idea, has something astonishing about it, indeed at times something almost shudder-inducing. One might wonder that nature never once forgets its laws: that, for instance, if it is once in accordance with a law of nature that, when certain substances meet under determinate conditions, a chemical combination, a release of gas, a combustion takes place, then also, whenever the conditions come together, whether by our arrangement or entirely by chance (where the punctuality is all the more astonishing for being unexpected), today as well as a thousand years ago, the determinate

appearance occurs at once and without delay. We feel this marvel most vividly in rare appearances, which follow only under very complicated circumstances but are announced to us beforehand as following under them: for example, that when certain metals, alternating with one another and with an acidulated liquid, touch each other, leaves of silver placed between the ends of this chain must suddenly go up in green flames; or that under certain conditions the hard diamond changes into carbonic acid. It is the ghostlike omnipresence of the forces of nature that then startles us, and what no longer occurs to us in everyday appearances, we notice here, namely how mysterious the connection between cause and effect really is; like the connection one imagines between a magic formula and the spirit that, summoned by it, necessarily appears. If, on the other hand, we have penetrated to the philosophical knowledge that a force of nature is a determinate level of the objectification of the will, that is, of that which we too recognize as our innermost essence; and that this will in itself, as distinct from its appearance and the forms of that, lies outside time and space, and that the multiplicity conditioned by these therefore belongs neither to it nor immediately to the level of its objectification, that is, the Idea, but only to the appearances of that Idea; and that the law of causality has significance only in relation to time and space, in that it determines in them, for the multiplied appearances of the different Ideas in which the will manifests itself, their place, regulating the order in which they must enter;—if, I say, in this knowledge the inner sense of Kant's great doctrine has dawned on us, that space, time and causality belong not to the thing in itself but only to the appearance, are only forms of our knowledge, not qualities of the thing in itself; then we shall see that this astonishment at the lawfulness and punctuality of the working of a force of nature, at the perfect equality of all its millions of appearances, at the infallibility of their occurrence, is in truth comparable to the astonishment of a child or a savage who, looking for the first time through a many-faceted glass at, say, a flower, marvels at the perfect likeness of the countless flowers he sees, and counts the petals of each of them one by one.

Every universal original force of nature is therefore in its inner essence nothing other than the objectification of the will at a low level: each such level we call an eternal *Idea*, in Plato's sense. The *law of nature*, however, is the relation of the Idea to the form of its appearance. This form is time, space and causality, which have a necessary and inseparable connection and relation to one another. Through time and space the Idea multiplies itself into countless appearances; but the order in which these enter those forms of manifoldness is firmly determined by the law of causality: this law is, as it were, the norm of the boundary points of those appearances of different Ideas, according to which space, time and matter are distributed among them. This norm therefore necessarily relates to the identity of the whole of existing matter, which is the common substratum of all those different appearances. If these were not all assigned to that common matter, in the possession of which they have to share, there would be no need of such a law to determine their claims: they could all fill infinite space at once and side by side, through an infinite time. Only because all those appearances of the eternal Ideas are assigned to one and the same matter must there have been a rule for their entering and departing: otherwise none would make room for another. In this way the law of causality is essentially bound up with that of the permanence of substance: the two receive significance only from each other; and space and time, again, are related to them in the same way. For the mere possibility of opposite determinations in the same matter is time; the mere possibility of the persistence of the same matter under all opposite determinations is space. Therefore in the previous book we explained matter as the union of time and space; which union shows itself as the change of accidents with the persistence of substance, the universal possibility of which is just causality, or becoming. We therefore also said that matter is through and through causality. We explained the understanding as the subjective correlate of causality, and said that matter (and so the whole world as representation) exists only for the understanding, that the understanding is its condition, its supporter, as its necessary correlate. All this is said here only as a passing reminder of what was set out in the first book. Attention to the inner agreement of the two

books is required for a full understanding of them: for what in the real world is inseparably united, as its two sides, will and representation, has been torn apart by these two books, so that each, isolated, may be known the more distinctly.

It may perhaps not be superfluous to make it still clearer by an example how the law of causality has significance only in relation to time and space and the matter that consists in the union of the two, in that it determines the limits according to which the appearances of the forces of nature divide possession of that matter among themselves, while the original forces of nature themselves, as immediate objectifications of the will, which as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, lie outside those forms within which alone every etiological explanation has validity and significance, and for that very reason can never lead to the inner essence of nature.—Let us imagine for this purpose, say, a machine constructed according to the laws of mechanics. Iron weights start the motion by their gravity; copper wheels resist by their rigidity, push and lift one another and the levers by virtue of their impenetrability, and so on. Here gravity, rigidity, impenetrability are original, unexplained forces: mechanics states only the conditions under which, and the manner in which, they express themselves, come forth, and govern a definite matter, time and place. Now a strong magnet may act on the iron of the weights and overpower gravity: the motion of the machine stops, and the matter is at once the scene of an entirely different force of nature, of which the etiological explanation likewise states nothing more than the conditions of its occurrence, magnetism. Or else the copper disks of this machine are now laid on zinc plates and an acidulated liquid is led between them: at once the same matter of the machine has fallen to another original force, galvanism, which now governs it according to its laws, reveals itself in it through its appearances, of which etiology again can state no more than the circumstances under which, and the laws according to which, they show themselves. Now let us raise the temperature, let pure oxygen be added: the whole machine burns up; that is, once again an entirely different force of nature, chemism, at this time, in this place, has an irrefusable claim to that matter, and reveals itself in it as Idea, as a determinate level of the objectification of the will.—Let the metal calx thus produced now combine with an

acid: a salt arises, crystals shoot: they are the appearance of yet another Idea, itself again wholly unfathomable, while the occurrence of its appearance depended on those conditions which etiology knows how to state. The crystals effloresce, mingle with other substances, a vegetation rises out of them: a new appearance of the will;—and so one could follow the very same persisting matter into infinity, and watch how now this force of nature, now that, gains a right to it and unfailingly seizes it, in order to come forth and reveal its essence. The determination of this right, the point in time and space where it becomes valid, is given by the law of causality; but the explanation founded on that law goes only so far. The force itself is an appearance of the will and as such is not subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, that is, is groundless. It lies outside all time, is omnipresent, and seems as it were constantly to wait for the occurrence of the circumstances under which it can come forth and take possession of a definite matter, displacing the forces that until then governed it. All time exists only for its appearance, is without significance for the force itself: for thousands of years the chemical forces slumber in a matter, until the contact of the reagents sets them free; then they appear: but time exists only for this appearance, not for the forces themselves. For thousands of years galvanism slumbers in copper and zinc, and they lie quietly beside the silver, which, as soon as all three touch under the required conditions, must go up in flames. Even in the organic realm we see a dry seed preserve for three thousand years the slumbering force which, when favorable circumstances at last occur, rises up as a plant [17].

18 On 16 Sept. 1840, at the Literary and Scientific Institution of the City of London, Mr. Pettigrew, in a lecture on Egyptian antiquities, exhibited grains of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a tomb near Thebes, where they must have lain for thirty centuries. They were found in a hermetically sealed vase. He had sown twelve grains and obtained from them a plant which had grown five feet high and whose seed was now perfectly ripe. From the Times, of 21 Sept. 1840.—Likewise, at the Medico-Botanical Society of London, in the year 1830, Mr. Haulton produced a tuberous root which was found in the

hand of an Egyptian mummy If this reflection has now made the difference between the force of nature and all its appearances clear to us; if we have seen that the former is the will itself at this determinate level of its objectification, while multiplicity, through time and space, belongs to the appearances alone, and the law of causality is nothing other than the determination of the place in these for the single appearances; then we shall also recognize the perfect truth and the deep meaning of *Mallebranche's* doctrine of occasional causes, causes occasionnelles. It is well worth the trouble to compare this doctrine of his, as he sets it forth in the Recherches de la vérité, especially in the third chapter of the second part of the sixth book and in the éclaircissements appended at the back to this chapter, with my present exposition, and to perceive the most perfect agreement of the two doctrines, in spite of so great a difference in the course of thought. Indeed, I must admire how Mallebranche, wholly entangled in the positive dogmas which his age irresistibly forced upon him, nevertheless, in such fetters, under such a burden, hit upon the truth so happily and so rightly, and knew how to unite it with those very dogmas, at least with their language.
For the power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance. We find its frequent traces again in all, even the most bizarre, indeed the most absurd dogmas of various to whom it had probably been given out of a religious consideration, and which was therefore at least 2000 years old. He had planted it in a flowerpot, where it had at once grown and turned green. This is cited from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institution of Great-Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—"In the garden of Mr. Grimstone, of the Herbarium, Highgate, in London, there now stands a pea plant in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officers of the British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain for 2844 years."—From the Times of 16 August 1844. —Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the supposition that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, if it is introduced by hibernation and maintained by special circumstances. times and countries, often indeed in strange company, in curious mixture, but still recog-

nizable. It is then like a plant that germinates under a heap of large stones, yet climbs up toward the light, working its way through, with many detours and twists, deformed, pale, stunted;—but toward the light nonetheless.

Mallebranche is indeed right: every natural cause is only an occasional cause, gives only the occasion, the inducement, for the appearance of that one and indivisible will which is the in-itself of all things and whose graduated objectification is this whole visible world. Only the coming forth, the becoming visible at this place, at this time, is brought about by the cause and is to that extent dependent on it, but not the whole of the appearance, not its inner essence: this is the will itself, to which the principle of sufficient reason is not applicable, which is therefore groundless. No thing in the world has a cause of its existence simply and as such, but only a cause by which it is present precisely here and precisely now. Why a stone now shows gravity, now rigidity, now electricity, now chemical properties, depends on causes, on external influences, and is to be explained from these: but those properties themselves, and so its whole essence, which consists of them and consequently expresses itself in all the ways just listed, that it is therefore at all such as it is, that it exists at all, has no ground, but is the becoming-visible of the groundless will. Thus all cause is occasional cause. So we have found it in nature without knowledge: but just so it is also where it is no longer causes and stimuli but motives that determine the point of entry of the appearances, that is, in the actions of animals and men. For here as there it is one and the same will that appears, most different in the degrees of its manifestation, multiplied in the appearances of it, and in regard to these subject to the principle of sufficient reason, in itself free of all this. Motives do not determine the character of man, but only the appearance of this character, that is, the deeds; the outward shape of his course of life, not its inner meaning and content: these proceed from the character, which is the immediate appearance of the will and therefore groundless. Why one man is wicked and another good does not depend on motives and external influence, on teachings and sermons, say, and is in this sense absolutely inexplicable. But whether a wicked man shows his wickedness in petty injustices, cowardly intrigues, base knaveries, which he practices in the narrow circle of his sur-

roundings, or whether as a conqueror he oppresses nations, plunges a world into misery, sheds the blood of millions: this is the outward form of his appearance, the unessential part of it, and depends on the circumstances in which fate placed him, on his surroundings, on external influences, on motives; but his decision in response to these motives is never explicable from them: it proceeds from the will, whose appearance this man is. Of this in the fourth book. The manner in which the character unfolds its properties is wholly comparable to the manner in which every body of knowledgeless nature shows its own. Water remains water, with the properties inherent in it; but whether as a still lake it mirrors its banks, or plunges foaming over rocks, or, artificially induced, spouts up as a long jet: that depends on external causes; the one is as natural to it as the other; but according to the circumstances it will show the one or the other, equally ready for everything, yet in every case true to its character and always revealing only this. So too will every human character reveal itself under all circumstances; but the appearances that proceed from it will be such as the circumstances were.

27 If it has now become clear to us, from all the preceding considerations on the forces of nature and their appearances, how far explanation from causes can go and where it must stop, if it is not to fall into the foolish endeavor of tracing the content of all appearances back to their mere form, in which case nothing but form would remain in the end; then we shall now also be able to determine in general what is to be demanded of all etiology. It has to seek out, for all appearances in nature, the causes, that is, the circumstances under which they always occur: but then it has to trace the appearances, many-shaped under manifold circumstances, back to that which acts in every appearance and is presupposed in the cause, to original forces of nature, rightly distinguishing whether a difference in the appearance comes from a difference of the force or only from a difference in the circumstances under which the force expresses itself, and guarding itself equally against taking as the appearance of different forces what is the expression of one and the same force merely under different circumstances, and, conversely, against taking as expressions of one force what originally

belongs to different forces. This calls directly for the power of judgment; hence so few men are able to extend insight in physics, while all can extend experience. Laziness and ignorance make one inclined to appeal too early to original forces: this shows itself, with an exaggeration resembling irony, in the entities and quiddities of the Scholastics. Nothing is further from my wish than to have favored their reintroduction. One may as little appeal to the objectification of the will, instead of giving a physical explanation, as to the creative power of God. For physics demands causes: but the will is never cause: its relation to the appearance is not at all according to the principle of sufficient reason; rather, what is in itself will exists on the other side as representation, that is, is appearance: as such it obeys the laws that constitute the form of the appearance: so, for example, every motion, although it is always an appearance of the will, must nevertheless have a cause from which it is to be explained in relation to a determinate time and place, that is, not in general, according to its inner essence, but as a *single* appearance. This cause is mechanical in the case of a stone, is a motive in the case of the movement of a man: but it can never be lacking. On the other hand, the universal, the common essence of all appearances of a certain kind, that without the presupposition of which explanation from the cause would have neither sense nor significance, is the universal force of nature, which in physics must remain a qualitas occulta, precisely because here the etiological explanation comes to an end and the metaphysical begins. The chain of causes and effects, however, is never broken by an original force to which one would have to appeal, does not run back to it as to its first link; rather the nearest link of the chain, just as much as the remotest, already presupposes the original force, and could otherwise explain nothing. A series of causes and effects can be the appearance of the most diverse forces, whose successive entry into visibility is guided by it, as I explained above by the example of a metal machine: but the diversity of these original forces, which cannot be derived from one another, by no means interrupts the unity of that chain of causes and the connection between all its links. The etiology of nature and the philosophy of nature never do each other harm; rather they go side by side, regarding the same object from different points of view. Etiology gives an account of the

causes that necessarily brought about the single appearance to be explained, and shows, as the foundation of all its explanations, the universal forces that are active in all these causes and effects, determines these forces exactly, their number, their differences, and then all the effects in which each force comes forth differently according to the difference of the circumstances, always in keeping with its peculiar character, which it unfolds according to an infallible rule that is called a *law of nature*. As soon as physics shall have accomplished all this completely in every respect, it will have reached its completion: then no force in inorganic nature is any longer unknown, and there is no longer any effect that has not been demonstrated to be the appearance of one of those forces, under determinate circumstances, in accordance with a law of nature. Nevertheless a law of nature remains merely the rule noted in nature, according to which it proceeds each time under determinate circumstances, as soon as these occur: hence one can indeed define the law of nature as a universally expressed fact, un fait généralisé; whereupon a complete exposition of all laws of nature would be only a complete register of facts.—The consideration of nature as a whole is then completed by *morphology*, which enumerates, compares and orders all the permanent forms of organic nature: about the cause of the occurrence of the individual beings it has little to say, since in all of them this is generation, whose theory goes its own way, and in rare cases generatio aequivoca. To this latter, however, strictly speaking, belongs also the way in which all the lower levels of the objectivity of the will, that is, the physical and chemical appearances, come forth in particular cases, and the statement of the conditions for this coming forth is precisely that task of etiology. Philosophy, on the other hand, considers everywhere, and so in nature too, only the universal: the original forces themselves are here its object, and it recognizes in them the different levels of the objectification of the will, which is the inner essence, the in-itself of this world, which, when it abstracts from that will, it declares to be the mere representation of the subject.—If, however, etiology, instead of preparing the way for philosophy and supplying its teachings with application by means of examples, rather supposes that its goal is to deny all original forces, except perhaps one, the most general, impenetrability for example, which it imagines it understands

from the ground up and accordingly seeks to trace all the others violently back to it; then it deprives itself of its own foundation, and can give only error instead of truth. The content of nature is now displaced by the form, everything is ascribed to the acting circumstances, nothing to the inner essence of things. Were it really to succeed on this path, then, as already said, a sum in arithmetic would in the end solve the riddle of the world. But this is the path taken when, as already mentioned, all physiological effect is to be traced back to form and mixture, thus say to electricity, this again to chemism, and this to mechanism. The last was, for example, the error of Descartes and of all the atomists, who traced the motion of the heavenly bodies to the impact of a fluid, and the qualities to the cohesion and shape of the atoms, and worked toward declaring all appearances of nature to be mere phenomena of impenetrability and cohesion. Although this has been given up, the electrical, chemical and mechanical physiologists of our own days nonetheless do the same, and obstinately want to explain the whole of life and all the functions of the organism from the "form and mixture" of its constituents. That the goal of physiological explanation is the reduction of organic life to the universal forces which physics considers, is found still stated in Meckel's Archiv für Physiologie, 1820, vol. 5, p. 185.—Also *Lamarck*, in his Philosophie zoologique, vol. 2, ch. 3, declares life to be a mere effect of warmth and electricity: le calorique et la matière électrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie (p. 16). According to that, warmth and electricity would really be the thing in itself and the animal and plant world its appearance. The absurdity of this opinion stands out glaringly on p. 306 ff. of that work. It is well known that in the most recent time all those views, so often exploded, have reappeared with renewed audacity. At the bottom of them, if one considers it closely, lies finally the presupposition that the organism is only an aggregate of appearances of physical, chemical and mechanical forces, which, come together here by chance, have brought the organism about, as a freak of nature without further significance. The organism of an animal, or of man, would accordingly, philosophically considered, not be the presentation of an Idea of its own, that is, not itself immediately objectivity of the will at a certain higher level; but in it would

appear only those Ideas which objectify the will in electricity, in chemism, in mechanism: the organism would therefore be as accidentally blown together from the meeting of these forces as the figures of men and animals out of clouds or stalactites, and hence in itself not further interesting.—We shall, however, see directly how far that application of physical and chemical modes of explanation to the organism may nevertheless be permitted and useful within certain limits; for I shall show that the vital force does indeed use and employ the forces of inorganic nature, yet by no means consists of them; as little as the smith consists of hammer and anvil. Hence not even the so very simple plant life will ever be explained from them, from capillary force and endosmosis, say, to say nothing of animal life.

The following consideration prepares the way for that rather difficult discussion.

It is true that, in accordance with all that has been said, it is an aberration of natural science when it tries to trace the higher grades of the objectivity of the will back to lower ones; for to misjudge and deny original, self-subsisting forces of nature is just as faulty as to assume peculiar forces without ground where there is merely a particular mode of appearance of forces already known. Kant therefore says rightly that it is absurd to hope for a Newton of the blade of grass, that is, for one who would trace the blade of grass back to appearances of physical and chemical forces, of which it would then be only the accidental concretion, a mere freak of nature, in which no peculiar Idea appeared, that is, in which the will did not reveal itself directly on a higher and special grade, but only just as in the appearances of inorganic nature, and by accident in this form. The Scholastics, who would by no means have allowed anything of the kind, would have been quite right to say that it was a complete denial of the forma substantialis and a degrading of it to a forma accidentalis. For Aristotle's forma substantialis designates precisely what I call the grade of objectification of the will in a thing.—On the other hand, however, we must not overlook that in all Ideas, that is, in all forces of inorganic and all forms of organic nature, it is *one and the same will* that reveals itself, that is, enters into the form of representation, into *objectivity*. Its unity must therefore make itself known also through

an inner kinship among all its appearances. This kinship reveals itself on the higher grades of its objectivity, where the whole appearance is more distinct, that is, in the plant and animal kingdoms, through the universally pervading analogy of all forms, the fundamental type, which recurs in all appearances. This type has therefore become the guiding principle of the excellent zoological systems that have come from the French in this century, and it is most completely demonstrated in comparative anatomy, as l'unité de plan, l'uniformité de l'élément anatomique. To discover it was also the chief business, or at any rate certainly the most laudable endeavor, of the nature-philosophers of the Schellingian school, who deserve some credit in this respect, even though in many cases their hunt for analogies in nature degenerates into mere facetiousness. But they have rightly demonstrated that same universal kinship and family likeness in the Ideas of inorganic nature as well, for example between electricity and magnetism, whose identity was later established, between chemical attraction and gravity, and the like. They have called attention in particular to the fact that *polarity*, that is, the splitting of a force into two qualitatively different, opposed activities that strive toward reunion, which for the most part reveals itself in space as a diverging in opposite directions, is a fundamental type of almost all appearances of nature, from the magnet and the crystal to man. In China, however, this knowledge has been current since the most ancient times, in the doctrine of the opposition of *Yin* and *Yang*.—Indeed, precisely because all the things of the world are the objectivity of one and the same will, and are consequently identical in their inner essence, there must be not only that unmistakable analogy among them, and in everything more imperfect the trace, intimation, and disposition of the nearest more perfect thing; but also, since all those forms belong only to the world as *representation*, we may even suppose that in the most universal forms of representation, in this proper framework of the appearing world, that is, in space and time, the fundamental type, the intimation, the disposition of everything that fills the forms may be found and demonstrated. It seems that an obscure knowledge of this gave rise to the Kabbala and to all the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and also of the Chinese in the Y-king; and in that Schellingian school too, in its mani-

fold efforts to bring to light the analogy among all the appearances of nature, we find several attempts, though unhappy ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of space and time. Yet one cannot know how far a mind of genius will one day carry out both endeavors.

Now although the difference between appearance and thing in itself is never to be lost from sight, and the identity of the will objectified in all Ideas must therefore never be twisted (since it has determinate grades of its objectivity) into an identity of the individual Ideas themselves in which it appears, so that, for example, chemical or electrical attraction may never be traced back to attraction by gravity, even though their inner analogy is recognized and the former may be regarded as, so to speak, higher powers of the latter; just as little as the inner analogy in the structure of all animals entitles us to confuse and identify the species and, say, to declare the more perfect ones to be variations of the less perfect; and although, finally, the physiological functions too are never to be traced back to chemical or physical processes: yet, to justify this procedure within certain limits, we may assume the following with great probability.

When, among the appearances of the will on the lower grades of its objectification, that is, in the inorganic, several come into conflict with one another, each seeking, along the guiding thread of causality, to seize the available matter, there emerges from this strife the appearance of a higher Idea, which overpowers all the more imperfect ones that were there before, yet in such a way that it lets their essence continue in a subordinate fashion, by taking up into itself an analogue of it. This process is comprehensible only from the identity of the appearing will in all Ideas and from its striving toward ever higher objectification. Thus we see, for example, in the hardening of the bones an unmistakable analogue of crystallization, which originally governed the lime, although ossification is never to be traced back to crystallization. The analogy shows itself more faintly in the hardening of flesh. So too the mixing of the fluids in the animal body, and secretion, are an analogue of chemical mixture and separation; indeed the laws of the latter continue to operate there, but subordinated,

greatly modified, overpowered by a higher Idea; for this reason merely chemical forces outside the organism will never yield such fluids; but "Encheiresin naturae," chemistry calls it, mocks itself and doesn't know how.

The more perfect Idea that issues from such a victory over several lower Ideas, or objectifications of the will, gains an entirely new character, precisely because it takes up into itself from each of those it has overpowered an analogue raised to a higher power: the will objectifies itself in a new and more distinct way. There arises, originally through generatio aequivoca, afterward through assimilation to the germ already present, organic sap, plant, animal, man. Thus from the strife of lower appearances there emerges the higher, which devours them all, yet also realizes the striving of all of them in a higher degree.—Here already, then, the law prevails: serpens, nisi serpentem comederit, non fit draco.

I wish I had been able to overcome, by clarity of presentation, the obscurity that attaches to the subject matter of these thoughts; but I see well enough that the reader's own reflection must come greatly to my aid if I am not to remain uncomprehended or be misunderstood.—According to the view here given, we shall indeed be able to demonstrate in the organism the traces of chemical and physical modes of operation, but never to explain it from them; for it is by no means a phenomenon produced by the united working of such forces, that is, produced by accident, but a higher Idea, which has made those lower ones subject to itself through overpowering assimilation; for the one will that objectifies itself in all Ideas, in striving toward the highest possible objectification, here gives up the lower grades of its appearance, after a conflict among them, in order to appear all the more mightily on a higher one. No victory without struggle: since the higher Idea, or objectification of the will, can emerge only by overpowering the lower ones, it suffers the resistance of these, which, though brought into servitude, still always strive to attain independent and complete expression of their essence. As the magnet that has lifted a piece of iron maintains a continual struggle with gravity, which, as the lowest objectification of the will, has a more original right to the matter of that iron, and in which constant struggle the magnet even grows stronger, since the resistance, as it were, spurs it to greater exertion; so every appearance of the will, including the one

that presents itself in the human organism, maintains an enduring struggle against the many physical and chemical forces which, as lower Ideas, have an earlier right to that matter. Hence the arm sinks that one has held up for a while by overpowering gravity; hence the comfortable feeling of health, which expresses the victory of the Idea of the self-conscious organism over the physical and chemical laws that originally govern the fluids of the body, is so often interrupted, indeed is really always accompanied by a certain greater or lesser discomfort arising from the resistance of those forces, and through which even the vegetative part of our life is constantly bound up with a faint suffering. Hence, too, digestion depresses all animal functions, because it claims the whole vital force for the overpowering of chemical forces of nature by assimilation. Hence, in general, the burden of physical life, the necessity of sleep and finally of death, since at last, favored by circumstances, those subjugated forces of nature win back from the organism, wearied by its very constancy of victory, the matter that was wrested from them, and attain to the unhindered presentation of their essence. One may therefore also say that every organism presents the Idea of which it is the image only after deduction of that part of its force which is spent on overpowering the lower Ideas that dispute the matter with it. This seems to have been in Jakob Böhm's mind when he says somewhere that all the bodies of men and animals, indeed all plants, are really half dead. According as the organism succeeds more or less in overpowering those forces of nature that express the lower grades of the objectivity of the will, it becomes a more or less perfect expression of its Idea, that is, it stands nearer to or farther from the ideal to which, within its species, beauty belongs.

Thus everywhere in nature we see strife, struggle, and alternation of victory, and in this very fact we shall come to recognize more clearly the division against itself that is essential to the will. Every grade of the objectification of the will disputes with the others the matter, the space, the time. The persisting matter must constantly change its form, as mechanical, physical, chemical, and organic appearances, greedily pressing forward, wrest the matter from one another along the guiding thread of causality, each wanting to reveal its Idea. This strife can be traced through the whole of nature; indeed nature exists only through it:

ει γαρ μη ην το νεικος εν τοις πραγμασιν, εν αν ην απαντα, ως φησιν Εμπεδοκλης. (nam si non inesset in rebus contentio, unum omnia essent, ut ait Empedocles. Arist. Metaph. B., 5): for this strife itself is, after all, only the revelation of the division against itself that is essential to the will. This universal struggle attains its clearest visibility in the animal world, which has the plant world for its nourishment, and in which in turn every animal becomes the prey and nourishment of another, that is, must yield the matter in which its Idea presented itself to the presentation of another Idea, since each animal can maintain its existence only through the constant suppression of an alien one. So the will to life throughout feeds on itself and in different shapes is its own nourishment, until finally the human race, because it overpowers all the others, regards nature as a manufactured article for its use; yet the same race also, as we shall find in the fourth book, reveals in itself that struggle, that self-division of the will, with the most fearful distinctness, and becomes homo homini lupus. Meanwhile we shall recognize the same strife, the same overpowering, equally on the low grades of the objectivity of the will. Many insects (especially the ichneumon flies) lay their eggs on the skin, indeed in the body, of the larvae of other insects, whose slow destruction is the first work of the hatching brood. The young polyp, which grows out of the old one as a branch and later separates from it, already fights with it, while still attached to it, over the prey that offers, so that one tears it from the other's mouth (Trembley, Polypod. II, p. 110, and III, p. 165). But the most glaring example of this kind is furnished by the bulldog-ant of Australia: if one cuts it in two, a battle begins between the head part and the tail part; the former attacks the latter with its jaws, and the latter defends itself bravely by stinging the former; the battle usually lasts half an hour, until they die or are dragged away by other ants. The event takes place every time. (From a letter of Howitt, in the W. Journal, printed in Galignani's Messenger of 17 Nov. 1855.) On the banks of the Missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak so wound about, fettered, and laced, on trunk and all its branches, by a gigantic wild vine that it must wither as if suffocated. The same shows itself even on the lowest grades: for example, where through organic assimilation water and carbon are changed into plant sap, or plant or bread into blood, and so everywhere where,

with the chemical forces limited to a subordinate mode of operation, animal secretion takes place; then also in inorganic nature, as when crystals that are shooting forth meet, cross, and interfere with one another so that they cannot show the purely crystallized form, so that almost every geode is the image of such a strife of the will on that so low grade of its objectification; or as when a magnet forces magnetism upon iron, in order to present its Idea here too; or as when galvanism overpowers elective affinities, decomposes the firmest compounds, and so cancels the chemical laws that the acid of a salt decomposed at the negative pole must go to the positive pole without being allowed to combine with the alkalis through which it passes on the way, or even merely to redden the litmus it meets. On the grand scale it shows itself in the relation between central body and planet: the latter, although in decided dependence, still always resists, just like the chemical forces in the organism; from which arises the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal force, which keeps the structure of the universe in motion and is itself already an expression of that universal struggle, essential to the appearance of the will, which we are now considering. For since every body must be regarded as the appearance of a will, and will necessarily presents itself as a striving, the original state of every heavenly body balled into a sphere cannot be rest, but motion, a striving forward into infinite space, without rest and without goal. Neither the law of inertia nor that of causality opposes this; for since, according to the former, matter as such is indifferent to rest and motion, motion may be its original state just as well as rest. Hence, when we find it in motion, we are just as little entitled to presuppose that a state of rest preceded it and to ask for the cause of the onset of the motion as, conversely, if we found it at rest, we would have to presuppose a motion preceding it and to ask for the cause of its cessation. Hence no first impulse is to be sought for the centrifugal force; rather, in the planets, according to the hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, it is a remnant of the original rotation of the central body, from which they separated when it contracted. To this body itself, however, motion is essential: it still rotates and at the same time flies onward in endless space, or perhaps circles about a larger central body invisible to us. This view agrees entirely with the astronomers' conjecture of a central

sun, and also with the observed advance of our whole solar system, perhaps also of the whole star cluster to which our sun belongs, from which finally a general advance of all the fixed stars together with the central sun is to be inferred. This, of course, loses all meaning in infinite space (since motion in absolute space is not distinguishable from rest), and precisely thereby, as already directly through the striving and flying without goal, becomes the expression of that nothingness, that lack of a final end, which at the close of this book we shall have to ascribe to the striving of the will in all its appearances; hence, too, endless space and endless time had to be the most universal and essential forms of its whole appearance, which exists to express its whole essence.—Finally, we can recognize the struggle we are considering, of all appearances of the will against one another, even in mere matter, regarded as such, in so far, that is, as the essence of its appearance is rightly stated by Kant as repulsive and attractive force; so that already matter has its existence only in a struggle of forces striving against each other. If we abstract from all chemical difference of matter, or think ourselves so far back in the chain of causes and effects that there is as yet no chemical difference, there remains to us mere matter, the world balled into a sphere, whose life, that is, objectification of the will, now consists in that struggle between the force of attraction and the force of repulsion, the former as gravity, pressing from all sides toward the center, the latter as impenetrability, whether through rigidity or elasticity, resisting it. This constant pressure and resistance may be regarded as the objectivity of the will on the very lowest grade, and already there it expresses the will's character.

So here, on the lowest grade, we would see the will present itself as a blind impulse, a dark, dull urge, far from all immediate knowability. It is the simplest and weakest mode of its objectification. But as such a blind impulse and striving without knowledge it still appears in the whole of inorganic nature, in all the original forces which physics and chemistry are occupied in seeking out and whose laws they are occupied in learning, and each of which presents itself to us in millions of entirely similar, law-governed appearances, announcing no

trace of individual character, but merely multiplied by time and space, that is, by the principium individuationis, as an image is multiplied by the facets of a glass.

Objectifying itself more distinctly from grade to grade, the will nevertheless still works wholly without knowledge, as a dark, driving force, even in the plant kingdom, where no longer causes proper but stimuli are the bond of its appearances; and so finally also in the vegetative part of the animal appearance, in the production and formation of every animal and in the maintenance of its inner economy, where still mere stimuli necessarily determine its appearance. The ever higher grades of the objectivity of the will lead finally to the point where the individual that presents the Idea could no longer obtain its nourishment, which has to be assimilated, by mere movement on stimuli; for such a stimulus must be waited for, whereas here the nourishment is of a more specially determined kind, and with the ever-growing manifoldness of appearances the crowding and confusion has become so great that they disturb one another, and the chance on which the individual moved by mere stimuli must depend for its nourishment would be too unfavorable. The nourishment must therefore be sought out and chosen, from the point where the animal has wrenched itself free from the egg or the womb in which it vegetated without knowledge. Thereby movement on motives, and for the sake of these knowledge, becomes necessary here; and knowledge accordingly enters as an aid, μηχανη, required at this grade of the objectification of the will for the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the species. It comes forth, represented by the brain or a larger ganglion, just as every other striving or determination of the objectifying will is represented by an organ, that is, presents itself for the representation as an organ [19].—But with this aid, this μηχανη, the world as representation stands there at one stroke, with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, plurality, and causality. The world now shows its second side. Hitherto mere will, it is now at the same time representation, object of the knowing subject. The will, which up to this point pursued its drive in the dark, most surely and infallibly, has on this grade kindled a light for itself, as a means that became necessary to remove the disadvantage which would arise, precisely for the most

perfected of its appearances, from their crowding and complicated constitution. The infallible certainty and lawfulness with which the will had worked until now in inorganic and merely vegetative nature rested on its being active solely in its original essence, as blind impulse, as will, without help, but also without disturbance, from a second, entirely different world, the world as representation, which, though only the image of the will's own essence, is yet of an entirely different nature and now intervenes in the connection of its appearances. Thereby its infallible certainty comes to an end. Animals are already exposed to illusion, to deception. [20] On this see ch. 22 of the second volume; also my essay "On the Will in Nature," p. 54 ff. and pp. 70–79 of the first edition, or p. 46 ff. and pp. 63–72 of the second. They have, however, only intuitive representations, no concepts, no reflection; they are therefore bound to the present and cannot take the future into account.—It seems as if this knowledge without reason had not in all cases been sufficient for its purpose and at times had, as it were, needed a helping hand. For there presents itself to us the very remarkable phenomenon that the blind working of the will and the working illumined by knowledge, in two kinds of appearances, reach over, in a most surprising way, each into the domain of the other. First, namely, we find in the midst of the activity of animals, which is guided by intuitive knowledge and its motives, an activity carried out without these, that is, with the necessity of the blindly working will: in the constructive instincts, which, guided by no motive and no knowledge, have the look of bringing their works to completion even on abstract, rational motives. The other case, the opposite of this, is where, conversely, the light of knowledge penetrates into the workshop of the blindly working will and illumines the vegetative functions of the human organism: in magnetic clairvoyance.—Finally, where the will has reached the highest grade of its objectification, the knowledge of the understanding that dawned on the animals, to which the senses supply the data from which mere intuition, bound to the present, arises, no longer suffices: man, that complicated, many-sided, plastic, most needy being, exposed to countless injuries, had, in order to subsist, to be illumined by a twofold knowledge; a higher power, as it were, of intuitive knowledge had to be added to this, a reflection of it: reason, as

the faculty of abstract concepts. With this came reflective awareness, containing a survey of the future and the past and, as a consequence of this, deliberation, care, the capacity for premeditated action independent of the present, and finally also fully distinct consciousness of one's own decisions of will as such. Now if with merely intuitive knowledge the possibility of illusion and deception had already entered, whereby the earlier infallibility in the will's knowledgeless urge was canceled, so that instinct and constructive impulse, as expressions of the will without knowledge, had to come to its aid in the midst of the expressions guided by knowledge; then with the entry of reason that certainty and unerringness of the expressions of the will (which at the other extreme, in inorganic nature, even appears as strict lawfulness) is almost wholly lost: instinct falls entirely back; deliberation, which is now to replace everything, begets (as set forth in the first book) wavering and uncertainty; error becomes possible, which in many cases hinders the adequate objectification of the will through deeds. For although the will has already taken in character its determinate and unalterable direction, in accordance with which the willing itself occurs infallibly on the occasion of the motives, yet error can falsify its expressions, in that illusory motives then flow in like real ones and cancel these [21]: as, for example, when superstition substitutes imagined motives that force a man to a course of action exactly opposite to the way in which his will would otherwise express itself under the existing circumstances: Agamemnon slaughters his daughter; a miser dispenses alms out of pure egoism, in the hope of a hundredfold repayment someday, and so on.

Knowledge in general, rational as well as merely intuitive, thus proceeds originally from the will itself, belongs to the essence of the higher grades of its objectification as a mere μηχανη, a means for the maintenance of the individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Destined originally, then, for the service of the will, for the accomplishment of its ends, it also remains almost throughout wholly subservient to it: so in all animals and in almost all men. Yet we shall see in the third book how in individual men knowledge can withdraw from this servitude, throw off its yoke, and subsist purely for itself, free from all the aims of willing, as the mere clear mirror of the world, from which art pro-

ceeds; and finally, in the fourth book, how through this kind of knowledge, when it reacts upon the will, the self-[22] The Scholastics therefore said quite rightly: Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum. See Suarez, Disp. metaph. disp. XXIII, sect. 7 et 8. suppression of the will can occur, that is, resignation, which is the final goal, indeed the innermost essence of all virtue and holiness, and deliverance from the world.

28 We have considered the great manifoldness and diversity of the appearances in which the will objectifies itself; indeed, we have seen their endless and irreconcilable struggle against one another. Nevertheless, according to our whole exposition so far, the will itself, as thing in itself, is by no means comprised in that plurality, that change. The diversity of the (Platonic) Ideas, that is, of the gradations of objectification, the multitude of individuals in which each of these presents itself, the struggle of forms for matter: all this does not touch the will, but is only the manner and way of its objectification, and only through this has an indirect relation to it, by virtue of which it belongs to the expression of its essence for representation. As a magic lantern shows many and varied pictures, though it is only one and the same flame that gives visibility to them all, so in all the manifold appearances which fill the world side by side, or displace one another in succession as events, it is yet only the one will that appears, whose visibility, whose objectivity, all this is, and which remains unmoved in the midst of that change: it alone is the thing in itself; every object, however, is appearance, phenomenon, to speak in Kant's language.—Although in man, as (Platonic) Idea, the will finds its most distinct and most perfect objectification, yet this alone could not express its essence. In order to appear in its proper significance, the Idea of man could not present itself alone and torn loose, but had to be accompanied by the descending series through all the forms of animals, through the plant kingdom, down to the inorganic: only all of these together complete the full objectification of the will; they are presupposed by the Idea of man as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, branches, trunk, and root: they form a pyramid whose apex is man. One may also, if one takes pleasure in comparisons, say: their appearance accompanies that of man as necessarily as

full light is accompanied by all the gradual gradations of half-shadow through which it loses itself in darkness; or one may call them the echo of man and say: animal and plant are the descending fifth and third of man, the inorganic kingdom is the lower octave. The whole truth of this last simile, however, will become clear to us only when, in the following book, we try to fathom the deep significance of music, and it will show itself to us how the melody, advancing in connection through high, lightly moving tones, is in a certain sense to be regarded as representing the life and striving of man, which has connection through reflection, while the unconnected ripieno voices and the heavily moving bass, from which the harmony necessary to the completeness of music proceeds, depict the rest of animal and knowledgeless nature. But of this in its place, where it will no longer sound so paradoxical.—We find, however, that inner necessity of the gradation of its appearances, inseparable from the adequate objectivity of the will, expressed in the whole of these appearances also by an outer necessity, namely that by virtue of which man needs the animals for his maintenance, these in gradation one another, and then also the plants, which in turn need the soil, the water, the chemical elements and their mixtures, the planet, the sun, the rotation and revolution about it, the obliquity of the ecliptic, and so on.—At bottom this springs from the fact that the will must feed on itself, because there is nothing outside it and it is a hungry will. Hence the hunt, the anxiety, and the suffering.

As the knowledge of the unity of the will, as thing in itself, in the infinite diversity and manifoldness of appearances alone gives the true key to that wondrous, unmistakable analogy of all the productions of nature, that family likeness that lets us regard them as variations on one and the same theme, which is not itself given; so likewise, through the clearly and deeply grasped knowledge of that harmony, that essential connection of all the parts of the world, that necessity of their gradation, which we have just considered, a true and sufficient insight will open to us into the inner essence and significance of the undeniable purposiveness of all organic products of nature, which we presuppose even a priori when we consider and judge them.

This purposiveness is of two kinds: in part an inner one, that is, an agreement of all the parts of a single organism so ordered that its maintenance and that of its species result from it, and that therefore presents itself as the end of that arrangement. In part, however, the purposiveness is an outer one, namely a relation of inorganic nature to organic nature in general, or also of individual parts of organic nature to one another, which makes possible the maintenance of the whole of organic nature, or of individual animal species, and which therefore confronts our judgment as a means to this end.

The inner purposiveness now enters the context of our consideration as follows. If, according to what has been said so far, all the differences of forms in nature and all the plurality of individuals belong not to the will but only to its objectivity and the form of this, it follows necessarily that the will is indivisible and wholly present in every appearance, although the grades of its objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, are very different. For easier comprehension we can regard these different Ideas as individual acts of will, simple in themselves, in which its essence expresses itself more or less; the individuals, however, are again appearances of the Ideas, thus of those acts, in time and space and plurality.—Now on the lowest grades of objectivity such an act (or Idea) retains its unity even in the appearance; while on the higher grades, in order to appear, it needs a whole series of states and developments in time, which, all taken together, first complete the expression of its essence. Thus, for example, the Idea that reveals itself in some universal force of nature has always only a single utterance, even though this presents itself differently according to the external conditions; otherwise its identity could not be demonstrated at all, which is done precisely by separating off the difference that arises merely from the external conditions. Likewise the crystal has only one manifestation of life, its shooting, which afterward has its fully sufficient and exhaustive expression in the solidified form, the corpse of that momentary life. The plant, however, already does not express the Idea whose appearance it is at one stroke and by a single utterance, but in a succession of developments of its organs, in time. The animal not only develops its organism in the same way, in a succession of often very different forms (metamorphosis); but this form itself, though already

objectivity of the will on this grade, does not suffice for the complete presentation of its Idea; rather this is first completed by the actions of the animal, in which its empirical character, which is the same in the whole species, expresses itself and which is first the complete revelation of the Idea, whereby the latter presupposes the determinate organism as its fundamental condition. In man the empirical character is already peculiar to each individual (indeed, as we shall see in the fourth book, even to the point of the complete suppression of the character of the species, namely through the self-suppression of the whole of willing). What is recognized as empirical character through the necessary development in time and the consequent breaking up into single actions is, when we abstract from this temporal form of appearance, the intelligible character, in Kant's expression; and in demonstrating this distinction and in presenting the relation between freedom and necessity, that is, really between the will as thing in itself and its appearance in time, Kant shows his immortal merit especially splendidly [23]. The intelligible character therefore coincides with the Idea, or, still more properly, with the original act of will that reveals itself in it. [24] See "Critique of Pure Reason, Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmic Events," pp. 560–586 of the fifth and p. 532 ff. of the first edition, and "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, pp. 169–179; Rosenkranz's edition, p. 224 ff. Cf. my treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 43. To this extent, then, not only the empirical character of every man, but also that of every animal species, indeed of every plant species and even of every original force of inorganic nature, is to be regarded as the appearance of an intelligible character, that is, of an extra-temporal, indivisible act of will.—Incidentally, I should like to draw attention here to the naïveté with which every plant expresses its whole character by its mere form and openly lays it out, reveals its whole being and willing, which makes the physiognomies of plants so interesting; whereas the animal, in order to be known as to its Idea, must already be observed in its doings and goings-on, and man must be thoroughly explored and tested, since reason makes him capable of dissimulation to a high degree. The animal is just as much more naive than man as the plant is more naive than the animal. In the animal we see the will to life, as it were,

more naked than in man, where it is so overlaid with knowledge, and moreover veiled by the capacity for dissimulation, that its true essence comes to light almost only by accident and in places. Quite naked, but also much weaker, it shows itself in the plant, as mere blind urge to existence, without aim or goal. For the plant reveals its whole essence at the first glance and with perfect innocence, which does not suffer from its carrying its genitals, which in all animals have been given the most hidden place, displayed on its summit.

This innocence of the plant rests on its lack of knowledge: guilt lies not in willing, but in willing with knowledge. Every plant tells first of all of its home, of the climate of that home and the nature of the soil from which it has sprung. Hence even someone of little practice easily recognizes whether an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone, and whether it grows in water, in a swamp, on mountains, or on the heath. Besides this, however, every plant also expresses the special will of its species and says something that cannot be expressed in any other language.—But now to the application of what has been said to the teleological consideration of organisms, so far as it concerns their inner purposiveness. If in inorganic nature the Idea, which is everywhere to be regarded as a single act of will, reveals itself also only in a single and always uniform utterance, and one can therefore say that here the empirical character partakes directly of the unity of the intelligible, coincides with it, as it were, for which reason no inner purposiveness can show itself here; if, on the other hand, all organisms present their Idea through a succession of developments one after another, which is conditioned by a manifoldness of different parts side by side, so that the sum of the utterances of their empirical character is the expression of the intelligible only when taken together; then this necessary side-by-side of the parts and succession of the development does not cancel the unity of the appearing Idea, of the act of will that utters itself; rather this unity now finds its expression in the necessary relation and concatenation of those parts and developments with one another, according to the law of causality. Since it is the single and indivisible, and just thereby wholly self-consistent will that reveals itself in the whole Idea as in one act, its appearance, although diverging into a diversity of parts and states, must yet show that unity again in a

thoroughgoing agreement of these: this happens through a necessary relation and dependence of all the parts on one another, whereby the unity of the Idea is restored also in the appearance. Accordingly we now recognize those different parts and functions of the organism reciprocally as means and end of one another, but the organism itself as the final end of all. Consequently, both the diverging of the Idea, simple in itself, into the plurality of the parts and states of the organism, on the one hand, and the restoration of its unity through the necessary connection of those parts and functions, in that they are cause and effect, thus means and end, of one another, on the other, are peculiar and essential not to the appearing will as such, the thing in itself, but only to its appearance in space, time, and causality (all of them mere forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the form of appearance). They belong to the world as representation, not to the world as will: they belong to the manner and way in which the will becomes object, that is, representation, on this grade of its objectivity. Whoever has penetrated into the sense of this perhaps somewhat difficult discussion will now really understand the doctrine of Kant, which comes to this, that both the purposiveness of the organic and the lawfulness of the inorganic are first brought into nature by our understanding, and that both therefore belong only to the appearance, not to the thing in itself. The wonder mentioned above at the unfailing constancy of the lawfulness of inorganic nature is essentially the same as the wonder at the purposiveness of organic nature: for in both cases it is only the sight of the original unity of the Idea, which for the appearance had assumed the form of plurality and diversity, that surprises us [25].

As for the second kind of purposiveness according to the division made above, the outer, which shows itself not in the inner economy of organisms but in the support and help that they receive from outside, both from inorganic nature and one from another, this too finds its explanation in general in the discussion just presented, since the whole world, with all its appearances, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible will, the Idea that stands to all other Ideas as the harmony to the single voices, so that this unity of the will must show itself also in the agreement of all its appearances with one another. But we can raise this

insight to much greater distinctness if we go somewhat more closely into the phenomena of that outer purposiveness and agreement of the different parts of nature with one another, a discussion which will at the same time cast light back on the preceding. We shall best arrive at this by considering the following analogy.

The character of every individual man, insofar as it is thoroughly individual and not wholly comprised in that of the species, may be regarded as a special Idea, corresponding to a peculiar act of objectification of the will. This act itself would then be his intelligible character, while his empirical character [26] Compare "On the Will in Nature," at the end of the section "Comparative Anatomy." would be the appearance of it. The empirical character is wholly and entirely determined by the intelligible, which is groundless will, that is, will that as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason (the form of appearance). The empirical character must furnish in a course of life the image of the intelligible, and cannot turn out otherwise than the essence of the latter requires. But this determination extends only to what is essential, not to what is inessential in the course of life that thus appears. To this inessential belongs the closer determination of the events and actions that are the material on which the empirical character shows itself. These are determined by external circumstances, which supply the motives to which the character reacts according to its nature; and since they can be very different, the external shaping of the appearance of the empirical character, that is, the determinate factual or historical shaping of the course of life, will have to be governed by their influence. This can turn out very different, even though what is essential in this appearance, its content, remains the same: thus, for example, it is inessential whether one plays for nuts or for crowns; but whether one cheats at the game or proceeds honestly, that is the essential: this is determined by the intelligible character, that by external influence. As the same theme can present itself in a hundred variations, so can the same character in a hundred very different courses of life. But however various the external influence may be, the empirical character expressed in the course of life must, however it turns out, objectify the intelligible exactly, since it adapts its objectification to the material of fac-

tual circumstances that it finds ready to hand.—Something analogous to that influence of external circumstances upon the course of life, which is essentially determined by the character, we must assume if we want to conceive how the will, in the original act of its objectification, determines the different Ideas in which it objectifies itself, that is, the different forms of natural beings of every kind, among which it distributes its objectification and which must therefore necessarily have a relation to one another in appearance. We must assume that among all those appearances of the one will a universal mutual adapting and accommodating to one another took place; though in this, as we shall soon see more clearly, all determination of time is to be left out, since the Idea lies outside time. Accordingly every appearance had to adapt itself to the surroundings into which it entered, but these in turn also to it, even if the latter occupies a much later place in time; and everywhere we see this consensus naturae. Every plant is therefore suited to its soil and climate, every animal to its element and to the prey that is to become its nourishment, and is also somehow, to some extent, protected against its natural pursuer; the eye is suited to light and its refrangibility, the lung and the blood to the air, the swim-bladder to the water, the eye of the seal to the change of its medium, the water-holding cells in the stomach of the camel to the drought of the African deserts, the sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to drive its little ship, and so on down to the most special and astonishing external purposivenesses [27]. Now, however, in all this we must abstract from every temporal relation, since such relations can concern only the appearance of the Idea, not the Idea itself. Accordingly that mode of explanation is to be used backward as well, and we must assume not only that every species accommodated itself to the circumstances it found, but that these circumstances, which preceded it in time, themselves likewise took account of the beings that were still to come. For it is indeed one and the same will that objectifies itself in the whole world: it knows no time, since this form of the principle of sufficient reason belongs neither to it nor to its original objectivity, the Ideas, but only to the manner in which these are known by the individuals, themselves transient, that is, to the appearance of the Ideas. Hence in our present consideration of the manner in which the objectification of the will is

distributed among the Ideas, the temporal sequence is wholly without significance, and the Ideas whose appearances, in accordance with the law of causality to which as such they are subject, entered earlier into the temporal sequence, have thereby [28] See "On the Will in Nature," the section "Comparative Anatomy." no precedence over those whose appearance enters later, which are rather precisely the most perfect objectifications of the will, to which the earlier ones had to adapt themselves just as much as these to those. Thus the course of the planets, the inclination of the ecliptic, the rotation of the earth, the distribution of land and sea, the atmosphere, light, warmth, and all similar phenomena, which are in nature what the ground bass is in harmony, adapted themselves, as if by presentiment, to the coming species of living beings, whose bearer and sustainer they were to become. In the same way the soil adapted itself to the nourishment of plants, these to the nourishment of animals, these to the nourishment of other animals, just as well as, conversely, all these in turn to those. All parts of nature come to meet one another, because it is one will that appears in all of them, while the temporal sequence is wholly alien to its original and alone adequate objectivity (the following book explains this expression), the Ideas. Even now, when the species have only to maintain themselves and no longer to come into being, we see here and there such a provision of nature extending into the future, really abstracting, as it were, from the temporal sequence, an accommodating of what is there to what is still to come. So the bird builds the nest for young it does not yet know; the beaver erects a structure whose purpose is unknown to it; the ant, the hamster, the bee gather stores for a winter that is unknown to them; the spider and the ant-lion set up, as if with deliberate cunning, traps for the future prey they do not know; insects lay their eggs where the future brood will in future find nourishment. When, about the time of flowering, the female flower of the dioecious Valisneria unwinds the spiral coils of its stalk, by which it was held until then at the bottom of the water, and thereby rises to the surface, at precisely that moment the male flower, which grows on a short stalk at the bottom of the water, tears itself away from this and so, at the sacrifice of its life, reaches the surface, where, floating about, it seeks out the female flower, which then, after fertilization has taken place,

draws itself back to the bottom by contraction of its spiral, where the fruit develops [29]. Here too I must once more mention the larva of the male stag beetle, which bites the hole in the wood for its metamorphosis twice as large as the female does, in order to gain room for the future horns. In general, then, the instinct of animals gives us the best illustration of the rest of the teleology of nature. For as instinct is an acting like that according to a concept of an end, and yet wholly without it; so all forming by nature is like that according to a concept of an end, and yet wholly without it. For in the external as in the internal teleology of nature, what we have to think as means and end is everywhere only the appearance, spread apart for our mode of knowledge in space and time, of the unity of the one will, which is so far in agreement with itself.

Meanwhile the mutual adapting and accommodating of the appearances that springs from this unity cannot nevertheless extinguish the inner conflict presented above, appearing in the universal struggle of nature, which is essential to the will. That harmony goes only so far as to make possible the continued existence of the world and its beings, which without it would long since have perished. It therefore extends only to the continuance of the species and of the general conditions of life, not to that of the individuals. If, then, by virtue of that harmony and accommodation, the species in the organic and the universal forces of nature in the inorganic exist side by side and even support one another, the inner conflict of the will objectified through all those Ideas shows itself, on the other hand, in the unceasing war of extermination among the individuals of those species and in the constant wrestling of the appearances of those forces of nature with one another, as set forth above. The arena and object of this struggle is matter, which they strive to wrest from one another, as well as space and time, whose union through the form of causality is really matter, as demonstrated in the first book [30].

31 Chatin, sur la Valisneria spiralis, in the Comptes rendus de l'acad. d. sc., No. 13, 1855.

32 On this see chs. 26 and 27 of the second volume.

29 I conclude here the second main part of my exposition, in the hope that, so far as is possible in the very first communication of a thought never there before, which therefore cannot be wholly free from the traces of the individuality in which it was first engendered, I have succeeded in imparting the distinct certainty that this world in which we live and have our being is, in its whole essence, through and through will and at the same time through and through representation; that this representation, already as such, presupposes a form, namely object and subject, and is therefore relative; and that if we ask what remains after the cancellation of this form and of all the forms subordinate to it, which the principle of sufficient reason expresses, this, as something toto genere different from representation, can be nothing other than will, which is accordingly the proper thing in itself. Everyone finds themselves to be this will, in which the inner essence of the world consists, just as they also find themselves to be the knowing subject, whose representation is the whole world, which in this respect has existence only in relation to their consciousness, as its necessary bearer. Everyone is thus, in this double respect, the whole world itself, the microcosm, and finds both sides of it whole and complete in themselves. And what they thus recognize as their own essence also exhausts the essence of the whole world, the macrocosm: it too, therefore, like themselves, is through and through will and through and through representation, and nothing more remains. So we see here the philosophy of Thales, which considered the macrocosm, and that of Socrates, which considered the microcosm, coincide, since the object of both proves to be the same.—The whole knowledge communicated in the first two books will, however, gain greater completeness, and thereby also greater certainty, through the two books still to follow, in which, it is hoped, many a question that may have been raised, distinctly or indistinctly, in our consideration so far will find its sufficient answer.

Meanwhile one such question may still be discussed specially, since it can really be raised only as long as one has not yet wholly penetrated into the sense of the exposition so far, and precisely to that extent can serve to elucidate it. It is the following. Every will is will toward something, has an object, an aim of its willing: what then does that will finally want, or what does it strive after, which is

presented to us as the essence in itself of the world?—This question rests, like so many others, on a confusion of the thing in itself with the appearance. To the latter alone, not to the former, the principle of sufficient reason extends, of which the law of motivation is also a form. Everywhere a ground can be given only for appearances as such, for individual things, never for the will itself, nor for the Idea in which it objectifies itself adequately. Thus for every single movement, or change in general, in nature, a cause is to be sought, that is, a state that necessarily brought it about; but never for the force of nature itself, which reveals itself in that movement and in countless similar appearances: and it is therefore real unintelligence, arising from lack of reflective awareness, to ask for a cause of gravity, of electricity, and so on. Only if it had perhaps been shown that gravity and electricity were not original, peculiar forces of nature, but only modes of appearance of a more general, already known force of nature, could one ask for the cause that makes this force of nature produce here the appearance of gravity, of electricity. All this has been set forth at length above. In just the same way every single act of will of a knowing individual (which is itself only appearance of the will as thing in itself) necessarily has a motive, without which that act would never occur; but as the material cause contains merely the determination that at this time, in this place, in this matter, a manifestation of this or that force of nature must occur, so too the motive determines only the act of will of a knowing being, at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, as something wholly individual; but by no means that this being wills at all and wills in this way: that is manifestation of its intelligible character, which, as the will itself, the thing in itself, is groundless, lying as it does outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason. Hence every human being also has constantly aims and motives by which they guide their conduct, and can always give an account of their single doings: but if one asked them why they will at all, or why they want to exist at all, they would have no answer; indeed the question would seem absurd to them: and in this precisely the consciousness would really express itself that they themselves are nothing but will, whose willing in general thus goes without saying and needs the closer determination by motives only in its single acts, for each point of time.

In truth the absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essence of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. This was already touched upon above, in mentioning centrifugal force; it also reveals itself most simply on the very lowest grade of the objectivity of the will, namely in gravity, whose constant striving, with the manifest impossibility of a final goal, lies before our eyes. For even if, according to its will, all existing matter were united in one lump, still within it gravity, striving toward the center, would be fighting with impenetrability, as rigidity or elasticity. The striving of matter can therefore always only be checked, never by any means fulfilled or satisfied. But precisely so it is with all the striving of all the appearances of the will. Every goal reached is again the beginning of a new course, and so on to infinity. The plant raises its appearance from the germ through stem and leaf to blossom and fruit, which again is only the beginning of a new germ, of a new individual, which once more runs through the old course, and so through infinite time. Such, too, is the course of life of the animal: procreation is its summit, after reaching which the life of the first individual sinks, quickly or slowly, while a new one guarantees to nature the maintenance of the species and repeats the same appearance. Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of every organism must also be regarded as the mere appearance of this constant urge and change, a renewal which the physiologists now cease to hold to be a necessary replacement of the material consumed in movement, since the possible wear of the machine can by no means be an equivalent for the constant inflow through nutrition: Eternal becoming, endless flux, belongs to the revelation of the essence of the will. The same shows itself finally also in human strivings and wishes, which always delude us with the prospect that their fulfillment is the final goal of willing; but as soon as they are attained they no longer look the same, and are therefore soon forgotten, antiquated, and really always, though not admittedly, laid aside as vanished illusions; we are happy enough if something to wish and strive for remains, so that the game of the constant transition from wish to satisfaction, and from this to a new wish, whose rapid course is called happiness and the slow one suffering, may be kept up, and not fall into that stagnation which shows itself as fearful, life-benumbing boredom, a languid yearning without a definite object,

a deadening languor.—According to all this, the will, where knowledge illumines it, always knows what it wills now, what it wills here; but never what it wills in general: every single act has an end; the whole of willing has none: just as every single natural appearance is determined for its occurrence at this place, at this time, by a sufficient cause, whereas the force that manifests itself in it has no cause at all, since such a force is a grade of the appearance of the thing in itself, of the groundless will.—The sole self-knowledge of the will as a whole, however, is the representation as a whole, the entire intuitive world. It is its objectivity, its revelation, its mirror. What it declares in this capacity will be the subject of our further consideration [33].

[34] On this see ch. 28 of the second volume.

Book III

Second Consideration of the World as Representation: The Representation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art.

Τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν; ΠΛΑΤΩΝ.

30 Having considered, in the second book, from its other side the world that was presented in the first book as mere representation, object for a subject, and having found that this other side is will, which alone proved to be that which that world still is besides representation, we called, in accordance with this knowledge, the world as representation, both as a whole and in its parts, the objectivity of the will, which therefore means: the will become object, that is, representation. We now recall further that such objectification of the will had many but determinate grades, on which, with gradually rising distinctness and perfection, the essence of the will entered into representation, that is, presented itself as object. In these grades we already there recognized Plato's Ideas, insofar, namely, as those grades are precisely the determinate species, or the original, unchanging forms and properties of all natural bodies, inorganic as well as organic, and also the universal forces that reveal themselves according to laws of nature. These Ideas, then, taken all together, present themselves in countless individuals and particulars, to which, as their prototype, they relate as to their

copies. The plurality of such individuals is representable only through time and space, their arising and passing away only through causality; in all of these forms we recognize only the different shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, which is the ultimate principle of all finitude, of all individuation, and the universal form of representation as it falls into the knowledge of the individual as such. The Idea, on the other hand, does not enter into that principle: hence neither plurality nor change belongs to it. While the individuals in which it presents itself are countless and incessantly come to be and pass away, it remains unchanged as the one and the same, and the principle of sufficient reason has no meaning for it. But since this principle is the form under which all knowledge of the subject stands, insofar as the subject knows as an individual, the Ideas will also lie wholly outside the sphere of knowledge of the subject as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to become objects of knowledge, this can happen only with the abolition of individuality in the knowing subject. The closer and more detailed explanations on this point are now what will first occupy us.

31 First, however, the following very essential remark. I hope that I succeeded in the preceding book in producing the conviction that what in the Kantian philosophy is called the thing in itself, and which appears there as so important but obscure and paradoxical a doctrine, and which, especially through the way in which Kant introduced it, namely by the inference from the grounded to the ground, was found to be a stumbling block, indeed the weak side of his philosophy: that this, I say, when one arrives at it by the quite different path we have taken, is nothing other than the will, in the sphere of that concept as expanded and determined in the manner indicated. I hope further that, after what has been set forth, no scruple will be felt in recognizing, in the determinate grades of objectification of that will which constitutes the in-itself of the world, that which Plato called the eternal Ideas, or the unchanging forms (ειδη), which, acknowledged as the principal but at the same time most obscure and paradoxical dogma of his doctrine, have been, through a series of centuries, an object of reflection, of dispute, of mockery, and of veneration for so many minds of such diverse dispositions.

If now the will is for us the thing in itself, and the Idea the immediate objectivity of that will on a determinate grade, then we find Kant's thing in itself and Plato's Idea, which alone is for him οντως ον, these two great obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the West, to be, not indeed identical, but yet very closely related and distinguished by only a single determination. Both great paradoxes are, indeed, precisely because, with all their inner accord and kinship, they sound so extremely different through the extraordinarily different individualities of their authors, the best commentary each on the other, since they resemble two quite different paths that lead to one goal.—

This can be made clear in a few words. What Kant says is, in essence, the following: "Time, space, and causality are not determinations of the thing in itself, but belong only to its appearance, since they are nothing but forms of our knowledge. Since, however, all plurality and all arising and passing away are possible only through time, space, and causality, it follows that these too cling only to the appearance, by no means to the thing in itself. But because our knowledge is conditioned by those forms, all experience is only knowledge of the appearance, not of the thing in itself; hence its laws also cannot be made valid for the thing in itself. What has been said extends even to our own self, and we know it only as appearance, not as to what it may be in itself." This is, in the important respect under consideration, the sense and content of Kant's doctrine.—Plato, however, says: "The things of this world, which our senses perceive, have no true being at all: they are always becoming, but never are: they have only a relative being, are all together only in and through their relation to one another: one may therefore just as well call their whole existence a non-being. Consequently they are also not objects of real knowledge (επιστημη); for only of that which is in and for itself and always in the same way can there be such knowledge: they, on the other hand, are only the object of an opinion occasioned by sensation (δοξα μετ' αισθησεως αλογου). So long as we are limited to the perception of them, we resemble men who sit in a dark cave so firmly bound that they cannot even turn their heads, and who see nothing but, by the light of a fire burning behind them, on the wall opposite them, the shadow-images of real things that are carried past between them and the fire, and even

of one another, indeed each of himself, only the shadows on that wall. Their wisdom, however, would be to predict the sequence of those shadows, learned from experience. What, on the other hand, alone can be called truly existent (οντως ον), because it always is but never becomes nor passes away, is the real archetypes of those shadow-images: these are the eternal Ideas, the primal forms of all things. No plurality belongs to them; for each is by its essence only one, since it is the archetype itself, of which the copies, or shadows, are all the individual, transient things of the same kind that bear its name. No arising and passing away belongs to them either: for they are truly existent, but never becoming nor perishing like their vanishing copies. (In these two negative determinations, however, there is necessarily contained the presupposition that time, space, and causality have for them neither meaning nor validity, and that they do not exist in these.) Of them alone, therefore, is there real knowledge, since the object of such knowledge can be only that which always and in every respect (thus in itself) is; not that which is, but again also is not, according as one looks at it."—This is Plato's doctrine. It is evident, and needs no further demonstration, that the inner sense of both doctrines is wholly the same, that both declare the visible world to be an appearance which is in itself nothing, and which has meaning and borrowed reality only through what expresses itself in it (for the one the thing in itself, for the other the Idea); and to this latter, the truly existent, according to both doctrines, all the forms of that appearance, even the most universal and essential, are entirely alien. Kant, in order to deny these forms, himself immediately grasped them in abstract expressions and at once denied time, space, and causality, as mere forms of appearance, of the thing in itself; Plato, on the other hand, did not reach the supreme expression, and denied those forms of his Ideas only indirectly, in that he denied of the Ideas that which is possible only through those forms, namely plurality of the like, arising and passing away. For good measure, however, I want to make that remarkable and important agreement perceptible by an example. Let an animal stand before us, in full vital activity. Plato will say: "This animal has no true existence, but only an apparent one, a constant becoming, a relative existence, which can just as well be called a non-being as a being. Truly existent is only the

Idea that is imaged in that animal, or the animal in itself (αυτο το θηριον), which is dependent on nothing, but is in and for itself (καθ' εαυτο, αει ὡς αυτως), not become, not ending, but always in the same way (αει ον, και μηδεποτε ουτε γιγνομενον, ουτε απολλυμενον). Insofar as we recognize in this animal its Idea, it is wholly one and the same, and without significance, whether we have this animal before us now, or its ancestor living a thousand years ago; further, whether it is here or in a distant country; whether it presents itself in this or that manner, posture, action; whether, finally, it is this or any other individual of its kind: all this is nothing and concerns only the appearance: the Idea of the animal alone has true being and is the object of real knowledge."—So Plato. Kant would say something like this: "This animal is an appearance in time, space, and causality, which are all the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience that lie in our faculty of knowledge, and not determinations of the thing in itself. Hence this animal, as we perceive it at this determinate time, in this given place, as an individual that has come to be in the connection of experience, that is, along the chain of causes and effects, and that is just as necessarily perishable, is no thing in itself, but an appearance valid only in relation to our knowledge. In order to know it as to what it may be in itself, and consequently independently of all determinations lying in time, space, and causality, a different mode of knowledge would be required than the only one possible to us, through senses and understanding."

To bring Kant's expression still closer to the Platonic, one might also say: time, space, and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by virtue of which the one being of each kind, which really alone exists, presents itself to us as a plurality of beings of the same kind, ever anew arising and passing away, in endless succession. The apprehension of things by means of and in accordance with this arrangement is the immanent one; that apprehension, on the other hand, which becomes aware of how matters stand with it is the transcendental. This latter we receive in abstracto through the Critique of Pure Reason; but exceptionally it can also arise intuitively. This last is my addition, which I am endeavoring to elucidate precisely by the present third book.

Had one ever really understood and grasped Kant's doctrine, had one since Kant really understood Plato, had one faithfully and earnestly pondered the inner sense and content of the doctrines of both great masters, instead of flinging about the technical terms of the one and parodying the style of the other, one could not have failed to find long since how greatly the two great sages agree, and that the pure meaning, the goal, of both doctrines is wholly the same. Not only would one then not have constantly compared Plato with Leibniz, on whom his spirit by no means rested, or even with a well-known gentleman still living [1], as if one wanted to mock the shade of the great thinker of antiquity; but in general one would then have got much further than one is, or rather one would not have retrogressed so shamefully far as one has in these last forty years: one would not today let oneself be led by the nose by this windbag, tomorrow by another, and would not have opened the nineteenth century, which announced itself so significantly, in Germany with philosophical farces performed over Kant's grave (as the ancients sometimes did at the funeral rites of their own), to the just mockery of other nations, since nothing becomes the serious and even stiff Germans less. But so small is the real public of genuine philosophers that even the pupils who understand are brought to them only sparingly by the centuries.—Εισι δη ναρθηκοφοροι μεν πολλοι, βακχοι [2] F. H. Jacobi. δε γε παυροι. (Thyrsigeri quidem multi, Bacchi vero pauci.) Ἡ ατιμια φιλοσοφιᾳ δια ταυτα προσπεπτωκεν, ὅτι ου κατ' αξιαν αυτης ἁπτονται· ου γαρ νοθους εδει ἁπτεσθαι, αλλα γνησιους. (Eam ob rem philosophia in infamiam incidit, quod non pro dignitate ipsam attingunt: neque enim a spuriis, sed a legitimis erat attrectanda.) Plat.

One went after the words, the words: "representations a priori, forms of intuiting and thinking that are conscious independently of experience, primal concepts of the pure understanding," and so forth—and now asked whether Plato's Ideas, which are supposed to be likewise primal concepts and, further, also recollections from an intuition of the truly existent things that preceded life, were perhaps the same as Kant's forms of intuiting and thinking, which lie a priori in our consciousness: these two wholly heterogeneous doctrines, the Kantian of the forms, which restrict the knowledge of the individual to the

appearance, and the Platonic of the Ideas, whose knowledge expressly denies those very forms—these doctrines, so far diametrically opposed, since in their expressions they resemble each other a little, one compared attentively, deliberated and disputed about their sameness, found at last that they were nevertheless not the same, and concluded that Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Kant's critique of reason had no agreement whatever [3]. But enough of this.

32 In consequence of our considerations so far, for all the inner agreement between Kant and Plato, and the identity of the goal that hovered before both, or of the view of the world that stirred them to philosophize and guided them, Idea and thing in itself are nevertheless not for us simply one and the same: rather, the Idea is for us only the immediate and therefore adequate objectivity of the thing in itself, which itself, however, is the [4] See, e.g., "Immanuel Kant, a Memorial, by Fr. Bouterweck," p. 49,—and Buhle's "History of Philosophy," vol. 6, pp. 802–815 and 823.
will, the will insofar as it is not yet objectified, not yet become representation. For the thing in itself is, according to Kant himself, to be free of all the forms that attach to knowing as such; and it is only (as is shown in the Appendix) an error of Kant's that he did not count among these forms, before all the others, being-an-object-for-a-subject, since precisely this is the first and most universal form of all appearance, that is, of representation; hence he ought expressly to have denied being an object to his thing in itself, which would have saved him from that great inconsistency, discovered early. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily object, something known, a representation, and precisely thereby, but also only thereby, different from the thing in itself. It has merely laid aside the subordinate forms of appearance, which we comprehend all together under the principle of sufficient reason, or rather has not yet entered into them; but the first and most universal form it has retained, that of representation in general, of being an object for a subject. The forms subordinate to this (whose universal expression is the principle of sufficient reason) are what multiply the Idea into individual and transient individuals, whose number is, in relation to the Idea, wholly indifferent. The principle of sufficient reason is

thus again the form into which the Idea enters, in that it falls into the knowledge of the subject as individual. The individual thing that appears in conformity with the principle of sufficient reason is thus only a mediate objectification of the thing in itself (which is the will), between which and it the Idea still stands, as the sole immediate objectivity of the will, in that it has assumed no other form belonging to knowing as such than that of representation in general, that is, of being an object for a subject. Hence it alone, too, is the most adequate possible objectivity of the will or thing in itself, is itself the whole thing in itself, only under the form of representation: and herein lies the ground of the great agreement between Plato and Kant, although, in the strictest sense, that of which the two speak is not the same. The individual things, however, are no wholly adequate objectivity of the will, but this is here already clouded by those forms whose common expression is the principle of sufficient reason, but which are the condition of knowledge as it is possible for the individual as such.—We would in fact, if it is permitted to infer from an impossible presupposition, no longer know individual things, nor events, nor change, nor plurality, but would apprehend only Ideas, only the scale of grades of objectification of that one will, the true thing in itself, in pure, unclouded knowledge, and consequently our world would be a nunc stans; if we were not, as subject of knowing, at the same time individuals, that is, if our intuition were not mediated by a body, from whose affections it proceeds, and which is itself only concrete willing, objectivity of the will, thus an object among objects, and as such, as it enters into knowing consciousness, can do so only in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and consequently already presupposes, and thereby introduces, time and all the other forms that this principle expresses. Time is merely the distributed and fragmented view which an individual being has of the Ideas, which are outside time, and hence eternal: therefore Plato says that time is the moving image of eternity: αιωνος εικων κινητη ὁ χρονος [5].

33 Since, then, as individuals we have no other knowledge than that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, but this form excludes the knowledge of the Ideas, it is certain that, if it is possible for us to raise ourselves from the

knowledge of individual things to that of the Ideas, this can happen only through a change taking place in the subject, a change that corresponds and is analogous to that great change in the whole kind of the object, and by virtue of which the subject, insofar as it knows an Idea, is no longer an individual.

We recall from the preceding book that knowing in general itself belongs to the objectification of the will on its higher grades, and that sensibility, nerves, and brain are only, like other parts of the organic being, expression [6] On this see ch. 29 of the second volume. of the will at this grade of its objectivity, and that the representation arising through them is therefore likewise destined for its service, as a means (μηχανη) for the attainment of its now more complicated (πολυτελεστερα) ends, for the maintenance of a being with manifold needs. Originally, then, and by its essence, knowledge is wholly subservient to the will; and as the immediate object, which by the application of the law of causality becomes its point of departure, is only objectified will, so too all knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason remains in a nearer or more distant relation to the will. For the individual finds its body as an object among objects, to all of which it has manifold relations and connections according to the principle of sufficient reason, so that the consideration of them always leads back, by a nearer or a farther road, to its body, and thus to its will. Since it is the principle of sufficient reason that places the objects in this relation to the body and thereby to the will, the knowledge that serves the will must also strive solely to become acquainted with precisely those relations of the objects that are posited by the principle of sufficient reason, and so will pursue their manifold relations in space, time, and causality. For only through these is the object interesting to the individual, that is, has a relation to the will. Hence the knowledge that serves the will also really knows of the objects nothing more than their relations, knows the objects only insofar as they exist at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, from these causes, with these effects, in a word, as individual things; and if one canceled all these relations, the objects too would have vanished for it, precisely because it otherwise knew nothing of them.—We must also not conceal that what the sciences consider in things is likewise essentially nothing other than all this, namely their relations, the relations of time

and of space, the causes of natural changes, the comparison of forms, the motives of events, thus nothing but relations. What distinguishes them from common knowledge is merely their form, the systematic, the facilitation of knowledge by the comprehension of everything individual into the universal through the subordination of concepts, and the completeness thereby attained. All relation itself has only a relative existence: for example, all being in time is also again a non-being; for time is precisely that through which opposite determinations can belong to the same thing: hence every appearance in time also again is not; for what separates its beginning from its end is only time, something essentially evanescent, without permanence, and relative, here called duration. Time, however, is the most universal form of all objects of the knowledge that stands in the service of the will, and the archetype of its other forms.
As a rule, knowledge remains always subject to the service of the will, as indeed it has come forth for this service, and has, so to speak, sprouted from the will as the head from the trunk. In animals this servitude of knowledge to the will can never be abolished. In men such abolition occurs only as an exception, as we shall presently consider more closely. This difference between man and animal is expressed outwardly by the difference in the relation of the head to the trunk. In the lower animals the two are still wholly grown together; in all of them the head is directed to the earth, where the objects of the will lie; even in the higher ones head and trunk are still much more one than in man, whose head appears to be set freely on the body, only borne by it, not serving it. This human advantage is presented in the highest degree by the Apollo Belvedere: the far-gazing head of the god of the Muses stands so freely on the shoulders that it appears wholly wrested from the body, no longer subject to care for it.

34 The transition, possible as I have said, but to be regarded only as an exception, from the common knowledge of individual things to the knowledge of the Idea occurs suddenly, in that knowledge tears itself loose from the service of the will, and precisely thereby the subject ceases to be a merely individual one and is now pure, will-less subject of knowledge, which no longer pursues relations in

accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, but rests in steadfast contemplation of the object offered, apart from its connection with any others, and is absorbed in it.

For this to become clear, it necessarily needs a detailed exposition, and one must for the time being rise above the strangeness of it, until, once the whole thought to be communicated in this work has been taken together, that strangeness vanishes of itself.

If, raised up by the power of the mind, one lets go the usual way of considering things, ceases to pursue only their relations to one another, whose last goal is always the relation to one's own will, along the guiding thread of the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, and thus no longer considers the Where, the When, the Why, and the What-for of things, but solely and alone the What; and if one also does not let abstract thinking, the concepts of reason, take possession of consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of one's mind to intuition, sinks wholly into it, and lets the whole consciousness be filled by the quiet contemplation of the natural object that happens to be present, be it a landscape, a tree, a rock, a building, or whatever it may be; in that one, according to an apt German idiom, loses oneself wholly in this object, that is, forgets precisely one's individuality, one's will, and remains only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object; so that it is as if the object alone were there, without anyone who perceives it, and one can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, since the whole consciousness is wholly filled and occupied by a single intuitive picture; if, then, in this way the object has stepped out of all relation to anything outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will: then what is thus known is no longer the individual thing as such, but it is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will on this grade: and precisely thereby the one who is caught up in this intuition is at the same time no longer an individual, for the individual has precisely lost itself in such intuition; rather, such a one is pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge. This, so striking in itself now (and I know very well that it confirms the saying that comes from Thomas Paine, du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas), will become gradually clearer and less

strange through what follows. It was this too that hovered before Spinoza when he wrote down: mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit (Eth. V, pr. 31, schol.)[7]. In such contemplation, then, at one stroke the individual thing becomes the Idea of its species, and the intuiting individual becomes pure subject of knowing. The individual as such knows only individual things; the pure subject of knowing only Ideas. For the individual is the subject of knowing in its relation to a determinate individual appearance of the will, and is subservient to it. This individual will-appearance is as such subject to the principle of sufficient reason in all its shapes: all knowledge that refers to it therefore also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and for the purposes of the will no other knowledge is fit than this, which always has only relations to the object. The knowing individual as such, and the individual thing known by it, are always somewhere, sometime, and links in the chain of causes and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and its correlate, the Idea, have stepped out of all those forms of the principle of sufficient reason: time, place, the individual who knows, and the individual who is known, have no meaning for them. Only when, in the manner described, a knowing individual raises itself to pure subject of knowing, and precisely thereby the object considered to Idea, does the world as representation emerge wholly and purely, and does the perfect objectification of the will take place, since the Idea alone is its adequate objectivity. This includes object and subject in like manner, since these [8] I also recommend, for the elucidation of the mode of knowledge here in question, that one read what he says in the same work, L. II, prop. 40, schol. 2, likewise L. V, prop. 25 to 38, on the cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, and especially prop. 29, schol.; prop. 36, schol., and prop. 38, demonstr. et schol. are its only form: in it, however, the two hold each other wholly in balance: and as the object here too is nothing but the representation of the subject, so the subject too, in being wholly absorbed in the intuited object, has itself become this object, in that the whole consciousness is nothing more than its most distinct image. This consciousness precisely, when one thinks all the Ideas, or grades of the objectivity of the will, passing in order through it, really constitutes the whole world as representation. The individual things of all times and spaces are nothing but

the Ideas multiplied by the principle of sufficient reason (the form of the knowledge of individuals as such) and thereby clouded in their pure objectivity. As, when the Idea emerges, subject and object can no longer be distinguished in it, because only when they completely fulfill and penetrate each other does the Idea, the adequate objectivity of the will, the real world as representation, arise; so too the knowing and the known individual, in this, are, as things in themselves, not distinguished. For if we abstract wholly from that real world as representation, nothing remains but the world as will. The will is the in-itself of the Idea, which objectifies it perfectly; it is also the in-itself of the individual thing and of the individual who knows it, who objectify it imperfectly. As will, outside representation and all its forms, it is one and the same in the contemplated object and in the individual who, soaring up in this contemplation, becomes conscious of itself as pure subject: those two are therefore not distinguished in themselves: for in themselves they are the will, which here knows itself, and only as the manner in which this knowledge comes to it, that is, only in the appearance, is there, by virtue of its form, the principle of sufficient reason, plurality and difference. As little as I am, without the object, without the representation, knowing subject, but mere blind will; so little, without me as subject of knowing, is the known thing object, but mere will, blind urge. This will is in itself, that is, outside representation, one and the same with mine: only in the world as representation, whose form is always at least subject and object, do we part as known and knowing individual. As soon as knowing, the world as representation, is abolished, nothing at all remains but mere will, blind urge. That it receive objectivity, become representation, posits at one stroke both subject and object: but that this objectivity be pure, perfect, adequate objectivity of the will, posits the object as Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and the subject as pure subject of knowledge, free from individuality and from servitude to the will.

Whoever, in the manner stated, has so far immersed and lost themselves in the intuition of nature that they exist only as purely knowing subject becomes thereby immediately aware that, as such, they are the condition, thus the bear-

er, of the world and of all objective existence, since this now presents itself as dependent on their own. They thus draw nature into themselves, so that they feel it only as an accident of their essence. In this sense Byron says:

Are not the mountains, waves and skies, a part Of me and of my soul, as I of them? [9]

How, though, should one who feels this hold oneself to be absolutely transitory, in contrast to imperishable nature? Rather, such a one will be seized by the consciousness of what the Upanishad of the Veda declares: Hae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est. (Oupnekhat, I, 122.)[10]

35 To attain a deeper insight into the essence of the world, it is indispensable that one learn to distinguish the will as thing in itself from its adequate objectivity; then the different grades on which this emerges more distinctly and more perfectly, that is, the Ideas themselves, from the mere appearance of the Ideas in the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, the confined mode of knowledge of individuals. Then one will [11] Are not mountains, waves, skies a part of me and of my soul, as I of them?

12 On this see ch. 30 of the second volume. assent to Plato when he attributes real being only to the Ideas, but concedes to the things in space and time, this world that is real for the individual, only an apparent, dreamlike existence. Then one will see how one and the same Idea reveals itself in so many appearances and offers its essence to the knowing individuals only piecemeal, one side after another. One will then also distinguish the Idea itself from the manner in which its appearance falls into the observation of the individual, recognizing the former as essential, the latter as inessential. We wish to consider this by way of example, first in the smallest and then in the greatest.—When the clouds drift, the figures they form are not essential to them, are indifferent to them; but that, as elastic vapor, they are compressed by the impact of the wind, driven away, expanded, torn apart: this is their nature, this is the essence of the forces that objectify themselves in them, this is the Idea; only for the individual observer are there the figures of the moment.—To the brook that rolls downward over stones, the eddies, waves, and foam-formations that it lets be seen are

indifferent and inessential; that it follows gravity, behaves as an inelastic, perfectly displaceable, formless, transparent fluid: this is its essence, this is, if known intuitively, the Idea; only for us, so long as we know as individuals, are those formations there.—The ice on the windowpane shoots according to the laws of crystallization, which reveal the essence of the force of nature emerging here, present the Idea; but the trees and flowers that it forms in the process are inessential and exist only for us.—What appears in cloud, brook, and crystal is the faintest echo of that will which emerges more perfectly in the plant, still more perfectly in the animal, most perfectly in man. But only the essential in all those grades of its objectification constitutes the Idea; the unfolding of these, on the other hand, in that it is drawn apart, in the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, into manifold and many-sided appearances, is inessential to the Idea, lies merely in the mode of knowledge of the individual, and has reality only for this. The same now necessarily holds also of the unfolding of that Idea which is the most perfect objectivity of the will: consequently the history of the human race, the throng of events, the change of the times, the many-shaped forms of human life in different countries and centuries, all this is only the accidental form of the appearance of the Idea, belongs not to the Idea itself, in which alone the adequate objectivity of the will lies, but only to the appearance, which falls into the knowledge of the individual, and is as alien, inessential, and indifferent to the Idea itself as the figures they present are to the clouds, the form of its eddies and foam-formations to the brook, its trees and flowers to the ice.

Whoever has grasped this well, and knows how to distinguish the will from the Idea, and this from its appearance, for them the events of the world will have meaning only insofar as they are the letters from which the Idea of man can be read, but not in and for themselves. They will not believe with the people that time brings forth something really new and significant, that through it or in it something absolutely real comes into existence, or even that time itself as a whole has beginning and end, plan and development, and, say, as its final goal the highest perfection (according to their concepts) of the last generation, living thirty years. They will therefore as little appoint, with Homer, a whole

Olympus full of gods to direct those events of time as take, with Ossian, the figures of the clouds for individual beings, since, as said, both have equal significance in relation to the Idea that appears in them. In the manifold shapes of human life and the unceasing change of events, they will regard as the abiding and essential only the Idea, in which the will to life has its most perfect objectivity, and which shows its different sides in the qualities, passions, errors, and merits of the human race, in selfishness, hatred, love, fear, boldness, levity, dullness, cunning, wit, genius, and so on, all of which, converging and coagulating into thousandfold shapes (individuals), continually perform the great and the small history of the world, whereby it is in itself all the same whether what sets them in motion is nuts or crowns. They will finally find that it is in the world as in the dramas of Gozzi, in all of which the same persons always appear, with the same intention and the same fate: the motives and events, to be sure, are different in each piece; but the spirit of the events is the same: the persons of one piece also know nothing of the occurrences in the other, in which they themselves acted: hence, after all the experiences of the earlier pieces, Pantalone has not become more nimble or generous, Tartaglia more conscientious, Brighella more courageous, or Columbine more modest.—

Suppose that we were once permitted a clear view into the realm of possibility and over all the chains of causes and effects, that the Earth Spirit stepped forth and showed us in a picture the most excellent individuals, enlighteners of the world and heroes, whom chance destroyed before the time of their activity—then the great events that would have changed the history of the world and brought on periods of the highest culture and enlightenment, but which the blindest chance, the most insignificant accident, checked at their origin; finally the splendid powers of great individuals, which would have fertilized whole ages of the world, but which they, led astray by error or passion, or forced by necessity, wasted uselessly on unworthy and unfruitful objects, or even squandered in play:—if we saw all this, we should shudder and lament over the lost treasures of whole ages of the world. But the Earth Spirit would smile and say: "The source from which the individuals and their powers flow is inexhaustible and infinite like time and space: for those, just like these forms of all appear-

ance, are also only appearance, visibility of the will. That infinite source no finite measure can exhaust; hence to every event or work stifled in the germ the undiminished infinity still stands open for its return. In this world of appearance neither true loss nor true gain is possible. The will alone is: it, the thing in itself, it, the source of all those appearances. Its self-knowledge, and the affirmation or denial that decides itself thereupon, is the only event in itself."—[13]

14 This last sentence cannot be understood without acquaintance with the following book.

36 History follows the thread of events: it is pragmatic insofar as it derives them according to the law of motivation, which law determines the appearing will where it is illumined by knowledge. On the lower grades of its objectivity, where it still works without knowledge, natural science considers the laws of the changes of its appearances as etiology, and what abides in them as morphology, which lightens its almost infinite theme by the aid of concepts, comprehending the universal in order to derive the particular from it. Finally, the mere forms in which, for the knowledge of the subject as individual, the Ideas appear drawn apart into plurality, that is, time and space, are considered by mathematics. All of these, whose common name is science, thus follow the principle of sufficient reason in its different shapes, and their theme remains the appearance, its laws, its connection, and the relations arising therefrom.—But what kind of knowledge considers that which exists outside and independent of all relation, the only really essential thing in the world, the true content of its appearances, that which is subject to no change and is therefore known with equal truth for all time, in a word, the *Ideas*, which are the immediate and adequate objectivity of the thing in itself, of the will?—It is *art*, the work of genius. It repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding in all the appearances of the world, and according to the material in which it repeats them it is plastic art, poetry, or music. Its sole origin is the knowledge of the Ideas; its sole goal the communication of this knowledge.—While science, following the restless and unstable stream of grounds and consequents in their fourfold form, is at every goal reached always

pointed onward again and can never find a final goal or complete satisfaction, any more than by running one reaches the point where the clouds touch the horizon, art, on the other hand, is everywhere at its goal. For it tears the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course and has it isolated before it: and this single thing, which in that stream was a vanishingly small part, becomes for it a representative of the whole, an equivalent of the infinitely many in space and time: it therefore stops at this single thing: it holds the wheel of time still: the relations vanish for it: only the essential, the Idea, is its object. —We can therefore designate it directly as *the mode of considering things independently of the principle of sufficient reason*, in contrast to the consideration that follows precisely this principle, which is the path of experience and science. This latter kind of consideration is to be compared to an infinite, horizontally running line; the former, however, to the perpendicular cutting it at any point whatever. The consideration that follows the principle of sufficient reason is the rational mode of consideration, which alone holds and helps in practical life as in science: that which looks away from the content of that principle is the mode of consideration of genius, which alone holds and helps in art. The former is Aristotle's mode of consideration; the second is on the whole Plato's. The former resembles the mighty storm that rushes on without beginning or goal, bending, moving, and sweeping everything along with it; the second, the quiet sunbeam that cuts through the path of this storm, wholly unmoved by it. The former resembles the countless, violently moved drops of the waterfall, which, ever changing, rest not a moment; the second, the rainbow resting quietly upon this raging tumult.—Only through the pure contemplation described above, which is wholly absorbed in the object, are Ideas apprehended, and the essence of *genius* consists precisely in the preponderant capacity for such contemplation: since this demands a complete forgetting of one's own person and its relations, *genius* is nothing other than the most perfect *objectivity*, that is, objective direction of the mind, opposed to the subjective direction, which goes to one's own person, that is, to the will. Genius is accordingly the capacity to conduct oneself as purely perceiving, to lose oneself in intuition, and to withdraw knowledge, which originally exists only for the service of the

will, from this service, that is, to lose from sight altogether one's interest, one's willing, one's ends, thus to divest oneself fully for a time of one's personality, in order to remain as *purely knowing subject*, clear eye of the world: and this not for moments, but so lastingly and with so much deliberateness as is needed to repeat what has been apprehended by considered art, and "to fix in enduring thoughts what hovers in wavering appearance."—It is as if, in order for the man of genius to emerge in an individual, a measure of the power of knowledge must have fallen to that individual which far exceeds what is required for the service of an individual will; and this freed surplus of knowledge now becomes the subject pure of will, the bright mirror of the essence of the world.—From this is explained the liveliness, amounting to restlessness, in individuals of genius, since the present can seldom satisfy them, because it does not fill their consciousness: this gives them that restless striving, that unceasing search for new objects worthy of contemplation, and also that almost never satisfied longing for beings like themselves, equal to them, to whom they could communicate themselves; whereas the ordinary child of earth, wholly filled and satisfied by the ordinary present, is absorbed in it, and, finding his equals everywhere, has that special comfortableness in everyday life which is denied to the man of genius.—Imagination has been recognized as an essential component of genius, indeed it has sometimes even been held identical with it: the former rightly, the latter wrongly. Since the objects of the man of genius as such are the eternal Ideas, the abiding essential forms of the world and of all its appearances, but the knowledge of the Idea is necessarily intuitive, not abstract, the knowledge of the man of genius would be limited to the Ideas of the objects actually present to his person, and dependent on the concatenation of circumstances that brought those to him, if imagination did not extend his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal experience and put him in a position to construct, from the little that has come into his actual apperception, all the rest, and so to let almost all possible pictures of life pass before him. Moreover, the real objects are almost always only very defective exemplars of the Idea that presents itself in them: hence the man of genius needs imagination in order to see in things not what nature has actually formed, but what it endeavored to

form, and did not bring about because of the struggle of its forms among one another mentioned in the previous book. We shall return to this below, in considering sculpture. Imagination, then, extends the circle of vision of the man of genius beyond the objects that offer themselves in reality to his person, both in quality and in quantity. On this account unusual strength of imagination is the companion, indeed the condition, of genius. But conversely imagination does not testify to genius; rather even people entirely without genius can have much imagination. For as one can consider a real object in two opposite ways: purely objectively, as genius does, grasping its Idea; or commonly, merely in its relations, according to the principle of sufficient reason, to other objects and to one's own will; so one can also look at a phantasm in both ways: considered in the first manner, it is a means to the knowledge of the Idea, whose communication is the work of art; in the second case the phantasm is employed to build castles in the air, which suit selfishness and one's own whim, and momentarily deceive and delight; whereby of the phantasms thus linked really only their relations are known. He who plays this game is a fantasist: he will easily mix the pictures with which he amuses himself in solitude into reality, and thereby become unfit for it: he will perhaps write down the juggleries of his imagination, where they yield the ordinary novels of every kind, which entertain his like and the great public, in that the readers dream themselves into the place of the hero and then find the presentation very "comfortable."

The common man, this factory product of nature, such as she turns out daily by the thousand, is, as said, at least wholly incapable of a lasting contemplation that is disinterested in every sense, which is real contemplativeness: he can direct his attention to things only insofar as they have some relation to his will, even if only a very indirect one. Since in this respect, which always requires only the knowledge of relations, the abstract concept of the thing is sufficient and mostly even better suited, the common man does not dwell long on mere intuition, and therefore does not fix his gaze long upon an object; but, in everything that presents itself to him, seeks only, and quickly, the concept under which it is to be brought, as the idle man seeks a chair, and then it interests him no further. Hence he is so quickly done with everything, with works of art, beautiful

objects of nature, and the sight of life in all its scenes, which is really significant everywhere. He, however, does not dwell: he seeks only his own path in life, at most also everything that might some day become his path, that is, topographical notes in the widest sense: on the contemplation of life itself as such he wastes no time. The man of genius, on the other hand, whose power of knowledge, by its preponderance, withdraws from the service of his will for a part of his time, dwells on the contemplation of life itself, strives to grasp the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other things: over this he frequently neglects the contemplation of his own path in life, and therefore for the most part follows it awkwardly enough. While to the common man his faculty of knowledge is the lantern that lights his path, to the man of genius it is the sun that makes the world manifest. This so different way of looking into life soon becomes visible even in the outward appearance of the two. The look of the man in whom genius lives and works easily distinguishes him, in that, at once lively and steady, it bears the character of contemplativeness, of contemplation; as we can see in the portraits of the few heads of genius that nature has brought forth now and then among the countless millions: whereas in the look of the others, when it is not, as is mostly the case, dull or sober, the true opposite of contemplation, prying, easily becomes visible. Accordingly the "expression of genius" in a head consists in this, that a decided preponderance of knowing over willing is visible in it, and consequently also a knowing without any relation to a willing, that is, a *pure knowing*, expresses itself in it. In heads as they commonly are, on the other hand, the expression of willing predominates, and one sees that knowing always comes into activity only at the impulse of willing, and is therefore directed merely to motives.

Since the knowledge of genius, or knowledge of the Idea, is that which does not follow the principle of sufficient reason, whereas that which does follow it imparts prudence and reasonableness in life and brings the sciences into being, individuals of genius will be afflicted with the defects that neglect of the latter mode of knowledge brings with it. Here, however, the restriction is to be noted that what I shall cite in this regard touches them only insofar as, and while, they are actually engaged in the mode of knowledge of genius, which is by no

means the case at every moment of their life, since the great, though spontaneous, tension that is required for the will-free apprehension of the Ideas necessarily relaxes again and has great intervals, in which they stand, both in respect of merits and of defects, fairly equal to ordinary men. On this account the working of genius has always been regarded as an inspiration, indeed, as the name itself indicates, as the working of a superhuman being, different from the individual himself, which only periodically takes possession of him. The aversion of individuals of genius to directing their attention to the content of the principle of sufficient reason will show itself first in respect of the ground of being, as aversion to mathematics, whose consideration goes to the most universal forms of appearance, space and time, which are themselves only shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, and is therefore wholly the opposite of that consideration which seeks only the content of the appearance, the Idea expressing itself in it, looking away from all relations. Besides this, the logical treatment of mathematics too will be repugnant to the man of genius, since this treatment, shutting out real insight, does not satisfy, but, offering a mere chain of inferences according to the principle of the ground of knowledge, makes the greatest claim, of all the powers of the mind, on memory, namely in order always to have present all the earlier propositions on which one relies. Experience has also confirmed that great men of genius in art have no ability for mathematics: never was a man at the same time very distinguished in both. Alfieri relates that he never could grasp even the fourth proposition of Euclid. Goethe has been abundantly reproached with his lack of mathematical knowledge by the unintelligent opponents of his theory of colors: to be sure, here, where the question was not of calculating and measuring from hypothetical data, but of immediate knowledge of cause and effect by the understanding, that reproach was so wholly askew and out of place that those opponents displayed their total lack of judgment thereby as much as by their other Midas-pronouncements. That even today, almost half a century after the appearance of Goethe's theory of colors, even in Germany, the Newtonian nonsense remains undisturbed in possession of the professorial chairs and people go on talking quite seriously of the seven homogeneous lights and their different

refrangibility,—will one day be counted among the great intellectual traits of character of mankind in general and of Germandom in particular.—The same ground given above explains the equally well-known fact that, conversely, distinguished mathematicians have little receptivity for works of the fine arts, which expresses itself especially naively in the well-known anecdote of that French mathematician who, after reading through the Iphigenia of Racine, asked with a shrug: Qu'est-ce que cela prouve?—Since, further, keen apprehension of relations according to the law of causality and motivation is really what constitutes prudence, but the knowledge of genius is not directed to relations, a prudent man, insofar as and while he is so, will not be a man of genius, and a man of genius, insofar as and while he is so, will not be prudent.—Finally, intuitive knowledge, in whose domain the Idea wholly lies, stands generally in direct opposition to the rational or abstract knowledge, which is guided by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. It is also well known that great genius is seldom found paired with predominant reasonableness; rather, conversely, individuals of genius are often subject to violent affects and unreasonable passions. The ground of this is nevertheless not weakness of reason, but partly unusual energy of the whole appearance of will that the individual of genius is, which expresses itself by the vehemence of all acts of will, and partly preponderance of intuitive knowledge through senses and understanding over the abstract, hence a decided direction to the intuitive, whose most energetic impression in them so outshines the colorless concepts that no longer these but that guides action, which for that very reason becomes unreasonable: accordingly the impression of the present is very powerful on them, and sweeps them away to the unreflective, to affect, to passion. Hence also, and in general because their knowledge has partly withdrawn from the service of the will, in conversation they will think not so much of the person to whom, as rather of the subject about which, they speak, which hovers vividly before them: hence they will judge or narrate too objectively for their own interest, will not keep silent about what would more prudently be left unsaid, and so on. Hence, finally, they are inclined to monologues and can in general show several weaknesses that really approach madness. That genius and madness have a side

where they border upon one another, indeed pass over into one another, has often been remarked, and poetic inspiration itself has even been called a kind of madness: amabilis insania Horace calls it (Od. III, 4), and "sweet madness" Wieland, at the opening of the "Oberon." Even Aristotle is said, according to Seneca's citation (de tranq. animi, 15, 16), to have said: Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit. Plato expresses it, in the myth of the dark cave cited above (de Rep. 7), by saying: Those who outside the cave have beheld the true sunlight and the really existent things (the Ideas) can afterward, in the cave, because their eyes are unaccustomed to the darkness, no longer see, no longer properly recognize the shadow-images down there, and are therefore, in their blunders, mocked by the others who never got out of this cave and away from these shadow-images. He also says in the Phaedrus (p. 317) directly that without a certain madness there can be no genuine poet, indeed (p. 327) that everyone who recognizes in the transient things the eternal Ideas appears mad. Cicero also cites: Negat enim, sine furore, Democritus, quemquam poëtam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato (de divin. I, 37). And finally Pope says:

Great wits to madness sure are near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide[15].

Especially instructive in this respect is Goethe's "Torquato Tasso," in which he sets before our eyes not only the suffering, the essential martyrdom of genius as such, but also its steady transition to madness. Finally, the fact of the immediate contact between genius and madness is confirmed by the biographies of men of great genius, for example Rousseau's, Byron's, Alfieri's, and by anecdotes from the lives of others; and in part I must, on the other hand, mention that in frequent visits to madhouses I have found individual subjects of unmistakably great gifts, whose genius showed distinctly through the madness, which here, however, had gained complete mastery. This cannot be ascribed to chance, because on the one hand the number of the mad is comparatively very small, while on the other hand an individual of genius is a phenomenon rare beyond all ordinary estimation and appearing in nature only as the greatest exception; of which one can convince oneself solely by enumerating the really

great men of genius that all of civilized Europe has produced in all ancient and modern times, among whom, however, only those are to be counted who delivered works that have retained through all times an enduring value for mankind —by enumerating, I say, these individuals and comparing their number with the 250 million who, renewing themselves every thirty years, constantly live in Europe. Indeed, I will not leave unmentioned that I have known some people of not significant, but yet decided, mental superiority, who at the same time betrayed a slight tinge of derangement. Accordingly it might seem that every heightening of the intellect beyond the ordinary measure, as an abnormality, already disposes to madness. Meanwhile I wish to present as briefly as possible my opinion on the purely intellectual ground of that kinship between genius and madness, since this discussion will indeed contribute to the [16] The great mind is akin to madness, And a thin wall alone separates the two. elucidation of the real essence of genius, that is, of that quality of mind which alone can create genuine works of art. This, however, makes necessary a brief discussion of madness itself [17].

A clear and complete insight into the essence of madness, a correct and distinct concept of that which really distinguishes the madman from the sane, has, to my knowledge, still not been found.—Neither reason nor understanding can be denied to the mad: for they talk and comprehend, they often reason very correctly; they also, as a rule, perceive the present quite correctly and see the connection between cause and effect. Visions, like fever-fantasies, are no usual symptom of madness: delirium falsifies intuition, madness thoughts. For the most part, namely, the mad are not at all mistaken in the knowledge of what is immediately *present*; but their raving always refers to the *absent* and the *past*, and only through that to its connection with the present. Hence their illness seems to me to strike especially the *memory*; not indeed in such a way that it wholly failed them, for many know many things by heart and sometimes recognize persons they have long not seen; but rather so that the thread of memory is torn, its continuous connection annulled, and no evenly connected recollection of the past is possible. Single scenes of the past stand there correctly, like the single present; but in their recollection there are gaps, which they then fill with fic-

tions that either, always the same, become fixed ideas: then it is fixed delusion, melancholy; or are each time different, momentary notions: then it is called folly, fatuitas. For this reason it is so hard to question a madman, on his entry into the madhouse, about his earlier course of life. More and more, then, true and false mingle in his memory. Although the immediate present is correctly known, it is falsified by the feigned connection with an [18] On this see ch. 31 of the second volume. imagined past: they therefore take themselves and others for identical with persons who lie merely in their feigned past, do not recognize some acquaintances at all, and so, with a correct representation of the present single thing, have nothing but false relations of it to the absent. If madness reaches a high degree, complete memorylessness arises, for which reason the madman is then wholly incapable of regard for anything absent or past, but is determined wholly alone by the momentary whim, in connection with the fictions that fill the past in his head: unless one constantly keeps one's superior force before his eyes, one is then not for a moment safe with him from ill-treatment or murder.—The knowledge of the madman has this in common with that of the animal, that both are limited to the present: but what distinguishes them is this: the animal has really no representation at all of the past as such, although the past acts on the animal through the medium of habit, so that, for example, the dog recognizes its former master even after years, that is, receives from the sight of him the accustomed impression; but of the time that has elapsed since then it has no recollection: the madman, on the other hand, carries about in his reason also always a past in abstracto, but a false one, which exists only for him, and this either always or only just now: the influence of this false past now also hinders the use of the correctly known present, which the animal does make. That violent mental suffering and unexpected terrible events frequently occasion madness, I explain to myself as follows. Every such suffering is always, as a real event, limited to the present, thus only passing and so far not yet excessively heavy: it becomes inordinately great only insofar as it is lasting pain: but as such it is again only a thought and therefore lies in the *memory*; if now such a grief, such a painful knowledge or remembrance, is so agonizing that it proves absolutely unbearable, and the individual would succumb to it—

then nature, thus anguished, seizes upon *madness* as the last means of rescuing life: the spirit, so greatly tormented, tears, as it were, the thread of its memory, fills the gaps with fictions, and thus flees from the mental pain exceeding its strength to madness—as one amputates a limb seized by gangrene and replaces it with a wooden one.—As an example consider the raving Ajax, King Lear, and Ophelia: for the creations of the genuine man of genius, to which alone one can appeal here as universally known, are to be set equal to real persons in truth: moreover frequent real experience also shows quite the same thing here. A faint analogue of that kind of transition from pain to madness is this, that we all often seek, as if mechanically, to scare away a tormenting recollection that suddenly occurs to us by some loud utterance or movement, to divert ourselves from it, to distract ourselves by force.— If, as we have said, we see the madman rightly know the single present thing, and even some single things of the past, yet misapprehend the connection and the relations, and so err and talk deliriously, then this is precisely the point at which he touches the individual of genius. For the man of genius too abandons the knowledge of relations, which is the knowledge that accords with the principle of sufficient reason, in order to see and seek in things only their Ideas, to grasp their real nature, which expresses itself to intuition, and in respect of which a thing represents its whole species and therefore, as Goethe says, counts as one case for thousands—and in doing so he too loses sight of the connection of things. The single object of his contemplation, or the present moment, which he apprehends with excessive vividness, appears in so bright a light that the remaining links of the chain to which they belong recede, as it were, into darkness; and this produces phenomena that bear a resemblance to those of madness, one long since recognized. What exists in the individual thing only imperfectly, weakened by modifications, the way of seeing proper to genius raises to the Idea of it, to the perfect. He therefore sees extremes everywhere, and by this very fact his conduct runs to extremes: he cannot strike the right measure, he lacks sobriety, and the result is what I have described. He knows the Ideas perfectly, but not the individuals.

Hence, as has been observed, a poet may know Man deeply and thoroughly, yet men very poorly; he is easily deceived and is a plaything in the hands of the cunning [19].

37 Although, then, according to our exposition, genius consists in the capacity to know independently of the principle of sufficient reason, and therefore to know, in place of single things, which have their existence only in relation, their Ideas, and, standing over against these, to be oneself the correlate of the Idea, that is, no longer individual but pure subject of knowing; yet this capacity must dwell, in a lesser and varying degree, in all men as well. Otherwise they would be as little able to enjoy works of art as to produce them, and would have absolutely no receptivity to the beautiful and the sublime; indeed these words could have no meaning for them. Unless there happen to be some who are altogether incapable of aesthetic pleasure, we must therefore assume in all men that faculty of knowing in things their Ideas, and so of momentarily divesting themselves of their personality. The man of genius has the advantage over them only in a far higher degree and a more lasting duration of that mode of knowledge, which lets him retain throughout it the presence of mind required to repeat what he has thus known in a deliberate work; and this repetition is the work of art. Through it he communicates the apprehended Idea to others. The Idea therefore remains unchanged and the same; and so aesthetic pleasure is essentially one and the same, whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the intuition of nature and of life. The work of art is merely a means of facilitating the knowledge in which that pleasure consists. That the Idea comes to meet us more easily from the work of art than directly from nature and reality arises from this: that the artist, who [20] On this, Chapter 32 of the second volume. knew only the Idea and no longer reality, has also repeated in his work only the Idea, purely, has separated it out of reality, omitting all disturbing accidents. The artist lets us look into the world through his eyes. That he has these eyes, that he knows the essential in things, which lies outside all relations, is precisely the gift of genius, the inborn; but that he is able to lend us this gift too, to put his eyes on us: this is the acquired, the technical side of art. For this reason,

then, now that in what precedes I have set forth the inner nature of the aesthetic mode of knowledge in its most general outlines, the closer philosophical consideration of the beautiful and the sublime that now follows will treat both at once, in nature and in art, without separating these any further. What goes on in a man when the beautiful moves him, and when the sublime moves him, we shall consider first. Whether he draws this emotion directly from nature, from life, or comes to share in it only through the mediation of art, establishes no essential difference, but only an outward one.

38 We have found in the aesthetic way of regarding things *two inseparable components*: the knowledge of the object, not as a single thing but as a Platonic Idea, that is, as the abiding form of this whole species of things; and then the self-consciousness of the knower, not as an individual but as *pure, will-less subject of knowledge*. The condition under which both components always enter united was the abandoning of the mode of knowledge bound to the principle of sufficient reason, which on the other hand is the only one suited to the service of the will, and also to science.—The *pleasure* too that is aroused by the contemplation of the beautiful we shall see proceed from those two components, now more from the one, now more from the other, according to what the object of aesthetic contemplation is.

All *willing* springs from need, that is, from lack, that is, from suffering. Fulfillment puts an end to this; yet against one wish that is fulfilled at least ten remain denied. Further, desire lasts long, its demands go on to infinity; fulfillment is short and meagerly measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only apparent: the fulfilled wish at once makes room for a new one; the former is an error recognized, the latter an error not yet recognized. No attained object of willing can give lasting satisfaction that no longer gives way: rather it is always like the alms thrown to the beggar, which keeps him alive today so as to prolong his torment until tomorrow.—Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled with our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with their constant hoping and fearing, so long as we are subjects of willing, lasting happiness and peace will never be ours. Whether we pursue or flee, fear harm or

strive for enjoyment, is essentially all one: the care for the ever demanding will, in whatever shape, continually fills and moves consciousness; and without peace no true well-being is possible at all. Thus the subject of willing lies constantly on the revolving wheel of Ixion, draws always in the sieve of the Danaids, is the eternally languishing Tantalus.

But when some outward occasion or inward mood suddenly lifts us out of the endless stream of willing, wrests knowledge from the slavery of the will, so that attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing but grasps things free of their relation to the will, and thus regards them without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, given up to them entirely insofar as they are merely representations, not insofar as they are motives: then the peace that was always sought on that first road of willing, but always fled from us, has all at once come of itself, and we are wholly at ease. It is the painless state that Epicurus prized as the highest good and as the state of the gods: for we are, for that moment, released from the vile pressure of the will, we keep the Sabbath from the penal servitude of willing, the wheel of Ixion stands still.

This state, however, is precisely the one I described above as required for the knowledge of the Idea: pure contemplation, absorption in intuition, losing oneself in the object, forgetting of all individuality, suspension of the mode of knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason and grasps only relations. In it, at the same time and inseparably, the intuited single thing rises to the Idea of its species, and the knowing individual to pure subject of will-less knowing, and both as such no longer stand in the stream of time and of all other relations. It is then all one whether we watch the sun set from the dungeon or from the palace.

Inner mood, a preponderance of knowing over willing, can call forth this state in any surroundings. This is shown us by those excellent Netherlanders who directed such purely objective intuition upon the most insignificant objects and set up a lasting monument of their objectivity and mental calm in *still life*. The aesthetic beholder cannot regard it without emotion, since it presents to him the quiet, still, will-free state of mind of the artist, which was needed in order to intuit such insignificant things so objectively, to contemplate them so

attentively, and to repeat this intuition with such presence of mind. And since the picture invites him too to share in such a state, his emotion is often still heightened by the contrast with his own restless state of mind, clouded by violent willing, in which he happens to be. In the same spirit landscape painters, especially Ruisdael, have often painted extremely insignificant landscape subjects, and thereby produced the same effect in a still more delightful way.

So much the inner power of an artistic mind accomplishes quite alone; but that purely objective frame of mind is facilitated and furthered from without by objects that come to meet it, by the abundance of beautiful nature, which invites intuition, indeed presses itself upon it. Whenever it opens up to our gaze all at once, it almost always succeeds in wresting us, if only for moments, from subjectivity, from the slavery of the will, and transposing us into the state of pure knowing. That is why one tormented by passions, or by want and care, is so suddenly refreshed, cheered and lifted up by a single free glance into nature: the storm of the passions, the press of desire and fear, and all the torment of willing are then at once calmed in a wonderful way. For in the moment when, torn loose from willing, we have given ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we have as it were stepped into another world, where everything that moves our will and thereby shakes us so violently is no more. This liberation of knowledge lifts us out of all that as wholly as sleep and dream do: happiness and unhappiness have vanished; we are no longer the individual, that is forgotten, but only pure subject of knowledge; we exist only as the *one* eye of the world that looks out from all knowing beings, but in man alone can become wholly free from the service of the will. In this all difference of individuality so completely vanishes that it is then all one whether the beholding eye belongs to a mighty king or to a tormented beggar. For neither happiness nor misery is carried across that boundary. So near to us always lies a realm in which we have wholly escaped all our misery; but who has the strength to keep himself in it long? As soon as any relation of those objects thus purely intuited to our will, to our person, enters consciousness again, the spell is at an end: we fall back into the knowledge that the principle of sufficient reason governs, we know now no longer the Idea but the single thing, the link of a chain to which we too belong, and we are given

back to all our misery.—Most people, because objectivity, that is, genius, is entirely lacking in them, stand almost always at this standpoint. Hence they do not like to be alone with nature: they need company, at least a book. For their knowing remains in the service of the will; they therefore seek in objects only whatever relation to their will there may be, and with everything that has no such relation there sounds in their inner being, like a ground bass, a constant, comfortless "It does me no good." Thereby, in solitude, even the most beautiful surroundings take on for them a desolate, dark, alien, hostile look.

That bliss of will-less intuiting is, finally, also what spreads so wondrous a magic over the past and the distant, and by a self-deception presents them to us in so beautifying a light. For when we recall to mind long-vanished days spent in a distant place, it is the objects alone that our imagination calls back, not the subject of the will, which carried its incurable sufferings about with it then just as it does now; but these are forgotten, because since then they have often already made way for others. Now the objective intuition works in memory just as the present one would work if we could bring ourselves to give ourselves up to it free of will. Hence it comes about that, especially when some distress oppresses us more than usual, the sudden recollection of scenes of the past and the distant flies past us like a lost paradise. Only the objective, not the individually subjective, is called back by imagination, and we imagine that this objective stood before us then as purely, untroubled by any relation to the will, as its image does now in imagination; whereas in fact the relation of the objects to our willing caused us torment then as much as now. We can withdraw ourselves from all suffering through present objects just as well as through distant ones, as soon as we raise ourselves to a purely objective contemplation of them, and so are able to produce the illusion that only those objects, not we ourselves, were present. Then, rid of the wretched self, we become as pure subject of knowing wholly one with those objects, and as alien as our distress is to them, so alien is it, in such moments, to ourselves. The world as representation then alone remains, and the world as will has vanished.

By all these considerations I wish to have made clear of what kind and how great is the share which the subjective condition of aesthetic pleasure has in it, namely the liberation of knowing from the service of the will, the forgetting of one's self as individual, and the elevation of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowing, independent of all relations. With this subjective side of aesthetic contemplation there always enters at the same time, as its necessary correlate, the objective side of it, the intuitive apprehension of the Platonic Idea. But before we turn to the closer consideration of this and to the achievements of art in relation to it, it is more fitting to dwell a little longer on the subjective side of aesthetic pleasure, in order to complete the consideration of it by discussing the impression of the *sublime*, which depends on that side alone and arises through a modification of it. After that our investigation of aesthetic pleasure will, through the consideration of its objective side, receive its full completeness.

But before going on, the following remarks still belong to what has gone before. Light is the most delightful of things: it has become the symbol of all that is good and salutary. In all religions it designates eternal salvation, and darkness damnation. Ormuzd dwells in the purest light, Ahriman in eternal night. In Dante's Paradise it looks roughly like Vauxhall in London, since all the blessed spirits there appear as points of light that arrange themselves into regular figures. The absence of light saddens us immediately; its return gladdens us. Colors arouse an immediate, lively delight, which reaches its highest degree when they are transparent. All this comes solely from the fact that light is the correlate and condition of the most perfect perceptual mode of knowledge, the only one that does not directly affect the will at all. For seeing is not capable, as the affection of the other senses is, of itself, immediately and through its sensory effect, of an agreeableness or disagreeableness of *sensation* in the organ; that is, it has no immediate connection with the will. Only the intuition arising in the understanding can have one, and that then lies in the relation of the object to the will. With hearing this is already different: tones can arouse pain immediately, and can also be immediately, sensuously pleasant, without reference to harmony or melody. Touch, as one with the feeling of the

whole body, is still more subject to this immediate influence on the will; yet there is still a touching free of pain and of voluptuousness. Smells, however, are always agreeable or disagreeable, and tastes still more so. These last two senses are therefore the most contaminated with the will; hence they are always the least noble, and Kant called them the subjective senses. The joy in light is therefore in fact only the joy in the objective possibility of the purest and most perfect perceptual mode of knowledge, and as such is to be derived from the fact that pure knowing, freed and rid of all willing, is supremely delightful and already as such has a great share in aesthetic enjoyment.—From this view of light we may again derive the incredibly great beauty that we ascribe to the mirroring of objects in water. That lightest, swiftest, finest kind of action of bodies on one another, to which we too owe by far the most perfect and purest of our perceptions, the action by means of reflected rays of light, is here brought before our eyes quite clearly, surveyably and completely, in cause and effect, and indeed on a grand scale. Hence our aesthetic joy in it, which in the main is rooted wholly in the subjective ground of aesthetic pleasure and is joy in pure knowing and its ways [21].

39 To all these considerations, which are meant to bring out the subjective part of aesthetic pleasure—that is, this pleasure insofar as it is joy in mere perceptual knowing as such, as opposed to the will—there attaches itself, as directly connected with them, the following explanation of that mood which has been called the feeling of the *sublime*.

It has already been remarked above that being transposed into the state of pure intuiting occurs most easily when the objects come to meet it, that is, when through their manifold and at the same time definite and distinct form they readily become representatives of their Ideas, in which beauty, in the [22] On this, Chapter 33 of the second volume. objective sense, precisely consists. Above all, beautiful nature has this quality, and thereby wins from even the most insensible at least a fleeting aesthetic pleasure. Indeed, it is so striking how the plant world in particular invites aesthetic contemplation and as it were presses itself upon it, that one might say this coming to meet us was connected

with the fact that these organic beings are not themselves, like animal bodies, immediate objects of knowledge, and so need the foreign understanding individual in order to step out of the world of blind willing into that of representation; so that they, as it were, long for this entrance, in order to obtain at least mediately what is denied them immediately. For the rest, I leave this daring thought, which perhaps borders on enthusiasm, wholly undecided, since only a very intimate and devoted contemplation of nature can arouse or justify it [23]. So long, then, as it is this coming to meet us of nature, the significance and distinctness of its forms, from which the Ideas individualized in them readily speak to us, that transposes us out of the knowledge of mere relations, which serves the will, into aesthetic contemplation, and thereby raises us to will-free subject of knowing, so long it is merely the *beautiful* that works on us, and the feeling of beauty that is aroused. But if those very objects whose significant forms invite us to their pure contemplation stand in a hostile relation to the human will in general, as it presents itself in its objectivity, the human body, are opposed to it, threaten it by their superior power that cancels all resistance, or dwindle it to nothing before their immeasurable greatness; and if the beholder nevertheless does not direct his attention to this hostile relation to his will that thrusts itself [24] All the more does it please and surprise me now, 40 years after I wrote down the above thought so timidly and hesitantly, to discover that St. Augustine had already expressed it: Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod *nosse* non possunt, quasi *innotescere* velle videantur. (De civ. Dei, XI, 27.) upon him, but, though perceiving and acknowledging it, turns consciously away from it, tearing himself violently loose from his will and its relations and, given up to knowledge alone, calmly contemplates those very objects so fearful to the will as pure will-less subject of knowing, apprehending only their Idea, which is foreign to every relation, and therefore gladly lingering over their contemplation, and consequently being lifted by this very thing beyond himself, his person, his willing and all willing—then the feeling of the *sublime* fills him, he is in the state of elevation, and for that reason the object that occasions such a state is also called *sublime*. What distinguishes the feeling of the sublime from

that of the beautiful is therefore this: with the beautiful, pure knowing has won the upper hand without a struggle, in that the beauty of the object, that is, its quality that facilitates the knowledge of its Idea, removed the will, and the knowledge of relations that is in thrall to the will, from consciousness without resistance and therefore imperceptibly, and left consciousness behind as pure subject of knowing, so that not even a recollection of the will remains. With the sublime, on the other hand, that state of pure knowing is first of all won by a conscious and violent tearing loose from the relations of the same object to the will which are recognized as unfavorable, by a free elevation, accompanied by consciousness, above the will and the knowledge that relates to it. This elevation must not only be won with consciousness but also maintained, and is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of the will, yet not of a single, individual willing, such as fear or desire, but of human willing in general, insofar as it is expressed universally through its objectivity, the human body. Were a real single act of will to enter consciousness, through actual personal distress and danger from the object, then the individual will thus really moved would at once gain the upper hand, the calm of contemplation would become impossible, and the impression of the sublime would be lost, giving place to anxiety, in which the individual's striving to save himself drove out every other thought.—A few examples will contribute very much to making this theory of the aesthetically sublime clear and to placing it beyond doubt; at the same time they will show the diversity of the degrees of that feeling of the sublime. For since it is one with the feeling of the beautiful in its principal determination, the pure, will-free knowing and the knowledge, necessarily entering with it, of the Ideas that stand outside all relation determined by the principle of sufficient reason, and differs from the feeling of the beautiful only by an addition, namely the elevation above the recognized hostile relation of the very object contemplated to the will in general, there arise, according as this addition is strong, loud, urgent, near, or only faint, distant, merely hinted, several degrees of the sublime, indeed transitions from the beautiful to the sublime. I hold it more suitable to the exposition to bring these transitions, and in general the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime, before the eyes first in examples,

although those whose aesthetic receptivity is not very great at all, and whose imagination is not lively, will understand only the examples of the higher, more distinct degrees of that impression that follow later; they must therefore keep to these alone, and let the examples of the very weak degrees of the said impression, which are to be cited first, rest.

Just as man is at once the impetuous and gloomy pressure of willing (designated by the pole of the genitals as its focal point) and the eternal, free, serene subject of pure knowing (designated by the pole of the brain), so, corresponding to this opposition, the sun is at once source of *light*, the condition of the most perfect mode of knowledge and thereby of the most delightful of things —and source of *warmth*, the first condition of all life, that is, of all appearance of the will on its higher stages. What warmth is for the will, therefore, light is for knowledge. For that very reason light is the greatest diamond in the crown of beauty and has the most decisive influence on the knowledge of every beautiful object: its presence in general is an indispensable condition; its favorable position heightens the beauty even of the most beautiful. Above all else, however, the beautiful in architecture is heightened by its favor, through which even the most insignificant becomes the most beautiful object.—If we now see, in the severe winter, in the general numbness of nature, the rays of the low-standing sun thrown back by masses of stone, where they illuminate without warming and are thus favorable only to the purest mode of knowledge, not to the will, then the contemplation of the beautiful effect of the light on these masses transposes us, like all beauty, into the state of pure knowing. Here, however, through the faint recollection of the lack of warming by those very rays, that is, of the life-giving principle, this state already demands a certain elevation above the interest of the will, contains a faint summons to persist in pure knowing, turning away from all willing, and is precisely thereby a transition from the feeling of the beautiful to that of the sublime. It is the faintest breath of the sublime in the beautiful, which latter itself appears here only in slight degree. An almost equally faint example is the following.

Let us transport ourselves into a very lonely region, with unbounded horizon, under a wholly cloudless sky, trees and plants in quite motionless air, no animals, no human beings, no moving waters, the deepest stillness—such surroundings are like a summons to seriousness, to contemplation, with a tearing loose from all willing and its neediness. But precisely this already gives such merely lonely and deeply resting surroundings a touch of the sublime. For because they offer the will, which needs constant striving and attaining, no objects, neither favorable nor unfavorable, only the state of pure contemplation remains; and whoever is not capable of this is abandoned, to his humiliating abasement, to the emptiness of the unoccupied will, to the torment of boredom. To that extent such surroundings give a measure of our own intellectual worth, for which in general the degree of our capacity to endure, or love, solitude is a good yardstick. The surroundings described give, then, an example of the sublime in a low degree, in that in them, as a contrast to the state of pure knowing, in its calm and all-sufficiency, there is mixed a recollection of the dependence and wretchedness of the will, which needs constant driving.—This is the kind of the sublime that is praised in the sight of the endless prairies in the interior of North America.

Now let such a region also be stripped of plants and show only bare rocks; then through the total absence of the organic, which is necessary to our subsistence, the will is already made downright anxious. The desolation takes on a fearful character; our mood becomes more tragic; the elevation to pure knowing takes place with a more decided tearing loose from the interest of the will, and as we persist in the state of pure knowing, the feeling of the sublime emerges distinctly.

In a still higher degree the following surroundings can occasion it. Nature in stormy motion; chiaroscuro, through threatening black thunderclouds; enormous, bare, overhanging cliffs that by their interlocking shut off the view; rushing, foaming waters; total desolation; the wailing of the air sweeping through the ravines. Our dependence, our struggle with hostile nature, our will broken in it, now comes vividly before our eyes. But so long as personal distress does not gain the upper hand, and we remain in aesthetic contemplation, the pure

subject of knowing looks through that struggle of nature, through that image of the broken will, and calmly, unshaken, untouched (unconcerned), apprehends the Ideas in the very objects that are threatening and fearful to the will. In this very contrast lies the feeling of the sublime.

But the impression becomes still more powerful when we have the struggle of the enraged forces of nature before our eyes on a grand scale: when in those surroundings a falling torrent by its raging deprives us of the possibility of hearing our own voice—or when we stand by the vast sea roused in storm. Waves as high as houses rise and sink, dashed violently against steep shore cliffs, they spray the foam high into the air, the storm howls, the sea roars, lightning flashes from black clouds and thunderclaps drown out storm and sea. Then, in the unshaken spectator of this scene, the duality of his consciousness reaches its highest distinctness. He feels himself at once as individual, as frail appearance of the will, which the slightest blow of those forces can shatter, helpless against mighty nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing in the face of tremendous powers; and with that, at the same time, as eternal calm subject of knowing, who, as condition of the object, is the bearer of this whole world, and to whom the fearful struggle of nature is only his representation, he himself in calm apprehension of the Ideas, free and alien to all willing and all needs. It is the full impression of the sublime. Here it is occasioned by the sight of a power threatening the individual with annihilation, a power incomparably superior to him.

In quite another way it can arise at the presentation of a mere greatness in space and time, whose immeasurability dwindles the individual to nothing. We can call the first kind the dynamically sublime, the second the mathematically sublime, retaining Kant's names and his correct division, although in the explanation of the inner nature of that impression we depart from him entirely and concede to neither moral reflections nor hypostases from scholastic philosophy any share in it.

When we lose ourselves in the contemplation of the infinite greatness of the world in space and time, and meditate on the millennia that have passed and those to come—or also when the night sky actually brings countless worlds

before our eyes, and so the immeasurability of the world forces itself upon consciousness—we feel ourselves dwindled to nothing; we feel ourselves, as individual, as animate body, as transient appearance of the will, like a drop in the ocean, dwindling away, dissolving into nothing. But at the same time, against such a specter of our own nothingness, against such a lying impossibility, there rises the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only in our representation, only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget individuality, and which is the necessary, the conditioning bearer of all worlds and all times. The greatness of the world, which disquieted us before, now rests in us: our dependence on it is canceled by its dependence on us.—All this, however, does not come at once into reflection, but shows itself as a merely felt consciousness that one is, in some sense (which philosophy alone makes clear), one with the world, and is therefore not weighed down but lifted up by its immeasurability. It is the felt consciousness of what the Upanishads of the Vedas repeatedly express in such manifold turns, above all in the saying already adduced above: Illae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est. (Oupnek'hat, vol. 1, p. 122). It is elevation above one's own individuality, the feeling of the sublime.

In a quite immediate way we receive this impression of the mathematically sublime already from a space which, indeed, is small when considered against the structure of the world, but which, by having become immediately perceptible to us as a whole, in all three dimensions, acts on us with its entire magnitude, which suffices to make the measure of our own body almost infinitely small. A space empty to perception can never do this, and hence never an open one, but only one immediately perceptible through limitation in all dimensions, that is, a very high and large vault, like that of St. Peter's in Rome, or St. Paul's in London. The feeling of the sublime arises here through becoming aware of the vanishing nothingness of our own body before a greatness which, on the other hand, itself lies only in our representation, and of which we as knowing subject are the bearer; thus here as everywhere through the contrast between the insignificance and dependence of our self as individual, as appearance of the will, and the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing. Even the

vault of the starry heaven, when it is contemplated without reflection, acts only like that stone vault, and not with its true magnitude but only with its apparent one.—Some objects of our intuition arouse the impression of the sublime in that, both by virtue of their spatial greatness and of their great age, that is, their duration in time, we feel ourselves dwindled to nothing in the face of them, and yet revel in the enjoyment of the sight of them: of this kind are very high mountains, the Egyptian pyramids, colossal ruins of high antiquity.

Indeed, our explanation of the sublime can be carried over to the ethical as well, namely to what is called the sublime character. This too springs from the will's not being aroused by objects which would indeed be suited to arouse it, knowing retaining the upper hand in this case as well. Such a character will accordingly regard men purely objectively, not according to the relations they might have to his will. He will, for example, notice their faults, even their hatred and injustice toward himself, without being thereby aroused to hatred on his part; he will look upon their happiness without feeling envy; he will recognize their good qualities without, however, wishing a closer connection with them; he will perceive the beauty of women without desiring them. His personal happiness or unhappiness will not strongly affect him; rather he will be as Hamlet describes Horatio: for thou hast been As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing; A man, that fortune's buffets and rewards Hast ta'en with equal thanks. etc. (A. 3. sc. 2.) [25]

For in his own course of life and its mishaps he will see less his individual lot than the lot of mankind in general, and will accordingly conduct himself in it more as one who knows than as one who suffers.

40 Because opposites illuminate one another, the remark may find its place here that the real opposite of the sublime is something that at first glance one perhaps does not recognize as such: the *charming*. By this, however, I understand that which [26] For you were always as though, while everything struck you, you suffered nothing: Fate's blows and gifts you have taken with equal thanks, etc. arouses the will by holding out to it immediately the granting, the fulfillment.—If the feeling of the sublime arose from the fact that an object directly

unfavorable to the will becomes object of pure contemplation, which is then maintained only by a constant turning away from the will and elevation above its interest, and this is just what constitutes the sublimity of the mood; then the charming, on the contrary, draws the beholder down out of the pure contemplation required for every apprehension of the beautiful, in that, through objects that immediately appeal to it, it necessarily stirs up his will, whereby the contemplator no longer remains pure subject of knowing but becomes needy, dependent subject of willing.—That every beautiful thing of the cheerful kind is commonly called charming is a concept taken too widely, through lack of proper discrimination, which I must set entirely aside, indeed disapprove.—In the sense given and explained, however, I find in the realm of art only two kinds of the charming, and both unworthy of it. The one, quite low, is in the still life of the Netherlanders, when it strays so far that the objects represented are articles of food, which by their deceptive rendering necessarily excite the appetite for them, which is precisely an agitation of the will that puts an end to every aesthetic contemplation of the object. Painted fruit is still admissible, since it presents itself as a further development of the flower and, through form and color, as a beautiful natural product, without one's being directly compelled to think of its edibility; but unfortunately we often find, with deceptive naturalness, dishes set out and prepared, oysters, herrings, lobsters, bread and butter, beer, wine, and so on, which is wholly reprehensible.—In history painting and sculpture the charming consists in nude figures, whose posture, half-clothing and whole manner of treatment aim at exciting lasciviousness in the beholder, whereby the purely aesthetic contemplation is at once canceled, and the purpose of art thus worked against. This fault corresponds wholly to the one just censured in the Netherlanders. The works of antiquity, for all the beauty and complete nudity of the figures, are almost always free of it, because the artist himself created them in a purely objective spirit, filled with ideal beauty, not in the spirit of subjective, base desire.—The charming is therefore to be avoided everywhere in art.

There is also a negative charming, which is still more reprehensible than the positive charming just discussed: and this is the disgusting. Precisely like the properly charming, it rouses the will of the beholder and thereby destroys the purely aesthetic contemplation. But what is stirred up thereby is a violent not-willing, a recoil: it rouses the will by holding out to it objects of its abhorrence. Hence it has always been recognized that it is wholly inadmissible in art, where even the ugly, so long as it is not disgusting, can be tolerated in its proper place, as we shall see below.

41 The course of our consideration has made it necessary to insert the discussion of the sublime here, where that of the beautiful was completed only by half, only on its one, the subjective, side. For it was only a particular modification of this subjective side that distinguished the sublime from the beautiful. Whether, namely, the state of pure will-less knowing, which every aesthetic contemplation presupposes and demands, set in as if of itself, without resistance, by the mere vanishing of the will from consciousness, the object inviting and drawing us to it; or whether this state was first won by a free, conscious elevation above the will, to which the contemplated object itself stands in an unfavorable, hostile relation, a relation which, if one were to dwell on it, would cancel the contemplation—this is the difference between the beautiful and the sublime. In the object the two are not essentially different: for in every case the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the single thing, but the Idea striving for revelation in it, that is, the adequate objectivity of the will at a determinate grade. Its necessary correlate, withdrawn like itself from the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject of knowing, just as the correlate of the single thing is the knowing individual, both of which lie in the domain of the principle of sufficient reason.

When we call an object *beautiful*, we thereby declare that it is object of our aesthetic contemplation, which includes two things: on the one hand, that its sight makes us *objective*, that is, that in contemplating it we are conscious of ourselves no longer as individuals but as pure will-less subject of knowing; and on the other hand, that we know in the object not the single thing but an Idea.

This can happen only insofar as our contemplation of the object is not given up to the principle of sufficient reason, does not follow out its relation to anything outside it (which in the end always connects with relations to our willing), but rests on the object itself. For the Idea and the pure subject of knowing enter consciousness always at the same time, as necessary correlates, and with this entrance all difference of time at once vanishes, since both are wholly foreign to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms and lie outside the relations posited by it, comparable to the rainbow and the sun, which have no part in the constant motion and succession of the falling drops. Hence, if I contemplate a tree aesthetically, that is, with the eyes of an artist, and so know not it but its Idea, it is at once without significance whether it is this tree or its forebear that bloomed a thousand years ago, and likewise whether the contemplator is this or any other individual living at any time and place. With the principle of sufficient reason the single thing and the knowing individual are canceled, and nothing remains but the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, which together make up the adequate objectivity of the will at this grade. And not only from time but also from space is the Idea exempt: for it is not the spatial form that hovers before me, but its expression, its pure significance, its innermost being, which unlocks itself to me and addresses me, that is really the Idea, and it can be quite the same amid great differences in the spatial proportions of the form.

Since, then, on the one hand every existing thing can be regarded purely objectively and outside all relation; and since, on the other hand, the will appears in every thing, at some grade of its objectivity, and the thing is accordingly the expression of an Idea; every thing is also *beautiful*.—That even the most insignificant thing admits of purely objective and will-less contemplation, and thereby proves itself beautiful, is attested by the still life of the Netherlanders, already mentioned above (§. 38) in this connection. But one thing is more beautiful than another in that it facilitates that purely objective contemplation, comes to meet it, indeed as it were compels it, and then we call it very beautiful. This is the case partly because, as a single thing, through the very distinct, purely determinate, thoroughly significant relation of its parts, it purely

expresses the Idea of its species, and through the completeness united in it of all the expressions possible to its species reveals the Idea of that species perfectly, so that it greatly facilitates for the beholder the transition from the single thing to the Idea, and thereby also the state of pure contemplativeness; and partly that superiority of special beauty in an object lies in this, that the Idea itself which speaks to us out of it is a high grade of the objectivity of the will, and therefore thoroughly significant and full of meaning. That is why man is beautiful above all else, and the revelation of his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and human expression are the most significant object of the plastic arts, just as human action is the most significant object of poetry.—Yet every thing nevertheless has its own peculiar beauty: not only every organic thing and everything that presents itself in the unity of an individuality, but also everything inorganic, formless, indeed every artifact. For all of these reveal the Ideas through which the will objectifies itself at the lowest grades; they give, as it were, the deepest, fading bass notes of nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light, and so on, are the Ideas that express themselves in rocks, buildings, waters. Beautiful garden art and architecture can do nothing more than help them to unfold those qualities of theirs distinctly, many-sidedly and completely, give them opportunity to express themselves purely, whereby they invite aesthetic contemplation and facilitate it. Bad buildings and regions, on the other hand, which nature neglected or art spoiled, accomplish this little or not at all; yet from these too those general fundamental Ideas of nature cannot wholly vanish. To the beholder who seeks them they speak here too, and even bad buildings and the like are still capable of aesthetic contemplation: the Ideas of the most general qualities of their material are still recognizable in them, only that the form artificially given them is no means of facilitation, but rather an obstacle, which makes aesthetic contemplation harder. Artifacts, consequently, also serve the expression of Ideas; only it is not the Idea of the artifact that speaks from them, but the Idea of the material to which this artificial form was given. In the language of the Scholastics this can be expressed very conveniently in two words, namely: in the artifact the Idea of its forma substantialis expresses itself, not that of its forma accidentalis, which latter leads to no Idea, but only to a

human concept from which it proceeded. It is understood that by artifact here no work of the plastic arts is expressly meant. For the rest, the Scholastics in fact understood by forma substantialis what I call the grade of objectification of the will in a thing. We shall return presently, in considering beautiful architecture, to the expression of the Idea of the material.—According to our view, however, we cannot assent to Plato when he asserts (De Rep., X, p. 284–285, et Parmen., p. 79, ed. Bip.) that table and chair express the Ideas table and chair; rather we say that they express the Ideas that already express themselves in their mere material as such. According to Aristotle (Metaph., XI, ch. 3), however, Plato himself would have posited Ideas only of natural beings: ὁ Πλατων εφη, ὁτι ειδη εστιν ὁποσα φυσει. (Plato dixit, quod ideae eorum sunt, quae natura sunt) and in ch. 5 it is said that, according to the Platonists, there are no Ideas of house and ring. At any rate Plato's immediate disciples, as Alcinous reports to us (introductio in Platonicam philosophiam, ch. 9), already denied that there are Ideas of artifacts. He says, namely: Ὁριζονται δε την ιδεαν, παραδειγμα των κατα φυσιν αἰωνιον. Ουτε γαρ τοις πλειστοις των απο Πλατωνος αρεσκει, των τεχνικων ειναι ιδεας, οἱον ασπιδος η λυρας, ουτε μην των παρα φυσιν, οἱον πυρετου και χολερας, ουτε των κατα μερος, οἱον Σωκρατους και Πλατωνος, αλλ' ουτε των ευτελων τινος, οἱον ρυπου και καρφους, ουτε των προς τι, οἱον μειζονος και ὑπερεχοντος· ειναι γαρ τας ιδεας νοησεις θεου αιωνιους τε και αυτοτελεις.—(Definiunt autem ideam exemplar aeternum eorum, quae secundum naturam existunt. Nam plurimis ex iis, qui Platonem secuti sunt, minime placuit, arte factorum ideas esse, ut clypei atque lyrae; neque rursus eorum, quae praeter naturam, ut febris et cholerae; neque particularium, ceu Socratis et Platonis; neque etiam rerum vilium, veluti sordium et festucae; neque relationum, ut majoris et excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei aeternas, ac seipsis perfectas.)—On this occasion yet another point may be mentioned in which our doctrine of Ideas departs very greatly from Plato's. He teaches, namely (De Rep., X, p. 288), that the object which fine art intends to present, the model of painting and poetry, is not the Idea but the single thing. Our whole exposition so far maintains precisely the opposite, and Plato's opinion will mislead us the less in

this as it is the source of one of the greatest and acknowledged errors of that great man, namely his low esteem and rejection of art, especially of poetry: his false judgment on this he attaches directly to the passage cited.

42 I return to our exposition of the aesthetic impression. The knowledge of the beautiful, to be sure, always posits purely knowing subject and known Idea as object at once and inseparably. Yet the source of aesthetic enjoyment will lie now more in the apprehension of the known Idea, now more in the bliss and peace of mind of pure knowing, freed from all willing and thereby from all individuality and the pain that proceeds from it; and this predominance of the one or the other component of aesthetic enjoyment will depend on whether the Idea apprehended intuitively is a higher or a lower grade of the objectivity of the will. Thus in the aesthetic contemplation (in reality, or through the medium of art) of beautiful nature in the inorganic and vegetable, and of the works of beautiful architecture, the enjoyment of pure will-less knowing will predominate, because the Ideas apprehended here are only low grades of the objectivity of the will, and therefore not appearances of deep significance and meaningful content. When, on the other hand, animals and human beings are the object of aesthetic contemplation or presentation, the enjoyment will consist more in the objective apprehension of these Ideas, which are the most distinct revelations of the will; because such Ideas lay out the greatest variety of forms, richness and deep significance of appearances, and reveal to us most perfectly the nature of the will, be it in its violence, terribleness, satisfaction, or in its breaking (the last in tragic presentations), finally even in its turning or self-abolition, which is especially the theme of Christian painting; just as in general history painting and the drama have for their object the Idea of the will illumined by full knowledge.—We now want to go through the arts one by one, whereby the theory of the beautiful set up here will receive completeness and distinctness.

43 Matter as such cannot be the presentation of an Idea. For it is, as we found in the first book, through and through causality: its being is sheer acting. Causality, however, is a form of the principle of sufficient reason; knowledge of

the Idea, on the other hand, essentially excludes the content of that principle. We also found in the second book matter as the common substratum of all the particular appearances of the Ideas, and consequently as the connecting link between the Idea and the appearance or the single thing. So for the one reason as well as for the other, matter cannot of itself present an Idea. A posteriori this is confirmed by the fact that of matter as such no intuitive representation at all is possible, but only an abstract concept: in the former, namely, only the forms and qualities present themselves of which matter is the bearer, and in all of which Ideas are revealed. This corresponds also to the fact that causality (the whole essence of matter) cannot be presented intuitively by itself, but only a determinate causal connection.—On the other hand, every *appearance* of an Idea, since as such it has entered into the form of the principle of sufficient reason, or into the principium individuationis, must present itself in matter, as a quality of it. To that extent, then, as said, matter is the connecting link between the Idea and the principium individuationis, which is the form of the knowledge of the individual, or the principle of sufficient reason.—Plato has therefore quite rightly set up, beside the Idea and its appearance, the single thing, which two otherwise comprise all things of the world, only matter as a third, different from both (Timaeus, p. 345). The individual, as appearance of the Idea, is always matter. Every quality of matter, too, is always appearance of an Idea, and as such also capable of aesthetic contemplation, that is, knowledge of the Idea presenting itself in it. This holds even of the most general qualities of matter, without which it never is, and whose Ideas are the weakest objectivity of the will. Such are: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, reaction to light, and so on.

If we now consider *architecture* merely as fine art, leaving aside its destination to useful purposes, in which it serves the will, not pure knowing, and is thus no longer art in our sense, we can attribute to it no other aim than to bring to distinct intuitiveness some of those Ideas which are the lowest grades of the objectivity of the will: namely gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, these general properties of stone, these first, simplest, dullest visibilities of the will, groundbass notes of nature; and then beside them light, which in many respects is an

opposite of those. Even on this low grade of the objectivity of the will we already see its nature reveal itself in discord: for really the conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic material of beautiful architecture; to let it emerge perfectly distinctly in manifold ways is its task. It solves this by depriving those indestructible forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction and holding them off by a detour, whereby the conflict is prolonged and the inexhaustible striving of both forces becomes visible in manifold ways.—The whole mass of the building, left to its original inclination, would present a mere lump, bound as firmly as possible to the body of the earth, toward which gravity, in which the will here appears, presses unceasingly, while rigidity, likewise objectivity of the will, resists. But precisely this inclination, this striving, is prevented by architecture from immediate satisfaction and permitted only a mediate one, by detours. So, for example, the entablature can press upon the earth only by means of the column; the vault must support itself, and can satisfy its striving toward the mass of the earth only through the mediation of the piers, and so on. But precisely on these forced detours, precisely through these checks, those forces dwelling in the crude mass of stone unfold themselves most distinctly and manifoldly; and farther than this the purely aesthetic purpose of architecture cannot go. Hence the beauty of a building lies indeed in the evident fitness of every part, not to the external arbitrary purpose of man (to that extent the work belongs to useful architecture), but immediately to the subsistence of the whole, to which the place, size and form of every part must have so necessary a relation that, if possible, were any part removed, the whole would have to collapse. For only in that each part bears as much as it fittingly can, and each is supported precisely where and precisely as much as it must be, does that counterplay, that conflict between rigidity and gravity, which constitute the life, the expressions of will, of the stone, unfold to the most perfect visibility, and do these lowest grades of the objectivity of the will reveal themselves distinctly. Likewise the shape of every part must be determined by its purpose and its relation to the whole, not by caprice. The column is the very simplest form of the support, determined merely by the purpose; the twisted column is tasteless; the square pier is in fact less simple, though accidentally easier to make, than the

round column. Likewise the forms of frieze, beam, arch, dome are wholly determined by their immediate purpose and thereby explain themselves. The ornaments of the capitals and so on belong to sculpture, not to architecture, by which, as additional decoration, they are merely admitted, and could also be omitted.—In accordance with what has been said, it is indispensable for the understanding and aesthetic enjoyment of a work of architecture to have an immediate, intuitive knowledge of its material, according to its weight, rigidity and cohesion; and our pleasure in such a work would be suddenly greatly diminished by the disclosure that pumice stone was the building material, for then it would strike us as a kind of sham building. Almost the same effect would be produced by the news that it was only of wood, while we had supposed stone; precisely because this now alters and shifts the relation between rigidity and gravity, and thereby the significance and necessity of all the parts, since those natural forces reveal themselves much more weakly in the wooden building. Hence from wood, too, no work of beautiful architecture can really be made, however much it may assume all the forms: this is explicable solely by our theory. But if we were told, finally, that the building whose sight delights us consists of quite different materials, of very unequal weight and consistency, which however could not be distinguished by the eye, the whole building would thereby become as unenjoyable to us as a poem in a language unknown to us. All this proves precisely that architecture acts not merely mathematically but dynamically, and that what speaks to us through it is not by any means mere form and symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature, those first Ideas, those lowest grades of the objectivity of the will.—The regularity of the building and its parts is brought about partly by the immediate fitness of each member for the subsistence of the whole; partly it serves to facilitate the survey and understanding of the whole; partly, finally, the regular figures contribute to beauty, in that they reveal the lawfulness of space as such. But all this is only of subordinate worth and necessity and by no means the main thing, since even symmetry is not indispensably required, ruins being beautiful still.

A quite special relation the works of architecture still have to light: they gain double beauty in full sunshine with the blue sky as background, and show again a wholly different effect in moonlight. Hence, too, in the erection of a beautiful work of architecture, special regard is always taken of the effects of the light and of the quarters of the heavens. All this has its ground, to be sure, largely in the fact that bright and sharp illumination first makes all parts and their relations truly visible; but besides this I am of the opinion that architecture, as well as gravity and rigidity, is also destined to reveal the nature of light, which is wholly opposed to these. For when the light is caught, checked, thrown back by the great, opaque, sharply bounded and variously shaped masses, it unfolds its nature and properties most purely and distinctly, to the great enjoyment of the beholder, since light is the most delightful of things, as the condition and objective correlate of the most perfect perceptual mode of knowledge.

Because the Ideas that are brought to distinct intuition by architecture are the lowest grades of the objectivity of the will, and consequently the objective significance of what architecture reveals to us is comparatively slight, the aesthetic enjoyment at the sight of a beautiful and favorably lit building will lie not so much in the apprehension of the Idea as in the subjective correlate of that apprehension posited with it. It will therefore consist predominantly in this: that at this sight the beholder is torn loose from the mode of knowledge of the individual, which serves the will and follows the principle of sufficient reason, and raised up to that of the pure will-free subject of knowing; that is, in the pure contemplation itself, freed from all suffering of willing and of individuality.—In this respect the opposite of architecture, and the other extreme in the series of the fine arts, is the drama, which brings the most significant Ideas to knowledge, and in the aesthetic enjoyment of which, therefore, the objective side is decidedly predominant.

Architecture differs from the plastic arts and from poetry in that it gives not a copy but the thing itself. It does not repeat, as they do, the known Idea, whereby the artist lends the beholder his eyes; rather, here the artist merely sets

the object in order for the beholder and facilitates for him the apprehension of the Idea, by bringing the actual, individual object to a distinct and complete expression of its nature.

The works of architecture are very seldom, like the other works of fine art, erected for purely aesthetic purposes: rather these are subordinated to other, useful purposes, foreign to art itself; and there the great merit of the architect consists in nevertheless carrying through and attaining the purely aesthetic purposes in their subordination to foreign ones, by skillfully adapting them in manifold ways to the arbitrary purpose of each case, and judging rightly what aesthetic-architectonic beauty is compatible and can be united with a temple, what with a palace, what with an arsenal, and so on. The more a rough climate multiplies those demands of need and utility, determines them more firmly and prescribes them more inexorably, the less room for play has the beautiful in architecture. In the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece and Rome, where the demands of necessity were smaller and more loosely determined, architecture could pursue its aesthetic purposes most freely; under the northern sky these were much stunted for it. Here, where boxes, pointed roofs and towers were the requirement, architecture, since it could unfold its own beauty only within very narrow limits, had to adorn itself all the more, by way of compensation, with ornament borrowed from sculpture, as may be seen in Gothic fine architecture.

If, then, architecture must in this way suffer great restrictions through the demands of necessity and utility, it has on the other hand in these very demands a strong support; for, given the extent and costliness of its works and the narrow sphere of its aesthetic mode of operation, it could not maintain itself at all as mere fine art if it did not at the same time have, as a useful and necessary trade, a firm and honorable place among human occupations. The lack of precisely this last is what prevents another art from standing beside it as a sister, although in aesthetic respect it is quite properly to be assigned to it as its counterpart: I mean the fine art of the water-conduit. For what architecture accomplishes for the Idea of gravity where this appears combined with rigidity, that same thing the other accomplishes for the same Idea where fluidity is associated

with it, that is, formlessness, easiest displaceability, transparency. Waterfalls plunging foaming and roaring over rocks, cataracts quietly dissolving in spray, fountains driving up as lofty columns of water, and clear-mirroring lakes reveal the Ideas of fluid heavy matter exactly as the works of architecture unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. In the useful art of the water-conduit the beautiful art finds no support, since the purposes of the former, as a rule, cannot be united with its own, and this takes place only by exception, as for example in the Cascata di Trevi at Rome [27].

44 What the two arts mentioned accomplish for those lowest grades of the objectivity of the will, fine garden art accomplishes in a certain measure for the higher grade of vegetable nature. The scenic beauty of a spot rests largely on the manifold natural objects found together on it, and then on their separating out purely, standing forth distinctly, and yet presenting themselves in fitting connection and variation. These two conditions are what beautiful garden art helps along; yet it is far from being as much master of its material as architecture is of its own, and therefore its effect is limited. The beauty it displays belongs almost wholly to nature; it itself has done little for it. On the other hand it can do very little against the disfavor of nature, and where nature does not work for it but against it, its achievements are slight.

Insofar, then, as the plant world, which without the mediation of art offers itself everywhere to aesthetic enjoyment, is an object of [28] On this, Chapter 35 of the second volume.

art, it belongs mainly to landscape painting. In the domain of this, all the rest of nature that lacks knowledge lies with it as well.—In still life and in painted mere architecture, ruins, church interiors and the like, the subjective side of aesthetic enjoyment is the predominant one: that is, our pleasure in them lies not mainly in the immediate apprehension of the Ideas presented, but more in the subjective correlate of this apprehension, in pure will-less knowing. For, in that the painter lets us see things through his eyes, we receive here at the same time a sympathetic feeling and the after-sense of the deep peace of mind and total silence of the will that were needed in order to sink knowledge so wholly into

those lifeless objects and to apprehend them with such love, that is, here with such a degree of objectivity.—The effect of landscape painting proper is, it is true, on the whole still of this kind too; but because the Ideas presented, as higher grades of the objectivity of the will, are already more significant and meaningful, the objective side of aesthetic pleasure already emerges more and holds the balance against the subjective. Pure knowing as such is no longer wholly the main thing; rather, with equal power the known Idea works, the world as representation at a significant grade of the objectification of the will.

But a much higher grade is revealed by animal painting and animal sculpture, of the latter of which we have significant remains from antiquity, for example horses in Venice, on Monte Cavallo, on the Elgin reliefs, also at Florence, in bronze and marble, in the same place the ancient boar, the howling wolves, also the lions at the arsenal in Venice, also in the Vatican a whole room full of mostly ancient animals, and so on. In these presentations the objective side of aesthetic pleasure obtains a decided preponderance over the subjective. The calm of the subject knowing these Ideas, who has quieted his own will, is indeed present, as in every aesthetic contemplation, but its effect is not felt: for we are occupied by the restlessness and violence of the will presented. It is that willing, which also makes up our own nature, that here comes before our eyes, in shapes in which its appearance is not, as in us, governed and mitigated by presence of mind, but presents itself in stronger features and with a distinctness that verges on the grotesque and monstrous, but in compensation also without dissimulation, naive and open, lying free in the light of day; and on this precisely our interest in animals rests. The characteristic of the species already emerged in the presentation of plants, yet showed itself only in the forms; here it becomes much more significant and expresses itself not only in the shape, but in action, posture and gesture, although always still only as character of the species, not of the individual.—In this knowledge of Ideas of higher grades, which we receive in painting through foreign mediation, we can also share immediately, through purely contemplative intuition of plants and observation of animals, and indeed of the latter in their free, natural and comfortable state. The objective contemplation of their manifold, wondrous shapes and of their

doings and ways is an instructive lesson from the great book of nature, is a deciphering of the true Signatura rerum [29]: we see in it the manifold grades and modes of the manifestation of the will, which, in all beings the one and the same, everywhere wills the same thing, that which objectifies itself precisely as life, as existence, in such endless variety, in such different shapes, which are all accommodations to the different external conditions, comparable to many variations on the same theme. If we were, however, to communicate to the contemplator the disclosure of their inner nature also for reflection, and in a single word, we could best put that Sanskrit formula, which occurs so often in the holy books of the Hindus and is called Mahavakya, that is, the great word, to [30] Jakob Böhm, in his book De Signatura rerum, ch. 1, §. 15, 16, 17, says: "And there is no thing in nature that does not also reveal its inner form outwardly: for the inward works constantly toward revelation.———Every thing has its mouth for revelation.———And that is the language of nature, in which every thing speaks out of its own property and ever reveals and presents itself.———For every thing reveals its mother, who thus gives the *essence and the will* to the formation." this use: "Tat twam asi," that is: "you are this living thing."

45 To present directly and intuitively the Idea in which the will reaches the highest degree of its objectification is, finally, the great task of history painting and of sculpture. The objective side of the joy in the beautiful is here decidedly predominant, and the subjective has receded into the background. It is to be noted, further, that even on the next grade below this, in animal painting, the characteristic is wholly one with the beautiful: the most characteristic lion, wolf, horse, sheep, bull was also always the most beautiful. The reason for this is that animals have only character of the species, no individual character. In the presentation of man, however, the character of the species separates from the character of the individual: the former is now called beauty (wholly in the objective sense), the latter, however, retains the name of character or expression, and the new difficulty arises of presenting both perfectly at once in the same individual.

Human beauty is an objective expression that designates the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest grade of its knowability, the Idea of man in general, completely expressed in the intuited form. Yet however much the objective side of the beautiful comes to the fore here, the subjective remains its constant companion. And precisely because no object carries us away so quickly to purely aesthetic intuiting as the most beautiful human countenance and figure, at the sight of which an unspeakable pleasure instantly seizes us and lifts us beyond ourselves and all that torments us, this is possible only because this most distinct and purest knowability of the will transposes us also most easily and quickly into the state of pure knowing, in which our personality, our willing with its constant pain, vanishes so long as the purely aesthetic joy lasts. Hence Goethe says: "Whoever beholds human beauty, nothing evil can blow upon him: he feels himself in harmony with himself and with the world."—That nature succeeds with a beautiful human figure we must explain by the fact that the will, in objectifying itself at this highest grade in an individual, through fortunate circumstances and its own force wholly overcomes all the hindrances and resistance which the appearances of the will at lower grades oppose to it, such as the forces of nature, from which it must always first win and wrest the matter that belongs to all. Further, the appearance of the will at the higher grades always has manifoldness in its form: already the tree is only a systematic aggregate of the innumerably repeated sprouting fibers; this composition increases ever more as we go higher, and the human body is a highly combined system of quite different parts, each of which has a life subordinate to the whole, yet also peculiar to itself, vita propria. That all these parts now be subordinated to the whole precisely in the proper way and coordinated with one another, conspire harmoniously to the presentation of the whole, nothing excessive, nothing stunted—all this is the rare set of conditions whose result is beauty, the perfectly stamped character of the species.—So nature. But how art?—It is thought: by imitation of nature.—But by what is the artist to recognize nature's successful work, the one to be imitated, and find it out among the failures, if he does not anticipate the beautiful before *experience*? Besides, has nature ever produced a man perfectly beautiful in all parts?—Then it has been

thought that the artist must gather together the beautiful parts distributed singly among many men, and compose from them a beautiful whole: a perverse and thoughtless opinion. For it is again the question, by what is he to recognize that precisely these forms are the beautiful ones and those not?—We see too how far in beauty the old German painters got by imitation of nature. Look at their nude figures.—Purely a posteriori and from mere experience no knowledge of the beautiful is possible at all: it is always, at least in part, a priori, although of a quite different kind from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason that we are conscious of a priori.

These concern the universal form of appearance as such, as it grounds the possibility of knowledge in general, the universal, exceptionless How of appearing, and from this knowledge mathematics and pure natural science proceed. That other kind of knowledge a priori, on the other hand, which makes the presentation of the beautiful possible, concerns, instead of the form, the content of appearances, instead of the How, the What of appearing. That we all recognize human beauty when we see it, but that in the true artist this happens with such clarity that he shows it as he has never seen it, and surpasses nature in his presentation: this is possible only because the will, whose adequate objectification at its highest grade is here to be judged and found, is indeed we *ourselves*. Through this alone do we in fact have an anticipation of that which nature (which is precisely the will that makes up our own nature) strives to present; and this anticipation in the true man of genius is accompanied by such a degree of presence of mind that, in recognizing in the single thing its Idea, he as it were *understands nature at half a word* and now purely speaks out what she only stammers, that he impresses on the hard marble the beauty of form which in a thousand attempts fails her, sets it over against nature, as it were calling to her: "That was what you wanted to say!" and "Yes, that was it!" echoes back from the connoisseur.—Only so could the Greek of genius find the archetype of the human form and set it up as canon for the school of sculpture; and only by virtue of such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognize the beautiful where nature has actually succeeded in the particular. This anticipation is the *ideal*: it is the Idea insofar as it is known, at least by half, a priori, and, in

that as such it comes to meet, in a supplementary way, what is given a posteriori through nature, becomes practical for art. The possibility of such an anticipation of the beautiful a priori in the artist, as of its recognition a posteriori in the connoisseur, lies in the fact that artist and connoisseur are themselves the in-itself of nature, the objectifying will. For only like is known by like, as Empedocles said: only nature can understand itself; only nature will fathom itself: but also only by mind is mind apprehended [31].

The perverse opinion that the Greeks found the ideal of human beauty which they set up quite empirically, by gathering together single beautiful parts, here baring and noting a knee, there an arm, has, incidentally, one wholly analogous to it in regard to poetry, namely the assumption that, for example, Shakespeare noted from his own experience of life in the world the countlessly manifold characters in his dramas, so true, so sustained, so worked out from the depths, and then reproduced them. The impossibility and absurdity of such an assumption needs no discussion: it is evident that the man of genius produces the works of the plastic arts only through a presaging anticipation of the beautiful, and the works of poetry only through just such an anticipation of the characteristic; although both need experience as a schema, by which alone what is obscurely conscious to them a priori is called forth into full distinctness, and the possibility of deliberate presentation now enters.

Human beauty was explained above as the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest grade of its knowability. It expresses itself through form; and this lies in space alone and has no necessary relation to time, as movement, for example, has. To that extent we can say: the adequate objectification of the will through a merely spatial appearance is beauty, in the objective sense. The plant is nothing other than such a merely spatial appearance of the will, since no movement, and consequently no relation to time (apart from its development), belongs to the expression of its nature: its mere shape expresses its whole nature and lays it open. Animal and man [32] The last sentence is the German rendering of Helvetius's il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit, which I did not need to note in the first edition. But since then, through the stupefying influence of Hegelian pseudo-wisdom, the age has been brought so low and become so

coarse that many might well even fancy that here too an allusion is made to the opposition of "mind and nature": I am therefore obliged to guard myself expressly against the imputation of such rabble-philosophemes. however need, for the complete revelation of the will appearing in them, still a series of actions, whereby that appearance in them obtains an immediate relation to time. All this has already been discussed in the previous book; it connects with our present consideration as follows. As the merely spatial appearance of the will can objectify it at each determinate grade perfectly or imperfectly, which constitutes precisely beauty or ugliness, so too the temporal objectification of the will, that is, the action, and indeed the immediate action, thus movement, can correspond purely and perfectly to the will that objectifies itself in it, without foreign admixture, without superfluity, without deficiency, expressing just precisely the determinate act of will of the moment; or else all this can be the reverse. In the first case the movement takes place with *grace*; in the other, without. As beauty, then, is the corresponding presentation of the will in general through its merely spatial appearance, so grace is the corresponding presentation of the will through its temporal appearance, that is, the perfectly correct and appropriate expression of every act of will, through the movement and posture that objectify it. Since movement and posture already presuppose the body, Winckelmann's expression is very correct and apt when he says: "Grace is the peculiar relation of the acting person to the action." (Works, vol. 1, p. 258.) It follows of itself that plants can be credited with beauty, but not with grace, unless in a figurative sense; animals and men, however, with both, beauty and grace. Grace consists, according to what has been said, in this: that every movement and posture be performed in the easiest, most fitting and most convenient way, and thus be the purely corresponding expression of its intention, or of the act of will, without superfluity, which presents itself as purposeless, meaningless fiddling or contorted posture, and without deficiency, which presents itself as wooden stiffness. Grace presupposes as its condition a correct proportion of all the limbs, a regular, harmonious structure of the body, since only by means of this are perfect ease and evident fitness possible in all postures

and movements: thus grace is never without a certain degree of beauty of body. Both, perfect and united, are the most distinct appearance of the will at the topmost grade of its objectification.

It belongs, as mentioned above, to the distinguishing mark of mankind that in it the character of the species and that of the individual come apart, so that, as was said in the previous book, every man represents in a certain measure a wholly peculiar Idea. The arts, therefore, whose aim is the presentation of the Idea of mankind, have as their task, beside beauty, as the character of the species, also the character of the individual, which is preeminently called *character*; yet this again only insofar as it is not to be regarded as something accidental, wholly peculiar to the individual in his singularity, but as a side of the Idea of mankind that stands out particularly in just this individual, for the revelation of which the presentation of him is therefore serviceable. Thus character, though as such individual, must nevertheless be apprehended and presented ideally, that is, with emphasis on its significance in regard to the Idea of mankind in general (to whose objectification it contributes in its own way); otherwise the presentation is portrait, repetition of the single as such, with all its accidents. And even the portrait should, as Winckelmann says, be the ideal of the individual.

That character, to be apprehended ideally, which is the emphasizing of a peculiar side of the Idea of mankind, now presents itself visibly, partly through the abiding physiognomy and bodily constitution, partly through transient affect and passion, modification of knowing and willing reciprocally by one another, all of which expresses itself in mien and movement. Since the individual always belongs to mankind and, on the other hand, mankind always reveals itself in the individual, and indeed with a peculiar ideal significance of the latter, neither may beauty be canceled by character, nor character by beauty: because cancellation of the character of the species by that of the individual would give caricature, and cancellation of the individual by the character of the species would give meaninglessness. Hence presentation, when it aims at beauty, as sculpture chiefly does, will nevertheless always modify this (that is, the character of the species) somewhat by the individual character, and will always express the Idea

of mankind in a determinate, individual way, emphasizing a particular side of it; because the human individual as such has in a certain measure the dignity of an Idea of his own, and it is essential to the Idea of mankind that it present itself in individuals of peculiar significance. Hence we find in the works of the ancients the beauty which they clearly apprehended expressed not through a single figure but through many, bearing different character, grasped as it were each time from another side, and accordingly presented differently in Apollo, differently in Bacchus, differently in Hercules, differently in Antinous: indeed, the characteristic can limit the beautiful and finally even step forth to the point of ugliness, in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun, and so on. But if the characteristic goes so far as the actual cancellation of the character of the species, thus to the unnatural, it becomes caricature.—Still much less than beauty may grace be impaired by the characteristic: whatever posture and movement the expression of character may demand, it must still be executed in the way most fitting, most appropriate, easiest for the person. This will be observed not only by the sculptor and painter, but also by every good actor; otherwise caricature arises here too, as distortion, dislocation.

In sculpture beauty and grace remain the main thing. The real character of the mind, emerging in affect, passion, interplay of knowing and willing, representable only through the expression of the face and the gesture, is preeminently the property of painting. For although eyes and color, which lie outside the domain of sculpture, contribute much to beauty, they are still far more essential to character. Further, beauty unfolds itself more fully to contemplation from several standpoints; expression, character, on the other hand, can be perfectly apprehended from *one* standpoint as well.

Because beauty is evidently the chief aim of sculpture, *Lessing* sought to explain the fact that *Laocoön* does not cry out by saying that crying out is not to be reconciled with beauty. Since for Lessing this subject became the theme, or at least the point of departure, of a book of his own, and so much has also been written on it before and after him, I may be permitted to put forward my opinion on it

here by way of episode, although so special a discussion does not really belong in the context of our consideration, which is directed throughout to the general.

46 That Laocoön, in the famous group, does not cry out is evident, and the general, ever recurring astonishment at it must therefore come from the fact that in his situation we should all cry out; and nature too demands it, since in the most violent physical pain and suddenly occurring greatest bodily anguish, all reflection that might perhaps bring about a silent endurance is wholly driven out of consciousness, and nature gives herself air by crying out, whereby she expresses at once the pain and the anguish, calls the rescuer, and frightens the assailant. Winckelmann therefore already missed the expression of crying out; but in seeking the artist's justification he in fact made Laocoön into a Stoic, who thinks it not in keeping with his dignity to cry out secundum naturam, but imposes on his pain the further useless constraint of choking back its expressions. Winckelmann therefore sees in him "the tried spirit of a great man, who wrestles with tortures and seeks to suppress the expression of feeling and to shut it up within himself: he does not break out into loud cries, as in Virgil, but only anxious sighs escape him," and so on (Works, vol. 7, p. 98.—The same more fully vol. 6, p. 104 ff.). This opinion of Winckelmann's Lessing then criticized in his Laocoön and corrected in the manner indicated above: in place of the psychological ground he put the purely aesthetic one, that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not admit the expression of crying out. Another argument he adds, namely that a wholly transient state, incapable of duration, must not be represented in the motionless work of art, has a hundred examples against it of excellent figures that are fixed in wholly fleeting movements, dancing, wrestling, catching, and so on. Indeed Goethe, in the essay on Laocoön which opens the Propyläen (p. 8), holds the choice of such a wholly transient moment to be positively necessary.—In our own day *Hirt* (Horen, 1797, tenth issue), tracing everything back to the highest truth of expression, decided the matter to the effect that Laocoön does not cry out because, already on the

point of dying of suffocation, he can no longer cry out. Lastly *Fernow* (Römische Studien, vol. 1, p. 426 ff.) has discussed and weighed all those three opinions, yet himself added no new one, but mediated and united those three.

I cannot help being astonished that such thoughtful and acute men laboriously draw in inadequate grounds from afar, seize on psychological, indeed physiological arguments, to explain a thing whose ground lies quite near and is at once evident to the unprejudiced—and especially that Lessing, who came so near to the right explanation, nevertheless by no means hit the real point.

Before all psychological and physiological investigation whether Laocoön in his situation would cry out or not, which, incidentally, I should affirm entirely, it is to be decided, with regard to the group, that crying out could not be represented in it, solely on the ground that the representation of it lies wholly outside the domain of sculpture. One could not produce from marble a crying Laocoön, but only one tearing his mouth open and fruitlessly striving to cry, a Laocoön whose voice has stuck in his throat, vox faucibus haesit. The essence, and consequently also the effect on the spectator, of crying out lies wholly in the sound, not in the gaping of the mouth. This latter phenomenon, which necessarily accompanies crying out, must first be motivated and justified by the sound produced through it: then it is, as characteristic of the action, admissible, indeed necessary, even if it detracts from beauty. But in the plastic art, to which the presentation of crying out itself is wholly foreign and impossible, to present the violent means of crying out, which disturbs all the features and the rest of the expression, the gaping of the mouth, would be truly senseless; because one would then bring before the eyes the means, which for the rest demands many sacrifices, while its end, the crying out itself, together with its effect on the mind, would be left out. Indeed, what is more, one would thereby produce the invariably ridiculous sight of an exertion that remains without effect, truly comparable to what a wag procured for himself when he firmly stopped up with wax the horn of the sleeping night watchman, then woke him with a cry of fire, and amused himself over his fruitless efforts to blow.—Where, on the contrary, the presentation of crying out lies within the domain of the presenting art, it is wholly admissible, because it serves truth, that is, the complete pre-

sentation of the Idea. So in poetry, which for its intuitive presentation lays claim to the reader's imagination: hence in Virgil Laocoön cries like a bull that has torn itself loose after the axe has struck it; hence Homer (Il., XX, 48–53) lets Mars and Minerva cry out quite frightfully, without prejudice to their divine dignity as well as divine beauty. Likewise in the art of the stage: Laocoön on the stage had to cry out absolutely; Sophocles also makes Philoctetes cry out, and on the ancient stage he will indeed really have cried out. As a wholly similar case I remember having seen in London the famous actor *Kemble*, in a play translated from the German, Pizarro, play the American Rolla, a half-savage, but of very noble character: nevertheless, when he was wounded, he cried out loudly and violently, which was of great and excellent effect, because, as highly characteristic, it contributed much to truth.—On the contrary, a painted or stone mute crier would be still far more ridiculous than painted music, which is already censured in Goethe's Propyläen; since crying out detracts far more from the rest of the expression and from beauty than music does, which mostly occupies only hands and arms and is to be regarded as an action characterizing the person, and can to that extent quite properly be painted, provided only that it requires no violent movement of the body or distortion of the mouth: so for example St. Cecilia at the organ, Raphael's violin player in the Sciarra gallery at Rome, and others.—Because, then, owing to the limits of art, the pain of Laocoön could not be expressed by crying out, the artist had to set every other expression of it in motion: this he has accomplished in the highest perfection, as Winckelmann (Works, vol. 6, p. 104 ff.) so masterfully describes, whose excellent description therefore retains its full worth and truth as soon as one abstracts from the imputation of a Stoic disposition [33].

47 Because beauty, together with grace, is the chief object of sculpture, it loves the nude, and tolerates clothing only insofar as this does not hide the forms. It makes use of drapery not as a concealment but as a mediate presentation of the form, a mode of presentation that occupies the understanding greatly, since it arrives at the intuition of the cause, namely the form of the body, only through the effect alone immediately given, the fall of the folds. Accordingly, in sculp-

ture drapery is in a certain measure what foreshortening is in painting. Both are hints, but not symbolic ones, rather such as, when successful, directly compel the understanding to intuit what is hinted at just as if it were actually given.

Let me be allowed to insert here, by the way, a simile concerning the speaking arts. Namely, as the beautiful bodily form is visible to best advantage with the lightest clothing, or with none at all, so that a very beautiful man, if he had taste as well and were also allowed to follow it, would prefer to go almost naked, clothed only after the manner of the ancients;—just so every beautiful and thoughtful mind will always express itself in the most natural, most unreserved, simplest way,[34] This episode, too, has received its supplement in Chapter 36 of the second volume. striving, if it is at all possible, to communicate its thoughts to others, in order thereby to lighten the loneliness which it must feel in a world like this. Conversely, however, poverty of mind, confusion, perversity will clothe itself in the most far-fetched expressions and obscurest phrases, so as to veil in difficult and pompous phrases small, tiny, sober or everyday thoughts, like him who, because the majesty of beauty is lacking to him, wants to make up for this lack by clothing, and seeks to hide the pettiness or ugliness of his person under barbaric finery, tinsel, feathers, ruffs, puffs and cloak. As embarrassed as he would be if he had to go naked, so embarrassed would many an author be if one forced him to translate his so pompous, obscure book into its small, clear content.

48 *History painting* has, besides beauty and grace, character as its chief object. By this is to be understood the presentation of the will at the highest grade of its objectification, where the individual, as emphasizing a particular side of the Idea of mankind, has peculiar significance, and makes this known not through mere figure alone, but through action of every kind and the modifications of knowing and willing that occasion and accompany it, visible in mien and gesture. Since the Idea of mankind is to be presented in this scope, the unfolding of its many-sidedness in significant individuals must be brought before the eyes, and these in turn can be made visible in their significance only through manifold scenes, occurrences and actions. History painting solves this infinite task of

its own by bringing before the eyes scenes of life of every kind, of great and small significance. No individual and no action can be without meaning: in all and through all the Idea of mankind unfolds itself more and more. For this reason no event of human life is to be excluded from painting. One therefore does great injustice to the excellent painters of the Netherlandish school if one prizes only their technical skill, but for the rest looks down on them with contempt because they mostly presented subjects from common life, while one holds significant only the occurrences of world history or Biblical story. One should consider first of all that the inner significance of an action is quite different from the outer, and the two often go apart from one another. The outer significance is the importance of an action in relation to its consequences for and in the real world; thus according to the principle of sufficient reason. The inner significance is the depth of insight into the Idea of mankind which it opens up, in drawing to light the more rarely emerging sides of that Idea, by letting individualities that express themselves distinctly and decisively unfold their peculiarities by means of suitably placed circumstances. Only the inner significance counts in art: the outer counts in history. The two are wholly independent of one another, can occur together, but each can also appear alone. An action of the highest importance for history can be, in inner significance, a very everyday and common one; and conversely a scene from everyday life can be of great inner significance if in it human individuals and human doing and willing appear, down to the most hidden folds, in a bright and distinct light. Also, with very different outer significance, the inner can be the same and one, so that, for example, it is all one to the latter whether ministers over the map quarrel about lands and peoples, or peasants in the tavern want to prove to each other over cards and dice that they are in the right; as it is all the same whether one plays chess with golden or with wooden pieces. Besides, the scenes and occurrences which make up the life of so many millions of men, their doings and ways, their need and their joy, are already for that reason important enough to be an object of art, and must, through their rich manifoldness, give material enough for the unfolding of the many-sided Idea of mankind. Even the fleetingness of the moment which art has fixed in such a picture (called nowadays a genre picture)

arouses a faint, peculiar emotion: for to hold fast, in the lasting picture, the fleeting world which transforms itself unceasingly, in single occurrences that yet represent the whole, is an achievement of the painter's art by which it seems to bring time itself to a standstill, in that it raises the single thing to the Idea of its species. Finally, the historical subjects of painting, significant in the outer sense, often have the disadvantage that precisely what is significant in them cannot be presented intuitively but must be supplied in thought. In this respect the nominal meaning of the picture must be distinguished from the real: the former is the outer meaning, but one that comes in only as concept; the latter is the side of the Idea of mankind which becomes manifest through the picture for intuition. For example, let the former be Moses found by the Egyptian princess, a moment of the highest importance for history; the real meaning, on the other hand, what is actually given to intuition, is a foundling rescued by a distinguished lady from its floating cradle, an occurrence that may have happened often. The costume alone can here make that determinate historical case recognizable to the scholar; but costume is valid only for the nominal meaning, indifferent for the real: for this latter knows only man as such, not the arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no advantage over those taken from mere possibility, which are therefore to be named not individually but only generally: for what is really significant in the former is surely not the individual, not the single event as such, but the universal in it, the side of the Idea of mankind that expresses itself through it. On the other hand, determinate historical subjects are by no means to be rejected on that account: only the properly artistic view of them, in the painter as in the beholder, never goes to the individually single in them, which really constitutes the historical, but to the universal that expresses itself in it, to the Idea. Also only such historical subjects are to be chosen where the main thing is really presentable and need not merely be supplied in thought; otherwise the nominal meaning removes itself too far from the real: what is merely thought in the picture becomes the most important and does injury to what is intuited. If already on the stage it does not do for the main thing to go on behind the scene (as in French tragedy), it is in the picture evidently a still far greater fault. Historical subjects have a decidedly

harmful effect only when they restrict the painter to a field chosen arbitrarily and not according to the purposes of art but others, and above all when this field is poor in picturesque and significant objects, if it is, for example, the history of a small, secluded, obstinate, hierarchical—that is, delusion-ruled—backwater people, despised by the great contemporary peoples of the Orient and Occident, like the Jews.—Since the migration of nations lies once and for all between us and all ancient peoples, as the former change of the sea bed lies between the present surface of the earth and that earlier one whose organisms show themselves to us only petrified, it is to be regarded as a great misfortune that the people whose past culture should chiefly serve as the foundation of our own were not the Indians, or the Greeks, or even only the Romans, but precisely these Jews. But especially it was an ill star for the painters of genius of Italy, in the 15th and 16th centuries, that in the narrow circle to which they were arbitrarily assigned for the choice of subjects they had to resort to miseries of every kind: for the New Testament, in its historical part, is for painting almost still less favorable than the Old, and the history of martyrs and church teachers that follows it is altogether an unlucky subject. Yet one has to distinguish very carefully from the pictures whose object is the historical or mythological of Judaism and Christianity those in which the real, that is, the ethical spirit of Christianity is revealed to intuition by the presentation of men full of this spirit. These presentations are in fact the highest and most admirable achievements of the painter's art; they too have succeeded only for the greatest masters of this art, especially Raphael and Correggio, the latter above all in his earlier pictures. Paintings of this kind are really not to be counted among the historical ones: for they mostly present no event, no action, but are mere groupings of saints, the Redeemer himself, often as a child, with his mother, angels and so on. In their mien, especially the eyes, we see the expression, the reflection, of the most perfect knowledge, namely that which is not directed to single things but has perfectly apprehended the Ideas, thus the whole nature of the world and of life. This knowledge, reacting in them on the will, does not, like that other, furnish *motives* for it, but on the contrary has become a *quietive* of all willing, from which the perfect resignation that is the innermost spirit of

Christianity as of Indian wisdom, the giving up of all willing, the turning back, the abolition of the will and with it of the whole nature of this world, that is, redemption, has proceeded. So did those masters of art, deserving of eternal praise, express in their works the highest wisdom intuitively. And here is the summit of all art, which, having followed the will, in its adequate objectivity, the Ideas, through all grades, from the lowest, where causes, then where stimuli, and finally where motives move it so manifoldly and unfold its nature, now ends with the presentation of its free self-abolition through the one great quietive that dawns on it from the most perfect knowledge of its own nature [35].

49 At the foundation of all our considerations of art so far lies throughout the truth that the object of art, whose presentation is the aim of the artist, and whose knowledge must therefore precede his work as its germ and origin, is an *Idea*, in Plato's sense, and absolutely nothing else; not the single thing, the object of common apprehension; nor the concept, the object of rational thinking and of science. Although Idea and concept have something in common, in that both, as unities, represent a plurality of actual things, the great difference between the two will have become clear and evident enough from what was said in the first book about the concept and in the [36] This passage presupposes the following book entirely for its understanding. present book about the Idea. That Plato too, however, already grasped this distinction purely I by no means wish to assert: rather, many of his examples of Ideas and of his discussions of them are applicable merely to concepts. In the meantime we let this rest and go our own way, glad whenever we tread the trace of a great and noble mind, yet pursuing not his footsteps but our goal.—The *concept* is abstract, discursive, within its sphere wholly indeterminate, determinate only as to its boundary, attainable and comprehensible to anyone who has only reason, communicable by words without further mediation, to be exhausted entirely by its definition. The *Idea*, on the other hand, which may at a pinch be defined as the adequate representative of the concept, is thoroughly intuitive and, though representing an infinite multitude of single things, yet thoroughly determinate. By the individual as such it is never known, but only by him who has raised

himself above all willing and all individuality to pure subject of knowing: thus it is attainable only by the man of genius, and then by him who, through an elevation of his pure power of knowledge, mostly occasioned by the works of genius, is in a mood of genius. Hence it is communicable not absolutely but only conditionally, in that the Idea apprehended and repeated in the work of art speaks to each only according to the measure of his own intellectual worth; for which reason precisely the most excellent works of every art, the noblest products of genius, must remain forever books sealed to the dull majority of men and inaccessible to it, separated from it by a wide gulf, just as the society of princes is inaccessible to the rabble. To be sure, even the most commonplace let the acknowledged great works pass on authority, so as, namely, not to betray their own weakness; yet they remain silently ever ready to pronounce their sentence of condemnation on them, as soon as one lets them hope they can do so without exposing themselves, whereupon their long-suppressed hatred of everything great and beautiful, which never spoke to them and thereby humbled them, and of its authors, joyfully gives itself air. For in general, to acknowledge and allow another's worth willingly and freely, one must have worth of one's own. On this is founded the necessity of modesty accompanying all merit, as also the disproportionately loud fame of this virtue, which alone out of all its sisters is every time appended to the praise of anyone who ventures to praise a man in any way distinguished, in order to conciliate and to still the wrath of worthlessness. What, then, is modesty other than feigned humility, by means of which, in a world bursting with base envy, one wants to beg for excellences and merits the pardon of those who have none? For whoever arrogates none to himself, because he really has none, is not modest, but only honest.

The *Idea* is the unity fallen apart into plurality by virtue of the form of time and space of our intuitive apprehension; the *concept*, on the other hand, is the unity restored out of plurality by means of the abstraction of our reason. The latter can be designated as unitas post rem, the former as unitas ante rem. Finally, the difference between concept and Idea can also be expressed by a simile, by saying: the concept is like a dead receptacle in which what one has put in really lies side by side, but from which also no more can be taken out (by ana-

lytic judgments) than one has put in (by synthetic reflection); the Idea, on the other hand, develops in him who has grasped it representations that are new in regard to the concept of the same name: it is like a living, developing organism, endowed with generative power, which produces what did not lie encased in it. According to all that has been said, the concept, however useful it is for life, and however serviceable, necessary and productive for science, is for art eternally unfruitful. The apprehended Idea, on the other hand, is the true and only source of every genuine work of art. In its powerful originality it is drawn only from life itself, from nature, from the world, and also only by the true man of genius, or by him who is inspired, for the moment, up to the pitch of genius. Only from such immediate conception do genuine works arise, which carry immortal life in themselves. Precisely because the Idea is and remains intuitive, the artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention and goal of his work; not a concept but an Idea hovers before him: hence he can give no account of his doing; he works, as people put it, from mere feeling and unconsciously, indeed instinctively. Imitators, mannerists, imitatores, servum pecus, on the contrary, proceed in art from the concept: they note what pleases and takes effect in genuine works, make it clear to themselves, grasp it in the concept, thus abstractly, and now imitate it, openly or covertly, with shrewd deliberateness. They suck, like parasitic plants, their nourishment from the works of others, and, like polyps, take on the color of their food. Indeed, carrying the comparison further, one could maintain that they are like machines which chop up very finely what one puts into them and mix it together, but can never digest it, so that the foreign constituents can still always be found again, sought out from the mixture and separated; the man of genius alone, on the other hand, would be like the organic body that assimilates, transforms and produces. For he is, to be sure, brought up and formed by his predecessors and their works; but he is fertilized only by life and the world itself immediately, through the impression of the intuitive. Hence even the highest culture never harms his originality. All imitators, all mannerists grasp the nature of the exemplary achievements of others in the concept; but concepts can never impart inner life to a work. The age, that is, the dull multitude of each time, itself knows only

concepts and clings to them, and therefore receives mannered works with swift and loud applause; but the same works are already unenjoyable after a few years, because the spirit of the age, that is, the ruling concepts, on which alone they could be rooted, have changed. Only the genuine works, which are drawn immediately from nature, from life, remain, like these themselves, eternally young and always of primal force. For they belong to no age but to mankind; and as they were, for that very reason, received lukewarmly by their own age, to which they scorned to conform, and, because they uncovered mediately and negatively its particular aberration, were acknowledged late and unwillingly, so, for their part, they cannot grow old either, but speak to us fresh and ever anew even in the latest times. Then they are also no longer exposed to being overlooked and misjudged, since they stand crowned and sanctioned by the applause of the few capable heads who appear singly and sparingly through the centuries [37] and cast their votes, whose slowly growing sum establishes the authority which alone is that tribunal meant when one appeals to posterity. It is those successively appearing individuals alone; for the mass and multitude of posterity will always be and remain as perverse and dull as the mass and multitude of contemporaries always was and always is.—Read the complaints of great minds, from every century, about their contemporaries: they always sound like today's; because the human race is always the same. At every time and in every art mannerism takes the place of the spirit, which is always the property only of individuals; but mannerism is the old, cast-off garment of the last-existing and recognized appearance of the spirit. In accordance with all this, as a rule the applause of posterity is not acquired otherwise than at the expense of the applause of contemporaries; and conversely [38].

50 If now the aim of all art is communication of the apprehended Idea, which precisely in such mediation through the mind of the artist, in which it appears cleansed of everything foreign and isolated, now becomes comprehensible also to him who has weaker receptivity and no productivity; and if, further, starting out from the concept is reprehensible in art; then we cannot approve of it when a work of art is determined, intentionally and avowedly, for the expression of a

concept: this is the case in *allegory*. An allegory is a work of art that means something other than it presents. But the intuitive, and hence also the Idea, expresses itself immediately and wholly perfectly, and has no need of the mediation of something else by which it may be hinted at. What, then, in [39] Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.

40 On this, Chapter 34 of the second volume. this way, through something wholly other, is hinted at and represented, because it cannot itself be brought before intuition, is always a concept. By allegory, therefore, a concept is always to be designated, and consequently the mind of the beholder is to be led away from the intuitive representation presented to a wholly different, abstract, non-intuitive one, which lies entirely outside the work of art: here, then, picture or statue is to accomplish what writing accomplishes, only far more perfectly. What we declare to be the aim of art, presentation of the Idea to be apprehended only intuitively, is here not the aim. For what is intended here, however, no great perfection of the work of art is required at all; it suffices that one see what the thing is supposed to be, since, as soon as this is found, the aim is achieved and the mind is now led to a wholly different kind of representation, to an abstract concept, which was the goal set. Allegories in the plastic arts are consequently nothing other than hieroglyphs: the artistic worth which they may otherwise have as intuitive presentations accrues to them not as allegories but otherwise. That the Night of Correggio, the Genius of Fame by Hannibal Caracci, the Hours of Poussin, are very beautiful pictures is to be entirely separated from their being allegories. As allegories they accomplish no more than an inscription, indeed rather less. We are here again reminded of the distinction made above between the real and the nominal meaning of a picture. The nominal is here precisely the allegorical as such, for example the genius of fame; the real is what is actually presented: here a beautiful winged youth, surrounded in flight by beautiful boys. This expresses an Idea; but this real meaning works only so long as one forgets the nominal, allegorical one: if one thinks of this, one leaves the intuition, and an abstract concept occupies the mind; and the transition from the Idea to the concept is always a fall. Indeed, that nominal

meaning, that allegorical intention, often does injury to the real meaning, the intuitive truth: so, for example, the unnatural lighting in the Night of Correggio, which, however beautifully executed, is yet motivated merely allegorically and is impossible in reality. If, therefore, an allegorical picture has artistic worth, this is wholly separate from and independent of what it accomplishes as allegory: such a work of art serves two ends at once, namely the expression of a concept and the expression of an Idea; only the latter can be the end of art, the other is a foreign end, the playful amusement of letting a picture at the same time do service as an inscription, as hieroglyph, invented for the benefit of those whom the real essence of art can never speak to. It is the same as when a work of art is at the same time a useful implement, where it also serves two ends: for example a statue that is at the same time a candelabrum or a caryatid, or a bas-relief that is at the same time the shield of Achilles. Pure friends of art will approve neither the one nor the other. To be sure, an allegorical picture, precisely in this quality, can also produce a lively impression on the mind; the same, however, would then, under like circumstances, be produced by an inscription as well. For example, if in the mind of a man the wish for fame is lastingly and firmly rooted, in that he perhaps even regards fame as his rightful property, which is withheld from him only so long as he has not yet produced the documents of his possession, and he now steps before the genius of fame with his laurel crowns; his whole mind is thereby stirred and his power called to activity: but the same would happen if he suddenly saw the word "Fame" large and distinct on the wall. Or if a man has made known a truth which is important either as an assertion for practical life or as an insight for science, but has found no belief; then an allegorical picture representing Time as it lifts the veil and lets naked Truth be seen will work powerfully on him: but the same would be accomplished by the device "Le tems découvre la vérité." For what really works here is always only the abstract thought, not what is intuited.

If, according to what has been said, allegory in the plastic arts is a faulty striving, serving an end wholly foreign to art, it becomes quite intolerable when it leads so far astray that the presentation of forced and violently dragged-in interpretive quibbles falls into the silly. Such is, for example, a tortoise as a hint of

feminine seclusion; the glancing down of Nemesis into the bosom of her garment, hinting that she sees even into what is hidden; the explanation of Bellori that Hannibal Caracci clothed Voluptuousness in a yellow garment because he wanted to hint that her joys soon wither and become yellow as straw.—If now, however, there is between what is presented and the concept thereby hinted at no connection at all founded on subsumption under that concept or on association of ideas, but sign and signified are connected quite conventionally, by positive, accidentally occasioned statute, then I call this variety of allegory *symbol*. So the rose is symbol of secrecy, the laurel symbol of fame, the palm symbol of victory, the shell symbol of pilgrimage, the cross symbol of the Christian religion: to this belong also all hints by mere colors immediately, such as yellow as the color of falseness, and blue as the color of fidelity. Such symbols may often be of use in life, but their worth is foreign to art: they are to be regarded quite like hieroglyphs, or even like Chinese word-writing, and really stand in one class with coats of arms, with the bush that hints at an inn, with the key by which one recognizes chamberlains, or the leather by which one recognizes miners.—If finally certain historical or mythical persons, or personified concepts, are made recognizable by symbols fixed once for all, these would really be called *emblems*: of this kind are the animals of the Evangelists, the owl of Minerva, the apple of Paris, the anchor of hope, and so on. In the meantime, by emblems one mostly understands those figurative, simple presentations, explained by a motto, which are meant to illustrate a moral truth, of which there are great collections, by J. Camerarius, Alciatus and others: they make the transition to poetic allegory, of which more below.—Greek sculpture appeals to intuition, therefore it is *aesthetic*; Hindostanic sculpture appeals to the concept, therefore it is merely *symbolic*.

This judgment on allegory, founded on our considerations so far of the inner essence of art and closely connected with them, is directly opposed to the view of Winckelmann, who, far from declaring allegory, as we do, to be something wholly foreign to the aim of art and often disturbing it, speaks up for it everywhere, and even (Works, vol. 1, p. 55 ff.) places the highest aim of art in the "presentation of general concepts and non-sensuous things." Let it be left to

each to adopt the one view or the other. Only, with these and similar views of Winckelmann concerning the real metaphysics of the beautiful, the truth became very clear to me that one can have the greatest receptivity and the most correct judgment about the beautiful in art without being able, however, to give an abstract and properly philosophical account of the essence of the beautiful and of art: just as one can be very noble and virtuous and have a very delicate conscience, deciding in single cases with the exactness of a gold balance, without being thereby able to fathom philosophically the ethical significance of actions and to present it in abstracto.

Allegory has, however, a wholly different relation to *poetry* than to the plastic arts, and though objectionable here, it is quite admissible and serviceable there. For in the plastic arts it leads from the given intuitive, the proper object of all art, to abstract thoughts; in poetry, however, the relation is reversed: here what is immediately given in words is the concept, and the immediate aim is always to lead from this to the intuitive, whose presentation the imagination of the hearer must undertake. If in the plastic arts one is led from the immediately given to something else, this must always be a concept, because here only the abstract cannot be immediately given; but a concept may never be the origin, and its communication never the aim, of a work of art. In poetry, on the other hand, the concept is the material, the immediately given, which may therefore very well be left in order to call up a wholly different intuitive, in which the goal is reached. In the context of a poem many a concept, or abstract thought, may be indispensable which is nevertheless in itself and immediately not capable of any intuitiveness at all: this is then often brought to intuitiveness by some example to be subsumed under it. This already happens in every figurative expression, and happens in every metaphor, simile, parable and allegory, which all differ only by the length and fullness of their presentation. In the speaking arts, similes and allegories are for this reason of excellent effect. How beautifully Cervantes says of sleep, to express that it withdraws us from all mental and bodily suffering, "it is a cloak that covers the whole man." How beautifully Kleist expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers and investigators enlighten the human race, in the verse:

"Those whose nightly lamp illuminates the whole globe." How strongly and intuitively Homer designates the mischief-bringing Ate, in saying: "she has tender feet, for she does not tread on the hard ground, but walks only on the heads of men" (Il., XIX, 91). How greatly the fable of Menenius Agrippa about the stomach and the limbs worked on the Roman people, who had withdrawn from the city. How beautifully Plato's allegory of the cave, already mentioned, at the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, expresses a most abstract philosophical dogma. Likewise the fable of Persephone, who by tasting a pomegranate in the underworld falls to it, is to be regarded as a profound allegory of philosophical tendency: this becomes especially clear through the treatment of this fable, beyond all praise, which Goethe has woven as an episode into the Triumph of Sensibility. Three extended allegorical works are known to me: one open and avowed is the incomparable Criticon of Balthasar Gracian, which consists of a great rich web of interlinked, highly ingenious allegories, which serve here for the cheerful clothing of moral truths, to which he thereby imparts the greatest intuitiveness, and amazes us by the wealth of his inventions. Two concealed ones, however, are Don Quixote and Gulliver in Lilliput. The former allegorizes the life of every man who will not, like the others, merely look after his personal welfare, but pursues an objective, ideal end which has taken possession of his thinking and willing; whereupon he certainly cuts a strange figure in this world. In Gulliver one need only take everything physical spiritually to notice what the satirical rogue, as Hamlet would call him, meant by it.—Since, then, in poetic allegory the concept is always the given, which it wants to make intuitive through a picture, it may well even be at times expressed or supported by a painted picture: this is nevertheless not regarded as a work of the plastic arts, but only as a designating hieroglyph, and makes no claim to painterly, but only to poetic worth. Of this kind is that beautiful allegorical vignette of Lavater's, which must work so heartening on every noble champion of truth: a hand that, holding a light, is stung by a wasp, while above, at the flame, gnats burn up: beneath it the motto:

"And though it singe the gnat's wing, and burst its skull and all its little brain; light remains light still; and though the fiercest wasp should sting me, I will not let it go."

To this belongs further that gravestone with the blown-out, smoking light and the inscription:

"When it is over, it will be plain, whether it was tallow candle or wax."—

Of this kind, finally, is an old German family tree on which the last scion of the family, whose line reached high up, expressed his resolve to end his life in complete abstinence and chastity and therefore to let his line die out, by having himself depicted at the root of the many-branched tree, cutting off the tree above him with a pair of shears. To this belong in general the emblems mentioned above, commonly so called, which one might also describe as short painted fables with an express moral.—Allegories of this kind are always to be counted with the poetic, not the painterly, and are precisely thereby justified: also the pictorial execution remains here always a side matter, and no more is demanded of it than that it present the thing recognizably. But as in the plastic arts, so in poetry also, allegory passes over into symbol when between what is intuitively brought forward and the abstract designated by it there is no connection other than an arbitrary one. Because all that is symbolic rests fundamentally on agreement, the symbol has, among other disadvantages, also this one, that its meaning is forgotten in time and it then falls entirely mute: who, if he did not know it, would guess why the fish is the symbol of Christianity? Only a Champollion: for it is through and through a phonetic hieroglyph. Hence the Revelation of John now stands there as poetic allegory much like the reliefs with magnus Deus sol Mithra, on which people still keep interpreting [41].

51 If, with our considerations so far on art in general, we now turn from the plastic arts to *poetry*, we shall not doubt that it too has the aim of revealing the Ideas, the grades of the objectification of the will, and of communicating them to the hearer with the distinctness and vividness with which the poetic mind apprehended them. Ideas are essentially intuitive: if, therefore, in poetry what is

communicated immediately through words is only abstract concepts, the intention is nevertheless evidently to let the hearer intuit the Ideas of life in the representatives of these concepts, which can happen only with the aid of his own imagination. But in order to set this in motion in a way answering the purpose, the abstract concepts, which are the immediate material of poetry as of the driest prose, must be so put together that their spheres intersect in such a manner that none can persist in its abstract generality, but in its place an intuitive representative appears before the imagination, which the words of the poet now modify further and further according to his intention. As the chemist obtains solid precipitates from perfectly clear and transparent liquids by combining them, so the poet understands how to precipitate, as it were, from the abstract, transparent generality of concepts,[42] On this, Chapter 36 of the second volume. by the way he combines them, the concrete, the individual, the intuitive representation. For only intuitively is the Idea known; but knowledge of the Idea is the aim of all art. Mastery in poetry, as in chemistry, makes one able to obtain every time precisely the precipitate one intends. To this end serve the many epithets in poetry, by which the generality of every concept is restricted, more and more, down to intuitiveness. Homer adds to almost every noun an epithet whose concept intersects the sphere of the first concept and at once considerably diminishes it, whereby he already comes so much nearer to intuition: for example,

Εν δ' επεσ' Ωκεανῳ λαμπρον φαος ἠελιοιο, Ἑλκον νυκτα μελαιναν επι ζειδωρον αρουραν.

(Occidit vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis, Trahens noctem nigram super almam terram.)

And "A gentle wind blows from the blue sky, the myrtle stands still and the laurel high,"—this precipitates from a few concepts the whole delight of the southern climate before the imagination.

A quite special aid of poetry is rhythm and rhyme. Of their incredibly powerful effect I know no other explanation to give than that our imaginative powers, essentially bound to time, have thereby acquired a peculiarity by virtue of which we inwardly follow every regularly recurring noise and as it were chime

in with it. Thereby rhythm and rhyme become partly a binding agent of our attention, in that we follow the recitation more willingly, and partly there arises through them in us a blind agreement with what is recited, preceding all judgment, whereby it obtains a certain emphatic power of conviction independent of all grounds.

By virtue of the generality of the material which poetry uses to communicate the Ideas, namely concepts, the extent of its domain is very great. The whole of nature, the Ideas of all grades, are representable by it, in that it proceeds, according to the Idea to be communicated, now descriptively, now narratively, now presenting immediately dramatically. If, however, in the presentation of the lower grades of the objectivity of the will the plastic art mostly surpasses it, because nature without knowledge, and also merely animal nature, reveals almost its whole essence in a single well-chosen moment, man, on the contrary, insofar as he expresses himself not through his mere figure and expression of mien, but through a chain of actions and the thoughts and affects accompanying them, is the chief object of poetry, with which in this no other art can compare, because it has here the benefit of progression, which the plastic arts lack.

Revelation of that Idea which is the highest grade of the objectivity of the will, presentation of man in the connected series of his strivings and actions, is thus the great subject of poetry.—To be sure, experience also teaches, history also teaches, to know man; yet more often men than man: that is, they give more empirical notices of the conduct of men toward one another, from which rules for one's own conduct emerge, than that they let deep glances be cast into the inner nature of man. Meanwhile this latter is by no means excluded from them: yet whenever it is the nature of mankind itself that opens itself to us in history or in our own experience, we, in the one case, and the historian, in the other, have already apprehended it with artists' eyes, already poetically, that is, according to the Idea, not the appearance, according to the inner nature, not the relations. One's own experience is unavoidably the condition of understanding poetry, as of history: for it is as it were the dictionary of the language that both speak. History, however, stands to poetry as portrait painting to history painting: the former gives what is true in the particular, the latter what is true in the

universal; the former has the truth of the appearance and can certify it from the appearance, the latter has the truth of the Idea, which is to be found in no single appearance, yet speaks from all. The poet presents, with choice and intention, significant characters in significant situations: the historian takes both as they come. Indeed, he is not to regard and select the events and the persons according to their inner, genuine significance, expressing the Idea, but according to the outer, apparent, relative significance, important in relation to the connection, to the consequences. He may consider nothing in and for itself, according to its essential character and expression, but must consider everything according to relation, in the concatenation, in influence on what follows, and especially on his own age. For this reason he will not pass over an action of a king that is of little significance, indeed in itself common: for it has consequences and influence. On the other hand, actions of individuals that are in themselves highly significant, and very distinguished individuals themselves, if they have no consequences, no influence, are not to be mentioned by him. For his consideration follows the principle of sufficient reason and seizes the appearance, of which this is the form. The poet, however, apprehends the Idea, the nature of mankind, outside all relation, outside all time, the adequate objectivity of the thing in itself at its highest grade. Even though, now, in that way of considering things necessary to the historian too, the inner nature, the significance of the appearances, the kernel of all those shells, can never be wholly lost and can at least by him who seeks it still be found and known; yet that which is significant in itself, not in relation, the real unfolding of the Idea, will be found far more correctly and distinctly in poetry than in history, and to the former therefore, however paradoxical it sounds, much more real, genuine, inner truth is to be ascribed than to the latter. For the historian is to follow the individual event exactly according to life, as it develops in time along the manifold entangled chains of grounds and consequences; but he cannot possibly possess all the data for this, have seen everything or ascertained everything: at every moment he is deserted by the original of his picture, or a false one is slipped in in its place, and this so often that I believe I may assume that in all history there is more of the false than of the true. The poet, on the other hand, has appre-

hended the Idea of mankind from some determinate side, just the one to be presented; it is the nature of his own self that objectifies itself to him in it: his knowledge is, as expounded above on the occasion of sculpture, half a priori: his model stands before his mind, fixed, distinct, brightly lit, cannot desert him: hence he shows us in the mirror of his mind the Idea purely and distinctly, and his depiction is, down to the particular, true as life itself [43]. The great ancient historians are therefore, in the particulars where the data desert them, for example in the speeches of their heroes, poets; indeed their whole way of treating the material approaches the epic: but this very thing gives their presentations unity, and lets them retain inner truth even where the outer was inaccessible to them or even falsified. And having compared history just now to portrait painting, in contrast to poetry, which would correspond to history painting, we find Winckelmann's saying that the portrait should be the ideal of the individual followed also by the ancient historians, since they present the particular in such a way that the side of the Idea of mankind expressing itself in it stands forth: the modern ones, on the contrary, with few exceptions, mostly give only "a rubbish barrel and a lumber room and at most a grand state pageant."—Whoever, then, wants to know the [44] It goes without saying that I speak throughout exclusively of the so rare, great, genuine poet and mean no one less than that shallow crowd of mediocre poets, rhymesters and fairy-tale inventors, which especially nowadays in Germany grows so rank, but to which one should call unceasingly in the ears from all sides:

Mediocribus esse poëtis Non homines, non Di, non concessere columnae.

It is itself worthy of serious consideration what a quantity of one's own and others' time and paper is spoiled by this swarm of mediocre poets and how harmful their influence is, in that the public partly always grasps for the new, partly also by nature has more inclination to the perverse and flat, as being more homogeneous to it; hence those works of the mediocre draw it away from the genuine masterpieces and from its culture through them, and hold it back, and consequently, working directly against the favorable influence of the men of genius, ever more spoil taste and thus hinder the progress of the age. Criticism and satire should therefore scourge the mediocre poets without any

indulgence or pity, until they are brought, for their own good, to employ their leisure rather in reading good things than in writing bad.—For if even the gentle god of the Muses was put into such wrath by the bungling of the uncalled that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what mediocre poetry would ground its claims to toleration.

mankind, according to its inner nature, identical in all appearances and developments, according to its Idea, to him the works of the great, immortal poets will hold up a far more faithful and distinct image than the historians ever can: for even the best of these are, as poets, by no means the first, and also do not have free hands. The relation of the two can in this respect also be elucidated by the following simile. The mere, pure historian, working by the data alone, is like one who, with no knowledge of mathematics, investigates by measuring the proportions of figures found by chance, whose empirically found statement is therefore burdened with all the errors of the drawn figure: the poet, on the contrary, is like the mathematician, who constructs those proportions a priori, in pure intuition, and states them, not as the drawn figure actually has them, but as they are in the Idea, which the drawing is to make sensible.—For this reason Schiller says:

"What has never and nowhere come to pass, that alone never grows old." With regard to knowledge of the essence of humanity, I must even concede a greater value to biographies, above all to autobiographies, than to history proper, at least as it is commonly written. For one thing, the data for the former can be gathered more accurately and completely than for the latter; for another, in history proper it is not so much men who act as peoples and armies, and the individuals who still step forward appear at so great a distance, with so much around them and so large a retinue, and besides wrapped in stiff robes of state or heavy, unyielding armor, that it is truly hard to make out the human movement through all of it. The faithfully portrayed life of an individual, on the other hand, within a narrow sphere, shows the conduct of men in all its nuances and shapes: the excellence, the virtue, even the saintliness of a few, the perversity, wretchedness, and malice of most, the villainy of some. Moreover, in the respect considered here, which is the only one that concerns us, namely the

inner significance of what appears, it makes no difference at all whether the objects around which the action turns are, relatively speaking, trifles or matters of weight, farmsteads or kingdoms: for all these things, in themselves without significance, acquire it only through the will's being moved by them, and only to that extent: the motive has significance solely through its relation to the will; the relation it has, as a thing, to other such things does not come into consideration at all. As a circle an inch across and one forty million miles across have exactly the same geometrical properties, so the events and history of a village and those of an empire are in essence the same; and one can study and come to know humanity in the one as in the other. It is also a mistake to suppose that autobiographies are full of deceit and pretense. On the contrary, lying (though possible anywhere) is perhaps harder there than anywhere else. Pretense is easiest in mere conversation; indeed, paradoxical as it sounds, it is at bottom harder even in a letter, because there a man, left to himself, looks into himself and not outward, finds it hard to bring what is foreign and distant close, and does not have the measure of the impression on the other before his eyes; this other, on the contrary, composed, in a mood foreign to the writer, looks the letter over, reads it repeatedly and at different times, and so easily finds out the hidden intention. An author, too, can most easily be known as a man from his book, because all those conditions operate here more strongly and more lastingly; and to pretend in an autobiography is so hard that there is perhaps not a single one that is not, taken as a whole, truer than any other written history. The man who sets down his life surveys it as a whole and in its large outlines; the particular grows small, the near recedes, the far comes near again, considerations shrink: he sits himself down to confession, and has sat down of his own free will: the spirit of lying does not take hold of him here so easily; for in every man there is also an inclination to truth, which with every lie must first be overcome, and which has here taken up an uncommonly strong position. The relation between biography and the history of peoples can be made intuitive by the following simile. History shows us humanity as a view from a high mountain shows us nature: we see much at once, wide stretches, great masses; but nothing becomes distinct, nor recognizable in its whole proper essence. The depicted

life of the individual, by contrast, shows us the man as we know nature when we walk about among its trees, plants, rocks, and waters. But as landscape painting, in which the artist lets us look into nature through his eyes, greatly eases for us the knowledge of its Ideas and the state of will-less, pure knowing that this requires; so, for the presentation of the Ideas that we may seek in history and biography, poetry has a great deal in its favor over both: for here too the genius holds up to us the clarifying mirror, in which everything essential and significant steps toward us assembled and set in the brightest light, while the accidental and the alien is eliminated [45].

The presentation of the Idea of humanity, which is the poet's task, he can now carry out in one of two ways: either so that the one presented is at the same time the one presenting: this happens in lyric poetry, in the song proper, where the poet only vividly beholds and describes his own state, whereby a certain subjectivity is, from the nature of its object, essential to this kind of poetry;—or else the one to be presented is wholly different from the one presenting, as in all the other kinds, where the presenter more or less hides behind what is presented and in the end vanishes entirely. In the romance the presenter still expresses his own state somewhat through the tone and bearing of the whole: far more objective than the song, it therefore still has something subjective; this is already fainter in the idyll, much more so in the novel, almost wholly gone in the epic proper, and in the drama finally gone to the last trace, drama being the most objective, in more than one respect the most perfect, and also the most difficult kind of poetry. The lyric kind is for that very reason the easiest, and while art otherwise belongs only to the true genius, so rare, even a man not very eminent on the whole can produce a beautiful song when, in fact, through [46] On this, see Chapter 38 of the second volume. strong stimulus from without, some enthusiasm raises his powers of mind: for all that is needed is a vivid intuition of his own state in the excited moment. This is proved by many single songs of individuals who have remained otherwise unknown, especially the German folk songs, of which we have an excellent collection in the "Wunderhorn," and likewise by countless love songs and other songs of the people in all languages. For to seize the mood of the moment and embody it in song is the

whole achievement of this poetic kind. Yet in the lyric poetry of true poets the inner nature of all humanity is mirrored, and everything that millions of men, past, present, and to come, have felt and will feel in the same situations, since these are forever recurring, finds its corresponding expression there. Because those situations, through their constant recurrence, stand fast like humanity itself and always call forth the same feelings, the lyric productions of true poets remain correct, effective, and fresh for thousands of years. Indeed, the poet is in general the universal man: everything that has ever moved the heart of any man, and everything that human nature in any situation brings forth out of itself, whatever dwells and broods anywhere in a human breast, is his theme and his material; as, besides, is the whole of the rest of nature. Hence the poet can sing sensual pleasure as well as mysticism, be Anacreon or Angelus Silesius, write tragedies or comedies, portray the sublime or the base disposition, according to mood and calling. Accordingly, no one may prescribe to the poet that he should be noble and sublime, moral, pious, Christian, or this or that, still less reproach him with being this and not that. He is the mirror of humanity, and brings to its consciousness what it feels and pursues.

Let us now consider more closely the essence of the song proper, taking as examples excellent and at the same time pure models, not ones that already approach another kind in some way, such as the romance, the elegy, the hymn, the epigram, and so on; then we shall find that the peculiar essence of the song in the narrowest sense is as follows.—It is the subject of the will, that is, one's own willing, that fills the consciousness of the singer, often as a willing set free and satisfied (joy), yet still more often as a willing checked (sorrow), always as emotion, passion, a stirred state of mind. Beside this, however, and at the same time, the sight of the surrounding nature makes the singer conscious of himself as the subject of pure, will-less knowing, whose unshakable, blessed calm now stands in contrast to the pressure of the ever-limited, ever-needy willing: the feeling of this contrast, of this interplay, is really what is expressed in the song as a whole and what in general constitutes the lyric state. In this state pure knowing comes toward us, as it were, to deliver us from willing and its pressure: we follow; but only for moments: willing, the memory of our personal ends, tears

us away again and again from calm contemplation; yet again and again the nearest beautiful surroundings, in which pure will-less knowledge offers itself to us, lure us away from willing. Therefore in the song and the lyric mood willing (the personal interest in ends) and the pure beholding of the surroundings that present themselves are wondrously mixed and interwoven: relations between the two are sought and imagined; the subjective mood, the affection of the will, imparts its color to the surroundings beheld, and these in turn reflect their color back upon it: of this whole state of mind, thus mingled and divided, the genuine song is the imprint.—To make this abstract dissection of a state very far removed from all abstraction comprehensible through examples, one can take up any of Goethe's immortal songs: as particularly clear for this purpose I will recommend only a few: "Shepherd's Lament," "Welcome and Farewell," "To the Moon," "On the Lake," "Autumn Feeling"; the songs proper in the "Wunderhorn" also are excellent examples, quite especially the one that begins: "O Bremen, I must now leave you."—As a comic and aptly hitting parody of the lyric character, a song by Voss strikes me as remarkable, in which he describes the feelings of a drunken lead-roofer falling from a tower, who in passing makes the observation, very foreign to his state and therefore belonging to will-free knowledge, that the tower clock shows half past eleven.—Whoever shares with me the view set forth of the lyric state will also admit that it is really the intuitive and poetic knowledge of that proposition set up in my treatise on the principle of sufficient reason and already mentioned in this work, that the identity of the subject of knowing with that of willing may be called the miracle κατ' ἐξοχην; so that the poetic effect of the song ultimately rests on the truth of that proposition. In the course of life those two subjects, or, to speak popularly, head and heart, move ever further apart: one separates one's subjective feeling more and more from one's objective knowledge. In the child both are still wholly fused: it can hardly tell itself apart from its surroundings, it merges with them. In the youth all perception at first produces feeling and mood, and even blends with it; as Byron expresses very beautifully:

I live not in myself, but I become Portion of that around me; and to me High mountains are a feeling [47].

For that very reason the youth clings so closely to the intuitive outer side of things; for that very reason he is fit only for lyric poetry, and only the man for dramatic. The old man can at most still be thought of as an epic poet, like Ossian, Homer: for narrating belongs to the character of old age.

In the more objective kinds of poetry, especially the novel, epic, and drama, the end, the revelation of the Idea of humanity, is attained chiefly by two means: by a correct and deeply conceived presentation of significant characters, and by the invention of significant situations in which they unfold. For as it falls to the chemist not only to present the simple substances and their principal compounds pure and genuine, but also to expose them to the influence of such reagents as make their peculiarities distinctly and strikingly [48] Not in myself alone do I live; I become one part of what surrounds me, and to me high mountains are a feeling. visible; just so it falls to the poet not only to set before us significant characters, true and faithful as nature itself, but, to make them known to us, he must place them in such situations as bring their peculiarities fully to unfold and show them distinctly, in sharp outlines; these are therefore called significant situations. In real life and in history chance only rarely brings about situations of this quality, and there they stand singly, lost and hidden amid the multitude of the insignificant. The thoroughgoing significance of the situations is to distinguish the novel, the epic, the drama from real life, just as much as the assembling and choosing of significant characters; but in both, the strictest truth is the indispensable condition of their effect, and lack of unity in the characters, their contradiction with themselves or with the essence of humanity in general, as well as impossibility or a near-impossible improbability in the events, even if only in secondary circumstances, offend in poetry just as much as misdrawn figures, or false perspective, or faulty lighting do in painting: for there as here we demand the faithful mirror of life, of humanity, of the world, only made clearer by the presentation and made significant by the arrangement. Since the end of all the arts is one, the presentation of Ideas, and their essential difference lies only in which grade of the objectification of the will the Idea to be presented is, by which the material of the presentation is again determined, even the arts furthest removed from one another can be illu-

minated by comparison. Thus, for example, in order to grasp fully the Ideas that express themselves in water, it is not enough to see it in the still pond and in the evenly flowing stream; rather those Ideas unfold completely only when the water appears under all circumstances and obstacles that, acting upon it, induce it to the full manifestation of all its properties. That is why we find it beautiful when it plunges down, roars, foams, leaps up again, or when it falls and dissolves into spray, or finally, artificially forced, strives upward as a jet: thus showing itself differently under different circumstances, it yet always faithfully maintains its character: it is as natural to it to spurt upward as to rest mirroring; it is equally ready for the one as for the other, as soon as the circumstances occur. What the artist of fountains accomplishes with fluid matter, the architect accomplishes with rigid matter, and the epic or dramatic poet the same with the Idea of humanity. Unfolding and making distinct the Idea that expresses itself in the object of each art, the will that objectifies itself at each grade, is the common end of all the arts. The life of man, as it mostly shows itself in actuality, resembles water as it mostly shows itself, in pond and river: but in the epic, the novel, and the tragedy chosen characters are placed in such circumstances that all their peculiarities unfold, the depths of the human mind open, and become visible in extraordinary and significant actions. Thus poetry objectifies the Idea of man, to which it is peculiar to present itself in highly individual characters.

Tragedy is to be regarded as the summit of poetic art, both in the greatness of its effect and in the difficulty of its execution, and it is acknowledged to be so. It is very significant for the whole of our inquiry, and well worth noting, that the end of this highest poetic achievement is the presentation of the terrible side of life: that the nameless pain, the wretchedness of mankind, the triumph of wickedness, the mocking rule of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are here set before us; for in this lies a significant hint about the nature of the world and of existence. It is the conflict of the will with itself which here, at the highest grade of its objectivity, unfolds most completely and steps forth in all its terror. It becomes visible in the suffering of mankind, which is brought about partly by chance and error, which appear as rulers of

the world and, through a malice that goes so far as to seem intentional, are personified as fate; partly it proceeds from mankind itself, through the crossing strivings of the individuals' wills, through the wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same will that lives and appears in them all, but whose appearances fight against one another and tear one another to pieces. In this individual it comes forth mightily, in that more weakly, here brought more to reflection and mitigated by the light of knowledge, there less, until at last, in a single individual, this knowledge, purified and heightened by suffering itself, reaches the point where the appearance, the veil of Maya, deceives it no longer, the form of appearance, the principium individuationis, is seen through by it, the egoism that rests on this form thereby dies away, and the *motives* that were before so powerful lose their power, and in their place the perfect knowledge of the essence of the world, working as a *quietive* of the will, brings about resignation, the giving up not merely of life but of the whole will to life itself. Thus we see in tragedy at last the noblest, after long struggle and suffering, renounce forever the ends they had until then pursued so vehemently, and all the enjoyments of life, or willingly and joyfully give up life itself: so the constant prince of Calderon; so Gretchen in "Faust"; so Hamlet, whom his Horatio would gladly follow, but whom Hamlet bids remain and draw painful breath a while longer in this harsh world, in order to clear up Hamlet's fate and cleanse his memory;—so also the Maid of Orleans, the Bride of Messina: they all die purified by suffering, that is, after the will to live has first died within them; in Voltaire's "Mohammed" this is even said in so many words, in the closing words that the dying Palmira calls out to Mohammed: "The world is for tyrants: live on, you!"—The demand for so-called poetic justice, on the other hand, rests on a complete misjudgment of the essence of tragedy, indeed of the essence of the world. It appears with effrontery, in all its flatness, in the criticisms that Dr. Samuel Johnson has furnished on the individual plays of Shakespeare, in which he complains, quite naively, of the thoroughgoing neglect of it; a neglect which is indeed there: for what have the Ophelias, the Desdemonas, the Cordelias done to deserve it?—But only the flat, optimistic, Protestant-rationalist, or really Jewish view of the world will make the demand for poetic justice and find

in its satisfaction its own. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero atones for is not his particular sins but original sin, that is, the guilt of existence itself:

Pues el delito mayor Del hombre es haber nacido.

(For the greatest guilt of man is that he was born.)

As Calderon says outright.

Concerning the manner of treating tragedy, I will allow myself only one remark. The presentation of a great misfortune is alone essential to tragedy. But the many different ways in which the poet brings it about can be brought under three kinds. It can happen, namely, through the extraordinary wickedness of a character, brushing the farthest limits of possibility, who becomes the author of the misfortune; examples of this kind are Richard III, Iago in "Othello," Shylock in "The Merchant of Venice," Franz Moor, the Phaedra of Euripides, Creon in the "Antigone," and the like. It can further happen through blind fate, that is, chance and error: of this kind a true model is Sophocles' King Oedipus, also the Women of Trachis, and in general most of the tragedies of the ancients belong here; among the moderns, examples are "Romeo and Juliet," Voltaire's "Tancred," "The Bride of Messina." But the misfortune can finally be brought about also by the mere position of the persons toward one another, by their relationships; so that there is need neither of a monstrous error, nor of an unheard-of chance, nor of a character reaching the limits of humanity in evil; but characters such as are ordinary in a moral respect, in circumstances such as occur often, are so set against one another that their situation compels them, knowing and seeing, to bring the greatest calamity upon each other, without the wrong lying wholly on any one side. This last kind seems to me far preferable to the other two; for it shows us the greatest misfortune not as an exception, not as something brought about by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as something proceeding easily and of itself, almost as essential, from the doings and characters of men, and by that very fact brings it frighteningly close to us. And if in the other two kinds we behold the monstrous fate and the appalling wickedness as terrible powers, but ones that threaten us only from a great distance, and which we might well

escape without taking refuge in renunciation; the last kind shows us those forces that destroy happiness and life as such that the way to us too stands open to them at every moment, and the greatest suffering brought about by entanglements whose essentials our own fate too could take on, and by actions that we too perhaps would be capable of committing, so that we could not complain of injustice: then we feel ourselves, shuddering, already in the midst of hell. The execution in this last kind has, however, also the greatest difficulty; for here the greatest effect has to be produced with the slightest expenditure of means and moving causes, merely through their position and distribution: hence even in many of the best tragedies this difficulty is evaded. As a perfect model of this kind, however, one play is to be cited which in other respects is far surpassed by several others by the same great master: it is "Clavigo." "Hamlet" belongs here in a way, if one looks merely at his relation to Laertes and Ophelia; "Wallenstein" too has this merit; "Faust" is wholly of this kind if one regards only the affair with Gretchen and her brother as the main action; likewise Corneille's "Cid," except that it lacks the tragic outcome, which the analogous relation of Max to Thekla, on the other hand, has [49].

52 Having now in the foregoing considered all the fine arts, in the generality that suits our standpoint, beginning with beautiful architecture, whose end as such is to make distinct the objectification of the will at the lowest grade of its visibility, where it shows itself as [50] On this, see Chapter 37 of the second volume. a dull, unknowing, lawful striving of mass and yet already reveals self-division and conflict, namely between gravity and rigidity;—and closing our inquiry with tragedy, which at the highest grade of the objectification of the will brings before our eyes this very discord of the will with itself, in terrible greatness and distinctness;—we find that one fine art nevertheless has remained excluded from our consideration and had to remain so, since in the systematic connection of our exposition there was no fitting place for it at all: it is *music*. It stands wholly apart from all the others. We do not recognize in it the imitation, the repetition, of any Idea of the beings in the world: and yet it is so great and exceedingly glorious an art, it acts so mightily on the innermost of man, it is

there so wholly and so deeply understood by him, as an entirely universal language, whose distinctness even surpasses that of the perceptual world itself;—that we surely have to look for more in it than an exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi, which is what Leibniz declared it to be[51] and was nevertheless quite right, so far as he considered only its immediate and outward significance, its shell. Were it nothing more, however, the satisfaction it affords would have to be like that which we feel when a sum comes out right, and could not be that inward joy with which we see the deepest interior of our being brought to speech. On our standpoint, therefore, where the aesthetic effect is what we have in view, we must grant it a far more serious and profound significance, relating to the innermost essence of the world and of our own self, in respect of which the numerical ratios into which it can be resolved are related not as the thing signified but themselves first as the sign. That it must stand to the world, in some sense, as presentation to the thing presented, as copy to original, we can infer from the analogy with the other arts, all of which have this character, and with whose effect on us its own is on the whole of the same kind, only stronger, quicker, more necessary, more infallible.

52 Leibnitii epistolae, collectio Kortholti: ep. 154.

Also, this imitative relation of music to the world must be a very intimate one, infinitely true and accurately hitting, because it is understood instantly by everyone and gives evidence of a certain infallibility in that its form can be reduced to quite definite rules, expressible in numbers, from which it cannot deviate at all without ceasing wholly to be music.—Yet the point of comparison between music and the world, the respect in which the former stands to the latter in the relation of imitation or repetition, lies very deeply hidden. Men have practiced music at all times without being able to give an account of this: content to understand it immediately, they renounce an abstract comprehension of this immediate understanding itself.

While I surrendered my mind wholly to the impression of the art of tone in its manifold forms, and then returned again to reflection and to the course of my thoughts set forth in the present work, there came to me a disclosure about its

inner essence and about the nature of its relation of imitation to the world, which by analogy must necessarily be presupposed; a disclosure which for myself is entirely sufficient and satisfying for my inquiry, and which will no doubt be equally evident to anyone who has followed me so far and agreed with my view of the world; but which I recognize as essentially impossible to prove, since it assumes and posits a relation of music, as a representation, to what can essentially never be representation, and will have music regarded as the copy of an original that can itself never be immediately represented. I can therefore do nothing more than here, at the close of this third book, devoted chiefly to the consideration of the arts, set forth this disclosure about the wonderful art of tones that suffices for me, and I must leave assent or denial of my view to the effect which, on each reader, is exerted partly by music, partly by the whole single thought that I have communicated in this work. Besides, in order to be able to give one's approval, with genuine conviction, to the account of the significance of music that is to be given here, I hold it necessary that one often listen to music with sustained reflection upon it, and for this again it is required that one be already very familiar with the whole thought I have presented.

The adequate objectification of the will is the (Platonic) Ideas; to stimulate knowledge of these through the presentation of individual things (for such the works of art themselves always are) (which is possible only with a corresponding change in the knowing subject) is the end of all the other arts. They all, therefore, objectify the will only indirectly, namely by means of the Ideas: and since our world is nothing other than the appearance of the Ideas in multiplicity, through entering into the principium individuationis (the form of the knowledge possible to the individual as such); music, since it passes over the Ideas, is also entirely independent of the appearing world, simply ignores it, could in a certain way exist even if there were no world at all: which cannot be said of the other arts. For music is as *direct* an objectification and copy of the whole *will* as the world itself is, indeed as the Ideas are, whose multiplied appearance makes up the world of individual things. Music is therefore by no means, like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas; but the *copy of the will itself*, whose objectivity the Ideas also are: for that very reason the effect of music is so

much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts: for these speak only of shadows, but it of the essence. Since, however, it is the same will that objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, only in each of the two in an entirely different way, there must be, though absolutely no direct likeness, yet a parallelism, an analogy, between music and the Ideas, whose appearance in multiplicity and imperfection is the visible world. The demonstration of this analogy will, as an elucidation, make easier the understanding of this explanation, difficult by reason of the obscurity of the subject.

In the deepest tones of harmony, in the fundamental bass, I recognize again the lowest grades of the objectification of the will, inorganic nature, the mass of the planet. All the high tones, easily moved and dying away more quickly, are, as is well known, to be regarded as arising from the secondary vibrations of the deep fundamental tone, which they always faintly sound along with whenever it is struck, and it is a law of harmony that only those high tones may fall upon a bass note which really already sound of themselves together with it (its sons harmoniques) through the secondary vibrations. This is analogous to the fact that the whole of the bodies and organisms of nature must be regarded as having arisen through gradual development out of the mass of the planet: this is, as their support, so their source; and the same relation the higher tones have to the fundamental bass.—The depth has a limit beyond which no tone is audible any more: this corresponds to the fact that no matter is perceptible without form and quality, that is, without the manifestation of a force that cannot be further explained, in which precisely an Idea expresses itself, and more generally to the fact that no matter can be wholly without will: so that, as a certain degree of pitch is inseparable from tone as such, so a certain degree of manifestation of will is inseparable from matter.—The fundamental bass is therefore for us in harmony what inorganic nature is in the world, the crudest mass, on which everything rests and out of which everything rises and develops.—Next, then, in the whole of the ripieno parts that produce the harmony, between the bass and the leading voice that sings the melody, I recognize again the whole graduated series of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself. Those standing nearer the bass are the lower of those grades, the bodies still inorganic but already

manifesting themselves in many ways; the higher-lying ones represent to me the plant and animal world.—The determinate intervals of the scale are parallel to the determinate grades of the objectification of the will, to the determinate species in nature. The deviation from the arithmetical exactness of the intervals, through some temperament, or brought about by the chosen key, is analogous to the individual's deviation from the type of the species: indeed the impure discords, which give no determinate interval, can be compared to the monstrous abortions between two animal species, or between man and animal.—To all these bass and ripieno parts, which make up *harmony*, there is now lacking, however, that coherence in progression which the upper voice alone has, the voice that sings the melody, and which alone also moves swiftly and lightly in modulations and runs, while all those others have only a slower movement, without a coherence subsisting in each for itself. Most ponderously moves the deep bass, the representative of the crudest mass: its rising and falling occurs only in great steps, in thirds, fourths, fifths, never by a single tone; unless it were a bass transposed by double counterpoint. This slow movement is also physically essential to it: a quick run or trill in the depth cannot even be imagined. Faster, yet still without melodic coherence and meaningful progression, move the higher ripieno parts, which run parallel to the animal world. The incoherent course and lawful determination of all the ripieno parts is analogous to the fact that in the whole unreasoning world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no being has a really coherent consciousness that would make its life a meaningful whole, none experiences a succession of mental developments, none perfects itself through education, but everything stands there evenly at every time as it is according to its kind, determined by fixed law.—Finally in the *melody*, in the high, singing principal voice that leads the whole and, with unbound freedom, advances in uninterrupted, significant coherence of *one* thought from beginning to end, representing a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the objectification of the will, the deliberate life and striving of man. As he alone, because he is endowed with reason, always looks forward and backward, on the path of his actuality and of the countless possibilities, and so accomplishes a deliberate and thereby, as a whole, coherent course of life:—so,

correspondingly, the *melody* alone has significant, purposeful coherence from beginning to end. It therefore tells the history of the will illuminated by deliberation, whose imprint in actuality is the series of its deeds; but it says more, it tells its most secret history, paints every stirring, every striving, every movement of the will, all that which reason comprises under the broad and negative concept feeling and cannot take up further into its abstractions. Hence it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and passion, as words are the language of reason: already Plato explains it as ἡ των μελων κινησις μεμιμημενη, εν τοις παθημασιν ὁταν ψυχη γινηται (melodiarum motus, animi affectus imitans), De leg. VII, and Aristotle too says: δια τι οἱ ρυθμοι και τα μελη, φωνη ουσα, ηθεσιν εοικε; (cur numeri musici et modi, qui voces sunt, moribus similes sese exhibent?), Probl. c. 19.

Just as the essence of man consists in this, that his will strives, is satisfied, and strives anew, and so on forever, indeed his happiness and well-being is only this, that the passage from wish to satisfaction and from this to a new wish proceeds rapidly, since the failure of satisfaction is suffering, and the failure of the new wish empty longing, languor, boredom; so, corresponding to this, the essence of melody is a constant deviating, straying from the fundamental tone, along a thousand paths, not only to the harmonic steps, to the third and the dominant, but to every tone, to the dissonant seventh and to the augmented intervals, yet always a final return to the fundamental tone follows: on all these paths melody expresses the many-shaped striving of the will, but always also, through the final refinding of a harmonic step, and still more of the fundamental tone, satisfaction. The invention of melody, the uncovering in it of all the deepest secrets of human willing and feeling, is the work of the genius, whose working here lies more evidently than anywhere far from all reflection and conscious intention and could be called an inspiration. The concept is here, as everywhere in art, unfruitful: the composer reveals the innermost essence of the world and utters the profoundest wisdom, in a language that his reason does not understand; as a magnetic somnambulist gives disclosures about things of which when awake she has no concept. Hence in a composer, more than in any other artist, the man is wholly separate and distinct from the artist. Even in the explanation of

this wonderful art the concept shows its poverty and its limits: I will nevertheless try to carry our analogy through.—As the rapid passage from wish to satisfaction and from this to a new wish is happiness and well-being, so rapid melodies without great strayings are cheerful; slow ones, falling upon painful dissonances and finding their way back to the fundamental tone only after many bars, are, as analogous to delayed, hindered satisfaction, sad. The delay of the new stirring of the will, languor, could have no other expression than the held fundamental tone, whose effect would soon be unbearable: very monotonous, insipid melodies already approach this. The short, easily grasped phrases of quick dance music seem to speak only of an easily attained, common happiness; the Allegro maestoso, on the other hand, in great phrases, long passages, wide strayings, signifies a greater, nobler striving toward a distant goal, and its final attainment. The Adagio speaks of the suffering of a great and noble striving which scorns all petty happiness. But how wonderful is the effect of minor and major! How astonishing that the change of a half tone, the entry of the minor third instead of the major, forces upon us at once and unfailingly an anxious, painful feeling, from which the major again delivers us just as instantly. The Adagio in minor attains the expression of the highest pain, becomes the most shattering lament. Dance music in minor seems to signify the missing of the petty happiness which one should rather scorn, seems to speak of the attainment of a low end amid toils and drudgeries.—The inexhaustibility of possible melodies corresponds to the inexhaustibility of nature in the variety of individuals, physiognomies, and courses of life. The transition from one key to a wholly other, since it entirely cancels the connection with what went before, is like death, in that the individual ends in it; but the will that appeared in this one lives on as before, appearing in other individuals, whose consciousness, however, has no connection with that of the first.

In demonstrating all these analogies, however, one must never forget that music has to them no direct but only an indirect relation; for it never expresses the appearance, but solely the inner essence, the in-itself of all appearance, the will itself. It does not, therefore, express this or that particular and determinate joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or jubilation, or merriment, or peace of

mind; but *joy, sorrow, pain, horror, jubilation, merriment, peace of mind themselves*, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential element, without any accessories, and so without the motives for them. Yet we understand them perfectly in this abstracted quintessence. From this it arises that our imagination is so easily excited by music and now tries to give shape to that invisible and yet so vividly moved spirit world which speaks to us so wholly directly, and to clothe it in flesh and bone, that is, to embody it in an analogous example. This is the origin of song with words and finally of opera,—which for that very reason should never leave this subordinate position in order to make itself the main thing and music the mere means of its expression, which is a great mistake and a grievous perversity. For everywhere music expresses only the quintessence of life and its events, never these themselves, whose differences therefore do not always enter into it. Just this universality, belonging to it alone, together with the most exact determinateness, gives it the high value which it has as the panacea for all our sufferings. If music, then, seeks too much to attach itself to the words and to model itself on the events, it is striving to speak a language that is not its own. From this fault no one has kept himself so pure as *Rossini*: hence his music speaks so distinctly and purely its *own* language that it has no need of words at all, and therefore, even performed on mere instruments, has its full effect.

According to all this we can regard the appearing world, or nature, and music as two different expressions of the same thing, which is therefore itself the sole mediator of their analogy, knowledge of which is required in order to see into that analogy. Music is accordingly, when regarded as an expression of the world, a language of the highest degree of universality, which even stands to the universality of concepts roughly as these do to individual things. Its universality, however, is by no means that empty universality of abstraction, but of a wholly different kind, and is combined with thoroughgoing distinct determinateness. In this it resembles the geometrical figures and the numbers, which, as the universal forms of all possible objects of experience and applicable to all a priori, are yet not abstract but intuitive and thoroughly determinate. All possible strivings, excitements, and manifestations of the will, all those processes in

the inner life of man which reason throws into the broad negative concept feeling, are to be expressed by the infinitely many possible melodies, but always in the universality of mere form, without the material, always only according to the in-itself, not the appearance, as it were the innermost soul of them, without body. From this intimate relation which music has to the true essence of all things is also to be explained this, that when fitting music is played to any scene, action, event, or surroundings, it seems to open to us their most secret sense and appears as the most correct and distinct commentary upon it; likewise that to him who gives himself up wholly to the impression of a symphony, it is as if he saw all possible events of life and of the world pass by him: yet, when he reflects, he can name no likeness between that play of tones and the things hovering before him. For music is, as said, different from all the other arts in this, that it is not a copy of the appearance, or more correctly, of the adequate objectivity of the will, but the direct copy of the will itself, and so presents, for everything physical in the world, the metaphysical, for all appearance the thing in itself. One could accordingly just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will: from this, then, it is explicable why music makes every painting, indeed every scene of real life and of the world, step forth at once with heightened significance; certainly the more so, the more analogous its melody is to the inner spirit of the given appearance. On this rests the fact that one can set a poem to music as a song, or an intuitive presentation as a pantomime, or both as an opera. Such single pictures of human life, set to the universal language of music, are never bound to it or corresponding to it with thoroughgoing necessity; but they stand to it only in the relation of an arbitrary example to a universal concept: they present, in the determinateness of actuality, that which music says in the universality of mere form. For melodies are, in a certain way, like the universal concepts, an abstraction from actuality. This, namely, the world of individual things, supplies the intuitive, the particular and individual, the single case, both to the universality of concepts and to the universality of melodies, which two universalities are, however, in a certain respect opposed to each other; in that concepts contain only the forms first abstracted from intuition, as it were the stripped-off outer shell of things, and are thus quite properly abstrac-

ta; music, on the other hand, gives the innermost kernel preceding all formation, or the heart of things. This relation could be expressed very well in the language of the Scholastics by saying: the concepts are the universalia post rem, music however gives the universalia ante rem, and actuality the universalia in re. To the general sense of the melody attached to a poem, other examples, equally arbitrarily chosen, of the universal expressed in it could correspond in the same degree: hence the same composition suits many stanzas, hence also the vaudeville. That a relation between a composition and an intuitive presentation is possible at all rests, as said, on the fact that both are only quite different expressions of the same inner essence of the world. When now in the individual case such a relation is really present, that is, the composer has known how to express in the universal language of music the stirrings of will that make up the kernel of an event: then the melody of the song, the music of the opera, is expressive. The analogy discovered by the composer between those two must, however, have proceeded from the direct knowledge of the essence of the world, unconscious to his reason, and must not be an imitation consciously intended, mediated by concepts: otherwise music does not express the inner essence, the will itself, but only imitates its appearance inadequately; as all properly imitative music does, for example "The Seasons" of Haydn, also his "Creation" in many passages where appearances of the perceptual world are directly imitated; so also in all battle pieces: which is wholly to be rejected.

The inexpressible inwardness of all music, by virtue of which it passes before us as so wholly familiar and yet eternally distant a paradise, so wholly intelligible and yet so inexplicable, rests on this, that it reproduces all the stirrings of our innermost being, but wholly without the actuality and far from its torment. Likewise the seriousness essential to it, which wholly excludes the ridiculous from its own immediate domain, is to be explained by this, that its object is not representation, with respect to which alone deception and ridiculousness are possible; its object is directly the will, and this is essentially the most serious of all things, as that on which everything depends.—How rich in content and significance its language is, even the repeat signs bear witness, together with the

Da capo, which in works in the language of words would be intolerable, but in that language are very fitting and agreeable: for in order to grasp it wholly one must hear it twice.

If in this whole account of music I have now endeavored to make clear that it expresses, in a language of the highest universality, in a single homogeneous material, namely mere tones, and with the greatest determinateness and truth, the inner essence, the in-itself of the world, which we think, according to its most distinct manifestation, under the concept will; if further, according to my view and aim, philosophy is nothing other than a complete and correct repetition and expression of the essence of the world in very general concepts, since only in such is an overview of that whole essence possible that is everywhere sufficient and applicable; then whoever has followed me and entered into my way of thinking will not find it so very paradoxical if I say that, supposing it succeeded in giving a perfectly correct, complete explanation of music going into detail, that is, a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses, this would at once also be a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or one wholly equivalent to such, and thus the true philosophy; and that we can consequently parody the saying of Leibniz cited above, which on a lower standpoint is quite right, in the sense of our higher view of music, as follows: Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi. For scire, to know, means everywhere to have set down in abstract concepts. Since now, further, by virtue of the manifoldly confirmed truth of the Leibnizian saying, music, apart from its aesthetic or inner significance, and regarded merely externally and purely empirically, is nothing other than the means of grasping directly and in concreto larger numbers and more complex numerical ratios, which otherwise we can know only indirectly, by apprehension in concepts; we can now, by uniting those two so different and yet correct views of music, form a concept for ourselves of the possibility of a philosophy of numbers, such as that of Pythagoras was, and also that of the Chinese in the Y-king, and then, in this sense, interpret that saying of the Pythagoreans which Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math., L. VII) cites: τῳ αριθμῳ δε τα παντ' επεοικεν (numero cuncta assimilantur). And if we finally bring this view to our interpreta-

tion of harmony and melody given above, we shall find a mere moral philosophy without explanation of nature, as Socrates wished to introduce it, wholly analogous to a melody without harmony, which Rousseau wanted exclusively, and, in contrast to this, a mere physics and metaphysics without ethics will correspond to a mere harmony without melody.—To these incidental reflections let me be permitted to attach a few remarks concerning the analogy of music with the appearing world. We found in the previous book that the highest grade of the objectification of the will, man, could not appear alone and torn off, but that the grades standing below him, and these again the deeper ones, were presupposed: just so now music, which like the world directly objectifies the will, is perfect only in complete harmony. The high leading voice of the melody needs, in order to make its whole impression, the accompaniment of all the other voices, down to the deepest bass, which is to be regarded as the origin of all: the melody itself enters as an integral part into the harmony, as this also into that: and as only so, in the full-voiced whole, music expresses what it aims to express, so the one and timeless will finds its perfect objectification only in the complete union of all the grades, which in countless degrees of heightened distinctness reveal its essence.—The following analogy is also very remarkable. We saw in the previous book that, notwithstanding the adaptation of all appearances of the will to one another, with respect to the species, which gives occasion for teleological consideration, there yet remains an ineradicable conflict among those appearances as individuals, visible at all grades of them, which makes the world a constant battlefield of all those appearances of the one and same will, whose inner contradiction with itself thereby becomes visible. Even to this there is something corresponding in music. A perfectly pure harmonic system of tones, namely, is impossible not only physically but even arithmetically. The numbers themselves, by which the tones can be expressed, have irresolvable irrationalities: not even a scale can be calculated within which every fifth would stand to the fundamental tone as 2 to 3, every major third as 4 to 5, every minor third as 5 to 6, and so on. For if the tones are right in relation to the fundamental tone, they are no longer so in relation to one another; since, for example, the fifth would have to be the minor third of the third, and so on:

for the tones of the scale are to be compared to actors, who have to play now this role, now that. Hence a perfectly correct music cannot even be conceived, to say nothing of being performed; and for this reason every possible music deviates from perfect purity: it can only conceal the dissonances essential to it, by distributing them among all the tones, that is, by temperament. On this see Chladni's "Acoustics," § 30, and his "Short Survey of the Doctrine of Sound and Tone," p. 12[53].

I would have much more to add about the way music is perceived, namely solely and only in and through time, with the complete exclusion of space, and also without the influence of knowledge of causality, that is, of the understanding: for [54] On this, see Chapter 39 of the second volume. tones already make the aesthetic impression as effect, and without our going back to their cause, as in intuition.—I will, however, not prolong these considerations further, since in this third book I have perhaps already been too detailed for some, or have gone too much into particulars. My purpose, however, made it necessary, and one will disapprove of it the less if one calls to mind the importance and high value of art, so seldom sufficiently recognized, considering that if, according to our view, the whole visible world is only the objectification, the mirror, of the will, accompanying it to its self-knowledge, indeed, as we shall soon see, to the possibility of its deliverance; and at the same time that the world as representation, when one considers it in isolation, by tearing oneself loose from willing and letting it alone occupy consciousness, is the most joyous and the only innocent side of life;—we have to regard art as the higher heightening, the more perfect development, of all this, since it accomplishes essentially just the same thing, only more concentrated, more perfected, with intention and deliberation, that the visible world itself does, and may therefore be called, in the full sense of the word, the flower of life. If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the will, art is the making distinct of this visibility, the camera obscura, which shows the objects more purely and lets them be better surveyed and comprehended, the play within the play, the stage upon the stage in "Hamlet."

The enjoyment of all beauty, the consolation that art affords, the artist's enthusiasm, which lets him forget the troubles of life, this one prerogative of genius over others, which alone compensates him for the suffering heightened in equal measure with the clarity of consciousness and for the desolate solitude among a heterogeneous race,—all this rests on this, that, as will be shown to us further on, the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is a constant suffering, partly wretched, partly terrible; whereas the same, as representation alone, purely beheld, or repeated through art, free of torment, affords a significant spectacle. This purely knowable side of the world and the repetition of it in any art is the artist's element. The contemplation of the spectacle of the objectification of the will holds him spellbound: he stops at it, does not tire of contemplating it and repeating it in presentation, and meanwhile himself bears the costs of the performance of that spectacle, that is, is himself the will that thus objectifies itself and remains in constant suffering. That pure, true, and deep knowledge of the essence of the world now becomes an end in itself for him: he stops at it. Hence it does not become for him, as we shall see in the next book with the saint who has attained resignation, a quietive of the will, does not deliver him forever, but only for moments, from life, and so is for him not yet the way out of it, but only for the time being a consolation in it; until his strength, heightened by it and finally weary of the play, lays hold of the earnest. As a symbol of this transition one can regard the Saint Cecilia of Raphael. To the earnest, then, let us too turn in the next book.

Book IV



Second Consideration of the World as Will:
Affirmation and Denial of the Will to Life, Once Self-Knowledge Has Been Attained.
Tempore quo cognitio simul advenit, amor e medio supersurrexit. Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil Duperron, vol. II, p. 216.

53 The last part of our consideration announces itself as the most serious, since it concerns the actions of men, the subject that touches everyone directly, that can be foreign or indifferent to no one, indeed the one to which it is so natural for man to refer everything else that in every connected inquiry he will always regard the part of it that bears on doing as the result of its whole content, at least so far as it interests him, and will therefore give earnest attention to this part, if to no other.—In the respect indicated, one would, in the usual way of speaking, call the part of our consideration that now follows practical philosophy, as opposed to the theoretical philosophy treated so far. In my opinion, however, all philosophy is always theoretical, since it is essential to it, whatever the immediate object of inquiry may be, always to remain purely contemplative and to investigate, not to prescribe. To become practical, on the other hand, to guide conduct, to remake character, are old claims which it should at last give up, now that its insight has matured. For here, where the worth or worthlessness of an existence is at stake, where salvation or damnation is at stake, it is not

its dead concepts that decide, but the innermost essence of man himself, the daemon that guides him and that has not chosen him but is the one he himself has chosen—as Plato puts it—his intelligible character—as Kant expresses it. Virtue is not taught, any more than genius is: indeed, for virtue the concept is as unfruitful, and fit only to be used as a tool, as it is for art. We should therefore be just as foolish to expect that our systems of morals and ethics would raise up the virtuous, the noble, and saints, as that our aesthetics would raise up poets, sculptors, and musicians.

Philosophy can nowhere do more than interpret and explain what is there, and bring the essence of the world, which expresses itself in concreto, that is, as feeling, intelligibly to everyone, to the distinct, abstract knowledge of reason, but this in every possible relation and from every point of view. As the same thing was attempted in the three preceding books, in the universality peculiar to philosophy, from other points of view, so in the present book the conduct of man shall be considered in the same way; a side of the world which might well be found the most important of all, not only, as I remarked before, by subjective but also by objective judgment. I shall remain wholly faithful to our manner of consideration so far, rest on what has been set forth hitherto as presupposition, and really do no more than develop the one thought which is the content of this whole work, as hitherto in all other objects, so now in the conduct of man, and thereby do the last thing I can toward as complete a communication of it as possible.

The standpoint given and the manner of treatment announced already show that in this ethical book one is to expect no precepts, no doctrine of duties; still less is a universal moral principle, a sort of universal recipe for producing all virtues, to be given. Nor shall we speak of an "*unconditional ought*," because such a thing, as shown in the Appendix, contains a contradiction, nor of a "law for freedom," which is in the same case. We shall not speak of an ought at all: for that is how one speaks to children and to peoples in their childhood, but not to those who have appropriated the whole culture of an age that has come of age. It is surely a palpable contradiction to call the will free and yet to prescribe laws to it by which it ought to will:—"ought to will!"—wooden iron!

According to our whole view, however, the will is not only free but even almighty; from it come not only its conduct but also its world; and as it is, so its conduct appears, so its world appears: both are its self-knowledge and nothing else: it determines itself and thereby both: for outside it there is nothing, and they are itself: only so is it truly autonomous; according to every other view, however, heteronomous. Our philosophical endeavor can only be directed to interpreting and explaining the conduct of men, the so different, indeed opposed maxims whose living expression it is, according to their innermost essence and content, in connection with our consideration so far and just as we have hitherto sought to interpret the other appearances of the world and to bring their innermost essence to distinct, abstract knowledge. Our philosophy will in this assert the same *immanence* as in the whole consideration so far: it will not, contrary to Kant's great doctrine, want to use the forms of appearance, whose universal expression is the principle of sufficient reason, as a vaulting pole by which to leap over the appearance itself, which alone gives them significance, and land in the boundless domain of empty fictions. Rather, this real world of knowability, in which we are and which is in us, remains, as the material, so also the limit of our consideration: a world so rich in content that even the deepest inquiry of which the human mind might be capable could not exhaust it. Since, then, the real, knowable world will no more fail our ethical considerations in material and reality than it did the preceding ones, we shall have not the least need to take refuge in contentless, negative concepts, and then perhaps even make ourselves believe that we are saying something when, with raised eyebrows, we speak of the "Absolute," the "Infinite," the "Supersensible," and whatever other mere negations of the sort there are (ουδεν εστι, η το της στερησεως ονομα, μετα αμυδρας επινοιας.—nihil est, nisi negationis nomen, cum obscura notione. Jul. or. 5), in place of which one could more briefly say Cloud-cuckoo-land (νεφελοκοκκυγια): covered, empty dishes of this sort we shall not need to serve up.—Finally, we shall here as little as hitherto tell stories and pass them off as philosophy. For we are of the opinion that anyone is still immeasurably far from a philosophical knowledge of the world who supposes that he can grasp its essence in any way *historically*, however finely disguised;

which is the case as soon as in his view of the essence in itself of the world any *becoming*, or having become, or going to become, is found, any earlier or later has the least significance, and consequently, distinctly or covertly, a starting point and an end point of the world, together with the road between the two, is sought and found, and the philosophizing individual perhaps even recognizes his own place on this road. Such *historical philosophizing* furnishes in most cases a cosmogony, which admits many varieties, but otherwise also a system of emanation, a doctrine of falling away, or finally, when, in despair over fruitless attempts on those paths, it is driven onto the last path, conversely a doctrine of constant becoming, sprouting, arising, coming forth to light out of the dark, the dark ground, primal ground, groundlessness, and whatever other such twaddle there is, which, moreover, is most briefly disposed of by the remark that a whole eternity, that is, an infinite time, has already run down to the present moment, so that everything that can become and is to become must already have become. For all such historical philosophy, however grand its airs, assumes, as if Kant had never existed, *time* to be a determination of things in themselves, and therefore stops at what Kant calls the appearance, in contrast to the thing in itself, and Plato the becoming, never being, in contrast to the being, never becoming, or finally what among the Indians is called the web of Maya: it is just the knowledge given over to the principle of sufficient reason, with which one never reaches the inner essence of things, but only pursues appearances into the infinite, moves without end or goal, comparable to the squirrel in the wheel, until perhaps at last one tires and stops, above or below, at some arbitrary point and now wants to extort respect for that point from others as well. The genuine philosophical way of considering the world, that is, the one that teaches us to know its inner essence and so leads beyond the appearance, is precisely that which does not ask where from and where to and why, but always and everywhere only what the world is, that is, which considers things not according to any relation, not as becoming and passing away, in short, not according to one of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason; but conversely takes as its object precisely that which remains over after the elimination of this whole mode of consideration that follows that principle, the

essence of the world, appearing in all relations but itself not subject to them, always equal to itself, the Ideas of it. From such knowledge, as art, so philosophy proceeds, and indeed, as we shall find in this book, also that disposition of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to deliverance from the world.

54 The first three books will, it is hoped, have brought about the distinct and certain knowledge that in the world as representation a mirror has risen for the will, in which it knows itself, with growing degrees of distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man, whose essence, however, receives its perfect expression only through the connected series of his actions, whose self-conscious connection is made possible by reason, which lets him always survey the whole in abstracto.

The will, which considered purely in itself is without knowledge and only a blind, irresistible urge, as we still see it appear in inorganic and vegetable nature and their laws, as also in the vegetative part of our own life, receives through the added world of representation, developed to its service, knowledge of its willing and of what it is that it wills, namely that it is nothing other than this world, life, just as it stands there. We therefore called the appearing world its mirror, its objectivity: and since what the will wills is always life, precisely because that is nothing more than the presentation of that willing for the representation, it is all one and only a pleonasm if, instead of saying simply "the will," we say "the will to life."

Since the will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essential of the world; life, the visible world, the appearance, however, only the mirror of the will; the latter will accompany the will as inseparably as the shadow the body: and if will exists, life, world will exist too. To the will to life, therefore, life is certain, and so long as we are filled with the will to live we need not be anxious about our existence, not even at the sight of death. We do indeed see the individual arise and perish: but the individual is only appearance, is only there for knowledge entangled in the principle of sufficient reason, the principium individuationis: for this, indeed, it receives its life as a gift, comes forth out of nothing, then through death suffers the loss of that gift and returns into nothing. But we

want to consider life philosophically, that is, according to its Ideas, and there we shall find that neither the will, the thing in itself in all appearances, nor the subject of knowing, the spectator of all appearances, is touched in any way by birth and death. Birth and death belong precisely to the appearance of the will, hence to life, and it is essential to it to present itself in individuals who arise and perish, as fleeting appearances, emerging in the form of time, of that which in itself knows no time, but must present itself in just this way in order to objectify its proper essence. Birth and death belong to life in the same way and hold each other in balance as reciprocal conditions of one another, or, if one likes the expression, as poles of the whole appearance of life. The wisest of all mythologies, the Indian, expresses this by giving to the very god who symbolizes destruction, death (as Brahma, the most sinful and lowest god of the Trimurti, symbolizes generation, origination, and Vishnu preservation), by giving, I say, to Shiva, together with the necklace of skulls, the lingam as attribute, this symbol of generation, which appears here therefore as the counterweight of death, whereby it is indicated that generation and death are essential correlates, which reciprocally neutralize and cancel each other.—It was entirely the same disposition that drove Greeks and Romans to decorate the costly sarcophagi precisely as we still see them, with feasts, dances, weddings, hunts, animal fights, bacchanals, that is, with representations of the mightiest urge for life, which they present to us not only in such pleasures but even in voluptuous groups, even to the coupling of satyrs and goats. The purpose was evidently to point, from the death of the mourned individual, with the greatest emphasis to the immortal life of nature and thereby, though without abstract knowledge, to intimate that the whole of nature is the appearance and also the fulfillment of the will to life. The form of this appearance is time, space, and causality, by means of these, however, individuation, which brings with it that the individual must arise and perish, which however affects the will to life, of whose appearance the individual is as it were only a single example or specimen, as little as the whole of nature is injured by the death of an individual. For it is not the individual but the species alone that nature cares about, and it presses for its preservation with all earnestness, providing for it so lavishly, through the immense surplus of

germs and the great power of the fertilizing impulse. The individual, on the other hand, has no value for nature and cannot have, since infinite time, infinite space, and in these an infinite number of possible individuals are its realm; hence it is always ready to let the individual fall, which is therefore not only exposed to destruction in a thousand ways, through the most insignificant accidents, but is destined for it from the beginning and is led toward it by nature itself, from the moment it has served the preservation of the species. Quite naively nature itself thereby utters the great truth that only the Ideas, not the individuals, have proper reality, that is, are perfect objectivity of the will. Since now man is nature itself, and indeed at the highest degree of its self-consciousness, nature however is only the objectified will to life; so man, when he has grasped this point of view and stays with it, may indeed, and rightly, console himself about his own death and that of his friends, by looking back on the immortal life of nature, which he himself is. So, consequently, Shiva with the lingam is to be understood, so those ancient sarcophagi, which with their images of the most glowing life call to the lamenting beholder: Natura non contristatur.

That procreation and death are to be regarded as belonging to life and as essential to this appearance of the will follows also from this, that both present themselves to us as merely the higher-powered expressions of that of which all the rest of life also consists. For this is through and through nothing other than a constant change of matter under the fixed persistence of form: and that is precisely the perishability of individuals together with the imperishability of the species. Constant nourishment and reproduction differ from procreation only in degree, and constant excretion only in degree from death. The former shows itself most simply and distinctly in the plant. This is through and through only the constant repetition of the same impulse, its simplest fiber, which groups itself into leaf and branch; it is a systematic aggregate of similar plants bearing one another, whose constant reproduction is their sole impulse: for the more complete satisfaction of it, it raises itself, by means of the ladder of metamorphosis, finally to blossom and fruit, that compendium of its existence and striving, in which it now by a shorter road attains what is its only goal, and at one

stroke accomplishes a thousandfold what until then it effected singly: the repetition of itself. Its activity up to the fruit stands to the fruit as writing to printing. It is evidently entirely the same with the animal. The process of nutrition is a constant procreating, the process of procreation a nourishing raised to a higher power; the sensual pleasure in procreation is the comfort of the feeling of life raised to a higher power. On the other hand, excretion, the constant exhaling and throwing off of matter, is the same thing that in heightened power is death, the opposite of procreation. As we are in this always content to preserve the form without mourning the matter thrown off, so we should behave in the same way when in death the same thing happens in heightened power and as a whole that daily and hourly happens in detail in excretion: as we are indifferent to the first, we should not shrink back from the other. From this standpoint it appears just as perverse to demand the continuance of one's individuality, which is replaced by other individuals, as the permanence of the matter of one's body, which is always replaced by new: it appears just as foolish to embalm corpses as it would be to preserve one's excrements carefully. As for the individual consciousness, bound to the individual body, it is interrupted completely every day by sleep. Deep sleep is, as regards the present of its duration, not at all different from death, into which it often, for example in freezing, passes quite continuously, but only as regards the future, namely with respect to waking. Death is a sleep in which individuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has remained awake[1].

Above all we must clearly recognize that the form of the appearance of the will, hence the form of life or of reality, is really only the *present*, not the future, nor [2] The following reflection, too, may serve him to whom it is not too subtle to make clear to himself that the individual is only the appearance, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing, that is, the supplementary condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and on the other hand a single appearance of the will, of the same will that objectifies itself in every thing. But this duplicity of our essence does not rest in a unity subsisting for itself: otherwise we should be able to become conscious of ourselves *in ourselves and independently of the objects of knowing and willing*:

this, however, we absolutely cannot do, but as soon as, in order to try it, we go into ourselves and, directing knowing inward, want for once to reflect fully; we lose ourselves in a bottomless void, find ourselves like the hollow glass sphere out of whose emptiness a voice speaks, but whose cause is not to be found in it, and while we thus want to seize ourselves, we grasp, with shuddering, nothing but an insubstantial ghost.

the past: these exist only in the concept, are only there in the connection of knowledge, so far as it follows the principle of sufficient reason. In the past no man has lived, and in the future none will ever live; the *present* alone is the form of all life, but it is also its sure possession, which can never be wrested from it. The present is always there, together with its content: both stand firm, without wavering; like the rainbow on the waterfall. For to the will life is secure and certain, to life the present. To be sure, when we think back over the thousands of years that have passed, over the millions of men who lived in them, we ask: What were they? What has become of them?—But we need only recall the past of our own life and vividly renew its scenes in imagination, and then ask again: What was all this? What has become of it?—As it is with this, so it is with the life of those millions. Or should we suppose that the past receives a new existence because it is sealed by death? Our own past, even the nearest, and yesterday, is now only a vain dream of the imagination, and the same is the past of all those millions. What was? What is?—The will, whose mirror is life, and the will-free knowing which clearly beholds it in that mirror. Whoever has not yet recognized this, or does not want to, must add to that question above, about the fate of past generations, this one also: why he in particular, the questioner, is so fortunate as to hold this precious, fleeting, only real present, while those hundreds of generations of men, indeed the heroes and sages of those times, have sunk into the night of the past and have thereby become nothing; but he, his insignificant ego, is really there?—or more briefly, though oddly: why this now, his now,—is precisely now and was not long ago?—In asking so strangely he regards his existence and his time as independent of each other and the former as thrown into the latter: he really assumes two nows, one that belongs to the object, the other to the subject, and marvels at the happy chance of their

coincidence. In truth, however, (as is shown in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason) only the point of contact of the object, whose form is time, with the subject, which has no shape of the principle of sufficient reason as its form, constitutes the present. Now, however, every object is the will in so far as it has become representation, and the subject is the necessary correlate of the object; real objects, however, exist only in the present: past and future contain mere concepts and phantasms, hence the present is the essential form of the appearance of the will and inseparable from it. The present alone is that which is always there and stands immovably fixed. Empirically apprehended, the most fleeting of all, it presents itself to the metaphysical glance, which looks past the forms of empirical intuition, as the only abiding thing, the Nunc stans of the Scholastics. The source and bearer of its content is the will to life, or the thing in itself,—which we are. That which is forever becoming and passing away, in that it either has already been or is yet to come, belongs to the appearance as such, by virtue of its forms, which make arising and passing away possible. Accordingly, let one think: Quid fuit?—Quod est.—Quid erit?—Quod fuit; and take it in the strict sense of the words. For to the will life is certain, to life the present. Hence everyone can also say: "I am once and for all lord of the present, and through all eternity it will accompany me like my shadow: accordingly I do not wonder where it has come from, and how it happens that it is just now."—We can compare time to an endlessly turning circle: the ever-sinking half would be the past, the ever-rising half the future; at the top, however, the indivisible point touching the tangent would be the extensionless present: as the tangent does not roll on with it, so neither does the present, the point of contact of the object, whose form is time, with the subject, which has no form, because it does not belong to the knowable but is the condition of all that is knowable. Or: time is like an irresistible stream, and the present like a rock on which it breaks but which it does not sweep along. The will, as thing in itself, is as little subject to the principle of sufficient reason as is the subject of knowledge, which in the end is after all, in a certain respect, the will itself or its manifestation; and as life, its own appearance, is certain to the will, so too is the present, the only form of actual life. We have accordingly to inquire neither

into the past before life, nor into the future after death: rather we have to know the present as the only form in which the will appears to itself[3]; the present will not escape the will, but the will assuredly will not escape it either. Whoever, therefore, is satisfied with life as it is, whoever affirms it in every way, can with confidence regard it as endless and banish the fear of death as an illusion which instills in him the absurd fear that he could ever be deprived of the present, and conjures up for him a time without a present in it: an illusion which with regard to time is what, with regard to space, is that other by virtue of which everyone in his imagination regards the spot on the globe which he happens to occupy as the above and everything else as the below: just so everyone ties the present to his individuality and thinks that with it all present is extinguished; past and future would then be without it. But as on the globe it is everywhere above, so also the form of all life is present, and to fear death because it snatches from us the present is no wiser than to fear that one could slide off the round globe on which one happily now happens to stand on top. To the objectification of the will the form of the present is essential, which as an extensionless point cuts the time infinite in both directions and stands immovably fixed, like an everlasting noon without cooling evening; as the real sun burns without pause, while it only seems to sink into the bosom of night: hence if a man fears death as his annihilation, it is no different from thinking that the sun could at

[4] Scholastici docuerunt, quod aeternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio, sed Nunc stans; i. e. idem nobis Nunc esse, quod erat Nunc Adamo: i. e. inter nunc et tunc nullam esse differentiam. Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.

evening lament: "Woe is me! I am going down into eternal night."[5] Conversely, too: whoever is oppressed by the burdens of life, who indeed would like life and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and especially cannot bear any longer the hard lot that has fallen precisely to him: such a one has no deliverance to hope for from death and cannot save himself through suicide; only with a false semblance does the dark, cool Orcus allure him as a harbor of rest. The earth rolls from day into night; the individual dies; but the sun itself burns without pause in eternal noon. To the will-to-life, life is certain: the form of life is present

without end; no matter how the individuals, appearances of the Idea, arise and perish in time, comparable to fleeting dreams.—Suicide appears to us, then, already here as a vain and therefore foolish act: when we have advanced further in our consideration, it will present itself to us in a still less favorable light.

Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive; but nature does not err: its course is sure and it does not hide it. Each thing is wholly in it, and it is wholly in each. In every animal it has its center: the animal has found its way safely into existence, as it will safely find its way out: meanwhile it lives fearless of annihilation and unconcerned, borne up by the consciousness that it is nature itself and

[6] In Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe" (second edition, vol. 1, p. 154) Goethe says: "Our spirit is a being of wholly indestructible nature: it is a continuing work from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which only seems to go down to our earthly eyes, but which really never goes down, and shines on unceasingly."—Goethe has the simile from me; not I from him. Without doubt he uses it, in this conversation held in 1824, as a result of a perhaps unconscious reminiscence of the above passage; since it stands there, in the same words as here, in the first edition, p. 401; and recurs also ibid. p. 528, as here at the close of § 65. That first edition had been sent to him in December 1818, and in March 1819 he had his approval conveyed to me by letter, through my sister, at Naples, where I then was, and had enclosed a slip on which he had marked the numbers of some pages that pleased him particularly; so he had read my book. like it imperishable. Man alone carries about in abstract concepts the certainty of his death: this, however, very strangely, can alarm him only for single moments, when an occasion presents it to the imagination. Against the mighty voice of nature reflection can do little. In him too, as in the animal that does not think, that security prevails as a lasting state, springing from the innermost consciousness that he is nature, the world itself, by virtue of which no man is noticeably disturbed by the thought of certain and never distant death, but each lives on as if he must live forever; which goes so far that one could say that no one has a really living conviction of the certainty of his death, since otherwise there could be no such great difference between his mood and that of the condemned criminal; but each recognizes

that certainty in abstracto and theoretically, yet lays it aside, like other theoretical truths that are, however, not applicable in practice, without taking it up at all into his living consciousness. Whoever duly notes this peculiarity of the human disposition will see that the psychological modes of explaining it, from habit and from resignation to the inevitable, are by no means sufficient, but that its ground is the one given, lying deeper. From the same it is also to be explained why at all times, among all peoples, dogmas of some kind of continuance of the individual after death are found and are held in esteem, though the proofs for them must always be highly insufficient, those for the contrary, however, strong and numerous, indeed this really needs no proof, but is known by sound understanding as fact, and as such is confirmed by the confidence that nature lies as little as it errs, but lays its doing and essence open, even utters it naively, while only we ourselves darken it by delusion, in order to interpret out of it what just suits our limited view.

But what we have now brought to distinct consciousness, that although the single appearance of the will begins in time and ends in time, the will itself, as thing in itself, is not touched by this, nor yet the correlate of all objects, the knowing, never-known subject, and that to the will-to-life, life is always certain: —this is not to be counted among those doctrines of continuance. For to the will, considered as thing in itself, as also to the pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of the world, there belongs as little a persisting as a passing away, since these are determinations valid in time alone, while those lie outside time. Hence the egoism of the individual (this single appearance of the will illuminated by the subject of knowing) can draw as little nourishment and consolation for its wish to maintain itself through an infinite time from our exposition, as it could from the knowledge that after its death the rest of the external world will nevertheless go on existing in time, which is only the expression of that very same view, but considered objectively and therefore temporally. For everyone is perishable only as appearance, but as thing in itself timeless, hence also endless; but also only as appearance is he distinct from the other things of the world, as thing in itself he is the will that appears in everything, and death cancels the illusion that separates his consciousness from that of the others: this is

continuance. His not being touched by death, which belongs to him only as thing in itself, coincides, for the appearance, with the continued existence of the rest of the external world[7]. Hence it also comes about that the intimate and merely felt consciousness of what we have just raised to distinct knowledge does indeed, as said, prevent the thought of death from poisoning life even for the rational being, since such consciousness is the basis of that courage to live which sustains everything living and lets it go on living cheerfully, as if there were no death, namely so long as it has life in view and is directed to it; but this does not prevent the individual from being seized by the fear of death and trying in every way to flee when death, in the [8] In the Veda this is expressed by saying that when a man dies, his power of sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with the water, his hearing with the air, his speech with the fire, and so on (Oupnek'hat, vol. 1, p. 249 ff.)—as also by the fact that, in a special ceremony, the dying man hands over his senses and all his faculties, one by one, to his son, in whom they are now to live on. (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 82 ff.) particular instance and in actuality, or even only in imagination, approaches the individual and the latter now has to look it in the face. For as, so long as its knowledge was directed to life as such, it had to recognize in life also the imperishability, so, when death comes before its eyes, it has to recognize it for what it is, the temporal end of the single temporal appearance. What we fear in death is by no means the pain: for partly this evidently lies on this side of death; partly we often flee from pain to death, just as, conversely, we sometimes take on the most dreadful pain only to escape death a little while longer, although it would be swift and easy. We distinguish, then, pain and death as two quite different evils: what we fear in death is in fact the destruction of the individual, as which it openly announces itself, and since the individual is the will to life itself in a single objectification, its whole being struggles against death.—Where, then, feeling in this manner leaves us helplessly exposed, reason can nevertheless step in and for the most part overcome its adverse impressions, by placing us on a higher standpoint, where, instead of the particular, we now have the whole in view. Therefore a philosophical knowledge of the essence of the world that had come as far as the point at which we now stand in our consideration, but went

no further, could already at this standpoint overcome the terrors of death, in proportion as in the given individual reflection had power over immediate feeling. A man who had firmly incorporated the truths set forth so far into his habit of mind, but had not at the same time, through his own experience, or through a further-reaching insight, come to recognize lasting suffering as essential to all life; but who found satisfaction in life, was perfectly at home in it, and who, on calm reflection, would wish his course of life, as he has experienced it so far, to be of endless duration, or of ever-new recurrence, and whose courage to live were so great that, for the enjoyments of life, he would willingly and gladly take into the bargain all the hardship and pain to which it is subject; such a man would stand "with firm, sturdy bones on the well-founded, enduring earth" and would have nothing to fear: armed with the knowledge that we ascribe to him, he would look indifferently at death speeding toward him on the wings of time, regarding it as a false semblance, an impotent ghost, to frighten the weak, but which has no power over him who knows that he himself is that will whose objectification or copy the whole world is, to whom therefore life remains always certain, and the present too, the proper and sole form of the appearance of the will, whom therefore no infinite past or future, in which he would not be, can frighten, since he regards these as the vain delusion and web of Maya, who would therefore have as little to fear from death as the sun from the night.—On this standpoint in the Bhagavad Gita Krishna places his budding pupil Arjuna, when the latter, at the sight of the armies drawn up for battle (somewhat as Xerxes was), is seized with melancholy, wants to despair and desist from the fight, to prevent the destruction of so many thousands: Krishna places him on that standpoint, and the death of those thousands can no longer hold him back: he gives the signal for battle.—This standpoint is also marked by Goethe's Prometheus, particularly where he says:
"Here I sit, forming men in my image, a race that shall be like me, to suffer, to weep, to enjoy and to rejoice, and to pay no heed to you, as I!"
To this standpoint the philosophy of Bruno and that of Spinoza could also lead anyone whose conviction their faults and imperfections did not disturb or weaken. Bruno's philosophy has no ethics in the proper sense, and that in the

philosophy of Spinoza does not issue at all from the essence of his doctrine, but is, though commendable and beautiful in itself, attached to it only by means of weak and palpable sophisms.—Finally, many men would probably take the standpoint indicated, if their knowledge kept equal pace with their willing, that is, if they were in a position, free of every delusion, to become clear and distinct to themselves. For this is, for knowledge, the standpoint of the complete affirmation of the will to life.

The will affirms itself, means: when in its objectivity, that is, the world and life, its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this knowledge by no means checks its willing; rather precisely this life, thus known, is also willed by it as such, as hitherto without knowledge, as blind urge, so now with knowledge, consciously and deliberately.—The opposite of this, the denial of the will to life, shows itself when with that knowledge willing ends, in that the individual known appearances no longer act as motives of willing, but the whole knowledge of the essence of the world, mirroring the will, grown from the grasp of the Ideas, becomes a quietive of the will and so the will freely cancels itself. These wholly unfamiliar concepts, hardly intelligible in this general expression, will, it is hoped, become distinct through the presentation, soon to follow, of the phenomena, here modes of conduct, in which, on the one side, the affirmation, in its various degrees, and on the other the denial expresses itself. For both proceed indeed from knowledge, but not from an abstract knowledge that expresses itself in words, but from a living one that expresses itself through deed and conduct alone and remains independent of the dogmas that occupy reason, as abstract knowledge, in the matter. To present both and bring them to the distinct knowledge of reason can alone be my purpose, but not to prescribe or recommend the one or the other, which would be as foolish as pointless, since the will in itself is the absolutely free, wholly self-determining, and there is no law for it.—This freedom and its relation to necessity we must, however, first of all and before we proceed to the said exposition, discuss and determine more exactly, then also make some general considerations, relating to the will and its objects, about life, whose affirmation

and denial is our problem, through all of which we shall make easier for ourselves the intended knowledge of the ethical significance of the modes of conduct according to their innermost essence.

Since, as said, this whole work is only the unfolding of a single thought, it follows that all its parts stand in the most intimate connection with one another, and not merely that each stands in necessary relation to the next preceding one and therefore presupposes, in the first place, only that as remembered by the reader, as is the case with all philosophies that consist merely of a series of inferences; but that every part of the whole work is akin to every other and presupposes it, for which reason it is required that the reader remember not only what has just preceded but also everything earlier, so that he may be able to connect it with what is present at any time, however much else may stand between; a demand which Plato too made on his reader, through the intricate labyrinths of his dialogues, which take up the main thought again only after long episodes, and by that very fact the more clarified. With us this demand is necessary, since the dissection of our one and only thought into many considerations, while the only means for communication, is for the thought itself not an essential but only an artificial form.—The separation of four main points of view, in four books, and the most careful connection of what is akin and homogeneous serve to ease the presentation and its apprehension: nevertheless the material does not at all admit of progression in a straight line, such as the historical is, but makes a more intricate presentation necessary, and this again a repeated study of the book, through which alone the connection of each part with every other becomes distinct and only then all together mutually illuminate one another and become perfectly clear[9].

55 That the will as such is free follows already from the fact that, on our view, it is the thing in itself, the content of all appearance. [10] On this, chapters 41–44 of the second volume. Appearance, on the other hand, we know to be subject throughout to the principle of sufficient reason, in its four forms; and since we know that necessity is wholly identical with consequence from a given ground, the two being convertible concepts, everything that belongs to appearance, that

is, everything that is object for the subject cognizing as an individual, is on the one hand ground and on the other consequence, and in this latter capacity is determined throughout by necessity, and can therefore in no respect be other than it is. The entire content of nature, all its appearances, is thus through and through necessary, and the necessity of every part, every appearance, every event can in each case be demonstrated, since the ground on which it depends as consequence must be capable of being found. This admits of no exception: it follows from the unrestricted validity of the principle of sufficient reason. On the other hand, however, this same world, in all its appearances, is for us objectivity of the will; and the will, since it is not itself appearance, not representation or object, but thing in itself, is also not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of all object, and so is not determined as a consequence by a ground, and therefore knows no necessity, that is, is free. The concept of freedom is thus really a negative one, its content being merely the denial of necessity, that is, of the relation of consequence to its ground in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason.—Here, then, lies before us most clearly the point of unity of that great opposition, the union of freedom with necessity, of which in recent times there has often been talk, yet, so far as I know, never clearly and properly. Every thing is, as appearance, as object, throughout necessary: the same thing is in itself will, and this is entirely free, for all eternity. The appearance, the object, is determined necessarily and unalterably in the concatenation of grounds and consequences, which can suffer no interruption. But the existence at all of this object, and the manner of its existence, that is, the Idea that reveals itself in it, or in other words its character, is immediately appearance of the will. In keeping with the freedom of this will, then, it might not exist at all, or else be originally and essentially something wholly different; in which case, however, the whole chain of which it is a link, but which is itself appearance of the same will, would also be a wholly different one: but once it is there and present, it has entered the series of grounds and consequences, is always necessarily determined within it, and can accordingly neither become something else, that is, change, nor step out of the series, that is, vanish. Man, like every other part of nature, is objectivity of the will: hence all that has been

said holds of him too. As every thing in nature has its forces and qualities, which react in a determinate way to a determinate influence and make up its character, so he too has his character, from which the motives call forth his actions with necessity. In this very manner of acting his empirical character reveals itself, and in this again his intelligible character, the will in itself, whose determinate appearance he is. But man is the most perfect appearance of the will, which, in order to subsist, had to be illuminated, as shown in the second book, by so high a degree of knowledge that in it even a wholly adequate repetition of the essence of the world, under the form of representation, became possible—the apprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world—as we came to know it in the third book. In man, therefore, the will can attain to full self-consciousness, to a distinct and exhaustive cognition of its own essence, as it is mirrored in the whole world. From the actual presence of this degree of knowledge art arises, as we saw in the previous book. At the end of our whole inquiry, however, it will also appear that through this same knowledge, in so far as the will turns it upon itself, a cancellation and self-denial of the will is possible in its most perfect appearance: so that freedom, which otherwise, belonging only to the thing in itself, can never show itself in appearance, in such a case emerges in appearance too, and, cancelling the essence that underlies the appearance while the appearance itself still continues in time, produces a contradiction of the appearance with itself, and precisely thereby presents the phenomena of holiness and self-abnegation. All this, however, can become fully intelligible only at the end of this book.—For the present it is merely indicated in a general way by this how man is distinguished from all other appearances of the will: freedom, that is, independence of the principle of sufficient reason, which belongs only to the will as thing in itself and contradicts appearance, can nevertheless in his case possibly occur in appearance as well, where it then necessarily presents itself as a contradiction of the appearance with itself. In this sense not only the will in itself but even man can indeed be called free, and thereby be distinguished from all other beings. How this is to be understood, however, can become clear only through all that follows, and for the present we must still wholly leave it out of account. For first an error is to be guarded

against, namely that the conduct of the particular, determinate man is not subject to necessity, that is, that the power of the motive is less certain than the power of the cause, or the consequence of the conclusion from the premises. The freedom of the will as thing in itself does not, so long as we, as said, leave aside the case above, which concerns only an exception, by any means pass over directly to its appearance, not even where this attains the highest stage of visibility, and thus not to the rational animal with individual character, that is, the person. The person is never free, although it is the appearance of a free will: for it is the already determined appearance of that will's free willing, and in that this enters into the form of all object, the principle of sufficient reason, it does indeed develop the unity of that will into a multiplicity of actions, which, however, because of the timeless unity of that willing in itself, presents itself with the lawfulness of a natural force. But since it is nevertheless that free willing which becomes visible in the person and in the person's whole course of life, related to it as the concept to the definition, every single deed of the person too is to be ascribed to the free will, and announces itself to consciousness immediately as such: hence, as was said in the second book, everyone holds himself a priori (that is, here according to his original feeling) to be free also in his particular actions, in the sense that in every given case every action would be possible to him, and only a posteriori, from experience and reflection upon experience, does he recognize that his conduct proceeds quite necessarily from the meeting of character with motives. Hence it comes that the crudest man, following his feeling, defends with the greatest vehemence complete freedom in particular actions, while the great thinkers of all ages, indeed even the more profound doctrines of faith, have denied it. But to anyone to whom it has become clear that the whole essence of man is will and he himself only appearance of this will, while such an appearance has the principle of sufficient reason for its necessary form, one already cognizable from the side of the subject, which in this case shapes itself as the law of motivation, a doubt of the inevitability of the deed, given the character and the motive at hand, will seem like a doubt that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles.—The necessity of individual action Priestley has demonstrated very adequately in his "Doctrine of philo-

sophical necessity"; but the coexistence of this necessity with the freedom of the will in itself, that is, outside appearance, was first demonstrated by Kant,[11] whose merit here is especially great, in that he established the distinction between intelligible and empirical character, which I retain entirely, since the former is the will as thing in itself, so far as it appears in a determinate individual in a determinate degree, but the latter is this appearance itself, as it presents itself in the manner of acting, according to time, and already in the bodily organization, according to space. To make the relation of the two comprehensible, the best expression is the one already used in the introductory treatise: that the intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time, and therefore indivisible and unchangeable, whose appearance, developed and drawn apart in time and space and in all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, is the empirical character, as it presents itself, in experience, in the whole manner of acting and in the course of life of this man. As the whole tree is only the ever-repeated appearance of one and the same impulse, which presents itself most simply in the fiber, and repeats itself in the composition [12] "Critique of Pure Reason," first edition, pp. 532–558; fifth edition, pp. 560–586; and "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, pp. 169–179.—Rosenkranz edition, pp. 224–231. into leaf, stalk, branch, and trunk, and is easily recognized there; so all the deeds of man are only the ever-repeated utterance of his intelligible character, varying somewhat in form, and the induction resulting from their sum gives his empirical character.—I shall not, moreover, repeat here in reworked form Kant's masterly exposition, but presuppose it as known.

In the year 1840 I treated the important topic of the freedom of the will thoroughly and at length, in my crowned prize essay upon it, and in particular uncovered the ground of the illusion by virtue of which one supposes oneself to find in self-consciousness, as a fact of it, an empirically given absolute freedom of the will, that is, a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae: for it was precisely to this point that the prize question, very sagaciously, was directed. Referring the reader, then, to that essay, and likewise to § 10 of the prize essay on the foundation of morals published together with it under the title "The Two

Fundamental Problems of Ethics," I now omit the still imperfect exposition of the necessity of the acts of will given at this place in the first edition, and wish instead to elucidate the illusion mentioned above by a short discussion, which has the nineteenth chapter of our second volume as its presupposition and therefore could not be given in the prize essay mentioned.

Apart from the fact that, because the will, as the true thing in itself, is something really original and independent, the feeling of originality and self-sufficiency must accompany its acts in self-consciousness too, although these are here already determined, the illusion of an empirical freedom of the will (instead of the transcendental, which alone is to be attributed to it), that is, of a freedom of the individual deeds, arises from the separate and subordinate position of the intellect toward the will, set out in the nineteenth chapter of the second volume, especially under No. 3. For the intellect learns the resolutions of the will only a posteriori and empirically. Accordingly, when a choice lies before it, it has no datum as to how the will is going to decide. For the intelligible character, by virtue of which, given the motives, only one decision is possible and that one therefore a necessary one, does not fall within the knowledge of the intellect; only the empirical character becomes known to it, successively, through its individual acts. Hence it seems to the knowing consciousness (intellect) that, in a case at hand, two opposite decisions are equally possible to the will. This, however, is exactly as when one says of an upright pole that has been thrown off balance and begun to sway, "it can fall to the right or to the left"; which "can" has only a subjective meaning and really says "with respect to the data known to us": for objectively the direction of the fall is already necessarily determined as soon as the swaying begins. So too, then, the decision of one's own will is undetermined only for its spectator, one's own intellect, and hence only relatively and subjectively, namely for the subject of knowing; in itself and objectively, by contrast, in every choice presented the decision is at once determined and necessary. This determination, however, enters consciousness only through the decision that follows. We even obtain an empirical confirmation of this when some difficult and important choice lies before us, yet only under a condition that has not yet occurred but is merely to be hoped for; so that for

the present we can do nothing in the matter but must remain passive. Now we consider what we shall resolve upon when the circumstances have arrived that permit us free activity and decision. Usually far-sighted, rational reflection speaks more for one of the resolutions, immediate inclination more for the other. As long as we, under compulsion, remain passive, the side of reason seems inclined to keep the upper hand; but we foresee how strongly the other side will pull when the opportunity for action is there. Until then we are zealously busy, by cold meditation of the pro et contra, putting the motives on both sides in the brightest light, so that each can act on the will with its whole force when the moment arrives, and no error on the part of the intellect may perhaps mislead the will into deciding otherwise than it would if everything acted equally. This distinct unfolding of the opposing motives, however, is all that the intellect can do in the choice. The real decision it awaits as passively, and with the same tense curiosity, as that of a foreign will. To it, therefore, from its standpoint, both decisions must appear equally possible: and this is precisely the illusion of the empirical freedom of the will. Into the sphere of the intellect the decision enters, to be sure, quite empirically, as the final outcome of the matter; yet it has proceeded from the inner constitution, the intelligible character, of the individual will, in its conflict with given motives, and therefore with perfect necessity. The intellect can do nothing further in this than illuminate the nature of the motives sharply and from all sides; it is not able, however, to determine the will itself, since this is wholly inaccessible to it, indeed, as we have seen, unfathomable.

Could a man, under the same circumstances, act at one time thus and at another time otherwise, his will itself would have had to change in the meantime and would therefore lie in time, since only in time is change possible: but then either the will would have to be a mere appearance, or time a determination of the thing in itself. Accordingly that dispute over the freedom of the individual act, over the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, turns really on the question whether the will lies in time or not. If it is, as both Kant's doctrine and my whole exposition make necessary, the thing in itself, outside time and every form of the principle of sufficient reason, then not only must the individ-

ual in the same situation always act in the same way, and not only is every evil deed the firm surety for countless others, which he must commit and cannot leave undone; but it would also be possible, as Kant says, if only the empirical character and the motives were completely given, to calculate a man's conduct in the future like a solar or lunar eclipse. As nature is consistent, so is character: every single action must turn out in accordance with it, as every phenomenon turns out in accordance with the law of nature: the cause in the latter case and the motive in the former are only occasional causes, as was shown in the second book. The will, whose appearance is the whole being and life of man, cannot deny itself in the individual case, and what man wills on the whole he will also always will in particular. The assertion of an empirical freedom of the will, of a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, is most closely connected with the fact that the essence of man was placed in a soul that was originally a knowing being, indeed really an abstractly thinking one, and only in consequence of this also a willing one; that the will, therefore, was made secondary in nature, whereas in truth it is knowledge that is secondary. The will was even regarded as an act of thought and identified with judgment, notably by Descartes and Spinoza. According to this, each man would have become what he is only in consequence of his knowledge: he would come into the world as a moral zero, would know the things in it, and thereupon resolve to be this man or that, to act thus or thus, and could also, in consequence of new knowledge, adopt a new manner of acting, and so become another man again. Further, he would on this view first cognize a thing as good and in consequence of this will it; instead of first willing it and in consequence of this calling it good. According to my whole fundamental view, that is, all of this is an inversion of the true relation. The will is the first and original; knowledge is merely added, belonging to the appearance of the will as an instrument of it. Every man is accordingly what he is through his will, and his character is original; since willing is the basis of his essence. Through the knowledge added to it he learns, in the course of experience, what he is, that is, he comes to know his character. He knows himself, then, in consequence of and in accordance with the constitution of his will; instead of, as on the old view, willing in consequence of and in accordance with

his knowing. According to that view he would only have to consider how he would most like to be, and he would be it: that is their freedom of the will. It consists, then, really in this, that man is his own work, in the light of knowledge. I, on the contrary, say: he is his own work before all knowledge, and this merely comes in addition to illuminate it. Therefore he cannot resolve to be such or such a man, nor can he become another; but he is, once for all, and knows successively what he is. With them he wills what he knows; with me he knows what he wills.

The Greeks called character ηθος and its utterances, that is, customs, ηθη; but this word comes from εθος, habit: they had chosen it to express the constancy of character metaphorically through the constancy of habit. Το γαρ ηθος απο του εθους εχει την επωνυμιαν. ηθικη γαρ καλειται δια το εθιζεσθαι (a voce εθος, i. e. consuetudo, ηθος est appellatum: ethica ergo dicta est απο του εθιζεσθαι, sive ab assuescendo), says Aristotle. (Eth. magna, I, 6, p. 1186, and Eth. Eud., p. 1220, and Eth. Nic., p. 1103, ed. Ber.). Stobaeus cites: οι δε κατα Ζηνωνα τροπικως· ηθος εστι πηγη βιου, αφ' ης αι κατα μερος πραξεις ρεουσι (Stoici autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, metaphorice ethos definiunt vitae fontem, e quo singulae manant actiones.) II, ch. 7.—In the Christian doctrine of faith we find the dogma of predestination, by the election and non-election of grace (Rom. 9, 11–24), evidently sprung from the insight that man does not change; that his life and conduct, that is, his empirical character, is only the unfolding of the intelligible, the development of decided, unchangeable dispositions already recognizable in the child, so that his conduct is, as it were, already firmly determined at birth and remains essentially the same to the end. With this we too agree; but the consequences which arose from the union of this quite correct insight with the dogmas found in the Jewish doctrine of faith, and which then furnished the very greatest difficulty, the eternally insoluble Gordian knot around which most of the controversies of the Church turn—these I do not undertake to defend; since even the Apostle Paul himself has hardly succeeded in this, by his parable of the potter set up for this purpose: for the result would in the end be none other than: "Let the race of man fear the gods!

"They hold dominion in eternal hands, and can wield it as it pleases them."—

Such considerations, however, are really foreign to our subject. Rather, some discussions will now be in place on the relation between character and cognition, in which all its motives lie.

Since the motives which determine the appearance of the character, or action, act upon it through the medium of knowledge, but knowledge is changeable, often wavering back and forth between error and truth, yet as a rule corrected more and more in the progress of life, though in very different degrees; so a man's manner of acting can be noticeably altered without our being entitled to infer from it a change in his character. What a man really and on the whole wills, the striving of his innermost essence and the goal he pursues in accordance with it, this we can never change by outward influence upon him, by instruction: else we could remake him. Seneca says excellently: velle non discitur; whereby he prefers the truth to his Stoics, who taught διδακτην ειναι την αρετην (doceri posse virtutem). From without the will can be acted on only through motives. These, however, can never change the will itself: for they themselves have power over it only on the presupposition that it is precisely such as it is. All they can do, then, is change the direction of his striving, that is, make him seek what he unchangeably seeks by a different way than before. Hence instruction, improved knowledge, thus influence from without, can indeed teach him that he erred in the means, and can accordingly make him pursue the goal that, in accordance with his inner essence, he is bound to strive for, by quite another path, even in quite another object than before: but never can it make him will something really other than he has hitherto willed; this remains unchangeable, for he is indeed nothing but this willing itself, which otherwise would have to be canceled. That former point, however, the modifiability of knowledge and thereby of doing, goes so far that he seeks to attain his unchangeable end, be it for example Mohammed's paradise, at one time in the real world, at another in an imaginary world, measuring the means accordingly and so employing the first time prudence, violence and deceit, the other time abstinence, justice, alms, pilgrimage to Mecca. His striving itself has not

changed on that account, still less he himself. Thus although his acting does present itself as very different at different times, his willing has remained entirely the same. Velle non discitur.

For the efficacy of motives their mere presence is not enough; their being cognized is required too: for, according to a very good expression of the Scholastics already mentioned once, causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale; sed secundum esse cognitum. In order that, for example, the relation which egoism and compassion bear to each other in a given man may come forth, it is not sufficient that he happen to possess wealth and see another's misery; he must also know what can be done with wealth, both for himself and for others; and not only must another's suffering present itself to him, but he must also know what suffering is, and also what enjoyment is. Perhaps on a first occasion he did not know all this as well as on a second; and if he now acts differently on the same occasion, this lies only in the fact that the circumstances were really different, namely in the part that depends on his knowledge of them, even if they seem to be the same.—As the not knowing of really present circumstances takes away their efficacy, so on the other hand wholly imaginary circumstances can act as real ones, not only in a single deception but also on the whole and permanently. If, for example, a man is firmly persuaded that every benefaction will be repaid him a hundredfold in a future life, such a conviction counts and acts in every respect like a safe bill of exchange at a very long date, and he can give out of egoism as with another insight he would take out of egoism. He has not changed: velle non discitur. By virtue of this great influence of knowledge on action, with the will unchangeable, it happens that character develops only gradually and its different traits come forth. Hence it shows itself different in every period of life, and upon a violent, wild youth a settled, temperate, manly age may follow. In particular the evil of the character will with time come forth ever more powerfully; but sometimes passions to which one yielded in youth are later voluntarily curbed, merely because the opposite motives have only now entered knowledge. Hence also we are all at first innocent, which means merely that neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature: it comes

forth only in the motives, and only in time do the motives enter knowledge. In the end we come to know ourselves as quite other than we held ourselves to be a priori, and often we are then terrified at ourselves.

Repentance arises never from the will having changed (which is impossible), but from knowledge having changed. The essential and proper part of what I have ever willed I must still will: for I myself am this will, which lies outside time and change. I can therefore never repent of what I have willed, but certainly of what I have done; because, led by false concepts, I did something other than was in accordance with my will. The insight into this, given more correct knowledge, is repentance. This extends not merely to prudence in life, to the choice of means and the judgment of the suitability of the end to my real will; but also to the properly ethical. Thus I may, for example, have acted more egoistically than accords with my character, misled by exaggerated notions of the need I myself was in, or also of the cunning, falseness, malice of others, or also by having acted hastily, that is, without reflection, determined not by motives distinctly cognized in abstracto but by merely intuitive motives, by the impression of the present and by the affect it excited, which was so strong that I did not really have the use of my reason; the return of reflection is then, however, here too only corrected knowledge, from which repentance can issue, which then always announces itself by making good what has happened, so far as that is possible. Yet it is to be noted that, in order to deceive oneself, one prepares apparent hastinesses, which are really secretly considered actions. For we deceive and flatter no one by such fine artifices as ourselves.—The reverse of the case cited can also occur: an excessive trust in others, or ignorance of the relative value of the goods of life, or some abstract dogma, belief in which I have now lost, may mislead me into acting less egoistically than accords with my character, and thereby prepare for me repentance of another kind. Always, then, repentance is corrected knowledge of the relation of the deed to the real intention.—Just as matter already ruled by other Ideas, here natural forces, offers resistance to the will in so far as it reveals its Ideas in space alone, that is, through mere shape, and seldom lets the shape which here strove toward visibility come forth perfectly pure and distinct, that is, beautiful; so an analogous

hindrance meets the will that reveals itself in time alone, that is, through actions, in knowledge, which seldom gives it the data quite correctly, whereby the deed then turns out not exactly corresponding to the will and therefore prepares repentance. Repentance, then, always arises from corrected knowledge, not from change of the will, which is impossible. Anguish of conscience over what has been committed is anything but repentance; it is pain at the knowledge of oneself in oneself, that is, as will. It rests precisely on the certainty that one still has the same will. Were it changed, and anguish of conscience therefore mere repentance, it would cancel itself: for then the past could no longer awaken anguish, since it would present the utterances of a will that would no longer be that of the penitent. We shall discuss the significance of anguish of conscience at length farther on.

The influence that knowledge, as the medium of motives, has, not on the will itself, but on its coming forth in actions, also grounds the chief difference between the doing of men and that of animals, since the mode of knowledge of the two is different. The animal, that is, has only intuitive representations; man, through reason, has abstract representations too, concepts. Although animal and man are determined by motives with equal necessity, man nevertheless has over the animal a complete power of choice, which has often been regarded as a freedom of the will in individual deeds, although it is nothing other than the possibility of a fully fought-out conflict between several motives, of which the stronger then determines him with necessity. For this the motives must have taken the form of abstract thoughts; because only by means of these is a real deliberation, that is, a weighing of opposite grounds for action, possible. In the animal the choice can take place only between motives lying before it intuitively, and is therefore limited to the narrow sphere of its present, intuitive apprehension. Hence the necessity of the determination of the will by the motive, which is like that of the effect by the cause, can be presented intuitively and immediately only in animals, because here the spectator too has the motives as directly before his eyes as their effect; whereas in man the motives are almost always abstract representations, in which the spectator has no share, and even for the agent himself the necessity of their working is hidden behind their con-

flict. For only in abstracto can several representations, as judgments and chains of inferences, lie side by side in consciousness and then, free from all determination of time, act against one another until the stronger overpowers the rest and determines the will. This is the complete power of choice, or capacity for deliberation, which man has over the animal, and on account of which freedom of the will has been ascribed to him, in the belief that his willing is a mere result of the operations of the intellect, without a determinate impulse serving as its basis; whereas, in truth, motivation works only on the ground of and under the presupposition of his determinate impulse, which in him is individual, that is, a character. A more detailed account of that capacity for deliberation, and of the difference between human and animal choice brought about by it, is to be found in "The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics" (first edition, p. 35 ff.), to which I therefore refer here. Moreover, this capacity for deliberation in man is also among the things that make his existence so much more tormented than that of the animal; as indeed our greatest pains in general lie not in the present, as intuitive representations or immediate feeling, but in reason, as abstract concepts, tormenting thoughts, from which the animal, living only in the present and hence in enviable freedom from care, is wholly free.

That dependence of human deliberation, shown above, upon the faculty of thinking in abstracto, thus also of judging and inferring, seems to have been what misled both Descartes and Spinoza into identifying the decisions of the will with the faculty of affirming and denying (power of judgment), from which Descartes deduced that the will, which with him is indifferently free, bears the blame for all theoretical error too; Spinoza, on the other hand, that the will is necessarily determined by the motives, as judgment is by the grounds[13]; which latter, incidentally, is correct, yet appears as a true conclusion from false premises.—

The demonstrated difference in the way the animal and man are moved by motives extends its influence very far on the essence of both and contributes most to the thoroughgoing and striking difference in the existence of the two. While the animal is always motivated only by an intuitive representation, man strives to exclude this kind of motivation entirely and to let himself be deter-

mined only by abstract representations, whereby he uses his prerogative of reason to the greatest possible advantage and, independent of the present, chooses or flees not the transient pleasure or pain but considers the consequences of both. In most cases, leaving aside entirely insignificant actions, abstract, thought motives determine us, not present impressions. Hence any single privation for the moment is quite easy for us, but any renunciation terribly hard: for the former affects only the fleeting present, the latter however the future, and therefore includes [14] Cart. medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., P. II, prop. 48 et 49, caet. countless privations, of which it is the equivalent. The cause of our pain, as of our joy, therefore lies mostly not in the real present, but only in abstract thoughts: it is these that often become intolerable to us, create torments against which all the sufferings of the animal kingdom are very small, since over them even our own physical pain is often not felt at all; indeed, in violent mental suffering we inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely to divert attention from the former to the latter: hence in the greatest mental pain one tears out one's hair, beats one's breast, lacerates one's face, rolls on the ground; all of which are really only violent means of distraction from an intolerable thought. Precisely because mental pain, as the far greater, makes one insensible to the physical, suicide becomes very easy to one in despair, or consumed by morbid vexation, even if earlier, in a comfortable state, he shrank back from the thought of it. Likewise care and passion, that is, the play of thoughts, wear down the body more often and more than physical hardships. In accordance with this Epictetus says rightly: Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus decreta) (V.) and Seneca: Plura sunt, quae nos terrent, quam quae premunt, et saepius opinione quam re laboramus. (Ep. 5). Eulenspiegel too satirized human nature most excellently, in that he laughed when going uphill but wept when going downhill. Indeed children who have hurt themselves often cry not over the pain but, when one pities them, over the thought of the pain thereby excited. Such great differences in action and in life flow from the difference between the animal and the human mode of knowledge. Further, the emergence of the distinct and decided individual character, which chiefly distinguishes man

from the animal, which has almost only a character of the species, is likewise conditioned by the choice among several motives, possible only by means of abstract concepts. For only after a preceding choice are the resolutions, which turn out differently in different individuals, a sign of their individual character, which is another in each; whereas the doing of the animal depends only on the presence or absence of the impression, provided that it is a motive at all for its species. Hence, finally, in man alone the resolution, not the mere wish, is a valid sign of his character, for himself and for others. The resolution, however, becomes certain, for him as for others, only through the deed. The wish is merely a necessary consequence of the present impression, be it of the external stimulus or of the inner transient mood, and is therefore as immediately necessary and without reflection as the doing of animals: hence it too, just like that, expresses only the character of the species, not that of the individual, that is, indicates merely what man in general, not what the individual feeling the wish, would be capable of doing. The deed alone, because, as a human action, it always requires a certain reflection, and because man is as a rule master of his reason, hence deliberate, that is, decides according to thought, abstract motives, is the expression of the intelligible maxim of his action, the result of his innermost willing, and stands forth as a letter in the word that designates his empirical character, which itself is only the temporal expression of his intelligible character. Hence, in a healthy mind, only deeds burden the conscience, not wishes and thoughts. For only our deeds hold up to us the mirror of our will. The deed already mentioned above, committed quite without reflection and really in blind affect, is in a manner a middle thing between mere wish and resolution: hence it can be erased, like a misdrawn stroke, by true repentance, which however also shows itself as a deed, from the picture of our will, which is the course of our life.—Incidentally, the remark may find a place here, as a curious simile, that the relation between wish and deed has an entirely accidental but exact analogy with that between electrical distribution and electrical communication.

In consequence of this whole consideration of the freedom of the will and what relates to it, we find, although the will in itself and outside appearance is to be called free, indeed almighty, that same will in its individual appearances illuminated by knowledge, thus in men and animals, determined by motives, to which the character in each case reacts always in the same way, lawfully and necessarily. We see that man, by virtue of the added abstract or rational knowledge, has over the animal a power of choice, which, however, only makes him the battlefield of the conflict of motives, without withdrawing him from their dominion, and which therefore, while it conditions the possibility of the complete utterance of the individual character, is by no means to be regarded as freedom of the individual willing, that is, independence of the law of causality, whose necessity extends over man as over every other appearance. Up to the point indicated, then, and no further, goes the difference that reason, or knowledge by means of concepts, brings about between human and animal willing. But as for what wholly different phenomenon of the human will, impossible in the animal kingdom, can come forth when man abandons the whole knowledge of individual things as such, subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and by means of knowledge of the Ideas sees through the principium individuationis, whereupon a real emergence of the true freedom of the will as thing in itself becomes possible, through which the appearance enters a certain contradiction with itself, which the word self-abnegation designates, indeed at last the in-itself of its essence cancels itself:—this real and sole immediate utterance of the freedom of the will in itself, even in appearance, cannot yet be distinctly presented here, but will be the object of our consideration quite at the last. But now that, by the present expositions, the unchangeability of the empirical character, which is the mere unfolding of the intelligible outside time, has become clear to us, as also the necessity with which actions proceed from its meeting with motives: we have first to set aside an inference which might very easily be drawn from it in favor of reprehensible inclinations. For since our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of an act of will outside time and therefore indivisible and unchangeable, or of an intelligible character, by which everything essential, that is, the ethical content of our course of life, is

unchangeably determined and must accordingly express itself in its appearance, the empirical character, while only the unessential of this appearance, the outward shaping of our course of life, depends on the shapes under which the motives present themselves; so one might conclude that it would be vain effort to work at an improvement of one's character, or to resist the force of evil inclinations, so that it would be more advisable to submit to the unalterable and to comply at once with every inclination, be it even evil.—But the case here is wholly the same as with the theory of unavoidable fate, and the inference made from it, which is called αργος λογος, in more recent times Turkish faith, whose proper refutation, as Chrysippus is said to have given it, Cicero presents in the book de fato, ch. 12, 13.

For although everything can be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate, it is so only by means of the chain of causes. Hence in no case can it be determined that an effect occur without its cause. Not the event simply, therefore, is predetermined, but the event as result of preceding causes: so not the result alone, but also the means, as the result of which it is determined to occur, are decreed by fate. If, accordingly, the means do not occur, then certainly neither does the result: both always according to the determination of fate, which, however, we always learn only afterward.

As events will always turn out in accordance with fate, that is, with the endless concatenation of causes, so our deeds will always turn out in accordance with our intelligible character: but as we do not foreknow the former, so no insight a priori into the latter is given us either; only a posteriori, through experience, do we come to know ourselves as we do others. If the intelligible character entailed that we could form a good resolution only after a long struggle against an evil inclination, then this struggle must precede and be waited for. Reflection on the unchangeability of the character, on the unity of the source from which all our deeds flow, must not mislead us into anticipating the decision of the character, in favor of one party or the other: from the resolution that follows we shall see what kind of men we are, and mirror ourselves in our deeds. From this precisely is explained the satisfaction, or the anguish of soul, with which we look back on the path of life we have traveled: both come not from those past

deeds still having an existence: they are past, have been, and are now nothing more; but their great importance for us comes from their significance, comes from the fact that these deeds are the imprint of the character, the mirror of the will, in which, looking, we recognize our innermost self, the kernel of our will. Because we learn this not beforehand but only afterward, it behooves us to strive and struggle in time, precisely so that the picture which we work through our deeds may turn out such that the sight of it may calm us as much as possible, not alarm us. The significance of such calm, or anguish of soul, however, will, as said, be investigated farther on. Here, on the other hand, belongs the following consideration, which stands by itself. Besides the intelligible and the empirical character, a third, different from both, is still to be mentioned, the acquired character, which one obtains only in life, through dealings with the world, and which is meant when a man is praised as a man who has character, or blamed as characterless.—One might indeed think that, since the empirical character, as appearance of the intelligible, is unchangeable and, like every natural appearance, consistent in itself, man too for that very reason would have to appear always like himself and consistent, and would therefore have no need to acquire a character artificially through experience and reflection. But the case is otherwise, and although one is always the same, one nevertheless does not understand oneself at all times, but often mistakes oneself, until one has acquired true self-knowledge to a certain degree. The empirical character, as mere natural impulse, is in itself irrational: indeed its utterances are moreover disturbed by reason, and the more, the more reflection and power of thought a man has. For these always hold before him what belongs to man in general, as character of the species, and what is possible to man in willing as in achieving. Thereby the insight into that which alone of all this he, by virtue of his individuality, wills and is able to do, is made harder for him. He finds in himself the dispositions for all human strivings and powers, however various; but the different degree of them in his individuality does not become clear to him without experience: and if he now does take up the strivings that alone accord with his character, he nevertheless feels, especially in single moments and moods, the incitement to quite opposite ones, incompatible with them, which, if he wants

to pursue the former undisturbed, must be wholly suppressed. For as our physical path on earth is always only a line, not a surface, so in life, if we want to grasp and possess one thing, we must leave lying, renouncing, countless others, to the right and to the left. If we cannot resolve upon this, but grasp, like children at a fair, at everything that tempts in passing; then this is the perverse endeavor to turn the line of our path into a surface: we then run in zigzags, flit this way and that like will-o'-the-wisps, and arrive at nothing.—Or, to use another simile, as, according to Hobbes's doctrine of right, originally everyone has a right to everything, but to nothing an exclusive right; the latter, however, he can obtain to single things by renouncing his right to all the rest, while the others do the same with regard to what he has chosen; just so is it in life, where we can pursue any determinate endeavor, be it for enjoyment, honor, wealth, science, art, or virtue, with real earnestness and with success only when we give up all claims alien to it, and renounce everything else. Therefore mere willing and also being able is in itself not yet sufficient, but a man must also know what he wills and know what he can do: only so will he show character, and only then can he accomplish anything proper. Before he arrives at that, he is, notwithstanding the natural consistency of the empirical character, nevertheless characterless, and although on the whole he must remain true to himself and run his course, drawn on by his daemon; yet he will describe not a straight line but a trembling, uneven one, will waver, deviate, turn back, prepare repentance and pain for himself: all this because he sees before him, in great and small, so much as possible and attainable to man, and yet does not know which of it alone is suited to him and practicable for him, indeed even only enjoyable by him. He will therefore envy many a one a situation and circumstances that are suited only to that other's character, not to his own, and in which he would feel unhappy, indeed could not even endure it. For as the fish is well only in the water, the bird only in the air, the mole only under the earth, so every man only in the atmosphere suited to him; as, for example, court air is not breathable by everyone. From lack of sufficient insight into all this many a one will make all sorts of unsuccessful attempts, will do violence to his character in particular cases, and yet on the whole will have to give way to it again: and what he thus

laboriously attains against his nature will give him no enjoyment; what he thus learns will remain dead; indeed even in ethical respects a deed, sprung not from pure, immediate impulse but from a concept, a dogma, too noble for his character, will lose all merit through subsequent egoistic repentance, even in his own eyes. Velle non discitur. As we become aware of the inflexibility of other characters only through experience, and until then childishly believe that by rational representations, by requests and entreaties, by example and magnanimity we could bring anyone to abandon his nature, change his manner of acting, depart from his way of thinking, or even extend his abilities; so it goes with ourselves too. We must first learn from experience what we will and what we can do: until then we do not know it, are characterless, and must often be thrown back upon our own path by hard blows from outside.—But when we have at last learned it, then we have attained what is called character in the world, the acquired character. This is accordingly nothing other than the most perfect possible knowledge of one's own individuality: it is the abstract, hence distinct, knowledge of the unalterable qualities of one's own empirical character and of the measure and direction of one's mental and bodily powers, thus of the whole strengths and weaknesses of one's own individuality. This puts us in a position to carry out deliberately and methodically the role of our own person, unalterable in itself, which we formerly played naturally and without rule, and to fill the gaps that whims or weaknesses cause in it according to the guidance of firm concepts. The manner of acting that is in any case necessary through our individual nature we have now brought to distinctly conscious maxims, ever present to us, by which we carry it out as deliberately as if it were a learned one, without ever going astray through the passing influence of mood or of the impression of the present, without being hindered by the bitterness or sweetness of some particular encountered on the way, without hesitation, without wavering, without inconsistencies. We shall now no longer, as novices, wait, try, grope about, to see what we really will and what we can do; but we know it once for all, have in every choice only to apply general propositions to particular cases, and arrive at once at the resolution. We know our will in general and do not let ourselves be misled by mood or outward solicitation into resolving in

particular what is contrary to it as a whole. We know equally the kind and measure of our powers and of our weaknesses, and will thereby spare ourselves much pain. For there is really no enjoyment other than in the use and feeling of one's own powers, and the greatest pain is a perceived lack of powers where one needs them. Now, having investigated where our strengths and where our weaknesses lie, we shall cultivate, use, and seek to turn to account in every way our prominent natural gifts and always turn to where these are fit and count, but thoroughly and with self-conquest avoid the endeavors for which we have by nature slight gifts; we shall beware of attempting what we nevertheless cannot achieve. Only he who has arrived at this will always, with full deliberation, be wholly himself, and will never be left in the lurch by himself, because he always knew what he could demand of himself. He will then often partake of the joy of feeling his strengths, and rarely experience the pain of being reminded of his weaknesses, which latter is humiliation, which perhaps causes the greatest mental pain: hence one can far better bear to look his ill fortune in the face than his ineptitude.—If we, then, are perfectly acquainted with our strengths and weaknesses, we shall also not try to show powers we do not have, shall not play with false coin, because such sham-fighting in the end misses its goal. For since the whole man is only the appearance of his will, nothing can be more perverse than, setting out from reflection, to want to be something other than one is: for it is an immediate contradiction of the will with itself. Imitation of the qualities and peculiarities of others is much more disgraceful than wearing another's clothes: for it is the judgment of one's own worthlessness pronounced upon oneself. Knowledge of one's own disposition and of one's capacities of every kind and their unalterable limits is in this respect the surest way to the greatest possible contentment with oneself. For what holds of external circumstances holds of internal ones: namely that for us there is no more effective consolation than the full certainty of unalterable necessity. An evil that has befallen us torments us not so much as the thought of the circumstances through which it could have been averted; hence nothing is more effective for our calm than the contemplation of what has happened from the standpoint of necessity, from which all accidents present themselves as instruments

of a ruling fate, and we thus recognize the evil that has come as inevitably drawn upon us by the conflict of inner and outer circumstances; that is, fatalism. We lament and rage also really only so long as we hope thereby either to work upon others or to rouse ourselves to unheard-of exertion. But children and grown people know very well how to resign themselves as soon as they clearly see that it is not otherwise at all: θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκῃ.

(Animo in pectoribus nostro domito necessitate.)

We are like the captured elephants, which for many days rage and struggle terribly, until they see that it is fruitless, and then suddenly calmly offer their necks to the yoke, tamed forever. We are like King David, who, as long as his son still lived, ceaselessly besieged Jehovah with entreaties and behaved like one in despair; but as soon as the son was dead, thought no further of it. Hence it comes that countless permanent evils, such as crippledness, poverty, low station, ugliness, a repulsive dwelling-place, are borne by countless people quite indifferently and no longer felt at all, like healed-over wounds, merely because these people know that inner or outer necessity leaves nothing here to be changed; whereas happier people do not see how it can be borne. As with outer, so with inner necessity, nothing reconciles so firmly as a distinct knowledge of it. If we have distinctly recognized once for all our faults and weaknesses as well as our good qualities and strengths, set our goal accordingly, and made our peace with what is unattainable, we thereby escape most surely, so far as our individuality permits, the bitterest of all sufferings, discontent with ourselves, which is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of one's own individuality, of false conceit and the presumption arising from it. To the bitter chapters of the self-knowledge here recommended the Ovidian verse is most excellently applicable:

Optimus ille animi vindex laedentia pectus Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.

So much for the acquired character, which is important not so much for ethics proper as for life in the world, but whose discussion nevertheless was coordinated, as the third kind, with that of the intelligible and the empirical character, on

which latter two we had to enter upon a somewhat detailed consideration, in order to make clear to ourselves how the will in all its appearances is subject to necessity, while it can nevertheless in itself be called free, indeed almighty.

56 This freedom, this omnipotence, of which the whole visible world, its appearance, stands as utterance and image, developing progressively in accordance with the laws that the form of knowledge brings with it—can now also, and indeed where in its most perfect appearance the fully adequate knowledge of its own essence has dawned upon it, express itself anew, in that it either here too, at the summit of reflection and self-consciousness, wills the same that it willed blindly and not knowing itself, in which case knowledge, in the particular as in the whole, remains always a motive for it; or else conversely this knowledge becomes for it a quietive, which calms and cancels all willing. This is the affirmation and denial of the will to life, already set out above in general, which, as a general, not particular, expression of will with regard to the individual's course of life, neither disturbingly modifies the development of the character nor finds its expression in individual actions; but either by an ever stronger emergence of the whole previous manner of acting, or conversely by the cancellation of it, expresses in living form the maxim which the will, after the knowledge now obtained, has freely seized.—The more distinct development of all this, the chief subject of this last book, is now already somewhat eased and prepared for us by the intervening considerations on freedom, necessity and character: but it will become still more so after we, postponing that once more, have first directed our consideration to life itself, whose willing or not-willing is the great question, and indeed in such a way that we seek to recognize in general what, through its affirmation, really comes to the will itself, which indeed everywhere is the innermost essence of this life, in what manner and how far it satisfies it, indeed can satisfy it; in short, what is to be regarded, in general and essentially, as its condition in this world of its own, belonging to it in every respect.

First of all I wish that one would recall here the consideration with which we closed the second book, occasioned by the question raised there about the goal and purpose of the will; in place of an answer to which it appeared before our

eyes how the will, at all stages of its appearance, from the lowest to the highest, wholly lacks a final goal and purpose, always strives, because striving is its sole essence, which no attained goal puts an end to, which is therefore incapable of any final satisfaction, but can only be held up by hindrance, while in itself it goes on to infinity. We saw this in the simplest of all natural appearances, gravity, which does not cease to strive and to press toward an extensionless center, whose attainment would be the annihilation of gravity and matter, does not cease even if the whole universe were already balled together. We see it in the other simple natural appearances: the solid strives, whether by melting or by dissolution, toward fluidity, where alone its chemical forces become free: rigidity is their captivity, in which they are held by cold. The fluid strives toward the form of vapor, into which it passes at once as soon as it is freed from all pressure. No body is without affinity, that is, without striving, or without craving and desire, as Jakob Böhm would say. Electricity propagates its inner self-division to infinity, even though the mass of the globe swallows up the effect. Galvanism, as long as the pile lives, is likewise a purposeless, unceasingly renewed act of self-division and reconciliation. Just such a restless, never satisfied striving is the existence of the plant, an unceasing driving through ever higher forms, until the end point, the seed, becomes again the starting point: this repeated to infinity: nowhere a goal, nowhere final satisfaction, nowhere a resting place. At the same time we shall remember from the second book that everywhere the manifold natural forces and organic forms dispute with one another the matter on which they want to emerge, each possessing only what it has wrested from the other, and so a constant struggle for life and death is maintained, from which precisely the resistance mainly proceeds by which that striving, which makes up the innermost essence of every thing, is everywhere hindered, presses in vain, yet cannot relinquish its essence, tortures its way through, until this appearance perishes, whereupon others greedily seize its place and its matter.

We have long since recognized this striving, which makes up the kernel and the in-itself of every thing, as the very same and identical thing that in us, where it manifests itself most distinctly, in the light of fullest consciousness, is called

will. We then call its hindrance by an obstacle that places itself between it and its momentary goal, suffering; its attaining the goal, on the other hand, satisfaction, well-being, happiness. We can transfer these designations also to those appearances of the world without knowledge, weaker in degree, identical in essence. These we then see engaged in constant suffering and without lasting happiness. For all striving springs from want, from dissatisfaction with one's condition, and is therefore suffering as long as it is not satisfied; but no satisfaction is lasting, rather it is always only the starting point of a new striving. We see striving everywhere variously hindered, everywhere fighting; and so, for as long as this lasts, always as suffering: no final goal of striving, thus no measure and end of suffering.

But what we thus discover only with sharpened attention and with effort in nature without knowledge steps clearly before us in the knowing nature, in the life of the animal kingdom, whose constant suffering is easily demonstrated. We shall, however, without dwelling on this intermediate stage, turn to where, illuminated by the clearest knowledge, everything stands out most distinctly, in the life of man. For as the appearance of the will becomes more perfect, so suffering too becomes more and more evident. In the plant there is as yet no sensibility, hence no pain: a certainly very slight degree of suffering dwells in the lowest animals, the infusoria and radiata: even in insects the capacity to feel and to suffer is still limited: only with the perfect nervous system of vertebrates does it appear in a high degree, and in an ever higher, the more intelligence develops. In the same measure, then, as knowledge attains distinctness and consciousness rises, the torment grows too, which consequently reaches its highest degree in man, and there again the more, the more distinctly he knows, the more intelligent he is: he in whom genius lives suffers most. In this sense, namely in reference to the degree of knowledge in general, not to mere abstract knowing, I understand and use here that saying of Koheleth: Qui auget scientiam, auget et dolorem.—This exact relation between the degree of consciousness and that of suffering has been expressed most beautifully, by an intuitive and striking presentation, in a drawing by that philosophical painter, or painting philosopher, Tischbein. The upper half of his sheet represents women from whom their

children are being carried off, and who, in various groups and attitudes, express in manifold ways deep maternal pain, anguish, despair; the lower half of the sheet shows, in quite the same arrangement and grouping, sheep from which the lambs are being taken away: so that to every human head, every human attitude of the upper half of the sheet, there below corresponds an animal analogue, and one now clearly sees how the pain possible in dull animal consciousness stands to the mighty torment that first became possible through the distinctness of knowledge, the clarity of consciousness.

For this reason we want to consider in human existence the inner and essential fate of the will. Anyone will easily find again in the life of the animal the same, only weaker, expressed in different degrees, and will be able to convince himself sufficiently also from the suffering animal world how essentially all life is suffering.

57 At every stage that knowledge illuminates, the will appears to itself as an individual. In infinite space and infinite time the human individual finds himself as finite, and consequently as a magnitude vanishing in comparison with them, cast into them, and, because of their boundlessness, has always only a relative, never an absolute When and Where of his existence: for his place and his duration are finite parts of an infinite and boundless whole.—His real existence is only in the present, whose unhindered flight into the past is a constant passage into death, a constant dying; since his past life, apart from its possible consequences for the present, as also from the testimony about his will that is imprinted in it, is already wholly done with, dead and nothing more: hence it must reasonably also be indifferent to him whether the content of that past was torments or pleasures. The present, however, constantly becomes past under his hands: the future is wholly uncertain and always short. So his existence, considered already from the formal side alone, is a constant plunging of the present into the dead past, a constant dying. If we now look at it from the physical side too, it is evident that, just as our walking, as is well known, is only a constantly arrested falling, so the life of our body is only a continually arrested dying, an ever-postponed death: finally, in just the same way, the activity of our

spirit is a continually deferred boredom. Every breath wards off the constantly invading death, with which we thus fight in every second, and then again, at greater intervals, through every meal, every sleep, every warming up, and so on. In the end it must win: for we are forfeit to it already by birth, and it plays only a while with its prey before devouring it. We continue our life, however, with great interest and much care, as long as possible, as one blows up a soap bubble as long and as large as possible, though with the firm certainty that it will burst.

If we already saw in nature without knowledge its inner essence as a constant striving, without goal and without rest; then in the contemplation of the animal and of man this stands out before us still much more distinctly. Willing and striving is their whole essence, to be compared wholly to an unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack, hence pain, to which they consequently fall prey originally and through their essence. If, on the other hand, they lack objects of willing, in that too easy satisfaction at once takes them away again; then terrible emptiness and boredom befall them: that is, their essence and their existence itself becomes an unbearable burden to them. Their life, then, swings, like a pendulum, to and fro, between pain and boredom, which two are in fact its ultimate constituents. This has had to be expressed in a very strange way also in the fact that, after man had put all sufferings and torments into hell, nothing remained for heaven but boredom.

The constant striving, however, which makes up the essence of every appearance of the will, obtains at the higher stages of objectification its first and most general foundation in this, that here the will appears to itself as a living body, with the iron command to nourish it: and what gives this command its force is precisely that this body is nothing other than the objectified will to life itself. Man, as the most perfect objectification of that will, is accordingly also the most needy of all beings: he is concrete willing and needing through and through, is a concretion of a thousand needs. With these he stands on the earth, left to himself, in uncertainty about everything, except his neediness and his want: accordingly the care for the maintenance of that existence, under such heavy demands announcing themselves anew every day, fills, as a rule, the whole of human life. To this attaches then immediately the second demand,

that of the propagation of the species. At the same time the most various kinds of dangers threaten him from all sides, to escape which requires constant watchfulness. With cautious step and anxious looking about he pursues his path, for a thousand accidents and a thousand enemies lie in wait for him. So he went in the wilderness, and so he goes in civilized life; there is no security for him:

Qualibus in tenebris vitae, quantisque periclis Degitur hocce aevi, quodcunque est! Lucr., II, 15.

The life of the great majority, too, is only a constant struggle for this existence itself, with the certainty of losing it in the end. What makes them endure in so toilsome a struggle, however, is not so much the love of life as the fear of death, which nevertheless, as unavoidable, stands in the background and may step forward at any moment.—Life itself is a sea full of rocks and whirlpools, which man avoids with the greatest caution and care, although he knows that, even if he succeeds, with all effort and art, in winding his way through, he comes by that very fact with every step nearer to the greatest, the total, the unavoidable and incurable shipwreck, indeed steers straight toward it, death: this is the final goal of the toilsome voyage and for him worse than all the rocks that he evaded.

Now it is at once very remarkable that, on the one hand, the sufferings and torments of life can easily grow to such a degree that even death, in flight from which the whole of life consists, becomes desirable and one hastens to it voluntarily; and on the other hand again, that as soon as want and suffering grant man a rest, boredom is at once so near that he necessarily needs pastime. What occupies all living things and keeps them in motion is the striving for existence. With existence, however, when it is assured to them, they do not know what to do: hence the second thing that sets them in motion is the striving to get rid of the burden of existence, to make it unfelt, "to kill time," that is, to escape boredom. Accordingly we see that almost all men secure from want and cares, after they have at last cast off all other burdens, are now a burden to themselves and now count each hour got through as gain, thus every deduction from that very life, to the longest possible preservation of which they until then summoned all their powers. Boredom, however, is anything but an evil to be lightly esteemed:

it paints at last real despair on the face. It makes beings who love one another so little as men do yet seek one another so much, and thus becomes the source of sociability. Public provisions too are made everywhere against it, as against other general calamities, even from political prudence; because this evil, as well as its opposite extreme, famine, can drive men to the greatest licentiousness: panem et Circenses the people need. The strict Philadelphian penitentiary system makes, by means of solitude and inactivity, boredom alone the instrument of punishment: and it is so terrible that it has already led convicts to suicide. As want is the constant scourge of the people, so boredom is that of the distinguished world. In middle-class life it is represented by Sunday, as want is by the six weekdays. Between willing and attaining, then, flows every human life throughout. The wish is, by its nature, pain: attainment quickly begets satiety: the goal was only apparent: possession takes away the charm: under a new form the wish, the need, returns: if not, then follow desolation, emptiness, boredom, against which the struggle is just as tormenting as against want.—That wish and satisfaction follow one another without too short and without too long intervals reduces the suffering which both give to the smallest measure and makes up the happiest course of life. For that which otherwise one might call the fairest part, the purest joys of life, and that only because it lifts us out of real existence and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it, that is, pure knowing, to which all willing remains foreign, the enjoyment of the beautiful, the genuine joy in art, this, because it requires rare gifts already, is granted only to the very few and even these only as a passing dream: and then the higher intellectual power makes precisely these few susceptible to far greater sufferings than the duller can ever feel, and moreover places them solitary among beings noticeably different from them: whereby this too balances out. To by far the greatest part of men, however, purely intellectual enjoyments are not accessible; they are almost wholly incapable of the joy that lies in pure knowing: they are wholly confined to willing. If, therefore, anything is to win their interest, to be interesting to them, it must (this lies already in the meaning of the word) somehow stir their will, be it even only by a remote relation to it lying only in possibility; but the will must never remain wholly out of play, because their existence

lies far more in willing than in knowing: action and reaction is their sole element. The naive utterances of this constitution can be gathered from trifles and everyday phenomena: so, for example, at places worth seeing which they visit, they write their names, in order thus to react, to act upon the place, since it did not act upon them: further, they cannot easily merely look at a strange, rare animal, but must provoke it, tease it, play with it, in order only to feel action and reaction; but quite especially does that need of will-stimulation show itself in the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is quite truly the expression of the pitiable side of humanity.

But whatever nature, whatever fortune may have done; whoever one is, and whatever one may possess; the pain essential to life cannot be cast off:

Πηλειδης δ' ωμωξεν, ιδων εις ουρανον ευρυν.

(Pelides autem ejulavit, intuitus in coelum latum.) And again: Ζηνος μεν παις ηα Κρονιονος, αυταρ οιζυν Ειχον απειρεσιην.

(Jovis quidem filius eram Saturnii; verum aerumnam Habebam infinitam.) The unceasing efforts to banish suffering accomplish nothing more than that it changes its shape. This is originally want, need, care for the maintenance of life. If one has succeeded, which is very hard, in driving out pain in this shape, it at once sets in, in a thousand other forms, alternating according to age and circumstances, as sexual impulse, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, ambition, avarice, sickness, and so on and so on. If at last it can find entrance in no other shape, it comes in the sad, gray garb of weariness and boredom, against which then many things are tried. If at last one succeeds in scaring these away, it will hardly happen without letting pain in again in one of the previous shapes and so beginning the dance anew; for between pain and boredom every human life is tossed to and fro. However depressing this consideration is, I would nevertheless call attention in passing to one side of it from which a consolation can be drawn, indeed perhaps even a Stoic indifference toward one's own present evil attained. For our impatience at this arises largely from the fact that we recognize it as accidental, as brought about by a chain of causes that might easily be otherwise. For over the immediately necessary and wholly universal evils, for example the necessity of old age and death and of many daily

inconveniences, we are not accustomed to grieve. It is rather the consideration of the accidentality of the circumstances which brought a suffering precisely upon us that gives it its sting. But if we have recognized that pain as such is essential to life and unavoidable, and that nothing further than its mere shape, the form in which it presents itself, depends on chance, that our present suffering therefore fills a place into which, without it, another would at once step, which is now excluded by it, that accordingly, in essentials, fate can do little to us; then such a reflection, if it became a living conviction, might bring about a considerable degree of Stoic equanimity and greatly diminish the anxious solicitude for one's own welfare. In fact, however, so potent a mastery of reason over immediately felt suffering may seldom or never be found.

Moreover, by that consideration of the unavoidableness of pain and of the displacing of one by another and the bringing in of the new by the departure of the former, one might even be led to the paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis that in each individual the measure of the pain essential to him is determined once for all by his nature, which measure could neither remain empty nor be overfilled, however much the form of the suffering may change. His suffering and well-being would accordingly be determined not at all from without but only by that measure, that disposition, which, though through physical condition it might experience some decrease and increase at different times, would yet remain on the whole the same and would be nothing other than what is called his temperament, or more exactly the degree in which he would be, as Plato expresses it in the first book of the Republic, ευκολος or δυσκολος, that is, of easy or of hard disposition.—In favor of this hypothesis speaks not only the well-known experience that great sufferings make all smaller ones wholly imperceptible, and conversely, in the absence of great sufferings, even the smallest annoyances torment and put us out of humor; but experience also teaches that when a great misfortune, at the mere thought of which we shuddered, has now actually occurred, our mood, once we have got over the first pain, on the whole stands quite unchanged; and also conversely, that after the arrival of a long-desired happiness, we feel on the whole and lastingly not noticeably better off and more comfortable than before. Only the moment of the occurrence of

those changes moves us unusually strongly as deep lamentation or loud jubilation; but both soon vanish, because they rested on deception. For they arise not over the immediately present enjoyment or pain, but only over the opening of a new future that is anticipated in it. Only because pain or joy borrowed from the future could they be so abnormally heightened, and consequently not for long.—For the hypothesis set up, according to which, as in knowing, so in the feeling of suffering or well-being a very great part would be subjectively and a priori determined, there can be further adduced as evidence the observations that human cheerfulness or gloom is evidently not determined by external circumstances, by wealth or rank; since we meet at least as many cheerful faces among the poor as among the rich: further, that the motives on which suicide follows are so exceedingly various; in that we can name no misfortune great enough to bring it about with much probability in every character, and few so small that equally weighty ones have not already occasioned it. If now the degree of our cheerfulness or sadness is not the same at all times, we shall, according to this view, ascribe it not to the change of external circumstances but to that of the inner state, of the physical condition. For when a real, though always only temporary, rise of our cheerfulness, even to joyousness, occurs, it tends to appear without any external occasion. We do often see our pain proceed only from a determinate external relation, and are visibly depressed and troubled only by this: we then believe that if only this were removed, the greatest contentment would have to come. But this is deception. The measure of our pain and well-being on the whole is, according to our hypothesis, subjectively determined for each point of time, and in relation to it that external motive of distress is only what a vesicatory is for the body, to which all the evil humors otherwise distributed draw. The pain grounded in our essence for this period of time, and therefore not to be cast off, would be, without that determinate external cause of suffering, distributed over a hundred points and would appear in the form of a hundred small vexations and whims over things that we now wholly overlook, because our capacity for pain is already filled by that chief evil, which has concentrated all the otherwise scattered suffering on one point. To this also corresponds the observation that when a great anxiety

oppressing us is at last, through a happy outcome, lifted from our breast, at once another takes its place, whose entire material was already there before, but could not come into consciousness as care, because this had no capacity left for it, which is why this material of care remained merely as a dark unnoticed nebulous shape at the outermost edge of its horizon. Now, however, since room has been made, this ready material steps up at once and takes the throne of the reigning (πρυτανευουσα) anxiety of the day: even if it is, in matter, very much lighter than the material of that vanished anxiety, it yet knows how to blow itself up so that it equals it in apparent size and thus, as chief anxiety of the day, completely fills the throne.

Immoderate joy and very violent pain always appear only in the same person: for the two condition one another reciprocally and are also jointly conditioned by great liveliness of spirit. Both are, as we just found, produced not by the purely present, but by anticipation of the future. But since pain is essential to life and is also in its degree determined by the nature of the subject, so that sudden changes, because they are always external, cannot really alter its degree; there lies at the foundation of excessive jubilation or pain always an error and delusion: consequently those two overstrainings of the mind could be avoided by insight. Every immoderate jubilation (exultatio, insolens laetitia) rests always on the delusion of having found something in life which is not to be met with in it at all, namely lasting satisfaction of the tormenting, ever newly born wishes or cares. From every single delusion of this kind one must be inevitably brought back later, and then, when it vanishes, pay for it with pains as bitter as its entry caused joy. In this respect it is quite like a height from which one can come down again only by falling; hence one should avoid it: and every sudden, excessive pain is precisely only the fall from such a height, the vanishing of such a delusion, and therefore conditioned by it. One could consequently avoid both if one could prevail upon oneself always to survey things as a whole and in their connection with perfect clarity and firmly to guard against lending them the color that one wished they had. Stoic ethics was aimed chiefly at freeing the

mind from all such delusion and its consequences, and giving it instead unshakable equanimity. Horace is filled with this insight in the well-known ode:

Aequam memento rebus in arduis Servare mentem, non secus in bonis Ab insolenti temperatam Laetitia.—

Mostly, however, we close ourselves to the knowledge, comparable to a bitter medicine, that suffering is essential to life and therefore does not flow in upon us from without, but everyone carries the inexhaustible source of it in his own inner being. We rather seek for the pain that never leaves us always some external, particular cause, a pretext, as it were; as the free man makes himself an idol in order to have a master. For tirelessly we strive from wish to wish, and although every satisfaction attained, however much it promised, does not satisfy us, but mostly soon stands there as a shaming error, we yet do not see that we are drawing water with the cask of the Danaids; but hasten to ever new wishes:

Sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur Caetera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus; Et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantes. (Lucr., III, 1095.)

So it goes on, then, either to infinity, or, what is rarer and presupposes already a certain strength of character, until we meet with a wish that cannot be fulfilled and yet cannot be given up: then we have, as it were, what we sought, namely something that we can accuse at every moment, instead of our own essence, as the source of our sufferings, and by which we are now at variance with our fate but reconciled with our existence, in that the knowledge recedes again that suffering is essential to this existence itself and true satisfaction impossible. The consequence of this last mode of development is a somewhat melancholy mood, the constant bearing of a single great pain and from it a resulting disesteem of all smaller sufferings or joys; consequently a phenomenon already more dignified than the constant snatching at ever other deceptive shapes, which is much more common.

58 All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always only negative and absolutely never positive. It is not a gratification coming to us originally and of itself, but must always be the satisfaction of a wish. For wish, that is, want, is the preceding condition of every enjoyment. With satisfaction, however, the wish and consequently the enjoyment cease. Hence satisfaction or gratification can never be more than deliverance from a pain, from a need: for to this belongs not only every actual, manifest suffering, but also every wish whose importunity disturbs our repose, indeed even the deadening boredom that makes existence a burden to us.—

Now, however, it is so hard to attain and carry through anything: difficulties and labors without end stand against every undertaking, and at every step the obstacles pile up. But when at last everything is overcome and attained, nothing other can ever have been gained than that one is delivered from some suffering or wish, and consequently is only as one was before its onset.—Immediately given to us is always only the want, that is, the pain. Satisfaction and enjoyment, however, we can know only mediately, through remembrance of the preceding suffering and privation, which ceased upon their arrival. Hence it comes that we do not rightly become aware of the goods and advantages we really possess, nor prize them, but think no otherwise than that it must be so: for they make happy always only negatively, by holding off sufferings. Only after we have lost them does their value become felt: for the want, the privation, the suffering, is the positive, that which announces itself immediately. Hence also the remembrance of need, sickness, want and the like that has been survived gives us joy, because such is the only means of enjoying the present goods. Nor can it be denied that in this respect and on this standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will to life, the sight or description of others' sufferings gives us satisfaction and enjoyment on just that path, as Lucretius beautifully and candidly expresses it, at the beginning of the second book:

Suave, mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem: Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas; Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.

However, it will be shown to us farther on that this kind of joy, through knowledge of one's own well-being thus mediated, lies very near to the source of real positive malice.

That all happiness is only of a negative, not of a positive nature, that for this very reason it cannot be lasting satisfaction and gratification, but is always only a deliverance from a pain or want, on which must follow either a new pain or else languor, empty longing and boredom; this finds a confirmation also in that faithful mirror of the essence of the world and of life, in art, especially in poetry. Every epic or dramatic poem, namely, can always only represent a wrestling, striving and fighting for happiness, never however lasting and perfected happiness itself. It leads its hero through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the goal: as soon as it is reached, it quickly lets the curtain fall. For there would now remain nothing for it but to show that the glittering goal, in which the hero fancied he would find happiness, had only teased him too, and that after attaining it he was no better off than before. Because a genuine, lasting happiness is not possible, it cannot be an object of art. The purpose of the idyll, to be sure, is really the portrayal of such a happiness: but one also sees that the idyll as such cannot maintain itself. Always it becomes for the poet under his hands either epic, and is then only a very insignificant epic, composed of small sufferings, small joys and small endeavors: this is the commonest case; or else it becomes merely descriptive poetry, portrays the beauty of nature, that is, really pure knowing free of will, which indeed is also in fact the only pure happiness, which neither is preceded by suffering or need, nor is necessarily followed by repentance, suffering, emptiness, weariness: only this happiness cannot fill the whole life, but merely moments of it.—What we see in poetry we find again in music, in whose melody we have indeed recognized the innermost history of the self-conscious will, universally expressed, the most secret life, longing, suffering and rejoicing, the ebb and flow of the human heart. Melody is always a deviation from the keynote through a thousand strange wanderings, up to the most painful dissonance, whereupon it at last finds the keynote again, which

expresses the satisfaction and appeasement of the will, with which however nothing further can then be done and whose longer continuance would be only tiresome and meaningless monotony, corresponding to boredom.

Everything that these considerations were to make clear, the unattainability of lasting satisfaction and the negativity of all happiness, finds its explanation in what was shown at the close of the second book: that namely the will, whose objectification human life is, like every appearance, is a striving without goal and without end. The stamp of this endlessness we find impressed also on all parts of its entire appearance, from the most universal form of this, time and space without end, up to the most perfect of all appearances, the life and striving of man.—One can assume theoretically three extremes of human life and regard them as elements of actual human life. First, the mighty willing, the great passions (Radscha-Guna). It comes forth in the great historical characters; it is portrayed in epic and drama: but it can also show itself in the small sphere, for the greatness of the objects is here measured only by the degree in which they move the will, not by their external relations. Then second, pure knowing, the apprehension of the Ideas, conditioned by the liberation of knowledge from the service of the will: the life of genius (Satwa-Guna). Finally third, the greatest lethargy of the will and with it of the knowledge bound to it, empty longing, life-numbing boredom (Tama-Guna). The life of the individual, far from remaining in one of these extremes, touches them only seldom, and is for the most part only a weak and wavering approach to this side or that, a meager willing of petty objects, ever recurring and so escaping boredom.—It is really incredible how meaningless and empty of significance, seen from without, and how dull and unreflecting, felt from within, the life of the great majority of men flows by. It is a faint longing and tormenting, a dreamy staggering through the four ages of life to death, in the company of a series of trivial thoughts. They are like clockworks which are wound up and go, without knowing why; and every time a man is begotten and born, the clock of human life is wound up anew, in order to repeat once more its barrel-organ tune already played countless times, phrase by phrase and bar by bar, with insignificant variations. —Every individual, every human face and its course of life, is only one more

brief dream of the infinite spirit of nature, of the persistent will to life, is only one more fleeting figure which it playfully draws on its infinite sheet, space and time, and lets subsist for a span vanishingly small in comparison with these, then wipes out, to make new room. Yet, and here lies the troubling side of life, each of these fleeting figures, these stale whims, must be paid for by the whole will to life, in all its vehemence, with many and deep pains and at last with a long-dreaded, finally arriving, bitter death. Therefore the sight of a corpse makes us so suddenly serious.

The life of every individual, if one surveys it as a whole and in general and picks out only its most significant features, is really always a tragedy; but gone through in detail, it has the character of a comedy. For the bustle and plague of the day, the restless teasing of the moment, the wishing and fearing of the week, the mishaps of every hour, by means of chance ever intent on mischief, are pure comedy scenes. But the never fulfilled wishes, the frustrated striving, the hopes mercilessly trodden down by fate, the ill-fated errors of the whole life, with the increasing suffering and death at the close, always make a tragedy. So, as if fate had wished to add mockery to the misery of our existence, our life must contain all the woes of tragedy, and we cannot even maintain the dignity of tragic persons, but, in the broad detail of life, are inevitably silly characters of comedy. However much great and small plagues fill every human life and keep it in constant unrest and motion, they are yet unable to conceal the inadequacy of life to fill the spirit, the emptiness and staleness of existence, or to shut out the boredom that is always ready to fill every pause that care leaves. From this it has arisen that the human spirit, not yet content with the cares, troubles and occupations laid on it by the real world, creates for itself, in the shape of a thousand different superstitions, an imaginary world besides, then busies itself with this in every way and squanders time and powers on it as soon as the real world will grant it the repose for which it is not at all receptive. This is therefore originally most the case with the peoples to whom the mildness of the climate and soil makes life easy, above all with the Hindus, then with the Greeks, Romans, and later with the Italians, Spaniards, and so on.—Demons, gods and saints man creates for himself after his own image; to these must then be offered unceas-

ingly sacrifices, prayers, temple decorations, vows and the fulfillment of them, pilgrimages, salutations, adorning of the images, and so on. Their service interweaves itself everywhere with reality, indeed obscures this: every event of life is then taken as a counteraction of those beings: association with them fills half the time of life, keeps hope constantly alive and, through the charm of deception, often becomes more interesting than that with real beings. It is the expression and the symptom of the twofold neediness of man, partly for help and assistance, and partly for occupation and pastime: and though it often works directly against the former need, in that, upon occurring mishaps and dangers, precious time and powers are uselessly spent on prayers and sacrifices instead of on averting them; it serves the second need so much the better, through that fantastic conversation with a dreamed-up world of spirits: and this is the by no means contemptible gain of all superstitions.

59 Having now, through the most general considerations, through investigation of the first elementary basic features of human life, convinced ourselves a priori to this extent that it, already by its whole constitution, is capable of no true happiness, but is essentially a many-shaped suffering and throughout an unblessed condition; we could now awaken this conviction in ourselves much more vividly if we, proceeding more a posteriori, were to go into the more determinate cases, bring pictures before the imagination, and depict in examples the nameless misery which experience and history present, wherever one may look and in whatever respect one may inquire. But the chapter would be endless and would remove us from the standpoint of generality which is essential to philosophy. Besides, one might easily take such a description for a mere declamation on human misery, of a kind often heard before, and accuse it as such of one-sidedness, because it proceeded from single facts. From such reproach and suspicion, therefore, our wholly cold and philosophical demonstration, proceeding from the general and conducted a priori, of the unavoidable suffering grounded in the essence of life, is free. The confirmation a posteriori, however, is everywhere easy to have. Everyone who has awakened from the first dreams of youth, who heeds his own and others' experience, who has looked about him in life, in

the history of the past and of his own age, finally in the works of the great poets, will, unless some indelibly imprinted prejudice paralyzes his power of judgment, surely recognize the result that this human world is the realm of chance and error, which rule in it mercilessly, in great things as in small, beside which, however, folly and malice too wield the scourge: hence it comes that everything better forces its way through only with difficulty, the noble and wise very seldom comes to appearance and finds effect or hearing, but the absurd and perverse in the realm of thought, the flat and insipid in the realm of art, the evil and insidious in the realm of deeds, disturbed only by brief interruptions, really maintain the dominion; whereas the excellent of every kind is always only an exception, one case in millions, hence also, if it has made itself known in a lasting work, this afterward, having outlived the grudge of its contemporaries, stands isolated, is preserved, like a meteoric stone, sprung from another order of things than the one that rules here.—As for the life of the individual, every life-history is a history of suffering: for every course of life is, as a rule, a continued series of great and small mishaps, which everyone conceals as much as possible, because he knows that others will seldom feel sympathy or pity at them, but almost always satisfaction through the idea of the plagues from which they are just now spared;—but perhaps never will a man, at the end of his life, if he is reflective and at the same time sincere, wish to go through it again, but rather than that much prefer entire non-existence. The essential content of the world-famous monologue in "Hamlet" is, summed up, this: Our condition is so wretched that entire non-being would be decidedly preferable. If suicide now really offered us this, so that the alternative "To be or not to be" in the full sense of the words lay before us; then it would be unconditionally to be chosen, as a most desirable consummation (a consummation devoutly to be wish'd). But there is something in us that tells us it is not so; that this is not the end of it, that death is no absolute annihilation.—Likewise, what the father of history already reports [15], and has probably not been refuted since, is that no man has existed who has not more than once wished not to live to see the following day. According to this the so often lamented brevity of life might perhaps be the best thing about it.—If one finally were to bring before the eyes of everyone

the dreadful pains and torments to which his life is constantly exposed, horror would seize him: and if one were to lead the most obdurate optimist through the hospitals, lazarets and surgical chambers of torment, through the prisons, torture-chambers and slave-pens, over battlefields and places of execution, then open to him all the dark dwellings of misery where it creeps away from the gaze of cold curiosity, and in conclusion let him look into the hunger tower of Ugolino; then surely he too would at last see what kind of thing this meilleur des mondes possibles is. Where else did Dante take the material for his hell than from this our actual world? And yet it turned out a quite proper hell. When, on the other hand, he came to the task of depicting heaven and its joys, he had an insurmountable difficulty before him; because precisely our world offers no materials at all for any such thing. Hence nothing remained to him but, instead of the joys of paradise, to give us again the instruction imparted to him there by his ancestor, his Beatrice and various saints. From this, however, it is sufficiently clear what kind of world this is. To be sure, in human life, as in every bad ware, the outside [16] Herodotus, VII, 46. is overlaid with false glitter: what suffers always hides itself; whereas whatever pomp and splendor anyone can muster he displays, and the more inner contentment he lacks, the more he wishes to stand in the opinion of others as one made happy: so far goes folly, and the opinion of others is a chief goal of everyone's striving, although the total nothingness of it is already expressed by the fact that in almost all languages vanity, vanitas, originally means emptiness and nothingness.—But even under all this delusion the torments of life can very easily grow so great, and it happens indeed daily, that death, otherwise feared above all things, is seized with eagerness. Indeed, when fate wishes to show all its malice, even this refuge can be barred to the sufferer, and he, in the hands of enraged enemies, be left without rescue to cruel, slow tortures. In vain then does the tortured man call upon his gods for help: he remains abandoned without mercy to his fate. This hopelessness of rescue, however, is precisely only the mirror of the invincibility of his will, whose objectivity his person is.—As little as any external power can alter or cancel this will, so little can any foreign power free him from the torments that proceed from life, which is the appearance of that will. Always man is thrown back

upon himself, in everything as in the chief matter. In vain does he make gods for himself, to beg and flatter from them what only his own power of will can bring about. If the Old Testament had made the world and man the work of a God, the New Testament, to teach that salvation and redemption from the misery of this world can proceed only from the world itself, saw itself compelled to let that God become man. Man's will it is, and remains, on which everything depends for him. Sannyasis, martyrs, saints of every faith and name, have voluntarily and gladly endured every torture, because in them the will to life had canceled itself; then, however, even the slow destruction of its appearance was welcome to them. But I do not want to anticipate the further exposition.—Moreover, I cannot withhold here the declaration that *optimism*, where it is not perhaps the thoughtless talk of those under whose flat foreheads nothing but words find lodging, appears to me not merely as an absurd but also as a truly *wicked* way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the nameless sufferings of humanity.—Let no one think, moreover, that the Christian doctrine of faith is favorable to optimism; since, on the contrary, in the Gospels world and evil are used almost as synonymous expressions [17].

60 Having now completed the two expositions whose interposition was necessary, namely that on the freedom of the will in itself, together with the necessity of its appearance, and then that on its lot in the world that mirrors its essence, on the knowledge of which it has to affirm or deny itself; we can now raise to greater distinctness this affirmation and denial itself, which above we only stated and explained in general, by presenting the modes of action in which alone it finds its expression and considering them according to their inner significance.

The affirmation of the will is the constant willing itself, undisturbed by any knowledge, as it fills the life of men in general. Since the body of man is already the objectivity of the will as it appears at this stage and in this individual; so his willing, developing in time, is as it were the paraphrase of the body, the explication of the significance of the whole and its parts, is another mode of presentation of the same thing in itself whose appearance the body also already is.

Hence, instead of affirmation of the will, we can also say affirmation of the body. The fundamental theme of all the manifold acts of will is the satisfaction of the needs which are inseparable from the existence of the body in its health, already have their expression in it and can be traced back to maintenance of the individual and propagation of the species. But mediately, through this, the [18] On this, chapter 46 of the second volume. most various motives acquire power over the will and bring forth the most manifold acts of will. Each of these is only a sample, an example, of the will appearing here in general: of what kind this sample is, what shape the motive has and imparts to it, is not essential; but only that there is willing at all, and with what degree of vehemence, is the point here. The will can become visible only in the motives, as the eye exerts its power of sight only in light. The motive in general stands before the will as a many-shaped Proteus: it promises always complete satisfaction, quenching of the thirst of will; but when it is attained, it at once stands there in another shape and in this moves the will anew, always according to its degree of vehemence and its relation to knowledge, which precisely through these samples and examples become manifest as empirical character.

From the moment his consciousness begins, a human being finds himself willing, and as a rule his knowledge stays in constant relation to his will. He first seeks to become fully acquainted with the objects of his willing, and then with the means to them. Now he knows what he has to do, and as a rule he strives for no other knowledge. He acts and presses on: the awareness of working always toward the goal of his willing keeps him upright and active; his thinking concerns the choice of means. Such is the life of nearly all human beings: they will, they know what they will, and they strive for it with just so much success as keeps them from despair, and just so much failure as keeps them from boredom and its consequences. From this arises a certain cheerfulness, or at least composure, which wealth or poverty really does not alter: for the rich and the poor do not enjoy what they have, since this, as has been shown, works only negatively, but what they hope to obtain by their busy striving. They press forward with great earnestness, even with an air of importance: just so children carry on their play.—It is always an exception when such a course of life suffers

disturbance because from a knowledge independent of the service of the will and directed at the essence of the world as a whole, there arises either the aesthetic summons to contemplation or the ethical summons to renunciation. Most are chased through life by need, without being allowed to come to reflection. Often, on the other hand, the will flares up to a degree far beyond the affirmation of the body, which then shows itself in violent affects and powerful passions, in which the individual not only affirms his own existence but denies that of the rest, and seeks to do away with it where it stands in his way.

The preservation of the body by its own forces is so slight a degree of the affirmation of the will that, if it remained there of its own accord, we could assume that with the death of this body the will that appeared in it was extinguished too. But the satisfaction of the sexual impulse already goes beyond the affirmation of one's own existence, which fills so short a time; it affirms life beyond the death of the individual, into an indeterminate time to come. Nature, always true and consistent, here even naive, lays the inner meaning of the act of procreation quite openly before us. Our own consciousness, the vehemence of the impulse, teaches us that in this act the most decisive *affirmation of the will to life* expresses itself, pure and without further admixture (of, say, the denial of other individuals); and now, in time and the causal series, that is, in nature, a new life appears as the consequence of the act: the begotten stands before the begetter, different from him in appearance, but in itself, or according to the Idea, identical with him. It is therefore this act through which the species of living beings each join together into a whole and perpetuate themselves as such. In relation to the begetter, procreation is only the expression, the symptom, of his decisive affirmation of the will to life; in relation to the begotten it is not, say, the ground of the will that appears in him, since the will in itself knows neither ground nor consequence; rather, like every cause, it is only the occasional cause of the appearance of this will at this time in this place. As thing in itself, the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, since only the appearance, not the thing in itself, is subject to the principium individuationis. With that affirmation beyond one's own body, and extending to the production of a new one, suffering and death, as belonging to the appearance of life,

are affirmed anew as well, and the possibility of redemption, brought about by the most perfect capacity for knowledge, is this time declared fruitless. Here lies the deep ground of the shame over the business of procreation.—This view is represented mythically in the dogma of the Christian doctrine of faith, that we all share in the fall of Adam (which is evidently nothing but the satisfaction of sexual desire) and through it are guilty of suffering and death. In this the doctrine goes beyond the consideration according to the principle of sufficient reason and recognizes the Idea of man, whose unity, shattered into countless individuals, is restored by the bond of procreation that holds all together. Accordingly it regards each individual, on the one hand, as identical with Adam, the representative of the affirmation of life, and to that extent as fallen prey to sin (original sin), suffering and death; on the other hand, the knowledge of the Idea shows it each individual also as identical with the Redeemer, the representative of the denial of the will to life, and to that extent as sharing in his self-sacrifice, redeemed by his merit and rescued from the bonds of sin and death, that is, of the world (Rom. 5, 12–21).

Another mythical representation of our view of sexual satisfaction as the affirmation of the will to life beyond the individual life, as a surrender to it consummated only thereby, or as it were a renewed bond given to life, is the Greek myth of Proserpina, for whom return from the underworld was still possible so long as she had not tasted the fruits of the underworld, but who through the eating of the pomegranate falls wholly to it. From Goethe's incomparable presentation of this myth its meaning speaks very clearly, especially when, immediately after the eating of the pomegranate, the unseen chorus of the Fates suddenly breaks in:

"You are ours! You were to return fasting: and the bite of the apple makes you ours!"

It is remarkable that *Clement of Alexandria* (Strom., III, c. 15) designates the matter by the same image and the same expression: Οἱ μεν ευνουχισαντες ἑαυτους απο πασης ἁμαρτιας, δια την βασιλειαν των ουρανων, μακαριοι οὑτοι εισιν, *οἱ του κοσμου νηστευοντες*. (Qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato, propter regnum coelorum, ii sunt beati, *a mundo jejunantes*.)

That the sexual impulse is the decisive, strongest affirmation of life is confirmed also by the fact that for natural man, as for the animal, it is the final purpose, the highest goal of his life. Self-preservation is his first striving, and as soon as he has provided for this, he strives only for the propagation of the species: more he cannot strive for as a merely natural being. Nature too, whose inner essence is the will to life itself, drives man, like the animal, with all its force toward propagation. Once that is done, it has achieved its purpose with the individual and is wholly indifferent to its perishing, since for nature, as the will to life, only the preservation of the species matters, the individual being nothing to it.—Because in the sexual impulse the inner essence of nature, the will to life, expresses itself most strongly, the ancient poets and philosophers—Hesiod and Parmenides—said, very significantly, that *Eros* is the first, the creating one, the principle from which all things proceeded. (See Aristot. Metaph., I, 4.) Pherecydes said: Εις ερωτα μεταβεβλησθαι τον Δια, μελλοντα δημιουργειν. (Jovem, cum mundum fabricare vellet, in cupidinem sese transformasse.) Proclus ad Plat. Tim., l. III.—We have recently received a thorough treatment of this subject from *G. F. Schoemann*, "De cupidine cosmogonico," 1852. The Maya of the Indians, too, whose work and web is the whole world of semblance, is paraphrased by amor.

The genitals, far more than any other external member of the body, are subject solely to the will and not at all to knowledge: indeed, the will shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge as in those parts which, on occasion of mere stimuli, serve vegetative life, reproduction, and in which the will works blindly, as in nature devoid of knowledge. For procreation is only reproduction passing over to a new individual, reproduction to the second power, as it were, just as death is only excretion to the second power.—By all this the genitals are the real *focal point* of the will, and consequently the opposite pole to the brain, the representative of knowledge, that is, of the other side of the world, the world as representation. The former are the life-sustaining principle, assuring to time an endless life; in which capacity they were revered among the Greeks in the phallus, among the Hindus in the lingam, which are therefore the symbol

of the affirmation of the will. Knowledge, on the other hand, gives the possibility of the abolition of willing, of redemption through freedom, of the overcoming and annihilation of the world.

We have already considered at length at the beginning of this fourth book how the will to life, in its affirmation, has to regard its relation to death: namely, that death does not assail it, because death stands there as something already comprised in life itself and belonging to it, which is entirely balanced by its opposite, procreation, which, despite the death of the individual, secures and guarantees life to the will to life for all time; to express which the Indians gave the death-god Shiva the lingam as his attribute. We also set forth there how he who stands, with perfect reflective clarity, on the standpoint of decided affirmation of life looks death in the face without fear. Hence nothing more of this here. Without clear reflection most human beings stand on this standpoint and continually affirm life. As the mirror of this affirmation the world stands there, with countless individuals, in endless time and endless space, and endless suffering, between procreation and death without end.—Yet no further complaint is to be raised on this account from any side: for the will performs the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and is also its own spectator. The world is just such as it is because the will, whose appearance it is, is such, because it so wills. The justification for the sufferings is that the will affirms itself also in this appearance; and this affirmation is justified and balanced by the fact that the will bears the sufferings. A view opens to us here already of *eternal justice*, in the whole; further on we shall recognize it more closely and distinctly in particulars as well. But first we must still speak of temporal or human justice [19].

61 We recall from the second book that throughout nature, at all stages of the objectification of the will, there was necessarily a constant struggle among the individuals of all species, and that through this an inner conflict of the will to life with itself expressed itself. At the highest stage of objectification this phenomenon too, like everything else, will present itself with heightened distinctness, and can therefore be deciphered further. To this end we shall first trace *egoism*, as the starting point of all struggle, to its source.

Time and space we have called the principium individuationis, because only through them and in them is a plurality of the homogeneous possible. They are the essential forms of natural knowledge, that is, of knowledge sprung from the will. Hence the will everywhere appears in a plurality of individuals. But this plurality does not touch it, the will as thing in itself, but only its appearances: the will is present in each of these whole and undivided, and sees around it the countlessly repeated image of its own essence. This itself, however, the really real, it finds directly only within. Hence each wants everything for himself, wants to possess everything, or at least to rule it, and whatever resists him he would destroy. To this is added, in knowing beings, that the individual is the bearer of the knowing subject, and this the bearer of the world; that is, that the whole of nature outside him, and so all other individuals too, exist only in his representation, that he is always conscious of them only as his representation, hence merely indirectly and as something dependent on his own essence and existence; for with his consciousness the world necessarily perishes for him too, that is, its being and non-being become equivalent and indistinguishable. Every knowing individual [20] On this, chapter 45 of the second volume. is therefore in truth, and finds himself to be, the whole will to life, or the in-itself of the world itself, and also the supplementary condition of the world as representation, consequently a microcosm to be valued as equal to the macrocosm. Nature itself, always and everywhere truthful, gives him this knowledge, originally and independently of all reflection, simply and with immediate certainty. From the two necessary determinations given it is now explained that every individual, wholly vanishing in the boundless world and reduced to nothing, nonetheless makes himself the center of the world, considers his own existence and well-being before everything else, indeed, from the natural standpoint, is ready to sacrifice everything else to it, ready to annihilate the world in order only to preserve a little longer his own self, this drop in the ocean. This disposition is *egoism*, which is essential to everything in nature. But it is precisely this by which the inner conflict of the will with itself comes to fearful revelation. For this egoism has its subsistence and essence in that opposition of microcosm and macrocosm, or in the fact that the objectification of the will has the prin-

cipium individuationis for its form and thereby the will appears in the same way in countless individuals, and indeed in each of them wholly and completely on both sides (will and representation). While, therefore, each is immediately given to himself as the whole will and the whole representing subject, the others are given to him at first only as his representations; hence his own essence and its preservation take precedence over all others together. Each looks on his own death as on the end of the world, while he hears of the death of his acquaintances as a rather indifferent matter, unless he is personally concerned in it. In the consciousness raised to the highest degree, the human, egoism, like knowledge, pain and joy, must have reached the highest degree, and the conflict of individuals conditioned by it must emerge in the most terrible way. This we see everywhere before our eyes, in small things as in great, we see it now from the terrible side, in the lives of great tyrants and villains and in world-devastating wars, now from the ridiculous side, where it is the theme of comedy and shows itself most especially in self-conceit and vanity, which, as no one else has done, Rochefoucauld grasped and presented in abstracto: we see it in world history and in our own experience. But it emerges most clearly as soon as any crowd of human beings is released from all law and order: then at once the bellum omnium contra omnes shows itself in the plainest way, which Hobbes portrayed admirably in the first chapter of de cive. It shows itself how not only each seeks to wrest from the other what he himself wants to have, but even how often one, in order to increase his own well-being by an insignificant addition, destroys the whole happiness or life of another. This is the highest expression of egoism, whose appearances in this respect are surpassed only by those of real malice, which, quite disinterestedly and without any advantage of its own, seeks the harm and pain of others; of this we shall soon speak.—With this uncovering of the source of egoism compare the account of it in my prize essay on the foundation of morals, § 14.

A chief source of the suffering which we found above to be essential and unavoidable to all life is, as soon as it actually enters and in determinate shape, that *Eris*, the struggle of all individuals, the expression of the contradiction with which the will to life is inwardly afflicted, and which reaches visibility

through the principium individuationis: to illustrate it directly and glaringly, animal combats are the cruel means. In this primal discord lies an inexhaustible source of suffering, despite the precautions that have been taken against it, and which we shall presently consider more closely.

62 It has already been set out that the first and simple affirmation of the will to life is only the affirmation of one's own body, that is, the presentation of the will through acts in time, insofar as the body, in its form and fitness for its ends, already presents the same will in space, and no further. This affirmation shows itself as the preservation of the body by the application of its own forces. Immediately bound up with it is the satisfaction of the sexual impulse, indeed belonging to it, insofar as the genitals belong to the body. Hence *voluntary* renunciation of the satisfaction of that impulse, founded on no *motive* whatever, is already denial of the will to life, is a voluntary self-abolition of the will, brought about by knowledge that has entered and works as a *quietive*: accordingly such denial of one's own body already presents itself as a contradiction of the will against its own appearance. For although here too the body objectifies in the genitals the will to reproduction, reproduction is nonetheless not willed. For just this reason, namely because it is denial or abolition of the will to life, such renunciation is a hard and painful self-conquest; but of this further below. —Now, however, since the will presents that *self-affirmation* of one's own body in countless individuals side by side, by virtue of the egoism peculiar to all it very easily goes, in one individual, beyond this affirmation to the *denial* of the same will appearing in another individual. The will of the first breaks into the boundary of the other's affirmation of will, either in that the individual destroys or injures the foreign body itself, or else in that he compels the forces of that foreign body to serve *his* will instead of the will appearing in that foreign body itself; that is, when he withdraws the forces of this body from the will that appears as a foreign body, and thereby increases the force serving *his* will beyond that of his own body, and consequently affirms his own will beyond his own body by means of the denial of the will appearing in a foreign body.—This breaking into the boundary of another's affirmation of will has

always been clearly recognized, and the concept of it designated by the word *wrong*. For both parties recognize the matter instantly, not indeed as we do here in distinct abstraction, but as a feeling. The one who suffers wrong feels the breaking into the sphere of the affirmation of his own body, through its denial by a foreign individual, as an immediate and spiritual pain, entirely separate and different from the physical suffering felt alongside it from the deed, or the vexation at the loss. To the one who does wrong, on the other hand, there presents itself the knowledge that he is in himself the same will that appears also in that body, and that affirms itself in the one appearance with such vehemence that, overstepping the boundary of his own body and its forces, it becomes the denial of just this will in the other appearance, and consequently that he, considered as will in itself, precisely through his vehemence wars against himself, tears himself to pieces;—this knowledge too, I say, presents itself to him instantly, not in abstracto, but as an obscure feeling: and this is called remorse of conscience, or, more closely for this case, the feeling of *wrong done*.

Wrong, whose concept we have thus analyzed in the most general abstraction, expresses itself in concreto most completely, most properly and most palpably in cannibalism: this is its clearest, most evident type, the dreadful picture of the greatest conflict of the will against itself at the highest stage of its objectification, which is man. Next to this, it expresses itself in murder, upon whose commission, therefore, the remorse of conscience, whose meaning we have just stated abstractly and drily, follows instantly with fearful distinctness and strikes the peace of mind with a wound incurable for the whole of life; since our horror at a murder committed, like our recoil from one that is to be committed, corresponds to the boundless attachment to life by which everything living, precisely as appearance of the will to life, is pervaded. (Incidentally, that feeling which accompanies the commission of wrong and of evil, or the anguish of conscience, we shall further on dissect more fully and raise to distinctness of concept.) As essentially of the same kind as murder and differing from it only in degree, we must regard deliberate maiming, or mere injury of a foreign body, indeed every blow.—Further, wrong presents itself in the subjugation of

another individual, in forcing him into slavery; finally in the attack on foreign property, which, insofar as property is regarded as the fruit of its owner's labor, is essentially of the same kind as that, and is related to it as mere injury is to murder.

For *property*, which cannot be taken from a man *without wrong*, can, according to our explanation of wrong, only be that which has been worked on by his forces, by the withdrawal of which one therefore withdraws the forces of his body from the will objectified in it, to let them serve the will objectified in another body. For only so does the one who does wrong, by attacking not the foreign body but a lifeless thing entirely different from it, nonetheless break into the sphere of the other's affirmation of will, since the forces, the labor, of the foreign body are as it were grown together and identified with this thing. From this it follows that all genuine, that is, moral right of property is originally founded solely and only on working upon the thing; as people generally assumed even before Kant, indeed as the oldest of all law-books says plainly and beautifully: "Wise men who know the past declare that a cultivated field is the property of him who cut down the timber, cleared it and plowed it; just as an antelope belongs to the first hunter who mortally wounded it."—Laws of Manu, IX, 44.—Only from Kant's senility do I explain his whole doctrine of right, as a strange entanglement of errors drawing one another after them, and this too, that he wants to found the right of property on first seizure. For how should the mere declaration of my will to exclude others from the use of a thing immediately give, of itself, a *right* to do so? Plainly it needs first a ground of right itself; instead of which Kant assumes that it is one. And how should he in himself, that is, morally, act wrongly, who did not respect those claims to sole possession of a thing, founded on nothing but their own declaration? How should his conscience trouble him over it? since it is so clear and easy to see that there can be absolutely no *rightful seizure*, but solely a rightful appropriation, acquisition of possession of the thing, through the expenditure of originally one's own forces upon it. For where a thing has been worked on, improved, protected from mishaps, preserved, by whatever foreign effort, be it ever so small, and were this effort only the plucking or picking up from the ground of

a wild-grown fruit, there the one who attacks such a thing evidently withdraws from the other the result of the force he expended on it, thus makes the body of that other serve *his* will instead of its own, affirms his own will beyond its appearance up to the denial of the other's, that is, does wrong [21].—Mere enjoyment of a thing, on the other hand, without any working on it or securing it against destruction, gives just as little right to it as the declaration of one's will to sole possession. Hence, if a family has hunted alone in a preserve for a century, without having done anything to improve it, it cannot, without moral wrong, prevent a stranger who now wants to hunt there. The so-called right of prior occupation, then, according to which, for mere enjoyment already had of a thing, one demands in addition a reward, namely the exclusive right to further enjoyment, is morally quite groundless. To him who relied solely on this right the newcomer might reply with much better right: "Precisely because you have already enjoyed for so long, it is right that now others too should enjoy." Of every thing that is absolutely not capable of being worked on, by improvement or securing against mishap, there is no morally founded sole possession; unless by voluntary cession on the part of all others, say as reward for other services; which, however, already presupposes a community regulated by convention, the state.—The morally founded right of property, as derived above, gives the owner, by its nature, just as unlimited a power over the thing as he has over his own body; from which it follows that he can transfer his property to others, by exchange or gift, [22] It does not require, then, for the foundation of the natural right of property, the assumption of two grounds of right side by side, the one founded on *detention*, beside the one founded on *formation*; the latter suffices everywhere. Only the name *formation* is not quite fitting, since the expenditure of some effort on a thing need not always be a giving of form. who then possess the thing with the same moral right as he.

As for the *commission* of wrong in general, it takes place either by *force* or by *cunning*; which, with regard to what is morally essential, is all one. First, in murder it is morally all one whether I use the dagger or poison; and in an analogous way with every bodily injury. The other cases of wrong are always to be traced back to this, that I, committing wrong, compel the foreign individual to

serve my will instead of his, to act according to my will instead of his. By way of force I attain this through physical causality; by way of cunning, however, by means of motivation, that is, causality that has passed through knowledge, consequently by putting before his will *sham motives*, by virtue of which, believing he is following his own will, he follows *mine*. Since the medium in which motives lie is knowledge, I can do this only by falsifying his knowledge, and this is *lying*. It always aims at influence on the foreign will, not on his knowledge alone, by itself and as such, but on that only as a means, namely insofar as it determines his will. For my lying itself, as proceeding from my will, requires a motive: but such a motive can only be the foreign will, not the foreign knowledge in and for itself; since as such it can never have an influence on *my* will, hence can never move it, never be a motive of its ends: only the foreign willing and doing can be such, and through it, thus only mediately, the foreign knowledge. This holds not only of all lies sprung from obvious self-interest, but also of those proceeding from pure malice, which wants to feast on the painful consequences of the foreign error it has occasioned. Even mere braggartry aims, by means of the heightened regard or improved opinion thereby won from others, at greater or easier influence on their willing and doing. The mere refusal of a truth, that is, of a statement at all, is in itself no wrong, but every palming off of a lie certainly is. He who refuses to show the lost traveler the right road does him no wrong; but he does who points him to the wrong one.—From what has been said it follows that every *lie*, just like every act of violence, as such is *wrong*; because it already as such has for its aim to extend the dominion of my will to foreign individuals, thus to affirm my will through the denial of theirs, just as force does.—The most perfect lie, however, is the *broken contract*; for here all the determinations enumerated are completely and distinctly together. For in entering a contract, the foreign promised performance is immediately and avowedly the motive for my own now to follow. The promises are exchanged with deliberation and formally. The truth of the statement made therein by each stands, by assumption, in his power. If the other breaks the contract, he has deceived me and, by thrusting mere sham motives into my knowledge,

steered my will according to his intention, extended the dominion of his will over the foreign individual, and thus committed a perfect wrong. On this is founded the moral lawfulness and validity of *contracts*.

Wrong by force is not so disgraceful for the doer as wrong by cunning; because the former bears witness to physical strength, which under all circumstances impresses the human race; the latter, on the other hand, by its use of the roundabout way, betrays weakness, and so lowers him as a physical and moral being at once; besides, because lying and deceit can succeed only by the doer at the same time himself expressing abhorrence and contempt against them in order to win confidence, and his victory rests on people crediting him with the honesty that he lacks.—The deep abhorrence which craftiness, faithlessness and treachery everywhere arouse rests on the fact that fidelity and honesty are the bond which, from outside, unites into unity again the will fragmented into the plurality of individuals, and thereby sets limits to the consequences of the egoism that has proceeded from that fragmentation. Faithlessness and treachery tear this last, outer bond, and thereby give the consequences of egoism boundless scope.

In the context of our manner of consideration we have found as the content of the concept *wrong* the character of the action of an individual in which he extends the affirmation of the will appearing in his body so far that it becomes the denial of the will appearing in foreign bodies. We have also, by quite general examples, pointed out the boundary where the domain of wrong begins, at the same time determining its gradations from the highest degree to the lower by a few chief concepts. Accordingly the concept *wrong* is the original and positive one: the opposite concept of *right* is the derived and negative one. For we must keep not to the words but to the concepts. In fact *right* would never have been spoken of had there been no wrong. The concept *right* contains merely the negation of wrong, and under it is subsumed every action that is not an overstepping of the boundary set forth above, that is, not a denial of the foreign will for the sake of stronger affirmation of one's own. That boundary therefore divides, with regard to a purely *moral* determination, the whole domain of possible actions into those which are wrong or right. As soon as an action does

not, in the manner set out above, intervene in the sphere of the foreign affirmation of will, denying it, it is not wrong. Hence, for example, the refusal of help in another's urgent need, the calm looking on at another's death by hunger while one has plenty, is cruel and devilish, to be sure, but not wrong: only it can be said with perfect certainty that whoever is capable of carrying lovelessness and hardness to such a degree will also most certainly commit any wrong as soon as his wishes demand it and no constraint prevents it.

The concept of *right*, as the negation of wrong, has found its chief application, and without doubt its first origin too, in the cases where attempted wrong is warded off by force, a warding off that cannot itself be wrong again and is therefore right; although the violence exercised in it, considered merely in itself and torn from its context, would be wrong, and here is justified only by its motive, that is, becomes right. If an individual goes so far in the affirmation of his own will that he breaks into the sphere of the affirmation of will essential to my person as such and thereby denies it, then my warding off of that intrusion is only the denial of that denial, and to that extent on my side nothing more than the affirmation of the will that appears essentially and originally in my body and is already expressed implicitly by its mere appearance; consequently not wrong, and so right. This means: I then have a right to deny that foreign denial with the force necessary to abolish it, which, as is easy to see, can go as far as the killing of the foreign individual, whose encroachment, as an intruding external force, can be warded off with a counteraction somewhat outweighing it, without any wrong, consequently with right; because everything that happens on my side always lies only in the sphere of the affirmation of will that is essential to my person as such and already expressed by it (which is the scene of the struggle), and does not intrude into the foreign sphere, and is consequently only the negation of a negation, thus affirmation, not itself negation. I can therefore, *without wrong*, compel the foreign will that denies my will, as this appears in my body and in the use of its forces for its preservation, without denial of any foreign will that keeps within the same limits, to desist from this denial: that is, to that extent I have a *right of coercion*.

In all cases where I have a right of coercion, a perfect right to use *force* against others, I can, as circumstances require, just as well oppose cunning to foreign force without doing wrong, and consequently have a *real right to lie, exactly as far as I have the right to coerce*. Hence someone who assures a highway robber searching him that he has nothing more on him acts quite rightly: so too he who lures a robber who has broken in at night into a cellar by a lie and locks him up there. Whoever is carried off captive by robbers, say by Barbary corsairs, has the right, for his liberation, to kill them not only by open force but also by stealth.—For this reason too a promise extorted by immediate bodily violence is not binding at all; because the one who suffers such coercion can, with full right, free himself from his oppressors by killing them, to say nothing of deceiving them. Whoever cannot take back by force his property that has been robbed from him commits no wrong if he procures it for himself by cunning. Indeed, if someone gambles away my money that he has robbed from me, I have the right to use false dice against him, because everything I win from him already belongs to me. Whoever would deny this would have to deny still more the lawfulness of stratagem in war, which is even an actual lie in deed and a proof of the saying of Queen Christina of Sweden: "The words of men are to be counted for nothing; one can scarcely trust even their deeds."—So sharply does the boundary of right graze that of wrong. Incidentally, I hold it superfluous to demonstrate that all this agrees perfectly with what was said above about the wrongfulness of the lie, as of violence: it can also serve to clarify the strange theories about the lie of necessity [23].

By all that has gone before, then, wrong and right are merely *moral* determinations, that is, such as hold good with regard to the consideration of human action as such, and in relation to *the inner meaning of this action in itself*. This announces itself immediately in consciousness, in that, on the one hand, the doing of wrong is accompanied by an inner pain, which is the merely felt consciousness, in the one who does wrong, of the excessive strength of the affirmation of the will in himself, which goes to the degree of denying the foreign appearance of will; and also of the fact that he, though as appearance different from the one who suffers wrong, is in himself identical with him. The further

exposition of this inner meaning of all anguish of conscience can follow only further below. The one who suffers wrong, on the other hand, is painfully conscious of the denial of his will, as this is already expressed by his body and its natural needs, for whose satisfaction nature refers him to the forces of this body, [24] The further exposition of the doctrine of right set up here is to be found in my prize essay "On the Foundation of Morals," §. 17, pp. 221–230 of the first edition. and is also at the same time conscious that he could, without doing wrong, ward off that denial in every way, if power were not lacking to him. This purely moral meaning is the only one that right and wrong have for man as man, not as citizen of a state; it would consequently remain even in the state of nature, without any positive law, and it constitutes the foundation and content of all that has therefore been called *natural right*, but which would better be called moral right, since its validity extends not to suffering, to external reality, but only to doing and to the self-knowledge of his individual will which arises from it for man, and which is called *conscience*; in the state of nature, however, it cannot in every case also assert itself outwardly, over other individuals, and prevent force from ruling instead of right. In the state of nature it depends, namely, on each man merely not to *do* wrong in every case, but by no means not to *suffer* wrong in every case, which depends on his accidental external power. Hence the concepts of right and wrong are indeed valid for the state of nature too and by no means conventional; but there they hold merely as *moral* concepts, for the self-knowledge of one's own will in each. They are, namely, on the scale of the most various degrees of strength with which the will to life affirms itself in human individuals, a fixed point, like the freezing point on the thermometer, namely the point where the affirmation of one's own will becomes the denial of the foreign, that is, the point which indicates, by the doing of wrong, the degree of its vehemence, together with the degree of the entanglement of knowledge in the principium individuationis (which is the form of knowledge standing wholly in the service of the will). But whoever wants to set aside or disown the purely moral consideration of human action, and to consider action merely according to its external efficacy and its outcome, can indeed, with *Hobbes*, declare right and wrong to be conventional

determinations, arbitrarily adopted and therefore not existing at all outside positive law, and we can never bring home to him by external experience what does not belong to external experience; just as we cannot show the same *Hobbes*—who characterizes that thoroughly empirical cast of his thinking most remarkably by denying, in his book "De principiis Geometrarum," the whole of really pure mathematics and stubbornly asserting that the point has extension and the line breadth—ever a point without extension and a line without breadth, and so can bring home to him the apriority of mathematics as little as the apriority of right, because he has once for all closed himself to every non-empirical knowledge.

The pure *doctrine of right* is therefore a chapter of *morals* and refers directly only to *doing*, not to *suffering*. For only the former is an expression of the will, and morals considers this alone. Suffering is a mere occurrence: morals can take suffering into account only indirectly, namely solely in order to show that what is done merely in order to suffer no wrong is no doing of wrong.—The working out of that chapter of morals would have for its content the exact determination of the boundary up to which an individual can go in the affirmation of the will already objectified in his body without this becoming the denial of just that will insofar as it appears in another individual, and then also of the actions that overstep this boundary, are consequently wrong, and therefore can in turn be warded off without wrong. Thus one's own *doing* would always remain the focus of the inquiry.

In external experience, however, as occurrence, *suffering wrong* appears, and in it there manifests itself, as said, more clearly than anywhere, the appearance of the conflict of the will to life against itself, proceeding from the plurality of individuals and from egoism, both of which are conditioned by the principium individuationis, which is the form of the world as representation for the knowledge of the individual. We have also seen above that a very great part of the suffering essential to human life has its ever-flowing source in that conflict of individuals.

The reason common to all these individuals, which lets them know, unlike the animals, not merely the single case but also the whole in its connection, abstractly, soon taught them, however, to see the source of that suffering and made them consider a means of lessening it, or where possible abolishing it, through a common sacrifice, which is, however, outweighed by the advantage arising from it in common. For however agreeable the doing of wrong may be, on occasion, to the egoism of the individual, it has nevertheless a necessary correlate in the suffering of wrong by another individual, to whom this is a great pain. And as reason, thinking over the whole, stepped out of the one-sided standpoint of the individual to whom it belongs and freed itself for the moment from attachment to it, it saw the enjoyment of doing wrong in one individual each time outweighed by a proportionally greater pain in the suffering of wrong of the other, and found further that, because everything was here left to chance, each would have to fear that the enjoyment of occasional wrongdoing would fall to his lot far more seldom than the pain of suffering wrong. Reason recognized from this that, both to lessen the suffering spread over all and to distribute it as evenly as possible, the best and only means was to spare all the pain of suffering wrong, by having all renounce also the enjoyment to be gained by doing wrong.—This means, then, readily devised by egoism, which proceeds methodically through the use of reason and leaves its one-sided standpoint, and gradually perfected, is the *compact of the state* or *law*. As I here state its origin, Plato already presents it in the Republic. In fact that origin is essentially the only one and is set by the nature of the thing. Nor can the state, in any country, ever have had another, because it is precisely this manner of origin, this purpose, that makes it a state; though it is a matter of indifference whether the condition that preceded it in each particular people was that of a crowd of savages independent of one another (anarchy), or of a crowd of slaves ruled arbitrarily by the stronger (despotism). In both cases there was as yet no state: only through that common agreement does it come into being, and according as this agreement is more or less unmixed with anarchy or despotism, the state too is more or less perfect.

Republics tend toward anarchy, monarchies toward despotism, the middle way of constitutional monarchy, devised for that reason, tends toward the rule of factions. To found a perfect state one must begin by creating beings whose nature permits them throughout to sacrifice their own good to the public good. Until then, however, something can already be attained by there being a family whose welfare is wholly inseparable from that of the country, so that it can never, at least in the main things, promote the one without the other. On this rest the strength and the advantage of hereditary monarchy.

If morals concerned itself exclusively with the *doing* of right or wrong, and could mark out exactly the boundary of his action for anyone resolved to do no wrong, then, conversely, the theory of the state, the doctrine of legislation, concerns itself solely with the *suffering* of wrong, and would never trouble itself about the *doing* of wrong were it not for its always necessary correlate, the suffering of wrong, which, as the enemy it works against, is its object. Indeed, were a doing of wrong conceivable with which no suffering of wrong on another side was connected, the state would, consistently, in no way forbid it.—Further, because in *morals* the will, the disposition, is the object of consideration and alone real, the firm will to a wrong yet to be committed, which only external power holds back and renders ineffective, counts for morals as quite equal to wrong actually committed, and it condemns the one who so wills as unjust before its judgment seat. The state, on the contrary, is not at all concerned with will and disposition merely as such, but solely with the *deed* (whether merely attempted or carried out) because of its correlate, the suffering on the other side: for the state, therefore, the deed, the occurrence, is alone real: the disposition, the intention, is investigated only insofar as the meaning of the deed becomes recognizable from it. Hence the state will forbid no one to carry murder and poison against another constantly in thought, so long as it knows for certain that the fear of sword and wheel will constantly check the effects of that willing. Nor has the state at all the foolish plan of uprooting the inclination to do wrong, the evil disposition; its plan is only to set beside every possible motive for the commission of a wrong a preponderating motive for refraining from it, in the inevitable punishment: accordingly the criminal code is as

complete a register as possible of counter-motives to all criminal actions presumed possible,—both in abstracto, in order to make the application in concreto when a case occurs. The theory of the state, or legislation, will now, for this purpose of its own, borrow from morals that chapter which is the doctrine of right and which, besides the inner meaning of right and wrong, determines the exact boundary between the two, but solely and only in order to use its reverse side and to look at all the boundaries which morals gives as not to be crossed if one does not want to *do* wrong, from the other side, as the boundaries whose crossing by another one must not tolerate if one does not want to *suffer* wrong, and from which one therefore has a *right* to drive others back: hence these boundaries are now, from the possibly passive side, fortified by laws. It turns out that, as the historian has been called, quite wittily, a prophet turned around, the jurist is the moralist turned about, and therefore the doctrine of right in the proper sense, that is, the doctrine of the *rights* one may assert, is morals turned about, in the chapter where morals teaches the rights one may not violate. The concept of wrong and of its negation, right, which is originally *moral*, becomes *juridical* by the shifting of the point of departure from the active to the passive side, that is, by a turning about. This, together with the doctrine of right of Kant, who very falsely derives the establishment of the state as a moral duty from his categorical imperative, has then in the most recent times too, here and there, occasioned the very strange error that the state is an institution for the promotion of morality, proceeds from the striving for it and is accordingly directed against egoism. As if the inner disposition, to which alone morality or immorality belongs, the eternally free will, could be modified from without and changed by influence! Still more perverse is the theorem that the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense and thereby of morality: whereas freedom lies beyond appearance, let alone beyond human institutions. The state is, as said, so little directed against egoism in general and as such that, on the contrary, it has sprung precisely from the egoism of all, an egoism that rightly understands itself, proceeds methodically, steps from the one-sided to the general standpoint and thus, by summation, becomes common, and it exists only to serve that egoism; it is set up under the correct presupposition

that pure morality, that is, right action from moral grounds, is not to be expected, since otherwise the state itself would be superfluous. Not at all against egoism, then, but solely against the disadvantageous consequences of egoism, which arise from the plurality of egoistic individuals reciprocally for all of them and disturb their well-being, is the state directed, aiming at this well-being. Hence *Aristotle* already says (De Rep., III): Τελος μεν ουν πολεως το ευ ζην· τουτο δε εστιν το ζην ευδαιμονως και καλως. (Finis civitatis est bene vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere.) *Hobbes* too has set out this origin and purpose of the state quite correctly and admirably; as the old maxim of all political order, salus publica prima lex esto, likewise designates the same.—When the state attains its purpose completely, it will produce the same appearance as if perfect justice of disposition prevailed universally. But the inner essence and origin of the two appearances will be the reverse. Namely, in the latter case it would be this, that no one wanted to *do* wrong; but in the former this, that no one wanted to *suffer* wrong and the proper means to this end were perfectly applied. Thus the same line can be described from opposite directions, and a beast of prey with a muzzle is as harmless as a grass-eating animal.—Beyond this point, however, the state cannot go: it cannot, then, show an appearance like that which would spring from universal mutual benevolence and love. For as we have just found that, by its nature, it would not forbid a doing of wrong to which no suffering of wrong on another side corresponded, and forbids every doing of wrong merely because this is impossible; so, conversely, according to its tendency directed to the well-being of all, it would very gladly see to it that everyone *experienced* benevolence and works of human love of every kind; were not these too to have an unavoidable correlate in the doing of benefits and works of love, in which, however, every citizen of the state would want to take the passive, none the active part, and the latter could on no ground be expected of one rather than another. Accordingly only the negative, which is precisely *right*, can be *enforced*, not the positive, which has been understood under the name of duties of love, or imperfect duties.

Legislation, as said, borrows the pure doctrine of right, or the doctrine of the essence and boundaries of right and wrong, from morals, in order to apply it now, from the reverse side, to its own purposes, which are foreign to morals, and accordingly to set up positive legislation and the means of upholding it, that is, the state. Positive legislation is therefore the purely moral doctrine of right applied from its reverse side: this application can take place with regard to the peculiar relations and circumstances of a particular people. But only if positive legislation is determined throughout, in essentials, by the guidance of the pure doctrine of right, and for each of its enactments a ground in the pure doctrine of right can be shown, is the resulting legislation properly a *positive right*, and the state a *rightful* association, *state* in the proper sense of the word, a morally permissible, not immoral, institution. Otherwise, on the contrary, positive legislation is the establishment of a *positive wrong*, is itself a publicly avowed, enforced wrong. Such is every despotism, the constitution of most Mohammedan realms; to this belong even some parts of many constitutions, for example serfdom, compulsory labor service, and the like.—The pure doctrine of right, or natural right, better called moral right, underlies every rightful positive legislation, though always by inversion, as pure mathematics underlies every branch of the applied. The most important points of the pure doctrine of right, as philosophy has to hand them over to legislation for that purpose, are the following: 1) Explanation of the inner and proper meaning and origin of the concepts wrong and right, and of their application and place in morals. 2) The derivation of the right of property. 3) The derivation of the moral validity of contracts; since this is the moral foundation of the compact of the state. 4) The explanation of the origin and purpose of the state, of the relation of this purpose to morals, and of the transfer of the moral doctrine of right to legislation, by inversion, which is appropriate in consequence of this relation. 5) The derivation of the right of punishment.—The remaining content of the doctrine of right is mere application of those principles, closer determination of the boundaries of right and wrong, for all possible relations of life, which are therefore united and divided under certain points of view and titles. In these particular doctrines the textbooks of pure right all agree fairly well: only in the

principles do they sound very different; because these are always connected with some philosophical system. Having, in accordance with ours, discussed the first four of those chief points briefly and in general terms, yet definitely and distinctly, we have still to speak likewise of the right of punishment.

Kant sets up the wholly false assertion that outside the state there is no perfect right of property. According to our derivation above, there is property even in the state of nature, with perfect natural, that is, moral right, which cannot be violated without wrong, but can be defended to the utmost without wrong. On the other hand it is certain that outside the state there is no *right of punishment*. All right to punish is founded solely on the positive law, which, before the offense, has fixed a penalty for it, the threat of which, as a counter-motive, is to outweigh any motives there may be to that offense. This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned and recognized by all citizens of the state. It is therefore founded on a common contract, to whose fulfillment under all circumstances, thus to the carrying out of punishment on the one side and to the toleration of it on the other, the members of the state are bound; hence the toleration can rightfully be enforced. Consequently the immediate *purpose of punishment* in the individual case is the *fulfillment of the law as a contract*. The sole purpose of the law, however, is *deterrence* from infringement of the rights of others: for in order that everyone may be protected from suffering wrong, people have united in the state, renounced doing wrong, and taken upon themselves the burdens of maintaining the state. The law, therefore, and its execution, punishment, are essentially directed to the *future*, not to the *past*. This distinguishes *punishment* from *revenge*, the latter being motivated solely by what has happened, thus by the past as such. All requital of wrong by the infliction of a pain, without purpose for the future, is revenge, and can have no other purpose than to console oneself for what one has suffered by the sight of the other's suffering, which one has oneself caused. Such is malice and cruelty, and ethically not to be justified. Wrong that someone has done me does not at all authorize me to do wrong to him. Requital of evil with evil, without further intention, is neither morally nor otherwise to be justified by any rational ground, and the jus talionis set up as an independent, ultimate principle of the

right of punishment is void of sense. Hence Kant's theory of punishment as mere requital, for the sake of requital, is a wholly groundless and perverse view. And yet it still haunts the writings of many jurists, under all sorts of distinguished phrases, which amount to empty verbiage, such as: by punishment the crime is expiated, or neutralized and canceled, and the like. But no human being has the authority to set himself up as purely moral avenger and requiter and to visit the misdeeds of another with pains that he inflicts on him, thus imposing penance for them upon him. This would rather be a most presumptuous arrogation; hence precisely the Biblical "Vengeance is mine, says the Lord, and I will repay." But man certainly has the right to provide for the safety of society: this, however, can happen only by proscribing all the actions designated by the word "criminal," in order to forestall them by counter-motives, which are the threatened penalties; which threat can be effective only through execution in the case that nonetheless occurs. That the purpose of punishment, or more exactly of the penal law, is deterrence from crime, is so generally recognized, indeed so self-evident a truth, that it is even expressed in England in the very old formula of accusation (indictment), which the crown advocate still uses today in criminal cases, in that it concludes: if this be proved, you, the said N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter others from the like crimes, in all time coming [25].—Purpose for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge, and punishment has this only when it is carried out in *fulfillment of a law*, which, just by thereby announcing itself as inevitable for every future case too, preserves for the law the power to deter, in which its purpose consists.

—Here a Kantian would now infallibly object that, according to this view, the punished criminal would indeed be used "merely as a means." But this proposition, repeated so tirelessly by all Kantians, that "one may treat man only as an end, never as a means," sounds significant, to be sure, and is therefore a proposition exceedingly suitable for all who like to have a formula that spares them any further thinking; but looked at in the light it is a highly vague, indeterminate saying, attaining its aim quite indirectly, which for every case of its application first requires special explanation, determination and modification, but

taken so generally is insufficient, says little, and moreover is problematic. The murderer, fallen under the law to the death penalty, must now indeed and with full right be used as a mere *means*. For public security, the chief purpose of the state, is disturbed by him, indeed is abolished if the law remains unfulfilled: he, his life, his person, must now be the means to the fulfillment of the law and thereby to the restoration of public security, and is made so with all right, for the execution of the compact of the state, which was entered into by him too, insofar as he was a citizen of the state: and accordingly he, in order to enjoy security for his life, [26] If this is proved, then you, the said N. N., must suffer the legal penalty, in order to deter others from similar crimes in all future time. his freedom and his property, had also pledged his life, his freedom and his property for the security of all, which pledge is now forfeited.

This theory of punishment set up here, immediately evident to sound reason, is, in the main, of course no new thought, but only one almost displaced by new errors, whose clearest presentation was therefore necessary. In essentials it is already contained in what Pufendorf says about it in "De officio hominis et civis," book 2, ch. 13. Hobbes agrees with it likewise: "Leviathan," chs. 15 and 28. In our own days, as is well known, *Feuerbach* has championed it. Indeed it is already found in the sayings of the philosophers of antiquity: Plato presents it clearly in the Protagoras (p. 114, edit. Bip.), also in the Gorgias (p. 168), and finally in the eleventh book of the Laws (p. 165). Seneca expresses Plato's opinion and the theory of all punishment perfectly in the brief words: Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est; Sed ne peccetur (De Ira, I, 16).

In the state, then, we have come to know the means by which egoism, equipped with reason, seeks to evade its own bad consequences that turn against itself, so that each now promotes the welfare of all because he sees his own included in it. If the state attained its end perfectly, then to a certain degree—since through the human forces united in it, it also knows how to make the rest of nature more and more serviceable to itself—something approaching the land of Cockaigne might in the end come about, through the removal of every kind of ill. But the state has, in part, remained still very far from this goal; in part, countless ills absolutely essential to life would still keep life, now as before, in

suffering, among which, even if they were all removed, boredom would at last at once occupy every place abandoned by the others; in part, even the strife of individuals can never be wholly abolished by the state, since it harasses in small things where it is forbidden in great; and finally Eris, happily driven out from within, turns at last outward: banished as strife of individuals by the institution of the state, she returns from without as war of nations, and now demands in the great and all at once, as accumulated debt, the bloody sacrifices that had been withdrawn from her by prudent precaution in particular cases. Indeed, suppose even all this were at last overcome and removed by a prudence supported by the experience of thousands of years; the result in the end would be actual overpopulation of the whole planet, the dreadful ills of which only a bold imagination can now picture to itself [27].

63 We have come to know *temporal justice*, which has its seat in the state, as requiting or punishing, and have seen that such justice becomes justice only through regard for the future; since without such regard all punishing and requiting of a misdeed would remain without justification, indeed would be a mere adding of a second ill to what has happened, without sense or meaning. Quite otherwise, however, is it with *eternal justice*, which was mentioned earlier, and which governs not the state but the world, is not dependent on human institutions, not subject to chance and delusion, not uncertain, wavering and erring, but infallible, firm and sure.—The concept of requital already includes time: hence eternal justice can be no requiting justice, cannot therefore, like the latter, allow postponement and respite and, balancing the bad deed with the bad consequence only by means of time, need time in order to exist. The punishment must here be so bound up with the offense that both are one.

Δοκειτε πηδαν τ' αδικηματ' εις θεους Πτεροισι, κἄπειτ' εν Διος δελτου πτυχαις Γραφειν τιν' αυτα, Ζηνα δ' εισορωντα νιν Θνητοις δικαζειν; Ουδ' ὁ πας ουρανος, Διος γραφοντος τας βροτων ἁμαρτιας, Εξαρκεσειεν, ουδ' εκεινος αν σκοπων Πεμπειν ἑκαστῳ ζημιαν· αλλ' ἡ Δικη Ενταυθα που 'στιν εγγυς, ει βουλεσθ' ὁραν.
Eurip., ap. Stob. Ecl., I, c. 4.

28 On this, chapter 47 of the second volume.

(Volare pennis scelera ad aetherias domus Putatis, illic in Jovis tabularia Scripto referri; tum Jovem lectis super Sententiam proferre?—sed mortalium Facinora coeli, quantaquanta est, regia Nequit tenere: nec legendis Juppiter Et puniendis par est. Est tamen ultio, Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat prope.)

That such an eternal justice really lies in the essence of the world will soon become perfectly evident, from our whole line of thought developed so far, to anyone who has grasped it.

The appearance, the objectivity of the one will to life, is the world, in all the multiplicity of its parts and forms. Existence itself and the kind of existence, in the totality as in each part, comes from the will alone. It is free, it is almighty. In each thing the will appears exactly as it determines itself in itself and outside of time. The world is only the mirror of this willing: and all finitude, all sufferings, all torments which it contains belong to the expression of what the will wills, are as they are because it so wills. With the strictest right, therefore, each being bears existence in general, then the existence of its kind and of its peculiar individuality, quite as it is and in surroundings such as they are, in a world such as it is, ruled by chance and error, temporal, transient, ever suffering: and in everything that befalls it, indeed can only befall it, justice is always done to it. For the will is its own, and as the will is, so is the world. The responsibility for the existence and nature of this world can be borne only by the world itself, by no other; for how could another have wished to take it upon himself?—If one wants to know what human beings, considered morally, are worth on the whole and in general, let one consider their fate, on the whole and in general. This is want, misery, lamentation, torment and death. Eternal justice rules: were they not, taken as a whole, worthless, their fate, taken as a whole, would not be so sad. In this sense we can say: the world itself is the world's judgment.

If one could lay all the misery of the world in one pan of a scale, and all the guilt of the world in the other, the tongue of the balance would surely stand level.

To be sure, however, knowledge, as it comes into being for the individual as such, sprung from the will to serve it, does not present the world as it finally reveals itself to the inquirer, as the objectivity of the one and only will to life that he himself is; rather, the gaze of the crude individual is clouded, as the

Indians say, by the veil of Maya: to him there shows itself, instead of the thing in itself, only the appearance, in time and space, the principium individuationis, and in the remaining forms of the principle of sufficient reason: and in this form of his limited knowledge he sees not the essence of things, which is one, but its appearances; as separate, divided, innumerable, very different, indeed opposed. For him pleasure appears as one thing and torment as quite another, this man as tormentor and murderer, that one as sufferer and victim, evil as one thing and ill as another. He sees one man living in joys, abundance and pleasures, and at the same time before his door another dying in torment from want and cold. Then he asks: where is the retribution? And he himself, in the vehement pressure of will which is his origin and his essence, seizes the pleasures and enjoyments of life, holds them clasped fast, and does not know that by this very act of his will he seizes and presses fast to himself all the pains and torments of life, at the sight of which he shudders. He sees the ill, he sees the evil in the world: but far from recognizing that both are only different sides of the appearance of the one will to life, he takes them to be very different, indeed wholly opposed, and often seeks, through evil, that is, by causing the suffering of another, to escape the ill, the suffering of his own individual, entangled in the principium individuationis, deceived by the veil of Maya.—For as on the raging sea, which, unbounded on all sides, raises and sinks mountains of water with a howl, a boatman sits in a small boat, trusting the frail craft; so in the midst of a world full of torments the single human being sits calmly, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis, or the way in which the individual knows things, as appearance. The unbounded world, full of suffering everywhere, in an infinite past, in an infinite future, is foreign to him, indeed is a fairy tale to him: his vanishing person, his extensionless present, his momentary comfort, this alone has reality for him: and to preserve this he does everything, so long as a better knowledge does not open his eyes. Until then there lives only in the innermost depth of his consciousness the quite dark presentiment that all that, after all, is really not so foreign to him, but has a connection with him against which the principium individuationis cannot protect him. From this presentiment springs that so indestructible *dread*, common to all

human beings (indeed perhaps even to the cleverer animals), which suddenly seizes them when, by some accident, they become confused about the principium individuationis, as the principle of sufficient reason, in one of its forms, seems to suffer an exception: for example when it seems that some change occurred without cause, or one dead were there again, or in any other way the past or the future were present, or the distant near. The tremendous terror at such a thing is based on their suddenly becoming confused about the forms of knowledge of appearance, which alone keep their own individual separate from the rest of the world. This separation, however, lies only in the appearance and not in the thing in itself: on precisely this eternal justice rests. In fact all temporal happiness stands, and all prudence walks, on undermined ground. They protect the person from mishaps and provide it with enjoyments; but the person is mere appearance, and its difference from other individuals and its freedom from the sufferings which these bear rest on the form of appearance, the principium individuationis. According to the true essence of things each has to regard all the sufferings of the world as his own, indeed all possible ones as real for him, so long as he is the firm will to life, that is, affirms life with all his strength. For the knowledge that sees through the principium individuationis, a happy life in time, given by chance, or won from it by prudence, in the midst of the sufferings of countless others, is—only a beggar's dream in which he is a king, but from which he must awake, to learn that only a fleeting delusion had separated him from the suffering of his life.

Eternal justice eludes the gaze entangled in the knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, in the principium individuationis: such a gaze misses it entirely, unless it rescues it by fictions. It sees the wicked man, after misdeeds and cruelties of every kind, live in joys and leave the world unmolested. It sees the oppressed drag his life full of suffering to the end, without an avenger, a requiter, showing himself. But eternal justice will be comprehended and grasped only by him who rises above that knowledge which proceeds along the guiding thread of the principle of sufficient reason and is bound to individual things, who cognizes the Ideas, sees through the principium individuationis, and becomes aware that the forms of appearance do not belong to the thing in

itself. He alone is also the one who, by virtue of the same knowledge, can understand the true essence of virtue, as it will soon open itself to us in connection with the present consideration; although for the practice of it this knowledge in abstracto is by no means required. For one who has attained the said knowledge, then, it becomes clear that, because the will is the in-itself of all appearance, the torment inflicted on others and the torment experienced oneself, the evil and the ill, always strike only that one and the same essence; even though the appearances in which the one and the other present themselves stand there as quite different individuals and are even separated by distant times and spaces. He sees that the difference between him who inflicts the suffering and him who must endure it is only appearance and does not touch the thing in itself, which is the will living in both, which here, deceived by the knowledge bound to its service, mistakes itself, seeking heightened well-being in one of its appearances, producing great suffering in another, and so, in vehement urge, sinks its teeth into its own flesh, not knowing that it always injures only itself, thus, through the medium of individuation, revealing the conflict with itself which it bears within. The tormentor and the tormented are one. The former errs in believing himself not a sharer in the torment, the latter in believing himself not a sharer in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened, he who inflicts the suffering would recognize that he lives in everything that suffers torment in the wide world and, if gifted with reason, vainly ponders why it was called into existence for such great suffering, the guilt for which it does not see: and the tormented would see that all the evil that is committed in the world, or ever was, flows from that will which also constitutes his own essence, also appears in him, and that through this appearance and its affirmation he has taken upon himself all the sufferings that proceed from such will and rightly endures them, so long as he is this will.—From this knowledge speaks the poet Calderon, full of presentiment, in “Life Is a Dream”:

Pues el delito mayor Del hombre es haber nacido.

(For the greatest guilt of man is that he was born.)

How should it not be a guilt, since by an eternal law death is its penalty? By that verse Calderon has also merely expressed the Christian dogma of original sin.

The living knowledge of eternal justice, of the beam of the scales that inseparably joins the malum culpae with the malo poenae, requires complete elevation above individuality and above the principle of its possibility: it will therefore, like the pure and distinct knowledge of the essence of all virtue, which is related to it and which we shall discuss at once, remain forever inaccessible to the majority of human beings.—Hence the wise forefathers of the Indian people did indeed express it directly in the Vedas, which are permitted only to the three reborn castes, or in the esoteric doctrine of wisdom, so far, that is, as concept and language can grasp it and their still pictorial, even rhapsodic manner of presentation allows; but in the popular religion, or exoteric doctrine, they communicated it only mythically. The direct presentation we find in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom, whose kernel has at last come to us, as the greatest gift of this century, in the Upanishads, expressed in many ways, but especially in that all the beings of the world, living and lifeless, are led past the gaze of the pupil one after another, and over each of them is pronounced that word which has become a formula and as such is called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes, more correctly tat twam asi, which means: "this you are" [29].—To the people, however, that great truth, so far as it could grasp it in its limitedness, was translated into the mode of knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, which by its nature can by no means take up that truth purely and in itself, even stands in direct contradiction to it, but received in the form of myth a surrogate for it, which was sufficient as a regulative for action, in that it makes the ethical significance of action comprehensible by pictorial presentation, within the mode of knowledge according to the principle of sufficient reason, which is itself forever alien to that significance; which is the purpose of all doctrines of faith, in that they are all of them mythical dressings of the truth that is inaccessible to the crude human mind. In this sense that myth could also be called, in Kant's language, a postulate of practical reason: considered as such, however, it has the great advantage of containing no ele-

ments whatever except those that lie before our eyes in the realm of reality, and of being able therefore to support all its concepts with intuitions. What is meant here is the myth of the transmigration of souls. It teaches that all sufferings which one inflicts on other beings in life must be atoned for in a following life on this very world by exactly the same sufferings; which goes so far that whoever merely kills an animal will one day, in infinite time, be born as just such an animal and suffer the same death. It teaches that evil conduct draws after it a future life, on this world, in suffering and despised beings, that accordingly one is then born again in lower castes, or as a woman, or as an animal, as a Pariah or Chandala, as a leper, as a crocodile, and so on. All the torments with which the myth threatens it supports [30] Oupnek'hat, vol. 1, p. 60 ff. with intuitions from the real world, through suffering beings who likewise do not know how they incurred their torment, and it needs no other hell to help it out. As reward, on the other hand, it promises rebirth in better, nobler forms, as a Brahman, as a sage, as a saint. The highest reward, which awaits the noblest deeds and complete resignation, which also falls to the woman who in seven successive lives died voluntarily on her husband's funeral pyre, no less to the man whose pure mouth never spoke a single lie, this reward the myth can express in the language of this world only negatively, by the so often recurring promise of not being born again at all: non adsumes iterum existentiam apparentem: or, as the Buddhists, who admit neither Veda nor castes, express it: "You shall attain Nirvana, that is, a state in which there are four things that do not exist: birth, age, sickness and death."

Never has a myth attached itself, and never will one attach itself, more closely to the philosophical truth accessible to so few than this ancient doctrine of the noblest and oldest people, among whom it still prevails as universal popular belief, however degenerate that people now is in many respects, and has decisive influence on life, today just as four thousand years ago. That non plus ultra of mythical presentation Pythagoras and Plato therefore already grasped with admiration, took over from India or Egypt, revered, applied and, we do not know how far, even believed.—We, on the other hand, now send the Brahmans English clergymen and Moravian linen-weavers, in order, out of pity, to

instruct them better and to tell them that they were made out of nothing and ought to rejoice over it gratefully. But what befalls us is what befalls him who fires a bullet at a rock. In India our religions will never, ever take root: the primeval wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by the events in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom flows back to Europe and will produce a fundamental change in our knowing and thinking.

64 But from our presentation of eternal justice, a philosophical and not a mythical one, we now want to proceed to the considerations related to it, of the ethical significance of action and of conscience, which is the merely felt knowledge of that justice.—Only I want first, at this point, to call attention to two peculiarities of human nature, which can serve to make clear how the essence of that eternal justice, and the unity and identity of the will in all its appearances on which that justice rests, is conscious to everyone, at least as an obscure feeling. Quite independently of the purpose of the state in punishment demonstrated above, which founds the right of punishment, it affords satisfaction, after an evil deed has happened, not only to the injured party, who is mostly animated by vindictiveness, but also to the wholly disinterested spectator, to see that the one who caused another a pain suffers back precisely the same measure of pain. It seems to me that nothing other than the consciousness of that eternal justice expresses itself in this, which, however, is at once misunderstood and falsified by the unpurified mind, in that it, entangled in the principium individuationis, commits an amphiboly of concepts and demands of the appearance what belongs only to the thing in itself, does not see how in themselves the offender and the offended are one, and that it is the same essence which, not recognizing itself again in its own appearance, bears both the torment and the guilt; but rather demands to see the torment again in the very individual to whom the guilt belongs. Hence most people would also demand that a man who has a very high degree of malice—which, however, may well be found in many, only not paired with other qualities as in him—one who, namely, would be at the same time, by unusual mental power, far superior to others and who consequently inflicts unspeakable sufferings on millions of others, say as a world con-

queror—they would demand, I say, that such a man atone for all those sufferings sometime and somewhere by an equal measure of pains; because they do not recognize how in themselves the tormentor and the tormented are one and that the same will through which these exist and live is also precisely that which appears in him and through him attains to the clearest revelation of its essence, and which likewise suffers, as in the oppressed, so also in the conqueror, and indeed in him the more, the higher the clarity and distinctness of consciousness and the greater the vehemence of will.—That the deeper knowledge, no longer entangled in the principium individuationis, from which all virtue and nobility proceed, no longer harbors that disposition demanding requital, is already attested by Christian ethics, which forbids outright all requital of evil with evil and lets eternal justice rule in the domain of the thing in itself, which is different from appearance. ("Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord." Rom. 12, 19.)

A far more striking, but also far rarer trait in human nature, which expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the domain of experience, that is, of individuation, and at the same time indicates a felt consciousness that, as I put it above, the will to life performs the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and that the one and same will lives in all appearances—such a trait, I say, is the following. We see now and then a man become so deeply outraged at a great injury that he has experienced, or perhaps only witnessed, that he stakes his own life on it, deliberately and without hope of rescue, in order to take revenge on the perpetrator of that outrage. We see him, say, seek out a powerful oppressor for years, at last murder him, and then die himself on the scaffold, as he had foreseen, often even not seeking to avoid it, since his life had retained value for him only as a means of revenge.—Such examples are found especially among the Spaniards [31]. If we now examine the spirit of that thirst for requital [32] That Spanish bishop who in the last war poisoned himself and the French generals at his table at the same time belongs here, like several other facts from that war. Examples are also found in Montaigne, book 2, ch. 12. carefully, we find it very different from common revenge, which wants to soothe the suffering endured by the sight of the suffering caused: indeed, we

find that what it aims at deserves to be called not so much revenge as punishment: for in it lies really the intention of an effect on the future, through example, and here indeed without any selfish purpose, neither for the avenging individual, for he perishes in the act, nor for a society that provides itself security through laws: for that punishment is carried out by the individual, not by the state, nor in fulfillment of a law; rather it always strikes a deed that the state did not want or was not able to punish and whose punishment it disapproves. It seems to me that the indignation which drives such a man so far beyond the boundaries of all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he is himself the whole will to life, which appears in all beings, through all times, to which therefore the most distant future belongs equally with the present and cannot be a matter of indifference: affirming this will, he nevertheless demands that in the spectacle which presents its essence, no such monstrous outrage should ever appear again, and wants, by the example of a revenge against which there is no bulwark, since fear of death does not deter the avenger, to terrify every future wrongdoer. The will to life, though still affirming itself, no longer clings here to the individual appearance, the individual, but embraces the Idea of man and wants to keep its appearance pure of such monstrous, revolting outrage. It is a rare, significant, indeed sublime trait of character, by which the individual sacrifices himself in striving to make himself the arm of eternal justice, whose real essence he still fails to recognize.

65 By all our considerations so far of human action we have prepared the last, and have made our task much lighter, namely to raise the real ethical significance of action, which in life is designated by the words *good* and *evil* and by which one makes oneself perfectly understood, to abstract and philosophical distinctness and to demonstrate it as a member of our main thought.

But I want first to trace those concepts *good* and *evil*, which are treated by the philosophical writers of our day, most strangely, as simple concepts, therefore incapable of analysis, back to their real meaning; so that one may not remain caught in an indistinct delusion that they contain more than is really the case, and that in and for themselves they already say all that is needed here. This I can

do because I am myself as little inclined to seek a hiding place in ethics behind the word *Good* as I formerly sought one behind the words *beautiful* or *true*, in order then, say, by an appended "-ness," which nowadays is supposed to have a special σεμνοτης and thereby to help out in several cases, and by a solemn air, to make people believe I had done more by pronouncing these three words than designate three very wide and abstract, consequently not at all rich-in-content concepts, which have very different origin and meaning. Indeed, who, having made himself acquainted with the writings of our day, has not at last come to be disgusted by those three words, however excellent the things to which they originally point, after having had to see a thousand times how everyone least capable of thinking believes he need only bring forth those three words, with wide mouth and the air of an inspired sheep, to have spoken great wisdom?

The explanation of the concept *true* has already been given in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, ch. 4, §. 29 ff. The content of the concept *beautiful* has found its real explanation for the first time through our whole third book. Now we want to trace the concept *good* back to its meaning, which can be done with very little. This concept is essentially relative and designates the *suitability of an object to some determinate striving of the will*. Thus everything that pleases the will in any of its expressions, that fulfills its purpose, is thought through the concept good, however different it may otherwise be. Therefore we say good food, good roads, good weather, good weapons, good omen, and so on, in short, we call good everything that is just as we want it; hence also what is good to one may be the very opposite to another. The concept of the good divides into two subspecies: namely that of the immediately present and that of the only mediate satisfaction of the will in each case, directed to the future: that is, the agreeable and the useful. The concept of the opposite is, so long as the talk is of non-knowing beings, expressed by the word *bad*, more rarely and more abstractly by *ill*, which thus designates everything not pleasing to the striving of the will in each case. Like all other beings that can enter into relation to the will, people too who were favorable, helpful, friendly to the purposes just then willed have been called *good*, in the same meaning and always with retention of the relative, which shows itself, for example, in the

phrase: "This one is good to me, but not to you." But those whose character brought with it that they did not hinder the strivings of foreign wills as such but rather furthered them, who were thus throughout helpful, benevolent, kind, beneficent, have been called *good* men on account of this relation of their way of acting to the will of others in general. The opposite concept is designated in German, and for about a hundred years also in French, in knowing beings (animals and men) by a different word than in beings without knowledge, namely by *böse*, méchant, whereas in almost all other languages this distinction does not occur and κακος, malus, cattivo, bad are used of men as of lifeless things which are opposed to the purposes of a determinate individual will. So, having proceeded wholly from the passive part of the good, the consideration could pass only later to the active, and examine the manner of action of the man called *good*, no longer in relation to others but to himself, setting itself the task of explaining in particular, in part the pure objective high esteem which this manner of action produced in others, in part the peculiar contentment with himself which it evidently produced in him, since he purchased it even with sacrifices of another kind; and likewise, conversely, the inner pain that accompanied the evil disposition, however many external advantages it brought to him who harbored it. From this there arose the ethical systems, both philosophical and those supported by doctrines of faith. Both always seek to bring happiness into some connection with virtue, the former either through the principle of contradiction or else through that of sufficient reason, making happiness thus either identical with virtue or a consequence of it, always sophistically: the latter, however, by the assertion of other worlds than that which is possibly known to experience [33]. Our consideration, on the other hand, will show the inner essence of virtue to be a striving in a direction quite opposite to that toward happiness, that is, toward well-being and life. According to the above, the *good*, by its concept, is των προς τι, thus every good is essentially relative: for it has its essence only in its relation to a desiring will. *Absolute good* is therefore a contradiction: highest good, summum bonum, means the same, namely really a final satisfaction of the will, after which no new willing [34] Let it be remarked in passing here that what gives every posi-

tive doctrine of faith its great power, the foothold by which it takes the minds firmly into possession, is wholly its ethical side; though not immediately as such, but in that it, firmly linked and interwoven with the rest of the mythical dogma peculiar to each doctrine of faith, appears explicable only through it; so much so that, although the ethical significance of actions is not at all explicable according to the principle of sufficient reason, but every myth follows this principle, the believers nevertheless hold the ethical significance of action and their myth to be wholly inseparable, indeed simply one, and regard every attack on the myth as an attack on right and virtue. This goes so far that among monotheistic peoples atheism, or godlessness, has become the synonym of the absence of all morality. To priests such confusions of concepts are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that fearful monster, fanaticism, arise, and rule not merely individual, eminently perverse and evil persons but whole peoples, and finally, what to the honor of mankind stands only once in its history, embody itself in this Occident as the Inquisition, which, according to the latest and at last authentic reports, in Madrid alone (while in the rest of Spain there were still many such spiritual dens of murderers) in 300 years let 300,000 human beings die in torment on the pyre for matters of faith: of which every zealot, as often as he wants to raise his voice, is at once to be reminded. would set in, a last motive, whose attainment would give an indestructible contentment of the will. According to our consideration so far in this fourth book, such a thing is not conceivable. The will can as little cease, through any satisfaction, from always willing anew, as time can end or begin: a lasting fulfillment satisfying its striving completely and forever does not exist for it. It is the vessel of the Danaids: there is no highest good, no absolute good for it; but always only a provisional one. If, however, one chooses, in order to give an old expression, which one would not wholly abolish from habit, a sort of honorary office, as it were as an emeritus, one may, figuratively and metaphorically, call the complete self-abolition and denial of the will, true will-lessness, which alone stills and quiets the urge of the will forever, alone gives that contentment which cannot be disturbed again, alone is world-redeeming, and of which we shall soon treat, at the close of our whole consideration,—the absolute good, the sum-

mum bonum, and regard it as the only radical remedy for the disease against which all other goods are only palliatives, only anodyna. In this sense the Greek τελος, like finis bonorum, corresponds to the thing even better. So much for the words *good* and *evil*; but now to the matter.

If a man, as soon as occasion offers and no external power restrains him, is always inclined to do *wrong*, we call him *evil*. According to our explanation of wrong, this means that such a man not only affirms the will to life as it appears in his body, but goes so far in this affirmation that he denies the will appearing in other individuals; which shows itself in his demanding their forces for the service of his will and seeking to destroy their existence if they stand in the way of the strivings of his will. The ultimate source of this is a high degree of egoism, whose essence was set out above. Two things are immediately evident here: *first*, that in such a man an exceedingly vehement will to life, going far beyond the affirmation of his own body, expresses itself; and *second*, that his knowledge, wholly given over to the principle of sufficient reason and entangled in the principium individuationis, remains fixed on the complete difference, posited by the latter, between his own person and all others; hence he seeks solely his own well-being, perfectly indifferent to that of all others, whose essence is, rather, wholly foreign to him, separated from his own by a wide gulf, indeed whom he really regards only as masks, without any reality. And these two qualities are the basic elements of the evil character.

That great vehemence of willing is now, in and for itself and immediately, a constant source of suffering. First, because all willing, as such, springs from lack, thus from suffering. (Hence, as is recalled from the third book, the momentary silence of all willing, which sets in as soon as we are given over, as pure will-less subject of knowing [correlate of the Idea], to aesthetic contemplation, is already a chief component of the joy in the beautiful.) Second, because, through the causal connection of things, most desires must remain unfulfilled and the will is far more often crossed than satisfied, so that on this account too vehement and much willing always brings with it vehement and much suffering. For all suffering is nothing other than unfulfilled and crossed willing: and even the pain of the body, when it is injured or destroyed, is possible as such

only because the body is nothing other than the will itself become object. For this reason, then, because much and vehement suffering is inseparable from much and vehement willing, the facial expression of very evil men already bears the stamp of inner suffering: even when they have attained all external happiness, they always look unhappy, whenever they are not caught up in momentary jubilation or dissembling. From this inner torment, quite immediately essential to them, there finally proceeds even the joy in the suffering of others, which springs not from mere egoism but is disinterested, and which is real *malice* and rises to *cruelty*. For this the suffering of others is no longer a means to the attainment of the purposes of one's own will, but an end in itself. The closer explanation of this phenomenon is the following. Because man is the appearance of the will, illuminated by the clearest knowledge, he always measures the real and felt satisfaction of his will against the merely possible one which knowledge holds before him. From this springs envy: every privation is infinitely heightened by the enjoyment of others, and lightened by the knowledge that others also endure the same privation. The ills that are common to all and inseparable from human life trouble us little: likewise those that belong to the climate, to the whole country. The memory of greater sufferings than our own stills their pain: the sight of the sufferings of others alleviates our own. If now a man is filled with an exceedingly vehement urge of will, would with burning greed gather everything together to cool the thirst of egoism, and in the process, as is necessary, must learn that all satisfaction is only apparent, that what is obtained never accomplishes what the thing desired promised, namely the final stilling of the grim urge of will; but that through fulfillment the wish only changes its shape and now torments under another, indeed finally, when all are exhausted, the urge of will itself, even without a known motive, remains and makes itself known as a feeling of the most dreadful desolation and emptiness, with the most hopeless torment: if from all this, which at ordinary degrees of willing is felt only to a lesser extent and produces only the ordinary degree of gloomy mood, there necessarily arises, in him who is the appearance of will going to eminent malice, an excessive inner torment, eternal unrest, incurable pain; then he seeks indirectly the alleviation of which he is not capable directly,

namely seeks, through the sight of the suffering of others, which he at the same time recognizes as an expression of his power, to mitigate his own. The suffering of others becomes now an end in itself for him, is a sight on which he feasts: and thus arises the phenomenon of real cruelty, of bloodthirstiness, which history so often shows, in the Neros and Domitians, in the African Deys, in Robespierre, and so on.

Vindictiveness, which repays evil with evil, not out of regard for the future, which is the character of punishment, but merely on account of what has happened, the past, as such, thus disinterestedly, not as a means but as an end, in order to feast on the torment of the offender, which one has oneself caused, is already akin to malice. What distinguishes revenge from pure malice and to some extent excuses it is a semblance of right; insofar, namely, as the same act which is now revenge would, if it were ordered lawfully, that is, according to a previously determined and known rule and in an association that has sanctioned it, be punishment, thus right.

Besides the suffering described, which springs from one root with malice, the very vehement will, and is therefore inseparable from it, there is joined to malice also another, quite different and particular pain, which becomes perceptible with every evil action, whether this be mere injustice from egoism or pure malice, and which, according to the length of its duration, is called *remorse of conscience* or *anguish of conscience*.—Whoever now remembers and has present the content of this fourth book so far, but especially the truth set out at its beginning, that life itself, as its mere copy or mirror, is always certain to the will to life, and then also the presentation of eternal justice,—will find that, in accordance with those considerations, remorse of conscience can have no other than the following meaning, that is, its content, expressed abstractly, is the following, in which one distinguishes two parts, which nonetheless again wholly coincide and must be thought as perfectly united.

However thickly the veil of Maya may enshroud the mind of the evil man—that is, however firmly he is caught in the principium individuationis, by which he regards his person as absolutely different from every other and divided from it by a wide gulf, a way of knowing that he holds to with all his might, since it

alone accords with his egoism and is its support, as indeed knowledge is almost always bribed by the will—still, in the innermost recess of his consciousness there stirs the secret presentiment that such an order of things is only appearance, and that in itself matters stand altogether differently; that however much time and space may divide him from other individuals and from the countless torments they suffer, indeed suffer through him, and may present them as wholly alien to him, nevertheless in itself, and apart from representation and its forms, it is the one will to life that appears in all of them, which here, failing to recognize itself, turns its weapons against itself, and by seeking heightened well-being in one of its appearances lays the greatest suffering upon another; and that he, the evil man, is this entire will, and consequently is not only the tormentor but also the tormented, from whose suffering he is parted and kept free only by a deceptive dream whose form is space and time, a dream that melts away, so that in truth he must pay for voluptuous pleasure with torment, and all the suffering that he knows only as possible strikes him in actuality as the will to life, since only for the knowledge of the individual, only by means of the principium individuationis, are possibility and actuality, nearness and distance in time and space, different; not so in themselves. This truth, expressed mythically, that is, adapted to the principle of sufficient reason and thereby translated into the form of appearance, is what the transmigration of souls conveys. Its purest expression, however, free of all admixture, it has in that dimly felt but inconsolable torment which is called the anguish of conscience.—This anguish springs, moreover, from a second immediate knowledge, closely bound up with the first: the knowledge of the strength with which the will to life affirms itself in the evil individual, a strength that reaches far beyond his individual appearance, to the complete denial of that same will as it appears in other individuals. The inner horror of the villain at his own deed, which he tries to hide from himself, therefore contains, beside that presentiment of the nullity and mere seeming of the principium individuationis and of the difference it posits between himself and others, also the knowledge of the vehemence of his own will, of the force with which he has seized upon life and fastened himself to it—this very life, whose terrible side he sees before him in the torment of those he

has oppressed, and to which he is nevertheless so firmly grown that the most dreadful things proceed from his own hand as a means to the complete affirmation of his own will. He knows himself as the concentrated appearance of the will to life, feels to what degree he has fallen prey to life, and with it to the countless sufferings essential to it, since it has endless time and endless space in which to cancel the difference between possibility and actuality and to transform all the torments that for the present he merely *knows* into torments *felt*. The millions of years of constant rebirth, to be sure, exist here only in the concept, just as the whole past and future exist only in the concept: filled time, the form of the appearance of the will, is the present alone, and for the individual time is always new: he finds himself always as newly arisen. For life is inseparable from the will to life, and its sole form is the Now. Death (forgive the repetition of the simile) is like the setting of the sun, which is swallowed up by night only in seeming, but in reality, itself the source of all light, burns without cease, brings new days to new worlds, always rising and always setting. Beginning and end touch only the individual, by means of time, the form of this appearance for the representation. Outside time lies the will alone, Kant's thing in itself, and its adequate objectivity, Plato's Idea. Hence suicide offers no escape: what each man wills in his innermost being, that he must be; and what each man is, that he precisely *wills*.—So, besides the merely felt knowledge of the seeming and nullity of those forms of representation that sunder individuals, it is the self-knowledge of one's own will and of its degree that gives conscience its sting. The course of life weaves the image of the empirical character, whose original is the intelligible, and the evil man is terrified at this image; it makes no difference whether it is woven in bold strokes, so that the world shares his abhorrence, or in strokes so small that he alone sees it: for it concerns only him immediately. The past would be a matter of indifference, as mere appearance, and could not alarm the conscience, if the character did not feel itself free of all time and unchangeable by it, so long as it does not deny itself. That is why things done long ago still weigh on the conscience. The petition "Lead me not into temptation" says: "Let me not see who I am."—By the force with which the evil man affirms life, which shows itself to him in the suffering he inflicts on

others, he measures the distance from him at which lies the giving up and denial of that very will, the only possible deliverance from the world and its torment. He sees how far he belongs to it and how firmly he is bound to it: the *known* suffering of others has not been able to move him; to life and to *felt* suffering he falls prey. Whether this will ever break and overcome the vehemence of his will remains an open question.

This exposition of the meaning and inner nature of evil, which as mere feeling, that is, not as distinct, abstract knowledge, is the content of the *anguish of conscience*, will gain still more distinctness and completeness from a consideration, carried out in the same way, of the *good* as a property of the human will, and finally of total resignation and holiness, which proceed from the good once it has reached its highest degree. For opposites always illuminate each other, and the day reveals at once itself and the night, as Spinoza has most admirably said.

66 A morality without grounding, that is, mere moralizing, cannot have any effect, because it does not motivate. A morality that does motivate can do so only by working on self-love. But what springs from this has no moral worth. From this it follows that no genuine virtue can be brought about by morality, or by abstract knowledge in general; rather, it must spring from intuitive knowledge, which recognizes in another individual the same being as in one's own.

For virtue does indeed proceed from knowledge, but not from abstract knowledge, communicable through words. If it were, it could be taught, and by stating its essence here in the abstract, together with the knowledge underlying it, we should have made everyone who grasps this ethically better as well. But this is by no means the case. Rather, one can no more produce a virtuous man by ethical lectures or sermons than all the aesthetics, from Aristotle's on, have ever made a poet. For the concept is as unfruitful for the real and inner essence of virtue as it is for art, and can serve only in a wholly subordinate role, as an instrument in carrying out and preserving what has been otherwise known and resolved. Velle non discitur. On virtue, that is, on goodness of disposition, abstract dogmas are in fact without influence: the false ones do not disturb it, and the true ones hardly promote it. It would also be truly very bad if the chief

thing in human life, its ethical worth, which holds for eternity, depended on something whose attainment is as much subject to chance as dogmas, articles of faith, philosophemes. For morality the dogmas have merely this value, that the man who is already virtuous from a knowledge of another kind, soon to be discussed, has in them a schema, a formula, by which he gives his own reason an account, mostly merely feigned, of his non-egoistic conduct, whose essence reason—that is, he himself—does not *comprehend*, and with which account he has accustomed reason to rest content.

Upon *acting*, outward conduct, dogmas may indeed have a strong influence, as may habit and example (the latter because the ordinary man does not trust his own judgment, of whose weakness he is aware, but follows only experience, his own or another's); but the disposition is not thereby changed[35]. All abstract knowledge gives only motives; but motives, as shown above, can change only the direction of the will, never the will itself. All communicable knowledge, however, can act on the will only as motive: however dogmas may steer it, therefore, what the man really and fundamentally wills remains the same: only about the paths by which to attain it has he received other thoughts, and imaginary motives guide him just like real ones. Hence, for example, so far as his ethical worth is concerned, it is all one whether he makes great gifts to the helpless, firmly persuaded that he will receive everything back tenfold in a future life, or spends the same sum on improving an estate that will, late indeed but all the more surely and amply, pay[36] They are mere opera operata, the Church would say, which are of no avail unless grace bestows the faith that leads to rebirth. Of this more below. interest:—and a murderer, quite as much as the bandit who earns a wage thereby, is also he who, orthodox in belief, delivers the heretic to the flames; indeed, depending on inner circumstances, also he who strangles Turks in the Holy Land, if, that is, like the former, he really does it because he thinks to win himself a place in heaven thereby. For these men too wish to provide only for themselves, for their egoism, just like that bandit, from whom they differ only in the absurdity of their means.—From outside, as already said, the will can be reached only through motives: but these change merely the way it expresses itself, never the will itself. Velle non discitur.

In the case of good deeds whose doer appeals to dogmas, however, one must always distinguish whether these dogmas really are the motive for them, or whether, as I said above, they are nothing more than the apparent account by which he seeks to satisfy his own reason about a good deed that flows from a wholly different source—a deed he performs because he is *good*, but does not know how to explain properly because he is no philosopher, and yet would like to think something in connection with it. The difference is very hard to find, however, because it lies in the inmost heart. Hence we can almost never judge the conduct of others, and seldom our own, correctly in moral terms.—The deeds and ways of acting of the individual and of a people can be greatly modified by dogmas, example and habit. But in themselves all deeds (opera operata) are mere empty images, and only the disposition that leads to them gives them moral significance. This, however, can really be quite the same with very different outward appearance. With an equal degree of wickedness, one man may die on the wheel, another peacefully in the bosom of his family. It may be the same degree of wickedness that expresses itself in one people in coarse features, in murder and cannibalism, and in another, by contrast, finely and quietly en miniature, in court intrigues, oppressions and subtle machinations of every sort: the essence remains the same. One can imagine that a perfect state, or perhaps even a dogma of rewards and punishments beyond death believed with perfect firmness, would prevent every crime: politically much would be gained thereby, morally nothing; rather, only the depiction of the will through life would be checked.

Genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue and pure nobility of mind therefore do not proceed from abstract knowledge, but yet from knowledge: namely, from an immediate, intuitive knowledge that can be neither reasoned away nor reasoned into being, a knowledge that, precisely because it is not abstract, also cannot be communicated, but must dawn on each person for himself, and which therefore finds its real, adequate expression not in words but solely in deeds, in conduct, in the course of a man's life. We, who here are seeking the theory of virtue and so also have to express abstractly the essence of the knowledge that underlies it, will nonetheless be unable to supply in this

expression that knowledge itself, but only the concept of it; in doing so we always start from conduct, in which alone it becomes visible, and refer back to it as the only adequate expression of that knowledge, which we merely interpret and explicate, that is, state abstractly what really goes on in it.

Before we now speak of goodness proper, in contrast to the *evil* just presented, we must touch, as an intermediate stage, on the mere negation of evil: this is *justice*. What right and wrong are has been set out sufficiently above; so we can say here in a few words that he who voluntarily recognizes that purely moral boundary between wrong and right, and lets it hold even where no state or other power secures it, and who consequently, according to our explanation, never goes, in the affirmation of his own will, as far as the denial of the will presenting itself in another individual, is *just*. He will not, then, inflict suffering on others in order to increase his own well-being: that is, he will commit no crime, will respect the rights and the property of everyone.—We see now that for such a just man the principium individuationis is no longer, as it is for the evil man, an absolute partition; that he does not, like the latter, affirm only his own appearance of will and deny all others; that others are for him no mere masks whose essence is wholly different from his own; rather, by his way of acting he shows that he *recognizes* his own essence, namely the will to life as thing in itself, also in the foreign appearance given to him merely as representation, and so finds himself again in it, up to a certain degree, namely that of not doing wrong, that is, of not injuring. To exactly this degree he sees through the principium individuationis, the veil of Maya: to that extent he sets the being outside himself equal to his own: he does not injure it.

In this justice, if one looks to its innermost core, there already lies the resolve not to go so far in the affirmation of one's own will as to deny the appearances of will in others by forcing them to serve it. One will therefore want to render to others as much as one enjoys from them. The highest degree of this justice of disposition, which however is always already paired with goodness proper, whose character is no longer merely negative, goes so far that a man calls in question his right to inherited property, wants to sustain his body only by his own powers, mental or bodily, feels every service rendered by others, every luxu-

ry, as a reproach, and at last takes to voluntary poverty. Thus we see *Pascal*, when he took the ascetic turn, no longer willing to suffer any attendance, although he had servants enough: despite his constant ill health he made his bed himself, fetched his own food from the kitchen, and so on. (Vie de Pascal par sa soeur, p. 19.) Quite in keeping with this, it is reported that many Hindus, even Rajahs, with great wealth, use it only for the maintenance of their own people, their court and their servants, and follow with strict scrupulosity the maxim of eating nothing but what they have themselves sown and reaped with their own hands. A certain misunderstanding underlies this, however: for the individual, precisely because he is rich and powerful, can render such considerable services to the whole of human society that they weigh as much as the inherited wealth whose security he owes to society. Really, the excessive justice of such Hindus is already more than justice, namely actual renunciation, denial of the will to life, asceticism, of which we shall speak last. Conversely, on the other hand, sheer idleness and living on the powers of others, with inherited property, without rendering anything in return, can already be regarded as morally wrong, even if by positive laws it must remain right.

We have found that voluntary justice has its innermost origin in a certain degree of seeing through the principium individuationis, in which the unjust man remains wholly caught. This seeing through can take place not only in the degree required for that, but also in a higher degree, which drives to positive benevolence and beneficence, to love of mankind: and this can happen however strong and energetic in itself the will appearing in such an individual may be. Knowledge can always hold the balance against it, teach it to resist the temptation to wrong, and even bring forth every degree of goodness, indeed of resignation. So the good man is by no means to be considered an originally weaker appearance of will than the evil man; rather, it is knowledge that masters in him the blind urge of the will. There are indeed individuals who only seem good-natured, owing to the weakness of the will appearing in them; what they are, however, soon shows in their being incapable of any considerable self-conquest to carry out a just or good deed.

But if there comes before us, as a rare exception, a man who, say, possesses a considerable income, yet uses little of it for himself and gives all the rest to those in need, while he himself goes without many enjoyments and comforts, and we try to make this man's conduct clear to ourselves, then, setting aside altogether the dogmas by which he himself may want to make his conduct comprehensible to his reason, we shall find, as the simplest, most general expression and as the essential character of his way of acting, that he *makes less of a distinction than is usual* between himself and others. If this very distinction is, in the eyes of many others, so great that another's suffering is to the malicious man an immediate joy, to the unjust man a welcome means to his own well-being; if the merely just man stops at not causing it; if in general most men know and are acquainted with countless sufferings of others in their vicinity, but do not resolve to alleviate them because they would have to take some privation on themselves; if thus to each of all these a mighty difference seems to obtain between his own ego and the other's; then for that noble man whom we imagine, by contrast, this difference is not so significant; the principium individuationis, the form of appearance, no longer holds him so fast; rather, the suffering that he sees in another concerns him almost as nearly as his own: he therefore seeks to establish the balance between the two, denies himself enjoyments, takes on privations, in order to alleviate the sufferings of others. He becomes aware that the difference between himself and others, which to the evil man is so great a gulf, belongs only to a transitory, deceptive appearance: he recognizes, immediately and without inferences, that the in-itself of his own appearance is also that of the foreign one, namely that will to life which constitutes the essence of every thing and lives in all; indeed, that this extends even to animals and to the whole of nature: hence he will also torment no animal[37].

He is now as little able to let others go hungry while he himself has superfluities and things he could do without, as anyone would go hungry for a day in order to have more on the following day than he can enjoy. For to him who practices the works [38] The right of man to the life and the powers of animals rests on this: that, since suffering rises in equal measure with the heightening of clarity of consciousness, the pain which the animal suffers through death or work is

not yet as great as that which man would suffer through the mere lack of the animal's flesh or powers; man can therefore go, in the affirmation of his own existence, as far as the denial of the animal's existence, and the will to life as a whole bears thereby less suffering than if one held the reverse. This determines at the same time the degree of use that man may make of the powers of animals without wrong, a degree which is often exceeded, especially in the case of beasts of burden and hunting dogs; against which, therefore, the activity of societies for the protection of animals is especially directed. In my view that right also does not extend to vivisection, above all of the higher animals. On the other hand the insect does not suffer as much by its death as man does by its sting.—The Hindus do not see this. of love, the veil of Maya has become transparent, and the deception of the principium individuationis has left him. His self, his will, he recognizes in every being, and consequently in the one who suffers too. The perversity has departed from him with which the will to life, failing to recognize itself, here in one individual enjoys fleeting, deceptive pleasures, and for them there in an *other* suffers and starves, and so inflicts torment and endures torment, not recognizing that, like Thyestes, it greedily devours its own flesh, and then here laments undeserved woe and there commits outrages without fear of Nemesis, ever and ever only because it fails to recognize itself in the foreign appearance, and therefore does not perceive eternal justice, caught in the principium individuationis, thus in general in that kind of knowledge which the principle of sufficient reason governs. To be healed of this delusion and illusion of Maya, and to practice works of love, are one. The latter, however, is the unfailing symptom of that knowledge.

The opposite of the pang of conscience, whose origin and meaning have been explained above, is the *good conscience*, the satisfaction that we feel after every disinterested deed. It arises from the fact that such a deed, proceeding as it does from the immediate recognition of our own essence in itself also in the foreign appearance, in turn also gives us the warrant of this knowledge, the knowledge that our true self is there not merely in our own person, this single appearance, but in everything that lives. Thereby the heart feels itself expanded, as through egoism it is contracted. For as the latter concentrates our interest upon the sin-

gle appearance of our own individual, in which knowledge ever holds before us the countless dangers that continually threaten this appearance, whereby anxiety and care become the keynote of our mood; so the knowledge that everything living is just as much our own essence in itself as our own person spreads our interest over everything living: the heart is thereby expanded. Through the interest in one's own self thus diminished, the anxious care for it is attacked and restricted at its root: hence the calm, confident cheerfulness which virtuous disposition and good conscience give, and the more distinct emergence of it with every good deed, in that this deed vouches to ourselves for the ground of that mood. The egoist feels himself surrounded by foreign and hostile appearances, and all his hope rests on his own welfare. The good man lives in a world of friendly appearances: the welfare of each of them is his own. Although, therefore, the knowledge of the lot of mankind in general does not make his mood a cheerful one, the abiding knowledge of his own essence in everything living gives him nevertheless a certain evenness, and even cheerfulness, of mood. For an interest spread over countless appearances cannot cause such anxiety as one concentrated on *one*. The accidents that befall the totality of individuals balance out, while those that happen to the single one bring fortune or misfortune.

If now others have set up principles of morals, which they offered as prescriptions for virtue and as laws necessarily to be obeyed, whereas I, as already said, cannot do the like, since I have no ought or law to hold up before the eternally free will; then there is, by contrast, in the context of my consideration, something that to some extent corresponds and is analogous to that undertaking: that purely theoretical truth, of which my whole exposition can be regarded as merely the elaboration, namely that the will is the in-itself of every appearance, but itself, as such, is free from the forms of the latter and thereby from plurality: a truth that, with reference to conduct, I know no more worthy way to express than the formula of the Veda already mentioned: "Tat twam asi!" ("This you are!") Whoever can say it to himself, with clear knowledge and firm inward conviction, about every being he comes into contact with, is thereby certain of all virtue and blessedness and is on the straight path to deliverance.

But before I go further and show, as the last point of my exposition, how love —whose origin and essence we recognize in the seeing through of the principium individuationis—leads to deliverance, namely to the complete giving up of the will to life, that is, of all willing, and also how another path, less gentle but more frequent, brings man to the very same end, I must first state and explain here a paradoxical proposition, not because it is one, but because it is true and belongs to the completeness of the thought I have to set forth. It is this: "All love (αγαπη, caritas) is pity."

67 We have seen how from the seeing through of the principium individuationis there proceeded, in the lesser degree, justice, in the higher, goodness of disposition proper, which showed itself as pure, that is, disinterested love toward others. Where this becomes perfect, it sets the other individual and his fate wholly equal to one's own: further it can never go, since there is no ground for preferring the other individual to oneself. But the plurality of other individuals whose whole well-being or life is in danger may well outweigh the consideration of the single man's own well-being. In such a case the character that has attained the highest goodness and perfected nobility of mind will sacrifice his well-being and his life entirely for the well-being of many others: thus died Codrus, thus Leonidas, thus Regulus, thus Decius Mus, thus Arnold von Winkelried, thus everyone who voluntarily and consciously goes to certain death for his own people, for the fatherland. Also standing on this level is everyone who, to uphold what makes for the welfare of all mankind and rightfully belongs to it, that is, for universal, important truths and for the eradication of great errors, willingly takes upon himself suffering and death: thus died Socrates, thus Giordano Bruno, thus many a hero of truth found death at the stake, at the hands of priests.

Now, however, with a view to the paradox stated above, I must recall that we found earlier suffering to be essential to life as a whole and inseparable from it, and that we saw how every wish arises from a need, a lack, a suffering, so that every satisfaction is only a pain taken away, no positive happiness brought; that joys, to be sure, lie to the wish, pretending to be a positive good, but in truth

are only of negative nature and only the end of an evil. Whatever goodness, love and nobility of mind do for others is therefore always only the alleviation of their sufferings, and consequently what can move them to good deeds and works of love is always only the knowledge of another's suffering, immediately understood from one's own and set equal to it. From this, however, it follows that pure love (αγαπη, caritas) is by its nature pity; whether the suffering it alleviates be great or small, to which latter every unsatisfied wish belongs. We shall therefore not hesitate to say, in direct contradiction with Kant, who will acknowledge as truly good and as virtue only what has proceeded from abstract reflection, and specifically from the concept of duty and of the categorical imperative, and who declares felt pity to be weakness, by no means virtue—in direct contradiction with Kant to say: the mere concept is as unfruitful for genuine virtue as for genuine art: all true and pure love is pity, and every love that is not pity is selfishness. Selfishness is ερως; pity is αγαπη. Mixtures of the two occur frequently. Even genuine friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and pity: the former lies in the pleasure in the friend's presence, whose individuality corresponds to our own, and it almost always makes up the greater part; pity shows itself in the sincere sympathy in his weal and woe and in the disinterested sacrifices one makes for it. Even Spinoza says: Benevolentia nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. (Eth. III, pr. 27, cor. 3, schol.) As a confirmation of our paradoxical proposition one may observe that the tone and words of the language, and the caresses, of pure love coincide entirely with the tone of pity; incidentally also that in Italian pity and pure love are designated by the same word, pietà.

Here too is the place for discussing one of the most striking peculiarities of human nature, weeping, which, like laughter, belongs to the expressions that distinguish man from the animal. Weeping is by no means simply an expression of pain: for only very few pains make us weep.

In my opinion one never weeps directly over felt pain at all, but always only over its repetition in reflection. For one passes from the felt pain, even when it is bodily, to a mere representation of it, and then finds one's own state so pitiable that, if another were the sufferer, one is firmly and sincerely convinced

one would help him, full of pity and love: but now one is oneself the object of one's own sincere pity: with the most helpful disposition one is oneself the one in need of help, feels that one suffers more than one could bear to see another suffer, and in this strangely intertwined mood, in which the immediately felt suffering comes to perception again only by a double detour—presented as another's, sympathized with as such, and then suddenly perceived again as immediately one's own—nature procures relief for itself through that strange bodily spasm.—Weeping is accordingly pity with oneself, or pity thrown back to its starting point. It is therefore conditioned by the capacity for love and for pity, and by imagination: hence neither hardhearted nor unimaginative people weep easily, and weeping is even always regarded as a sign of a certain degree of goodness of character and disarms anger, because one feels that whoever can still weep must necessarily be capable also of love, that is, of pity toward others, precisely because this, in the manner described, enters into that mood which leads to weeping.—Wholly in accord with the explanation put forward is the description that Petrarch, expressing his feeling naively and truly, gives of the arising of his own tears:

I vo pensando: e nel pensar m' assale Una pietà si forte di me stesso, Che mi conduce spesso, Ad alto lagrimar, ch' i non soleva [39].

40 As I walk along lost in thought, there assails me such strong pity for myself that I often must weep aloud, which otherwise I was not accustomed to do.

What has been said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have suffered a pain mostly weep only when one pities them, thus not over the pain but over the representation of it.—When we are moved to weeping not by our own but by others' sufferings, this happens because we vividly put ourselves in imagination in the place of the sufferer, or else see in his fate the lot of the whole of mankind and consequently above all our own, and so, by a wide detour, still always weep over ourselves, feel pity for ourselves. This seems also to be a main reason for the universal, hence natural, weeping at deaths. It is not his own loss that the mourner bewails: one would be ashamed of such egoistic tears; whereas he is sometimes ashamed at not weeping. First, to be sure, he bewails

the lot of the deceased: yet he weeps also when death was for the latter, after long, grievous and incurable sufferings, a desirable deliverance. Chiefly, then, pity seizes him over the lot of the whole of mankind, which has fallen prey to finitude, by virtue of which every life, however striving, often so rich in deeds, must be extinguished and come to nothing: but in this lot of mankind he beholds above all his own, and the more so the nearer the deceased stood to him, hence most of all if it was his father. Even if for the latter life, through age and sickness, was a torment, and through his helplessness a heavy burden to the son, yet the latter weeps violently over the father's death: for the reason given[41].

68 After this digression on the identity of pure love with pity, the turning back of which upon the individual himself has the phenomenon of weeping as its symptom, [42] On this see ch. 47 of the second volume. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethics outlined in §§ 61–67 has received its fuller and more finished presentation in my prize essay on the foundation of morals. I take up again the thread of our interpretation of the ethical significance of action, in order now to show how from the same source from which all goodness, love, virtue and nobility of mind spring, there proceeds in the end also that which I call the denial of the will to life.

As we earlier saw hatred and malice conditioned by egoism, and this resting on the entanglement of knowledge in the principium individuationis; so we found as the origin and essence of justice, and then, as it goes further, of love and nobility of mind, up to the highest degrees, the seeing through of that principium individuationis, which alone, by canceling the difference between one's own and foreign individuals, makes possible and explains perfect goodness of disposition, up to the most disinterested love and the most magnanimous self-sacrifice for others.

If now this seeing through of the principium individuationis, this immediate knowledge of the identity of the will in all its appearances, is present in a high degree of distinctness, it will at once show a still further-reaching influence on the will. For when the veil of Maya, the principium individuationis, is so far lifted before the eyes of a man that he no longer makes the egoistic distinction

between his own person and the foreign, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own, and thereby is not only helpful in the highest degree but even ready to sacrifice his own individual as soon as several others can thereby be saved; then it follows of itself that such a man, who recognizes in all beings himself, his innermost and true self, must also regard the endless sufferings of all that lives as his own, and so appropriate to himself the pain of the whole world. No suffering is any longer foreign to him. All the torments of others, which he sees and so seldom is able to alleviate, all the torments of which he has knowledge indirectly, indeed which he only knows as possible, act on his mind like his own. It is no longer the changing weal and woe of his person that he has in view, as is the case with the man still caught in egoism; but, since he sees through the principium individuationis, everything lies equally near to him. He knows the whole, grasps its essence, and finds it involved in constant passing away, vain striving, inner conflict and unceasing suffering, sees, wherever he looks, suffering humanity and suffering animality, and a vanishing world. But all this now lies as near to him as only his own person lies to the egoist. How should he, with such knowledge of the world, affirm this very life by constant acts of will, and by that very act bind himself ever more firmly to it, press it ever more firmly to himself? If, therefore, he who is still caught in the principium individuationis, in egoism, knows only single things and their relation to his person, and these then become ever renewed motives of his willing; then, by contrast, that described knowledge of the whole, of the essence of things in themselves, becomes the quietive of all and every willing. The will now turns away from life: it shudders now at its pleasures, in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains the state of voluntary renunciation, of resignation, of true composure and complete will-lessness.—If to us others, whom the veil of Maya still enfolds, there also draws near at times, in heavily felt suffering of our own, or in vividly known suffering of others, the knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life, and we would like by complete and forever decisive renunciation to break the sting of the desires, shut the door against all suffering, purify and sanctify ourselves; yet soon the deception of appearance ensnares us again, and its motives set the will in motion anew: we

cannot tear ourselves free. The allurements of hope, the flattery of the present, the sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to our person amid the misery of a suffering world, under the dominion of chance and error, draw us back to it and fasten the bonds anew. That is why Jesus says: "It is easier for an anchor cable to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."

Let us compare life to a circular track of glowing coals, with a few cool spots, which track we must run round unceasingly; then the man caught in delusion is comforted by the cool spot on which he now stands, or which he sees close ahead, and goes on running the track. But he who, seeing through the principium individuationis, knows the essence of things in themselves and thereby the whole, is no longer receptive to such comfort: he sees himself in all places at once, and steps out.—His will turns, no longer affirms its own essence mirrored in appearance, but denies it. The phenomenon by which this declares itself is the transition from virtue to asceticism. That is, it no longer suffices him to love others equal to himself and to do as much for them as for himself; rather there arises in him a loathing for the being whose expression is his own appearance, the will to life, the kernel and essence of that world known as wretched. He therefore disowns precisely this being that appears in him and is already expressed by his body, and his doing now gives the lie to his appearance, enters into open contradiction with it. Essentially nothing other than appearance of will, he ceases to will anything, takes care not to attach his will to anything, seeks to confirm in himself the greatest indifference toward all things.—His body, healthy and strong, expresses the sexual impulse through the genitals; but he denies the will and gives the lie to the body: he wants no sexual gratification, on no condition. Voluntary, perfect chastity is the first step in asceticism or the denial of the will to life. It thereby denies the affirmation of the will that goes beyond the individual life, and gives thereby the sign that with the life of this body the will, whose appearance it is, also cancels itself. Nature, always true and naive, declares that if this maxim became universal the human race would die out: and after what was said in the second book on the connection of all appearances of will, I believe I may assume that with the highest appearance of

will its weaker reflection too, animality, would fall away; as with the full light the half-shadows too vanish. With the complete cancellation of knowledge the rest of the world would then of itself vanish into nothing; since without subject no object. I would even refer to this a passage in the Veda where it says: "As in this world hungry children throng about their mother, so all beings await the holy sacrifice." (Asiatic researches, vol. 8. Colebrooke, On the Vedas; the extract from the Sama-Veda stands also in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous essays, vol. 1, p. 88.) Sacrifice signifies resignation in general, and the rest of nature has to expect its deliverance from man, who is priest and sacrifice at once. Indeed, it deserves to be cited as most remarkable that this thought has also been expressed by the admirable and immeasurably profound Angelus Silesius, in the little verse headed "Man brings all to God"; it runs:

"Man! All things love you; around you is a great throng: everything runs to you, that it may reach God."

But a still greater mystic, Meister Eckhard, whose wonderful writings have now at last (1857) become accessible through Franz Pfeiffer's edition, says there, p. 459, wholly in the sense here discussed: "I prove this by Christ, where he says: when I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to me (John 12, 32). So shall the good man carry up all things to God, into their first origin. This the masters prove to us, that all creatures are made for the sake of man. Test this on all creatures, that one creature profits by the other: the ox the grass, the fish the water, the bird the air, the beast the forest. So all creatures come to the good man's use: one creature in the other the good man carries to God." He means to say: it is in return for his redeeming the animals too, in and with himself, that man makes use of them in this life.—Even the difficult Bible passage Rom. 8, 21–24 seems to me to be interpretable in this sense.

Buddhism too is not lacking in expressions of the matter: e.g. when Buddha, still as Bodhisatwa, has his horse saddled for the last time, namely for flight from his father's residence into the wilderness, he speaks to it the verse: "For a long time you have been there in life and in death; but now you shall cease to

carry and to drag. Only this once more, O Kantakana, carry me away from here, and when I shall have attained the Law (become Buddha), I shall not forget you." (Foe Koue Ki, trad. p. Abel Rémusat, p. 233.)

Asceticism shows itself, furthermore, in voluntary and intentional poverty, which arises not merely per accidens, by property being given away to alleviate the sufferings of others, but here is already an end in itself, is to serve as constant mortification of the will, so that the satisfaction of wishes, the sweetness of life, may not rouse again the will against which self-knowledge has conceived a loathing. He who has reached this point still feels, as an animate body, as concrete appearance of will, the disposition to willing of every kind: but he deliberately suppresses it, by forcing himself to do none of all that he would like to, but on the contrary to do all that he would not like to, even when it has no further purpose than just that of serving the mortification of the will. Since he himself denies the will appearing in his person, he will not resist when another does the same, that is, inflicts wrong upon him: therefore every suffering that comes upon him from outside, through chance or others' malice, is welcome to him, every injury, every disgrace, every insult: he receives them gladly, as the opportunity to give himself the certainty that he no longer affirms the will, but gladly takes the side of every enemy of the appearance of will that is his own person. He therefore bears such disgrace and suffering with inexhaustible patience and gentleness, repays evil with good without ostentation, and never again lets the fire of anger, any more than that of desire, awaken in him.—As the will itself, so he mortifies its visibility, its objectivity, the body: he feeds it sparingly, lest its luxuriant blooming and thriving revive and stir up anew and more strongly the will, of which it is the mere expression and mirror. So he takes to fasting, indeed he takes to chastisement and self-torture, in order, by constant privation and suffering, to break and kill more and more the will which he recognizes and abhors as the source of his own and the world's suffering existence.—When death finally comes, which dissolves this appearance of that will whose essence had here, by free denial of itself, long since died away, down to the feeble remainder that appeared as the animation of this body; it is, as longed-for deliverance, most welcome and is gladly received. With it there

ends here not, as with others, the mere appearance; rather the essence itself is canceled, which here had only a feeble existence in the appearance and through it[43]; and this last frail bond too is now torn. For him who ends thus, the world has ended at the same time.

And what I have here depicted with a feeble tongue and only in general terms is not some philosophical fairy tale of my own invention and only of today: no, it was the enviable life of very many saints and beautiful souls among the Christians, and still more among the Hindus and Buddhists, and among believers of other creeds as well. However different the dogmas imprinted on their reason, the inner, immediate, intuitive knowledge, from which alone all virtue and holiness can proceed, expressed itself nonetheless in the same and identical manner through their way of life. For here too there shows itself the great difference, so important and pervasive throughout our whole consideration and hitherto too little heeded, between intuitive and abstract knowledge. Between the two lies a wide gulf, over which, with regard to the knowledge of the essence of the world, philosophy alone leads. Intuitively, that is, in concreto, every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths: but to bring them into his abstract knowing, into reflection, is the business of the philosopher, who neither ought nor can do anything more.

Perhaps, then, here for the first time, abstractly and pure of everything mythical, the inner essence of holiness, self-denial,[44] This thought is expressed through a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanskrit text, the "Sankhya Karika": "Yet the soul remains for a while clothed with the body; as the potter's wheel, after the vessel is finished, continues to whirl by virtue of the impulse received earlier. Only when the enlightened soul separates from the body and nature ceases for it does its complete deliverance set in." Colebrooke, "On the philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous essays", vol. 1, p. 259. Likewise in the "Sankhya Carica by Horace Wilson", § 67, p. 184. mortification of self-will, asceticism, is stated as the denial of the will to life, which sets in after the perfected knowledge of its own essence has become for it the quietive of all willing. By contrast, it has been immediately known and expressed in deed by all those saints and ascetics who, with the same inner knowledge, spoke a

very different language, according to the dogmas they had once taken up into their reason, by virtue of which an Indian saint, a Christian, a Lamaist must each give a very different account of his own doing, which is, however, quite indifferent to the matter. A saint may be full of the most absurd superstition, or he may conversely be a philosopher: both count equally. His doing alone certifies him as a saint: for it proceeds, in the moral respect, not from abstract knowledge but from the intuitively apprehended, immediate knowledge of the world and its essence, and is interpreted by him through some dogma only to satisfy his reason. It is therefore as little necessary that the saint be a philosopher as that the philosopher be a saint: just as it is not necessary that a perfectly beautiful man be a great sculptor, or that a great sculptor be himself a beautiful man. In general it is a strange demand to make of a moralist that he recommend no other virtue than the one he himself possesses. To repeat the whole essence of the world abstractly, universally and distinctly in concepts, and so to lay it down as a reflected image in permanent concepts of reason ever ready at hand: this and nothing else is philosophy. I recall the passage of Bacon of Verulam cited in the first book.

But my above depiction of the denial of the will to life, or of the way of life of a beautiful soul, of a resigned, voluntarily penitent saint, is likewise only abstract and general, and therefore cold. As the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds is an intuitive one and not an abstract one, so too it finds its perfect expression not in abstract concepts, but solely in deed and conduct. Therefore, in order to understand more fully what we express philosophically as denial of the will to life, one has to become acquainted with examples from experience and actuality. Certainly one will not meet them in daily experience: nam omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt, says Spinoza excellently. One will therefore, unless made an eyewitness by a specially favorable fate, have to content oneself with the biographies of such men. Indian literature, as we see already from the little that we know so far through translations, is very rich in descriptions of the lives of the saints, penitents, Samanaeans, Saniassis, and so on, as they are called. Even the well-known, though by no means in every respect praiseworthy, “Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier” contains

many excellent examples of this kind. (Especially in the thirteenth chapter of the second volume.) Among Christians too there is no lack of examples for the intended illustration. One may read the biographies, mostly badly written, of those persons who are called now holy souls, now Pietists, Quietists, pious enthusiasts, and so on. Collections of such biographies have been made at various times, such as Tersteegen's "Life of Holy Souls", Reiz's "History of the Reborn", and in our days a collection by Kanne, which amid much that is bad contains also some good, among which I count especially the "Life of Beata Sturmin". Quite properly belongs here the life of St. Francis of Assisi, this true personification of asceticism and model of all mendicant monks. His life, described by his younger contemporary, St. Bonaventura, famous also as a scholastic, has recently been republished: "Vita S. Francisci a S. Bonaventura concinnata" (Soest 1847), after shortly before a careful, detailed biography of him, making use of all the sources, had appeared in France: "Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin de Mallan" (1845).—As an Oriental parallel to these cloister writings we have the highly readable book by Spence Hardy: "Eastern monachism, an account of the order of mendicants founded by Gotama Budha" (1850). It shows us the same thing in another garb. One also sees how indifferent it is to it whether it proceeds from a theistic or an atheistic religion.—

Above all, however, I can recommend, as a special and most detailed example and factual illustration of the concepts I have set forth, the autobiography of Madame de Guion. To make the acquaintance of this beautiful and great soul, whose memory always fills me with reverence, and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition while making allowance for the superstition of her reason, must be as gratifying to every man of a better sort as that book will always stand in bad credit with the common-minded, that is, the majority; for throughout and everywhere each can value only what is to some extent analogous to himself and for which he has at least a faint aptitude. This holds of the intellectual as of the ethical. To a certain extent one could even regard as an example belonging here the well-known French biography of Spinoza, if one uses as the key to it that glorious opening of his very insufficient treatise "De

emendatione intellectus", a passage which I can at the same time recommend as the most effective means I have come to know of soothing the storm of the passions. Finally, even the great Goethe, Greek as he is, did not think it unworthy of himself to show us this most beautiful side of humanity in the clarifying mirror of poetry, by presenting to us in the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" the life of Fräulein Klettenberg in idealized form and later, in his own biography, also giving historical information about it; as he has also told us the life of St. Philippo Neri, even twice.—World history, to be sure, will always keep silent, and must, about the men whose conduct is the best and only sufficient illustration of this important point of our consideration. For the subject matter of world history is a wholly different, indeed opposite one, namely not the denial and giving up of the will to life, but precisely its affirmation and appearing in countless individuals, in which its disunion with itself, at the highest summit of its objectification, emerges with perfect distinctness, and now brings before our eyes the superiority of the individual through his prudence, now the might of the multitude through its mass, now the power of chance personified as fate, always the futility and nullity of the whole striving. But we, who here do not follow the thread of appearances in time, but as philosophers seek to investigate the ethical significance of actions and here take this as the sole standard for what is significant and important to us, will surely not be kept by any fear of the perpetual majority vote of baseness and shallowness from confessing that the greatest, most important and most significant appearance that the world can show is not the conqueror of the world, but the overcomer of the world, thus in truth nothing other than the quiet and unnoticed way of life of such a man, to whom that knowledge has dawned, in consequence of which he gives up and denies that will to life which fills everything and drives and strives in everything, whose freedom first emerges here, in him alone, whereby his doing now becomes the direct opposite of the usual. For the philosopher, then, in this respect those biographies of holy, self-denying men, however badly they are mostly written, indeed presented mixed with superstition and nonsense, are nevertheless, through the significance of the subject matter, incomparably more instructive and important than even Plutarch and Livy.

The consideration of the ethical precepts given in this sense by men who were full of this spirit will further contribute a great deal to a closer and fuller knowledge of what we express, in the abstraction and generality of our manner of presentation, as the denial of the will to life; and these will at the same time show how old our view is, however new its purely philosophical expression may be. What lies nearest to us is Christianity, whose ethics is wholly in the spirit indicated and leads not only to the highest degrees of love of mankind, but also to renunciation; the latter side, to be sure, is already quite clearly present as a germ in the writings of the Apostles, yet is fully developed and explicitly stated only later. We find prescribed by the Apostles: love of the neighbor, weighing equal to self-love, beneficence, repayment of hatred with love and kindness, patience, gentleness, endurance of every possible insult without resistance, abstinence in food for the suppression of lust, resistance to the sexual impulse, entirely, if one is able. Here we see already the first stages of asceticism, or denial of the will proper, which latter expression says precisely what in the Gospels is called denying oneself and taking up the cross. (Matt. 16, 24. 25; Mark 8, 34. 35; Luke 9, 23. 24; 14, 26. 27. 33.) This tendency soon developed more and more and gave rise to the penitents, the anchorites and monasticism, which in itself was pure and holy, but for that very reason wholly unsuited to the greater part of mankind, so that what developed from it could be only hypocrisy and abomination: for abusus optimi pessimus. In more fully developed Christianity we now see that ascetic germ unfold into full bloom, in the writings of the Christian saints and mystics. These preach, beside the purest love, also complete resignation, voluntary total poverty, true composure, perfect indifference to all worldly things, dying to one's own will and rebirth in God, complete forgetting of one's own person and immersion in the contemplation of God. A full presentation of this is found in Fénelon's "Explication des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure". But nowhere, perhaps, is the spirit of Christianity in this development of it expressed so perfectly and powerfully as in the writings of the German mystics, thus of Meister Eckhard and in the justly famous book "The German Theology", of which Luther says, in the preface he wrote for it, that from no book, the Bible and Augustine excepted, has he learned

more of what God, Christ and man are than from this one,—whose genuine and unfalsified text, however, we first obtained in the year 1851 in the Stuttgart edition of Pfeiffer. The precepts and doctrines given in it are the most complete exposition, sprung from deepest inner conviction, of what I have presented as the denial of the will to life. There, then, one has to become acquainted with it more closely, before pronouncing on it with Judaic-Protestant confidence. Written in the same excellent spirit, though not to be rated quite equal to that work, is Tauler's "Imitation of the Poor Life of Christ", together with his "Medulla animae". In my opinion the doctrines of these genuine Christian mystics are related to those of the New Testament as spirit of wine is to wine. Or: what is made visible to us in the New Testament as through veils and mist, comes toward us in the works of the mystics without covering, in full clarity and distinctness. Finally one could also regard the New Testament as the first, the mystics as the second consecration.—σμικρα και μεγαλα μυστηρια.

Developed still further, expressed more variously and presented more vividly than was possible in the Christian Church and the Western world, we find what we have called the denial of the will to life in the ancient works of the Sanskrit language. That this important ethical view of life could attain here a yet further development and a more decisive expression is perhaps to be ascribed chiefly to the fact that it was not limited here by an element wholly foreign to it, as the Jewish creed is in Christianity—a creed to which the sublime founder of Christianity had of necessity to accommodate himself and to which he had to attach his teaching, partly consciously and perhaps partly even unconsciously, and through which Christianity is composed of two very heterogeneous components, of which I would call the purely ethical one preeminently, indeed exclusively, the Christian, and distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism it found already in place. If that excellent and salutary religion should ever fall into complete decay, as has often been feared, and especially in our own time, I should seek the cause of it solely in this: that it consists not of one simple element but of two, originally heterogeneous and brought together only by the course of the world; through whose decomposition, arising from their unequal affinity and their reaction to the advancing spirit of the age, the

dissolution would in such a case have had to come about, after which, however, the purely ethical part would still have to remain unharmed, because it is indestructible.—In the ethics of the Hindus, then, as we already find it, imperfect as our knowledge of their literature still is, expressed in the most manifold and forceful ways in the Vedas, Puranas, poetic works, myths, legends of their saints, maxims and rules of life[45], we see prescribed: love of one's neighbor with complete renunciation of all self-love; love in general not limited to the human race but embracing all that lives; charity even to the giving away of what one has earned each day with hard toil; boundless patience toward all who offend; repayment of all evil, however vile it may be, with good and with love; voluntary and joyful endurance of every disgrace; abstinence from all animal food; perfect chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure for him who aspires to true holiness; casting away of all property, abandonment of every dwelling place and of all kindred, deep and complete solitude, passed in silent contemplation, with voluntary penance and dreadful, slow self-torment, for the complete mortification of the will, which goes in the end as far as voluntary death—by hunger, by walking to meet the crocodiles, by plunging from the sacred summit of a cliff in the Himalaya, by being buried alive, also by throwing oneself under the wheels of the enormous car that carries the images of the gods about amid the singing, jubilation and dancing of the bayaderes. And these precepts, whose origin reaches back well over four thousand years, are still lived by even now, degenerate as that people is in many respects, by individuals even to the utmost extremes. [46] What has maintained itself in practice for so long, among a people embracing so many millions, [47] See, e.g., "Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron," vol. 2, nos. 138, 144, 145, 146.—"Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier," vol. 2, chaps. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.—"Asiatisches Magazin," by Klaproth, in the first volume: On the Fo Religion; in the same place "Bhaguat-Geeta" or "Conversations between Kreeshna and Arjoon"; in the second volume: "Moha-Mudgava."—Then "Institutes of Hindu-Law, or the ordinances of Menu, from the Sanskrit by Wm. Jones," in the German translation by Hüttner (1797); especially the sixth and twelfth chapters.—Finally, many pas-

sages in the "Asiatic researches." (In the last forty years Indian literature in Europe has grown so large that, if I now wished to complete this note from the first edition, it would fill a couple of pages.)

48 At the procession of Jaggernaut in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the car and perished instantly. (Letter of an East Indian landowner, in the "Times" of December 30, 1840.) while it imposes the heaviest sacrifices, cannot be an arbitrarily contrived whim, but must have its ground in the essence of mankind. There is this besides: one cannot marvel enough at the unanimity one finds on reading the life of a Christian penitent or saint and that of an Indian one. With dogmas, customs and surroundings so radically different, the striving and the inner life of both are entirely the same. So too in the precepts for both: thus, for example, Tauler speaks of complete poverty, which one should seek and which consists in wholly giving up and divesting oneself of everything from which one might draw any comfort or worldly satisfaction—evidently because all this continually gives fresh nourishment to the will, whose complete dying away is the aim; and as an Indian counterpart we see, in the precepts of Fo, that the Saniassi, who is to be without a dwelling and wholly without property, is commanded finally not to lie down under the same tree more than once, so that he may not conceive any fondness or inclination even for this tree. The Christian mystics and the teachers of the Vedanta philosophy also agree in this: that for him who has attained perfection they hold all outward works and religious observances to be superfluous.—So much agreement, across such different times and peoples, is a factual proof that what speaks out here is not, as optimistic shallowness likes to maintain, a perversity and madness of disposition, but an essential side of human nature, one that shows itself rarely only because of its excellence.

I have now indicated the sources from which, drawn directly and from life, one can come to know the phenomena in which the denial of the will to life presents itself. In a certain sense this is the most important point of our whole

inquiry; yet I have set it forth only quite in general terms, since it is better to refer to those who speak from immediate experience than to swell this book needlessly further by a weaker repetition of what they have said.

I shall add only a little more, for the general characterization of their state. As we saw above that the wicked man, by the vehemence of his willing, suffers constant, consuming inner torment, and, when all objects of willing are exhausted, slakes the grim thirst of his self-will at the sight of another's pain; so, by contrast, he in whom the denial of the will to life has dawned, however poor, joyless and full of privation his state may be when seen from outside, is full of inner joyfulness and true heavenly calm. It is not the restless urge of life, not the exultant joy that has violent suffering as its antecedent or subsequent condition, such as make up the course of life of the man who loves living; it is an unshakable peace, a deep calm and inward serenity, a state at which we cannot look, when it is brought before our eyes or our imagination, without the greatest longing, since we recognize it at once as the only right thing, infinitely outweighing all else, to which our better spirit calls out to us the great sapere aude. We then feel, indeed, that every fulfillment of our wishes wrested from the world is only like the alms that keeps the beggar alive today so that he may go hungry again tomorrow; resignation, on the other hand, is like an inherited estate: it relieves its owner of all cares forever.

We remember from the third book that aesthetic delight in the beautiful consists, in large part, in this: that, entering the state of pure contemplation, we are lifted for the moment out of all willing, that is, all wishes and cares, and as it were rid of ourselves, no longer the individual who knows for the sake of his constant willing, the correlate of the particular thing, to whom objects become motives, but the will-free, eternal subject of knowing, the correlate of the Idea; and we know that these moments, in which, delivered from the grim pressure of the will, we as it were emerge from the heavy ether of the earth, are the most blissful that we know. From this we can gauge how blessed the life of a man must be whose will is stilled not for moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but forever—indeed wholly extinguished, but for that last glimmering spark that sustains the body and will go out with it. Such a man, who after

many bitter struggles against his own nature has at last wholly overcome, remains only as a purely knowing being, as the undimmed mirror of the world. Nothing can any longer frighten him, nothing move him; for all the thousand threads of willing that hold us bound to the world, and that drag us back and forth in constant pain as craving, fear, envy, anger, he has cut. He now looks back calmly and smiling on the illusory images of this world, which once could stir and torment his mind too, but which now stand before him as indifferent as chess pieces after the game is ended, or as the cast-off masquerade costumes in the morning, whose figures teased and disquieted us in the carnival night. Life and its forms hover before him now only as a fleeting appearance, like a light morning dream to one half awake, through which reality already shines and which can no longer deceive; and, like that dream, they too vanish at last, without violent transition. From these considerations we can learn to understand in what sense Madame de Guion, toward the end of her autobiography, often expresses herself thus: "Everything is indifferent to me: I can will nothing more: often I do not know whether I am here or not."—Permit me also, in order to express how, after the dying away of the will, the death of the body (which is, after all, only the appearance of the will, and with the abolition of that will therefore loses all meaning) can now have nothing bitter in it but is very welcome, to set down the very words of that holy penitent, though they are not elegantly turned: "Midi de la gloire; jour où il n'y a plus de nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort, dans la mort même: parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde mort." (Vie de Mad. de Guion, vol. 2, p. 13.)

Yet we must not suppose that once the denial of the will to life has set in, through knowledge that has become a quietive, it no longer wavers, and that one can rest upon it as upon an acquired property. Rather, it must be won anew again and again by constant struggle. For since the body is the will itself, only in the form of objectivity, or as appearance in the world as representation, so long as the body lives the whole will to life also exists as a possibility, and strives continually to enter into actuality and to blaze up anew with all its ardor. Hence in the lives of holy men we find that calm and blessedness

described only as the blossom that issues from the constant overcoming of the will, and we see, as the soil from which it springs, the perpetual struggle with the will to life; for lasting calm no one can have on earth. We therefore see the histories of the inner life of saints full of spiritual struggles, temptations, and abandonment by grace, that is, by that mode of knowledge which, rendering all motives ineffective, quiets all willing as a universal quietive, gives the deepest peace and opens the gate of freedom. Hence, too, we see those who have once attained the denial of the will maintaining themselves on this path with all their strength, through renunciations of every kind wrung from themselves, through a penitential, hard way of life and the seeking out of what is disagreeable to them: all in order to subdue the will that is ever striving up again. Hence, finally, because they already know the value of redemption, their anxious care for the preservation of the salvation they have won, their scruples of conscience at every innocent enjoyment, or at every slight stirring of their vanity, which here too dies last—vanity, the most indestructible, the most active and the most foolish of all human inclinations.—By the term asceticism, which I have already used often, I understand, in the narrower sense, this deliberate breaking of the will by the denial of the agreeable and the seeking out of the disagreeable, the self-chosen penitential way of life and self-chastisement, for the sustained mortification of the will.

If we now see these practiced by those who have already attained the denial of the will, in order to maintain themselves in it, then suffering in general, as it is decreed by fate, is also a second way (δευτερος πλους) of arriving at that denial: indeed, we may assume that most come to it only by this way, and that it is suffering one has felt oneself, not merely known, that most often brings about complete resignation, often only when death is near. For only in a few is mere knowledge sufficient to bring about the denial of the will—knowledge which, seeing through the principium individuationis, first produces the most perfect goodness of disposition and universal love of mankind, and finally lets them recognize all the sufferings of the world as their own. Even in one who approaches this point, the tolerable condition of his own person, the flattery of the moment, the allurement of hope, and the satisfaction of the will, that is, of

pleasure, which ever offers itself anew, are almost always a constant obstacle to the denial of the will and a constant seduction to its renewed affirmation: for this reason all those allurements have been personified, in this respect, as devils. Usually, therefore, the will must be broken by the greatest suffering of one's own before its self-denial sets in. Then we see the man, after he has been brought through all the stages of mounting affliction, under the most violent resistance, to the very edge of despair, suddenly turn inward, know himself and the world, change his whole being, rise above himself and all suffering and, as though purified and sanctified by it, in unassailable calm, blessedness and sublimity willingly renounce everything he formerly willed with the greatest vehemence, and joyfully receive death. It is the silver gleam of the denial of the will to life, that is, of redemption, flashing suddenly forth from the purifying flame of suffering. Even those who were very wicked we sometimes see purified by the deepest pains to this degree: they have become different men, wholly transformed. Their former misdeeds therefore no longer trouble their conscience; yet they gladly atone for them with death, and willingly see the appearance of that will come to an end, which is now alien to them and an abomination. Of this denial of the will, brought about by great misfortune and despair of all rescue, the great Goethe has given us, in his immortal masterpiece, the "Faust," in the story of Gretchen's suffering, a clear and vivid presentation whose like I know nowhere else in poetry. It is a perfect model of the second way that leads to the denial of the will, which leads there not, like the first, through the mere knowledge of the suffering of a whole world, which one voluntarily appropriates, but through one's own self-felt, overwhelming pain. To be sure, very many tragedies lead their violently willing heroes at last to this point of complete resignation, where then usually the will to life and its appearance end together; but no presentation known to me brings the essential element of that transformation before the eyes so clearly and so free of all accessory matter as the one mentioned in "Faust."

In real life we see those unfortunates who have to drain the greatest measure of suffering, since, after all hope has been completely taken from them, they go, in full vigor of mind, toward a shameful, violent, often agonizing death on the

scaffold, very often transformed in just this way. We must not assume, indeed, that between their character and that of most men there is so great a difference as their fate indicates; rather we must ascribe the latter largely to circumstances: yet they are guilty and to a considerable degree evil. Now we see many of them, after complete hopelessness has set in, transformed in the manner described. They now show real goodness and purity of disposition, true abhorrence of committing any act in the least evil or loveless: they forgive their enemies, even those through whom they suffer innocently, not merely in words and perhaps from a hypocritical fear of the judges of the underworld, but in deed and in deep earnestness, and want no revenge whatever. Indeed their suffering and dying become dear to them at last; for the denial of the will to life has set in: they often refuse the rescue offered, die gladly, calmly, blessedly. To them, in the excess of pain, the last secret of life has been revealed, namely that ill and evil, suffering and hatred, the tormented and the tormentor, however different they show themselves to the knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, are in themselves one, appearance of that one will to life which objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the principium individuationis: they have come to know both sides, the evil and the ill, in full measure, and as they at last see the identity of both, they now reject both at once, deny the will to life. In what myths and dogmas they give their reason an account of this intuitive and immediate knowledge and of their transformation is, as said, entirely indifferent.

A witness of a change of heart of this kind was, without doubt, Mathias Claudius, when he wrote the remarkable essay which stands in the "Wandsbeck Messenger" (part 1, p. 115) under the heading "Conversion History of * * *" and has the following conclusion: "A man's way of thinking can pass from one point of the circumference to the opposite one, and back again to the former point, if circumstances mark out the arc for him. And these changes are not at all anything great and interesting in man. But that remarkable, catholic, transcendental change, in which the whole circle is irretrievably burst and all laws of psychology become vain and empty, in which the coat of skins is taken off,

or at least turned inside out, and the scales fall from a man's eyes, is such a thing that everyone who is at all conscious of the breath in his nostrils leaves father and mother, if he can hear and learn anything certain about it."

Nearness of death and hopelessness are, moreover, not absolutely necessary for such a purification through suffering. Even without them, through great misfortune and pain, the knowledge of the contradiction of the will to life with itself can force itself violently upon us and the nullity of all striving be recognized. Hence one has often seen men who led a very agitated life in the press of the passions—kings, heroes, adventurers—suddenly change, take to resignation and penance, become hermits and monks. To this belong all genuine conversion stories, for example also that of Raymond Lully, who, summoned at last to the chamber of a beauty whom he had long wooed, saw the fulfillment of all his wishes before him, when she, opening her bodice, showed him her breast, eaten away in the most terrible manner by cancer. From that moment, as if he had looked into hell, he was converted, left the court of the King of Majorca and went into the desert to do penance[49]. Very similar to this conversion story is that of the Abbé Rancé, which I have briefly told in the 48th chapter of the second volume. When we consider how in both the transition from pleasure to the horrors of life was the occasion, this gives us an illustration of the striking fact that it is the most life-loving, cheerful, sensual and frivolous nation in Europe, the French, among whom by far the strictest of all monastic orders, the Trappist, arose, was restored after its decline by Rancé, and, in spite of revolutions, church changes and spreading unbelief, maintains itself to the present day in its purity and terrible austerity.

A knowledge of the kind mentioned above, of the nature of this existence, can however also depart again together with its occasion, and the will to life, and with it the former character, set in again. So we see the passionate Benvenuto Cellini, once in prison and another time in a severe illness, transformed in this way, but after the suffering was gone relapse into the old state. In general, the denial of the will by no means proceeds from suffering with the necessity of effect from cause, but the will remains free. For here is precisely the one point where its freedom enters immediately into appearance; hence the so strongly

expressed astonishment of Asmus at the "transcendental change". With every suffering one can conceive a will superior to it in vehemence and thereby unconquered. Hence Plato tells in the "Phaedo" of some who feast, drink, enjoy Aphrodisia up to the moment of their execution, affirming life even to death. Shakespeare brings before our eyes, in Cardinal Beaufort[50], the frightful end of a wicked man who dies in despair, since no suffering and not even death can break the will, vehement to the point of extreme malice.

51 Bruckeri hist. philos., tomi IV, pars I, p. 10.

52 Henry VI, part 2, Act 3, Sc. 3.

The more vehement the will, the more glaring the appearance of its conflict: the greater, therefore, the suffering. A world that was the appearance of an incomparably more vehement will to life than the present one would exhibit so much the greater sufferings: it would thus be a *hell*.

Because all suffering, being a mortification and a summons to resignation, has in possibility a sanctifying power, it is to be explained from this that great misfortune and deep pain in themselves inspire a certain reverence. The sufferer becomes wholly venerable to us, however, only when, surveying the course of his life as a chain of sufferings, or mourning a great and incurable pain, he nevertheless does not really look at the concatenation of circumstances that precisely plunged his life into sorrow, and does not stop at that single great misfortune that befell him:—for up to there his knowledge still follows the principle of sufficient reason and clings to the single appearance; he still also wants life, only not under the conditions that have fallen to him;—but he stands there truly venerable only when his gaze has raised itself from the particular to the universal, when he regards his own suffering only as an example of the whole and, becoming in ethical respect a man of genius, counts one case as a case for thousands; so the whole of life, grasped as essentially suffering, then brings him to resignation. For this reason it is venerable when in Goethe's "Torquato Tasso" the Princess speaks out about how her own life and that of her family has always been sad and joyless, and in doing so looks wholly to the universal.

A very noble character we always imagine with a certain tinge of quiet sadness, which is anything but constant vexation at the daily adversities (such a vexation would be an ignoble trait and would make one fear an evil disposition); rather it is a consciousness, sprung from knowledge, of the nullity of all goods and of the suffering of all life; not of one's own alone. Such knowledge may, however, have been first awakened by self-experienced suffering, especially by a single great one; as a single unfulfillable wish brought Petrarch to that resigned sadness over the whole of life which speaks to us so movingly from his works: for the Daphne he pursued had to vanish from his hands, in order to leave him in her stead the immortal laurel. When through such a great and irrevocable denial from fate the will is broken to a certain degree, then in everything else almost nothing more is willed, and the character shows itself gentle, sad, noble, resigned. When at last the grief has no determinate object any longer, but spreads over the whole of life, then it is in a way a going-into-oneself, a drawing back, a gradual vanishing of the will, whose visibility, the body, it undermines even gently but to the core, whereby the man feels a certain loosening of his bonds, a gentle foretaste of death announcing itself as the dissolution of body and will at once; hence a secret joy accompanies this grief, which it is, I believe, that the most melancholy of all peoples has called the joy of grief. Yet here too lies the reef of *sentimentality*, in life itself as well as in its representation in poetry: when, namely, there is constant mourning and constant lament, without one's raising and bracing oneself to resignation; then one has lost earth and heaven at once and retained watery sentimentality. Only by suffering's taking on the form of mere pure knowledge, and this then as *quietive of the will* bringing about true resignation, is it the way to deliverance and thereby venerable. In this respect, however, we feel at the sight of every very unfortunate person a certain respect akin to that which virtue and nobility of mind compel from us, and at the same time our own happy state appears thereby as a reproach. We cannot help regarding every suffering, our own as well as another's, as an at least possible approach to virtue and holiness, and on the other hand pleasures and worldly satisfactions as the removal from it. This goes so far that every man who bears a great bodily suffering, or a heavy mental one, indeed even everyone

who merely performs bodily labor requiring the greatest exertion, in the sweat of his brow and with visible exhaustion, but does all this with patience and without grumbling—that every such man, I say, when we look at him with deep attention, strikes us, as it were, like a sick man who applies a painful cure, but bears the pain it causes willingly and even with satisfaction, knowing that the more he suffers, the more the morbid matter is destroyed, and that the present pain is therefore the measure of his cure.

According to all that has gone before, the denial of the will to life, which is what is called complete resignation or holiness, always proceeds from the quietive of the will, which is the knowledge of its inner conflict and its essential nullity, expressed in the suffering of all that lives. The difference that we have presented as two paths is whether it is suffering merely and purely *known*, by free appropriation of it through seeing through the principium individuationis, or suffering immediately *felt* by oneself, that calls forth that knowledge. True salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, is not to be thought of without complete denial of the will. Until then each is nothing other than this will itself, whose appearance is a vanishing existence, an always vain, ever frustrated striving, and the world full of suffering that has been presented, to which all belong irrevocably in the same manner. For we found above that to the will to life, life is always certain and its only real form is the present, which they never escape, however birth and death may hold sway in appearance. The Indian myth expresses this by saying: "they are born again". The great ethical difference of characters has the significance that the evil man is infinitely far from attaining to the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds, and is therefore in truth *actually* given over to all the torments that appear in life as *possible*; since even the happy state of his person that may be present is only an appearance mediated by the principium individuationis and a delusion of Maya, the happy dream of the beggar. The sufferings that he inflicts on others in the vehemence and fury of his urge of will are the measure of the sufferings whose experience of his own cannot break his will and lead to final denial. All true and pure love, on the other hand, indeed even all free justice, proceeds already from the seeing through of the principium individuationis, which,

when it sets in with full force, brings about the complete sanctification and deliverance, whose phenomenon is the above-described state of resignation, the unshakable peace accompanying it and the highest joyfulness in death[53].

69 From the denial of the will to life, now sufficiently presented within the limits of our manner of consideration, which is the sole act of its freedom to emerge in appearance and therefore, as Asmus calls it, the transcendental change, nothing differs more than the actual cancellation of its individual appearance, *suicide*. Far from being denial of the will, this is a phenomenon of strong affirmation of the will. For the essence of denial lies not in abhorring the sufferings but in abhorring the pleasures of life. The suicide wills life and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions under which it has fallen to him. He therefore by no means gives up the will to life, but merely life, by destroying the individual appearance. He wills life, wills the unhindered existence and affirmation of the body; but the entanglement of circumstances does not allow this, and great suffering arises for him. The will to life itself finds itself so hampered in this individual appearance that it cannot unfold its striving. It therefore decides in accordance with its essence in itself, which lies outside the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, and to which therefore every single appearance is indifferent; since it itself remains untouched by all arising and passing away and is the inner core of the life of all things. For that same firm inner certainty which makes us all live without constant dread of death, the certainty namely that its appearance can never fail the will, supports the deed in suicide too. The will to life thus appears precisely[54] On this see ch. 48 of the second volume. as much in this self-killing (Shiva) as in the well-being of self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the voluptuousness of procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the *unity of the Trimurti*, which every man wholly is, although in time it brings forward now one, now another of the three heads.—As the single thing is to the Idea, so suicide is to the denial of the will: the suicide denies merely the individual, not the species. We found already above that, because life is always certain to the will to life and suffering essential to it, suicide, the arbitrary destruction of a single appearance, in which the thing in itself remains undisturbed, as the

rainbow stands firm however quickly the drops, which are for moments its bearers, change, is a wholly futile and foolish act. But it is moreover the masterpiece of Maya, as the most glaring expression of the contradiction of the will to life with itself. As we recognized this contradiction already in the lowest appearances of the will, in the constant struggle of all expressions of natural forces and of all organic individuals for matter and time and space, and as we saw that conflict, on the ascending stages of the objectification of the will, emerge ever more, with terrible distinctness; so at last, on the highest stage, which is the Idea of man, it reaches that degree where not merely the individuals presenting the same Idea destroy one another, but even the same individual declares war on himself, and the vehemence with which he wills life and presses against the obstruction of life, suffering, brings him to destroy himself, so that the individual will cancels the body, which is only its own becoming-visible, by an act of will, rather than let suffering break the will. Precisely because the suicide cannot cease to will, he ceases to live, and the will affirms itself here precisely through the cancellation of its appearance, because it can no longer affirm itself otherwise. But because it was precisely the suffering from which he thus escapes that could, as mortification of the will, have led him to the denial of himself and to deliverance, the suicide in this respect resembles a sick man who does not let a painful operation that could heal him thoroughly be completed once it has begun, but prefers to keep the disease. Suffering approaches and as such opens the possibility of the denial of the will; but he rejects it, by destroying the appearance of the will, the body, so that the will may remain unbroken.—This is the reason why almost all ethical systems, philosophical as well as religious, condemn suicide; although they themselves can give no other grounds for it than strange sophistical ones. If, however, a man ever refrained from suicide from a purely moral motive, the innermost sense of this self-conquest (in whatever concepts his reason clothed it) was this: "I will not withdraw from suffering, so that it may contribute to cancelling the will to life, whose appearance is so wretched, by so strengthening the knowledge of the real essence of the world that is already now dawning on me, that it may become the final quietive of my will and deliver me forever."

As is well known, there occur from time to time cases where suicide extends to the children: the father kills the children he loves dearly, and then himself. If we consider that conscience, religion and all received concepts let him recognize murder as the gravest crime, but that he nevertheless commits it in the hour of his own death, and without being able to have any egoistic motive in it, the deed can be explained only by the fact that here the will of the individual immediately recognizes itself again in the children, but, caught in the delusion that takes the appearance for the thing in itself and at the same time deeply gripped by the knowledge of the misery of all life, now supposes that with the appearance it cancels the essence itself, and therefore wants to rescue himself and the children, in whom he sees himself immediately living again, from existence and its misery.—It would be a wholly analogous false path if one supposed one could attain the same as voluntary chastity achieves, by frustrating the ends of nature in conception, or even by promoting, in view of the inevitable sufferings of life, the death of the newborn, instead of doing everything to secure life to each one that presses into life. For where the will to life is present, no force can break it, as the sole metaphysical thing or the thing in itself, but can only destroy its appearance in this place at this time. It itself can be canceled by nothing but *knowledge*. Hence the only way of salvation is this, that the will appear unhindered, in order to be able to *know* its own essence in this appearance. Only in consequence of this knowledge can the will cancel itself and thereby also end the suffering which is inseparable from its appearance: but this is not possible by physical force, such as destruction of the germ, or killing of the newborn, or suicide. Nature leads the will precisely to the light, because only in the light can it find its deliverance. Hence the ends of nature are to be furthered in every way, as soon as the will to life, which is its inner essence, has decided.—Wholly different from ordinary suicide seems to be a particular kind of it, which however is perhaps not yet sufficiently established. It is death by starvation voluntarily chosen from the highest degree of asceticism, the appearance of which, however, has always been accompanied by much religious enthusiasm and even superstition and thereby made indistinct. It seems, however, that the complete denial of the will can reach the degree where even the will necessary

for the maintenance of the body's vegetation, through the taking of nourishment, falls away. Far from this kind of suicide arising from the will to life, such a completely resigned ascetic ceases to live merely because he has wholly ceased to will. Another kind of death than that by hunger is hardly conceivable here (unless it arose from a particular superstition); because the intention of shortening the torment would really already be a degree of affirmation of the will. The dogmas that fill the reason of such a penitent delude him with the illusion that a being of a higher kind has commanded him the fasting to which his inner inclination drives him. Older examples of this may be found in the "Breslau Collection of Natural and Medical Histories", September 1799, p. 363 ff.; in Bayle's "Nouvelles de la république des lettres", February 1685, p. 189 ff.; in Zimmermann, "On Solitude", vol. 1, p. 182; in the "Histoire de l'académie des sciences" of 1764 a report by Houttuyn; the same is repeated in the "Collection for Practicing Physicians", vol. 1, p. 69. Later reports are found in Hufeland's "Journal of Practical Medicine", vol. 10, p. 181, and vol. 48, p. 95; also in Nasse's "Journal for Psychic Physicians", 1819, part 3, p. 460; in the "Edinburgh medical and surgical Journal", 1809, vol. 5, p. 319. In the year 1833 all the newspapers reported that the English historian Dr. Lingard had died the voluntary death of starvation in January at Dover; according to later reports it was not he himself but a relative. However, in these reports the individuals are mostly represented as insane, and it can no longer be determined to what extent this may have been the case. But a more recent report of this kind I will set down here, if only for the safer preservation of one of the rare examples of the striking and extraordinary phenomenon of human nature just touched on, which at least in appearance belongs where I should like to draw it, and which otherwise could hardly be explained. The said more recent report stands in the "Nuremberg Correspondent", of July 29, 1813, in the following words:

"From Bern it is reported that near Thurnen, in a dense forest, a little hut was found and in it a male corpse, lying in decomposition already for about a month, in clothes that could give little information about the station of their owner. Two very fine shirts lay by it. The most important item was a Bible, with white leaves bound in, partly written on by the deceased. He reports in it

the day of his departure from home (the home, however, is not named), then says: He had been driven by the Spirit of God into a wilderness, to pray and to fast. He had already fasted seven days on his journey here, then had eaten again. Thereupon he had at his settlement already begun to fast again, and so many days. Now each day is marked with a stroke, and there are five of these, after the lapse of which the pilgrim presumably died. There was also found a letter to a pastor about a sermon that the deceased had heard from him; but there too the address was missing."—Between this voluntary death springing from the extreme of asceticism and the ordinary one springing from despair there may be all sorts of intermediate stages and mixtures, which are indeed hard to explain; but the human mind has depths, obscurities and entanglements which it is of the utmost difficulty to illuminate and unfold.

70 One might perhaps hold our whole exposition, now concluded, of what I call the denial of the will incompatible with the earlier exposition of the necessity which pertains to motivation as much as to any other shape of the principle of sufficient reason, and according to which motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes, on which the character here unfolds its essence and reveals it with the necessity of a law of nature, for which reason we there flatly denied freedom as liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. Far from cancelling this, however, I recall it here. In truth real freedom, that is, independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs only to the will as thing in itself, not to its appearance, whose essential form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element of necessity. But the only case where that freedom can also become immediately visible in the appearance is that where it puts an end to what appears, and because the mere appearance, so far as it is a link in the chain of causes, the animate body, nevertheless continues in time, which contains only appearances, the will that manifests itself through this appearance then stands in contradiction with it, in that it denies what the appearance expresses. In such a case, for example, the genitals, as visibility of the sexual impulse, are there and healthy; yet even in the innermost, no sexual gratification is willed: and the whole body is only visible expression of the will to life, and nevertheless the motives corre-

sponding to this will no longer work: indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual and thereby the greatest check to the natural will, is welcome and desired. Of this *real* contradiction, which arises from the immediate intervention of the freedom of the will in itself, knowing no necessity, into the necessity of its appearance, the contradiction between our assertions of the necessity of the determination of the will by motives, according to the measure of character, on the one hand, and of the possibility of the complete cancellation of the will, whereby the motives become powerless, on the other, is only the repetition in the reflection of philosophy. The key to the reconciliation of these contradictions lies, however, in this: that the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed immediately from the will, but from an altered mode of knowledge. For as long as knowledge is no other than that caught in the principium individuationis, simply following the principle of sufficient reason, the power of motives too is irresistible: but when the principium individuationis is seen through, the Ideas, indeed the essence of things in themselves, is immediately known as the same will in all, and from this knowledge there proceeds a universal quietive of willing; then the individual motives become ineffective, because the mode of knowledge corresponding to them, obscured by an entirely different one, has receded. Hence the character can indeed never change partially, but must, with the consistency of a law of nature, carry out in detail the will whose appearance it is as a whole: but this very whole, the character itself, can be entirely canceled by the change of knowledge indicated above. This cancellation of it is what Asmus, as cited above, designates and marvels at as the "catholic, transcendental change": it is also what in the Christian Church was very aptly called *rebirth*, and the knowledge from which it proceeds, what was called the *effect of grace*.—It is precisely because what is in question is not an alteration but a complete cancellation of the character that, however different the characters it has struck were before that cancellation, they nevertheless show after it a great similarity in their way of acting, although each still speaks very differently according to his concepts and dogmas.

In this sense, then, the old philosopheme of the freedom of the will, forever contested and forever asserted, is not groundless, and the dogma of the Church on the effect of grace and rebirth is not without sense and meaning either. But we now see both unexpectedly coincide in one, and can also understand in what sense the excellent Malebranche could say: "La liberté est un mystère", and was right. For precisely what the Christian mystics call the *effect of grace* and *rebirth* is for us the sole immediate expression of the *freedom of the will.* It sets in only when the will, having attained to knowledge of its essence in itself, receives from this a *quietive* and is thereby withdrawn from the effect of *motives*, which lies in the domain of another mode of knowledge, whose objects are only appearances.—The possibility of freedom thus expressed is the greatest advantage of man, one that forever eludes the animal, because the deliberateness of reason, which lets one survey the whole of life independently of the impression of the present, is its condition. The animal is wholly without the possibility of freedom, just as it is without the possibility even of a real, that is, deliberate, choice made after a complete prior conflict of motives, which for this purpose would have to be abstract representations. With the very necessity, therefore, with which the stone falls to the earth, the hungry wolf sinks its teeth into the flesh of the game, without possibility of knowing that it is the rent as well as the rending. *Necessity is the realm of nature; freedom is the realm of grace.*

Since now, as we have seen, that *self-cancellation of the will* proceeds from knowledge, but all knowledge and insight as such are independent of arbitrary choice, that denial of willing, that entrance into freedom, is also not to be forced by resolve, but proceeds from the innermost relation of knowing to willing in man, and therefore comes suddenly and as if flown in from outside.

That is precisely why the Church called it the *effect of grace*: but as it still makes this depend on the acceptance of grace, so too the effect of the quietive is ultimately an act of freedom of the will. And because in consequence of such effect of grace the whole being of man is changed from the ground up and turned around, so that he wants nothing more of all that he hitherto wanted so vehemently, so that really, as it were, a new man steps into the place of the old, it

called this consequence of the effect of grace *rebirth*. For what it calls the *natural man*, to whom it denies all capacity for the good, is precisely the will to life, which must be denied if deliverance from an existence like ours is to be attained. For behind our existence there lies something else, which becomes accessible to us only by our shaking off the world.

Considering not individuals, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, but the Idea of man in its unity, the Christian doctrine of faith symbolizes *nature*, the *affirmation of the will to life*, in Adam, whose sin, inherited by us, that is, our unity with him in the Idea, which presents itself in time through the bond of procreation, makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death: on the other hand it symbolizes *grace*, the *denial of the will*, *deliverance,* in the God made man, who, as free from all sinfulness, that is, from all will to life, cannot, like us, have sprung from the most decided affirmation of the will, nor can have a body, like us, that is through and through only concrete will, appearance of will; but, born of the pure virgin, has also only a semblance-body. This latter, namely, according to the Docetists, that is, certain Church Fathers very consistent in this. Apelles especially taught it, against whom and his followers Tertullian rose up. But even Augustine himself comments on the passage Rom. 8, 3: "Deus filium suum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati", thus: "Non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat" (Liber 83, quaestion. qu. 66). The same Augustine teaches in his work called the opus imperfectum, I, 47, that original sin is sin and punishment at once. It is, he says, already present in newborn children, but shows itself only when they have grown up. Yet the origin of this sin is, he says, to be derived from the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam; but in him we all existed; Adam became unhappy, and in him we all have become unhappy.—Indeed the doctrine of original sin (affirmation of the will) and of deliverance (denial of the will) is the great truth which constitutes the kernel of Christianity; while the rest is mostly only dress and covering, or accessory. Accordingly one should always conceive Jesus Christ in general, as the symbol, or the personification, of the denial of the will to life; not individually, whether according to his mythical history in the

Gospels or according to the presumed true history underlying it. For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy entirely. It is merely the vehicle of that first conception, for the people, who always demand something factual.—That in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true significance and degenerated into flat optimism does not concern us here.

It is, furthermore, an original and evangelical doctrine of Christianity, which Augustine, with the assent of the heads of the Church, defended against the flatness of the Pelagians, and which to purge of errors and bring forward again Luther made the chief aim of his striving, as he expressly declares in his book "De servo arbitrio",—the doctrine, namely, that the *will is not free*, but originally subject to the inclination to evil; hence its works are always sinful and defective and can never satisfy justice; that therefore, finally, not these works at all but faith alone makes blessed; but this faith itself arises not from resolve and free will, but through *effect of grace*, without our doing, comes upon us as from outside.—Not only the dogmas mentioned before, but this latter genuinely evangelical dogma too belongs to those which a crude and flat view today rejects as absurd, or conceals, in that it—despite Augustine and Luther, devoted to the Pelagian homespun understanding, which is precisely today's Rationalism—declares obsolete precisely these profound dogmas, peculiar and essential to Christianity in the narrowest sense, while it holds fast to the dogma, derived from Judaism and retained, joined to Christianity only by the historical path[55] [56] How far this is the case is evident from this, that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the Christian dogmatics systematized consistently by Augustine, which have led precisely to the opposite Pelagian flatness, vanish as soon as one abstracts from the Jewish fundamental dogma and recognizes that man is not the work of another, but of his own will. Then everything is at once clear and right: then there is no need of freedom in the operari: for it lies in the esse, and there precisely lies also the sin, as original sin: the effect of grace, however, is our own.—On the present, rationalistic view, by contrast, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, grounded in the New Testament, appear altogether untenable, indeed outrageous, for example predestination. Thereupon one rejects what is properly Christian, and returns to

crude Judaism. But the error of reckoning, or primal defect, of Christian dogmatics lies where one never looks for it, namely precisely in that which one withdraws from all examination as settled and certain. Take this away, and the whole dogmatics is rational: for that dogma spoils theology as it spoils all the other sciences. When one studies the Augustinian theology in the books "De civitate Dei" (especially in the 14th book), one experiences something analogous to trying to make a body stand whose center of gravity falls outside it: however one may turn and set it, it topples over again. So too here, in spite of all the efforts and sophisms of Augustine, the guilt of the world and its torment always falls back on the God who made all and in all everything, and moreover knew how things would go. That Augustine himself was aware of the difficulty and became very hesitant about it I have already shown in my prize essay on the freedom of the will (chap. 4, pp. 66–68 of the first edition).—Likewise the contradiction between the goodness of God and the misery of the world, as also between the freedom of the will and God's foreknowledge, is the inexhaustible theme of a nearly century-long controversy between the Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibniz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld and others, in which the only dogma fixed for the disputants is the existence of God, with his attributes, and they all turn ceaselessly in a circle, in trying to bring those things into harmony, that is, to solve a sum which never comes out, but whose remainder reappears now here, now there, after being covered up elsewhere. That the source of the embarrassment is to be sought in the fundamental presupposition, however, occurs to no one; although it presses itself upon one palpably. Only Bayle lets it be seen that he notices it. alone, and makes it the main thing.—We, however, recognize in the above-mentioned doctrine the truth in complete agreement with the result of our considerations. For we see that genuine virtue and holiness of disposition have their first origin not in deliberate choice (the works) but in knowledge (faith): just as we also developed it from our fundamental thought. Were it the works, which spring from motives and deliberate resolve, that led to blessedness, then virtue would always be only a prudent, methodical, far-sighted egoism; turn it as one will.—The faith, however, to which the Christian Church promises blessedness is this: that as through the fall of the

first man we all have become partakers of sin and have fallen prey to death and perdition, we are all also redeemed only through grace and the assumption of our enormous guilt by the divine Mediator, and this wholly without merit of ours (of the person); since what can proceed from the intentional (motive-determined) doing of the person, the works, can never justify us, absolutely and by its nature not, precisely because it is *intentional* doing brought about by motives, opus operatum. In this faith there lies first of all, then, that our condition is an originally and essentially hopeless one, of which we need *deliverance*; next that we ourselves belong essentially to evil and are so firmly bound to it that our works according to the law and the precept, that is, according to motives, can never satisfy justice, nor redeem us; but deliverance is gained *only* through faith, that is, through an altered mode of knowledge, and this faith itself can come only through grace, thus as if from outside: this means that salvation is something wholly foreign to our person, and points to a denial and cancellation of precisely this person as necessary to salvation. The works, the observance of the law as such, can never justify, because they are always an acting on motives. *Luther* demands (in the book "De libertate Christiana") that, after faith has set in, the good works proceed from it quite of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; but by no means as in themselves making claim to merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and gratuitously.—In the same way we too had first free justice alone, then love up to the complete cancellation of egoism, and finally resignation, or denial of the will, proceed from our ever clearer seeing through of the principium individuationis.

I have drawn in these dogmas of the Christian doctrine of faith, which in themselves are foreign to philosophy, here only to show that the ethics which proceeds from our whole consideration and agrees and coheres exactly with all its parts, even if it were new and unheard-of in expression, is by no means so in essence, but agrees fully with the thoroughly Christian dogmas, and was even contained and present in these themselves, in essentials; as it likewise agrees exactly with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the holy books of India, presented again in wholly different forms. At the same time the reminder of the

dogmas of the Christian Church served to explain and illustrate the apparent contradiction between the necessity of all expressions of character when motives are held before it (realm of nature) on the one hand, and the freedom of the will in itself to deny itself and cancel the character, with all the necessity of motives founded upon it (realm of grace) on the other.

71 In concluding here the outlines of ethics, and with them the whole development of that one thought the communication of which was my aim, I by no means wish to conceal an objection that touches this last part of the exposition, but rather to show that it lies in the nature of the matter and that to remedy it is simply impossible. It is this: that after our consideration has finally come to the point where in perfect holiness we have before our eyes the denial and giving up of all willing and thereby the deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering, this very thing now appears to us as a transition into empty *nothingness*.

On this I must first remark that the concept of *nothing* is essentially relative and always refers only to a determinate something which it negates. This property has been ascribed (by Kant in particular) only to the nihil privativum, which is what is marked with − as opposed to +, and which − could become + from the reversed point of view, and in contrast to this nihil privativum the nihil negativum has been set up, which would be nothing in every respect, for which one uses as example the logical, self-cancelling contradiction. Looked at more closely, however, no absolute nothing, no wholly proper nihil negativum, is even conceivable; rather every one of this kind, looked at from a higher standpoint, or subsumed under a wider concept, is always again only a nihil privativum. Every nothing is such only when thought in relation to something else, and presupposes this relation, hence also that something else. Even a logical contradiction is only a relative nothing. It is no thought of reason; but it is not for that reason an absolute nothing. For it is a composition of words, it is an example of the unthinkable, which one necessarily needs in logic in order to demonstrate the laws of thinking: hence if, for this purpose, one goes out for such an example, one will hold fast the nonsense as the positive which one is just seek-

ing, and skip over the sense as the negative. So every nihil negativum, or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privativum, or relative nothing, which can always exchange signs with that which it negates, so that then that would be thought as negation, but it itself as position. With this the result of the difficult dialectical investigation of the nothing also agrees, which Plato conducts in the "Sophist" (pp. 277–287, Bip.): Την *του έτερου* φυσιν αποδειξαντες ουσαν τε, και κατακεκερματισμενην επι παντα τα οντα *προς αλληλα*, το προς το ον έκαστου μοριον αυτης αντιτιθεμενον, ετολμησαμεν ειπειν, ὡς αυτο τουτο εστιν οντως *το μη ον*. (Cum enim ostenderemus, *alterius* ipsius naturam esse, perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam *invicem*; tunc partem ejus oppositam ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum revera *non ens* asseruimus.)

What is generally taken as positive, which we call *the existent* and whose negation the concept *nothing*, in its most general meaning, expresses, is precisely the world as representation, which I have shown to be the objectivity of the will, its mirror. This will and this world are also precisely ourselves, and to this world belongs representation as such, as one of its sides: the form of this representation is space and time, so that everything that exists from this standpoint must be somewhere and at some time. Denial, abolition, turning of the will is also abolition and disappearance of the world, its mirror. If we no longer catch sight of the will in this mirror, we ask in vain where it has turned, and then lament, since it has no where and when any longer, that it has been lost in nothingness.

An inverted standpoint, if it were possible for us, would exchange the signs and show what exists for us as nothing and that nothing as what exists. But so long as we ourselves are the will to life, the latter can be known and designated by us only negatively, because the old saying of Empedocles, that like is known only by like, deprives us here of all knowledge, just as, conversely, the possibility of all our actual knowledge, that is, the world as representation, or the objectivity of the will, ultimately rests on it. For the world is the self-knowledge of the will.

If it were nevertheless absolutely insisted that some positive knowledge be obtained of what philosophy can express only negatively, as denial of the will, nothing would remain for us but to point to the state which all those who have

attained to the complete denial of the will have experienced, and which has been designated by the names ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on; a state which, however, cannot properly be called knowledge, because it no longer has the form of subject and object, and which, moreover, is accessible only to one's own experience, which cannot be communicated further.

But we, who remain wholly and entirely on the standpoint of philosophy, must content ourselves here with negative knowledge, satisfied to have reached the last boundary stone of the positive. If we have recognized the essence in itself of the world as will, and in all its appearances only its objectivity, and have followed this from the knowledgeless urge of dark natural forces up to the most fully conscious action of man, we by no means evade the consequence that with the free denial, the giving up of the will, all those appearances too are now abolished: that constant pressing and driving without goal and without rest, at all stages of objectivity, in which and through which the world exists; abolished the multiplicity of successively ascending forms; abolished, with the will, its whole appearance; finally also the universal forms of this appearance, time and space, and also its last fundamental form, subject and object. No will: no representation, no world.

Before us, to be sure, only nothingness remains. But that which resists this dissolving into nothingness, our nature, is itself merely the will to life, which we ourselves are, as it is our world. That we so greatly abhor nothingness is nothing more than another expression of the fact that we so greatly will life, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing but it.—But if we turn our gaze from our own poverty and confinement to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having come to full self-knowledge, found itself again in everything and then freely denied itself, and who then only wait to see its last trace vanish with the body that it animates; then, instead of the restless urge and drive, instead of the constant transition from wish to fear and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope of which the life-dream of willing man consists, there shows itself to us that peace which is higher than all reason, that complete sea-calm of the mind, that deep tranquility, unshak-

able confidence and serenity, the mere reflected glow of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have portrayed it, is a whole and certain gospel: only knowledge has remained, the will has vanished. But we then look with deep and painful longing at this state, beside which the wretchedness and hopelessness of our own appears in full light through the contrast. Yet this contemplation is the only one that can console us lastingly, when on the one hand we have recognized incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the appearance of the will, to the world, and on the other hand see the world dissolve with the will abolished and keep before us only the empty nothing. Thus, in this way, by contemplating the life and conduct of the saints, whom to meet in our own experience is granted us only rarely, but whom their recorded history and, vouched for by the stamp of inner truth, art bring before our eyes, we have to dispel the dark impression of that nothing which hovers as the final goal behind all virtue and holiness, and which we fear as children fear the dark; instead of evading it ourselves, as the Indians do, through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption into *Brahm* or the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists. We confess it freely instead: what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all those who are still full of the will, assuredly nothing. But also, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this our so very real world with all its suns and Milky Ways is—nothing.

Appendix: Critique of Kantian Philosophy

Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.

C'est le privilège du vrai génie, et surtout du génie qui ouvre une carrière, de faire impunément de grandes fautes.

Voltaire.

It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a great mind than to give a clear and complete exposition of its worth. For the faults are something particular and finite, which can therefore be surveyed completely. But the very stamp that genius impresses on its works is that their excellence is unfathomable and inexhaustible: hence they become the ageless teachers of many centuries in succession. The consummate masterpiece of a truly great mind will always have a profound and far-reaching effect on the whole human race, so much so that it cannot be calculated to what distant centuries and countries its enlightening influence may reach. It will always do so: because, however cultivated and rich the age in which it came into being, genius always rises, like a palm tree, above the soil in which it is rooted.

But a profound and widespread effect of this kind cannot come about suddenly, because of the wide distance between genius and ordinary humanity. The knowledge that this one man drew, within *one* human lifetime, directly from life and the world, won, and laid before others already won and prepared, can-

not nevertheless at once become the property of mankind; because mankind does not have even so much power to receive as he had to give. Rather, even after it has survived the struggle with unworthy opponents who contest the life of the immortal at its very birth and would stifle the salvation of mankind in the germ (comparable to the serpent at the cradle of Hercules), that knowledge must then first travel the detours of countless false interpretations and distorted applications, must withstand the attempts at union with old errors, and thus live in conflict, until a new, unprejudiced generation grows up to meet it, which gradually, from a thousand derived channels, already in youth receives in part the content of that source, assimilates it little by little, and so comes to share in the benefit that was meant to flow to mankind from that great mind. So slow is the education of the human race, the weak and at the same time refractory pupil of genius.—So too the whole power and importance of Kant's doctrine will be revealed only by time, when some day the spirit of the age itself, gradually transformed by the influence of that doctrine, changed in what is most important and innermost, will bear living witness to the power of that giant mind. I, however, by no means wish here, presumptuously anticipating it, to take on the thankless role of Calchas and Cassandra. Only let it be permitted me, in consequence of what has been said, to regard Kant's works as still very new, whereas nowadays many look upon them as already antiquated, and indeed lay them aside as done with, or, as they put it, have them behind them, and others, emboldened by this, even ignore them and, with brazen faces, under the presuppositions of the old realistic dogmatism and its scholasticism, go on philosophizing about God and the soul;—which is as if one wanted to assert the doctrines of the alchemists in modern chemistry.—Moreover, Kant's works do not need my feeble eulogy, but will themselves praise their master forever and, if perhaps not in his letter, yet in his spirit, will always live on earth.

Admittedly, however, when we look back on the immediate success of his doctrines, that is, on the attempts and proceedings in the field of philosophy during the period that has passed since, a very dispiriting saying of Goethe's is confirmed for us: "as the water that is displaced by a ship closes together again just behind it, so too error, when superior minds have thrust it aside and made

room for themselves, closes up again very swiftly behind them, in the natural course." (Poetry and Truth, Part 3, p. 521.) Yet this period has been only an episode, which, to be counted among the fates of every new and great knowledge mentioned above, is now unmistakably near its end, as the soap bubble so persistently blown up bursts at last. People are beginning generally to realize that real and serious philosophy still stands where Kant left it. At any rate, I do not acknowledge that anything has happened in it between him and me; therefore I link up with him directly.

What I intend in this appendix to my work is really only a justification of the doctrine presented in it, insofar as it disagrees with the Kantian philosophy on many points, indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this is necessary, however, since evidently my train of thought, however different its content may be from the Kantian, is nevertheless entirely under the influence of the latter, necessarily presupposes it, proceeds from it, and I confess that I owe the best of my own development, next to the impression of the intuitively perceived world, to the works of Kant as well as to the sacred writings of the Hindus and to Plato.—But my contradictions of Kant that nevertheless exist I can justify only by charging him with error on these very points and exposing the faults he committed. Therefore in this appendix I must proceed throughout polemically against Kant, and indeed in earnest and with all my strength: for only so can it happen that the error which clings to Kant's doctrine is worn away, and its truth shines the brighter and stands the more securely. One must not expect, therefore, that my certainly heartfelt reverence for Kant should extend also to his weaknesses and faults, and that I should therefore expose these only with the most cautious forbearance, whereby my presentation would have to become weak and flat through circumlocutions. Toward a living person such forbearance is needed, because human weakness endures even the most justified refutation of an error only with soothing and flattery, and even so with difficulty, and a teacher of the centuries and benefactor of mankind deserves at the very least that one spare even his human weakness, so as to cause him no pain. But the dead man has cast off this weakness: his merit stands firm: time will purify it more and more of every overestimation and disparagement. His faults

must be separated from it, rendered harmless, and then consigned to oblivion. Therefore, in the polemic against Kant to be raised here, I have my eye solely on his faults and weaknesses, stand hostile to them, and wage a merciless war of extermination against them, always intent not on covering them over with indulgence but rather on setting them in the brightest light, in order to destroy them the more surely. For the reasons stated above, I am conscious in this of neither an injustice nor an ingratitude toward Kant. In order, however, to avert every appearance of malignity in the eyes of others too, I wish first to display my deeply felt reverence and gratitude toward Kant by briefly stating his chief merit as it appears in my eyes, and from such general points of view that I am not obliged to touch on the points in which I shall later have to contradict him. *Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself*—on the ground of the demonstration that between things and us there always stands the *intellect*, on account of which they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves. He was led onto this path by Locke (see Prolegomena to Every Metaphysics, §. 13, note 2). Locke had shown that the secondary qualities of things, such as sound, smell, color, hardness, softness, smoothness, and the like, being founded on affections of the senses, do not belong to the objective body, to the thing in itself, to which he ascribed only the primary qualities, that is, those that presuppose merely space and impenetrability, hence extension, shape, solidity, number, mobility. But this easily found Lockean distinction, which stays on the surface of things, was as it were only a youthful prelude to the Kantian. The latter, proceeding from an incomparably higher standpoint, declares all that Locke had allowed to stand as qualitates primarias, that is, qualities of the thing in itself, to belong likewise only to its appearance in our faculty of apprehension, and precisely for the reason that its conditions, space, time and causality, are known by us a priori. Thus Locke had subtracted from the thing in itself the share that the sense organs have in its appearance; Kant, however, now subtracted in addition the share of the brain functions (though not under this name); whereby the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself now acquired an infinitely greater significance and a far deeper sense. To this end he had to carry out the great separation of our

knowledge a priori from that a posteriori, which before him had never been done with due rigor and completeness, nor with clear consciousness: accordingly this now became the main subject matter of his profound investigations. —Here we may remark at once that Kant's philosophy stands in a threefold relation to that of his predecessors: first, a confirming and extending one to Locke's, as we have just seen; second, a correcting and exploiting one to Hume's, which is found most clearly expressed in the preface to the "Prolegomena" (that most beautiful and most comprehensible of all Kant's principal writings, which is read far too little, though it extraordinarily facilitates the study of his philosophy); third, a decidedly polemical and destructive one to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. One should know all three doctrines before proceeding to the study of the Kantian philosophy.—If now, according to the above, the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself, thus the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal and the real, is the fundamental feature of the Kantian philosophy, then the assertion of the absolute identity of these two, which appeared soon afterward, gives a sad confirmation of the saying of Goethe mentioned earlier; the more so as it rested on nothing but the charlatanry of intellectual intuition, and accordingly was only a return to the crudeness of the common view, masked under imposing airs of superior distinction, bombast and gibberish. It became the worthy point of departure for the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and spiritless Hegel.—As then Kant's separation of appearance from the thing in itself, conceived in the manner set forth above, far surpassed in profundity and circumspection of its grounding everything that had ever existed, so too it was infinitely momentous in its results. For, found wholly out of himself, in an entirely new way, from a new side and on a new path, he presented therein the same truth which Plato had already repeated unweariedly and in his language mostly expresses thus: this world, appearing to the senses, has no true being, but only an unceasing becoming; it is, and also is not, and the apprehension of it is not so much a knowledge as a delusion. This is also what he expresses mythically in the most important passage of all his works, already mentioned in the third book of the present writing, the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, by saying that men,

chained fast in a dark cave, see neither the genuine original light nor the real things, but only the meager light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real things that pass by behind their backs at this fire: they believed, however, that the shadows were reality, and that determining the succession of these shadows was true wisdom.—The same truth, presented again quite differently, is also a chief doctrine of the Vedas and Puranas, the doctrine of Maya, by which likewise nothing other is understood than what Kant calls appearance, in contrast to the thing in itself: for the work of Maya is declared to be precisely this visible world in which we are, a conjured-up magic, an insubstantial, in itself unessential semblance, comparable to optical illusion and to the dream, a veil enveloping human consciousness, something of which it is equally false and equally true to say that it is as that it is not.—Kant, however, not only expressed the same doctrine in an entirely new and original way, but made it, by means of the calmest and soberest presentation, into a proven and indisputable truth; whereas both Plato and the Indians had founded their assertions merely on a general view of the world, put them forward as the immediate utterance of their consciousness, and presented them more mythically and poetically than philosophically and clearly. In this respect they stand to Kant as the Pythagoreans Hicetas, Philolaus and Aristarchus, who already asserted the motion of the earth around the resting sun, stand to Copernicus. Such clear knowledge and calm, circumspect presentation of this dreamlike constitution of the whole world is really the basis of the whole Kantian philosophy, is its soul and its very greatest merit. He accomplished it by taking apart the whole machinery of our faculty of knowledge, by means of which the phantasmagoria of the objective world comes about, and displaying it piece by piece, with admirable circumspection and skill. All previous Western philosophy, appearing unspeakably crude beside the Kantian, had failed to recognize that truth, and for that very reason had really always spoken as in a dream. Kant first suddenly woke it from this; hence the last sleepers (Mendelssohn) called him the All-Crusher. He showed that the laws which rule in existence, that is, in experience in general, with inviolable necessity, are not to be applied in order to derive and explain *existence itself*, that therefore their validity is only a relative one,

that is, begins only after existence, the world of experience in general, is already posited and present; that consequently these laws cannot be our guide when we set about explaining the existence of the world and of ourselves. All earlier Western philosophers had imagined that these laws, according to which appearances are tied together and which all, time and space as well as causality and inference, I comprehend under the expression of the principle of sufficient reason, were absolute laws conditioned by nothing at all, aeternae veritates, that the world itself existed only in consequence and conformity with them, and that therefore the whole riddle of the world must be capable of solution by their guidance. The assumptions made to this end, which Kant criticizes under the name of the Ideas of reason, served really only to raise mere appearance, the work of Maya, Plato's world of shadows, to the sole and highest reality, to put it in the place of the innermost and true essence of things, and thereby to make real knowledge of this impossible: that is, in a word, to put the dreamers still more firmly to sleep. Kant showed those laws, and consequently the world itself, to be conditioned by the mode of knowledge of the subject; from which it followed that, however far one might investigate and infer further by their guidance, one would make no step forward in the main matter, that is, in the knowledge of the essence of the world in itself and outside representation, but would only move as the squirrel in the wheel. One can therefore also compare all dogmatists to people who thought that if only they walked straight on long enough they would reach the end of the world; Kant, however, would then have sailed round the world and shown that, because it is round, one cannot get out of it by horizontal movement, but that by perpendicular movement it is perhaps not impossible. One can also say that Kant's doctrine gives the insight that the end and beginning of the world are to be sought not outside, but within us.

All this, however, rests on the fundamental difference between dogmatic and *critical*, or *transcendental philosophy*. Anyone who wants to make this clear to themselves and bring it vividly home through an example can do so very briefly by reading through, as a specimen of dogmatic philosophy, an essay of Leibniz bearing the title "De rerum originatione radicali," printed for the first time in

Erdmann's edition of Leibniz's philosophical works, vol. 1, p. 147. Here the origin and the excellent constitution of the world are demonstrated a priori, quite in the realistic-dogmatic manner, using the ontological and the cosmological proof, on the ground of the veritatum aeternarum.—Incidentally it is also admitted once that experience shows the very opposite of the excellence of the world here demonstrated, but experience is then told that it understands nothing of this and should keep its mouth shut when philosophy a priori has spoken.—As adversary of this whole method there has appeared with Kant the *critical*

philosophy, which makes its very problem the veritates aeternas that serve as the foundation of every such dogmatic edifice, investigates their origin, and then finds it in the human head, where, namely, they grow out of the forms peculiar to it, which it carries in itself for the purpose of apprehending an objective world. Here, then, in the brain, is the quarry that supplies the material for that proud dogmatic structure. But because the critical philosophy, in order to arrive at this result, had to *go beyond* the veritates aeternas on which all previous dogmatism was based, in order to make these themselves the object of investigation, it has become *transcendental philosophy*. From this it then further results that the objective world as we know it does not belong to the essence of things in themselves, but is merely the *appearance* of it, conditioned by those very forms that lie a priori in the human intellect (that is, brain), and that it therefore can contain nothing but appearances.

Kant, to be sure, did not arrive at the knowledge that the appearance is the world as representation and that the thing in itself is the will. But he showed that the world of appearance is conditioned just as much by the subject as by the object, and in isolating the most general forms of its appearance, that is, of representation, he demonstrated that these forms are known not only starting from the object but equally well starting from the subject, and are surveyable in their whole lawfulness, because they are really the boundary common to both between object and subject, and he concluded that by following this boundary one penetrates neither into the interior of the object nor of the subject, and consequently never knows the essence of the world, the thing in itself.

He did not derive the thing in itself in the right way, as I shall soon show, but by means of an inconsistency which he had to pay for through frequent and irresistible attacks on this principal part of his doctrine. He did not recognize the thing in itself directly in the will; but he took a great, path-breaking step toward this knowledge, in that he presented the undeniable moral significance of human action as wholly different from and not dependent on the laws of appearance, nor ever explicable in accordance with them, but as something that touches the thing in itself directly: this is the second chief point of view for his merit.

As the third we can regard the complete overthrow of Scholastic philosophy, by which name I should like here to designate in general the whole period beginning with the church father Augustine and closing just before Kant. For the chief character of Scholasticism is surely that very correctly stated by Tennemann: the guardianship of the dominant national religion over philosophy, which really had nothing left to do but to prove and embellish the chief dogmas prescribed to it by that religion: the true Scholastics, down to Suarez, admit this unreservedly: the philosophers who follow do it more unconsciously, or at any rate without admitting it. Scholastic philosophy is allowed to run only to about a hundred years before Descartes, and then with him a wholly new epoch of free inquiry, independent of all positive doctrine of faith, is made to begin; but such inquiry cannot in fact be attributed to Descartes and his successors [1], but only a semblance [2] Bruno and Spinoza are to be wholly excepted here. They stand each by himself and alone, and belong neither to their century nor to their part of the world, which rewarded the one with death, the other with persecution and disgrace. Their wretched existence and death in this Occident resembles that of a tropical plant in Europe. Their true spiritual home was the banks of the holy Ganga: there they would have led a quiet and honored life among those of like mind.—Bruno expresses clearly and beautifully in the following verses, with which he opens the book della causa principio ed uno, for which he got the stake, how lonely he felt in his century,

and shows at the same time a presentiment of his fate, which made him hesitate to set forth his cause until that drive, so strong in noble minds, to communicate what is recognized as true, overcame it:

Ad partum properare tuum, mens aegra, quid obstat; Seclo haec indigno sint tribuenda licet? Umbrarum fluctu terras mergente, cacumen Adtolle in clarum, noster Olympe, Jovem.

Whoever reads this principal work of his, as also his other Italian writings, once so rare, now accessible to all through a German edition of it, and at most a striving after it. Descartes was a most distinguished mind, and accomplished a great deal if one takes his time into account. But if one sets this consideration aside and measures him by the liberation of thought from all fetters and the inauguration of a new period of unprejudiced independent inquiry which is credited to him, one must find that with his skepticism—which still lacks real earnestness and therefore surrenders so quickly and so badly—he indeed puts on the air as if he wanted to throw off at one stroke all the fetters of early-inoculated opinions belonging to his time and nation, but does so only in appearance for a moment, in order to take them up again at once and hold them the more firmly; and so likewise do all his successors down to Kant. Very applicable to a free self-thinker of this stamp is therefore Goethe's verse:

"He seems to me, with Your Grace's leave, Like one of those long-legged cicadas, That always flies and, flying, springs—And at once in the grass sings its old little song."—

Kant had reasons for putting on the air as if he too meant it only so. But the pretended leap, which was conceded because one already knew that it leads back into the grass, became this time a flight, and now those who stand below are left only to look after it and can no longer catch it again.

Kant, then, dared to demonstrate from his doctrine the unprovability of all those dogmas so often supposedly proved. Speculative theology and the rational psychology connected with it received the deathblow from him. Since then they have vanished from German philosophy, and one must will find with me that among all philosophers he alone approaches Plato somewhat, in respect of the strong admixture of poetic power and bent alongside the philosophical,

and that this too shows itself especially dramatically. The tender, spiritual, thinking being that confronts us from this writing of his, let one imagine under the hands of crude, raging priests as his judges and executioners, and thank the age which brought on a brighter and milder century, so that the posterity whose curse was to fall on those diabolical fanatics is now already the contemporary world. not let oneself be misled by the fact that here and there the word is retained after the matter has been given up, or that some wretched philosophy-professor has his master's fear before his eyes and lets truth be truth. The magnitude of this merit of Kant can be measured only by one who has observed the detrimental influence of those concepts on natural science as on philosophy in all, even the best, writers of the 17th and 18th centuries. In German scientific writings the change of tone and of metaphysical background that has occurred since Kant is striking: before him it was with these as it still is now in England.—This merit of Kant is connected with the fact that thoughtless pursuit of the laws of appearance, the raising of them to eternal truths and thereby of fleeting appearance to the real essence of the world, in short, *realism*, undisturbed in its delusion by any reflection, had been utterly dominant in all earlier philosophy, ancient, medieval, and modern. Berkeley, who, as Malebranche before him, had recognized its one-sidedness, indeed falsity, was not able to overthrow it, because his attack was confined to *one* point. It was thus reserved for Kant to help the idealist fundamental view—which throughout non-Islamized Asia is even, and essentially so, the view of religion—to dominance in Europe, at least in philosophy. Before Kant, then, we were in time; now time is in us, and so on.

Ethics too had been treated by that realistic philosophy according to the laws of appearance, which it held to be absolute and valid also of the thing in itself, and was therefore grounded now on the doctrine of happiness, now on the will of the world's creator, finally on the concept of perfection, which in and for itself is wholly empty and without content, since it designates a mere relation, which receives meaning only from the things to which it is applied, in that "to be perfect" means nothing more than "to correspond to some concept presupposed and given for the purpose," which therefore must have been set up beforehand,

and without which perfection is an unnamed number and consequently, pronounced alone, says nothing at all. If now, however, one should perhaps wish to make the concept of "humanity" a tacit presupposition and accordingly set up as the moral principle the striving for perfect humanity, one thereby says only: "Men ought to be as they ought to be"—and is as wise as before. "Perfect," namely, is almost only the synonym of "complete," in that it states that in a given case, or individual, all the predicates that lie in the concept of its species are represented, thus actually present. Hence the concept of "perfection," when used absolutely and in the abstract, is a word empty of thought, and so too is the talk of the "most perfect being" and the like. All this is mere verbiage. Nevertheless in the last century this concept of perfection and imperfection had become current coin; indeed it was the hinge on which almost all moralizing and even theologizing turned. Everyone had it on their lips, so that at last a veritable abuse was made of it. Even the best writers of the time, e.g. Lessing, we see most lamentably entangled in perfections and imperfections and wrestling with them. Yet every head capable of any thought must at least dimly have felt that this concept is without any positive content, since, like an algebraic sign, it indicates a mere relation in the abstract.—Kant, as already said, separated the undeniable great ethical significance of actions wholly from the appearance and its laws, and showed it as concerning immediately the thing in itself, the innermost essence of the world, whereas the former, that is, time and space, and all that fills them and orders itself in them according to the causal law, are to be regarded as an insubstantial and essenceless dream.

This little, which by no means exhausts the subject, may suffice as a testimony of my recognition of Kant's great merits, set down here for my own satisfaction, and because justice demanded that those merits be recalled to the memory of everyone who wants to follow me in the relentless exposure of his faults, to which I now proceed.

That Kant's great achievements had to be accompanied by great faults can be gauged already merely historically, from the fact that, although he brought about the greatest revolution in philosophy, and put an end to Scholasticism, which, understood in the wider sense indicated, had lasted fourteen centuries,

in order now really to begin a wholly new third world epoch of philosophy, the immediate result of his appearance was nevertheless almost only negative, not positive, in that, because he did not set up a complete new system to which his followers could have held for any period of time, all indeed noticed that something very great had happened, yet none rightly knew what. They saw well enough that all previous philosophy had been a fruitless dreaming from which the new age was now awakening; but what they were now to hold to, they did not know. A great void, a great need had set in: general attention, even that of the wider public, was aroused. Prompted by this, but not driven by inner impulse and feeling of power (which makes itself felt even at the most unfavorable moment, as with Spinoza), men without any distinguishing talents made manifold, weak, absurd, indeed at times mad attempts, to which the public, once it was aroused, nevertheless gave its attention and for a long time lent its ear with great patience, such as is to be found only in Germany.

As here, it must once have gone in nature when a great revolution had changed the whole surface of the earth, sea and land had exchanged places, and the ground had been leveled for a new creation. Then it took long before nature could bring forth a new series of lasting forms, each harmonizing with itself and with the others: strange monstrous organisms appeared, which, out of harmony with themselves and with one another, could not endure for long, but whose remains still extant today are precisely what have brought down to us the memory of that wavering and experimenting of nature newly shaping itself. —That in philosophy a crisis wholly similar to that, and an age of monstrous births, was brought on by Kant, as we all know, already allows the inference that his merit cannot have been perfect, but must have been afflicted with great defects, negative and one-sided. These defects we now wish to trace.

First of all, let us make clear to ourselves, and examine, the fundamental thought in which the intention of the whole Critique of Pure Reason lies.—Kant placed himself on the standpoint of his predecessors, the dogmatic philosophers, and accordingly started with them from the following presuppositions. 1) Metaphysics is the science of that which lies beyond the possibility of all experience.—2) Such a thing can never be found according to principles

which are themselves drawn from experience (Prolegomena, §. 1); but only what we know *before*, hence independently of, all experience can reach farther than possible experience.—3) In our reason some principles of this kind are actually to be met with: they are comprised under the name cognitions from pure reason.—So far Kant goes along with his predecessors; here, however, he parts from them. They say: "These principles, or cognitions from pure reason, are expressions of the absolute possibility of things, aeternae veritates, sources of ontology: they stand above the order of the world, as Fate stood above the gods of the ancients." Kant says: they are mere forms of our intellect, laws not of the existence of things but of our representations of them, hence valid only for our apprehension of things, and can accordingly not reach beyond the possibility of experience, at which, according to point 1, the aim was. For precisely the apriority of these forms of knowledge, since it can rest only on their subjective origin, cuts us off forever from knowledge of the essence in itself of things and confines us to a world of mere appearances, so that we cannot know things as they may be in themselves even a posteriori, let alone a priori. Accordingly metaphysics is impossible, and in its place steps critique of pure reason. Over against the old dogmatism Kant is here completely victorious; therefore all dogmatic attempts that have appeared since have had to take quite different paths from the earlier ones: I shall now lead up to the justification of my own, in accordance with the avowed intention of the present critique. Namely, on closer examination of the above argument one will have to admit that its very first basic assumption is a petitio principii; it lies in the proposition (stated clearly especially in the Prolegomena, §. 1): "The source of metaphysics must absolutely not be empirical, its principles and fundamental concepts must never be taken from experience, neither inner nor outer." For the grounding of this cardinal assertion, however, nothing at all is adduced but the etymological argument from the word metaphysics. In truth, however, the matter stands thus: The world and our own existence present themselves to us necessarily as a riddle. Now it is assumed without further ado that the solution of this riddle cannot proceed from a thorough understanding of the world itself, but must be sought in something wholly different from the world (for that is what "be-

yond the possibility of all experience" means); and that from that solution everything must be excluded of which we can in any way have *immediate* acquaintance (for that is what possible experience, inner as well as outer, means); that it must rather be sought only in that to which we can attain merely mediately, namely by means of inferences from universal propositions a priori. After the chief source of all knowledge had been excluded in this way and the straight road to truth barred, one need not wonder that the dogmatic attempts miscarried and that Kant could demonstrate the necessity of this miscarriage: for one had assumed in advance that metaphysics and knowledge a priori are identical. For this, however, it would first have had to be proved that the material for the solution of the riddle of the world absolutely cannot be contained in the world itself, but is to be sought only outside the world, in something to which one can attain only by the guidance of those forms known to us a priori. So long as this is not proved, however, we have no ground, in the most important and most difficult of all tasks, to stop up the most fertile of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in order to operate solely with forms empty of content. I say, therefore, that the solution of the riddle of the world must proceed from the understanding of the world itself; that thus the task of metaphysics is not to fly over the experience in which the world stands, but to understand it thoroughly, since experience, outer and inner, is indeed the chief source of all knowledge; that therefore only through the proper linking of outer experience with inner, made at the right point, and the connection thereby brought about of these two so heterogeneous sources of knowledge, is the solution of the riddle of the world possible; though even so only within certain limits which are inseparable from our finite nature, hence so that we attain to a correct understanding of the world itself without, however, reaching a closed explanation of its existence that abolishes all further problems. Hence est quadam prodire tenus, and my path lies in the middle between the doctrine of omniscience of the earlier dogmatism and the despair of the Kantian critique. The important truths discovered by Kant, however, by which the earlier metaphysical systems were overthrown, have furnished data and

material for mine. Compare what I have said about my method in chap. 17 of the second volume.—So much for the Kantian fundamental thought: now we will consider the execution and the details.

Kant's style bears throughout the stamp of a superior mind, of genuine, firm individuality and quite uncommon power of thought; its character can perhaps be aptly designated as a *brilliant dryness*, by virtue of which he is able to grasp and pick out concepts with great sureness, and then to toss them to and fro with the greatest freedom, to the reader's astonishment. The same brilliant dryness I find again in the style of Aristotle, although this is much simpler.—Nevertheless Kant's exposition is often indistinct, indefinite, inadequate and at times obscure. This latter is, to be sure, in part excusable by the difficulty of the subject and the depth of the thoughts; but a person who is thoroughly clear in their own mind and knows quite distinctly what they think and mean will never write indistinctly, will never set up wavering, indefinite concepts and, to designate them, collect highly difficult, complicated expressions from foreign languages in order afterwards to use them continually, as Kant took from the older, even Scholastic philosophy words and formulas which he combined for his purposes, such as "transcendental synthetic unity of apperception," and in general "unity of synthesis" put every time where "union" alone would have sufficed. Such a writer, further, will not explain again and again anew what has once been explained, as Kant does, for example, with the understanding, the categories, experience, and other chief concepts. Such a writer will altogether not repeat without end, and yet in each new presentation of the hundred-times-present thought leave in it precisely the same obscure passages; but will say their opinion once, distinctly, thoroughly, exhaustively, and leave it at that. Quo enim melius rem aliquam concipimus, eo magis determinati sumus ad eam unico modo exprimendam, says Descartes in his fifth letter. But the greatest disadvantage that Kant's exposition, obscure in places, has had is that it acted as exemplar vitiis imitabile, indeed was misinterpreted into a pernicious authorization. The public had been forced to see that the obscure is not always senseless: at once the senseless took refuge behind obscure exposition. Fichte was the first to seize this new privilege and use it heavily; Schelling at least

equaled him in it, and a host of hungry scribblers without spirit and without honesty soon outdid both. But the greatest impudence in serving up sheer nonsense, in botching together senseless, raving tissues of words, such as one had hitherto heard only in madhouses, appeared at last in Hegel and became the instrument of the clumsiest general mystification that has ever been, with a success that will appear fabulous to posterity and will remain a monument of German niaiserie. In vain did Jean Paul meanwhile write his fine paragraph "Higher Appreciation of Philosophical Madness in the Lecturer's Chair and of Poetic Madness on the Stage" (Aesthetic After-School); for Goethe had already said in vain:

"So one chatters and teaches undisturbed, Who cares to bother with the fools? Commonly people believe, if only they hear words, That there must surely be something to think in them."

But let us return to Kant. One cannot avoid admitting that he wholly lacks ancient, grand simplicity, that he wholly lacks naivety, ingénuité, candeur. His philosophy has no analogy with Greek architecture, which presents large, simple proportions revealing themselves to the eye all at once: rather it strongly recalls Gothic construction. For a quite individual peculiarity of Kant's mind is a singular delight in symmetry, which loves the motley multiplicity in order to order it, and to repeat the order in subordinate orders, and so on ceaselessly, just as in Gothic churches. Indeed, he sometimes carries this to the point of trifling, in which, for love of that inclination, he goes so far as to do manifest violence to truth and to treat it as the old-fashioned gardeners treat nature, whose work is symmetrical avenues, squares and triangles, pyramidal and spherical trees, and hedges wound into regular curves. I will substantiate this with facts.

After he has dealt with space and time in isolation, then dispatched this whole world of intuition filling space and time, in which we live and are, with the empty words "the empirical content of intuition is given to us,"—he arrives at once, with a leap, at the *logical foundation of his whole philosophy*, the *table of judgments*. From this he deduces a round dozen categories, symmetrically laid out under four headings, which later become the fearful bed of Procrustes, into which he forcibly squeezes all things of the world and everything that goes on

in man, shunning no violence and scorning no sophism, only to be able to repeat the symmetry of that table everywhere. The first thing that is symmetrically derived from it is the pure physiological table of general principles of natural science: namely, axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of empirical thought in general. Of these principles the first two are simple; the two latter, however, each put forth three offshoots symmetrically. The mere categories were what he calls *concepts*; these principles of natural science, however, are *judgments*. According to his supreme guiding thread to all wisdom, namely symmetry, it is now the turn of the *inferences* to prove fruitful, and indeed they do so again symmetrically and in regular beat. For, as through the application of the categories to sensibility experience, together with its principles a priori, grew up for the *understanding*; so likewise there arise, through the application of the *inferences* to the categories, which business *reason* performs, according to its alleged principle of seeking the unconditioned, the *Ideas* of *reason*. This goes on thus: the three categories of relation give three, and only three, possible kinds of major premises for inferences, which latter accordingly likewise fall into three kinds, each of which is to be regarded as an egg out of which *reason* hatches an Idea: namely, from the categorical kind of inference the Idea of the soul, from the hypothetical the Idea of the world, and from the disjunctive the Idea of God. In the middle one, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of the table of categories is now repeated once more, in that its four headings bring forth four theses, each of which has its antithesis as symmetrical pendant.

We do indeed render our admiration to the really most acute combination which called forth this elegant edifice; but we shall further examine it thoroughly, in its foundation and in its parts.—First, however, the following considerations must be put forward.

It is astonishing how Kant, without pausing to reflect further, pursues his way, following his symmetry, ordering everything according to it, without ever taking any one of the subjects so treated into consideration for itself. I will explain myself more closely. After he has taken intuitive knowledge into consideration only in mathematics, he wholly neglects the rest of perceptual knowledge, in

which the world lies before us, and holds solely to abstract thought, which after all receives all its significance and value only from the world of intuition, which is infinitely more significant, more universal, more rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge. Indeed, he has nowhere—and this is a main point—clearly distinguished intuitive and abstract knowledge, and precisely thereby, as we shall see afterwards, has involved himself in irresolvable contradictions with himself.—After he has dispatched the whole world of sense with the empty "it is given," he makes, as said, the logical table of judgments the cornerstone of his edifice. But here he does not reflect for a moment on what actually lies before him now. These forms of judgments are indeed *words* and *combinations of words*. The first question should surely have been what these immediately signify: it would have been found that these are *concepts*. The next question would then have been about the nature of *concepts*. From its answer it would have emerged what relation these have to the intuitive representations in which the world stands: then intuition and reflection would have come apart. Not merely how pure and merely formal intuition a priori, but also how its content, empirical intuition, enters consciousness, would now have had to be investigated. But then it would have shown what share the *understanding* has in this, and so also altogether what the *understanding* is, and what, on the other hand, *reason* really is, whose critique is written here. It is most striking that he does not once determine this latter properly and sufficiently; rather he gives only occasionally, and as the context at the moment demands, incomplete and incorrect explanations of it; wholly in contradiction with the rule of Descartes adduced above [3].

[4] Let it be remarked here that I cite the "Critique of Pure *Reason*" throughout by the page number *of the first edition*, since in the Rosenkranz edition of the collected works this page number is given throughout: in addition I add, prefixed with V, the page number of the fifth edition; with this all the rest, from the second on, agree in wording, hence probably also in page number.

For example, p. 11; V, 24, of the "Critique of Pure Reason," it is the faculty of principles a priori; p. 299; V, 356, it is said once more that reason is the faculty of *principles*, and it is opposed to the understanding, which is said to be the faculty of *rules*! Now one would think there must be a difference as wide as heaven between principles and rules, since it entitles him to assume a special faculty of knowledge for each of them. But this great difference is supposed to lie merely in this, that what is known a priori from pure intuition, or through the forms of the understanding, is a *rule*, and only what proceeds a priori from mere concepts is a principle. To this arbitrary and untenable distinction we shall return later in the Dialectic. On p. 330; V, 386, reason is the faculty of inferring: mere judging he often (p. 69; V, 94) declares to be the business of the understanding. In so doing he really says: judging is the business of the understanding so long as the ground of the judgment is empirical, transcendental, or metalogical (Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 31, 32, 33); but if it is logical, which is what inference consists in, then a quite special, much more eminent faculty of knowledge acts here, reason. Indeed, what is more, on p. 303; V, 360, it is expounded that the immediate conclusions from a proposition are still the affair of the understanding, and only those in which a mediating concept is used would be performed by reason; and as an example it is adduced that from the proposition "All men are mortal," the conclusion "Some mortals are men" is still drawn by mere understanding; whereas this one, "All scholars are mortal," requires a wholly different and much more eminent faculty, reason. How was it possible that a great thinker could bring forward such a thing! On p. 553; V, 581, reason is suddenly the permanent condition of all voluntary actions. On p. 614; V, 642, it consists in our being able to give account of our assertions: on pp. 643, 644; V, 671, 672, in its uniting the concepts of the understanding into Ideas, as the understanding unites the manifold of objects into concepts. On p. 646; V, 674, it is nothing other than the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal.

The *understanding* too is explained again and again anew: in seven places of the "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 51; V, 75, it is the faculty of producing representations itself. On p. 69; V, 94, the faculty of judging, that is, of thinking, that is,

of knowing through concepts. On p. 137, fifth edition, in general the faculty of cognitions. On p. 132; V, 171, the faculty of rules. On p. 158; V, 197, however, it is said: "it is not only the faculty of rules, but the source of principles, according to which everything stands under rules"; and yet above it was opposed to reason, because the latter alone was the faculty of principles. On p. 160; V, 199, the understanding is the faculty of concepts: on p. 302; V, 359, however, the faculty of the unity of appearances by means of rules.

The firm, sharp, determinate, simple explanations of those two faculties of knowledge which I have set up, and which always agree with the usage of language of all peoples and times, I shall not need to defend against such truly confused and groundless talk about them (although it proceeds from Kant). I have adduced these only as proofs of my reproach that Kant pursues his symmetrical, logical system without reflecting sufficiently on the subject which he so treats.

Had Kant now, as I said above, seriously investigated in what way two such different faculties of knowledge, one of which is the distinguishing mark of mankind, make themselves known, and what, according to the usage of language of all peoples and all philosophers, reason and understanding are called, then he would also never, on no further authority than the intellectus theoreticus and practicus of the Scholastics, used in a wholly different sense, have split reason into a theoretical and a practical one, and made the latter the source of virtuous action. Likewise, before Kant so carefully separated concepts of the understanding (by which he understands partly his categories, partly all common concepts) and concepts of reason (his so-called Ideas) and made both the subject matter of his philosophy, which for the most part treats only of the validity, application, origin of all these concepts;—before that, I say, he really should have investigated what a *concept* in general is. But even this so necessary investigation has unfortunately been wholly omitted; which has contributed much to the disastrous confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge that I shall soon demonstrate.—The same lack of sufficient reflection with which he passed over the questions: what is intuition? what is reflection? what concept? what reason? what understanding?—made him also pass over the following

equally indispensable investigations: what do I call the *object*, which I distinguish from the *representation*? what is existence? what object? what subject? what truth, illusion, error?—But without reflecting or looking around, he pursues his logical scheme and his symmetry. The table of judgments is to be and must be the key to all wisdom.

I set forth above as Kant's chief merit that he distinguished appearance from the thing in itself, declared this whole visible world to be appearance, and therefore denied its laws all validity beyond the appearance. It is indeed striking that he did not derive that merely relative existence of the appearance from the simple, so obvious, undeniable truth "*No object without a subject*," in order thus, at the very root, to present the object, because it exists always and only in relation to a subject, as dependent on it, conditioned by it, and therefore as mere appearance, which does not exist in itself, unconditionally. That important proposition Berkeley, to whose merit Kant is not just, had already made the cornerstone of his philosophy and thereby founded an immortal memory for himself, although he himself did not draw the proper consequences from that proposition and was then partly not understood, partly not sufficiently heeded. In my first edition I had explained Kant's bypassing of this Berkeleian proposition by a visible shyness of decided idealism; while on the other hand I found the latter clearly expressed in many passages of the "Critique of Pure Reason"; and I had accordingly charged Kant with contradicting himself. This reproach was also well founded, insofar as one knows, as was then my case, the "Critique of Pure Reason" only in the second edition, or in the five following editions printed after it. But when I later read Kant's chief work in the *first* edition, already become rare, I saw, to my great joy, all those contradictions vanish, and found that Kant, though he does not use the formula "no object without a subject," nevertheless, with the same decisiveness as Berkeley and I, declares the external world lying before us in space and time to be mere representation of the subject that knows it; hence he says, for example, on p. 383 there, without reserve: "If I take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world must fall away, as it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a kind of representations of it." But the whole passage from pp. 348–392, in

which Kant sets forth his decided idealism exceedingly beautifully and clearly, he suppressed in the second edition, and instead inserted a quantity of statements conflicting with it. Thereby the text of the "Critique of Pure Reason," as it circulated from the year 1787 to the year 1838, became a disfigured and corrupted one, and the work a self-contradictory book, whose sense, for that very reason, could be quite clear and intelligible to no one. The details of this, as also my conjectures on the reasons and weaknesses which can have moved Kant to such a disfigurement of his immortal work, I have set forth in a letter to Professor Rosenkranz, the chief passage of which he took up into his preface to the second volume of the edition of Kant's collected works prepared by him, to which I therefore refer here. As a consequence of my representations, namely, Professor Rosenkranz in the year 1838 found himself moved to restore the "Critique of Pure Reason" to its original form, by having it printed in the said second volume according to the *first* edition of 1781, whereby he has earned an inestimable merit toward philosophy, indeed has perhaps saved the most important work of German literature from destruction; and this one should never forget. But let no one imagine that they know the "Critique of Pure Reason" and have a clear concept of Kant's doctrine if they have read it only in the second or one of the following editions; that is absolutely impossible: for they have read only a mutilated, corrupted, in a way spurious text. It is my duty to say this here decisively and as a warning to everyone.

With the decidedly idealist fundamental view so clearly expressed in the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason," however, the manner in which Kant introduces the *thing in itself* stands in undeniable contradiction, and without doubt this is the chief reason why in the second edition he suppressed the indicated chief idealist passage and declared himself outright against the Berkeleian idealism, whereby he brought only inconsistencies into his work, without being able to remedy its main defect. This is, as is well known, the introduction of the *thing in itself* in the manner chosen by him, the untenability of which was set out at length by G. E. Schulze in the "Aenesidemus" and was soon recognized as the untenable point of his system. The matter can be made clear in very few words. Kant bases the presupposition of the thing in itself, though

concealed under various turns, on an inference according to the law of causality, namely that empirical intuition, or more correctly the *sensation* in our sense organs from which it proceeds, must have an external cause. Now, however, according to his own and correct discovery, the law of causality is known to us a priori, hence is a function of our intellect, thus of *subjective* origin; further, the sense sensation itself, to which we here apply the law of causality, is undeniably *subjective*; and finally even space, into which by means of this application we transpose the cause of the sensation as object, is a form of our intellect given a priori, hence *subjective*. Consequently the whole empirical intuition remains throughout on *subjective* ground, as a mere process in us, and nothing wholly different from it, independent of it, can be brought in as a *thing in itself*, or demonstrated as a necessary presupposition. In truth empirical intuition is and remains our mere representation: it is the world as representation. To the essence in itself of this we can attain only on the wholly different path taken by me, by drawing in self-consciousness, which proclaims the will as the in-itself of our own appearance: but then the thing in itself becomes something toto genere different from representation and its elements; as I have set forth.

The great defect of the Kantian system on this point, demonstrated early, as said, is a confirmation of the beautiful Indian proverb: "No lotus without a stalk." The faulty derivation of the thing in itself is here the stalk: yet only the manner of derivation, not the acknowledgment of a thing in itself for the given appearance. In this latter way, however, Fichte misunderstood it; which he could do only because he was concerned not with truth but with making a stir, for the furtherance of his personal ends. Accordingly he was bold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether and to set up a system in which not, as with Kant, merely the formal element of representation, but also the material, its whole content, was supposedly derived a priori from the subject. In this he reckoned quite correctly on the lack of judgment and the niaiserie of the public, which accepted bad sophisms, mere hocus-pocus and senseless wishy-washy for proofs; so that he succeeded in turning its attention from

Kant to himself and in giving German philosophy the direction in which it was afterwards carried further by Schelling and finally reached its goal in the nonsensical sham wisdom of Hegel.

I now return to Kant's great error, already touched on above, that he did not properly separate intuitive and abstract knowledge, from which a disastrous confusion has arisen, which we have now to consider more closely. Had he sharply separated intuitive representations from concepts merely thought in abstracto, he would have kept these two apart and would each time have known which of the two he had to do with. Unfortunately this has not been the case, although the reproach on this score has not yet been voiced aloud, and so is perhaps unexpected. His "object of experience," of which he constantly speaks, the proper object of the categories, is not the intuitive representation, but is also not the abstract concept, but different from both, and yet both at once, and a complete nonentity. For he has lacked, incredible as this seems, either circumspection or good will to come to terms with himself on this and to explain distinctly to himself and others whether his "object of experience, that is, of the knowledge brought about by application of the categories," is the intuitive representation in space and time (my first class of representations) or merely the abstract concept. Strange as it is, there constantly floats before his mind a middle thing between the two, and from this comes the baneful confusion which I must now bring to light: to which end I have to go through the whole Doctrine of Elements in general.

The *transcendental aesthetic* is a work of such exceeding merit that it alone could suffice to immortalize Kant's name. Its proofs have such full power of conviction that I count its propositions among the irrefutable truths, as they doubtless also belong among the most momentous, and are therefore to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world, namely a real, great discovery in metaphysics. The fact, strictly proved by him, that a part of our cognitions is known to us a priori admits of no other explanation than that these constitute the forms of our intellect: indeed this is less an explanation than merely the clear expression of the fact itself. For a priori means nothing other than "not gained by way of experience, hence not come into us from without." What, however,

is present in the intellect without having come from without is precisely what originally belongs to it itself, its own essence. If now what is thus present in the intellect itself consists in the general manner and way in which all its objects must present themselves to it; well, then it is thereby said that these are the forms of its knowing, that is, the manner and way, fixed once for all, in which it performs this its function. Accordingly "cognitions a priori" and "the intellect's own forms" are at bottom only two expressions for the same thing, hence in a way synonyms.

Of the doctrines of the transcendental aesthetic I should therefore not know what to take away, only some things to add. In particular, Kant did not carry his thoughts through to the end in that he did not reject the whole Euclidean method of demonstration, after he had yet said, p. 87; V, 120, that all geometrical knowledge has immediate evidence from intuition. It is most remarkable that even one of his opponents, and indeed the most acute of them, G. E. Schulze (Critique of Theoretical Philosophy, II, 241), draws the conclusion that from Kant's doctrine a wholly different treatment of geometry would result from the one actually customary; whereby he supposes himself to be leading an apagogical proof against Kant, but in fact opens war against the Euclidean method without knowing it. I appeal to §. 15 in the first book of the present work.

After the detailed discussion, given in the transcendental aesthetic, of the general *forms* of all intuition, one must expect to receive some enlightenment about the *content* of it, about the way the *empirical* intuition comes into our consciousness, how the knowledge of this whole world, so real and so important for us, arises in us. But on this Kant's whole doctrine really contains nothing more than the oft-repeated, empty phrase: "The empirical of intuition is given from without."—Hence Kant here passes, by a leap, from the *pure forms of intuition* to *thinking*, to *transcendental logic*. Right at the entrance to this (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 50; V, 74), where Kant cannot avoid touching the material content of empirical intuition, he takes the first false step, commits the πρωτον ψευδος. "Our knowledge," he says, "has two sources, namely receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of concepts: the first is the capacity to receive

representations, the second that of knowing an object through these representations: through the first an *object* is given to us, through the second it is thought."—That is false: for accordingly the *impression*, for which alone we have mere receptivity, which therefore comes from without and alone is really "given," would already be a *representation*, indeed already an *object*. It is, however, nothing more than a mere *sensation* in the sense organ, and only through the application of the *understanding* (that is, of the law of causality) and of the forms of intuition, space and time, does our *intellect* convert this mere *sensation* into a *representation*, which now stands there as an *object* in space and time and cannot be distinguished from the latter (the object) otherwise than insofar as one asks about the thing in itself, but otherwise is identical with it. I have set forth this process in detail in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 21. With this, however, the business of the understanding and of intuitive knowledge is accomplished, and no concepts and no thinking are needed for it; hence the animal too has these representations. If concepts, if thinking come in, to which spontaneity may indeed be ascribed, then *intuitive* knowledge is wholly left behind, and a wholly different class of representations, namely non-intuitive, abstract concepts, enters consciousness: this is the activity of *reason*, which, however, has the whole content of its thinking solely from the intuition that preceded it and from comparison of this with other intuitions and concepts. But in this way Kant already brings thinking into intuition and lays the ground for the disastrous mixing of intuitive and abstract knowledge, which I am here occupied in censuring. He has intuition, taken by itself, be without understanding, purely sensuous, hence wholly passive, and an *object* be apprehended only through thinking (category of the understanding): thus he brings *thinking into intuition*. Then, however, the object of *thinking* is in turn a single, real object; whereby thinking loses its essential character of universality and abstraction and obtains single things as object instead of universal concepts, whereby he again brings *intuiting into thinking*. From this springs the said disastrous mixing, and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowing.

Through the whole of it runs the complete mixing of the intuitive representation with the abstract into a middle thing between the two, which he presents as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories and calls this knowledge *experience*. It is hard to believe that Kant himself thought anything wholly determinate and really distinct in connection with this object of the understanding: this I shall now prove by the monstrous contradiction that runs through the whole of the transcendental logic and is the real source of the obscurity enveloping it.

Namely, in the "Critique of Pure Reason," pp. 67–69; V, 92–94; pp. 89, 90; V, 122, 123; further V, 135, 139, 153, he repeats and impresses: the understanding is no faculty of intuition, its knowledge is not intuitive but discursive; the understanding is the faculty of judging (p. 69; V, 94), and a judgment is mediate knowledge, representation of a representation (p. 68; V, 93); the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge through concepts (p. 69; V, 94); the categories of the understanding are by no means the conditions under which objects are given in intuition (p. 89; V, 122), and intuition requires the functions of thinking in no way (p. 91; V, 123); our understanding can only think, not intuit (V, pp. 135, 139). Further in the Prolegomena, §. 20: intuition, perception, perceptio, belongs merely to the senses; judging comes to the understanding alone; and §. 22: the business of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding to think, that is, to judge.—Finally also in the "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, p. 247: Rosenkranz edition p. 281: the understanding is discursive, its representations are thoughts, not intuitions.—All this is in Kant's own words.

From this it follows that this intuitive world would be there for us even if we had no understanding at all, that it comes into our head in a wholly inexplicable way, which he in fact often designates by his curious expression that intuition is *given*, without ever explaining this indeterminate and figurative expression further.

But now the whole rest of his doctrine of the understanding, of its categories and of the possibility of experience, as he sets it out in the transcendental logic, contradicts all that has been cited in the most glaring way. Namely: "Critique

of Pure Reason," p. 79; V, 105, the understanding brings by its categories unity into the manifold of *intuition*, and the pure concepts of the understanding relate a priori to objects of *intuition*. On p. 94; V, 126, "the categories are condition of experience, whether of the *intuition* or of the thinking which is met with in it." V, p. 127, the understanding is the author of experience. V, p. 128, the categories determine the *intuition* of objects. V, p. 130, everything that we represent to ourselves as combined in the object (which is surely something intuitive and not an abstraction) has first been combined by an act of the understanding. V, p. 135, the understanding is explained anew as the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception: but, according to all usage of language, apperception is not the thinking of a concept, but is *intuition*. V, p. 136, we find even a supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to the understanding. V, p. 143, there stands even as heading that all sensuous intuition is conditioned by the categories. In the same place the *logical function of judgments* brings also the manifold of given *intuitions* under an apperception in general, and the manifold of a given intuition stands necessarily under the categories. V, p. 144, unity comes into the *intuition*, by means of the categories, through the understanding. V, p. 145, the thinking of the understanding is very oddly explained by its synthesizing, combining and ordering the manifold of *intuition*. V, p. 161, experience is possible only through the categories and consists in the connection of *perceptions*, which surely are intuitions. V, p. 159, the categories are cognitions a priori of objects of *intuition* in general.—Further, here and V, pp. 163 and 165, a chief doctrine of Kant is set forth, this: that the *understanding* first makes *nature* possible, by prescribing laws to it a priori and nature conforming to its lawfulness, and so on. Now nature, however, is surely something intuitive and not an abstraction; the understanding would accordingly have to be a faculty of intuition. V, p. 168, it is said that the concepts of the understanding are the principles of the possibility of experience, and that this is the determination of appearances in space and time in general; which appearances are surely there in intuition. Finally, pp. 189–211; V, 232–265, stands the long proof (whose incorrectness is shown at length in my treatise on

the principle of sufficient reason, §. 23) that the objective succession and also the coexistence of the objects of experience are not perceived by the senses, but brought into nature solely by the understanding, which itself is thereby first made possible. Certainly, however, nature, the sequence of events and the coexistence of states are altogether intuitive and not merely abstractly thought.

I challenge everyone who shares my reverence for Kant to reconcile these contradictions, and to show that in his doctrine of the object of experience and of the way it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions, Kant thought something quite clear and determinate. I am convinced that the demonstrated contradiction that runs through the whole transcendental logic is the real ground of the great obscurity of its exposition. Kant, namely, was dimly conscious of the contradiction, struggled inwardly with it, yet would not or could not bring it to distinct consciousness, and therefore veiled it for himself and for others, and evaded it by all kinds of secret paths. From this it is perhaps also to be derived that he made of the faculty of knowledge so strange, complicated a machine, with so many wheels, as are the twelve categories, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, of inner sense, of the transcendental unity of apperception, further the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, and so on. And in spite of this great apparatus, not even an attempt is made to explain the intuition of the external world, which is surely the main thing in our knowledge; rather this importunate demand is turned aside, quite meagerly, always by the same empty, figurative expression: "Empirical intuition is given to us." On p. 145 of the fifth edition we learn further that it is given by the object: hence this must be something different from intuition.

If we now endeavor to explore Kant's innermost opinion, not distinctly stated by himself, we find that such an object, different from *intuition*, but also by no means a *concept*, is really for him the proper object for the understanding, indeed that the odd presupposition of such an unrepresentable object is really supposed to be that by which intuition first becomes experience. I believe that an old, deeply rooted prejudice, dead to all investigation, is the ultimate ground in Kant of the assumption of such an *absolute object*, which is in itself, that is,

even without a subject, object. It is by no means the *intuited* object, but is added in thought to the intuition through the concept, as something corresponding to it, and now the intuition is experience and has value and truth, which it consequently first receives through the relation to a concept (in diametrical opposition to our presentation, according to which the concept alone receives value and truth from intuition). This adding in thought of the directly unrepresentable object to the intuition is then the real function of the categories. "Only through intuition is the object given, which afterwards is thought in accordance with the category." (Critique of Pure Reason, first edition, p. 399.) This becomes especially clear from a passage, p. 125 of the fifth edition: "Now the question is whether concepts a priori do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something, though not *intuited*, is nevertheless *thought* as *object* in general," which he affirms. Here the source of the error and of the confusion enveloping it shows itself clearly. For the *object* as such is always only for *intuition* and in it: whether this be performed by the senses, or, in the object's absence, by the imagination. What is *thought*, on the other hand, is always a universal, non-intuitive *concept*, which at most can be the concept of an object in general: but only mediately, by means of concepts, does thinking relate to *objects*, which themselves are and remain always *intuitive*. For our thinking does not serve to lend reality to intuitions: these have it, so far as they are capable of it (empirical reality), through themselves; but it serves to gather up what is common to intuitions and their results, so as to preserve them and handle them more easily. Kant, however, ascribes the objects themselves to *thinking*, in order thereby to make experience and the objective world dependent on the *understanding*, without, however, letting this be a faculty of *intuition*. In this respect he does indeed distinguish intuiting from thinking, but makes single things the object partly of intuition, partly of thinking. In reality, however, they are only the former: our empirical intuition is at once *objective*; just because it proceeds from the causal nexus. Its objects are immediately the things, not representations different from these. Single things are intuited as such in the understanding and through the senses: the *one-sided* impression on these is thereby at once completed by the imagination. As soon as we pass over

to *thinking*, on the other hand, we leave single things and have to do with universal concepts without intuitiveness; even though we afterwards apply the results of our thinking to single things. If we hold fast to this, the inadmissibility of the assumption is evident that the intuition of things first receives reality through the thinking of these same things applying the twelve categories, and becomes experience. Rather, in the intuition itself the empirical reality, hence experience, is already given: but intuition too can come about only through application of the knowledge of the causal nexus, which is the sole function of the understanding, to the sense sensation. Intuition is accordingly really intellectual, which is precisely what Kant denies.

The assumption of Kant criticized here is found, besides the passage cited, set out with particular clarity also in the "Critique of Judgment," §. 36, right at the beginning; likewise in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," in the note to the first definition of the "Phenomenology." But with a naivety which Kant, at this awkward point, least dared, it is found set forth most plainly in the book of a *Kantian*, namely in Kiesewetter's "Outline of a General Logic," third edition, Part I, p. 434 of the Exposition, and Part II, §. 52 and 53 of the Exposition; likewise in Tieftrunk's "Doctrine of Thought in Purely German Dress" (1825). There one sees very clearly how every thinker's disciples, who do not think for themselves, become a magnifying mirror of his faults. In this presentation of his once-resolved doctrine of the categories Kant has everywhere stepped softly, the disciples however quite boldly, whereby they lay bare the falseness of the matter.

According to what has been said, the object of the categories in Kant is indeed not the thing in itself, yet it is its nearest kinsman: it is the *object in itself*, an object that needs no subject, an individual thing and yet not in time and space, because it is not intuitive; an object of thinking and yet not an abstract concept. Accordingly Kant really distinguishes three things: 1) the representation; 2) the object of the representation; 3) the thing in itself. The first belongs to sensibility, which for him includes, besides sensation, the pure forms of intuition, space and time. The second belongs to the understanding, which *adds it in thought* by means of its twelve categories. The third lies beyond all possibility of being

known. (For proof of this, see pp. 108 and 109 of the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason.") Now the distinction between the representation and the object of the representation is groundless. Berkeley had already proved this; it follows from my whole exposition in the first book, especially Chapter 1 of the Supplements, and indeed from Kant's own thoroughly idealist fundamental view in the first edition. But if one did not want to count the object of the representation as part of the representation and identify it with it, one would have to assign it to the thing in itself; in the end this depends on the sense one attaches to the word object. One thing, however, always stands firm: on clear reflection, nothing more is to be found than representation and thing in itself. The unwarranted insertion of that hybrid, the object of the representation, is the source of Kant's errors; but with its removal the doctrine of the categories as concepts a priori falls away too, since they contribute nothing to intuition and are not supposed to hold of the thing in itself, but serve only to let us think those "objects of representations" and thereby convert representation into experience. For every empirical intuition is already experience, and every intuition is empirical that proceeds from sensation. This sensation the understanding refers to its cause, by means of its sole function (knowledge a priori of the law of causality); and the cause, precisely thereby, presents itself in space and time (forms of pure intuition) as an object of experience, a material object, persisting in space through all time, yet even as such still remaining representation, just as space and time themselves do. If we want to go beyond this representation, we stand before the question of the thing in itself, to answer which is the theme of my whole work, as it is of all metaphysics. Connected with this error of Kant's, here set forth, is the fault I censured earlier: that he gives no theory of the origin of empirical intuition, but simply lets it be *given*, identifying it with mere sensation, to which he adds only the forms of intuition, space and time, comprising both under the name of sensibility. But from these materials no objective representation yet arises. This requires, absolutely, the relating of sensation to its cause, and thus the application of the law of causality, and thus understanding; for without this the sensation remains subjective and places no object in space, even when space is added to it. But for Kant the understanding

was not to be employed in intuition: it was supposed to *think* only, so as to stay within transcendental logic. Another fault of Kant's is connected with this: having rightly recognized the apriority of the law of causality, he left it to me to furnish the only valid proof of it, namely the proof from the possibility of objective empirical intuition itself, and gave instead one that is evidently false, as I have already shown in my treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 23.—

From the above it is clear that Kant's "object of the representation" (2) is put together from what he has stolen partly from the representation (1), partly from the thing in itself (3). If experience really came about only because our understanding applied twelve different functions in order to think, through as many concepts a priori, the objects that had previously been merely intuited, then every real thing as such would have to have a multitude of determinations which, given as a priori, could not be thought away at all, any more than space and time, but belonged quite essentially to the existence of the thing, and yet could not be derived from the properties of space and time. But only a single determination of this kind is to be found: that of causality. On it rests materiality, since the essence of matter consists in action and it is through and through causality (see Vol. II, Ch. 4). And materiality alone is what distinguishes the real thing from the figment of imagination, which after all is only representation. For matter, being what persists, gives the thing, so far as its matter goes, persistence through all time, while the forms change in accordance with causality. Everything else in the thing consists either of determinations of space or of time, or of its empirical properties, all of which run back to its efficacy and are thus more specific determinations of causality. But causality already enters as a condition into empirical intuition, which accordingly is a matter of the understanding, since the understanding makes intuition itself possible; apart from the law of causality, however, it contributes nothing to experience and its possibility. What fills the old ontologies, besides what has been stated here, is nothing but relations of things to one another or to our reflection, and a heap of scraped-together farrago.

The very manner of presentation of the doctrine of the categories gives a mark of its groundlessness. What a distance, in this respect, between the transcendental *Aesthetic* and the transcendental *Analytic*! *There*, what clarity, definiteness, certainty, firm conviction, which declares itself openly and communicates itself infallibly! Everything is full of light, no dark hiding places are left: Kant knows what he wants, and knows that he is right. *Here*, on the contrary, everything is dark, confused, indefinite, wavering, uncertain; the presentation is anxious, full of excuses and of appeals to what is still to come, or even to what is held back. Moreover, the whole second and third section of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding was completely altered in the second edition because it did not satisfy Kant himself, and it is quite different from the first, yet has not become clearer. One really sees Kant struggling with the truth in order to push through the doctrine he had once decided on. In the transcendental *Aesthetic* all his propositions are really proved, from undeniable facts of consciousness; in the transcendental *Analytic*, on the other hand, if we examine it in the light, we find mere assertions that it is so and must be so. Thus here, as everywhere, the presentation bears the stamp of the thinking from which it came: for style is the physiognomy of the mind.—It is also to be remarked that whenever Kant wants to give an example for closer elucidation, he takes almost every time the category of causality, and then what he says turns out right—precisely because the law of causality is the real, but also the sole form of the understanding, and the other eleven categories are only blind windows. The deduction of the categories is simpler and more straightforward in the first edition than in the second. He labors to show how, after the intuition given by sensibility, the understanding brings about experience by means of the thinking of the categories. In doing so, the expressions recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension, transcendental unity of apperception are repeated to the point of weariness, and still no clarity is reached. But it is highly remarkable that in this whole exposition he not once touches on what must occur to everyone first: the relating of sensation to its external cause. If he did not want to let this stand, he ought to have denied it expressly; but this too he does not do. So he sneaks around it, and all Kantians have sneaked after him in just the same

way. The secret motive for this is that he is saving the causal nexus, under the name "ground of appearance," for his false derivation of the thing in itself; and next, that through the relation to the cause intuition would become intellectual, which he must not admit. Besides, he seems to have feared that if the causal nexus between sensation and object were allowed to stand, the object would at once become the thing in itself and introduce the empiricism of Locke. This difficulty, however, is removed by the clear-headed reflection which reminds us that the law of causality is of subjective origin, just as much as sensation itself, and moreover that our own body too, so far as it appears in space, already belongs to the representations. But his fear of Berkeleyan idealism kept Kant from admitting this.

As the essential operation of the understanding by means of its twelve categories, "the combination of the manifold of intuition" is stated again and again; yet this is never properly explained, nor is it shown what this manifold of intuition is before the combination by the understanding. Now time and space, the latter in all its three dimensions, are continua, that is, all their parts are originally not separate but connected. But they are the pervasive forms of our intuition; so everything that presents itself (is given) in them also appears originally as a continuum, that is, its parts already appear as connected and need no further combination of the manifold. If, however, one wanted to interpret that union of the manifold of intuition to mean, say, that I refer the various sense impressions of an object to this one object, so that, for example, in intuiting a bell, I recognize that what affects my eye as yellow, my hands as smooth and hard, my ear as sounding, is nonetheless one and the same body, then this is rather a consequence of the knowledge a priori of the causal nexus (this real and sole function of the understanding). By virtue of it all those various effects on my various sense organs lead me back only to one common cause of them, namely the constitution of the body standing before me, so that my understanding, despite the diversity and multiplicity of the effects, apprehends the unity of the cause as a single object, which presents itself in intuition precisely in this way.—In the fine recapitulation of his doctrine which Kant gives in the "Critique of Pure *Reason*," pp. 719–726, or V, 747–754, he explains the cate-

gories perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, namely as "the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception has given a posteriori." Something seems to float before his mind here like this: that in the construction of a triangle the angles give the rule for putting the lines together; at least, what he says about the function of the categories can best be illustrated by this picture. The preface to the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" contains a long note which likewise offers an explanation of the categories and says that they "are in nothing different from the formal acts of the understanding in judging," except that in the latter subject and predicate may at most exchange places; judgment in general is then defined there as "an act by which given representations first become cognitions of an object." According to this, animals, since they do not judge, would also cognize no objects at all. In general, according to Kant, there are of *objects* only concepts, no intuitions. I, on the contrary, say: objects exist at first only for intuition, and concepts are always abstractions from this intuition. Hence abstract thinking must conform exactly to the world present in intuition, since only the relation to that world gives content to concepts, and we may assume for concepts no other form determined a priori than the capacity for reflection in general, whose essence is the forming of concepts, that is, of abstract, nonintuitive representations, which constitutes the sole function of *reason*, as I showed in the first book. I demand accordingly that we throw eleven of the categories out of the window and keep only that of causality, but understand that its activity is already the condition of empirical intuition, which is therefore not merely sensory but intellectual; and that the object so intuited, the object of experience, is one with the representation, from which only the thing in itself is still to be distinguished.

After studying the "Critique of Pure *Reason*" repeatedly at different ages, I have been forced to a conviction about the origin of the transcendental logic, which I communicate here because it is very helpful toward understanding it. The only discovery founded on objective apprehension and the highest human clarity of mind is the apperçu that time and space are known by us a priori. Delighted by this happy find, Kant wanted to follow its vein further, and his love of architectonic symmetry gave him the clue. Just as he had found empiri-

cal intuition to rest on a pure intuition a priori as its condition, so, he thought, certain *pure concepts* must likewise lie at the ground of the empirically acquired *concepts*, as a presupposition in our faculty of knowledge, and actual empirical thinking must first be made possible by a pure thinking a priori, which of itself would have no objects but would have to take them from intuition; so that, as the *transcendental Aesthetic* demonstrates an a priori foundation of mathematics, there would have to be such a foundation for logic as well, and the former would then find in a *transcendental logic* its symmetrical counterpart. From this point on Kant was no longer unprejudiced, no longer in the state of pure inquiry and observation of what is present in consciousness; he was guided by a presupposition and pursued an aim, namely to find what he presupposed, so that he could set upon the so happily discovered transcendental Aesthetic an analogous, and so symmetrically corresponding, transcendental logic as a second story. To this end he hit on the table of judgments, from which, as well as it would go, he formed the *table of categories*, the doctrine of twelve pure *concepts* a priori which were to be the condition of our *thinking* of just those *things* whose *intuition* is conditioned a priori by the two forms of sensibility: a *pure understanding* now corresponded symmetrically to *pure sensibility*. After this he came upon yet another consideration, which offered him a means of heightening the plausibility of the matter, by the assumption of the *schematism* of the pure concepts of the understanding; but it is precisely here that the course of his procedure, unconscious to himself, betrays itself most clearly. For in setting out to find an analogous a priori function for every empirical function of the faculty of knowledge, he noticed that between our empirical intuiting and our empirical thinking, carried out in abstract, nonintuitive concepts, there occurs a mediation, if not always, at least very often, namely when we now and then try to go back from abstract thinking to intuiting; but only try, really in order to convince ourselves that our abstract thinking has not strayed far from the safe ground of intuition and perhaps overshot it, or even degenerated into mere verbiage; much as, walking in the dark, we now and then reach out for the wall that guides us. We then go back to intuiting, again only tentatively and for a moment, by calling up in the imagination an intuition corresponding to the

concept that happens to occupy us, which, however, can never be wholly adequate to the concept but is a mere provisional representative of it. On this I have already said what is needed in my treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," §. 28. Kant calls a fleeting phantasm of this kind, as opposed to the finished image of the imagination, a schema, says it is as it were a monogram of the imagination, and now asserts that, just as such a schema stands midway between our abstract thinking of empirically acquired concepts and our clear intuition through the senses, so too between the a priori faculty of intuition of pure sensibility and the a priori faculty of thought of the pure understanding (that is, the categories) there exist schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding a priori. These schemata, as monograms of the pure imagination a priori, he describes one by one and assigns each to the category corresponding to it, in the strange "Chapter on the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding," which is famous for its extreme obscurity because no one has ever been able to make sense of it. Its obscurity, however, clears up when it is considered from the standpoint given here, and then, more than anywhere else, the deliberateness of his procedure comes to light, together with the resolve, formed beforehand, to find whatever would correspond by analogy and serve architectonic symmetry; indeed this is the case here to a degree that brings the matter close to the comic. For in assuming schemata of the pure (contentless) concepts of the understanding a priori (categories), analogous to the empirical schemata (or representatives of our real concepts through the imagination), he overlooks that the purpose of such schemata falls away entirely here. The purpose of schemata in empirical (real) thinking relates wholly to the material content of such concepts. Since these are abstracted from empirical intuition, we help and orient ourselves by casting a fleeting glance back, now and then in the midst of abstract thinking, at the intuition from which the concepts were taken, to make sure that our thinking still has real content. But this necessarily presupposes that the concepts occupying us arose from intuition; it is a mere looking back to their material content, indeed a mere aid for our weakness. With concepts a priori, which as yet have no content at all, such a thing obviously must fall away: for these did not arise from intuition, but come to meet it from

within, to receive a content from it for the first time, and so have nothing yet to look back to. I dwell on this point at length because it throws light precisely on the secret course of Kant's philosophizing, which consists in this: after the happy discovery of the two forms of intuition a priori, Kant strove henceforth, with analogy as his clue, to exhibit an a priori analogue for every determination of our empirical knowledge, and in the end, in the schemata, extended this even to a merely psychological fact. The apparent profundity and the difficulty of the exposition serve precisely to hide from the reader that its content remains a wholly unprovable and merely arbitrary assumption; and whoever at last penetrates the sense of such an exposition is easily misled into taking this laboriously won understanding for conviction of the truth of the matter. Had Kant, on the contrary, behaved here as unprejudiced and as purely observant as he did in discovering the intuitions a priori, he would have had to find that what is added to the pure intuition of space and time when it becomes an empirical one is, on the one hand, sensation, and on the other, the knowledge of causality, which transforms mere sensation into objective empirical intuition. For that very reason this knowledge is not first borrowed and learned from empirical intuition, but is present a priori, and is just the form and function of the pure understanding, though also its only one, yet one so rich in consequences that all our empirical knowledge rests on it.—If, as has often been said, the refutation of an error is completed only by showing psychologically how it arose, then I believe I have accomplished this in the above, with regard to Kant's doctrine of the categories and their schemata.

After Kant had brought such great errors into the first simple basic outlines of a theory of the faculty of representation, he fell upon many very complicated assumptions. Among these belongs first of all the synthetic unity of apperception: a very odd thing, very oddly presented. "The *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations." Must—be able: this is a problematic-apodictic enunciation; in plain words, a proposition that takes with one hand what it gives with the other. And what is the sense of this proposition, balanced so on its point?—That all representing is a thinking?—It is not; and it would be disastrous. There would then be nothing but abstract concepts, and least of all

a pure intuition free of reflection and will, such as that of the beautiful, the deepest grasp of the true nature of things, that is, of their Platonic Ideas. The animals, too, would then either have to think as well, or not even represent.—Or is the proposition perhaps to mean: no object without a subject? That would be very badly expressed in this way, and would come too late. If we put Kant's statements together, we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is, as it were, the extensionless center of the sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it. It is what I call the subject of knowing, the correlate of all representations, and is at the same time that which I have described and discussed at length, in Chapter 22 of the second volume, as the focus in which the rays of brain activity converge. I refer to that chapter here, so as not to repeat myself.

That I reject the whole doctrine of the categories and count it among the groundless assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of knowing follows from the critique of it given above; likewise from the demonstration of the contradictions in the transcendental logic, which had their ground in the confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge; and further from the demonstration of the lack of a distinct and definite concept of the essence of understanding and reason, in place of which we found in Kant's writings only disconnected, inconsistent, meager and incorrect statements about those two faculties of mind. It follows, finally, from the explanations I myself have given of these same faculties of mind, in the first book and its Supplements, and still more fully in the treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," §. 21, 26 and 34. These explanations are very definite and distinct; they result evidently from the consideration of the nature of our knowledge; and they agree completely with the concepts of those two powers of knowledge that manifest themselves in the usage of language and in the writings of all times and peoples, though without being brought to distinctness. Their defense against the very different Kantian account is for the most part already given with the exposure of the faults of that account.—But since the table of judgments, which Kant lays at the ground of his theory of thinking, indeed of his whole philosophy, is in itself, on the whole, correct, it still falls to me to show how these universal forms of all judgments

arise in our faculty of knowledge, and to bring them into agreement with my account of it.—In this discussion I shall always connect with the concepts understanding and reason the sense that my explanation has given them, which I therefore presuppose as familiar to the reader.

An essential difference between Kant's method and the one I follow lies in this, that he starts from mediate, reflected knowledge, I from immediate, intuitive knowledge. He is to be compared to one who measures the height of a tower from its shadow, I to one who applies the measuring rod directly. Hence for him philosophy is a science from concepts, for me a science in concepts, drawn from intuitive knowledge, the sole source of all evidence, and put into universal concepts and fixed there. This whole world around us, intuitive, many-formed, rich in meaning, he skips over, and holds to the forms of abstract thinking; and at the ground of this lies the presupposition, though he never states it, that reflection is the ectype of all intuition, that therefore everything essential in intuition must be expressed in reflection, and in very condensed, and so easily surveyed, forms and basic features. Accordingly the essential and law-governed in abstract knowing would put into our hands all the threads that set in motion before our eyes the motley puppet show of the intuitive world.—If only Kant had stated this supreme principle of his method distinctly, and had then followed it consistently, he would at least have had to separate the intuitive cleanly from the abstract, and we should not have to struggle with irresolvable contradictions and confusions. But from the way he has solved his task one sees that this principle of his method hovered before him only very indistinctly, so that even after a thorough study of his philosophy one still has to guess it first.

As for the method and fundamental maxim itself that I have stated, it has much in its favor and is a brilliant thought. The essence of all science already consists in this, that we gather the endlessly manifold of intuitive appearances under comparatively few abstract concepts, out of which we order a system, from which we have all those appearances entirely in the power of our knowledge, can explain what has happened and determine what is to come. The sciences, however, divide among themselves the broad domain of appearances according to the particular, manifold kinds of the latter.

Now it was a bold and happy thought to isolate what is altogether essential to concepts as such, apart from their content, in order to see, from the forms of all thinking thus found, what is essential also to all intuitive knowing, and consequently to the world as appearance in general; and because this would then have been found a priori, owing to the necessity of those forms of thinking, it would be of subjective origin, and would lead just to Kant's ends.—But before going further, it should have been investigated what the relation of reflection to intuitive knowledge is (which of course presupposes the pure separation of the two that Kant neglected), in what way, properly, the former reproduces and represents the latter, whether quite purely, or already altered by its reception into the forms of reflection itself and in part made unrecognizable; whether the form of abstract, reflective knowledge is determined more by the form of the intuitive, or by the constitution that inseparably attaches to the reflective itself, so that even what is very heterogeneous in intuitive knowledge can no longer be distinguished once it has entered the reflective, and conversely many differences that we perceive in the reflective mode of knowledge have also arisen from it itself and by no means point to corresponding differences in intuitive knowledge. As the result of this inquiry, however, it would have emerged that intuitive knowledge undergoes in its reception into reflection almost as much change as foodstuffs in their reception into the animal organism, whose forms and mixtures are determined by the organism itself, and from whose composition the constitution of the foodstuffs can no longer be recognized;—or (since that is saying a little too much) at least it would have emerged that reflection by no means stands to intuitive knowledge as the mirror image in the water to the objects mirrored, but hardly even as the shadow of these objects to the objects themselves. This shadow reproduces only some outer contours, but also unites the most manifold in the same shape and presents the most different by the same outline; so that the shapes of things could by no means be constructed completely and surely starting from it.

All reflective knowledge, or reason, has only one principal form, and this is the abstract concept. It is peculiar to reason itself and has immediately no necessary connection with the intuitive world, which therefore exists quite without it for

the animals, and could even be an entirely different one, and yet that form of reflection would fit it just as well. The union of concepts into judgments, however, has certain definite, law-governed forms, which, found by induction, make up the table of judgments. These forms are for the most part to be derived from the reflective mode of knowledge itself, hence immediately from reason, namely so far as they arise through the four laws of thought (called by me metalogical truths) and through the dictum de omni et nullo. Others of these forms have their ground in the intuitive mode of knowledge, hence in the understanding, but give no indication of as many particular forms of the understanding; rather they are to be derived wholly and entirely from the single function the understanding has, namely the immediate knowledge of cause and effect. Still others of those forms, finally, have arisen from the meeting and combination of the reflective and the intuitive mode of knowledge, or properly from the reception of the latter into the former. I shall now go through the moments of the judgment one by one and show the origin of each from the sources named; from which it follows of itself that a deduction of categories from them drops out, and that the assumption of these is as groundless as their exposition has been found confused and self-contradictory.

1) The so-called quantity of judgments springs from the essence of concepts as such, has its ground therefore solely in reason, and has no immediate connection at all with the understanding and intuitive knowledge.—For, as set forth in the first book, it is essential to concepts as such that they have an extent, a sphere, and that the wider, less determinate concept includes the narrower, more determinate one, which can therefore also be singled out. This can be done in two ways: either by designating it merely as an indeterminate part of the wider concept in general, or by determining it and separating it out completely, by assigning it a special name. The judgment that carries out this operation is called particular in the first case, universal in the second; for example, one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree can be isolated by a particular and by a universal judgment, namely: "Some trees bear galls"; or thus: "All oaks bear galls."—One sees that the difference between the two operations is very slight, indeed that the possibility of it depends on the wealth of words in

the language. Nevertheless Kant declared that this difference unveils two radically different acts, functions, categories of the pure understanding, which by means of just these determines experience a priori.

Finally, one can also use a concept in order to arrive by means of it at a determinate, single, intuitive representation, from which, and at the same time from many others, the concept itself was abstracted. This happens through the singular judgment. Such a judgment marks only the boundary where abstract knowledge borders on intuitive, to which it passes over immediately: "This tree here bears galls."—Kant has accordingly made a special category of this as well. After all that has gone before, no further polemic is needed here.

2) In the same way the quality of judgments lies wholly within the domain of reason, and is not a shadow of any law of the understanding that makes intuition possible; that is, it gives no direction toward one. The nature of abstract concepts, which is precisely the essence of reason itself objectively apprehended, carries with it, as likewise set forth in the first book, the possibility of uniting and separating their spheres. On this possibility, as their presupposition, rest the universal laws of thought, of identity and of contradiction, to which I have attributed metalogical truth because they spring purely from reason and cannot be explained further. They determine that what is united must remain united and what is separated must remain separated, and thus that what is posited cannot at the same time be canceled again; they therefore presuppose the possibility of joining and separating spheres, that is, judging itself. This, however, lies, as to its form, solely and exclusively in reason, and this form is not carried over, as the content of judgments is, from the intuitive knowledge of the understanding, in which therefore no correlate or analogue for it is to be sought. Once intuition has come about through the understanding and for the understanding, it stands there complete, subject neither to doubt nor to error, and consequently knows neither affirmation nor negation: for it speaks for itself, and does not have, like the abstract knowledge of reason, its worth and content in the mere reference to something outside it, according to the principle of sufficient reason as ground of knowing. It is therefore pure reality; all

negation is foreign to its essence. Negation can be added in thought only by reflection, but for that very reason always remains within the domain of abstract thinking.

To the affirmative and negative judgments Kant adds, borrowing a whim of the old Scholastics, the infinite ones—a subtly contrived stopgap that does not even need discussing, a blind window, of which he has installed many in the interest of his symmetrical architectonic.

3) Under the very wide concept of relation Kant has brought together three quite different kinds of judgments, which we must therefore illuminate one by one in order to recognize their origin. a) The hypothetical judgment in general is the abstract expression of that most universal form of all our cognitions, the principle of sufficient reason. That this has four wholly different meanings, and in each of them is rooted in a different faculty of knowledge, as well as concerning a different class of representations, I have already shown in 1813 in my treatise on it. From this it follows sufficiently that the origin of the hypothetical judgment in general, this universal form of thought, cannot be merely, as Kant would have it, the understanding and its category of causality. Rather, the law of causality, which according to my account is the sole form of knowledge of the pure understanding, is only one of the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, which embraces all pure or a priori knowledge, and which in each of its meanings has this hypothetical form of judgment as its expression.—Here, however, we see quite clearly how cognitions that are wholly different in origin and meaning nonetheless appear, when thought in abstracto by reason, in one and the same form of connection of concepts and judgments, and in this form can no longer be distinguished at all; to distinguish them one must go back to intuitive knowledge, leaving the abstract altogether. Hence the road Kant took, of finding from the standpoint of abstract knowledge the elements and innermost workings of intuitive knowledge as well, was thoroughly perverse. Moreover, my whole introductory treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason" is in a way to be regarded as nothing but a thorough discussion of the meaning of the hypothetical form of judgment; I therefore do not dwell on it further here. b) The form of the categorical judgment is nothing other than the

form of judgment in general in the most proper sense. For, strictly speaking, to judge means only to think the connection, or the incompatibility, of the spheres of concepts. Hence the hypothetical and the disjunctive connection are properly not special forms of judgment: they are applied only to judgments already finished, in which the connection of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical one; they in turn link these judgments, the hypothetical form expressing their dependence on one another, the disjunctive their incompatibility. Mere concepts, however, have only one kind of relation to one another, namely that which is expressed in the categorical judgment. The closer determination, or the subspecies, of this relation are the interlocking and the complete separateness of the concept spheres, that is, affirmation and negation; out of which Kant has made special categories under a wholly different title, that of quality. The interlocking and separateness have in turn subspecies, according as the spheres interlock wholly or only in part, a determination which makes up the quantity of judgments; out of which Kant has again made a quite special category title. Thus he separated what is very closely related, indeed identical, the easily surveyed modifications of the only possible relations of mere concepts to one another, and on the other hand united under this title of relation what is very different.

Categorical judgments have as their metalogical principle the laws of thought of identity and contradiction. But the ground for the linking of concept spheres, which gives truth to the judgment (and the judgment is just this linking), can be of very different kinds, and according to it the truth of the judgment is then either logical, or empirical, or metaphysical, or metalogical, as is set forth in the introductory treatise, §. 30–33, and need not be repeated here. From this, however, it follows how very different the immediate cognitions can be that all present themselves in abstracto through the connection of the spheres of two concepts as subject and predicate, and that one cannot at all set up a single function of the understanding as corresponding to them and producing them. For example, the judgments "The water boils; the sine measures the angle; the will resolves; occupation distracts; the distinction is difficult" express by the same logical form the most different kinds of relation. From this

we obtain once more the confirmation of how perverse the undertaking is, when one sets out to analyze immediate, intuitive knowledge from the standpoint of the abstract.—Moreover, the categorical judgment arises from a proper knowledge of the understanding, in my sense, only where a causality is expressed by it; but this is the case with all judgments too that designate a physical quality. For when I say "This body is heavy, hard, fluid, green, sour, alkaline, organic, etc.," this always designates its acting, hence a cognition possible only through the pure understanding. After this cognition, like many wholly different ones (for example the subordination of highly abstract concepts), had been expressed in abstracto through subject and predicate, people carried these mere relations of concepts back again to intuitive knowledge, and supposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have in intuition a particular correlate of their own: substance and accident. But I shall make clear further below that the concept substance has no other true content than that of the concept matter. Accidents, however, are wholly synonymous with modes of action, so that the supposed cognition of substance and accident is still the pure understanding's cognition of cause and effect. How the representation of matter really arises is discussed partly in our first book, §. 4, and in a still more comprehensible way in the treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," at the end of §. 21, p. 77; partly we shall see it more closely still in the examination of the principle that substance persists. c) The disjunctive judgments spring from the law of thought of the excluded third, which is a metalogical truth: they are therefore wholly the property of pure reason, and do not have their origin in the understanding. The derivation of the category of community or reciprocal action from them, however, is a really glaring example of the acts of violence that Kant sometimes permits himself against the truth, merely to satisfy his pleasure in architectonic symmetry. The untenability of that derivation has already often been rightly censured and demonstrated on several grounds, especially by G. E. Schulze in his "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy" and by Berg in his "Epicritique of Philosophy."—What real analogy is there between the leaving open of the determination of a concept by mutually exclusive predicates and the thought of reciprocal action? The two are in fact quite opposed, since

in the disjunctive judgment the actual positing of one of the two members of the division is at the same time a necessary cancellation of the other; whereas, when one thinks of two things in the relation of reciprocal action, the positing of the one is a necessary positing of the other as well, and vice versa. Hence the real logical analogue of reciprocal action is indisputably the circulus vitiosus, in which, just as allegedly in reciprocal action, what is grounded is also in turn the ground, and conversely. And just as logic rejects the circulus vitiosus, so the concept of reciprocal action too is to be banished from metaphysics. For I am quite seriously minded to show now that there is no reciprocal action at all in the proper sense, and that this concept, however popular its use is, precisely because of the indeterminacy of the thought, shows itself on closer view to be empty, false and void. First, recall what causality in general is, and consult for assistance my account of it in the introductory treatise, §. 20, as well as in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, Ch. 3, p. 27 ff., and finally in the fourth chapter of our second volume. Causality is the law according to which the states of matter that come about determine their place in time. Causality is concerned only with states, indeed properly only with changes, and neither with matter as such nor with persistence without change. Matter as such does not stand under the law of causality, since it neither comes into being nor passes away; therefore the whole thing does not either, as people commonly speak, but solely the states of matter. Further, the law of causality has nothing to do with persistence: for where nothing changes there is no acting and no causality, but an abiding, resting state. If such a state is changed, then either the newly arisen one is again lasting, or it is not, but at once brings about a third state; and the necessity with which this happens is just the law of causality, which is a shape of the principle of sufficient reason and therefore not to be explained further, since the principle of sufficient reason is precisely the principle of all explanation and all necessity. From this it is clear that being cause and being effect stand in exact connection and necessary relation to temporal sequence. Only in so far as state A precedes state B in time, and their succession is a necessary one and not a contingent one, that is, no mere following after but a following from—only in so far is state A cause and state B effect. The concept of reci-

procal action, however, contains this: that both are cause and both effect of each other. But this means as much as that each of the two is the earlier and also the later: so it is no thought at all. For that both states are simultaneous, and indeed necessarily simultaneous, cannot be assumed: because, as necessarily belonging together and being simultaneous, they make up only one state. For the persistence of this state the abiding presence of all its determinations is indeed required, but then there is no longer any talk of change and causality, only of duration and rest, and nothing more is said than that if one determination of the whole state is altered, the new state thereby arisen cannot be lasting, but becomes the cause of the alteration of all the other determinations of the first state as well, whereby in turn a new, third state comes in; all of which takes place only according to the simple law of causality and does not found a new law, that of reciprocal action.

I also maintain flatly that the concept of reciprocal action cannot be supported by a single example. Everything that people might offer for it is either a resting state, to which the concept of causality, which has meaning only for changes, finds no application at all, or an alternating succession of like-named, mutually conditioning states, for whose explanation simple causality is entirely sufficient. An example of the first kind is given by the pan of a scale brought to rest by equal weights: here there is no acting at all, for here there is no change; it is a resting state. Gravity strives, equally distributed, as in every body supported at its center of gravity, but can manifest its force through no effect. That the removal of one weight yields a second state, which at once becomes the cause of the third, the sinking of the other pan, takes place according to the simple law of cause and effect and needs no special category of the understanding, not even a special name. An example of the other kind is the continued burning of a fire. The combination of oxygen with the combustible body is the cause of heat, and this in turn is the cause of the renewed occurrence of that chemical combination. But this is nothing other than a chain of causes and effects, whose links, however, are alternately like-named: the burning A produces free heat B, this a new burning C (that is, a new effect, which is like-named with the cause A, but not individually the same), this a new heat D (which is not really

identical with the effect B, but only the same in concept, that is, like-named with it), and so on without end. A pretty example of what in common life is called reciprocal action is supplied by a theory of deserts given by Humboldt (Views of Nature, second edition, Vol. 2, p. 79). Namely, in sandy deserts it does not rain, but it does on the wooded mountains that bound them. The cause is not the attraction of the mountains on the clouds; rather, the column of heated air rising from the sandy plain prevents the vapor vesicles from breaking down and drives the clouds upward.

In the mountains the vertically rising current of air is weaker, the clouds sink, and the precipitation falls in the cooler air. So the lack of rain and the barrenness of the desert stand in reciprocal action: it does not rain because the heated sandy surface radiates more heat; the desert does not become steppe or grassland because it does not rain. But obviously we have here again, as in the example above, only a succession of like-named causes and effects, and nothing whatever essentially different from simple causality. It is just the same with the swinging of the pendulum, and also with the self-preservation of the organic body, in which likewise each state brings about a new one that is of the same kind as the one by which it was itself effected, but individually new; only here the matter is more complicated, in that the chain consists no longer of links of two kinds but of links of many kinds, so that a like-named link returns only after several others have intervened. But always we see before us nothing but an application of the single and simple law of causality, which gives the rule for the sequence of states, and not anything that would have to be grasped by a new and special function of the understanding.

Or does one perhaps even want to cite, as proof of the concept of reciprocal action, that action and reaction are equal? But this lies precisely in what I so strongly urge and have set out at length in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason: that cause and effect are not two bodies but two successive states of bodies; consequently each of the two states also implies all the bodies involved, and the effect, that is, the newly occurring state, in an impact for example, extends to both bodies in equal proportion. The body struck is changed just as much as the striking body is (each in proportion to its mass and

velocity). If one is pleased to call this reciprocal action, then every effect without exception is reciprocal action, and no new concept, still less a new function of the understanding, enters on that account; we have merely a superfluous synonym for causality. This view, however, Kant incautiously states outright in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," where the proof of the fourth theorem of mechanics begins: "All external action in the world is reciprocal action." How, then, can different a priori functions for simple causality and for reciprocal action lie in the understanding, and how can even the real succession of things be possible and knowable only by means of the former, and their simultaneity only by means of the latter? According to that, if all action is reciprocal action, succession and simultaneity would be the same too, and consequently everything in the world simultaneous.—If there were true reciprocal action, then the perpetuum mobile would also be possible, and even certain a priori; rather, the assertion that it is impossible rests on the a priori conviction that there is no true reciprocal action and no form of the understanding for such.

Aristotle too denies reciprocal action in the proper sense: for he remarks that two things can indeed be causes of each other reciprocally, but only in such a way that this is understood of each in a different sense, for instance when the one acts on the other as motive, but the latter on the former as cause of its motion. For we find the same words in two places: Physic., Lib. II, c. 3, and Metaph., Lib. V, c. 2. Εστι δε τινα και αλληλων αιτια· οιον το πονειν αιτιον της ευεξιας, και αυτη του πονειν· αλλ' ου τον αυτον τροπον, αλλα το μεν ως τελος, το δε ως αρχη κινησεως. (Sunt praeterea quae sibi sunt mutuo causae, ut exercitium bonae habitudinis, et haec exercitii: at non eodem modo, sed haec ut finis, illud ut principium motus.) If he assumed in addition a proper reciprocal action, he would list it here, since in both places he is occupied with enumerating all possible kinds of causes. In the Analyt. post., Lib. II, c. 11, he speaks of a circular course of causes and effects, but not of reciprocal action.

4) The categories of modality have the advantage over all the rest that what is expressed by each of them really does correspond to the form of judgment from which it is derived; which is hardly ever the case with the other categories, since

they are for the most part deduced out of the forms of judgment by the most arbitrary compulsion.

That the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary are what give rise to the problematic, assertoric and apodictic forms of judgment is perfectly true. But that those concepts are special, original forms of knowledge of the understanding, not to be derived any further, is not true. They come, rather, from the single original form of all knowing, and therefore the one of which we are conscious a priori, the principle of sufficient reason; the knowledge of necessity comes immediately from it, whereas the concepts of contingency, possibility, impossibility and actuality arise only when reflection is applied to this knowledge. All of these, therefore, are rooted by no means in a power of mind, the understanding, but arise through the conflict of abstract knowing with intuitive, as will be seen at once.

I maintain that being necessary and being the consequence of a given ground are wholly convertible concepts and completely identical. We can never cognize as necessary, indeed never even think as necessary, anything except so far as we regard it as the consequence of a given ground; and beyond this dependence, this being posited by another and this inevitable following from it, the concept of necessity contains absolutely nothing. It arises and exists, then, solely and exclusively through the application of the principle of sufficient reason. Hence, according to the different shapes of this principle, there is a physically necessary (the effect from the cause), a logically necessary (through the ground of knowledge, in analytic judgments, inferences, and so on), a mathematically necessary (according to the ground of being in space and time), and finally a practically necessary, by which we mean not the being determined by an alleged categorical imperative, but the action that, given an empirical character, occurs necessarily according to the motives present.—All that is necessary, however, is so only relatively, namely under the presupposition of the ground from which it follows; hence absolute necessity is a contradiction.—For the rest I refer to §. 49 of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason.

The contradictory opposite, that is, the negation of necessity, is contingency. The content of this concept is therefore negative, namely nothing more than this: lack of the connection expressed by the principle of sufficient reason. Consequently the contingent, too, is always only relative: it is such in relation to something that is not its ground. Every object, of whatever kind, for example every event in the real world, is always necessary and contingent at once: necessary in relation to the one thing that is its cause; contingent in relation to everything else. For its contact in time and space with everything else is a mere coincidence, without necessary connection; hence also the words chance, συμπτωμα, contingens. An absolutely contingent is therefore as little conceivable as an absolutely necessary. For the former would be an object that stood to no other in the relation of consequent to ground. But the unrepresentability of such an object is just the negatively expressed content of the principle of sufficient reason, which would therefore first have to be overturned in order to think an absolutely contingent; and then the contingent itself would have lost all meaning, since the concept of the contingent has meaning only in relation to that principle, and signifies that two objects do not stand to each other in the relation of ground and consequent.

In nature, so far as it is intuitive representation, everything that happens is necessary: for it proceeds from its cause. But if we consider this single thing in relation to the rest, which is not its cause, we cognize it as contingent; but this is already an abstract reflection. If we now abstract further, in an object of nature, entirely from its causal relation to the rest, and thus from its necessity and contingency, then this kind of knowledge is embraced by the concept of the actual, in which one considers only the effect, without looking around for the cause, in relation to which one would otherwise have to call it necessary, and in relation to everything else contingent. All this rests ultimately on the fact that the modality of judgment designates not so much the objective constitution of things as the relation of our knowledge to them. But since in nature everything proceeds from a cause, every actual thing is also necessary; yet again only so far as it exists at this time and in this place, for the determination by the law of causality extends only so far. If, however, we leave intuitive nature and pass over

to abstract thinking, then in reflection we can represent to ourselves all the laws of nature, which are known to us partly a priori, partly only a posteriori, and this abstract representation contains everything that is in nature at any time, in any place, but with abstraction from every determinate place and time: and with this, through such reflection, we have entered the broad realm of possibility. But what finds no place even here is the impossible. It is evident that possibility and impossibility exist only for reflection, for the abstract knowledge of reason, not for intuitive knowledge; although it is the pure forms of the latter that supply reason with the determination of the possible and the impossible. According as the laws of nature from which we proceed in thinking the possible and the impossible are cognized a priori or a posteriori, the possibility or impossibility is a metaphysical one, or only a physical one.

From this exposition, which needs no proof because it rests directly on the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and on the development of the concepts of the necessary, the actual and the possible, it follows sufficiently how wholly groundless is Kant's assumption of three special functions of the understanding for those three concepts, and that here again no scruple has disturbed him in carrying out his architectonic symmetry.

To this there is added, however, the very great fault that he, following of course the example of earlier philosophy, has confused the concepts of the necessary and the contingent with each other.

That earlier philosophy, namely, put abstraction to the following abuse. It was evident that whatever has its ground posited follows inevitably, that is, cannot not be, and is thus necessary. To this last determination alone, however, people clung, and said: necessary is what cannot be otherwise, or whose opposite is impossible. But they left out of account the ground and root of such necessity, overlooked the relativity of all necessity resulting from it, and thereby made the wholly unthinkable fiction of an *absolutely necessary*, that is, of a something whose existence would be as inevitable as the consequent from the ground, but which yet would not be a consequent from a ground and would therefore depend on nothing; which addition is precisely an absurd petition, because it conflicts with the principle of sufficient reason. Starting from this fiction, they

then declared, diametrically opposed to the truth, everything that is posited through a ground to be precisely the contingent, by looking at the relative character of its necessity and comparing this with that entirely fabricated *absolute* necessity, self-contradictory in its concept [5]. This radically perverse determination of the contingent Kant too retains and gives as the explanation: "Critique of Pure Reason," V, pp. 289–291; 243. V, 301; 419. V, 447, 486, 488. He even falls thereby into the most glaring contradiction with himself, in that on p. 301 he says: "Everything contingent has a cause," and adds: "Contingent is that whose non-being is possible." But what has a cause—its [6] See Christian Wolf's "Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Soul," §. 577–579.—It is strange that he declares contingent only what is necessary according to the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, that is, what happens from causes, whereas what is necessary according to the other shapes of the principle of sufficient reason he recognizes as necessary, for example what follows from the essentia (definition), thus the analytic judgments, and also the mathematical truths. As the ground of this he states that only the law of causality gives endless series, whereas the other kinds of grounds give finite ones. But this is not at all the case with the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason in pure space and time, and holds only of the logical ground of knowledge; yet it was such a ground that he took mathematical necessity to be.—Compare: treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 50.

non-being is absolutely impossible: therefore it is necessary.—Moreover, the origin of this whole false explanation of the necessary and the contingent is already to be found in Aristotle, namely in "De generatione et corruptione," Lib. II, c. 9 et 11, where the necessary is explained as that whose non-being is impossible. Opposed to it is that whose being is impossible; and between these two lies that which can be and also not be—that is, what comes into being and passes away—and this would then be the contingent. From what was said above it is clear that this explanation, like so many of Aristotle's, arose from stopping at abstract concepts without going back to the concrete and intuitive, in which, after all, lies the source of all abstract concepts, and by which they must therefore always be checked. "Something whose non-being is impossible"

can at any rate be thought in abstracto; but if we go with it to the concrete, the real, the intuitive, we find nothing to support the thought, even as a possibility, except precisely the said consequence of a given ground, whose necessity, however, is a relative and conditioned one.

On this occasion I add a few more remarks on those concepts of modality.—Since all necessity rests on the principle of sufficient reason, and for that very reason is relative, all *apodictic* judgments are originally, and in their ultimate meaning, *hypothetical*. They become *categorical* only through the addition of an *assertoric* minor, thus in the conclusion. If this minor is still undecided, and this indecision is expressed, then it gives the *problematic* judgment.

What is apodictic in general (as a rule), a law of nature, is in relation to a single case always only problematic, because the condition that brings the case under the rule must first actually occur. And conversely, what is necessary (apodictic) as such in the particular (every single change, necessary through its cause) is, when stated in general terms, again only problematic; because the cause that has occurred affected only the single case, and the apodictic, always hypothetical judgment asserts only general laws, never directly single cases.—All this has its ground in the fact that possibility exists only in the domain of reflection and for reason, the actual in the domain of intuition and for the understanding, the necessary for both. Indeed the difference between necessary, actual and possible exists properly only in abstracto and in concept; in the real world, on the other hand, all three coincide in one. For everything that happens, happens *necessarily*, because it happens from causes, and these themselves again have causes; so that all the occurrences of the world, great and small, are a strict chain of what necessarily comes about. Accordingly everything actual is at the same time necessary, and in reality there is no difference between actuality and necessity; and just as little between actuality and possibility. For what has not happened, that is, has not become actual, was also not possible, because the causes without which it could never have occurred did not themselves occur, nor could they occur, in the great chain of causes; it was therefore an impossibility. Every occurrence is accordingly either necessary or impossible. All this holds only of the empirically real world, that is, the complex of single things, and thus of the

wholly individual as such. If, on the other hand, we consider things in general by means of reason, apprehending them in abstracto, then necessity, actuality and possibility come apart again. We then recognize everything that conforms to the laws a priori belonging to our intellect as possible in general, and what corresponds to the empirical laws of nature as possible in this world, even if it has never become actual; we thus clearly distinguish the possible from the actual. The actual is in itself indeed always also something necessary, but it is apprehended as such only by one who knows its cause; apart from this it is, and is called, contingent. This consideration also gives us the key to that contentio περι δυνατων between the Megarian Diodorus and Chrysippus the Stoic, which Cicero relates in the book de fato. Diodorus says: "Only what becomes actual has been possible, and everything actual is also necessary."—Chrysippus, on the other hand: "Much is possible that never becomes actual, for only the necessary becomes actual."—We can explain this as follows. Actuality is the conclusion of an inference to which possibility gives the premises. But for this not the major alone is required, but the minor too: only the two together give full possibility. The major, namely, gives a merely theoretical, general possibility in abstracto; this in itself, however, makes nothing at all possible, that is, capable of becoming actual. For that the minor is needed as well, which gives the possibility for the single case by bringing it under the rule. By just this the case becomes at once actuality. For example:

Maj. All houses (and consequently my house too) can burn down. Min. My house catches fire. Concl. My house burns down.

For every universal proposition, and so every major, determines things, with regard to actuality, only under a presupposition, hence hypothetically; for example, the being able to burn down has as its presupposition the catching fire. This presupposition is supplied in the minor. The major always loads the cannon; but only when the minor applies the match does the shot, the conclusio, follow. This holds throughout of the relation of possibility to actuality. Since the conclusio, which is the assertion of actuality, always follows *necessarily*, it follows that everything actual is also necessary; which can also be seen from the fact that being necessary means only being the consequence of a given

ground, and this ground in the actual is a cause: so everything actual is necessary. We see here, accordingly, the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary coincide, and not merely the last presuppose the first, but also conversely. What holds them apart is the limitation of our intellect by the form of time: for time is the mediator between possibility and actuality. The necessity of the single event can be fully understood through knowledge of all its causes; but the coincidence of all these various causes, independent of one another, appears to us as *contingent*, and indeed the independence of them from one another is precisely the concept of contingency. But since each of them was the necessary consequence of its cause, whose chain is without beginning, it appears that contingency is a merely subjective appearance, arising from the limitation of the horizon of our understanding, and as subjective as the optical horizon, where the sky touches the earth.

Since necessity is one with consequence from a given ground, it must appear as a distinct kind in each shape of the principle of sufficient reason, and must also have its opposite in possibility and impossibility, which always arises only through the application of the abstract consideration of reason to the object. Hence over against the four kinds of necessity mentioned above stand as many kinds of impossibility: physical, logical, mathematical, practical. It may further be remarked that when one keeps wholly within the domain of abstract concepts, possibility always attaches to the more general concept, necessity to the narrower: for example, "an animal *can* be a bird, a fish, an amphibian, and so on"—"a nightingale *must* be a bird, this an animal, this an organism, this a body."—Properly because logical necessity, whose expression is the syllogism, goes from the general to the particular and never conversely.—In intuitive nature (the representations of the first class), on the other hand, everything is properly necessary, through the law of causality; only the reflection that supervenes can apprehend it at the same time as contingent, by comparing it with what is not its cause, and also as merely and purely actual, by abstracting from all causal connection. Only in this class of representations does the concept of the *actual* properly have place, as the derivation of the German word from the concept of causality already shows.—In the third class of representations, pure

mathematical intuition, if one keeps wholly within it, there is nothing but necessity; possibility arises here too only through reference to the concepts of reflection: for example, "a triangle *can* be right-angled, obtuse-angled, equiangular; it *must* have three angles that sum to two right angles." So here one arrives at the *possible* only by passing from the intuitive to the abstract.

After this exposition, which presupposes recollection of what was said both in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason and in the first book of the present work, there will, it is to be hoped, be no further doubt about the true and very diverse origin of those forms of judgment which the table lays before our eyes, nor about the inadmissibility and complete groundlessness of the assumption of twelve special functions of the understanding to explain them. Of the latter, indeed, many single and very easily made remarks already give indication. Thus, for example, it takes great love of symmetry and much confidence in a clue taken from it to assume that an affirmative, a categorical and an assertoric judgment are three things so fundamentally different that they warrant assuming for each of them a wholly peculiar function of the understanding.

Kant himself betrays his consciousness of the untenability of his doctrine of the categories by the fact that in the third chapter of the Analysis of Principles (phaenomena et noumena) he omitted in the second edition several long passages of the first (namely pp. 241, 242, 244–246, 248–253), which laid the weakness of that doctrine too openly bare. Thus, for example, he says there, p. 241, that he has not defined the individual categories because he could not have defined them even if he had wished, since they are capable of no definition:—in this he had forgotten that on p. 82 of the same first edition he had said: "I deliberately excuse myself from the definition of the categories, although I might be in possession of it."—This was therefore—sit venia verbo—wind. This last passage, however, he let stand. And so all those passages, afterwards prudently omitted, betray that nothing distinct can be thought in the categories and that this whole doctrine stands on weak feet.

This table of categories is now supposed to be the guiding thread by which every metaphysical, indeed every scientific, consideration is to be conducted. (Prolegomena, §. 39.) And in fact it is not only the foundation of the whole Kantian philosophy and the type according to which its symmetry is everywhere carried out, as I have already shown above; it has also become quite literally the bed of Procrustes, into which Kant forces every possible consideration, by an act of violence which I shall now examine somewhat more closely. And what must the imitatores, servum pecus, not have done on such an occasion! It has been seen. That violence, then, is exercised by setting aside and forgetting altogether the meaning of the expressions that designate the titles, forms of judgment and categories, and holding solely to these expressions themselves. These have in part their origin in Aristotle's Analyt. priora, I, 23 (περι ποιοτητος και ποσοτητος των του συλλογισμου όρων: de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi), but are chosen arbitrarily: for the extent of concepts might well have been designated otherwise than by the word *quantity*, although this word fits its object better than the other titles of the categories fit theirs. Even the word *quality* was obviously chosen only from the habit of setting quality over against quantity; for the name quality has been seized upon quite arbitrarily enough for affirmation and negation. Now, however, in every consideration he conducts, Kant brings every quantity in time and space, and every possible quality of things, physical, moral, and so on, under those category titles, although between these things and those titles of the forms of judging and thinking there is not the slightest thing in common, except the accidental, arbitrary naming. One must keep in mind all the esteem one otherwise owes Kant, so as not to express one's indignation at this procedure in harsh terms.—The next example is supplied at once by the pure physiological table of the general principles of natural science. What in all the world has the quantity of judgments to do with every intuition having an extensive magnitude? What has the quality of judgments to do with every sensation having a degree?—The former rests rather on the fact that space is the form of our outer intuition, and the latter is nothing more than an empirical and, moreover, wholly subjective perception, drawn merely from the consideration of the constitution of our sense

organs.—Further, in the table that lays the ground for rational psychology (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 344; V, 402), the *simplicity* of the soul is listed under quality; but this is precisely a quantitative property, and has no reference at all to affirmation or negation in judgment. Quantity, moreover, was to be filled by the *unity* of the soul, which is yet already comprised in simplicity. Then modality is squeezed in, in a ridiculous way: the soul, namely, stands in relation to *possible* objects; but a relationship belongs under relation, and this is already occupied by substance. Then the four cosmological Ideas, which are the material of the antinomies, are traced back to the titles of the categories; on which more below, in the examination of these antinomies. Several examples, if possible still more glaring, are supplied by the table of the *categories of freedom!* in the "Critique of Practical Reason";—further, in the "Critique of Judgment," by the first book, which goes through the judgment of taste according to the four titles of the categories; finally by the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, which are cut entirely to the table of categories, whereby perhaps the falsehood that is mixed here and there with the true and excellent in this important work was chiefly occasioned. One need only look at the end of the first chapter, to see how the unity, plurality and totality of the directions of lines are supposed to correspond to the categories so named according to the quantity of judgments.

—The principle of the *persistence of substance* is derived from the category of substance and inherence. We know this category, however, only from the form of categorical judgments, that is, from the connection of two concepts as subject and predicate. How violently, then, is that great metaphysical principle made dependent on this simple, purely logical form! But it was done only pro forma and for the sake of symmetry. The proof given here for this principle sets aside altogether its supposed origin in the understanding and in the category, and is conducted from the pure intuition of time. But even this proof is wholly incorrect. It is false that in mere time there is *simultaneity* and *duration*: these representations arise first of all from the union of *space* with time, as I have already shown in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 18, and set forth still further in § 4 of the present work; I must presuppose both exposi-

tions for the understanding of what follows. It is false that through all change time itself *remains*: rather, it is precisely time itself that flows; a lasting time is a contradiction. Kant's proof is untenable, however much he has propped it up with sophisms; indeed he falls thereby into the most palpable contradiction. For after he has (p. 177; V, 219) falsely set up *simultaneity* as a mode of time, he says (p. 183; V, 226) quite rightly: "*Simultaneity* is not a mode of time, in which no parts at all are simultaneous, but all are successive."—In truth, space is as much implied in simultaneity as time is. For if two things are simultaneous and yet not one, they are different through space; if two states of *one* thing are simultaneous (for example the glow and the heat of iron), they are two simultaneous effects of *one thing*, and therefore presuppose matter, and matter presupposes space. Strictly speaking, simultaneity is a negative determination, which contains only that two things, or states, are not different through time, so that their difference is to be sought elsewhere.—Certainly, however, our knowledge of the persistence of substance, that is, of matter, must rest on an insight a priori, since it is beyond all doubt and therefore cannot be drawn from experience. I derive it from this: that the principle of all becoming and passing away, the law of causality, of which we are conscious a priori, concerns quite essentially only the *changes*, that is, the successive *states* of matter, and is thus limited to form, but leaves *matter* untouched, which therefore stands in our consciousness as the foundation of all things, subject to no becoming and passing away, and thus always having been and always remaining. A deeper grounding of the persistence of substance, drawn from the analysis of our intuitive representation of the empirical world in general, is to be found in our first book, § 4, where it has been shown that the essence of *matter* consists in the complete *union of space and time*, a union possible only by means of the representation of causality, and consequently only for the understanding, which is nothing but the subjective correlate of causality. Hence matter, too, is never cognized otherwise than as acting, that is, through and through as causality; being and acting are one in it, which the very word *actuality* already indicates. Intimate union of space and time—causality, matter, actuality—are therefore one, and the subjective correlate of this one is the understanding. Matter must carry in

itself the conflicting properties of the two factors from which it proceeds, and it is the representation of causality that cancels the contradictory element in both and makes their coexistence comprehensible to the understanding, through which and for which alone matter is, and whose whole faculty consists in the knowing of cause and effect. For the understanding, therefore, the unstable flux of time, appearing as the change of accidents, unites in matter with the rigid immobility of space, which presents itself as the persistence of substance. For if substance passed away, like the accidents, the appearance would be torn entirely loose from space and belong only to bare time: the world of experience would be dissolved, through the destruction of matter, annihilation.—From the share, then, that *space* has in matter, that is, in all appearances of actuality—space being the opposite and counterpart of time and therefore, in itself and apart from union with it, knowing no change at all—that principle of the persistence of substance, which everyone recognizes as certain a priori, had to be derived and explained, and not from bare time, to which Kant, for this purpose, quite absurdly attributed a *remaining*.

The incorrectness of the proof that now follows, the proof of the apriority and necessity of the law of causality from the mere temporal sequence of events, I have shown at length in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23; I may therefore here only appeal to it [7]. It is exactly the same [8] With that refutation of mine of the Kantian proof one may compare at will the earlier attacks on it by *Feder*, On with the proof of reciprocal action, whose concept I even had to show above to be void.—On modality as well, the principles of which are now set out in detail, what is necessary has already been said.—

I should have to refute many further details in following the transcendental Analytic on, but I fear to tire the reader's patience and therefore leave them to his own reflection. But again and again there confronts us in the Critique of Pure Reason that chief and fundamental fault of Kant's which I have censured at length above, the complete failure to distinguish abstract, discursive knowledge from intuitive. This is what spreads a constant obscurity over Kant's whole theory of the faculty of knowledge, and never lets the reader know what is really being spoken of in each case; so that, instead of understanding, he only

ever conjectures, trying to take what is said each time alternately as about thinking and about intuiting, and remains constantly in suspense. That incredible lack of reflection on the essence of intuitive and abstract representation brings Kant, as I shall presently discuss more closely, in the chapter "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena," to the monstrous assertion that without thinking, that is, without abstract concepts, there is no knowledge of an object at all, and that intuition, because it is not thinking, is also no knowing at all, and altogether nothing but a mere affection of sensibility, mere sensation! Indeed more: that intuition without concept is wholly empty, but concept without intuition is still something (p. 253; V, 309). This is the exact opposite of the truth: for concepts get all their meaning, all their content, solely from their relation to intuitive representations, from which they have been abstracted, drawn off, that is, formed by letting fall everything unessential; hence, if the underlayer of intuition is withdrawn from them, they are empty and void. Intuitions, on the other hand, have in themselves immediate and very great significance (for it is in them, after all, that the Time, Space and Causality; § 28; and by *G. E. Schulze*, Critique of Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 2, pp. 422–442.

thing in itself is objectified): they stand for themselves, speak for themselves, do not have merely borrowed content, as concepts do. For over them the principle of sufficient reason rules only as the law of causality, and as such determines only their place in space and time; it does not condition their content and significance, as is the case with concepts, where it holds as the ground of knowing. Moreover, it looks as if Kant here really aims precisely to distinguish intuitive and abstract representation: he reproaches Leibniz and Locke, the former with having turned everything into abstract, the latter into intuitive representations. But no distinction comes of it; and even if Locke and Leibniz really committed those faults, a third fault, embracing those two, falls on Kant himself, namely to have mixed the intuitive and the abstract to such a degree that a monstrous hybrid of the two arose, a non-entity, of which no distinct representation is possible and which could therefore only confuse, stupefy and set at strife his disciples.

To be sure, thinking and intuition diverge, more than anywhere else, in the said chapter "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena"; but the manner of this distinction is here radically false. For it says, p. 253, V, 309: "If I take away all thinking (through categories) from an empirical knowledge, no knowledge of an object remains at all: for through mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and that this affection of sensibility is in me makes no relation of such representations to any object."—This sentence contains, as it were, all Kant's errors in a nutshell; for it comes to light thereby that he has misconceived the relation between sensation, intuition and thinking, and accordingly identifies intuition, whose form is supposed after all to be space, and indeed in all three dimensions, with the mere subjective sensation in the sense organs, but lets the knowing of an object come in only through thinking, which is different from intuiting. I say, on the contrary: objects are in the first place objects of intuition, not of thinking, and all knowledge of *objects* is originally and in itself intuition; this, however, is by no means mere sensation, but already in it the understanding shows itself active. The *thinking* that is added in man alone, not in the animals, is mere abstraction from intuition; it gives no knowledge new from the ground up, does not first posit objects that were not there before, but merely changes the form of the knowledge already gained through intuition, making it, namely, an abstract knowledge in concepts, whereby intuitiveness is lost, but on the other hand a combining of it becomes possible, which extends its applicability immeasurably. The *material* of our thinking, however, is no other than our intuitions themselves, and not something that, not contained in intuition, would first be brought in by thinking: hence of everything that occurs in our thinking the material must be demonstrable in our intuition; otherwise it would be an empty thinking. Although this material is worked upon and reshaped by thinking in very manifold ways, it must nevertheless be possible to restore it from them, and to lead thinking back to it;—as one reduces a piece of gold again from all its solutions, oxidations, sublimations and combinations, and lays it before us once more in metallic form, undiminished. This could not be so if thinking itself had added something to the object, indeed the chief thing.

The whole chapter on the Amphiboly that follows is merely a critique of the Leibnizian philosophy and as such correct on the whole, although the entire cut of it is made merely out of love for architectonic symmetry, which here too provides the guiding thread. Thus, to bring out the analogy with the Aristotelian Organon, a transcendental topic is set up, which consists in this, that one is to consider every concept under four aspects in order to determine first to which faculty of knowledge it belongs. Those four aspects, however, are assumed wholly arbitrarily, and with equal right ten others could be added; their fourfold number corresponds, however, to the category titles, and so the chief Leibnizian doctrines are distributed under them as well as will go. By this critique, too, what were merely false abstractions of *Leibniz* are in a way stamped as natural errors of reason; Leibniz, instead of learning from his great philosophical contemporaries, Spinoza and Locke, preferred to dish up his own strange inventions. In the chapter on the Amphiboly of Reflection it is said at last that there could possibly be a kind of intuition wholly different from ours, to which our categories would nevertheless be applicable; the objects of that supposed intuition would then be the *noumena*, things that can be merely *thought* by us, but since the intuition that would give that thinking meaning is lacking to us, indeed is quite problematic, the object of that thinking, too, would be merely a wholly indeterminate possibility. I have shown above, by quoted passages, that Kant, in the greatest contradiction with himself, sets up the categories now as the condition of intuitive representation, now as a function of merely abstract thinking. Here they appear exclusively in the latter meaning, and it seems altogether as if he meant to ascribe to them only a discursive thinking. If this is really his opinion, however, he should necessarily have characterized thinking in general at the beginning of the transcendental logic, before he specified the various functions of thinking so prolixly; he should consequently have distinguished it from intuiting, and shown what knowledge mere intuiting gives and what new knowledge comes in with thinking. Then one would have known what he is really talking about; or rather, then he would also have talked quite differently, namely at one time of intuiting and at another of thinking, instead of having to do now always with a mixture

of the two, which is a non-entity. Then there would also not be that great gap between the transcendental Aesthetic and the transcendental Logic, where, after presenting the mere form of intuition, he dismisses its content, the whole empirical perception, merely with the "*it is given*," and does not ask how it comes about, *with or without understanding*; but passes with a leap to abstract thinking, and not even to thinking in general, but at once to certain forms of thought, and says not a word on what thinking is, what a concept is, what the relation of the abstract and discursive to the concrete and intuitive is, what the difference is between the knowledge of man and that of the animal, and what reason is.

It was precisely that difference between abstract and intuitive knowledge, wholly overlooked by Kant, which the ancient philosophers designated by φαινομενα and νοουμενα [9], and whose opposition and incommensurability gave them so much to do, in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarians, and later, for the Scholastics, in the dispute between nominalism and realism, the germ of which, developing late, was already contained in the opposite mental tendency of Plato and Aristotle. Kant, however, who in an irresponsible way entirely neglected the very matter that those words φαινομενα and νοουμενα were already used to designate, now seizes the words as if they were still ownerless, to designate by them his things in themselves and his appearances.

—Having had to reject Kant's doctrine of the categories just as he himself rejected Aristotle's, I will nevertheless point here, by way of suggestion, to a third path for attaining the intended aim. What both sought under the name of categories were in any case the most universal concepts, under which all things, however different, must be subsumed, and through which, therefore, everything existing would finally be thought. For this very reason Kant conceived them as the *forms* of all thinking.

Grammar stands to logic as the garment to the body. Should not these supreme concepts, then, this fundamental bass of reason, which is the foundation of all more specific thinking and without whose application no thinking can take place at all, lie after all in the concepts which, precisely because of their exuber-

ant generality (transcendentality), find their expression not in single words but in whole classes of words, since with every word, whichever [10] See Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. hypotyp., Lib. I, c. 13, νοουμενα φαινομενοις ἀντετιθη Αναξαγορας (intelligibilia apparentibus opposuit Anaxagoras). it may be, one of them is already thought along with it; so that one would have to look for their designation not in the lexicon but in grammar? Should it not be, in the end, those differences of concepts by virtue of which the word expressing them is a noun, or an adjective, a verb, or an adverb, a pronoun, a preposition, or some other particle—in short the partes orationis? For indisputably these designate the forms which all thinking first assumes and in which it immediately moves; for just that reason they are the essential forms of language, the basic constituents of every language, so that we cannot conceive a language that did not consist at least of nouns, adjectives and verbs. Under these basic forms would then be subordinated those forms of thought which are expressed by the inflections of the former, that is, by declension and conjugation, where in the main it is immaterial whether one calls in the article and the pronoun to help in designating them. Let us, however, examine the matter somewhat more closely and raise the question anew: what are the forms of thinking?

1) Thinking consists throughout of judgments: judgments are the threads of its whole fabric. For without the use of a verb our thinking does not move from the spot, and whenever we use a verb we judge.

2) Every judgment consists in the knowing of the relation between subject and predicate, which it separates or unites with various restrictions. It unites them, beginning from the knowing of the real identity of the two, which can occur only with convertible concepts; then in the knowing that the one is always thought along in the other, though not conversely—in the universally affirmative proposition; up to the knowing that the one is sometimes thought along in the other, in the particular affirmative proposition. The negative propositions go the opposite way. Accordingly in every judgment subject, predicate and copula, the last affirmative or negative, must be found, even if not each of these is designated by a word of its own, though each mostly is. Often one word designates predicate and copula, as in "Caius grows old"; sometimes one word desig-

nates all three, as in concurritur, that is, "the armies come to close quarters." From this it is clear that the forms of thinking are not to be sought so directly and immediately in the words, nor even in the parts of speech, since the same judgment can be expressed in different languages, indeed even in the same language, by different words and even by different parts of speech, while the thought nevertheless remains the same, and consequently its form too; for the thought could not be the same with a different form of thinking itself. But the verbal structure can very well be different with the same thought and the same form of it, for it is merely the outer dress of the thought, which on the other hand is inseparable from *its* form. Grammar therefore only elucidates the dress of the forms of thought. The parts of speech can accordingly be derived from the original forms of thought themselves, independent of all languages; to express these, with all their modifications, is their purpose. They are the tool of the forms of thought, their garment, which must be fitted exactly to their frame, so that the frame can be recognized in it.

3) These real, unchangeable, original forms of thinking are indeed those of Kant's *logical table of judgments*; only that on this table there are blind windows, in favor of symmetry and of the table of categories, which must all drop out; likewise a false order. So, something like this: a) *Quality*: affirmation or negation, that is, connection or separation of the concepts: two forms. It attaches to the copula. b) *Quantity*: the subject concept is taken wholly or in part: totality or plurality. To the former belong also the individual subjects: Socrates means "all Socrates." Thus only two forms. It attaches to the subject. c) *Modality*: really has three forms. It determines the quality as necessary, actual, or contingent. It consequently attaches likewise to the copula.

These three forms of thinking arise from the laws of thought of contradiction and of identity. But from the principle of sufficient reason and that of the excluded third arises d) *Relation*. It enters only when judgments are passed on finished judgments, and can consist only in this, that it either states the dependence of one judgment on another (even where both are plural), thus connects

them, in the *hypothetical* proposition; or states that judgments exclude each other, thus separates them, in the *disjunctive* proposition. It attaches to the copula, which here separates or connects the finished judgments.

The *parts of speech* and grammatical forms are modes of expression of the three constituents of the judgment, that is, of subject, predicate and copula, as also of the possible relations of these, that is, of the forms of thought just enumerated, and of the closer determinations and modifications of the latter. Noun, adjective and verb are therefore essential basic constituents of language in general, for which reason they must be found in all languages. Yet a language could be conceived in which adjective and verb were always fused with each other, as they sometimes are in all languages. Provisionally it could be said: for the expression of the *subject* are destined noun, article and pronoun;—for the expression of the *predicate*, adjective, adverb, preposition;—for the expression of the *copula*, the verb, which, however, with the exception of esse, already contains the predicate. The exact mechanism of the expression of the forms of thought is to be taught by philosophical grammar, as the operations with the forms of thought themselves are by logic.

Remark. As a warning against a false path, and to elucidate the above, I mention S. Stern's "Preliminary Foundation for the Philosophy of Language," 1835, as a wholly failed attempt to construct the categories out of the grammatical forms. For he has entirely confused thinking with intuiting, and therefore wanted to deduce from the grammatical forms, instead of the categories of thinking, the alleged categories of intuiting, and so put the grammatical forms in direct relation to *intuition*. He is caught in the great error that *language* refers immediately to *intuition*; whereas it refers immediately only to thinking as such, that is, to *abstract concepts*, and only by means of these to intuition, to which, however, it stands in a relation that brings about a complete change of form. What is present in intuition, and so also the relations arising from time and space, does indeed become an object of thinking; so there must also be forms of language to express it, yet always only in abstracto, as concepts. The nearest material of thinking is always concepts, and only to such do the forms

of logic refer, never *directly* to intuition. The latter determines always only the material truth of propositions, never the formal, which is governed by the logical rules alone.

—I return to the Kantian philosophy and come to the *transcendental Dialectic*. Kant opens it with the explanation of *reason*, the faculty that is to play the principal role in it, since hitherto only sensibility and understanding were on the stage. I have already spoken above, among his various explanations of reason, also of the one given here, "that it is the faculty of principles." It is taught here that all the cognitions a priori considered so far, which make pure mathematics and pure natural science possible, give mere *rules* but no *principles*, because they proceed from intuitions and forms of knowledge, not from mere *concepts*, which is required in order to be called a principle. Such a principle is accordingly to be a knowledge *from mere concepts* and yet synthetic. This, however, is flatly impossible. From mere concepts nothing but *analytic* propositions can ever proceed. If concepts are to be connected synthetically and yet a priori, this connection must necessarily be mediated by a third thing, by a pure intuition of the formal possibility of experience, just as the synthetic judgments a posteriori are mediated by empirical intuition; consequently a synthetic proposition a priori can never proceed from mere concepts. In general, however, we are conscious a priori of nothing more than the principle of sufficient reason, in its various shapes, and no other synthetic judgments a priori are therefore possible than those which proceed from what gives that principle its content.

Meanwhile Kant at last comes forward with an alleged principle of reason that answers to his demand, though with only this *one*, from which other corollaries then flow. It is the proposition that Chr. Wolf sets up and explains in his "Cosmologia," sect. 1, c. 2, §. 93, and in his "Ontologia," §. 178. Just as above, under the title of the Amphiboly, mere Leibnizian philosophemes were taken for natural and necessary aberrations of reason and criticized as such, exactly the same is done here with the philosophemes of Wolf. Kant sets out this principle of reason, moreover, in a twilight produced by obscurity, vagueness and fragmentation (p. 307; V, 361, and 322; V, 379); but stated clearly it is this: "If the conditioned is given, then the totality of its conditions must also be given, and

hence also the *unconditioned*, through which alone that totality becomes complete." One becomes most vividly aware of the apparent truth of this proposition if one pictures the conditions and the conditioned as the links of a chain hanging downward, whose upper end, however, is not visible, so that it could run on to infinity; but since the chain does not fall but hangs, there must be at the top a link that is the first and is somehow fastened. Or more briefly: reason would like to have a point of attachment for the causal chain that points back to infinity; that would be convenient for it. But let us test the proposition not by images but in itself. Synthetic it certainly is: for analytically nothing follows from the concept of the conditioned beyond that of the condition. But it has no truth a priori, and none a posteriori either; it steals its semblance of truth in a very subtle way, which I must now uncover. Immediately and a priori we have the cognitions that the principle of sufficient reason expresses in its four forms. All the abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason are already borrowed from these immediate cognitions and are therefore mediate; and still more so are its corollaries. I have already explained above how *abstract* knowledge often unites manifold *intuitive* cognitions into *one* form or *one* concept in such a way that they can no longer be distinguished: so that abstract knowledge stands to intuitive knowledge as the shadow to the real objects, whose great multiplicity it reproduces through *one* outline that embraces them all. It is this shadow that the alleged principle of reason now exploits. In order to infer from the principle of sufficient reason the unconditioned, which flatly contradicts it, it shrewdly abandons the immediate, intuitive knowledge of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in its several forms, and makes use only of the abstract concepts, which are drawn from that knowledge and have value and meaning only through it, in order to smuggle its unconditioned somehow into the wide extent of those concepts. Its procedure becomes clearest in dialectical dress; thus, for example: "If the conditioned is there, its condition must also be given, and given entire, hence completely, hence the totality of its conditions, consequently, if they make up a series, the whole series, consequently also its first beginning, hence the unconditioned."—Already here it is false that the conditions of a conditioned, as such, can make up a *series*. Rather, for every

conditioned the totality of its conditions must be contained in its *proximate* ground, from which it proceeds immediately and which only thereby is a *sufficient* ground. Take, for example, the various determinations of the state that is the cause, all of which must have come together before the effect occurs. The series, however, the chain of causes for instance, arises only because we now regard as a conditioned that which was just now the condition; whereupon the whole operation at once begins anew from the start and the principle of sufficient reason appears afresh with its demand. But there can never be, for a conditioned, a proper successive series of conditions that would stand there merely as such and for the sake of the finally last conditioned; there is always rather an alternating series of conditioned and conditions: with each link traversed, however, the chain is interrupted and the demand of the principle of sufficient reason is wholly canceled; it begins again, as the condition becomes the conditioned. Thus the principle of *sufficient* reason always demands only the completeness of the *proximate condition*, never the completeness of a series. But this very concept of completeness of the condition leaves undetermined whether that completeness is to be simultaneous or successive: and as the latter is now chosen, there arises the demand for a complete series of conditions following one another. Only by an arbitrary abstraction is a series of causes and effects regarded as a series of nothing but causes, which would be there merely for the sake of the last effect and would therefore be demanded as its *sufficient* ground. On closer and more considered examination, descending from the indeterminate generality of abstraction to the single determinate real thing, one finds on the contrary that the demand for a *sufficient* ground goes only to the completeness of the determinations of the *proximate* cause, not to the completeness of a series. The demand of the principle of sufficient reason is wholly extinguished in every given sufficient ground. But it begins anew at once, as this ground is in turn regarded as a consequent: never, however, does it directly demand a series of grounds. If, on the other hand, instead of going to the thing itself, one stays within the abstract concepts, those differences have vanished: then a chain of alternating causes and effects, or of alternating logical grounds and consequents, is passed off as a chain of nothing but causes or grounds leading to the

last effect, and the *completeness of the conditions*, through which a ground first becomes *sufficient*, appears as a completeness of that assumed *series* of nothing but grounds, which would be there only for the sake of the last consequent. Then the abstract principle of reason steps forth very boldly with its demand for the unconditioned. But to recognize the invalidity of this demand there is as yet no need of a critique of reason by means of antinomies and their resolution, but only of a critique of reason in my sense, namely an investigation of the relation of abstract knowledge to the immediately intuitive, by descending from the indeterminate generality of the former to the firm determinateness of the latter. From this it then follows here that the essence of reason by no means consists in demanding an unconditioned: for as soon as it proceeds with full circumspection, it must itself find that an unconditioned is simply a nonentity. Reason, as a faculty of knowledge, can only ever have to do with objects; but every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably subject to the principle of sufficient reason and fallen under it, both a parte ante and a parte post. The validity of the principle of sufficient reason lies so deeply in the form of consciousness that one absolutely cannot represent to oneself objectively anything of which no further Why could be demanded, and hence no absolute Absolute, like a board before the head. That this man or that is bidden by his convenience to stop somewhere and assume such an Absolute at pleasure can accomplish nothing against that unshakable certainty a priori, not even if one puts on very distinguished airs about it. In fact the whole talk of the Absolute, this almost sole theme of the philosophies attempted since Kant, is nothing other than the cosmological proof incognito. For this proof, having been stripped of all rights and declared an outlaw as a result of the trial Kant brought against it, may no longer show itself in its true shape, and therefore appears in all sorts of disguises: now in distinguished ones, cloaked in intellectual intuition or pure thinking, now as a suspicious vagabond who half begs, half extorts what he gets, in the more modest philosophemes. If the gentlemen absolutely want an Absolute, I will put one into their hands that meets all the demands made on such a thing far better than their babbled nebulous phantoms: it is matter. It is unoriginated and imperishable, hence truly independent and quod per se est et

per se concipitur: from its womb everything proceeds and everything returns into it: what more can one ask of an Absolute?—But one should rather call out to those on whom no critique of reason has taken hold:

Are you not like the women, who keep coming back only to their first word, when one has spoken reason for hours?

Moreover, that the regress to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning, is by no means grounded in the essence of reason is also proved by fact: the primal religions of our species, which even now have the greatest number of adherents on earth, that is, Brahmanism and Buddhism, neither know nor admit such assumptions, but carry the series of mutually conditioning appearances up into infinity. On this I refer to the note that follows below, in the critique of the first antinomy, where one may also consult Upham's "Doctrine of Buddhaism" (p. 9), and in general every genuine account of the religions of Asia. One should not identify Judaism and reason.—

Kant, who also by no means wishes to maintain his alleged principle of reason as objectively valid but only as subjectively necessary, deduces it, even as such, only through a shallow sophism, p. 307; V, 364. The sophism is this: because we seek to subsume every truth known to us under a more general one as long as that is possible, this is supposed to be nothing other than the very pursuit of the unconditioned which we presuppose. In truth, however, by such seeking we do nothing other than apply reason, that is, that faculty of abstract, general knowledge which distinguishes the reflective, speech-endowed, thinking human being from the animal, the slave of the present, and use it expediently to simplify our knowledge through overview. For the use of reason consists precisely in this, that we know the particular through the general, the case through the rule, and this through the more general rule, so that we seek the most general points of view: by such overview our knowledge is so greatly facilitated and perfected that from it arises the great difference between the animal and the human course of life, and again between the life of the cultivated and that of the uncultivated human being. Now to be sure the series of *grounds of knowledge*, which exists solely in the domain of the abstract, hence of reason, always comes to an end in the indemonstrable, that is, in a representation which

according to this form of the principle of sufficient reason is not further conditioned, hence in the ground, immediately intuitive a priori or a posteriori, of the topmost proposition of the chain of inference. I have already shown in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 50, that here the series of grounds of knowledge actually passes over into the grounds of becoming, or of being. But to make this circumstance count in order to demonstrate something unconditioned according to the law of causality, even if only as a demand—this one can do only if one has not yet distinguished the forms of the principle of sufficient reason at all, but, clinging to the abstract expression, confounds them all. Yet this confusion Kant seeks to ground even by a mere play on words with Universalitas and Universitas, p. 322; V, 379.—It is thus utterly false that our seeking of higher grounds of knowledge, of general truths, springs from the presupposition of an object unconditioned in its existence, or has anything at all in common with it. How indeed should it be essential to reason to presuppose something that it must recognize as a nonentity as soon as it reflects? The origin of that concept of the unconditioned is rather never to be traced to anything other than the indolence of the individual, who wants thereby to be rid of all further questions, put by others or by oneself, though without any justification.

To this alleged principle of reason Kant himself, to be sure, denies objective validity, yet he gives it out as a necessary subjective presupposition, and so introduces an irresolvable discord into our knowledge, which he soon lets emerge more clearly. To this end he unfolds that principle of reason further, p. 322; V, 379, by his favorite architectonic-symmetrical method. From the three categories of relation spring three kinds of syllogisms, each of which furnishes the clue to the search for a particular unconditioned, of which there are therefore again three: soul, world (as object in itself and closed totality), God. Here a great contradiction is at once to be noticed, of which Kant however takes no notice, because it would be very dangerous to symmetry: two of these unconditioned are themselves in turn conditioned, through the third, namely soul and world through God, who is their producing cause: those two therefore have in

common with this one not at all the predicate of unconditionedness, which is what matters here, but only that of being inferred according to principles of experience, beyond the domain of the possibility of experience.

Setting this aside, we find in the three unconditioned ones, on which, according to Kant, every reason must light by following its essential laws, the three chief objects around which the whole philosophy that stands under the influence of Christianity, from the Scholastics down to Christian Wolf, has turned. However accessible and familiar those concepts have now become to mere reason through all those philosophers, it is by no means thereby established that, even without revelation, they would have to emerge from the development of every reason, as a product peculiar to the essence of reason itself. To settle this, historical inquiry would have to be called to our aid, to find out whether the ancient and the non-European peoples, especially the Hindustani, and many of the oldest Greek philosophers did really arrive at those concepts; or whether it is merely we who, too good-natured, ascribe them to those peoples, just as the Greeks found their own gods everywhere, by quite falsely translating the Brahm of the Hindus and the Tien of the Chinese as "God"; whether, rather, genuine theism is not to be found only in the Jewish religion and the two religions that have issued from it, whose adherents for that very reason lump together the followers of all other religions on earth under the name of heathens—a most simple-minded and crude expression, incidentally, which should at least be banished from the writings of scholars, because it identifies Brahmanists, Buddhists, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Germanic peoples, Gauls, Iroquois, Patagonians, Caribs, Otaheitans, Australians and others besides, and stuffs them all into one sack. For priests such an expression is fitting: in the learned world, however, it must be shown the door at once; it can travel to England and settle in Oxford.—That Buddhism in particular, the most numerously represented religion on earth, contains absolutely no theism, indeed abhors it, is a thoroughly settled matter. As for Plato, I am of the opinion that he owes to the Jews the theism which came over him from time to time. Numenius therefore (according to Clem. Alex. Strom., I, c. 22, Euseb. praep. evang., XIII, 12, and Suidas, under Numenius) called him Moses grae-

cisans: Τι γαρ εστι Πλατων, η Μωσης αττικιζων; and he reproaches him with having stolen (αποσυλησας) his teachings about God and creation from the Mosaic writings. *Clement* returns often to the point that Plato knew and used Moses, e.g., Strom. I, 25.—V, c. 14, §. 90 et seq.—Paedagog., II, 10, and III, 11; also in the Cohortatio ad gentes, c. 6, where, after having scolded and jeered at all the Greek philosophers in Capuchin fashion in the preceding chapter because they were not Jews, he praises Plato alone and breaks out into loud jubilation that Plato, just as he learned his geometry from the Egyptians, his astronomy from the Babylonians, his magic from the Thracians, and much besides from the Assyrians, so learned his theism from the Jews: Οιδα σου τους διδασκαλους, κἂν αποκρυπτειν εθελῃς,————δοξαν την του θεου παρ' αυτων ωφελησαι των Εβραιων (tuos magistros novi, licet eos celare velis,————illa de Deo sententia suppeditata tibi est ab Hebraeis). A touching scene of recognition.—But I discover a curious confirmation of the matter in the following. According to Plutarch (in Mario) and better according to Lactantius (I, 3, 19), Plato thanked nature that he had been born a human being and not an animal, a man and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian. Now in Isaak Euchel's Prayers of the Jews, from the Hebrew, second edition, 1799, p. 7, there stands a morning prayer in which they thank and praise God that the one giving thanks has been born a Jew and not a heathen, a free man and not a slave, a man and not a woman.—Such a historical inquiry would have spared Kant a dire necessity into which he now falls, as he lets those three concepts spring necessarily from the nature of reason and yet demonstrates that they are untenable and cannot be grounded by reason, and thereby makes reason itself a sophist, when he says, p. 339; V, 397: "They are sophistications, not of man but of pure reason itself, from which even the wisest cannot free himself and, though perhaps after much effort he may guard against the error, can never be rid of the illusion that incessantly pinches and mocks him." According to this, these Kantian "Ideas of reason" would be comparable to the focus in which the rays thrown back convergently by a concave mirror meet a few inches in front of its surface, as a result of which, through an unavoidable process of the understanding, there presents itself to us at that spot an object which is a thing without reality.

But very unfortunate is the choice, for those three supposedly necessary productions of pure theoretical reason, of the name *Ideas*, which was wrested from Plato, who used it to designate the imperishable forms that, multiplied through time and space, become imperfectly visible in the countless individual, perishable things. Plato's Ideas are accordingly thoroughly intuitive, as the word he chose also so definitely indicates, which one could translate adequately only by intuitivenesses or visibilities. And Kant has appropriated it to designate that which lies so far from all possibility of intuition that even abstract thinking can reach it only by halves. The word Idea, which Plato first introduced, has also since then, throughout twenty-two centuries, always kept the meaning in which Plato used it: for not only all the philosophers of antiquity, but also all the Scholastics and even the Church Fathers and the theologians of the Middle Ages used it solely in that Platonic meaning, namely in the sense of the Latin word exemplar, as *Suarez* expressly states in his twenty-fifth Disputation, Sect. 1.—That the English and the French were later seduced by the poverty of their languages into misusing that word is bad enough, but not of weight. Kant's misuse of the word Idea, by the substitution of a new meaning, which is dragged in by the thin thread of not being an object of experience—a trait it shares with Plato's Ideas, but also with all possible chimeras—is therefore not to be justified at all. Since the misuse of a few years does not count against the authority of many centuries, I have always used the word in its old, original, Platonic meaning.

The refutation of *rational* psychology is far more detailed and thorough in the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" than in the second and the following ones; hence one must absolutely make use of the first here. This refutation has on the whole very great merit and much that is true. Yet I am entirely of the opinion that Kant, merely for love of his symmetry, derives the concept of the soul from that paralogism as necessary, by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the concept of *substance*, which is the first category of relation, and accordingly asserts that in this way the concept of a soul would arise in every speculating reason. If that concept truly had its origin in the presupposition of a last subject of all the predicates of a thing, one would surely have

assumed a soul with the same necessity not only in man but in every lifeless thing, since such a thing too requires a last subject of all its predicates. In general, however, Kant uses a wholly inadmissible expression when he speaks of a something that could exist only as subject and not as predicate (e.g., "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 323; V, 412; "Prolegomena," §. 4 and 47); although a precedent for it is already to be found in Aristotle's "Metaphysics," IV, ch. 8. As subject and predicate nothing at all exists: for these expressions belong exclusively to logic and designate the relation of abstract concepts to one another. In the intuitive world their correlate or representative is supposed to be substance and accident. But then we need not seek any further for that which exists always only as substance and never as accident, but have it immediately in matter. It is the substance for all the properties of things, which are its accidents. It is really, if one wishes to keep the very expression of Kant's that has just been censured, the last subject of all predicates of every empirically given thing, namely that which remains after subtraction of all its properties of every kind: and this holds of man as of animal, plant or stone, and is so evident that, in order not to see it, a determined unwillingness to see is required. That it really is the prototype of the concept of substance I shall soon show.—Subject and predicate, however, stand to substance and accident rather as the principle of sufficient reason in logic stands to the law of causality in nature, and as inadmissible as the confusion or identification of these latter is, so is that of the former two. This last confusion and identification Kant carries to the highest degree in the "Prolegomena," §. 46, in order to let the concept of the soul arise from that of the last subject of all predicates and from the form of the categorical syllogism. To uncover the sophistication of this paragraph one need only reflect that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations, which concern solely and exclusively abstract concepts, and indeed in their relation within the judgment: substance and accident, on the other hand, belong to the intuitive world and its apprehension in the understanding, but are found there only as identical with matter and with form or quality: more of this presently.

The antithesis that has given occasion to the assumption of two fundamentally different substances, body and soul, is in truth that of the objective and the subjective. When a human being apprehends himself objectively in outer intuition, he finds a spatially extended and in general thoroughly corporeal being; when on the contrary he apprehends himself in mere self-consciousness, that is, purely subjectively, he finds a merely willing and representing being, free from all forms of intuition, and hence also without any of the properties that belong to bodies. Now he forms the concept of the soul, like all the transcendent concepts that Kant calls Ideas, by applying the principle of sufficient reason, the form of every object, to that which is not an object, and here to the subject of knowing and willing. For he regards knowing, thinking and willing as effects, whose cause he seeks, and being unable to take the body for that cause, he posits a cause of them wholly different from the body. In this way the first and the last dogmatist prove the existence of the soul: namely Plato already in the Phaedrus and Wolf still: namely from thinking and willing as the effects that lead to that cause. Only after the concept of an immaterial, simple, indestructible being had arisen in this way, by hypostatizing a cause corresponding to the effect, did the School develop and demonstrate it from the concept *substance*. But this concept itself it had formed beforehand quite specially for this purpose, by the following noteworthy device.

With the first class of representations, that is, the intuitive, real world, the representation of matter too is given, because the law of causality that rules in it determines the change of states, which themselves presuppose something persisting whose change they are. Above, in connection with the principle of the persistence of substance, I showed, with reference to earlier passages, that this representation of matter arises as time and space are intimately united in the understanding, for which alone it exists, through the law of causality (its sole form of knowledge), and the share of space in this product presents itself as the persistence of *matter*, the share of time as the change of its *states*. Purely by itself, matter can only be thought in abstracto, not intuited; since it always appears to intuition already in form and quality. Of this concept of matter, *substance* is now again an abstraction, hence a higher genus, and has arisen by leav-

ing standing, of the concept of matter, only the predicate of persistence, while thinking away all its other essential properties, extension, impenetrability, divisibility, and so on. Like every higher genus, therefore, the concept *substance* contains *less in itself* than the concept *matter*: but in return it does not contain, as the higher genus otherwise always does, *more under itself*, since beside matter it embraces no several lower genera; rather matter remains the sole true subspecies of the concept substance, the sole thing demonstrable, by which its content is realized and receives a proof. The purpose, then, for which reason otherwise produces a higher concept by abstraction, namely to think in it at once several subspecies differing by further determinations, does not obtain here at all: consequently that abstraction is either undertaken wholly without purpose and idly, or it has a secret ulterior aim. This now comes to light, as under the concept substance a second subspecies is coordinated with its genuine subspecies matter, namely the immaterial, simple, indestructible substance, soul. The smuggling in of this concept was effected, however, by the procedure already in the formation of the higher concept *substance* being lawless and illogical. In its lawful course reason forms a higher generic concept always only by setting several specific concepts side by side, proceeding now comparatively, discursively, and obtaining, by omitting their differences and retaining their agreements, the generic concept that embraces them all but contains less: from which it follows that the specific concepts must always precede the generic concept. In the present case, however, it is the reverse. Only the concept matter existed before the generic concept *substance*, which was formed from it without occasion and consequently without warrant, idly, by arbitrary omission of all its determinations but one. Only afterward was the second, spurious subspecies set beside the concept matter, and so foisted in. For the formation of this, however, nothing further was needed than an express negation of what had before been tacitly omitted in the higher generic concept, namely extension, impenetrability, divisibility. Thus the concept *substance* was formed merely to be the vehicle for smuggling in the concept of immaterial substance. It is consequently very far from being able to pass for a category or a necessary function of the understanding: rather it is a highly dispensable concept, because its sole true content

already lies in the concept of matter, beside which it contains only a great void, which can be filled by nothing except the smuggled-in side-species *immaterial substance*, for the reception of which alone it was formed: for which reason it is, strictly speaking, to be wholly rejected, and the concept of matter put in its place everywhere.

—The categories were a Procrustean bed for every possible thing, but the three kinds of syllogisms are one only for the three so-called Ideas. The Idea of the soul had been forced to find its origin in the categorical form of syllogism. Now it is the turn of the dogmatic representations about the world as a whole, insofar as it is thought, as object in itself, between two limits, that of the smallest (atom) and that of the largest (limits of the world in time and space). These must now emerge from the form of the hypothetical syllogism. In this no special compulsion is needed in itself. For the hypothetical judgment has its form from the principle of sufficient reason, and from the thoughtless, unconditioned application of this principle and then its arbitrary setting aside there arise, in fact, all those so-called Ideas, and not the cosmological ones alone: namely through this, that in accordance with that principle only the dependence of one object on another is ever sought, until at last the weariness of the imagination sets a goal to the journey: whereby it is lost from sight that every object, indeed the whole series of them and the principle of sufficient reason itself, stands in a much nearer and greater dependence, namely that on the knowing subject, for whose objects, that is, representations, that principle alone is valid, since their mere place in space and time is determined by it. Since, then, the form of knowledge from which the cosmological Ideas alone are here derived, namely the principle of sufficient reason, is the origin of all ratiocinating hypostases, no sophisms are needed for it this time; but all the more are needed to classify those Ideas according to the four titles of the categories.

1) The cosmological Ideas with regard to time and space, that is, of the limits of the world in both, are boldly regarded as determined by the category of *quantity*, with which they evidently have nothing in common except the designation, accidental in logic, of the extent of the subject-concept in the judgment by the word quantity, a figurative expression for which another could just as well have

been chosen. But for Kant's love of symmetry this is enough to seize upon the lucky accident of this naming and to attach to it the transcendent dogmas about the extension of the world.

2) Still more boldly Kant attaches to *quality*, that is, the affirmation or negation in a judgment, the transcendent Ideas about matter, where not even an accidental similarity of words lies at the bottom: for it is precisely to the quantity and not to the quality of matter that its mechanical (not chemical) divisibility relates. But, what is more, this whole Idea of divisibility does not belong at all among the inferences according to the principle of sufficient reason, from which, as the content of the hypothetical form, all the cosmological Ideas are nevertheless supposed to flow. For the assertion on which Kant here rests, that the relation of the parts to the whole is that of the condition to the conditioned, hence a relation according to the principle of sufficient reason, is a sophism, subtle to be sure, but groundless nonetheless. That relation rests rather on the principle of contradiction. For the whole is not through the parts, nor are these through the whole; rather both are necessarily together, because they are one and their separation is only an arbitrary act. On this it rests, according to the principle of contradiction, that if the parts are thought away the whole too is thought away, and conversely; but by no means on this, that the parts as *ground* conditioned the whole as *consequent*, and that we would therefore be necessarily driven, according to the principle of sufficient reason, to seek the last parts, in order to understand from them, as its ground, the whole.—So great are the difficulties that love of symmetry here overcomes.

3) Under the title of *relation* the Idea of the first cause of the world would now properly belong. But Kant must reserve this for the fourth title, that of modality, for which otherwise nothing would be left, and under which he then squeezes that Idea by this device, that the contingent (that is, by his explanation, which is diametrically opposed to the truth, every consequent from its ground) becomes necessary through the first cause.—As the third Idea, therefore, for the sake of symmetry, the concept of *freedom* steps in here, by which,

however, properly only the Idea of the cause of the world, the one Idea that fits here, is meant, as the note to the thesis of the third conflict plainly says. The third and fourth conflicts are at bottom tautological.

Above all this, however, I find and maintain that the whole antinomy is a mere sham fight, a mock combat. Only the assertions of the *antitheses* really rest on the forms of our faculty of knowledge, that is, if one expresses it objectively, on the necessary, a priori certain, most general laws of nature. Their proofs alone are therefore conducted from objective grounds. The assertions and proofs of the *theses*, on the other hand, have no other than a subjective ground, rest solely on the weakness of the ratiocinating individual, whose imagination grows weary at an infinite regress and therefore puts an end to it by arbitrary presuppositions, which it seeks to gloss over as best it can, and whose power of judgment, besides, is at this point paralyzed by prejudices stamped upon it early and firmly. For this reason the proof of the thesis in all four conflicts is everywhere only a sophism; whereas that of the antithesis is an unavoidable inference of reason from the laws of the world as representation, which are known to us a priori. Kant too has been able to uphold the thesis only with much effort and art, and to make it deliver seeming attacks on the adversary, who is endowed with original strength. In this his first and constant device is that he does not, as one does when one is conscious of the truth of one's proposition, bring out the nervus argumentationis and put it before the eyes as isolated, naked and distinct as ever possible; rather he introduces it on both sides concealed and mixed in under a flood of superfluous and prolix propositions.

The theses and antitheses that here appear in conflict recall the δικαιος and αδικος λογος which Socrates in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes lets appear contending. Yet this similarity extends only to the form, not to the content, however much those might like to maintain otherwise who ascribe to this most speculative of all questions of theoretical philosophy an influence on morality, and who therefore seriously take the thesis for the δικαιος, but the antithesis for the αδικος λογος. To take account of such narrow and perverse little minds, however, I shall not here condescend; and, giving the honor not to them but to truth, I shall expose the proofs which Kant conducts of the several theses as sophisms,

while those of the antitheses are conducted quite honestly, correctly and from objective grounds.—I presuppose that in this examination one will have the Kantian antinomy itself always before one.

Were one to let the proof of the thesis in the first conflict pass, it would prove too much, being just as applicable to time itself as to change in it, and would therefore prove that time itself must have begun, which is absurd. Moreover, the sophism consists in this, that in place of the beginninglessness of the series of states, of which the discussion first treats, the endlessness (infinity) of it is suddenly foisted in, and then what no one doubts is proved, that completedness logically contradicts this, and yet every present is the end of the past. The end of a beginningless series can, however, always be *thought* without prejudice to its beginninglessness: just as, conversely, the beginning of an endless series can be *thought*. Against the really correct argument of the antithesis, however, that the changes of the world *backward* absolutely and necessarily presuppose an infinite series of changes, nothing at all is brought forward. The possibility that the causal series may some day end in an absolute standstill we can think; but by no means the possibility of an absolute beginning [11].

With regard to the spatial limits of the world it is proved that, if it is to be called a *given whole*, it must necessarily have limits: the consequence is correct, only its antecedent was precisely what had to be proved but remains unproved. Totality presupposes limits, and limits presuppose totality: both together, however, are here arbitrarily presupposed.—The antithesis, however, supplies for this second point no such satisfactory proof as for the first, because the law of causality furnishes necessary determinations only with regard to time, not with regard to [12] That the assumption of a limit of the world in time is by no means a necessary thought of reason can even be shown historically, since the Hindus teach no such thing even in their popular religion, to say nothing of the Vedas; rather they seek to express the infinity of this world of appearance, this unsubstantial and essenceless web of Maya, mythologically by a monstrous chronology, while at the same time bringing out very ingeniously the relativity of all lengths of time in the following myth (Polier, Mythologie des Indous, Vol. 2, p. 585). The four ages, in the last of which we live, comprise together 4,320,000 years. Of

such periods of four ages each day of the creating Brahma has 1000 and his night again 1000. His year has 365 days and as many nights. He lives, always creating, 100 of his years: and when he dies, a new Brahma is at once born, and so from eternity to eternity. The same relativity of time is expressed also by the special myth which is retold from the Puranas in Polier's work, vol. 2, p. 594, where a Rajah, after a visit of a few moments to Vishnu in his heaven, finds on his return to earth several million years elapsed and a new age begun, because each day of Vishnu equals 100 recurrences of the four ages. space, and gives us a priori the certainty that no filled time could ever border on an empty one preceding it and no change could have been the first, but not that a filled space cannot have an empty one beside it. In this respect no decision a priori would be possible about the latter. Yet the difficulty of thinking the world in space as bounded lies in this, that space itself is necessarily infinite, and a bounded, finite world in it, however great it may be, therefore becomes an infinitely small magnitude; at which disproportion the imagination finds an insurmountable stumbling block; since there then remains to it only the choice of thinking the world either infinitely great or infinitely small. This the ancient philosophers already saw: Μητροδωρος, ὁ καθηγητης Επικουρου, φησιν ατοπον ειναι εν μεγαλῳ πεδιῳ ἑνα σταχυν γεννηθηναι, και ἑνα κοσμον εν τῳ απειρῳ (Metrodorus, caput scholae Epicuri, absurdum ait, in magno campo spicam unam produci, et unum in infinito mundum). Stob. Ecl., I, c. 23.—Hence many of them taught (as follows immediately after), απειρους κοσμους εν τῳ απειρῳ (infinitos mundos in infinito). This is also the sense of Kant's argument for the antithesis; only he has disfigured it by a scholastic, stilted presentation. The same argument could also be used against limits of the world in time, if one did not already have a far better one on the guiding thread of causality. Further, with the assumption of a world bounded in space, there arises the unanswerable question what privilege the filled part of space could have had over the infinite one that was left empty. A detailed and very readable exposition of the arguments for and against the finiteness of the world is given by Jordanus Brunus in the fifth dialogue of his book "Del infinito, universo e mondi." Moreover, Kant himself maintains seriously and from objective grounds the infinity of the world in space, in his

"Natural History and Theory of the Heavens," Part II, ch. 7. Aristotle too professes the same, "Phys.," III, ch. 4, which chapter, together with the following ones, is very readable with regard to this antinomy.

In the second conflict the thesis at once commits a not at all subtle petitio principii, as it begins: "Every *composite* substance consists of simple parts." From the compositeness arbitrarily assumed here it afterward proves the simple parts, to be sure, very easily. But the very proposition "all matter is composite," on which everything depends, remains unproved, because it is precisely a groundless assumption. For the simple is opposed not by the composite but by the extended, the part-having, the divisible. Properly, however, it is tacitly assumed here that the parts were there before the whole and were brought together, whereby the whole arose: for this is what the word "composite" says. Yet this can be asserted as little as the opposite. Divisibility says merely the possibility of dividing the whole into parts; by no means that it is composed of parts and thereby arose. Divisibility asserts the parts only a parte post; being composite asserts them a parte ante. For between the parts and the whole there is essentially no temporal relation: rather they condition each other reciprocally and are in so far always simultaneous: for only insofar as both are there does the spatially extended exist. What Kant therefore says in the note to the thesis: "Space should properly not be called a Compositum but a Totum, etc.," this holds wholly of matter as well, which is merely space become perceptible.—On the other hand the infinite divisibility of matter, which the antithesis asserts, follows a priori and incontestably from that of the space which it fills. This proposition has nothing at all against it: hence Kant too, p. 513; V, 541, where he speaks seriously and in his own person, no longer as the mouthpiece of the αδικος λογος, presents it as objective truth: likewise in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" (p. 108, first edition) the proposition, "matter is infinitely divisible," stands as an established truth at the head of the proof of the first theorem of mechanics, after having appeared and been proved in dynamics as the fourth theorem. Here, however, Kant spoils the proof for the antithesis, by the greatest confusion of presentation and a useless flood of words, in the cunning intention that the evidence of the antithesis should not

throw the sophisms of the thesis too much into the shade. Atoms are no necessary thought of reason, but merely a hypothesis for the explanation of the difference in the specific gravity of bodies. That we can explain this, however, in another way, and even better and more simply than by atomistics, Kant himself has shown in the Dynamics of his metaphysical foundations of natural science; to be sure, however, Priestley, "On matter and spirit," Sect. 1, had already done so before him; in Aristotle, "Phys.," IV, 9, the fundamental thought of it is to be found.

The argument for the third thesis is a very subtle sophism, and properly Kant's alleged principle of pure reason itself, wholly unmixed and unaltered. It wants to prove the finiteness of the series of causes by this, that a cause, in order to be sufficient, must contain the complete sum of the conditions from which the following state, the effect, proceeds. For this completeness of the determinations simultaneously present in the state that is cause, the argument now substitutes the completeness of the series of causes through which that state itself first came to actuality; and because completeness presupposes closedness, and this finiteness, the argument infers from this a first cause closing the series, hence an unconditioned one. But the conjuring trick lies in plain sight. In order to comprehend the state A as sufficient cause of the state B, I presuppose that it contains the completeness of the determinations required for this, by whose conjunction the state B follows unfailingly. Hereby my requirement of it as sufficient cause is wholly satisfied, and it has no immediate connection with the question how the state A itself came to actuality; this belongs rather to a wholly different consideration, in which I regard that same state A no longer as cause, but itself in turn as effect, to be sure of another state, which must again stand to it just as it itself stood to B. The presupposition of the finiteness of the series of causes and effects, and accordingly of a first beginning, appears in this nowhere as necessary, as little as the presence of the present moment has a beginning of time itself for its presupposition; it is rather first added by the indolence of the individual in motion. That that presupposition lies in the assumption of a cause as sufficient ground is thus surreptitious and false; as I have shown above at length, in considering the Kantian principle of reason that

coincides with this thesis. In explanation of the assertion of this false thesis Kant does not shrink, in the note to it, from giving his rising from his chair as an example of an unconditioned beginning, as if it were not just as impossible for him to rise without a motive as for the ball to roll without a cause. The groundlessness of his appeal, inspired by the feeling of weakness, to the philosophers of antiquity, I surely need not first demonstrate from Ocellus Lucanus, the Eleatics, and so on, not to speak of the Hindus. Against the proof of the antithesis, as against the preceding ones, nothing is to be objected.

The fourth conflict is, as I have already remarked, properly tautological with the third. The proof of the thesis, too, is in essentials again the same as that of the preceding one. Its assertion, that every conditioned presupposes a complete series of conditions, ending therefore with the unconditioned, is a petitio principii, which must simply be denied. Every conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition; that this in turn be conditioned begins a new consideration, which is not immediately contained in the first. A certain plausibility in the antinomy I sought to ward off.

Yet it is remarkable that no part of the Kantian philosophy has met with so little contradiction, and found so much recognition, as this so highly paradoxical doctrine. Almost all philosophical parties and textbooks have let it stand and repeated it, and indeed worked it over; while nearly all Kant's other doctrines have been attacked, and there has never been a lack of individual crooked heads who rejected even the transcendental Aesthetic. The undivided applause which the antinomy, by contrast, has found may in the end come from this, that certain people contemplate with inward complacency the point where the understanding is supposed quite properly to stand still, having bumped into something that at once is and is not, and, determining this too as a simple series of conditions, accordingly would really have before them here the sixth feat of Philadelphia, in Lichtenberg's playbill.

Kant's critical decision of the cosmological dispute, which now follows, is, if one investigates its real sense, not what he gives it out to be, namely the resolution of the dispute by the disclosure that both parties, proceeding from false

presuppositions, are both in the wrong in the first and second conflict, but both in the right in the third and fourth; it is rather in fact the confirmation of the antitheses by an elucidation of their statement.

First, Kant maintains in this resolution, with obvious injustice, that both parties proceeded from the presupposition, as major premise, that with the conditioned the completed (and hence closed) series of its conditions too is given. Only the thesis laid this proposition, Kant's pure principle of reason, at the bottom of its assertions: the antithesis, on the contrary, everywhere expressly denied it, and maintained the opposite. Further, Kant charges both parties with this presupposition also, that the world exists in itself, that is, independently of its being known and of the forms of this: but this presupposition too is again made only by the thesis; on the other hand, it lies so little at the bottom of the assertions of the antithesis that it is even wholly incompatible with them. For it directly contradicts the concept of an infinite series that it should be given entire: it is therefore essential to it that it exist only in relation to the running through of it, not independently of that. On the other hand, in the presupposition of determinate limits that of a whole is also contained, which subsists for itself and exists independently of the carrying out of its measurement. Thus only the thesis makes the false presupposition of a world-whole subsisting in itself, that is, given before all knowledge, to which knowledge would merely be added. The antithesis is in conflict with this presupposition altogether from the start: for the infinity of the series, which it asserted solely under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can exist only insofar as the regress is carried out, not independently of this. For as the object in general presupposes the subject, so too the object determined as an endless chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the mode of knowledge corresponding to it, namely the constant following of the links of that chain. This, however, is precisely what Kant gives as the resolution of the dispute and so often repeats: "The infinity of the magnitude of the world is only through the regress, not before it." This resolution of the conflict is thus properly only the decision in favor of the antithesis, in whose assertion that truth already lies, just as the same is wholly incompatible with the assertions of the thesis. Had the antithesis

asserted that the world consists of infinite series of grounds and consequents and yet exists independently of the representation and its regressive series, hence exists in itself and therefore constitutes a given whole, it would have contradicted not only the thesis but itself: for an infinite can never be given entire, nor can an endless series exist except insofar as it is run through endlessly, nor can a limitless constitute a whole. Only to the thesis, therefore, belongs that presupposition which Kant asserts to have led both parties astray.

It is already a doctrine of Aristotle that an infinite can never be actu, that is, real and given, but only potentia. Ουκ εστιν ενεργειᾳ ειναι το απειρον·————— αλλ' αδυνατον το εντελεχειᾳ ον απειρον (infinitum non potest esse actu: ————sed impossibile, actu esse infinitum). Metaph. K, 10.—Further: κατ' ενεργειαν μεν γαρ ουδεν εστιν απειρον, δυναμει δε επι την διαιρεσιν (nihil enim actu infinitum est, sed potentia tantum, nempe divisione ipsa). De generat. et corrupt., I, 3.—This he expounds at length, Phys. III, 5 and 6, where he gives, to a certain extent, the wholly correct resolution of all the antinomic oppositions. He presents the antinomies in his brief way and then says: "a mediator (διαιτητου) is needed": whereupon he gives the resolution that the infinite, whether of the world in space, or in time, or in division, is never before the regress or progress, but in it.—Thus this truth already lies in the rightly grasped concept of the infinite. One therefore misunderstands oneself when one imagines the infinite, of whatever kind it may be, as something objectively present and finished, and independent of the regress.

Indeed, if, proceeding conversely, one takes as the starting point that which Kant gives as the resolution of the conflict, the assertion of the antithesis follows straight from it. Namely: if the world is no unconditioned whole and does not exist in itself, but only in the representation, and if its series of grounds and consequents are not there before the regress of the representations of them, but only through this regress, then the world cannot contain determinate and finite series, because their determination and limitation would have to be independent of the representation, which would then merely be added to them: rather all its series must be endless, that is, not to be exhausted by any representation.

P. 506; V, 534, Kant wants to prove the transcendental ideality of the appearance from the wrongness of both parties, and begins: "If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite."—This, however, is false: a whole existing in itself can by no means be infinite.—Rather that ideality could be inferred from the infinity of the series in the world as follows: If the series of grounds and consequents in the world are absolutely without end, then the world cannot be a whole given independently of the representation: for such a whole always presupposes determinate limits, just as infinite series, on the other hand, presuppose infinite regress. Therefore the presupposed infinity of the series must be determined by the form of ground and consequent, and this by the mode of knowledge of the subject, and hence the world, as it is known, can exist only in the representation of the subject.

Whether Kant himself knew or not that his critical decision of the dispute is properly a pronouncement in favor of the antithesis, I am unable to decide. For it depends on whether that which Schelling somewhere very aptly called Kant's system of accommodation extends so far, or whether Kant's mind is here already caught in an unconscious accommodation to the influence of his time and surroundings.

The resolution of the third antinomy, the subject of which was the Idea of freedom, deserves special consideration, inasmuch as it is very remarkable for us that Kant is compelled to speak at greater length of the thing in itself, which until now was seen only in the background, precisely here, at the Idea of freedom. This is very explicable to us, now that we have recognized the thing in itself as the will. In general, here lies the point where Kant's philosophy leads on to mine, or where mine proceeds out of it as its stem. Of this one will convince oneself if one reads with attention in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 536 and 537; V, 564 and 565: with this passage compare also the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, pp. XVIII and XIX of the third edition, or p. 13 of the Rosenkranz edition, where it is even said: "The concept of freedom can present in its object (that is, after all, the will) a thing in itself, but not in intuition; the concept of nature, on the other hand, can present its object indeed in intuition, but not as thing in itself." But especially, on the resolution of the

antinomies, read §. 53 of the Prolegomena and then answer honestly the question whether everything said there does not sound like a riddle to which my doctrine is the key word. Kant did not come to the end of his thinking: I have merely carried his work through. Accordingly I have transferred what Kant says only of the human appearance to all appearance in general, which differs from that only in degree, namely that the essence in itself of it is something absolutely free, that is, a will. How fruitful, however, this insight is in union with Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space, time and causality, appears from my work.

Kant has nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a special exposition or distinct derivation. Rather, as often as he needs it, he draws it in at once by the inference that the appearance, hence the visible world, must after all have a ground, an intelligible cause, which would not be appearance and therefore would not belong to any possible experience. This he does after having incessantly impressed upon us that the categories, hence also that of causality, have a use restricted wholly to possible experience, are mere forms of the understanding which serve to spell out the appearances of the world of sense, beyond which, on the other hand, they have no meaning at all, and so on; and so he prohibits most strictly their application to things beyond experience and from the violation of this law explains, rightly, all earlier dogmatism and at the same time overturns it. The incredible inconsistency which Kant committed in this was soon noticed by his first opponents and used for attacks which his philosophy could not resist. For certainly we apply the law of causality wholly a priori and before all experience to the changes sensed in our sense organs: but precisely for that reason it is of just as subjective an origin as these sensations themselves, and leads therefore not to the thing in itself. The truth is that on the path of representation one can never get beyond representation: it is a closed whole and has in its own means no thread leading to the essence of the thing in itself, which differs from it toto genere. Were we merely representing beings, the way to the thing in itself would be wholly closed to us. Only the other side of our own essence can give us information about the other side of the essence in itself of things. This path I have taken. Some color is lent, however, to Kant's

inference to the thing in itself, though prohibited by himself, by the following. He does not posit, as the truth demanded, simply and unreservedly the object as conditioned by the subject, and conversely; but only the manner and way of the appearance of the object as conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which therefore also come to consciousness a priori. What is known, on the contrary, merely a posteriori is to him already immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes appearance only in passing through those forms given a priori. From this view it is to some extent explicable how it could escape him that being-object in general already belongs to the form of appearance and is just as much conditioned by being-subject in general as the manner of appearance of the object is by the forms of knowledge of the subject; that therefore, if a thing in itself is to be assumed, it can by no means be object either, as which he nevertheless always presupposes it, but such a thing in itself would have to lie in a domain differing toto genere from the representation (knowing and being known), and could therefore least of all be inferred according to the laws of the connection of objects with one another.

Kant fared with the demonstration of the thing in itself exactly as with that of the aprioricity of the law of causality: both doctrines are correct, but their proof is false: they belong therefore among the correct conclusions from false premises. I have retained both, but grounded them in a wholly different and secure way.

The thing in itself I have neither smuggled in nor inferred, according to laws that exclude it, since they already belong to its appearance; nor have I in general reached it by roundabout ways: rather I have demonstrated it immediately, where it lies immediately, in the will, which reveals itself immediately to everyone as the in-itself of his own appearance.

And this immediate knowledge of one's own will is also that from which, in human consciousness, the concept of freedom proceeds; because the will, as world-creating, as thing in itself, is certainly free from the principle of sufficient reason and with that from all necessity, hence wholly independent, free, indeed omnipotent. Yet this holds, in truth, only of the will in itself, not of its appearances, the individuals, who are already unalterably determined, precisely by it

itself, as its appearances in time. In common consciousness, not purified by philosophy, however, the will is at once confused with its appearance and what belongs only to it is attributed to this: from which arises the semblance of unconditioned freedom of the individual. Spinoza says for this very reason, and rightly, that even the thrown stone, if it had consciousness, would believe it flew of its own free will. For certainly the in-itself of the stone too is the sole free will, but, as in all its appearances, so here too, where it appears as stone, already fully determined. Yet of all this enough has already been said in the main part of this work.

Kant, in failing to recognize and overlooking this immediate origin of the concept of freedom in every human consciousness, now places, p. 533; V, 561, the origin of that concept in a very subtle speculation, by which namely the unconditioned, toward which reason is supposed always to strive, occasions the hypostatization of the concept of freedom, and on this transcendent Idea of freedom the practical concept of it too is supposed first of all to be grounded. In the Critique of Practical Reason, §. 6, and p. 185 of the fourth, p. 235 of the Rosenkranz edition, however, he derives this latter concept again otherwise, from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it: for the sake of this presupposition, accordingly, that speculative Idea is only the first origin of the concept of freedom; here, however, it properly receives meaning and application. Neither, however, is the case. For the delusion of a perfect freedom of the individual in his single actions is most lively in the conviction of the crudest man, who has never reflected, and is therefore grounded on no speculation, although often carried over to it. Free from it, on the other hand, are only philosophers, and indeed the profoundest, and likewise the most thoughtful and enlightened writers of the Church.

According to all that has been said, the real origin of the concept of freedom is therefore in no way essentially an inference, neither from the speculative Idea of an unconditioned cause, nor from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it; it springs rather immediately from the consciousness in which each person recognizes himself, without more ado, as the will, that is, as that which, as thing in itself, has not the principle of sufficient reason for its form

and itself depends on nothing, whereas everything else depends on it, but does not at the same time, with philosophical criticism and circumspection, distinguish himself, as an appearance of this will already entered into time and determined, one might say an act of will, from that will to life itself, and therefore, instead of recognizing his whole existence as an act of his freedom, seeks this freedom rather in his single actions. On this I refer to my prize essay on the freedom of the will.

Had Kant now, as he here pretends and also apparently did on earlier occasions, merely inferred the thing in itself, and that with the great inconsistency of an inference wholly prohibited by himself;—what a strange coincidence it would then be that he here, where for the first time he approaches the thing in itself more closely and illuminates it, at once recognizes in it the will, the free will, which makes itself known in the world only through temporal appearances!—I therefore really assume, though it cannot be proved, that Kant, as often as he spoke of the thing in itself, in the darkest depth of his mind always already thought indistinctly of the will. Evidence for this is given in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. XXVII and XXVIII, in the Rosenkranz edition p. 677 of the Supplements.

Moreover, it is precisely this intended resolution of the supposed third conflict that gives Kant occasion to express very beautifully the profoundest thoughts of his whole philosophy. So in the whole "sixth section of the Antinomy of Pure Reason"; above all, however, in the exposition of the opposition between empirical and intelligible character, pp. 534–550; V, 562–578, which I count among the most excellent things ever said by human beings (as a supplementary elucidation of this passage a parallel one in the "Critique of Practical Reason" is to be regarded, pp. 169–179 of the fourth, or pp. 224–231 of the Rosenkranz edition). It is all the more to be regretted, however, that this stands here not in its right place, inasmuch as it was in part not found on the path that the presentation indicates and would therefore have to be derived otherwise than it is, and in part also does not fulfill the purpose for which it stands, namely the resolution of the supposed antinomy. It is inferred from the appearance to its intelligible ground, the thing in itself, by the already sufficiently censured inconsis-

tent use of the category of causality beyond all appearance. As this thing in itself there is set up for this case the will of man (which Kant, most inadmissibly, with unpardonable violation of all linguistic usage, entitles reason), with an appeal to an unconditioned Ought, the categorical imperative, which is simply postulated.

Instead of all this, the pure, open procedure would have been to start immediately from the will, to demonstrate this as the in-itself of our own appearance, known without any mediation, and then to give that exposition of the empirical and intelligible character, to show how all actions, though necessitated by motives, are nevertheless, both by their author and by an outside judge, necessarily and unreservedly ascribed to that author himself and alone, as depending solely on him, to whom accordingly guilt and merit are assigned in keeping with them.—This alone was the straight path to the knowledge of that which is not appearance, and is therefore also not found according to the laws of appearance, but is that which reveals itself through the appearance, becomes knowable, objectifies itself: the will to life. This would then have had to be presented, merely by analogy, as the in-itself of every appearance. Then, however, it could certainly not have been said (p. 546; V, 574) that in lifeless, indeed in animal nature, no faculty is to be thought otherwise than as sensuously conditioned; which in Kant's language properly says that the explanation according to the law of causality exhausts the innermost essence of those appearances too, whereby then, very inconsistently, the thing in itself drops out in their case.—Through the wrong place and the roundabout derivation corresponding to it which the presentation of the thing in itself has received in Kant, the whole concept of it too has been falsified. For, found by inquiry for an unconditioned cause, the will, or the thing in itself, here enters into the relation of cause to effect with the appearance. This relation, however, takes place only within the appearance, presupposes it therefore already, and cannot connect it itself with that which lies outside of it and differs from it toto genere.

Further, the proposed purpose, the resolution of the third antinomy, is not at all attained by the decision that both parties, each in a different sense, are right. For thesis and antithesis alike speak by no means of the thing in itself, but

wholly of the appearance, the objective world, the world as representation. It is this and absolutely nothing else of which the thesis, through the sophism pointed out, wants to show that it contains unconditioned causes, and it is of this also that the antithesis denies the same, with right. Hence the whole exposition given here, in justification of the thesis, of the transcendental freedom of the will, insofar as it is thing in itself, however excellent it may be in itself, is here quite properly a μεταβασις εις αλλο γενος. For the transcendental freedom of the will here presented is by no means the unconditioned causality of a cause that the thesis asserts, because a cause must essentially be appearance, not something lying beyond all appearance and differing toto genere.

When cause and effect are spoken of, the relation of the will to its appearance (or of the intelligible character to the empirical) must never be drawn in, as happens here: for it is wholly different from the causal relation. Meanwhile it is also said here, in this resolution of the antinomy, in conformity with the truth, that the empirical character of man, like that of every other cause in nature, is unalterably determined, and that accordingly the actions proceed from it necessarily, in proportion to the external influences; hence also, notwithstanding all transcendental freedom (that is, independence of the will in itself of the laws of the connection of its appearance), no human being has the faculty of beginning a series of actions of himself: which latter, on the contrary, was asserted by the thesis. Freedom, then, has no causality either: for only the will is free, which lies outside nature or appearance, which is merely its objectification, but does not stand in a relation of causality to it, since this relation is first met with within appearance, presupposes it therefore already, and cannot include it itself and connect it with that which is expressly not appearance. The world itself is to be explained only from the will (since it is precisely the will itself, insofar as it appears) and not through causality. But in the world causality is the sole principle of explanation and everything happens solely according to laws of nature. Thus the right lies wholly on the side of the antithesis, which stays with that of which the discussion was, and uses the principle of explanation that holds of it, and therefore also needs no apology; whereas the thesis is to be extricated from

the matter by an apology, which first leaps over to something wholly other than what the question was about and then carries over a principle of explanation that is not applicable there.

The fourth conflict is, as already said, in its innermost sense tautological with the third. In the resolution of it Kant develops still further the untenability of the thesis: for its truth, on the other hand, and its supposed coexistence with the antithesis, he offers no ground, just as conversely he is unable to set any against the antithesis. Only quite by way of request does he introduce the assumption of the thesis, yet himself calls it (p. 562; V, 590) an arbitrary presupposition, whose object in itself may well be impossible, and shows merely a wholly impotent endeavor to procure for it somewhere a safe little spot before the thoroughgoing power of the antithesis, only so as not to uncover the nullity of the whole pretense, once taken a fancy to, of the necessary antinomy in human reason.

There follows the chapter on the transcendental Ideal, which transports us all at once back into the rigid Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. One believes one hears Anselm of Canterbury himself. The ens realissimum, the sum total of all realities, the content of all affirmative propositions, steps forth, and indeed with the claim to be a necessary thought of reason!—For my part I must confess that such a thought is impossible to my reason, and that at the words that designate it I am unable to think anything definite.

I do not doubt, moreover, that Kant was constrained to this strange chapter, unworthy of him, merely by his fondness for architectonic symmetry. The three chief objects of Scholastic philosophy (which one may, as said, understood in the wider sense, let run down to Kant), soul, world and God, were to be derived from the three possible major premises of syllogisms; although it is evident that they have arisen and can arise solely and alone through unconditioned application of the principle of sufficient reason. After the soul had now been squeezed into the categorical judgment, and the hypothetical one used up for the world, nothing was left for the third Idea but the disjunctive major premise. Fortunately a preliminary work in this sense was at hand, namely the ens realissimum of the Scholastics, together with the ontological proof of the

existence of God, rudimentarily set up by Anselm of Canterbury and then perfected by Descartes. This was used by Kant with joy, probably also with some reminiscence of an earlier Latin work of his youth. Meanwhile the sacrifice which Kant brings to his love of architectonic symmetry by this chapter is exceedingly great. In defiance of all truth the, one must say grotesque, representation of a sum total of all possible realities is made into a thought essential and necessary to reason. For the derivation of it Kant seizes upon the false pretense that our knowledge of individual things arises through an ever further-going limitation of general concepts, and hence also of a most general one of all, which would contain all reality in itself. In this he stands in contradiction as much with his own doctrine as with the truth; since, quite conversely, our knowledge, starting from the particular, is extended to the general, and all general concepts arise by abstraction from real, individual, intuitively known things, an abstraction which can be continued to the most general concept of all, which then comprehends everything under itself, but almost nothing in itself. Kant has thus here turned the procedure of our faculty of knowledge precisely on its head, and might therefore well even be accused of having given occasion to a philosophical charlatanry that has become famous in our days, which, instead of recognizing concepts as thoughts abstracted from things, conversely makes the concepts the first thing and sees in things only concrete concepts, thus bringing the world turned upside down to market as a philosophical buffoonery, which naturally had to find great applause.—

Even if we assume that every reason must, or at least can, arrive at the concept of God even without revelation, this happens, nevertheless, evidently solely along the guiding thread of causality; which is so obvious that it needs no proof. Hence Chr. Wolf also says (Cosmologia generalis, praef. p. 1): Sane in theologia naturali existentiam Numinis e principiis cosmologicis demonstramus. Contingentia universi et ordinis naturae, una cum impossibilitate casus, sunt scala, per quam a mundo hoc adspectabili ad Deum ascenditur. And before him Leibniz had already said, in reference to the law of causality: Sans ce grand principe nous ne pourrions jamais prouver l'existence de Dieu (Théod., §. 44). And likewise in his controversy with Clarke, §. 126: J'ose dire que sans ce

grand principe on ne saurait venir à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu. By contrast, the thought carried out in this chapter is so far from being one essential and necessary to reason that it is rather to be regarded as a veritable masterpiece among the monstrous products of an age that had been led by strange circumstances into the oddest aberrations and perversities, such as that of Scholasticism was, which stands without parallel in world history and can never return. This Scholasticism, to be sure, when it had come to its perfection, conducted the chief proof for the existence of God from the concept of the ens realissimum and used the other proofs only alongside, accessorily: this, however, is mere method of teaching and proves nothing about the origin of theology in the human mind. Kant has here taken the procedure of Scholasticism for that of reason, which has happened to him more often in general. If it were true that, according to essential laws of reason, the Idea of God proceeded from the disjunctive syllogism, in the form of an Idea of the most real being, then this Idea would also have turned up among the philosophers of antiquity: but of the ens realissimum there is nowhere a trace, in none of the ancient philosophers, although some of them certainly teach a world-creator, but only as a giver of form to the matter existing without him, δημιουργος, whom however they infer solely and alone according to the law of causality. True, Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math., IX, §. 88) cites an argument of Cleanthes which some take for the ontological proof. It is not that, however, but a mere inference from analogy: namely, because experience teaches that on earth one being is always more excellent than another, and man, as the most excellent, closes the series, yet he still has many faults; there must therefore be still more excellent beings and at last a most excellent of all (κρατιστον, αριστον), and this would be God.

Concerning the detailed refutation of speculative theology that now follows I have only to remark briefly that it, like the whole critique of the three so-called Ideas of reason, hence the whole Dialectic of Pure Reason, is indeed in a way the goal and purpose of the whole work, yet that this polemical part does not properly, like the preceding doctrinal part, that is, the Aesthetic and Analytic, have an entirely general, lasting and purely philosophical interest; but rather a

temporal and local one, in that it stands in special relation to the chief moments of the philosophy ruling in Europe down to Kant, the complete overthrow of which by this polemic, however, redounds to Kant's immortal merit. He eliminated theism from philosophy, since in it, as a science, and not a doctrine of faith, only that can find a place which is either empirically given or established by tenable proofs. Naturally only real philosophy is meant here, seriously understood, directed at truth and nothing else, and by no means the farcical philosophy of the universities, in which, now as before, speculative theology plays the chief role; as there too the soul, as a known person, now as before, appears without ceremony. For it is the philosophy furnished with salaries and honoraria, indeed even with titles of Hofrath, which, looking down proudly from its height, has for forty years not been aware at all of little folk like me, and would also heartily like to be rid of old Kant with his Critiques, in order to raise a lusty cheer for Leibniz.—Further it is to be remarked here that, as Kant was, by his own admission, led to his doctrine of the aprioricity of the concept of causality by Hume's skepticism with respect to that concept, so perhaps likewise Kant's critique of all speculative theology has its occasion in Hume's critique of all popular theology, which the latter had set forth in his so readable "Natural history of religion" and the "Dialogues on natural religion," indeed that Kant wanted in a way to supplement these. For the first-named writing of Hume is really a critique of popular theology, whose wretchedness it wants to show, while pointing respectfully to rational or speculative theology as the genuine. Kant, however, now uncovers the groundlessness of this latter, but leaves the popular untouched and even sets it up in an ennobled form, as a faith supported on moral feeling. This the philosophasters afterward twisted into apprehensions of reason, God-consciousnesses, or intellectual intuitions of the supersensible, the Godhead, and the like; whereas Kant rather, when he was pulling down old, venerable errors and knew the danger of the matter, had wished only to slip in, through moral theology, a couple of weak props for the time being, so that the collapse should not strike him, but that he should gain time to get away.

As regards the execution, no critique of reason was needed at all for the refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God, since even without presupposing the Aesthetic and Analytic it is very easy to make clear that this ontological proof is nothing but a hair-splitting game with concepts, without any power of conviction. Already in Aristotle's Organon there stands a chapter that suffices so perfectly for the refutation of the onto-theological proof as if it had been written on purpose for it: it is the seventh chapter of the second book of the Analyt. post.: among other things it says there expressly: το δε ειναι ουχ ουσια ουδενι: that is, existentia numquam ad essentiam rei pertinet.

The refutation of the cosmological proof is an application of the doctrine of the Critique expounded up to that point to a given case, and there is nothing to be objected to it.—The physico-theological proof is a mere amplification of the cosmological, which it presupposes, and finds its detailed refutation first in the Critique of Judgment. In this respect I refer my reader to the rubric "Comparative Anatomy" in my writing on the Will in Nature. Kant, as said, has in his critique of these proofs to do merely with speculative theology and confines himself to the school. Had he, on the other hand, had life and popular theology in view as well, he would have had to add to the three proofs a fourth, which is the really effective one with the great mass and which in Kant's technical language would most fittingly be named the keraunological: it is the one that is grounded on the feeling of man's helplessness, powerlessness and dependence in the face of infinitely superior, unfathomable and for the most part menacing powers of nature; to which is joined his natural tendency to personify everything, and finally there comes the hope of accomplishing something by entreaties and flattery, and perhaps by gifts. For in every human undertaking there is something that does not stand in our power and does not fall within our calculation: the wish to win this over for oneself is the origin of the gods. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor is an old true saying of Petronius. This proof it is that Hume, who appears altogether as Kant's precursor, chiefly criticizes in the writings mentioned above.—Those whom Kant has now, however, put into permanent embarrassment by his critique of speculative theology are the philosophy-professors: salaried by Christian governments, they may not leave

the chief article of faith in the lurch[13]. How do the gentlemen help themselves? They simply assert that the existence of God is a matter of course.—Indeed! after the old [14] Kant has said: "It is something very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and yet to prescribe to it beforehand on which side it must necessarily come out." (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 747; V, 775.) On the other hand the following naïveté is the pronouncement of a philosophy-professor of our time: "If a philosophy denies the reality of the fundamental ideas of Christianity, it is either false, or, even if true, still unusable—" scilicet for philosophy-professors. It was the late Professor Bachmann who, in the Jena Literary Gazette of July 1840, No. 126, so indiscreetly blabbed out the maxim of all his colleagues. Meanwhile it is noteworthy for the characterization of university philosophy how here truth, if it will not fit in and conform, is so unceremoniously shown the door, with: "March, Truth! we can't use you. Do we owe you anything? Do you pay us?—So, march!"

world, at the expense of its conscience, has performed miracles to prove it, and the new world, at the expense of its understanding, has fielded ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs,—it is a matter of course with the gentlemen. And from this God who is a matter of course they then explain the world: that is their philosophy.

Until Kant a real dilemma stood firm between materialism and theism, that is, between the assumption that a blind chance, or that an intelligence ordering from without according to purposes and concepts, had brought the world about, neque dabatur tertium. Hence atheism and materialism were the same: hence the doubt whether there could indeed be an atheist, that is, a human being who could really ascribe the so extraordinarily purposive arrangement of nature, above all the organic, to blind chance: see, for example, Bacon's essays (sermones fideles), essay 16, on Atheism. In the opinion of the great mass and of the English, who in such matters belong wholly to the great mass (mob), it is still so, even with their most famous scholars: see only R. Owen's Ostéologie comparée, of 1855, préface p. 11, 12, where he still stands before the old dilemma between Democritus and Epicurus on the one hand and an intelligence on the other, in which la connaissance d'un être tel que l'homme a existé

avant que l'homme fit son apparition. From an intelligence all purposiveness must have proceeded: to doubt this has not yet occurred to him even in a dream. Indeed, in the lecture of this preface, somewhat modified here, delivered on 5 Sept. 1853 at the Académie des sciences, he said with childlike naïveté: La téléologie, ou la théologie scientifique (Comptes rendus, Sept. 1853), that is to him immediately one! If something in nature is purposive, then it is a work of design, of deliberation, of intelligence. Now of course, what do the Critique of Judgment, or even my book on the Will in Nature, matter to such an Englishman and to the Académie des sciences? The gentlemen do not look down so deep. These illustres confrères despise indeed metaphysics and la philosophie allemande:—they keep to old wives' philosophy. The validity of that disjunctive major premise, of that dilemma between materialism and theism, rests, however, on the assumption that the world before us is that of things in themselves, that consequently there is no other order of things than the empirical. After, however, through Kant, the world and its order had become mere appearance, whose laws rest chiefly on the forms of our intellect, the existence and essence of things and of the world no longer needed to be explained by analogy with the changes in the world perceived or effected by us, nor did that which we apprehend as means and end need to have come into being also as a result of such knowledge. In that Kant, therefore, by his important distinction between appearance and thing in itself, withdrew its foundation from theism, he opened on the other hand the way to wholly different and more profound explanations of existence.

In the chapter on the final aims of the natural dialectic of reason it is pretended that the three transcendent Ideas are of value as regulative principles for the advance of the knowledge of nature. But Kant can hardly have been in earnest with this assertion. At least its opposite, namely that those presuppositions are inhibiting and deadening for all investigation of nature, will be beyond doubt to every student of nature. To test this by an example, consider whether the assumption of a soul, as an immaterial, simple, thinking substance, would have had to be conducive, or in the highest degree obstructive, to the truths which Cabanis has so beautifully set forth, or to the discoveries of Flourens, Marshall

Hall, and Ch. Bell. Indeed Kant himself says (Prolegomena, §. 44), "that the Ideas of reason are opposed and obstructive to the maxims of the rational knowledge of nature."—

It is certainly not one of the least merits of Frederick the Great that under his reign Kant could develop and was permitted to publish the "Critique of Pure Reason." Hardly under any other government would a salaried professor have ventured such a thing. Already to the successor of the great king Kant had to promise to write no more.

I could here regard myself as relieved of the critique of the ethical part of the Kantian philosophy, inasmuch as I have furnished such a critique more fully and thoroughly, 22 years later than the present one, in the "Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics." Meanwhile what has been retained here from the first edition, which for the sake of completeness alone could not be dropped, can serve as a suitable prolusion to that later and far more thorough critique, to which I accordingly refer the reader for the main part.

In accordance with the love of architectonic symmetry, theoretical reason had to have a counterpart too. The intellectus practicus of the Scholastics, which itself descends from the νους πρακτικος of Aristotle (De anima, III, 10, and Polit., VII, c. 14: ο μεν γαρ πρακτικος εστι λογος, ο δε θεωρητικος), supplies the word. Yet something wholly different is designated by it here, not, as there, reason directed to technique; here practical reason steps forth as the source and origin of the undeniable ethical significance of human action, as of all virtue, all magnanimity, and every attainable degree of holiness. All this accordingly would come from mere reason and would require nothing but this. To act reasonably and to act virtuously, magnanimously, holily would be one and the same: and to act selfishly, maliciously, viciously would be merely to act unreasonably. Meanwhile all times, all peoples, all languages have always distinguished the two very sharply and held them wholly to be two things, as indeed to this day all do who know nothing of the language of the newer school, that is, the whole world with the exception of a small band of German scholars: all those understand by a virtuous conduct and a reasonable course of life two wholly different things. That the exalted founder of the Christian religion,

whose course of life is set before us as the model of all virtue, was the most reasonable of all men would be called a very unworthy, indeed a blasphemous manner of speaking, and almost as much so if it were said that his precepts contained merely the best instruction for a wholly reasonable life. Further, that he who, in accordance with these precepts, instead of thinking of himself and his own future needs in advance, relieves always only the greater present want of others, without further regard; indeed gives his whole possessions to the poor, in order then, stripped of all resources, to go forth and preach to others also the virtue that he himself has practiced: this everyone rightly reveres: but who dares to praise it as the summit of reasonableness? And finally, who lauds it as an exceedingly reasonable deed that Arnold von Winkelried, with exuberant magnanimity, gathered the enemy spears together against his own body, to procure for his countrymen victory and deliverance?—On the other hand, when we see a human being who from youth, with rare deliberation, is intent on procuring for himself the means to a carefree livelihood, to the support of wife and children, to a good name among people, to outward honor and distinction, and who is led astray or tempted by none of this—neither the allure of present enjoyments, nor the itch to defy the arrogance of the powerful, nor the wish to avenge insults suffered or undeserved humiliation, nor the attraction of useless aesthetic or philosophical occupations of the mind and of journeys to lands worth seeing—ever to lose sight of his goal, but works with great consistency toward that alone, and is not led astray by all this and the like: who dares to deny that such a philistine is extraordinarily reasonable? even then when he might have allowed himself some means not praiseworthy, but without danger. Indeed, more: when a villain with calculated cunning, according to a well-considered plan, helps himself to riches, to honors, indeed to thrones and crowns, then with the subtlest guile ensnares neighboring states, overpowers them one by one and thus becomes a world-conqueror, and in this lets himself not be led astray by any regard for right or humanity, but with sharp consistency tramples and crushes everything that stands against his plan, plunges without pity millions into misfortune of every kind, millions into blood and death, yet royally rewards and at all times protects his adherents and helpers, forgetting nothing

ever, and thus attains his goal: who does not see that such a man must have proceeded in an exceedingly reasonable way, that, as for the drafting of the plans a mighty understanding, so for their execution perfect mastery of reason, indeed quite properly practical reason, was required?—Or are perhaps the precepts too which the shrewd and consistent, deliberate and far-sighted Machiavelli gives the prince unreasonable?[15]

As malice coexists very well with reason, and indeed is truly fearsome only in this union, so conversely magnanimity too is sometimes found combined with unreason. To this one may reckon the deed of Coriolanus, who, after having spent all his strength for years to procure vengeance on the Romans, now, when the time has at last come, lets himself be softened by the entreaties of the Senate and the tears of his mother and wife, gives up the revenge so long and so laboriously prepared, indeed, by thereby drawing the just wrath of the Volscians upon himself, dies for those Romans whose ingratitude he knows and whom he wanted to punish with such great exertion.—Finally, for the sake of completeness let it be mentioned, reason can very well unite with want of understanding. This is the case when a foolish maxim is chosen, but carried through with consistency. An example of this kind was given by Princess Isabella, daughter of Philip II, who vowed, so long as Ostend was not taken, to put on no clean shirt, and kept her word, for three years. In general all vows belong here, whose origin is lack of [16] Incidentally: Machiavelli's problem was the solution of the question how the prince can maintain himself unconditionally on the throne, despite enemies within and without. His problem was therefore by no means the ethical one, whether a prince as a human being should want any such thing or not; but purely the political one, how he can carry it out if he wants it. For this he gives the solution, as one writes an instruction in chess-playing, in which it would be foolish to miss the answer to the question whether it is morally advisable to play chess at all. To reproach Machiavelli with the immorality of his writing is just as much in place as it would be to reproach a fencing-master that he does not open his instruction with a moral lecture against murder and manslaughter.

insight in accordance with the law of causality, that is, want of understanding; none the less it is reasonable to fulfill them, if one is once of so limited an understanding as to vow them.

Corresponding to what has been cited, we see also the writers who appeared just before *Kant* set conscience, as the seat of the moral stirrings, in opposition to reason: so *Rousseau* in the fourth book of Emile: La *raison* nous trompe, mais la *conscience* ne trompe jamais; and somewhat further on: il est impossible d'expliquer par les conséquences de notre nature le principe immédiat de la *conscience* indépendant de la *raison* même. Still further: Mes sentimens naturels parlent pour l'intérêt commun, ma *raison* rapportait tout à moi.———On a beau vouloir établir la vertu par la *raison* seule, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner?—In the Rêveries du promeneur, prom. 4ème, he says: Dans toutes les questions de morale difficiles je me suis toujours bien trouvé de les résoudre par le dictamen de la *conscience*, plutôt que par les lumières de la *raison*.—Indeed, already *Aristotle* says expressly (Eth. magna, I, 5) that the virtues have their seat in the αλογῳ μοριῳ της ψυχης (in parte irrationali animi) and not in the λογον εχοντι (in parte rationali). In accordance with this *Stobaeus* says (Ecl., II, c. 7), speaking of the Peripatetics: Την ηθικην αρετην ὑπολαμβανουσι περι το αλογον μερος γιγνεσθαι της ψυχης, επειδη διμερη προς την παρουσαν θεωριαν υπεθεντο την ψυχην, το μεν λογικον εχουσαν, το δ' αλογον. Και περι μεν το λογικον την καλοκαγαθιαν γιγνεσθαι, και την φρονησιν, και την αγχινοιαν, και σοφιαν, και ευμαθειαν, και μνημην, και τας ὁμοιους· περι δε το αλογον, σωφροσυνην, και δικαιοσυνην, και ανδρειαν, και τας αλλας τας ηθικας καλουμενας αρετας. (Ethicam virtutem circa partem animae ratione carentem versari putant, cum duplicem, ad hanc disquisitionem, animam ponant, ratione praeditam, et ea carentem. In parte vero ratione praedita collocant ingenuitatem, prudentiam, perspicacitatem, sapientiam, docilitatem, memoriam et reliqua; in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, et reliquas virtutes, quas ethicas vocant.) And *Cicero* sets forth at length (De nat. Deor., III, c. 26–31) that reason is the necessary means and instrument for all crimes.

I have defined *reason* as the *faculty of concepts*. It is this wholly distinct class of general, non-intuitive representations, symbolized and fixed only by words, that distinguishes man from the animal and gives him dominion on earth. The animal is the slave of the present; it knows no motives but immediately sensuous ones, and so, when these present themselves, it is drawn or repelled by them as necessarily as iron by a magnet. In man, by contrast, the gift of reason has awakened deliberateness. This lets him, looking backward and forward, survey his life and the course of the world easily as a whole; it makes him independent of the present; it lets him go to work with reflection, by plan and with forethought, for evil as for good. But whatever he does, he does with perfect self-consciousness: he knows exactly how his will decides, what he chooses each time, and what other choice, in the nature of the case, was possible; and from this self-conscious willing he comes to know himself and mirrors himself in his deeds. In all these relations to man's action, reason is to be called *practical*; it is theoretical only insofar as the objects it occupies itself with have no relation to the thinker's action, but only a theoretical interest, of which very few men are capable. What is called *practical reason* in this sense is pretty well designated by the Latin word prudentia, which, according to Cicero (De nat. Deor., II, 22), is a contraction of providentia; whereas ratio, when used of a power of the mind, mostly means reason properly theoretical, although the ancients did not observe the distinction strictly.—In almost all men reason has its almost exclusively practical direction. But if this too is abandoned, and thinking loses its mastery over action, so that, as the saying goes, scio meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor, or "le matin je fais des projets, et le soir je fais des sottises"; if, that is, a man lets his action be guided not by his thinking but by the impression of the present, almost in the manner of the animal, we call him *unreasonable* (without thereby charging him with moral badness), although what he lacks is really not reason but the application of it to his action, and one might say, in a way, that his reason is merely theoretical but not practical. He may be quite a good man all the same, like many a one who cannot see an unfortunate without helping him, even at some sacrifice, but who leaves his own debts unpaid. Such an unreasonable character is wholly incapable of committing great crimes, because

the planning, the dissimulation and the self-command that these always require are impossible to him. To a very high degree of virtue, however, he will hardly attain either: for however strongly he may incline to the good by nature, the single vicious and malicious surges to which every man is subject cannot fail to come, and must, unless reason, showing itself practical, opposes to them unalterable maxims and firm resolutions, turn into deeds.

Finally, *reason* shows itself quite properly as *practical* in the truly reasonable characters, whom ordinary life therefore calls practical philosophers, and who are distinguished by an uncommon equanimity under unpleasant events as under pleasant ones, an even temper, and firm adherence to resolutions once taken. In fact it is the predominance of reason in them, that is, knowing that is more abstract than intuitive, and hence a surveying of life by means of concepts, in its generality, as a whole and on the large scale, which has made them acquainted once and for all with the deceptiveness of the momentary impression, with the instability of all things, the brevity of life, the emptiness of pleasures, the changes of fortune, and the great and small treacheries of chance. Nothing therefore comes upon them unexpected, and what they know in abstracto neither surprises them nor throws them off balance when it confronts them in reality and in the particular. It is otherwise with the less reasonable characters, over whom the present, the perceptual, the real exercises such power that the cold, colorless concepts recede wholly into the background of consciousness, and they, forgetting resolutions and maxims, are given over to affects and passions of every kind. I have already explained, at the end of the first book, that in my view Stoic ethics was originally nothing but a guide to a truly reasonable life in this sense. Horace too commends such a life repeatedly, in very many places. His Nil admirari belongs here, and so does the Delphic Μηδεν αγαν. To translate Nil admirari as "to admire nothing" is quite wrong. This saying of Horace's bears not so much on the theoretical as on the practical, and really means: "Prize no object unconditionally; gape in wonder at nothing; do not believe that the possession of any thing can bestow happiness: every ill-starred craving for an object is only a teasing chimera, which one can shake off just as well, but far more easily, through clarified knowledge than

through hard-won possession." In this sense Cicero too uses admirari, De divinatione, II, 2. What Horace means, then, is the αθαμβια and ακαταπληξις, also αθαυμασια, which Democritus already praised as the highest good (see Clem. Alex. Strom., II, 21, and compare Strabo, I, pp. 98 and 105).—Of virtue and vice there is properly no question in such reasonableness of conduct; but this practical use of reason asserts the real prerogative that man has over the animal, and only in this respect does it make sense, and is it permissible, to speak of a dignity of man.

In all the cases set forth, and in all conceivable ones, the difference between reasonable and unreasonable action comes down to whether the motives are abstract concepts or intuitive representations. That is precisely why the definition I have given of reason agrees exactly with the usage of language in all ages and among all peoples. Surely no one will take this usage for something accidental or arbitrary; he will see that it arose from the difference among the several faculties of the mind, of which every man is conscious, and that it speaks in accordance with this consciousness, though of course without raising it to the distinctness of an abstract definition. Our forefathers did not make words without attaching a definite sense to them, say so that they might lie ready for philosophers who would come centuries later and decide what was to be thought by them; rather, they designated by them quite definite concepts. Words, then, are no longer ownerless, and to put on them a wholly different sense from the one they have had until now is to abuse them; it is to introduce a license under which anyone could use any word in any sense he pleased, and boundless confusion would have to result. Locke has already shown at length that most disagreements in philosophy come from the false use of words. By way of illustration, take only a glance at the shameful abuse which thought-poor philosophasters nowadays practice with the words substance, consciousness, truth, and others besides. The utterances and explanations of all philosophers of all times about reason, with the exception of the most recent, likewise agree with my account of it no less than the concepts of that prerogative of man which prevail among all peoples. See what Plato, in the fourth book of the Republic and in countless scattered passages, calls the λογιμον or λογιστικον της

ψυχης; what Cicero says, De nat. Deor., III, 26–31; what Leibniz and Locke say about it in the passages already cited in the first book. There would be no end of citations here, if one wished to show how all philosophers before Kant have spoken of reason on the whole in my sense, even if they did not know how to explain its essence with perfect definiteness and distinctness, by tracing it back to a single point. What was understood by reason shortly before Kant's appearance is shown, on the whole, by two treatises of Sulzer in the first volume of his Miscellaneous Philosophical Writings: the one, "Analysis of the Concept of Reason," the other, "On the Reciprocal Influence of Reason and Language." If, on the other hand, one reads how reason is spoken of in the most recent time, through the influence of the Kantian error, which has since swelled like an avalanche, one is forced to assume that all the sages of antiquity, and all philosophers before Kant, had no reason at all: for the immediate perceptions, intuitions, apprehensions and premonitions of reason that have now been discovered remained as foreign to them as the sixth sense of bats is to us. As for myself, I must confess that I too, in my limitation, can make that reason—which directly perceives, or else apprehends, or intellectually intuits the supersensible, the Absolute, together with the long histories that befall it—conceivable and present to my mind in no other way than precisely as the sixth sense of bats. But one must say this in praise of the invention, or discovery, of such a reason, which at once and directly perceives whatever one pleases: it is an incomparable expédient for getting oneself and one's chosen pet ideas out of the affair in the easiest way in the world, in defiance of all *Kants* with their critiques of reason. The invention, and the reception it has found, do the age credit.

Although, then, the essence of *reason* (το λογιμον, ἡ φρονησις, ratio, raison, reason) has been rightly recognized by all philosophers of all times in general and on the whole, though not determined sharply enough nor traced back to a single point, what the *understanding* (νους, διανοια, intellectus, esprit, intellect, understanding) is has not become so clear to them; they therefore often confuse it with reason, and by that very fact also arrive at no perfectly complete, pure and simple account of the essence of reason. Among the Christian

philosophers the concept of reason received, besides, a quite foreign secondary meaning through its opposition to revelation, and starting from this many then maintain, rightly, that the knowledge of the obligation to virtue is possible from mere reason as well, that is, even without revelation. This consideration has certainly had an influence even on Kant's presentation and use of words. But that opposition is really of positive, historical significance, and is therefore an element foreign to philosophy, from which it must be kept free.

One might have expected that Kant, in his critiques of theoretical and practical reason, would have started from an exposition of the essence of reason in general, and, having thus determined the genus, would have gone on to explain the two species, showing how one and the same reason expresses itself in two such different ways and yet, by retaining its main character, proves itself the same. But nothing of all this is to be found. How inadequate, wavering and discordant are the explanations that he gives here and there, in passing, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of the faculty he is criticizing, I have already shown. *Practical* reason turns up unannounced in the Critique of Pure Reason itself, and afterwards, in the critique devoted expressly to it, stands there as a settled matter, with no further account given, and without the trampled usage of language of all times and peoples, or the definitions of the greatest earlier philosophers, being permitted to raise their voices. On the whole one can gather from the individual passages that Kant's opinion is this: the knowing of principles a priori is the essential character of reason; now since the knowledge of the ethical significance of action is not of empirical origin, it too is a principium a priori and accordingly springs from reason, which is then so far *practical*.—About the incorrectness of that definition of reason I have already said enough. But even apart from this, how superficial and shallow it is to use here the single mark of independence from experience in order to unite the most heterogeneous things, overlooking in the process their other, fundamentally essential, immeasurable distance from one another. For even supposing, though not conceding, that the knowledge of the ethical significance of action sprang from an imperative lying within us, an unconditional ought, how radically different such a thing would still be from those universal *forms of knowledge* which he

demonstrates in the Critique of Pure Reason as known to us a priori, by virtue of which consciousness we can pronounce beforehand an unconditional *must*, valid for all experience possible to us. But the difference between this must, this necessary form of every object, already determined in the subject, and that ought of morality, is as wide as heaven and so plain to see that one can adduce the coincidence of the two in the mark of non-empirical kind of knowledge perhaps as a witty simile, but not as a philosophical warrant for identifying the origin of both.

Incidentally, the birthplace of this child of practical reason, the *absolute ought* or categorical imperative, is not the Critique of Practical Reason but already the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 802; V, 830. The birth is violent and succeeds only by means of the forceps of a *therefore*, which, boldly and brazenly, one might even say shamelessly, plants itself between two propositions utterly strange to one another and without any connection, in order to join them as ground and consequence. For Kant's point of departure is the proposition that not only intuitive but also abstract motives determine us, and he puts it as follows: "Not merely what stimulates, that is, what immediately affects the senses, determines human choice; we have a faculty of overcoming, by representations of what is useful or harmful even in a remote way, the impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. These deliberations about what is desirable in regard to our whole condition, that is, good and useful, rest on reason." (Perfectly correct: if only he always spoke so reasonably of reason!) "*Therefore!* reason also gives laws, which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, and which say what ought to happen, even though perhaps it never happens."—! So, without further credentials, the categorical imperative leaps into the world, to rule there with its unconditional ought—a scepter of wooden iron. For in the concept *ought* there lies, thoroughly and essentially, a regard to threatened punishment or promised reward as its necessary condition, and this cannot be separated from it without canceling the concept itself and robbing it of all meaning: hence an *unconditional ought* is a contradictio in adjecto. This fault had to be censured, close as it is, for the rest, to Kant's great service to ethics. That service consists precisely in his having freed ethics from all principles of the world of

experience, in particular from every direct or indirect doctrine of happiness, and having shown, quite properly, that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world. The service is the greater because all the ancient philosophers, with the sole exception of Plato—Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans—by very different artifices, wanted to make virtue and happiness now dependent on each other according to the principle of sufficient reason, now identical according to the principle of contradiction. The same reproach applies no less to all philosophers of modern times down to Kant. His merit in this is therefore very great; yet justice requires us to recall here as well, first, that his presentation and execution often do not correspond to the tendency and spirit of his ethics, as we shall presently see, and second, that even so he is not the very first to have purified virtue of all principles of happiness. For Plato already, especially in the Republic, whose main tendency is just this, teaches expressly that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake alone, even if misfortune and disgrace were inevitably bound up with it. Christianity, however, preaches a wholly disinterested virtue still more: a virtue practiced not even for the sake of reward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously, out of love of God, inasmuch as works do not justify, but faith alone, which virtue accompanies as its mere symptom, so to speak, so that virtue appears quite gratuitously and of itself. Read Luther, De libertate Christiana. I will not even take the Indians into account, in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for one's works is everywhere described as the path of darkness, which can never lead to blessedness. Yet Kant's doctrine of virtue we do not find so pure: or rather, the presentation has fallen far short of the spirit, and even into inconsistency. In his *highest* good, treated afterwards, we find virtue wedded to happiness. The ought, so unconditional at the start, after all postulates a condition for itself later, really in order to be rid of the inner contradiction with which it is afflicted and under which it cannot live. The happiness in the highest good is indeed not really to be the motive for virtue: nevertheless it stands there like a secret article, whose presence turns all the rest into a mere sham contract: it is not really the reward of virtue, but yet a voluntary gift, to which virtue, when the labor is done, stealthily holds out an open hand. One can convince oneself of this from the "Critique of Practical Reason" (pp.

223–266 of the fourth edition, or pp. 264–295 of the Rosenkranz edition). His whole moral theology has the same tendency: by means of it morality, for this very reason, really annihilates itself. For, I repeat, all virtue that is practiced in any way for the sake of a reward rests on a prudent, methodical, far-sighted egoism.

The content of the absolute ought, the basic law of practical reason, is the much-praised: "Act so that the maxim of your will could at all times hold also as the principle of a universal legislation."—This principle sets him who demands a regulative for his own will the task of seeking one for the will of all. —Then the question arises how such a regulative is to be found. Evidently, in order to find the rule of my conduct, I am to take into account not myself alone, but the totality of all individuals. Then, instead of my own well-being, the well-being of all without distinction becomes my end. But that end is still well-being. I then find that all can fare equally well only if each sets the egoism of others as a limit to his own. From this it follows, to be sure, that I am to wrong no one, because, when this principle is assumed as universal, I too am not wronged; but this is the sole reason why I, not yet possessing a moral principle but only seeking one, can wish it to be a universal law. Evidently, however, in this way the wish for well-being, that is, egoism, remains the source of this ethical principle. As the basis of the doctrine of the state it would be excellent; as the basis of ethics it is no good. For the establishment, demanded in that moral principle, of a regulative for the will of all requires the seeker himself, in turn, to have a regulative; otherwise everything would be indifferent to him. This regulative, however, can only be his own egoism, since only on this does the conduct of others have any bearing, and hence only by means of it and with regard to it can he have a will concerning the actions of others, and not be indifferent to them. Very naively Kant himself lets this be seen, p. 123 of the "Critique of Practical Reason" (Rosenkranz edition, p. 192), where he works out the seeking of the maxim for the will thus: "If everyone looked on the distress of others with complete indifference, and *you belonged* to such an order of things, would you consent to it?"—Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam! would be the regulative of the consent inquired after. Likewise in the

"Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals," p. 56 of the third edition, p. 50 of the Rosenkranz edition: "A will that resolved to help no one in distress would contradict itself, since cases can occur in which *it needs the love and sympathy of others*," and so on. This principle of ethics, which, looked at in the light, is therefore nothing other than an indirect and veiled expression of the old, simple maxim, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris, thus refers first and immediately to the passive, to suffering, and only by means of that to doing. Hence it would be, as I said, quite serviceable as a guide for establishing the *state*, which is directed at preventing the suffering of wrong and would also procure for all and each the greatest sum of well-being; but in ethics, where the object of inquiry is *doing as doing* and in its immediate significance for the *doer*, not its consequence, suffering, or its relation to others, that consideration is wholly inadmissible, since at bottom it again comes down to a principle of happiness, and so to egoism.

We therefore cannot share Kant's delight in the fact that his principle of ethics is not material, that is, one that sets an object as motive, but merely formal, whereby it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws which the Critique of Pure Reason has taught us to know. It is indeed, instead of a law, only the formula for finding one: but partly we had this formula already, shorter and clearer, in: quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris; partly the analysis of this formula shows that solely regard for one's own happiness gives it its content, so that it can serve only a rational egoism, to which all legal constitution also owes its origin.

Another fault, which, because it offends everyone's feeling, has often been censured and was lampooned by Schiller in an epigram, is the pedantic stipulation that an act, in order to be truly good and meritorious, must be performed solely and alone out of respect for the recognized law and the concept of duty, and according to a maxim of which reason is conscious in abstracto; it must not come from any inclination, not from felt benevolence toward others, not from tender-hearted sympathy, compassion or stirring of the heart—which (according to the "Critique of Practical Reason," p. 213; Rosenkranz edition, p. 257) are even very troublesome to well-thinking persons, as confusing their

considered maxims; no, the act must be done unwillingly and with self-compulsion. Remember that all the while no hope of reward is to enter in, and weigh the great absurdity of the demand. But, what says more, it is directly opposed to the genuine spirit of virtue: not the deed, but the doing of it gladly, the love from which it proceeds and without which it is a dead work, constitutes its merit. Hence Christianity too rightly teaches that all outward works are worthless if they do not proceed from that genuine disposition, which consists in true willingness and pure love; and that what makes blessed and redeems is not the works performed (opera operata) but faith, the genuine disposition, which the Holy Spirit alone bestows, and which the free and deliberate will, with the law alone before its eyes, does not engender.—With that demand of Kant's, that every virtuous action should proceed from pure, deliberate respect for the law and according to its abstract maxims, coldly and without, indeed against, all inclination, it is just as if it were asserted that every genuine work of art must arise through well-considered application of aesthetic rules. The one is as perverse as the other. The question, already treated by Plato and Seneca, whether virtue can be taught, must be answered in the negative. One will finally have to resolve to see, what also gave rise to the Christian doctrine of election by grace, that in the main and inwardly virtue is, in a way, innate like genius; and that, just as all the professors of aesthetics with united forces can impart to no one the capacity for productions of genius, that is, genuine works of art, so all the professors of ethics and preachers of virtue are just as little able to transform an ignoble character into a virtuous, noble one. The impossibility of this is far more evident than that of changing lead into gold; and the search for an ethics, and a supreme principle of it, that should have practical influence and really transform and better the human race, is quite like the search for the philosopher's stone.—Of the possibility, however, of a total change of heart in man (rebirth), brought about not by abstract knowledge (ethics) but by intuitive knowledge (the working of grace), we have spoken at length at the end of our fourth book; the content of that book relieves me altogether of the necessity of dwelling on it longer here.

That Kant has by no means penetrated into the real meaning of the ethical content of actions he shows, finally, also by his doctrine of the highest good as the necessary union of virtue and happiness, and indeed in such a way that virtue would be the worthiness of happiness. The logical reproach already strikes him here, that the concept of worthiness, which here supplies the standard, itself presupposes an ethics as its standard, and so ought not to have been taken as the starting point. In our fourth book it emerged that all genuine virtue, once it has reached its highest degree, leads at last to a complete renunciation in which all willing comes to an end; happiness, on the other hand, is satisfied willing; the two are therefore fundamentally irreconcilable. For him to whom my exposition has become clear, no further explanation is needed of the total perversity of this Kantian view of the highest good. And independently of my positive exposition I have no further negative one to give here.

Kant's love of architectonic symmetry confronts us also in the "Critique of Practical Reason," in that he gave it entirely the cut of the "Critique of Pure Reason" and applied again the same titles and forms, with evident arbitrariness, which becomes especially visible in the table of the categories of freedom.

The *Doctrine of Right* is one of Kant's latest works, and so weak a one that, although I wholly disapprove of it, I consider a polemic against it superfluous: as if it were not the work of this great man but the product of an ordinary son of earth, it must die a natural death of its own weakness. As regards the Doctrine of Right, then, I forgo the negative procedure and refer to the positive one, that is, to the brief outlines of it set forth in our fourth book. A couple of general remarks on Kant's Doctrine of Right may stand here. The faults which I censured, as clinging to Kant everywhere, in considering the "Critique of Pure Reason," are found in the Doctrine of Right in such excess that one often thinks one is reading a satirical parody of the Kantian manner, or at least listening to a Kantian. Two principal faults, however, are these. He wants (and many since have wanted) to separate the doctrine of right sharply from ethics, and yet not to make the former dependent on positive legislation, that is, on arbitrary compulsion, but to let the concept of right subsist purely and a priori on its own. But this is not possible; for action, besides its ethical significance and

besides its physical relation to others, and thereby to outward compulsion, admits not even the possibility of any third view. Consequently, when he says: "A duty of right is one that *can* be enforced," this *can* is to be understood either physically: then all right is positive and arbitrary, and conversely every arbitrary act that can be made to prevail is right; or the *can* is to be understood ethically, and we are back in the domain of ethics. In Kant, accordingly, the concept of right hovers between heaven and earth and has no ground on which it can stand: with me it belongs to ethics. Second, his determination of the concept of right is wholly negative and thereby insufficient [17]: "Right is that which is compatible with the coexistence[18] Although the concept of right is really a negative one, in opposition to wrong, which is the positive point of departure, the definition of these concepts need not on that account be negative through and through. of the freedoms of individuals side by side according to a universal law."—Freedom (here the empirical, that is, physical freedom, not the moral freedom of the will) means the not being hindered, and is thus a mere negation: coexistence has quite the same meaning again. We therefore remain with sheer negations and obtain no positive concept; indeed we do not learn at all what is really being spoken of unless we already know it from elsewhere.—In the execution there afterwards develop the most perverse views, such as that in the natural state, that is, outside the state, there is no right of property at all, which really means that all right is positive, and by which natural right is made to rest on positive right, when the case ought to be the reverse; further, the grounding of rightful acquisition on taking possession; the ethical obligation to establish the civil constitution; the ground of penal law, and so on; all of which, as I said, I deem worthy of no special refutation. Meanwhile these Kantian errors too have proved very detrimental in their influence: they have confused and obscured again truths long since recognized and expressed, and have occasioned strange theories and much writing and disputing. Such a thing cannot last, to be sure, and already we see truth and sound reason making their way again. Of the latter, in contrast to so many distorted theories, J. C. F. Meister's Natural Right in particular bears witness, though I do not on that account regard it as a model of attained perfection.

On the *Critique of Judgment* too I can, after what has gone before, be very brief. One must marvel how Kant, to whom art has surely remained very foreign, and who, to all appearances, had little receptivity for the beautiful; who, moreover, in all probability never had occasion to see a significant work of art, and who finally seems not even to have had any knowledge of his giant brother Goethe, the only man to be set beside him both in the century and in the nation—one must marvel, I say, how with all this Kant could earn a great and lasting service to the philosophical consideration of art and the beautiful. This service lies in the following. However many reflections had been made on the beautiful and on art, the matter had really always been considered only from the empirical standpoint, and men had investigated, resting on facts, what property distinguished an object of any kind that was called *beautiful* from other objects of the same kind. On this path one arrived at first at quite special propositions, then at more general ones. One sought to separate genuine artistic beauty from the spurious and to find marks of this genuineness, which could then in turn serve as rules. What pleases as beautiful, what does not; what is therefore to be imitated, what to be striven after, what to be avoided; what rules, at least negative ones, are to be established; in short, what are the means of arousing aesthetic pleasure, that is, what are the conditions for it lying in the *object*—this was almost exclusively the theme of all reflections on art. Aristotle had taken this path, and on it in the most recent time we find Home, Burke, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder and others. True, the generality of the aesthetic propositions found led in the end back to the subject as well, and it was noticed that if the effect in the subject were properly known, one could then determine a priori also the cause of it lying in the object, whereby alone this inquiry could attain the certainty of a science. This occasioned here and there psychological discussions; but in this intention Alexander Baumgarten in particular set up a general aesthetics of everything beautiful, starting from the concept of the perfection of sensuous, and thus intuitive, knowledge. With the setting up of this concept, however, the subjective part too is at once disposed of in his work, and he proceeds to the objective and to the practical matters relating to it.—But Kant was reserved the merit, here as well, of seriously and deeply investigating

the *stirring itself* in consequence of which we call the object that occasions it *beautiful*, in order to find, if possible, its constituents and conditions in our mind. His investigation therefore took wholly the subjective direction. This path was evidently the right one: for in order to explain a phenomenon given in its effects, one must first know this effect itself exactly if one is to determine the nature of the cause thoroughly. Kant's service in this, however, really extends no further than to having shown the right path and, by a provisional attempt, given an example of roughly how it must be traveled. For what he gave cannot be regarded as objective truth and real gain. He indicated the method of this investigation, he broke the path, but for the rest he missed the goal.

In the critique of aesthetic judgment the remark will force itself upon us first of all that he retained the method peculiar to his whole philosophy, which I have considered at length above: I mean the starting from abstract knowledge in order to fathom intuitive knowledge, so that the former serves him, as it were, as a camera obscura in which to catch the latter and survey it. As in the Critique of Pure Reason the forms of judgments were to give him information about the knowledge of our whole intuitive world, so too in this critique of aesthetic judgment he proceeds not from the beautiful itself, from the intuitive, immediate beautiful, but from the *judgment* on the beautiful, the judgment of taste, as it is so very ungracefully called. This is his problem. His attention is aroused especially by the circumstance that such a judgment is evidently the statement of a process in the subject, and yet is as universally valid as if it concerned a property of the object. This struck him, not the beautiful itself. He starts always only from the statements of others, from the judgment on the beautiful, not from the beautiful itself. It is therefore as if he knew it wholly and entirely by hearsay only, and not directly. Almost in the same way a most intelligent blind man might put together a theory of colors from exact statements about them that he had heard. And really we may regard Kant's philosophemes on the beautiful almost only in such a relation. Then we shall find that his theory is very ingenious, indeed that here and there apt and true general remarks are made; but his actual solution of the problem is so unten-

able, remains so far beneath the dignity of the subject, that it cannot occur to us to hold it for objective truth. Hence I consider myself relieved even of a refutation of it, and here too refer to the positive part of my work.

With regard to the form of his whole book it is to be remarked that it sprang from the notion of finding in the concept of *purposiveness* the key to the problem of the beautiful. The notion is deduced, which is nowhere difficult, as we have learned from Kant's successors. So arises the baroque union of the knowledge of the beautiful with that of the purposive in natural bodies, in one faculty of knowledge called *judgment*, and the treatment of the two heterogeneous subjects in one book. With these three powers of knowledge, reason, judgment and understanding, various symmetrical-architectonic amusements are afterwards undertaken, the fondness for which shows itself in many ways throughout this book, already in the cut of the Critique of Pure Reason, forcibly fitted to the whole, but quite especially in the far-fetched antinomy of aesthetic judgment. One might also draw from it a charge of great inconsistency, that after it has been repeated unceasingly in the Critique of Pure Reason that the understanding is the faculty of judging, and after the forms of its judgments have been made the cornerstone of all philosophy, there now appears a quite peculiar faculty of judgment, wholly different from that. What I for my part call judgment, namely the ability to transfer intuitive knowledge into abstract, and to apply the latter correctly again to the former, is set out in the positive part of my work.

By far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is the theory of the sublime: it has succeeded incomparably better than that of the beautiful, and gives not only, like the latter, the general method of inquiry, but also a stretch of the right path toward it, so much so that even if it does not give the actual solution of the problem, it nevertheless comes very near it.

In the critique of *teleological* judgment one can recognize, owing to the simplicity of the material, perhaps more than anywhere else, Kant's singular talent for turning a thought this way and that and expressing it in manifold ways until a book has come of it. The whole book wants only this: although organized bodies necessarily appear to us as if they were put together in accordance with a

concept of purpose that preceded them, this still does not entitle us to assume it objectively so. For our intellect, to which things are given from without and mediately, and which therefore never knows their inside, by which they arise and subsist, but only their outside, cannot make a certain character peculiar to organic natural products conceivable to itself otherwise than by analogy, by comparing them with works made intentionally by men, whose character is determined by a purpose and the concept of it. This analogy is sufficient to make the agreement of all their parts with the whole conceivable to us, and thereby even to furnish the clue for investigating them; but by no means may it on that account be made the real ground of explanation of the origin and existence of such bodies. For the necessity of conceiving them so is of subjective origin.—Thus, roughly, I would sum up Kant's doctrine on this. In its main points he had already set it out in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 692–702; V, 720–730. But in the knowledge of *this* truth too we find *David Hume* as Kant's praiseworthy predecessor: he too had sharply contested that assumption, in the second part of his Dialogues concerning natural religion. The difference between Hume's critique of that assumption and Kant's is chiefly this, that Hume criticizes it as an assumption resting on experience, Kant on the other hand as an a priori one. Both are right, and their presentations supplement each other. Indeed, the essential part of Kant's doctrine on this we find already expressed in the commentary of Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle: ἡ δε πλανη γεγονεν αυτοις απο του ἡγεισθαι, παντα τα ένεκα του γινομενα κατα προαιρεσιν γενεσθαι και λογισμον, τα δε φυσει μη ούτως όραν γινομενα. (Error iis ortus est ex eo, quod credebant, omnia, quae propter finem aliquem fierent, ex proposito et ratiocinio fieri, dum videbant, naturae opera non ita fieri.) Schol. in Arist. ex. edit. Berol. p. 354. Kant is perfectly right in the matter. It was also necessary that, after it had been shown that the concept of effect and cause is not applicable to the whole of nature as regards its existence, it should likewise be shown that nature, as regards its constitution, is not to be thought of as the effect of a cause guided by motives (concepts of purpose). When one considers the great plausibility of the physico-theological proof, which even *Voltaire* held irrefutable, it was of the greatest importance to show that the subjective in our

apprehension, to which Kant has ascribed space, time and causality, extends also to our judgment of natural bodies; and accordingly that the compulsion we feel to think of them as premeditated, as having arisen according to concepts of purpose, that is, in a way in which the *representation of them would have preceded their existence*, is of just as subjective an origin as the intuition of space, which presents itself so objectively, and therefore may not be put forward as objective truth. Kant's exposition of the matter is, apart from its wearisome prolixity and repetition, excellent. Rightly he asserts that we shall never succeed in explaining the constitution of organic bodies from merely mechanical causes, by which he understands the unintentional and law-governed action of all universal natural forces. Here, however, I still find a gap. For he denies the possibility of such an explanation only with regard to the purposiveness and apparent intentionality of the *organic* bodies. But we find that even where these are not present, the grounds of explanation from one domain of nature cannot be carried over into the other, but forsake us as soon as we enter a new domain, and in their place new fundamental laws appear, whose explanation from those of the preceding domain is not at all to be hoped for. Thus in the domain of the properly mechanical there rule the laws of gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, which in themselves (apart from my explanation of all natural forces as lower grades of the objectification of the will) stand there as manifestations of forces not to be explained further, but themselves constitute the principles of all further explanation, which consists merely in reduction to them. If we leave this domain and come to the phenomena of chemism, electricity, magnetism, crystallization, those principles are no longer usable at all; indeed, those laws no longer hold, those forces are overpowered by others, and the phenomena proceed in direct contradiction to them, according to new fundamental laws which, just like the former, are original and inexplicable, that is, not to be reduced to any more general ones. Thus, for example, no one will ever succeed in explaining, by those laws of the properly mechanical, even the dissolution of a salt in water, let alone the more complicated phenomena of chemistry. In the second book of the present work all this has already been set out more fully. A discussion of this kind would, it seems to me, have been of great use in the cri-

tique of teleological judgment, and would have spread much light over what is said there. It would have been especially favorable to his excellent hint that a deeper knowledge of the essence in itself, of which the things in nature are the appearance, would find again, in the mechanical (law-governed) as in the apparently intentional workings of nature, one and the same ultimate principle, which could serve as the common ground of explanation for both. Such a principle I hope to have given by setting up the will as the real thing in itself. In accordance with this, the insight into the inner essence of the apparent purposiveness, and of the harmony and concord of the whole of nature, has perhaps become clearer and deeper in our second book and its supplements, but above all in my work "On the Will in Nature." Hence I have nothing further to say about it here.—

The reader whom this critique of the Kantian philosophy interests should not fail to read, in the second treatise of the first volume of my Parerga and Paralipomena, the supplement to it supplied under the heading "Some Further Elucidations of the Kantian Philosophy." For one must consider that my writings, few as they are, were not composed all at once but successively, in the course of a long life and with wide intervals between; accordingly one may not expect that everything I have said on a subject also stands together in one place.

Corrections.

Page 57, line 12 from top, the comma at the end is to be deleted. Also 58, line 16 from bottom, for: der read: die; 205, line 3 from top, for: ἁπτοσθαι, read: ἁπτεσθαι; 229, line 8 from bottom, for: daher read: dabei; 329, line 17 from bottom, after "Worte" insert:, understand therefore not simile, but idem.

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