



Politics

ARISTOTLE

Musean Translation

MOUSEIA

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Musean Translation

Translated by Michael Berardi

MOUSEIA

THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the Ancient Greek of all eight books, 182 Bekker pages and 1,609 line marks (the Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross's Oxford text), for fidelity, argument, imagery and clarity.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written c. 335–323 BCE · Political philosophy

SOURCE

Original text from the Perseus Digital Library.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The Greek is the pinned Perseus transcription of W. D. Ross's Oxford text; that transcription's own header notes inconsistencies with the print edition it cites and warns that a different print source may have been used, so readings are given as the transcription has them, apart from three transcription slips corrected and recorded in the source registry. Book divisions, Bekker page and line markers, and the edition's own citation abbreviations (Hom. Od. 9.114) follow that transcription; seven pages carry the end of one book and the start of the next, as the transcription's own book divisions do.

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Book I, 1252a–1255b



^{1252a1}Since we see that every city is a kind of association, and that every association has been established for the sake of some good—for everyone does everything for the sake of what seems good—it is clear that all associations aim at some good, but above all,⁵ at the most authoritative good of all, the association that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others. This is what is called the city, the political association. Those, then, who think that the statesman, the kingly ruler, the household manager, and the master are the same are mistaken. For they take the number, large or small,¹⁰ to distinguish each of these, not their kind: if he rules a few, he is a master; if more, a household manager; if still more, a statesman or a kingly ruler—as though there were no difference between a large household and a small city. And in distinguishing the statesman from the kingly ruler, they call him a kingly ruler when he himself stands at their head, but when,¹⁵ in accordance with the principles of this science, he rules and is ruled in turn, a statesman. But these claims are not true. What we mean will become clear to those who examine the matter by the method we have indicated. For just as in other matters we must divide what is composite into its uncompounded elements—these are the smallest²⁰ parts of the whole—so, by examining the parts of which the city is composed, we shall also see more clearly how these differ from one another, and whether we can arrive at any skilled understanding of each of the things mentioned.

If, then, one were to observe these things growing from their beginning,^{1252a25} as in other matters, this would be the best way to study them here too. First, those who cannot exist without one another must come together in pairs: female and male for the sake of generation—not from deliberate choice, but because, as in other animals and plants, the desire is natural³⁰ to leave behind another like oneself—and ruler and ruled by nature, for the sake of preservation. For what can foresee with its mind is by nature a ruler and by nature a master, while what can carry these things out through bodily labor is ruled and is by nature a slave. For this reason, the same thing is to the advantage of master and slave.

By nature, then,^{1252b1} the female and the slave are distinct. For nature makes nothing in the parsimonious manner in which the bronze workers make the Delphic knife, but one thing for one purpose. Each instrument would thus be made best, with not many tasks but one⁵ to serve. Among the barbarians, however, the female and the slave have the same position. The reason is that they have no ruler by nature; instead, their association is that of a female slave and a male slave. This is why the poets say, “It is fitting that Greeks should rule barbarians,” (Eur. *IA* 1400) as though barbarian and slave were the same by nature. From these¹⁰ two associations, then, the household first arises; and Hesiod was right when he wrote, “First of all a household, a woman, and an ox for plowing.” (Hes. *WD* 405) For the ox takes the place of a household servant for the poor. The association established by nature for everyday needs is therefore the household; its members Charondas calls companions of the same bread chest, and Epimenides¹⁵ of Crete, companions of the same table. The first association of several households for needs that are not merely daily is the village. By nature, the village seems above all to be a colony of a household, consisting of those whom some call companions of the same milk: children and children’s children. For this reason cities were originally ruled by kings, and so even now are the²⁰ nations: they came together from households ruled by kings. For every household is ruled as by a king by its eldest member, and so too its colonies, because of their kinship. This is also what Homer means when he says, “Each lays down the law for his children and wives.” (Hom. *Od.* 9.114)

For they are scattered, and this is how people lived in ancient times. For this reason, too, everyone says that the gods²⁵ are ruled by a king: some people are themselves still ruled by kings, while others were in ancient times. Just as human beings make the gods' forms resemble their own, so too they make the gods' ways of life resemble their own.

The complete association formed from several villages is a city, already reaching, one might say, the limit of full self-sufficiency. It comes into being for the sake of^{1252b30} living, but exists for the sake of living well. Therefore every city exists by nature, if indeed the first associations do too. For the city is their end, and nature is an end: what each thing is when its coming into being is complete, we call the nature of that thing—a human being, for example, a horse, or a household. Further, that for the sake of which a thing exists, its end, is best;

^{1253a1} and self-sufficiency is both an end and best. From these considerations, then, it is evident that the city is among the things that exist by nature, and that a human being is by nature a political animal. Anyone who is without a city by nature, and not by chance, is either base or greater than a human being, like⁵ the man Homer denounces as “Without clan, without law, without hearth.” (Hom. Il. 9.63) For such a person is at once like this by nature and eager for war, being unpaired, like a piece in a board game. It is clear why a human being is a political animal more than any bee or any animal that lives in a herd. For nature, as we say, does nothing in vain; and speech¹⁰ belongs to human beings alone among the animals. Voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and therefore belongs to the other animals too: their nature has reached this point, that they perceive pain and pleasure and signal them to one another. Speech, however, serves to reveal advantage and¹⁵ harm, and therefore also the just and the unjust. For this is peculiar to human beings in comparison with the other animals: they alone perceive good and bad, the just and the unjust, and the other things of this kind. Sharing in these things makes a household and a city. The city is also prior by nature to the household and to each of us.²⁰ For the whole must be prior to the part. If the whole is destroyed, there will be neither foot nor hand, except in name, as one might speak of a stone hand—for a

hand, once destroyed, will be like that. All things are defined by their function and capacity; hence, when they no longer have these, we should not say that they are the same things, but only that they have the same names.²⁵ It is clear, then, that the city is also prior by nature to each individual. For if each individual, when separated, is not self-sufficient, he will stand in the same relation to the whole as the other parts do. Anyone who cannot share in an association, or who needs nothing because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.

By nature, then, there is in ^{1253a30} everyone an impulse toward such an association; but the first person to establish it was responsible for the greatest goods. For just as a human being, when brought to completion, is the best of animals, so, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. Injustice is most dangerous when it has weapons. Human beings are born with weapons for practical wisdom and ³⁵ virtue, yet these can be used above all for their opposites. Hence, without virtue, a human being is most impious and savage, and worst in matters of sex and food. Justice is a political matter: for justice is the ordering of the political association, and justice is the judgment of the just.

^{1253b1} Since it is evident what parts the city consists of, we must first speak about household management; for every city is composed of households. The parts of household management correspond in turn to the parts of which a household consists, and a complete household consists of slaves and free people. Since ⁵ each thing must first be examined in its smallest elements, and the first and smallest parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children, we should examine these three relations: what each is and what it ought to be. These are mastery, the marital relation—for between woman and man there is no name for their ¹⁰ union—and, third, the relation of producing children—for this too has no name of its own. Let these, then, be the three we have mentioned. There is also a part that some think is household management itself, and others its greatest part; we must study how matters stand. I mean what is called wealth-getting. But first ¹⁵ let us speak about master and slave, so that we may both consider what bears on necessary use and see whether we can arrive at a better understanding of them than the views now

held. For some think that mastery is a kind of science, and that household management, mastery, statesmanship, and kingly rule are the same,²⁰ as we said at the outset. Others think that being a master is contrary to nature: one person is a slave and another free by convention, while by nature they differ in no way. For this reason, they say, it is not just, since it rests on force.

Since property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of household management—for without necessities it is impossible^{1253b25} either to live or to live well—and since the particular arts must have their appropriate instruments if their work is to be accomplished, the household manager must have them too. Of instruments, some are lifeless and others living: for a ship's pilot, for example, the rudder is lifeless and the lookout living—for³⁰ an assistant in the arts is a kind of instrument. So too a piece of property is an instrument for living, property is a collection of instruments, and a slave is a living piece of property; every assistant is, as it were, an instrument that comes before other instruments. For if each instrument could, at a command or by anticipating it, carry out³⁵ its own work, like the works of Daedalus, as people say, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which the poet says “enter the divine assembly of their own accord”—if shuttles wove by themselves in this way, and plectrums played the lyre—then master craftsmen would have no need of^{1254a1} assistants, nor masters of slaves.

What we ordinarily call instruments are instruments of production, whereas a piece of property is an instrument of action. For from the shuttle something arises beyond its use, while from clothing and a bed there is only their use.^{1254a5} Further, since production and action differ in kind, and both require instruments, their instruments must also have the same distinction. Life is action, not production; therefore the slave too is an assistant in what serves action. A piece of property is spoken of in the same way as a part. For a part is not¹⁰ only a part of something else, but also belongs entirely to something else; and likewise a piece of property. Thus the master is only the slave's master, and does not belong to him; but the slave is not only the master's slave, but also belongs wholly to him.

What the nature and capacity of the slave are is therefore clear from these considerations. For someone who is by nature not his own^{1254a15} but another's, though a human being, is a slave by nature. A human being belongs to another if, though human, he is a piece of property; and a piece of property is a separable instrument of action.

Whether anyone is by nature such a person or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether, on the contrary, all slavery is contrary to nature, must next be^{1254a20} examined. It is not difficult either to study this through reason or to learn it from what occurs. For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary but also advantageous, and immediately from birth some things are set apart for being ruled and others for ruling. There are many kinds both of rulers and²⁵ of the ruled; and rule over better subjects is always better, as over a human being rather than a beast, since the work accomplished by better agents is better. Where one rules and another is ruled, there is some work that belongs to them. For in everything composed of several parts and becoming a single common whole, whether its parts are continuous or³⁰ separate, a ruler and a ruled element appear. This is present in living things as a feature of nature as a whole; for even in things that have no share in life there is a kind of rule, as in a harmony. But perhaps these matters belong to a more external inquiry. A living thing consists in the first place of soul³⁵ and body, of which the one is by nature the ruler and the other the ruled. We should examine what is natural in things whose condition accords with nature rather than in things that are corrupted. Therefore we must study the human being whose body and soul are in the best condition, in whom this is evident;

for in people who are bad or^{1254b1} in a bad condition, the body might often seem to rule the soul because their condition is base and contrary to nature.

It is possible, then, as we say, to observe in a living thing, first of all, both the rule of a master and political rule. For the soul, in relation to the body,^{1254b5} exercises a master's rule, while the mind rules desire with political or kingly rule. In these cases it is evident that it is by nature and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the part subject to passions to be ruled by the mind and the part that possesses reason; whereas an equal or reversed rela-

tion is harmful to all.¹⁰ Again, the same holds between human beings and the other animals. For tame animals are better in nature than wild ones, and for all these it is better to be ruled by human beings, since they are preserved in this way. Further, in the relation of male to female, the one is by nature superior and the other inferior, the one ruling and the other ruled. The¹⁵ same must also hold among all human beings. Those who differ as much from others as soul from body and a human being from a beast—and this is the condition of those whose work consists in using their bodies, and for whom this is the best they can provide—are slaves by nature. For them it is better²⁰ to be ruled with this sort of rule, if indeed it is so for those already mentioned. For a slave by nature is one who is capable of belonging to another—and therefore does belong to another—and who shares in reason to the extent of apprehending it, but not possessing it. The other animals assist not through apprehension of reason, but through their feelings. Their usefulness differs little:²⁵ for both slaves and tame animals provide bodily assistance toward the necessities of life. Nature intends, then, to make the bodies of free people and slaves different too: those of slaves strong for necessary service, those of free people upright and useless for³⁰ such labors, but useful for political life, which is divided into the requirements of war and those of peace. Yet the opposite often happens as well: some have the bodies of free people, others their souls. This much, at least, is evident: if people differed³⁵ in body alone as much as the images of the gods differ, everyone would say that those who fell short deserved to be their slaves. And if this is true of the body, it is much more just that the distinction should be made in respect of the soul. But it is not equally easy to see^{1255a1} the beauty of the soul and that of the body.

It is evident, then, that some people are by nature free and others slaves, and that for the latter being a slave is both advantageous and just.

But it is not difficult to see that those who maintain the opposite are also right in a certain way. For being a slave is spoken of in two senses,^{1255a5} as is the slave himself. There is also someone who is a slave and serves as a slave by law. For the law is a kind of agreement by which people say that what is conquered in war belongs to the conquerors. Many versed in the laws indict this claim of

justice as they would a speaker for an unlawful proposal: it is monstrous, they say, if whoever can use force¹⁰ and is superior in power should have the victim of force as his slave and subject. Some hold one view and others the other, even among the wise. The reason for this dispute, and what makes the arguments overlap, is that virtue, when supplied with resources, is in a sense also most capable of using force, and¹⁵ what prevails always has a superiority in some good. Thus force seems not to be without virtue, and the dispute seems to concern only the just. For this reason some think the just is folly, while others think this very thing is just: that the superior should rule. For once these arguments are set apart,²⁰ the opposing arguments have neither strength nor persuasiveness in maintaining that what is better in virtue ought not to rule and be master. In general, some people, holding fast, as they think, to a kind of justice—for law is something just—declare slavery resulting from war to be just, yet at the same time deny it. For the origin may not²⁵ be just in wars, and no one would ever say that someone who does not deserve to be a slave is a slave. Otherwise, it will follow that those considered the best born are slaves and descended from slaves, if they happen to be captured and sold. This is why they do not wish to call themselves slaves, but only barbarians. Yet when they say this,³⁰ they are seeking nothing other than the slave by nature of whom we spoke at the outset; for they must say that some people are slaves everywhere and others nowhere. It is the same with noble birth: they consider themselves wellborn not only among their own people but everywhere, while barbarians are wellborn only at home,³⁵ as though some nobility and freedom were unqualified, and others not unqualified. So too Helen in Theodectes says, “Born of divine roots on either side, who would presume to call me a servant?” When they say this, they distinguish by nothing but virtue and vice⁴⁰ the slave and the free, the wellborn and the^{1255b1} lowborn.

Book I, 1255b–1258b



For they maintain that, just as a human comes from a human and a beast from beasts, so a good person comes from good people. Nature often wishes to bring this about, but cannot always do so.

That the dispute has some reason behind it, ^{1255b5} and that not all are divided into slaves by nature on the one hand and free people on the other, is clear. Yet in some cases this distinction holds, and for these it is advantageous and just that one should be a slave and the other a master. The one must be ruled and the other must exercise the rule for which he is naturally fitted, and therefore also mastery. But to exercise it badly is disadvantageous to both (for ¹⁰ the same thing is advantageous to the part and to the whole, to body and to soul; and the slave is a part of the master, a kind of living but separate part of his body. For this reason there is also a certain common advantage and friendship between slave and master when nature has assigned them these positions; but for those whose relation is not of this kind, ¹⁵ but rests on law and compulsion, the opposite holds).

From this it is also evident that mastery and political rule are not the same, nor are all forms of rule identical with one another, as some say. For one is rule over those free by nature, the other over slaves. Household management is a monarchy, since every household is ruled by one, ^{1255b20} whereas political rule is rule over free and equal people. A master, then, is not so called because of knowledge, but because of the kind of person he is; the same holds for the slave

and the free person. Yet there may be knowledge proper to a master and knowledge proper to a slave. Knowledge proper to a slave is of the sort taught by the man in Syracuse: there someone, for a fee,²⁵ used to teach slave boys their ordinary duties. Instruction of this kind might extend further, to cooking, for example, and the other such branches of service. For some tasks are more honorable than others, and some more necessary; and, as the proverb says, "Slave surpasses slave, and master surpasses master."³⁰ All such kinds of knowledge, then, belong to slaves. The knowledge proper to a master is the use of slaves. For being a master consists not in acquiring slaves, but in using them. This knowledge has nothing great or dignified about it: whatever the slave must know how to do, the master must³⁵ know how to command. For this reason, those who can avoid the trouble themselves appoint a steward to this office, while they themselves take part in public life or pursue philosophy. The art of acquisition is different from both of these; its just form, for example, is a kind of warfare or hunting. Let our distinctions concerning slave and master stand in this⁴⁰ form.

^{1256a1} Let us now consider property and wealth-getting as a whole, following the method already indicated, since the slave too was a part of property. First, one might ask whether wealth-getting is the same as household management,⁵ or a part of it, or an art that serves it; and, if it serves it, whether it does so as shuttle-making serves weaving or as bronze-working serves statue-making. For these do not serve in the same way: one supplies instruments, the other material. By material I mean the underlying substance from which a work is completed: wool, for example, for the weaver,¹⁰ and bronze for the sculptor. It is clear, then, that household management is not the same as wealth-getting, since the task of one is to procure, and of the other to use. For what art other than household management will use the things in the household? But whether wealth-getting is a part of it or a different kind of art is open to dispute.¹⁵ For if it belongs to the person skilled in wealth-getting to consider where resources and property are to come from, and property and wealth comprise many parts, the first question is whether farming is a part of household management or a different kind of art; and the same question concerns, in general, the care and

acquisition of food. Now there are many kinds of food,²⁰ and hence many ways of life among both animals and human beings. For it is impossible to live without food, so differences in food have made the ways of life of animals different. Among beasts, some live in herds and others live scattered, whichever is advantageous for their food, since some of them²⁵ eat animals, others fruit, and others everything. Nature has therefore distinguished their ways of life with a view to ease and the choice of these foods. Since the same thing is not naturally pleasant to every animal, but different things to different animals, the ways of life even of the animal-eaters and fruit-eaters differ from one another. So too³⁰ with human beings: their ways of life differ greatly. The most idle are nomads, for their food comes from tame animals without labor, leaving them at leisure. Since their livestock must move to find pasture, they themselves must follow along, as though with living farmland³⁵ to cultivate. Others live by hunting, and different people by different kinds of hunting: some by plunder, others by fishing—those who live beside lakes, marshes, rivers, or a suitable sea—and others by hunting birds or wild beasts. But the largest part of humankind lives from the earth and its cultivated fruits.

^{1256a40} These, then, are roughly the ways of life whose labor draws directly on nature and which do not, through exchange and retail trade, ^{1256b1} procure their food:

the nomadic, the plundering, the fishing, the hunting, and the farming life. Some also live pleasantly by combining these, supplementing the more deficient way of life wherever it falls short of self-sufficiency: some, for example, ^{1256b5} combine the nomadic and plundering lives, others the farming and hunting lives. The same holds for the others: they live in whatever manner their needs compel them to combine. Property of this kind, then, appears to be given to all by nature herself, both immediately at their first coming into being and when they are fully grown.¹⁰ For at their first coming into being, some animals produce along with their offspring enough food to suffice until the newborn can provide for itself, as do those that produce larvae or lay eggs. Those that bear living young have food within themselves for their offspring for a certain time: what is called milk¹⁵ is this substance. Thus it is likewise clear that we

must suppose plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the sake of human beings, once they have come into being: tame animals both for use and for food; and wild animals, if not all, at least most, for food and other assistance, so that²⁰ clothing and other instruments may also be made from them. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or in vain, nature must have made them all for the sake of human beings. For this reason the art of war too will by nature be in a sense an art of acquisition, since hunting is a part of it. We must use it against wild beasts and²⁵ against those human beings who are naturally fitted to be ruled but refuse, since this kind of war is just by nature.

One kind of acquisition, then, is by nature a part of household management: either it must be ready to hand, or household management must procure it so that it is ready to hand, providing a store of resources necessary for life and useful^{1256b30} for the community of a city or a household. True wealth seems to consist of these. For the amount of property of this sort sufficient for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon says in his verse: “No limit to wealth stands revealed to men.” (Sol. Fr. 13.71) There is a limit, as there is in the other arts;³⁵ for no instrument of any art is unlimited either in number or in size, and wealth is a collection of instruments for household management and political rule. That there is, then, a kind of acquisition natural to household managers and statesmen, and for what reason, is clear.

^{1256b40} There is another kind of acquisition, which people chiefly call wealth-getting, and rightly so; because of it there seems to be no^{1257a1} limit to wealth and property.

Many consider it one and the same as the kind just discussed, because the two are closely related. Yet it is neither the same as that kind nor far removed from it. One of them exists by nature, the other not by nature, but through experience^{1257a5} of a certain kind and art it arises instead. Let us begin our account of it here. Every article of property has two uses. Both are uses of the thing itself, but not in the same way: one is proper to the thing, the other is not. For example, a shoe may be worn or exchanged. Both¹⁰ are uses of a shoe; for the person who exchanges a shoe with someone who needs it, in return for money or food, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not for its proper use, since it did

not come into being for the sake of exchange. The same holds for the other articles of property. For¹⁵ all can be exchanged. Exchange arose at first from a natural circumstance: people had more of some things and less of others than was sufficient. This also makes it clear that retail trade is not by nature a part of wealth-getting; for people had to make exchanges only to the extent sufficient for themselves. In the first²⁰ community, then—that is, the household—it plainly has no function, but it does when the community has grown larger. For the members of the household shared all the same things, whereas those who lived separately shared many different things, which they had to distribute among themselves according to their needs through exchange, as many²⁵ non-Greek peoples still do. They exchange useful things themselves for one another, and nothing more: giving and receiving wine for grain, for example, and each of the other things of this kind. Such exchange, then, is neither contrary to nature nor any form of wealth-getting³⁰ —for it served to complete natural self-sufficiency. Yet the other form arose from this, as one would expect. For as assistance came increasingly from abroad, through importing what people lacked and exporting what they had in surplus, the use of money was necessarily devised. For not everything is easy to carry that is naturally³⁵ necessary. For this reason people agreed among themselves to give and receive in exchange something which was itself a useful thing and could readily be handled for the needs of life: iron, silver, or anything else of this sort. At first it was defined simply by size and weight, but in the end⁴⁰ they also stamped it with a mark, to free themselves from having to measure it; for the stamp was set upon it as a sign of its quantity.

^{1257b1} Once money had been devised from necessary exchange, the other form of wealth-getting arose: retail trade. At first it was perhaps practiced simply; then experience made it more skillful, showing where and how exchanges would produce the greatest⁵ profit. For this reason wealth-getting seems to concern money above all, and its task seems to be the ability to discern where an abundance of it will come from, since it produces wealth and resources. Indeed, people often regard wealth as an abundance of money, because it is the concern of wealth-getting¹⁰ and retail trade. At other times, however, money

seems to be an empty thing, wholly a matter of convention and nothing by nature: if those who use it change their convention, it has no worth and is useful for none of life's necessities. Someone rich in money will often lack necessary food. Yet it is absurd that there should be such¹⁵ wealth that a person with an abundance of it may die of hunger, as the story tells of the famous Midas, whose insatiable prayer made everything set before him turn to gold. For this reason people seek something else as wealth and wealth-getting, and rightly seek it. For there is a different kind of wealth-getting and wealth that is²⁰ natural. This kind belongs to household management; the other belongs to retail trade and produces wealth, not in every way, but through the exchange of resources. The latter seems to concern money, for money is the starting point and the end of exchange. And this wealth, the wealth arising from this kind of wealth-getting, is indeed unlimited.²⁵ For just as medicine has no limit in its pursuit of health, and each art has no limit in its pursuit of its end—since each wishes to achieve that end as fully as possible—but is not unlimited in the means to its end, since the end sets a limit for them all, so too this kind of wealth-getting has no limit to its end. Its end is of this kind:³⁰ wealth and the acquisition of resources. But the wealth-getting of household management has a limit, for this is not the task of household management. Thus, in one respect, a limit to all wealth seems necessary, yet in practice we see the opposite occurring: all who pursue wealth-getting increase their money without limit.³⁵ The cause is the close relationship between the two forms. For their uses overlap, since each form of wealth-getting uses the same thing. Both use the same property, but not in the same respect: one has a different end, while the other's end is increase. Thus some think this is the task of household management, and persist in the belief that preserving⁴⁰ or increasing their stock of money without limit is necessary. The cause of this disposition is a concern with living, but^{1258a1} not with living well.

Since that desire is unlimited, they also desire unlimited means of satisfying it. Even those who aim at living well seek the means to bodily pleasures; and since this too appears to depend on property,^{1258a5} they spend all their time on wealth-getting, and the other form of wealth-getting has arisen for this reason.

For since their enjoyment lies in excess, they seek the art that produces an excess of enjoyment. If they cannot provide it through wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means,¹⁰ using each of their capacities contrary to nature. For the task of courage is not to produce resources but confidence; nor is producing resources the task of generalship or medicine, but victory for the one and health for the other. Yet these people turn them all into arts of wealth-getting, as though that were the end and everything had to serve that end.

Concerning the kind of wealth-getting that is not^{1258a15} necessary, what it is, and why we have need of it, we have now spoken, as we have of the necessary kind, which differs from it, belongs by nature to household management, and concerns food. It is not unlimited like the other, but has a boundary.

The question raised at the outset is also clear: whether^{1258a20} wealth-getting belongs to the household manager and the statesman, or whether it does not, but must instead be ready to hand. For just as political rule does not make human beings, but receives them from nature and uses them, so nature must supply food, whether from earth, sea, or something else. From these supplies, arranging them as they should be arranged²⁵ is the household manager's task. For weaving does not make wool, but uses it, and also recognizes what sort is good and suitable, or poor and unsuitable. One might also ask why wealth-getting is a part of household management, while medicine is not; yet people must be healthy³⁰ within the household, just as they must live or meet any other necessity. But since in one sense it belongs to the household manager and the ruler to attend to health, and in another it does not, but belongs to the doctor, so too in one sense resources are the household manager's concern, and in another they are not, but belong to the art that serves him. Above all, as was said earlier, they must³⁵ be ready to hand by nature. For it is nature's task to provide food for what is born: in every case, the remainder of that from which it is born is food for it. Thus wealth-getting from fruits and animals is natural for all. Since it is twofold, as we said, one form belonging to retail trade and the other to household management,⁴⁰ and since the latter is necessary and praised,

while the^{1258b1} exchange form is rightly blamed, since it is not according to nature but takes from other people, moneylending is most reasonably hated: its gain comes from money itself, and not from that for which money was devised. For money came into being for the sake of exchange,⁵ but interest makes it increase. This is also the source of its name, which means offspring: what is born resembles what gives it birth, and interest is money born of money. Thus, of all forms of wealth-getting, this is the most contrary to nature.

Since we have made sufficient distinctions for understanding, the matters^{1258b10} that concern practice must be considered in turn. In all such matters, contemplation is a free pursuit, but practical experience is a necessity. Useful parts of wealth-getting include experience concerning property: what sorts are most profitable, where, and how—for example, what sort of stock of horses, cattle, or sheep, and likewise¹⁵ of the other animals. For one must know by experience which of these are most profitable compared with one another, and which sorts thrive in which places, since different animals flourish in different regions. Next comes knowledge of farming, both of open fields and of planted land, of beekeeping, and of the other animals, aquatic or winged, from²⁰ which assistance can be obtained. These, then, are the primary parts of the most proper form of wealth-getting. Of the exchange form, the largest part is commerce, which has three parts: shipowning, transport, and offering goods for sale. These differ from one another in that some are safer, while others yield a greater return.²⁵ The second part is lending at interest, and the third is wage labor, one sort of which belongs to the mechanical arts, the other to those without a craft who are useful only through their bodies. There is a third form of wealth-getting, between this and the first, since it has a share both in the natural form and in the exchange form: everything drawn from the earth³⁰ and from things arising from the earth which, though they bear no fruit, are useful—for example, woodcutting and every kind of mining. Mining itself comprises many kinds, for there are many sorts of things mined from the earth. Of occupations, those require the most skill in which chance has the smallest part; those are most mechanical in which the³⁵ body is most damaged; those most slavish in which the body is put to the most uses; and those most ignoble in which virtue

is least needed. We have now spoken of each of these in general; examining their particulars precisely would be useful for the occupations themselves, but tiresome to dwell on.

Book I, 1258b–1260b



Since some have^{1258b40} written about these matters, such as Charetides of Paros and^{1259a1} Apollodorus of Lemnos on farming both open fields and planted land, and likewise others on other subjects, anyone concerned with these matters should study them from those writings. There are also the scattered accounts of the means by which some people have succeeded in wealth-getting,⁵ which we must collect. For all these are useful to those who value wealth-getting: the case of Thales of Miletus, for example. This is an insight into wealth-getting, which people attribute to him because of his wisdom, but it happens to be of general application. For when people reproached him for his poverty, claiming the uselessness¹⁰ of philosophy, they say that he foresaw from his study of the stars that there would be a large olive crop. While it was still winter, he obtained a little money and paid deposits on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, hiring them cheaply because no one was bidding against him. When the season¹⁵ came and many presses were suddenly sought at once, he hired them out on whatever terms he wished. By collecting a great deal of money, he showed that it is easy for philosophers to become rich if they wish, but that this is not what they care about. Thales, then, is said to have displayed his wisdom in this way. But, as²⁰ we said, this device in wealth-getting is generally applicable whenever someone can establish a monopoly for himself. For this reason some cities too adopt this source of revenue when they lack resources: they establish a monopoly in goods for sale. In

Sicily, someone who had money deposited with him bought up all the iron from²⁵ the ironworks. Afterward, when the merchants arrived from the trading centers, he was the only seller. He did not raise the price greatly, but nevertheless, on his fifty talents, he gained a hundred. When Dionysius learned of this, he told him to take his money away, but no longer to³⁰ remain in Syracuse, since he was finding sources of revenue disadvantageous to Dionysius' own affairs. Yet this insight and that of Thales are the same: both contrived to establish a monopoly for themselves. It is useful for statesmen too to know these things. For many cities need wealth-getting and such³⁵ sources of revenue, just as a household does, and even more; hence some of those who take part in public life concern themselves with these matters alone.

There were three parts of household management—one, mastery, which we discussed earlier; another, paternal rule; and the third, marital rule. For a man rules both wife and children as free people,^{1259a40} both of them, but not with the same manner of rule,

rather,^{1259b1} he rules his wife politically and his children as a king. For the male is by nature more fitted to lead than the female, unless their relation is in some way contrary to nature; and the older and fully developed is more fitted to lead than the younger and undeveloped. In political rule, then,⁵ in most cases the ruler and the ruled exchange places, since they tend to be equal in nature and to differ in nothing. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled, they seek a distinction in outward appearance, forms of address, and honors, as Amasis also said in his account of the footbath. But the male always, in relation to¹⁰ the female, stands in this way. Rule over children is kingly, for the parent rules both by affection and by seniority, which is the form of kingly rule. For this reason Homer rightly addressed Zeus as “Father of men and gods,” (Hom. Il. 1.544) the king of them all. For by nature¹⁵ a king must differ from his subjects, yet be of the same kind; and this is the relation of the older to the younger and of the parent to the child.

It is evident, then, that household management is more concerned with human beings than with acquiring inanimate things, and^{1259b20} with their virtue rather than that of property, which we call wealth; and more with free

people than with slaves. First, concerning slaves, one might ask whether a slave has any virtue beyond the virtues of an instrument and a servant, any other virtue more honorable than these, such as moderation, courage, justice, and²⁵ the other such dispositions; or whether he has none beyond bodily service. Either answer presents a difficulty. For if slaves have these virtues, how will they differ from free people? But if they do not, that is absurd, since they are human beings and share in reason. The question is much the same concerning a woman and a child:³⁰ do they too have virtues, and must a woman be moderate, courageous, and just, and can a child be either intemperate or moderate, or not? We must therefore examine this generally concerning those who rule and those who are ruled by nature: is their virtue the same or different? For if both must share in nobility and goodness,³⁵ why should one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? Nor can they differ by having more or less of it: ruling and being ruled differ in kind, whereas more and less do not. But if one must have virtue and the other need not, that is strange. For if the ruler is not moderate and just,⁴⁰ how will he rule well? And if the ruled person is not, how will he be ruled^{1260a1} well?

For if he is intemperate and cowardly, he will do none of what he ought. It is evident, then, that both must share in virtue, but that there must be differences in this virtue, as there are among those ruled by nature. This is already indicated by the facts concerning^{1260a5} the soul. For in the soul there is by nature a ruling element and a ruled element, whose virtues we say are different: those of the rational and the irrational elements, for example. It is clear, then, that the same holds in other cases, so that there are by nature several kinds of ruler and ruled. For the free person, in his relation to the slave,¹⁰ rules in one way, the male rules the female in another, and the man the child in another. The parts of the soul are present in all of them, but present differently. For the slave has no deliberative element at all; the female has it, but it lacks authority; the child has it, but it is incomplete.¹⁵ For this reason the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in its complete form, since the task belongs without qualification to the directing craftsman, and reason is the directing craftsman; each of the others must possess as much as falls to his share. We must suppose, then,

that the same necessarily holds for the moral virtues: all must share in them, but not in the same²⁰ way, rather as much as each requires for his own task. Thus it is evident that moral virtue belongs to all those mentioned, and that moderation is not the same in a woman and a man, nor courage and justice, as Socrates thought. Rather, the one's courage is fitted for rule and the other's for service; and the same holds for the other virtues.

This becomes clearer still in the particulars^{1260a25} when we examine them. For those who speak in general terms deceive themselves when they say that virtue is the soul's being in good condition, or acting rightly, or something of this sort. Those who enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias does, speak far better than those who define them in this way. Thus we must accept the sort of distinction the poet made concerning a woman, and hold that it applies³⁰ in every case: "Silence brings adornment to a woman," (Soph. Aj. 293) but this no longer holds for a man. Since the child is incomplete, it is clear that his³² virtue too is not relative to himself in his present state, but to his end and to the one who guides him; likewise the slave's virtue is relative to his master. We laid it down that the slave is useful for necessary tasks, so it is clear that he needs only a little virtue: enough that neither intemperance nor cowardice makes him fail in his work. One might ask, if what has just been said is true, whether craftsmen too will need virtue, since they often fail in their work through intemperance. Or is there a very great difference here? For the⁴⁰ slave shares in his master's life, whereas the craftsman is further removed, and virtue falls to his share only to the extent that slavery does.

For the mechanical craftsman^{1260b1} has a certain limited slavery; and the slave is among those who are such by nature, but no shoemaker is, nor any of the other craftsmen. It is evident, then, that the master must be the source of this kind of virtue in the slave, but not by possessing the mastery that teaches the⁵ work itself. For this reason those who deprive slaves of reasoned speech and say that commands alone should be used are mistaken: slaves need admonition even more than children do.

Let our distinctions on these matters stand in this form. But concerning husband and wife, children and father, and concerning^{1260b10} the virtue of each, and their dealings with one another—what is good and what is not, and how the good should be pursued and the bad avoided—we must discuss these in our treatment of constitutions. For every household is a part of a city, and these are parts of a household; and we must consider the part in relation to the whole¹⁵ in respect of virtue. We must therefore educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if indeed it makes any difference to the city's being good that its children and women should be good. It must make a difference: for women are half the free population, and from children,²⁰ those who share in the constitution arise. Thus, since these matters have been distinguished and the remaining ones must be discussed elsewhere, let us leave our present arguments as complete, make a new beginning, and first examine those who have pronounced upon the best constitution.

Book II, 1260b–1264a



^{1260b27} Since we propose to examine the political community, asking which is best of all for those able to live as nearly as possible according to their wishes, we must also investigate the other constitutions,³⁰ both those employed by cities said to be well governed and any others proposed by particular thinkers and thought to be sound. In this way we may see what is right and useful; and our search for something different from these will not seem merely the work of people eager to display their ingenuity. Rather, because they are not³⁵ sound as they now exist, we may be seen to have undertaken this inquiry for that reason. We must first begin where this investigation naturally begins. For the citizens must share either everything, or nothing, or some things but not others. That they should share nothing is plainly⁴⁰ impossible: the constitution is a kind of community, and they must first share a place. For the territory is one for^{1261a1} a single city,

the citizens being partners in that one city. But is it better for a city that is to be well ordered to share everything that can be shared, or to share some things but not others? For citizens can have children and women^{1261a5} and property in common with one another, as in Plato's Republic. There Socrates says that children, women, and property should be held in common. Which arrangement, then, is better: the present one, or that prescribed by the law written in the Republic?

^{1261a10} Having women common to everyone presents many other difficulties, and the reason Socrates gives for legislating in this way does not appear to follow from his arguments. Further, the end he says the city should possess is impossible as it is now stated; and how it should be qualified has not been defined.¹⁵ I mean his claim that it is best for the whole city to be as nearly one as possible: this is the assumption Socrates adopts. Yet it is evident that, as it advances and becomes more and more one, it will cease even to be a city. For a city is by nature a plurality, and as it becomes more nearly one, from a city a household, and from a household a person,²⁰ will arise. We would call a household more nearly one than a city, and an individual more nearly one than a household. Thus, even if someone could bring this about, he should not do it, since he would destroy the city.

A city consists not merely of several human beings, but also of human beings differing in kind. A city does not arise from people who are alike. For there is a difference between an alliance^{1261a25} and a city. The former is useful through its numbers, even if its members are of the same kind, since an alliance naturally exists for mutual assistance, just as a heavier weight tips the balance more. But the elements from which a unity is to arise must differ in kind. In this respect a city will also differ from a nation,³⁰ when its population is not dispersed among villages, but is like the Arcadians. For this reason reciprocal equality preserves cities, as was said earlier in the *Ethics*. Even among people who are free and equal, this must be so. For all cannot rule at once, but only for a year at a time, or according to some other arrangement or period. This comes about³⁵ in such a way that all rule, just as if shoemakers and carpenters exchanged occupations, rather than the same people always remaining shoemakers and carpenters. Since it is better for things to be arranged in the latter way in the political community too, it is clear that the same people should always rule, if possible. But where this is impossible because in^{1261b1} nature all are equal,

and at the same time it is just for all to share in rule, whether ruling is a good or a bad thing, this arrangement at least imitates differences among those out of office: equals yield to one another in turn. For some rule and others are ruled in

succession,^{1261b5} as though they had become different people. In the same way, different rulers hold different offices. From this it is clear that the city is not by nature one in the way some people say, and that what has been described as the greatest good for cities destroys them. Yet the good of each thing preserves it.¹⁰ It is also clear in another way that seeking to make the city excessively one is not better. A household is more self-sufficient than an individual, and a city than a household; indeed, it seeks to be a city only when the community of its people comes to be self-sufficient. If, then, what is more self-sufficient is more desirable, being less one rather than¹⁵ more one is also more desirable.

But even if this is best—that the community should be as nearly one as possible—not even this appears to be established by the argument that everyone should say “mine” and “not mine” together. For Socrates thinks this a sign that the^{1261b20} city is completely one. But “everyone” has two meanings. If it means each individual, this would perhaps be closer to what Socrates wishes to achieve: each will call the same person his own son, and likewise the same woman his own wife, and will speak in the same way about property and each of the things that fall to him. As it is, they will not speak in this way,²⁵ those who share women and children: all will do so, but not each individually. Likewise with property: all will do so, but not each individually. It is clear, then, that saying “everyone” involves a fallacy. For “all” and “both,” and “odd” and “even,” through their ambiguity also³⁰ produce contentious inferences in arguments. Hence everyone’s saying the same thing is admirable in one sense, but impossible; in the other, it does nothing to produce concord. Besides, the proposal has another harmful consequence. What is common to the greatest number receives the least care. People care most for what is their own; for what is common,³⁵ less, or only to the extent that it falls to each of them. For, apart from other considerations, they neglect it more because they think someone else is looking after it, just as in household service many servants sometimes perform their duties worse than fewer do. Each citizen comes to have a thousand sons; these are not sons of each individual, but any one of them, to any citizen,^{1262a1} is equally a son.

Thus all will neglect them equally.

Further, each says “mine” of whichever citizen is prospering or faring badly, whatever his number may be, saying “mine” or “so-and-so’s” in this way of each of the thousand, or however many the^{1262a5} city contains; and even this he says doubtfully. For it is unclear to whom a child happened to be born, and whether it survived after birth. Yet is it better for each to say “mine” in this way, when two thousand or ten thousand call the same person “mine,” or rather as people in cities now say “mine”? For one, he is his own son; for another, his own brother:¹⁰ they give these names to the same person. Another calls him his cousin, or gives him some other name of kinship, whether by blood or by family connection and marriage, relating him first to himself or to his relatives. Besides these, another calls him a member of his brotherhood or tribe. It is better to be someone’s own cousin than a son in this way. Moreover, it is not even possible to prevent some people from¹⁵ supposing that particular people are their own brothers, children, fathers, and mothers. For the resemblances children bear to those who begot them must give grounds for recognizing one another. Some writers on the circuits of the earth say that this actually happens: among certain²⁰ Libyans of the interior, women are shared, but the children born to them are assigned according to their resemblances. Some women, and females of other animals, such as mares and cows, are naturally very likely to produce offspring resembling their parents, as did the mare in Pharsalus called Dicaea.

^{1262a25} Further, those who establish this community cannot easily guard against such difficulties as assaults, unintentional and intentional killings, fights, and abusive speech. None of these is holy when committed against fathers, mothers, and close relatives, as it is against those more distantly related.³⁰ Such things must occur more often when people do not know their relatives than when they do; and when they occur, the customary acts of expiation are possible where the relationship is known, but none is possible where it is not. It is also absurd to make sons common and then forbid lovers only sexual intercourse, without prohibiting love or intimacies³⁵ of other kinds that are utterly unfitting between father and son or brother and brother, since even love

alone is unfitting. It is also absurd to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the excessive intensity of the pleasure, and to think that its occurring between father and son or between brothers⁴⁰ makes no difference.

Sharing women and children seems more useful for the farmers^{1262b1} than for the guardians.

For there will be less friendship when children and women are held in common, and the ruled should be of this sort if they are to obey and not seek revolution. In general, such a law must produce the opposite of what properly^{1262b5} established laws should bring about, and of the reason Socrates thinks arrangements for children and women should be made in this way. For we consider friendship the greatest of goods for cities, since it would leave them least prone to faction; and Socrates praises above all the city's being one,¹⁰ which seems, and which he too says, to be the work of friendship. So we know Aristophanes says in the discourses on love that lovers, through their intense affection, desire to grow together and, from being two, both become one. In that case, both would necessarily perish, or one of them;¹⁵ but in the city friendship must become diluted through such a community, and a son will scarcely say "my father," or a father "my son." Just as a little sweetness mixed into much water makes the mixture imperceptible, so too does this happen to the kinship people feel for one another through names²⁰ of this kind. In such a constitution, a father must care very little for his sons, a son for his father, or brothers for one another. For two things above all make people care and feel affection: that something is their own, and that it is dear to them. Neither can belong to people who take part in public life in this way. Moreover,²⁵ the transfer of children born to farmers and craftsmen into the guardians, and of children born to guardians into the other groups, raises great confusion as to how it is to be done. Those who give and transfer children must know whom they are giving to whom. Further, the things mentioned earlier, still more often,³⁰ must occur among these people—assaults, love affairs, killings. For those given to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians brothers, children, fathers, and mothers; nor, conversely, will those among the guardians call the other citizens by these names, so as to avoid committing any such act because of their³⁵ kinship.

Let this, then, be our determination concerning the sharing of children and women.

The next question is property: how should it be arranged for those who are to take part in public life under the best constitution? Common or not common—^{1262b40} which should property be? One might examine this separately from the legislation concerning children and women.

I mean, ^{1263a1} concerning property, whether, even if children and women belong to separate families, as they now do everywhere, it is better for property and its use to be common. For example, should the plots of land be separate, but the produce be brought into a common stock and consumed, as some ⁵ nations do? Or should the reverse hold: the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce divided for private use, as some non-Greek peoples are also said to share it? Or should both the plots and the produce be common? If the farmers are other people, the arrangement would be different and ¹⁰ easier; but if the citizens themselves labor on their own property, it would present more difficulties. For when they are not equal but unequal in enjoyment and in work, accusations must arise against those who enjoy or receive much but work little, on the part of those who receive less ¹⁵ but work more. In general, living together and sharing all human affairs is difficult, especially affairs of this kind. The associations of fellow travelers show this: most of them fall out, coming into conflict with one another over everyday matters and trifles. Further, among servants, most of all ²⁰ we clash with those we employ most often for ordinary duties.

Common ownership of property, then, presents these and other such difficulties. But the present arrangement, embellished by customs and an order of right laws, would be greatly superior. For it will have the good of both arrangements: ^{1263a25} by both I mean common and private ownership of property. For property should be common in a certain sense, but in general private. When responsibilities are divided, they will not give rise to accusations against one another, and will lead to greater improvement, since each person attends to what is his own. Through virtue, however, in its use, ³⁰ “Friends’ possessions are common,” as the proverb says. Even now this arrangement is sketched out

in some cities, showing that it is not impossible; and especially in well-ordered cities some of it exists already, while the rest could come about. For each person, while having his own private property, makes some of it available to friends and uses other things³⁵ in common. In Lacedaemon, for example, they use one another's slaves almost as their own, and also horses and dogs, and, if they need provisions, the produce of farms throughout the country. It is clear, then, that it is better for property to be private, but to make its use common. To make people like this is the lawgiver's⁴⁰ special task. Further, the pleasure of regarding something as one's own makes an indescribable difference.

For surely it is not without purpose that toward^{1263b1} himself each person feels affection; this is natural. Selfishness, however, is rightly censured. It is not loving oneself, but loving oneself more than one should, just as with the love of money; for practically everyone loves⁵ each of these things. Moreover, it is most pleasant to do favors and give help to friends, guests, or companions, and this is possible when property is private. These things do not occur for those who make the city excessively one; and besides, they plainly abolish the acts of two virtues: temperance in relation to women¹⁰ —for it is a noble act to refrain through temperance from another man's wife—and generosity in relation to property. For no one will be seen to be generous, nor will he perform any generous act, since the work of generosity lies in the use of property.

^{1263b15} Such legislation, then, has a pleasing appearance and might seem humane. Whoever hears it gladly accepts it, thinking that a marvelous friendship will exist between everyone and everyone else, especially when someone denounces the evils now present in constitutions as arising because²⁰ property is not common. I mean lawsuits against one another over contracts, trials for false testimony, and flattery of the rich. None of these arises from the absence of common ownership, but from wickedness. Indeed, we see that those who own property in common and share it quarrel much more than those who hold separately²⁵ their property. But we see few people quarreling over partnerships, compared with the many who own their property privately. Further, it is just to mention not only how many evils they will lose by sharing, but also how many goods. Such a life appears utterly impossible.

The cause^{1263b30} of Socrates' error must be taken to be the incorrectness of his assumption. Both the household and the city must be one in a certain sense, but not in every sense. For there is a point at which, if it advances further, it will cease to be a city; and another at which it will still be a city, but a worse one, because it is close to ceasing to be a city. It is as though someone made³⁵ a harmony into a unison, or a rhythm into a single beat. Rather, since it is a plurality, as was said earlier, it must be made a community and a unity through education. It is absurd that someone intending to introduce education, and thinking it will make the city good, should suppose he can put it right by such measures rather than by⁴⁰ customs, philosophy, and laws, as, through the common messes in Lacedaemon and Crete, the^{1264a1} lawgiver made property common.

Book II, 1264a–1267a



We must also not overlook this very point: we should heed the long passage of time and the many years during which these arrangements, if they were sound, could not have escaped notice. For almost everything has been discovered, but some things have not been brought together, while others people do not use, though they ^{1264a5} know them. This would become especially clear if someone saw such a constitution being established in practice. For he will not be able to make the city without dividing and separating its members, some into common messes, others into brotherhoods and tribes. Thus the only distinctive legislation will turn out to be a prohibition on farming¹⁰ for the guardians, which is just what the Lacedaemonians now try to enforce.

Moreover, Socrates has not said what the form of the entire constitution will be for those who share in it, nor is it easy to say. Yet the body of the other citizens makes up almost the whole population of the city. Nothing has been determined about them: whether ^{1264a15} the farmers too should hold property in common or each should have his own private property, and further, whether their women and children should be private or common. For if everything is common to everyone in the same way, how will these people differ from those guardians? Or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their rule, and on what grounds will they submit²⁰ to it, unless they devise something like the Cretans' arrangement? For the Cretans allow their slaves everything else on the same terms, prohibiting only physical training and the possession of weapons.

But if these matters are arranged among them as they are in other cities, what form will their community take? Within a single city,²⁵ two cities must exist, and these opposed to one another. For he makes the guardians a kind of garrison, while the farmers, craftsmen, and others are citizens. Accusations, lawsuits, and all the other evils he says exist in cities will exist among these people too. Yet Socrates says³⁰ that because of their education they will not need many regulations, such as those governing the city, the market, and other such matters, while assigning education only to the guardians. Further, he makes the farmers, who pay a contribution, sovereign over the property. But they are likely to be much more troublesome, with pride³⁵ in full measure, than the helots, penestae, and slaves found in some places. Whether these arrangements are equally necessary or not, however, nothing has now been determined, nor about the related questions: what their constitution and education will be, and what their laws. These are not easy to discover; nor is it a small matter what sort of people⁴⁰ these are, for the preservation of the guardians' community.

But^{1264b1} if he makes the women common and the property private, who will manage the households as their husbands manage affairs in the fields—and who will do so even if the farmers' property and women are common? It is also absurd to draw the analogy from wild animals,⁵ arguing that women should follow the same pursuits as men, since those animals have no part in household management.

The way Socrates appoints the rulers is also precarious. For he always makes the same people rulers; and this causes faction even among people who possess no distinction, still more surely among spirited^{1264b10} and warlike men. It is clear that he must make the same people rulers. For the gold bestowed by the god is not mixed into the souls of one group at one time and another at another, but always into the same souls. He says the god mixed gold into some at birth, silver into others, and bronze and iron¹⁵ into those who were to become craftsmen and farmers. Further, although he deprives the guardians of happiness, he says the lawgiver must make the whole city happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most or all of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For happiness does not belong to the same things²⁰ as being even does. The lat-

ter can belong to a whole without belonging to either of its parts, but this is impossible with happiness. Moreover, if the guardians are not happy, who else is? Surely not the craftsmen and the mass of manual workers. The constitution Socrates has described, then, has these²⁵ difficulties and others no less serious.

The situation is much the same with the Laws, written later; so it is better to examine briefly the constitution presented there as well. For in the Republic Socrates has settled very few matters: concerning women^{1264b30} and children, how their sharing should be arranged, property, and the ordering of the constitution. For the population is divided into two parts, one consisting of farmers, the other of those who fight in its defense; and a third part drawn from these deliberates and is sovereign over the city. But as for the farmers and craftsmen,³⁵ whether they will share in no office or in some, and whether they too should possess weapons and fight alongside the others or not, Socrates has determined nothing. He thinks, however, that women should fight alongside the men and share the same education as the guardians. For the rest, with extraneous matters he has filled⁴⁰ his account, and with discussion of education—what sort should be given^{1265a1} to the guardians.

Most of the Laws consists of laws; he has said little about the constitution. Although he wishes to make this one more generally applicable to cities, little by little he brings it back toward the other constitution. For apart from^{1265a5} the sharing of women and property, he assigns the same arrangements to both constitutions: the same education, a life free from necessary labor, and likewise the arrangements for common messes. Except that in this constitution he says there should also be common messes for women; and while the former has a thousand¹⁰ men bearing arms, this one has five thousand.

All Socrates' discourses, then, possess an extraordinary quality, refinement, originality, and an inquiring spirit; but it is perhaps difficult to have everything right. For we must not overlook that the population just mentioned will require a territory as large as Babylonia,^{1265a15} or some other country of limitless extent, to support five thousand men living without work, and around them a further multitude of women and servants many times as numerous. We should make our assumptions according to our wishes, but assume nothing

impossible. It is said that the lawgiver should frame his laws with an eye to two things:²⁰ the territory and the people. It is also well to add the neighboring territories, first of all if the city is to live a political life. For it must use weapons of war that are useful not only within its own territory, but also outside it, in²⁵ other regions. Even if someone does not approve of such a life, either for himself or for the city in common, they must nonetheless be formidable to their enemies, not only when these enter their territory, but also when they leave it.

We should also consider the amount of property: might it be better to define it differently, with greater clarity? For enough property^{1265a30} he says there must be to live temperately, as though someone had said enough to live well. But this is too general, since it is possible to live temperately yet miserably. A better definition is to live temperately and generously; for taken separately, generosity leads to luxury, temperance to hardship. These alone³⁵ are desirable dispositions concerning the use of wealth: it is not possible, for example, to use wealth gently or courageously, but it is possible to use it temperately and generously. Hence these dispositions must concern it. It is also absurd to equalize property without making arrangements for the number of citizens, but to leave⁴⁰ childbearing unrestricted, on the assumption that childlessness will sufficiently balance it out to the same population, however many children are born,

^{1265b1} because this seems to happen in cities even now. But this cannot work out with the same precision in cities then as it does now. Now no one goes without, because property is divided among any number of people; then, since it is indivisible, those in excess must⁵ have nothing, whether they are few or many. One might suppose that childbearing needs to be limited more than property, so that no more than a certain number are born. This number should be set with an eye to the chance that some of those born will die, and to¹⁰ the childlessness of others. Leaving it unrestricted, as in most cities, must cause poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces faction and wrongdoing. Thus Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest lawgivers, thought the number of households and the number of citizens should remain the same,¹⁵ even if at the outset all had allotments unequal in size. But in these Laws the opposite holds.

We must say later how we think these matters could be better arranged. These Laws also leave out how the rulers will differ from the ruled. For he says²⁰ that, just as the warp is made from a different wool than the woof, so the rulers should stand in relation to the ruled. Since he allows total wealth to increase up to fivefold, why should this not also hold for land up to a certain limit? We must also examine the division of house plots, to see whether it does not²⁵ benefit household management. For he allotted two house plots to each person, separating them from one another; but it is difficult to inhabit two households.

The entire arrangement is intended to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but intermediate between them, what people call a polity; for it consists of those who bear heavy arms. If, then, he establishes this as the most generally applicable^{1265b30} to cities among the other constitutions, perhaps he has spoken well. But if he presents it as the best after the first constitution, he has not spoken well. For one might perhaps praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution more, or even some other more aristocratic one. Some people say the best constitution must be a mixture of all constitutions;³⁵ for this reason they praise the Lacedaemonians' constitution. Some say it consists of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, calling the kingship monarchy and the rule of the elders oligarchy, while the rule of the ephors makes it democratic, because from the people come⁴⁰ the ephors. Others say the ephorate is tyranny, and that it is democratic in the common messes and in the rest of^{1266a1} daily life.

But in these Laws it is said that the best constitution should consist of democracy and tyranny, which one would regard either as no constitutions at all or as the worst of all. Those who mix more forms therefore speak better, since what is composed of^{1266a5} more forms is a better constitution. Further, this constitution does not appear to have any monarchical element, but only oligarchic and democratic ones; and it tends to incline more toward oligarchy. This is clear from the appointment of rulers. Choosing by lot from those already elected is common to both forms; but as for the wealthier,¹⁰ requiring them to attend the assembly, elect rulers, or perform some other public duty, while exempting the others, is oligarchic. So too is the attempt to have more rulers drawn from the wealthy, and those holding the greatest offices drawn

from the highest property qualifications. He also makes the choice of the council oligarchic. For they elect¹⁵ under compulsion, all of them, but from the first property qualification; then again an equal number from the second; then from the third, except that not all those of the third or fourth classes were compelled to vote. From the fourth, only those of the first and second classes are compelled to elect. Then, from those chosen, equally from each property qualification,²⁰ a number should be appointed, he says. Those from the highest property qualifications will therefore be more numerous and better, because some of the common people will not elect, since they are not compelled to do so. That such a constitution should not be composed of democracy and monarchy is clear from these considerations and from what will be said later,²⁵ when the investigation turns to this sort of constitution. Electing rulers from among those already elected also carries a danger. For if certain people wish to combine, even a moderate number of them, the elections will always accord with their wishes. The constitution in the Laws, then, has this³⁰ character.

There are also other constitutions, some proposed by private individuals, others by philosophers and statesmen. All are closer than these two to the established constitutions under which people now take part in public life. For sharing children and^{1266a35} women is an innovation no one else has introduced; nor has anyone else instituted common messes for women. Instead, they begin rather with necessary matters. Some think the most important thing is that property should be well ordered, since, they say, everyone forms factions over it. Phaleas of Chalcedon therefore first introduced this proposal:⁴⁰ he says the citizens' property should be equal.

This,^{1266b1} he thought, would not be difficult to achieve at once in cities being founded. In cities already inhabited it would be harder; nonetheless, equality could be reached most quickly if the rich gave dowries but did not receive them, while the poor did not give them but received them⁵ instead. Plato, writing the Laws, thought some freedom should be allowed up to a point, but no citizen should be permitted to acquire more than five times the smallest holding, as was said earlier. Those who legislate in this way must also not overlook what they now overlook: that when regulating property¹⁰ by

amount, they should also set the number of children. For if the number of children exceeds the scale of the property, the law must be broken; and apart from its being broken, it is bad for many people to become poor after being rich, since it is difficult to prevent such people from seeking revolution. That there is¹⁵ some influence on the political community in equality of property was evidently recognized by some people long ago. Solon, for example, legislated on it, and among other peoples there is a law preventing anyone from acquiring as much land as he wishes. Likewise, laws prevent the sale of property: in Locri, for instance, a law²⁰ prohibits selling unless one can show that a manifest misfortune has occurred. There are also laws preserving the original allotments. The abolition of this restriction in Leucas made their constitution excessively democratic, since it no longer happened that people proceeded to office on the basis of the prescribed property qualifications. But equality²⁵ may exist in property, yet it may be too abundant, leading to luxury, or too scanty, leading to a pinched existence. It is clear, then, that making property equal is not enough for the lawgiver: he must aim at the mean. Further, even if someone fixed a moderate amount of property for everyone, it would be of no use. For desires need to be³⁰ equalized more than property, and this is impossible unless people are adequately educated by the laws. But perhaps Phaleas would say that this is precisely what he means. For he thinks cities must have equality in these two things, property and education. Yet he must say what the education will be; and its being one³⁵ and the same is of no use. For it can be one and the same, yet of a kind that will lead people to choose to grasp for more money, or honor, or both together.

Further, people form factions not only because property is unequal, but also because honors are, though in opposite ways in^{1266b40} each case. For the many do so because property is unequal,

^{1267a1} while the cultivated do so over honors, if these are equal. Hence the saying: "The base and the noble alike receive the same honor." (Hom. Il. 9.319) People do wrong not only for necessities, for which he thinks equality of property is a remedy, so that they need not steal clothing because they are cold or⁵ hungry, but also to enjoy themselves and satisfy their desires. For if their desire

goes beyond necessities, they will do wrong to remedy it. Nor is this the only reason: they may also desire to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied by pain. What, then, is the remedy for these three things? For the first, a little property¹⁰ and work; for the second, temperance. Third, if some wish to find enjoyment in themselves, they would seek a remedy nowhere but in philosophy, since the other pleasures require other people. For the greatest wrongs are committed through excess, not for necessities: people do not become tyrants to avoid being cold. Thus¹⁵ the honors are great if someone kills not a thief but a tyrant. Hence the arrangement of Phaleas' constitution helps only against minor wrongs. Further, most of his intended arrangements concern how people will conduct their public life well in their dealings with one another; but they must also do so in relation to their neighbors and all outsiders.²⁰ The constitution must therefore be organized with a view to military strength, about which he has said nothing. The same holds for property. It must be sufficient not only for civic uses but also for dangers from outside. Therefore it should neither be so abundant that²⁵ stronger neighbors desire it while its possessors cannot repel the invaders, nor so scanty that they cannot sustain a war even against their equals and peers. He has determined nothing about this; but we must not overlook what amount of property is advantageous. Perhaps the best limit, then, is that it should not be profitable³⁰ for stronger powers to wage war because of its abundance, but that they should stand toward it as they would if it did not possess so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus told him to consider how long he would take to capture the place and calculate the expense for that period. For he was willing to accept less³⁵ than this and leave Atarneus immediately. By saying this he made Autophradates reflect and abandon the siege.

Book II, 1267a–1270b



Equality of wealth among the citizens is, then, of some advantage in preventing faction among them, though its importance is, so to speak, slight. For the ^{1267a40} more cultivated may resent it, thinking themselves worthy of more than an equal share; hence they often appear to launch attacks and stir up faction.

Furthermore, ^{1267b1} human wickedness is insatiable. At first a payment of two obols alone is enough; but once this has become customary, people always want more, until they reach the point of having no limit. For desire is by nature unlimited, and its fulfillment is what most people⁵ live for. The principle for dealing with such matters, rather than equalizing wealth, is to form those who are decent by nature so that they do not wish to take more than their share, and the inferior so that they cannot. This will be so if they are weaker and are not treated unjustly. Nor has he properly explained equality of wealth. For¹⁰ he equalizes only landed property, but wealth also consists of slaves, livestock, and money, as well as an abundance of what are called furnishings. We must therefore seek either equality in all these things or some moderate arrangement, or leave them all alone. His legislation also appears to make the city small,¹⁵ if indeed all the artisans are to be public slaves and contribute nothing to the city's citizen population. But if those who perform public work must be public slaves, the arrangement should be like that at Epidamnus, or the one

Diophantus once established at Athens. Concerning the constitution of Phaleas,²⁰ these considerations should enable one to judge, more or less, whether anything he has said is sound or unsound.

Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of cities into blocks and laid out the Piraeus. In his other habits too he was unusually extravagant through his love of distinction, to such a degree^{1267b25} that some thought his way of life excessively elaborate, with his abundant hair and costly adornment, and also his clothing, cheap but warm, not only in winter but in the summer months as well; and he wished to be learned about nature as a whole. He was the first of those not taking part in public life to attempt to speak about the constitution³⁰ that is best. He designed a city with a population of ten thousand men, divided into three parts: he made one part artisans, another farmers, and the third those who fought in its defense and possessed arms. He also divided the territory into three parts, sacred, public, and private: the land from which³⁵ they would provide the customary offerings to the gods was sacred; that from which the defenders would obtain their livelihood was common; and the farmers' land was private. He thought there were only three kinds of laws, since the matters giving rise to lawsuits were three in number: outrage, injury, and death. He also legislated for a single law court with⁴⁰ sovereign authority, to which all cases thought to have been wrongly decided must be referred. He constituted it from certain elders^{1268a1} chosen for the purpose.

He thought judgments in the law courts should not be given by casting votes. Instead, each juror should bring a tablet on which, if he found wholly against the defendant, he would write the penalty; if he acquitted him wholly, he would leave it blank; and if he accepted one part but not another, this would^{1268a5} be specified. For he thought the existing law was not well framed, since it compelled jurors to commit perjury by deciding one way or the other. He also made a law that those who discovered something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, and that the children of those who died in war should be maintained at public expense, as though this had not yet been¹⁰ legislated elsewhere. This law now exists both at Athens and in other cities. All

rulers were to be chosen by the people, and he made the people consist of the three parts of the city. Those chosen were to attend to public affairs, the affairs of foreigners, and those of orphans.

These, then, are most of the provisions, and ^{1268a15} the most noteworthy, in Hippodamus's arrangement. One might first question the division of the citizen population. For the artisans, the farmers, and those who possess arms all share in the constitution, though the farmers have no arms, and the artisans neither land nor arms,²⁰ so that they become almost slaves of those who possess arms. It is therefore impossible for them to share in all the honors, since the generals, the guardians of the citizens, and, so to speak, the most authoritative offices must be drawn from those who possess arms. Yet if they have no share in the constitution, how can they be well disposed²⁵ toward it? Moreover, those who possess arms must be stronger than both the other parts. This is not easy unless they are numerous; but if they are, why must the others share in the constitution and have authority over the appointment of rulers? Furthermore, what use are the farmers to the city? Artisans³⁰ are necessary, since every city needs artisans, and they can live by their craft, as in other cities. If the farmers provided those who possess arms with food, they would reasonably be a part of the city; but as things stand, they have private land and will farm it privately.³⁵ Furthermore, if the defenders themselves farm the common land from which they are to obtain their food, the fighting and farming elements will not be separate, as the legislator wishes. But if those who farm it are different both from those who farm the private land and from the fighters, this will in turn be a fourth part of the city, having no⁴⁰ share, but standing outside the constitution. Yet if one makes the farmers of the private and the common land the same people, there will be a difficulty about the quantity of produce that ^{1268b1} each will raise for two households,

and why will they not simply take their own food from the same land and the same allotments and also provide it for the fighters? All these matters, then, involve great confusion. Nor is the law concerning judgment ^{1268b5} well framed: it requires the juror to make distinctions in his verdict, though the claim is stated without qualification, and turns the juror into an arbitrator. This is pos-

sible in arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, since they confer with one another about the judgment. In the law courts, however, it is not possible; indeed, precisely the opposite is what most legislators¹⁰ arrange for: jurors must not confer with one another. Again, how will the judgment not be confused when the juror thinks something is owed, but not as much as the litigant claims? The litigant claims twenty minas, but the juror will award ten minas, or the one more and the other less; another juror will award five,¹⁵ and another four. Plainly, they will divide the amount in this way, while some will award the whole claim and others nothing. What, then, will be the method of counting the votes? Furthermore, nothing compels a juror who acquits or condemns without qualification to commit perjury, provided the charge is stated without qualification and he judges justly. For the juror who acquits does not judge that nothing²⁰ is owed, but that the twenty minas are not owed. Rather, it is the juror who condemns while not believing the twenty minas are owed who commits perjury.

As for the proposal that those who discover something advantageous to the city should receive an honor, it is unsafe to legislate this: it merely sounds attractive. For it opens the way^{1268b25} to malicious accusations and, perhaps, changes of constitution. It also leads into another problem and a further inquiry. Some question whether it is harmful or advantageous to cities to change their ancestral laws when another law is better. Hence it is not easy to agree quickly to the proposal just mentioned, if indeed it is not advantageous³⁰ to make changes; and some may propose the abolition of laws or of a constitution as a common good. Since we have mentioned the matter, it is better to make a few further distinctions about it. For, as we said, it presents a difficulty, and making changes might seem better. At any rate, this has proved advantageous in the other sciences:³⁵ medicine, for example, has changed from ancestral practice, as have physical training and, in general, all the arts and capacities. Since political science too must be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same must necessarily hold for it. One might say that the facts themselves pro-

vide evidence, since the ancient laws were exceedingly simple⁴⁰ and barbarous. For the Greeks used to carry arms and buy their wives from one another, and whatever remains anywhere of the ancient customs is altogether naive,

^{1269a1} such as the law at Cyme concerning homicide: if the person prosecuting a murder produces a certain number of witnesses from among his own relatives, the defendant is guilty of murder. In general, everyone seeks not what is ancestral but what is good. It is likely that the⁵ first people, whether they were born from the earth or survived some destruction, were like ordinary, foolish people, as is indeed said of the earthborn; so it is absurd to abide by their decisions. Moreover, it is no better to leave even written laws unchanged. For just as in the other arts,¹⁰ so too in the political order it is impossible for everything to be set down precisely in writing. What is written must be general, but actions concern particulars.

From these considerations, then, it is evident that some laws must sometimes be changed. But viewed in another way, the matter would seem to call for great caution. For when^{1269a15} the improvement is slight, while it is bad to accustom people to abolishing laws readily, it is evident that some errors of legislators and rulers should be allowed to stand. For the benefit from making the change will not be as great as the harm from becoming accustomed to disobeying the rulers. The example drawn from the arts is also misleading; for it is not²⁰ the same to change an art as to change a law. Law has no strength to secure obedience apart from habit, and habit develops only over a long time. Thus, to change readily from existing laws to other, new laws is to weaken the power of law. Furthermore, if²⁵ laws indeed must be changed, should all of them be changed, and in every constitution, or not? And should anyone at all make changes, or only certain people? These things make a great difference. Let us therefore leave this inquiry for now; it belongs to another occasion.

Concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians and that of Crete,^{1269a30} and indeed nearly all other constitutions, there are two inquiries: one is whether anything has been legislated well or badly with reference to the best arrangement; the other is whether anything runs counter to the basic aim and character of the constitution they have set before themselves. It is agreed

that a city intending to be well governed³⁵ must have leisure from necessary tasks; but how to secure this is not easy to determine. For the serf class of Thessaly has often attacked the Thessalians, as have the helots the Laconians: they are constantly lying in wait, as it were, for their misfortunes. Among the Cretans,⁴⁰ however, nothing of the kind has yet occurred. Perhaps the reason is that the neighboring^{1269b1} cities,

although they make war on one another, never ally themselves with those who revolt, since this would not be advantageous to cities that themselves possess dependent populations. All the Laconians' neighbors, however, were enemies: the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians.^{1269b5} For in Thessaly too the serfs first revolted because the Thessalians were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Even if there were no other difficulty, the matter of supervision at least seems troublesome: in what manner should one deal with them? If given freedom, they become insolent and think themselves worthy of equal standing¹⁰ with their masters; if made to live in hardship, they plot against them and hate them. It is clear, then, that those whose system of helotry has these results have not discovered the best method.

Furthermore, the laxity in matters concerning women is harmful both to the constitution's aim and to the city's happiness. For just as^{1269b15} man and woman are parts of a household, it is clear that a city too must be regarded as divided roughly in two, into its male and female populations. Thus, in all constitutions where the arrangements concerning women are bad, half the city must be regarded as unregulated by law. This is precisely what has happened there. For the whole²⁰ city was to be capable of endurance, as the legislator wished; he has plainly achieved this with the men but has neglected the women. They live without restraint, in every kind of indulgence and in luxury. Wealth must therefore be honored in such a constitution, especially if the people happen to be ruled by women,²⁵ as are most military and warlike peoples, apart from the Celts and any others who have openly honored sexual intercourse with males. For the first teller of the myth seems not without reason to have joined Ares with Aphrodite: all such people evidently fall captive either to intercourse with males³⁰ or to intercourse with women. Hence this was the

case among the Laconians, and many affairs were administered by women during their period of rule. Yet what difference is there between women ruling and rulers being ruled by women? The result is the same. Whatever use³⁵ boldness has, it is in none of the ordinary pursuits, but, if anywhere, in war; even in this respect, the Laconian women were most harmful. They showed this during the Theban invasion: they were of no use, as in other cities, but caused more uproar than the enemy. From the outset, then,⁴⁰ it seems reasonable that among the Laconians the women came to enjoy this^{1270a1} laxity.

For they spent a long time away from their own land on military campaigns, fighting the war against the Argives and then those against the Arcadians and Messenians. When they had leisure, they presented themselves to the legislator already prepared^{1270a5} by military life, for it contains many elements of virtue. As for the women, they say that Lycurgus tried to bring them under the laws, but when they resisted he abandoned the attempt. These, then, are the causes of what came about, and therefore plainly of this error too. But we¹⁰ are not examining whom we should or should not excuse, but what is right and what is not. As was said earlier, the unsatisfactory condition of matters concerning women seems not only to bring a certain impropriety to the constitution in itself, but also to contribute to the love of money.¹⁵ For after what has now been said, one might criticize the inequality of property. Some of them have come to possess far too much wealth, and others extremely little; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. The laws too have regulated this badly. For buying or²⁰ selling one's existing property was made dishonorable by the legislator, and rightly so; yet he allowed anyone who wished to give it away or bequeath it. But the same result necessarily follows by either route. Moreover, nearly two-fifths of the whole territory belongs to women, both because many become heiresses²⁵ and because large dowries are given. Yet it would have been better to prescribe no dowry, or a small or moderate one. As things stand, a man may give his heiress in marriage to anyone he wishes, and if he dies without making arrangements, whoever he leaves as his heir may give her to anyone he wishes. Consequently, though the territory can support a thousand cavalrymen³⁰ and five hundred more, and thirty thousand hoplites, their total number

was not even a thousand. The facts themselves have made it clear that this arrangement was bad for them: the city could not withstand a single blow, but was destroyed because of its lack of men. They say that under the earlier³⁵ kings they gave others a share in the constitution, so that there was then no shortage of men despite their long wars; and they say that the Spartans once numbered as many as ten thousand. Nevertheless, whether this is true or not, it is better for the city's number of men to grow through an equalization of property. But⁴⁰ the law concerning the begetting of children also runs counter to this reform.

^{1270b1} For the legislator, wishing the Spartans to be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to have as many children as possible. They have a law exempting the father of three sons from garrison duty, and the father of four from all public obligations. Yet⁵ it is evident that if many children are born while the territory is divided in this way, many must become poor.

Moreover, the arrangements concerning the ephorate are bad. This office has sovereign authority over their most important affairs, but the ephors are drawn from the whole people, so that men who are very ^{1270b10} poor often come into office, and their poverty makes them open to purchase. They have shown this often before, and now in the affair of the Andrians: some of them, corrupted by money, did all they could to destroy the whole city. Because the office is excessively powerful and equal to a tyranny, courting¹⁵ them became necessary even for the kings, so that in this respect too the constitution suffered further harm: it changed from an aristocracy into a democracy. This office does, then, hold the constitution together. For the people remain quiet because they share in the greatest office; thus, whether this has come about through the legislator or by²⁰ chance, it is advantageous to their affairs. For if a constitution is to be preserved, all parts of the city must wish it to exist and to remain unchanged. The kings have this disposition because of their own honor, the noble and good because of the council of elders, since this office is a prize²⁵ for virtue, and the people because of the ephorate, since it is drawn from everyone. But although this office should be chosen from everyone, it should not be chosen in the present manner, which is altogether childish. Furthermore, the ephors have

authority over important judgments though they are ordinary people; hence, rather than their own discretion,³⁰ written rules and the laws should guide their judgments. The ephors' way of life is also inconsistent with the city's intention. Their own is excessively lax, while in the case of others it goes too far toward severity, so that they cannot endure it, but secretly evade the law³⁵ and enjoy bodily pleasures.

Book II, 1270b–1274b



Their arrangements for the office of the elders are also unsatisfactory. For if the elders were decent men, adequately educated in manly virtue, one might perhaps say that the office benefited the city. Yet even then their lifelong authority over important judgments would be open to dispute^{1270b40} (for the mind, like the body, has its old age).

^{1271a1} But when their education is such that even the lawgiver himself distrusts them as men who are not good, the arrangement is unsafe. There is evidence of both bribe-taking and the giving away of many public benefits to please others among those who have shared in this⁵ office. For this reason it would be better for them not to be exempt from scrutiny; as things stand, they are. The office of the ephors might seem to subject all the offices to scrutiny. But this gives the ephorate far too great a gift, and this is not the manner in which we say that accounts should be rendered. Moreover, the choice they make of the elders, in its¹⁰ method of judgment, is childish, and it is not right that the man who is to be deemed worthy of the office should himself ask for it. For the man worthy of the office ought to hold it, whether he wishes to or not. As things stand, the lawgiver evidently does here what he does in the rest of the constitution. For he makes the citizens ambitious for honor,¹⁵ and uses this in the choice of the elders: no one would ask to hold office unless he were ambitious for honor. Yet most of the injustices people commit voluntarily arise, one may say, from ambition for honor and love of money.

As for kingship, whether it is better for cities to possess it^{1271a20} or not, let that be a separate discussion. Still, it would certainly be better for each king to be judged by his own life, rather than as they are now. It is clear that the lawgiver does not himself think he can make them noble and good. At any rate, he distrusts them as men who are not good enough. For this reason they used to send out as fellow ambassadors²⁵ the kings' enemies, and thought that faction between the kings ensured the city's safety. Nor did the first founder legislate well concerning the common messes called phiditia. For the contribution should rather have come from public funds, as in Crete. Among the Laconians, however, each man must³⁰ contribute, although some are extremely poor and cannot meet this expense. Thus the result is the opposite of the lawgiver's intention. For he wishes the institution of the common messes to be democratic, but when legislated in this way it becomes anything but democratic. Participation³⁵ is not easy for the very poor, and their ancestral condition for participation in the constitution is this: whoever cannot pay this contribution is not to participate in it. Some others have also criticized the law concerning the admirals, and rightly so. For it becomes a cause of faction: alongside the kings,⁴⁰ who are permanent generals, the office of admiral has been established as almost a second kingship. One might also criticize the lawgiver's underlying purpose^{1271b1} in the way that Plato too criticized it in the Laws.

For the whole arrangement of the laws is directed toward one part of virtue, military virtue, since this is useful for gaining mastery. Accordingly, they preserved themselves while waging war, but perished once they had gained rule,^{1271b5} because they did not know how to use leisure and had practiced no other discipline of greater importance than warfare. There is a mistake no less serious than this. For they believe that the goods for which people contend are acquired through virtue rather than vice, and in this they are right. But that they suppose these goods superior to virtue¹⁰ is not right. The Spartans' public finances are also in a poor state. There is nothing in the city's treasury, although they are compelled to wage great wars, and their contributions are badly managed. For because most of the land belongs to the Spartans, they do not examine one another's¹⁵ contributions. The lawgiver has achieved the opposite of

what is advantageous: he has made the city poor in money and its private citizens lovers of money. Let this suffice, then, concerning the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, for these are the points one might chiefly criticize.

^{1271b20} The Cretan constitution is close to this one. In a few respects it is no worse, but for the most part it is less finely worked out. For the Laconians' constitution seems, and indeed is said, to have imitated the Cretan constitution in most respects; and most ancient arrangements are less fully articulated than newer ones. They say²⁵ that when Lycurgus went abroad after giving up his guardianship of King Charilaus, he spent most of his time in Crete because of their kinship. For the Lycians were colonists of the Laconians, and those who came to found the colony found the system of laws already established³⁰ among the inhabitants of that time. For this reason the neighboring inhabitants still use them in the same manner, on the understanding that Minos first established the system of laws. The island also seems naturally suited and well situated for rule over the Greeks. For it commands the whole sea, around which nearly all the Greeks³⁵ are settled. It lies a short distance from the Peloponnese on one side, and from Asia, in the region of Triopium and Rhodes, on the other. For this reason Minos also gained mastery of the sea, subdued some of the islands and settled others, and finally, after attacking Sicily, ended his life⁴⁰ there near Camicus.

The Cretan arrangement corresponds to the Laconian. For the helots cultivate the land for the latter,^{1272a1} and the neighboring inhabitants for the Cretans,

and both have common messes. In ancient times, at least, the Laconians called these not *phiditia* but *andreaia*, as the Cretans do, which also makes clear that they came from there. There is also the arrangement of the constitution. The^{1272a5} ephors have the same power as those called *cosmoi* in Crete, except that the ephors number five and the *cosmoi* ten. The elders correspond to the elders whom the Cretans call the council. There was formerly kingship, but the Cretans later abolished it, and the¹⁰ *cosmoi* hold the command in war. Everyone participates in the assembly, but it has authority over nothing except to approve by vote what the elders and *cosmoi* have resolved.

The Cretans' arrangements for the common messes, then, are better than the Laconians'. For in Lacedaemon each man contributes the prescribed amount per head,^{1272a15} and if he does not, the law prevents him from participating in the constitution, as was also said earlier. In Crete, however, the arrangement is more communal. From all the produce of the public crops and herds, and from the tribute paid by the neighboring inhabitants, a portion is assigned to the gods and public²⁰ services, and another to the common messes, so that all are fed at public expense—women, children, and men. The lawgiver has devised many measures to encourage moderation in eating as beneficial, and to keep men apart from women so that they may not have many children, making males²⁵ their partners in intercourse for this purpose. Whether this is bad or not will be considered on another occasion. It is clear, then, that the Cretans' arrangements for the common messes are better than the Laconians'. But the arrangements concerning the cosmoi are worse still than those concerning the ephors. For the evil that belongs to the office of the ephors belongs to these as well³⁰ (for any chance persons may hold it), while the advantage it offers the constitution there is absent here. There, because the choice is made from everyone, the people share in the greatest office and wish the constitution to endure. Here, however, they choose the cosmoi not from everyone but from certain families, and the elders³⁵ from those who have served as cosmoi. Concerning these one might make the same arguments as concerning the elders in Lacedaemon. For their exemption from scrutiny and their lifelong tenure are honors greater than their worth, and their ruling not according to written laws but by their own judgment is unsafe. That the people remain quiet without sharing⁴⁰ in office is no sign that the arrangement is good. For the cosmoi have no opportunity for gain as the ephors do, being far^{1272b1} removed, on their island, from those who would corrupt them.

The remedy they employ for this defect is strange, and belongs not to constitutional government but to the domination of a powerful group. For often some of the cosmoi's fellow officeholders or private citizens combine and expel them. The cosmoi are also permitted^{1272b5} to resign their office before their term is over. It would be better for all these things to take place according to

law rather than according to men's wishes, for this is not a secure standard. Worst of all is the suspension of the cosmoi's office by the powerful, which those among them who do not wish to submit to justice often bring about. This also makes clear that the arrangement has something¹⁰ of a constitution, but is not a constitution; it is rather the domination of a powerful group. They habitually divide the people and their friends into opposing camps, produce anarchy, stir up faction, and fight one another. Yet how does such a situation differ from the city's ceasing for a time to be a city, and the political¹⁵ community's dissolution? A city in this condition is in danger from those who wish and are able to attack it. But, as has been said, it is preserved by its location: its remoteness has brought about the exclusion of foreigners. For this reason too the Cretans' neighboring inhabitants remain subject, whereas the helots frequently revolt. For the Cretans have no share in foreign²⁰ rule, and recently a war from abroad has crossed over to the island and revealed the weakness of the laws there. Let this suffice, then, for our account of this constitution.

The Carthaginians too seem to take part in public life well, and^{1272b25} in many respects better than others, while in some respects above all they resemble the Laconians. For these three constitutions—the Cretan, the Laconian, and, third, the Carthaginian—are in a way close to one another and differ greatly from the others. Many of their institutions are³⁰ well arranged. A sign of a well-ordered constitution is that the people willingly remain within its constitutional order, and that neither any faction worth mentioning nor any tyrant has arisen. Its resemblances to the Laconian constitution are these: the common messes of the associations correspond to the phiditia, the hundred³⁵ and four hold an office corresponding to the ephors (with this improvement: the ephors are drawn from any chance persons, whereas they choose this office according to merit), and the kings and the council of elders correspond to the kings and elders there. It is also better that the kings should neither come from one fixed family nor from any chance family,⁴⁰ but, if some family is distinguished, that they should be chosen from its members rather than according to age. For since they have authority over important matters, if they are worthless,^{1273a1} they do great harm,

and have already harmed the city of the Lacedaemonians.

Most of the points that one might criticize as deviations happen to be common to all the constitutions mentioned. Of those that depart from the underlying principle of aristocracy^{1273a5} and polity, some incline more toward democracy, others toward oligarchy. For the kings, together with the elders, have authority to bring some matters before the people and not others, if they all agree; otherwise, the people have authority over these matters too. When these rulers introduce a matter, they¹⁰ allow the people not merely to hear the rulers' resolutions, but to have authority to judge them; and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals, which is not possible in the other constitutions. That the boards of five, which have authority over many important matters, are chosen by their own members, and that the office of the hundred¹⁵ is chosen by these boards—the greatest office—and furthermore these boards hold office longer than the others (for they exercise rule both after leaving office and before entering it), is oligarchic. But their being unpaid and not chosen by lot must be counted aristocratic, as must anything else of this kind, and the fact that all cases are judged by the governing bodies²⁰ (and not different cases by different bodies, as in Lacedaemon). The Carthaginian arrangement departs from aristocracy chiefly toward oligarchy, following a view that most people share. For they think that rulers should be chosen not only according to merit but also according to wealth, since it is impossible²⁵ for a man without resources to rule well and have leisure. If, then, choice according to wealth is oligarchic and choice according to virtue aristocratic, this would be a third kind of arrangement, the very one according to which the Carthaginians have also ordered their constitution. For they make their choices with an eye to both these things, especially³⁰ for the greatest offices, those of the kings and generals.

This deviation from aristocracy must be regarded as a mistake on the law-giver's part. For one of the most necessary things is to see to this from the outset: that the best men can have leisure and do nothing unseemly, not only while holding office but also^{1273a35} while living as private citizens. But if one must also consider affluence for the sake of leisure, it is bad that the greatest offices, kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth

more honored than virtue, and makes the whole city love money. Whatever the⁴⁰ sovereign body considers honorable, the opinion of the other citizens must necessarily follow. And wherever virtue is not honored above all, that^{1273b1} constitution cannot be securely governed as an aristocracy.

It is reasonable to expect those who buy offices to become accustomed to making a profit from them, when they hold office after spending money. For it would be strange if a poor but decent man wished to make a profit, while an inferior man who had spent money did not.^{1273b5} For this reason those who can rule best ought to rule. Even if the lawgiver had neglected the affluence of decent men, it would be better at least to take care that they have leisure while holding office. It would also seem bad for the same man to hold several offices, a practice highly regarded among the Carthaginians. For one¹⁰ work is best accomplished by one person. The lawgiver must see that this happens, and not assign the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Thus, where the city is not small, it accords better with constitutional government, and is more democratic, for more people to share in the offices. For, as we have said, participation is more widely shared, and each task is accomplished better,¹⁵ with the same tasks also accomplished faster. This is clear in military and naval affairs: in both, ruling and being ruled have extended, so to speak, through everyone. Although their constitution is oligarchic, they escape its dangers very well by constantly enriching some portion of the people, sending them out to²⁰ the cities. For by this means they remedy its defects and make the constitution lasting. But this is the work of chance, whereas they ought to be free of faction through the lawgiver's work. As things stand, if some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the ruled revolts, the laws provide no remedy for restoring peace. Such, then, is the state of the Lacedaemonians'²⁵ constitution, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian, which are justly held in high regard.

Of those who have expressed views about a constitution, some have never participated in any political actions at all, but have spent their lives as private citizens. If any of their views are worth considering, we have discussed^{1273b30} nearly all of them. Others have themselves taken part in public life and become lawgivers, some for their own cities, others also for certain foreign cities. Of

these, some became makers of laws alone, others of a constitution as well, as did Lycurgus and Solon; for these men established both laws and constitutions.³⁵ The Lacedaemonians' constitution has been discussed. Some think that Solon was an excellent lawgiver: that he abolished an excessively unmixed oligarchy, freed the people from slavery, and established the ancestral democracy by blending the constitution well. For the council on the⁴⁰ Areopagus was oligarchic, the filling of the offices by choice aristocratic, and the law courts democratic.

But Solon seems^{1274a1} not to have abolished the institutions already in existence—the council and the choice of officeholders—but to have established the people's power by making the law courts open to everyone. For this reason some also blame him: they say that he destroyed the other institutions by making the law court sovereign⁵ over everything, though it was chosen by lot. For when this grew strong, they courted the people as though courting a tyrant, and changed the constitution into the present democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the council on the Areopagus, and Pericles established pay for service in the law courts. In this way¹⁰ each of the popular leaders advanced it, enlarging it into the present democracy. Yet this seems to have happened not according to Solon's intention, but rather by a concurrence of circumstances (for the people, having brought about naval supremacy during the Persian Wars, became proud and took on bad popular leaders despite opposition¹⁵ from the decent men in public life). Solon at least seems to have given the people the most necessary power, that of choosing officeholders and subjecting them to scrutiny (for if the people did not have authority even over this, they would be slaves and enemies), while he appointed all the offices from the notables and the prosperous, from the five-hundred-measure class²⁰ and the yoke-men, and from the third class, called the cavalry class. The fourth was the laboring class, who had a share in no office.

Zaleucus became a lawgiver for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas of Catana for his own citizens and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy^{1274a25} and Sicily. Some also attempt to connect them in a succession: Onomacritus was the first skilled in lawgiving, and, being a Locrian living in Crete, received his training there in the art of divination; Thaletas became his companion,

Lycurgus and Zaleucus pupils of Thaletas, and Zaleucus's pupil³⁰ was Charondas. But they make these assertions without sufficient attention to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also became a lawgiver for the Thebans. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiads and became the lover of Diocles, the victor at Olympia. When Diocles left the city out of hatred for³⁵ his mother Alcyone's love, Philolaus departed for Thebes, and both ended their lives there. Even now people point out their tombs, which are easily visible from one another; but in relation to the territory of the Corinthians, one is visible from it and the other is not. For the story is that they arranged their burial in this way:⁴⁰ Diocles, because of his loathing for that passion, so that Corinthian territory would not be visible from his burial mound, and Philolaus so that it^{1274b1} would be visible.

For this reason, then, they lived among the Thebans. Philolaus became their lawgiver on certain other matters and on the bearing of children, in what they call laws of adoption. This is his distinctive legislative provision:^{1274b5} that the number of land allotments should be preserved. There is nothing distinctive in Charondas except the actions for false testimony (for he was the first to institute the formal challenge to testimony). But in the precision of his laws he is more accomplished even than present-day lawgivers.

Phaleas's distinctive provision is the equalization of property, and Plato's^{1274b10} the community of women, children, and property, and the common messes for women; also the law concerning drunkenness, that sober men should preside over drinking parties, and training in warfare so that men become ambidextrous through practice, on the ground that one hand should not be useful and the other¹⁵ useless. There are laws of Draco, but he laid down his laws for an existing constitution. There is nothing distinctive in his laws worth mentioning, except their harshness owing to the magnitude of the penalties. Pittacus too became a maker of laws, but not of a constitution. His distinctive law is that drunken men, if they²⁰ commit an offense, should pay a greater penalty than sober men. For because more men act outrageously when drunk than when sober, he looked not to the greater indulgence that should be shown to drunken men, but to advantage. Androdamas of Rhegium also

became a lawgiver for the Chalcidians in Thrace. His provisions concern homicide²⁵ and heiresses; nevertheless, no one could point to anything distinctive in his work. Let this, then, stand as our examination of constitutions, both those in force and those proposed by certain thinkers.

Book III, 1274b–1278a



^{1274b32} For someone investigating constitutions—what each is and what sort it is—the first inquiry is almost certainly to consider the city: what, precisely, is a city? As things stand, people dispute this, some saying³⁵ that the city performed an action, others that it was not the city but the oligarchy or the tyrant. We see that the entire concern of the statesman and the lawgiver is with the city, and the constitution is a certain ordering of those who inhabit the city. Since the city is a composite thing, like any other whole⁴⁰ made up of many parts, it is clear that we must first inquire into the citizen; for a city is a certain multitude of citizens.

^{1275a1} We must therefore examine whom we should call a citizen and what a citizen is. For the citizen, too, is often disputed: not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen. Someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often⁵ not a citizen in an oligarchy. Let us leave aside those who happen to receive this designation in some other way, such as citizens made so by decree. A citizen is not a citizen by residing somewhere, for resident foreigners and slaves also share in residence. Nor are those citizens who share in legal rights to the extent of being liable to suit and bringing suit¹⁰ (for this belongs also to those who participate under treaties: they too have these rights. Indeed, in many places resident foreigners do not even share fully in these, but must be assigned a patron, so that their participation in this kind of association is incomplete). Rather, just as children who have not yet, because of their age,¹⁵ been enrolled, and old men

who have been exempted, must be said to be citizens in a sense, but not altogether without qualification, we must add that the former are incomplete citizens and the latter past their prime, or some other expression of the kind. It makes no difference, for the meaning is clear. We are seeking the citizen without qualification, with no such²⁰ defect requiring correction; for similar difficulties can also be raised and resolved about the disfranchised and exiles. The citizen without qualification is defined by nothing else so much as by sharing in judgment and office. Some offices are limited in time, so that in some, a second term²⁵ is never permitted for the same person, or may be held only after certain fixed intervals; others are unlimited, such as those of the juror and the assembly member. Perhaps someone might say that such people are not even officeholders, and do not on this account share in office. Yet it is absurd to deprive those with the greatest authority of office. But let this make no difference: a name³⁰ is what the argument concerns, for there is no name for what the juror and the assembly member have in common, by which we should call them both. For purposes of definition, then, let it be an unlimited office. We accordingly count as citizens those who share in office in this way.

The citizen who would best fit all those called citizens is, roughly speaking, of this kind. But we must^{1275a35} not overlook that, where the underlying things differ in kind and one is first, another second, and another next in order, they either have nothing in common at all, insofar as they are such, or only very little. We see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are later and others^{1275b1} earlier;

for defective and deviant constitutions must be later than those without defects. What we mean by deviant constitutions will become clear afterward. Consequently the citizen, too, must differ according to each constitution.^{1275b5} For this reason the citizen we have described is above all a citizen in a democracy; in other constitutions he may be, but need not be. For in some there is no people, and they do not customarily hold assemblies, but specially summoned meetings; and they divide the judging of lawsuits among different offices. In Lacedaemon, for example, contract cases are judged by¹⁰ different ephors, the elders judge homicide cases, and perhaps some other office judges other cases.

Matters at Carthage are not arranged in the same way: certain offices judge all the lawsuits. But the definition of the citizen admits of correction. In the other constitutions it is not the unlimited officeholder who is assembly member¹⁵ and juror, but the one whose office is defined. For to all or some of these has been assigned the task of deliberating and judging, either on all matters or on certain ones. Who the citizen is, then, is clear from this. Whoever has the right to share in deliberative or judicial office we now call a citizen of this²⁰ city; and a city, to speak without qualification, is a multitude of such people sufficient for a self-sufficient life.

For practical purposes people define a citizen as one born of two citizens, not of one alone, whether father or mother. Some extend this requirement further, to two or three or more generations of ancestors.^{1275b25} When the definition is given in this political and hasty fashion, some ask how that ancestor in the third or fourth generation will be a citizen. Gorgias of Leontini, perhaps partly at a loss and partly being ironic, said that, just as mortars are those things made by mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are those made by their civic officials;³⁰ for there are some who are Larissaeans-makers. But the matter is simple. If they shared in the constitution according to the definition we gave, they were citizens. Indeed, the requirement of being born of a male or female citizen cannot even be applied to the first inhabitants or founders.

But perhaps there is greater difficulty about those who^{1275b35} were admitted to citizenship after a change of constitution, as Cleisthenes did at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants: he enrolled in the tribes many foreigners and slaves who were resident foreigners. The dispute about these concerns not who is a citizen, but whether he is one unjustly or justly. Yet someone might raise this further difficulty:

^{1276a1}if someone is not justly a citizen, is he not a citizen at all, on the assumption that what is unjust and what is false have the same force? But since we see that some hold office unjustly, and we will say that they hold office, though not justly, and the citizen is defined by a certain office—for one who shares in⁵ an office of this kind is a citizen, as we said—it is clear that we must call these people citizens too;

but whether they are so justly or unjustly connects with the dispute mentioned earlier. For some are at a loss as to when the city has acted and when it has not: for example, when an oligarchy or tyranny changes into ^{1276a10} a democracy. At such a time some refuse to discharge contracts, on the ground that it was not the city but the tyrant who received the loan, and likewise refuse many other obligations of this kind, on the ground that some constitutions rest on force and not on the common advantage. If, then, some democracies also govern in this fashion, we must equally ¹⁵ call the actions of this constitution actions of this city, just as we must those arising from oligarchy and tyranny. This argument seems related to the difficulty of how we should say that a city is the same, or not the same but another. At its most superficial, this difficulty ²⁰ is investigated with regard to the place and the people: for the place and the people can be divided, and some inhabit one place and others another.

We should therefore regard this difficulty as a milder one, for since the city is spoken of in many senses, there is a certain ease about an inquiry of this kind. Similarly, ^{1276a25} when people inhabit the same place, when should we consider their city one? Surely not by its walls: one wall could be built around the Peloponnese. Perhaps Babylon is such a city, and every city whose circumference is more that of a nation than of a city. They say that when Babylon was captured, for three ³⁰ days some part of the city did not know it.

But consideration of this difficulty will be useful on another occasion. For the statesman must not overlook the question of a city's size—how large it should be, and whether one nation or several is advantageous. But when the same people inhabit the same place, ^{1276a35} should we say that the city is the same as long as the inhabitants remain of the same stock, although some are always dying and others being born, just as we customarily speak of the same rivers and the same springs, although water is always coming in and flowing out? Or should we say that the people ⁴⁰ are the same for this reason, but that the ^{1276b1} city is different?

For if indeed the city is a certain association, and an association of citizens in a constitution, then when the constitution becomes different in kind and changes, it would seem necessary that the city, too, should no longer be the

same. So also we say that a chorus^{1276b5} is different when it is comic and when it is tragic, although it is often made up of the same people. Likewise every other association and composition is different if the form of its composition is different. For example, we say that a harmony of the same notes is different when it is Dorian and when it is Phrygian. If, then,¹⁰ this is how matters stand, it is clear that in calling a city the same we must look chiefly to its constitution. It may be called by a different name or the same one, whether its inhabitants are the same or entirely different people. But whether it is just to discharge or not discharge obligations when there is a change to another constitution¹⁵ in the city is a different question.

Following what has now been said, we must consider whether we should regard the virtue of a good man and that of a worthy citizen as the same or not the same. Yet if this is to receive investigation, we must first grasp the virtue of the citizen in some outline.^{1276b20} Just as a sailor is one member of an association, so, we say, is a citizen. Although sailors differ in their functions—one is a rower, another a helmsman, another a lookout, and another bears some other designation of this kind—it is clear that the most precise account of each one's²⁵ virtue will be peculiar to him; yet some common account will also fit them all. For the safety of the voyage is the work of them all: this is what every sailor seeks. Likewise, then, for citizens, however different they are, the preservation of their association is their work, and their association is the constitution.³⁰ The virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution. If, then, there are several kinds of constitution, it is clear that the worthy citizen cannot have one single, complete virtue. But we call a man good in virtue of one single virtue, the complete one.

That someone may be a worthy citizen without^{1276b35} possessing the virtue by which a man is worthy is therefore clear. Yet we can also approach the same argument in another way, by examining difficulties concerning the best constitution. For if it is impossible for a city to consist entirely of worthy people, still each must perform his own work well, and this comes from virtue.⁴⁰ Since it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike,

there would not^{1277a1} be one virtue of a citizen and of a good man. For all must possess the virtue of the worthy citizen—this is necessary if the city is to be best—but they cannot all possess the virtue of the good man, unless everyone must be good in⁵ the worthy city as a citizen. Again, since the city consists of unlike elements—just as an animal consists immediately of soul and body, and a soul of reason and desire, and a household of husband and wife, and property of master and slave—in the same way a city consists of all these, and in addition of other unlike¹⁰ kinds. The virtue of all citizens must therefore not be one, just as it is not one for the leader of a chorus and the person standing beside him.

Why, then, they are not the same without qualification is clear from this. But will there be someone for whom the virtue of a worthy citizen and a worthy man is the same? We say that the ruler^{1277a15} who is worthy is good and possesses practical wisdom, but the citizen need not possess practical wisdom. Some say, indeed, that the education of a ruler is different from the outset: we see that the sons of kings are trained in horsemanship and warfare, and Euripides says, “Not clever refinements for me ... but what the city needs,” (Eur. Fr. 16)²⁰ as though there were a particular education for a ruler. If the virtue of a good ruler and of a good man is the same, but the ruled person too is a citizen, then the virtue of citizen and man would not be the same without qualification, though it would be for a certain citizen. For the virtue of ruler and citizen is not the same, and perhaps this is why Jason said he went hungry when he was not a tyrant, as though²⁵ he did not know how to be a private person.

Yet the ability to rule and to be ruled is praised, and the virtue of the citizen seems to be the ability both to rule well and to be ruled well. If, then, we regard the virtue of the good man as that of ruling, and that of the citizen as both, the two would not be equally praiseworthy. Since, then,^{1277a30} both views are sometimes held—that ruler and ruled need not learn the same things, but that the citizen should know both and share in both—we may gain insight from the following. There is rule of a master, and by this we mean rule concerned with necessary tasks. The ruler need not know how to perform these,³⁵ but rather how

to make use of them. The other capacity is indeed slavish. By the other I mean the ability actually to perform the tasks of service. We speak of several kinds of slave, for there are several kinds of work. One part of these is occupied by manual laborers. These, as their name itself indicates, are those who live by^{1277b1} their hands,

among whom is the mechanical craftsman. For this reason, in some places craftsmen in earlier times did not share in offices, before the most extreme democracy arose. Thus the tasks of those ruled in this fashion are not for the good man, the statesman, or the^{1277b5} good citizen to learn, except perhaps for his own personal needs; for then it no longer follows that one is master and another slave.

But there is a kind of rule under which one rules those who are alike in stock and free. This is what we call political rule, which the ruler, through being ruled, must^{1277b10} learn, as he learns to command cavalry by serving under a cavalry commander, and to be a general by serving under a general and commanding a regiment and a company. Hence this, too, is well said: no one can rule well without having been ruled. Their virtues are different, but the good citizen must know how and be able both to be ruled and to¹⁵ rule; and this is the virtue of a citizen, to understand the rule of free people from both sides. Both belong also to the good man, even if the moderation and justice of ruling differ in kind. For when a good man is ruled but free, it is clear that his virtue, justice for example, would not be one, but would have forms²⁰ according to which he will rule and be ruled, just as moderation and courage differ in a man and a woman. A man would seem cowardly if he were only as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman talkative if she were only as restrained as a good man; since household management, too, differs for man and woman. The man's²⁵ work is to acquire, the woman's to preserve. Practical wisdom alone is a virtue peculiar to a ruler. The others, it seems, must be common to both ruled and rulers, but practical wisdom is not a virtue of the ruled person; rather, true opinion is. For the ruled person is like a flute-maker, and

the ruler³⁰ like the flute-player who uses the flute. Whether the virtue of a good man and a worthy citizen is the same or different, and how it is the same and how different, is therefore clear from this.

One of the difficulties about the citizen still remains. Is a citizen truly someone permitted to share in^{1277b35} office, or should we also count mechanical workers as citizens? If we must count those too who have no share in offices, not every citizen can possess the virtue we have described, for such a person is a citizen. But if none of these is a citizen, in what class should each be placed? He is neither a resident foreigner nor a foreigner. Or shall we say that this argument^{1278a1} produces nothing absurd?

For neither are slaves or freedmen any of the categories mentioned. This is true: we should not count as citizens all those without whom a city could not exist, since even children are not citizens in the same way as men. Rather,^{1278a5} the latter are citizens without qualification, the former on a condition: they are citizens, but incomplete ones. In ancient times in some places the mechanical laboring class consisted of slaves or foreigners; for this reason most of them are of this kind even now. The best city will not make a mechanical worker a citizen. But if he too is a citizen, the virtue of a citizen that we described¹⁰ must be said to belong not to everyone, nor merely to everyone free, but to those released from necessary tasks. Of those who perform necessary tasks, those who serve one person in such matters are slaves, while those who serve the public are mechanical workers and hired laborers. How matters stand with them will be clear from a little consideration of this; for when the point just stated comes to light, it makes this¹⁵ clear. Since there are several constitutions, there must also be several kinds of citizen, especially of the citizen who is ruled. Hence in one constitution the mechanical worker and the hired laborer must be citizens, while in some it is impossible: for example, if there is a constitution of the kind they call aristocratic, where according to virtue²⁰ and worth honors are bestowed. For it is impossible to pursue the activities of virtue while living the life of a mechanical worker or a hired laborer. In oligarchies a hired laborer cannot be a citizen, for participation in offices depends on high property qualifications; but a mechanical worker can, for many²⁵ craftsmen are wealthy. At

Thebes there was a law that someone who had not abstained from trade for ten years could not share in office. In many constitutions the law also draws in some foreigners: in certain democracies a person born of a female citizen is a citizen, and in many places the same holds for the illegitimate. Yet,³⁰ since they make such people citizens because of a shortage of legitimate citizens—for it is because their population is small that they apply the laws in this way—when they have an abundance of the masses, they gradually remove first those born of a male or female slave, then those descended through women, and finally make citizens only of those born of two citizens.

Book III, 1278a–1281b



That ^{1278a35} there are several kinds of citizen is clear from this, and that the citizen is above all someone who shares in honors, as Homer too wrote, “Like some dishonored migrant”; (Hom. Il. 9.648) (Hom. Il. 16.59) for someone who does not share in honors is like a resident foreigner. But there are places where this fact is concealed, in order to deceive those who live together⁴⁰ there.

Whether we should regard as different or the same the virtue ^{1278b1} by which a man is good and a citizen worthy is clear from what has been said: in one city the two are the same, in another different. And even in the former it is not every citizen, but the statesman who is sovereign, or capable of being sovereign, either by himself or with others, in the administration of⁵ public affairs.

Now that these matters have been defined, we must next consider whether we should posit one constitution or several; and if several, what they are, how many, and what their differences are. A constitution is an ordering of a city’s offices, both the others and especially ^{1278b10} the office sovereign over all. For everywhere the citizen body is sovereign in the city, and the citizen body is the constitution. I mean, for example, that in democracies the people are sovereign, while in oligarchies, on the contrary, the few are; and we say that the constitutions of these are different. We shall give the same account¹⁵ of the others too. First, then, we must establish for what purpose a city is constituted, and how many kinds of rule there are over human beings and their association in life. In our first discussions, in which we distinguished household management and

mastery, it was also said that a human being is by nature a political animal.²⁰ For this reason, even when they have no need of one another's help, people desire no less to live together. Yet the common advantage also brings them together, insofar as a share of living well falls to each. This, then, is above all the end, both for all in common and for each separately. But they also come together for the sake of life itself and²⁵ maintain their political association. For perhaps there is some portion of the noble even in mere life itself, provided the hardships of life do not greatly outweigh it. It is clear that most people endure much suffering in their attachment to life, as though it possessed a certain well-being and³⁰ natural sweetness.

Yet it is also easy to distinguish the modes of rule that we speak of; for we often define them in our external discussions as well. For mastery, although in truth the same thing is advantageous to the slave by nature and to the master by nature, nonetheless exercises rule^{1278b35} for the master's advantage, and only incidentally for the slave's; for if the slave perishes, mastery cannot be preserved. Rule over children and wife and the whole household, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for something common to both. In⁴⁰ itself it is for the ruled, as we see also in the other^{1279a1} arts,

such as medicine and physical training; but incidentally these might be for the practitioners themselves as well. For nothing prevents the trainer himself from sometimes being one of those in training, just as the helmsman is always one of the sailors. The trainer, then,^{1279a5} or helmsman looks to the good of the ruled, but when he himself becomes one of them, he shares incidentally in the benefit. For the one is a sailor, and the other, though a trainer, becomes one of those in training. For this reason, too, where political offices are constituted on the basis of the citizens' equality and¹⁰ similarity, they claim the right to rule in turn. Formerly, as is natural, they claimed the right to perform public service in turn, and to have someone look in return to their own good, just as they themselves, while ruling, had looked to his advantage. But now, because of the benefits from public resources and from office, they wish continuously¹⁵ to rule, as though holding office made them always healthy when they were sickly. For in that case too they would perhaps pursue office. It is clear, then, that all consti-

tutions which look to the common advantage are correct according to the just without qualification; while all those which look only to the rulers' own advantage²⁰ are defective and deviations from the correct constitutions. For they are forms of mastery, whereas the city is an association of free people.

With these matters defined, we must next examine constitutions: how many there are and what they are, and first those that are correct. For the deviations too will become^{1279a25} clear when these have been defined. Since constitution and citizen body signify the same thing, and the citizen body is what is sovereign in cities, and the sovereign must be either one person, a few, or the many, whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common advantage, such must be correct³⁰ constitutions; but those directed to the private advantage of the one, the few, or the multitude are deviations. For either we must say that those who participate are not citizens, or they must share in the advantage. Among monarchies we customarily call the one that looks to the common advantage kingship; the rule of the few,³⁵ but more than one, aristocracy, either because the best rule, or because it looks to what is best for the city and those who share in it. When the multitude takes part in public life for the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all constitutions, polity. (This happens reasonably enough: for one person⁴⁰ or a few may excel in virtue, but it is already difficult for a larger number^{1279b1} to attain perfection in every virtue,

but especially in military virtue they can; for this arises in a multitude. Hence under this constitution the fighting element is sovereign, and those who possess arms share in it.) The deviations from the forms mentioned are^{1279b5} tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy from polity. For tyranny is monarchy directed to the advantage of the monarch, oligarchy to that of the wealthy, and democracy to the advantage of the poor. As for what benefits the community,¹⁰ none of them is directed toward it.

We must say at somewhat greater length what each of these constitutions is. For they also present certain difficulties, and someone who investigates each subject philosophically, and not merely with an eye to action, must neither overlook nor^{1279b15} leave anything out, but make clear the truth about each.

Tyranny, then, is monarchy, as has been said, exercising mastery over the political association; oligarchy is when those who possess property are sovereign over the constitution, while democracy, on the contrary, is when those who do not possess a large amount of property, but are poor, are sovereign.²⁰ The first difficulty concerns the definition. For if the majority were wealthy and sovereign in the city, and democracy is when the multitude is sovereign—and likewise, conversely, if somewhere the poor happened to be fewer than the wealthy, but stronger and sovereign over the constitution, while where a small²⁵ number is sovereign people call it oligarchy—then the constitutions would not seem to have been well defined.

Yet even if someone combines fewness with wealth and multitude with poverty, and names the constitutions accordingly—oligarchy that in which the wealthy, being few in number, hold the offices, and democracy^{1279b30} that in which the poor, being many in number, do so—there is another difficulty. For what shall we call the constitutions just mentioned, the one in which the wealthy are more numerous and the one in which the poor are fewer, but each group is sovereign over the constitution, if indeed there is no other constitution besides those stated? The³⁵ argument therefore seems to make clear that the sovereignty of few or many is incidental, the former to oligarchies and the latter to democracies, because everywhere the wealthy are few and the poor many. Hence the characteristics stated do not happen to be the causes of the difference. As for the difference between⁴⁰ democracy and oligarchy, poverty and wealth^{1280a1} are what distinguish them,

and wherever people rule because of wealth, whether they are fewer or more numerous, this must be an oligarchy, and wherever the poor rule, a democracy. But as we said, it happens that the former are few and the latter many. For the wealthy are^{1280a5} few, while all share in freedom. On these grounds both lay claim to the constitution.

We must first grasp what limits they assign to oligarchy and democracy, and what the oligarchic and democratic conceptions of the just are. For all touch on something just, but^{1280a10} proceed only to a certain point, and do not state the whole of what is just in the authoritative sense. For example, the just seems to

be equality, and it is, but not for everyone, only for equals. Inequality also seems to be just, and indeed it is, but not for everyone, only for unequals. They omit this qualification, for whom, and judge badly. The cause is¹⁵ that the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are poor judges of their own affairs. Thus, since the just is just for certain people, and is divided in the same way with regard to the things and the people concerned, as was said earlier in the Ethics, they agree about equality in the thing, but dispute equality in the people concerned. This is chiefly²⁰ for the reason just given, that they judge badly about themselves; and further, because each side speaks of something just only up to a point, they suppose they are speaking of the just without qualification. For one side thinks that if they are unequal in some respect, such as wealth, they are unequal altogether; the other thinks that if they are equal in some respect, such as freedom, they are altogether²⁵ equal.

But they do not speak of what is most authoritative. For if they associated and came together for the sake of possessions, they would share in the city in precisely the proportion in which they shared in the property. Thus the argument of the oligarchic party would seem to carry weight: it would not be just for someone who contributed one mina to share equally in the hundred minas with someone who^{1280a30} gave all the rest, whether in the original sum or in the gains from it. But they came together not for the sake of life alone, but rather of living well—for there would then be a city of slaves and of other animals too, but as things stand there is not, because they have no share in happiness or in a life of deliberate choice—nor for the sake of an alliance, so that³⁵ no one might wrong them, nor for exchange and dealings with one another—for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all who have treaties with one another, would be citizens of a single city. At any rate, they have agreements about imports, treaties against wrongdoing,⁴⁰ and written terms of alliance. But offices for all concerning^{1280b1} these purposes have not been established in common;

rather, each has its own. Nor does either side concern itself with what sort of people the other ought to be, or with ensuring that none of those under the agreements will be unjust or possess any wickedness, but only with ensuring

that they do not wrong^{1280b5} one another. Those who care about good government, however, examine political virtue and vice. This also makes it clear that the city which is truly so called, and not merely in name, must concern itself with virtue. Otherwise the association becomes an alliance, differing only in location from the other alliances, those of distant¹⁰ allies. And the law is an agreement and, as Lycophron the sophist said, a guarantor to one another of just claims, but not something capable of making the citizens good and just. That this is how matters stand is clear. For even if someone brought the territories together into one, so that the cities of Megara and¹⁵ Corinth touched at their walls, they would still not be one city; nor would they be if they established intermarriage with one another, although this is one of the forms of association peculiar to cities. Likewise, if some people lived separately, yet not so far apart that they could not associate, but had laws to prevent them from wronging one another in²⁰ their exchanges—for example, if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, another something else of this kind, and they numbered ten thousand, but shared in nothing except such things as exchange and alliance—even then this would not yet be a city.

For what reason, precisely? Surely not because of a lack of proximity in their^{1280b25} association. For even if they came together while associating in this fashion, each nevertheless treating his own household as a city, and assisting one another only against those who wronged them, as though they had a defensive alliance, even so it would not seem a city to those who examine the matter precisely, if their dealings when together were the same as when apart. It is clear, then, that³⁰ the city is not an association in a place, for the purpose of not wronging one another and of exchange. These things must indeed be present if there is to be a city, but even if they are all present there is not yet a city. Rather, it is an association of households and families in living well, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life.³⁵ Yet this will not occur unless they inhabit one and the same place and intermarry. Hence marriage ties, phratries, sacrifices, and pastimes of shared life arose in cities. Such things are the work of friendship, for the choice to live together is friendship. The end of a city, then,

is living well,⁴⁰ and these things are for the sake of that end. Families and villages form a city through their^{1281a1} association in a complete and self-sufficient life,

and this, as we say, is to live happily and nobly. We must therefore hold that the political association exists for the sake of noble actions, not of living together. Hence those who contribute most to such an^{1281a5} association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal or superior in freedom and birth but inferior in political virtue, or those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed in virtue. That all who dispute about constitutions have some part of the just¹⁰ in what they say is therefore clear from what has been said.

There is a difficulty about what should be sovereign in the city. It must be either the multitude, the wealthy, the decent, the one person best of all, or a tyrant. But all these possibilities appear to present difficulty. For what if the poor, because they are^{1281a15} more numerous, divide the possessions of the wealthy among themselves? Is this not unjust? “No, by Zeus, for the sovereign has justly decreed it.” What, then, should we call the extreme of injustice? And again, when everything has been taken, if the greater number divide the possessions of the smaller, it is clear that they destroy the city. Yet virtue does not destroy²⁰ what possesses it, nor is the just destructive of a city. Thus it is clear that this law, too, cannot be just. Moreover, all the actions a tyrant has performed must also be just: for he uses force because he is stronger, just as the multitude does against the wealthy. But is it just for the fewer to rule²⁵ —the wealthy? If, then, they too do these things, plundering and taking away the multitude’s possessions, this is just; and so, therefore, is the other case. It is clear, then, that all these things are bad and unjust. But should the decent rule and be sovereign over everything? Then all the others must³⁰ be without honor, not being honored with political offices. For we call offices honors, and if the same people always hold office, the others must be without honor. But is it better for the one most worthy person to rule? This is still more oligarchic, for those without honor are more numerous. But perhaps someone might say³⁵ that it is bad for a human being, rather than law, to be sovereign at all, given the

passions that arise in his soul. If, then, it is law, but oligarchic or democratic law, what difference will it make to the difficulties raised? For what was said before will happen just the same.

Let there be another discussion of the other matters.^{1281a40} But the claim that the multitude should be sovereign rather than the best, who are few, might seem to admit of a solution and to present some difficulty, yet perhaps also some truth. For the many, each of whom is^{1281b1} not a worthy man,

may nevertheless, when they come together, be better than those others, not individually but collectively, just as dinners to which many contribute are better than those provided at one person's expense. For, being many, each may possess a portion of virtue and practical wisdom,^{1281b5} and when they come together the multitude may become like a single human being, with many feet and hands and many senses, and likewise with regard to character and thought. Hence the many also judge works of music and of poets better: different parts are judged by different people, and the whole¹⁰ by all together. But worthy men differ from each of the many in this way, just as, they say, beautiful people differ from those who are not beautiful, and things painted through art from real things: what is dispersed separately is brought together into one. For taken separately, this person's eye may be more beautiful than the one in the painting, and¹⁵ in someone else, another feature.

Whether, then, this difference between the many and the few worthy people can hold of every people and every multitude is unclear. Perhaps, by Zeus, it is clear that for some it is impossible: for the same argument would also fit wild beasts, and indeed how do^{1281b20} some people differ, so to speak, from wild beasts? But nothing prevents what was said from being true of a certain multitude. For this reason one could also resolve through these considerations the difficulty stated earlier and the one following it: over what should the free people and the multitude of citizens be sovereign? These are those who neither²⁵ are wealthy nor enjoy any reputation whatever for virtue. For it is not safe for them to share in the greatest offices: through injustice and lack of wisdom they must act unjustly in some matters and err in others. But to give them no share and let them participate in nothing is frightening: when many are poor and

without honor,³⁰ this city must be full of enemies. It remains, then, for them to share in deliberating and judging. For this reason Solon and some other law-givers assign them the election of officeholders and the scrutiny of those who have held office, but do not permit them to hold office individually. For all,³⁵ when they come together, have sufficient perception, and when mixed with the better people they benefit their cities, just as impure food mixed with pure makes the whole more useful than the small amount of pure food. But each separately is incomplete in judgment.

Book III, 1281b–1285a



This arrangement of the constitution presents a difficulty: first, that^{1281b40} judging who has treated a patient correctly would seem to belong to the same person as treating him and making him well from his present illness; and that person is the physician.

The same holds also^{1282a1} for the other kinds of expertise and the arts. Just as a physician must render his account before physicians, so must the others before their peers. A physician may be a practitioner, a master of the art, or, third, someone educated in the art (for there are⁵ such people in practically every art); and we grant those who are educated no less right to judge than those who have expert knowledge. Further, the same would seem to hold for choice. For choosing correctly, too, is the work of those who know: choosing a geometer belongs to those versed in geometry, and¹⁰ a pilot to those versed in navigation. Even if some laymen share in certain tasks and arts, they certainly do not do so more than the experts. Thus, according to this argument, the multitude should not be made sovereign either over the choice of officeholders or over the examination of their accounts. But perhaps not all these statements are correct,¹⁵ both because of our earlier argument, provided that the multitude is not excessively slavish (each person will be a worse judge than the experts, but all together will be better or no worse), and because, in some matters, the maker is neither the only nor the best judge, wherever the work is also understood by those who do not possess the art. For example,²⁰ knowledge of a house does

not belong only to its builder: its user will judge it even better (and its user is the household manager); a pilot judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner, not the cook, judges a feast.

One might perhaps think that this difficulty is adequately resolved in this way; but another follows from it.^{1282a25} For it seems absurd that inferior people should be sovereign over greater matters than decent people, and the examination of accounts and the choice of officeholders are matters of the greatest importance. In some constitutions, as has been said, these are assigned to the people; for the assembly is sovereign over all such matters. Yet people take part in the assembly,³⁰ serve on the council, and sit as jurors with small property qualifications and at any ordinary age, while those who serve as treasurers and generals and hold the greatest offices have large property qualifications. One might resolve this difficulty in the same way. For perhaps these arrangements too are correct. Neither the juror, nor the council member, nor the assembly member³⁵ is a ruler; rather, it is the law court, the council, and the people; and each of those mentioned is a part of these (by a part I mean the council member, the assembly member, and the juror). Thus the multitude is justly sovereign over greater matters; for the people, the council, and the law court consist of many. And the property qualification⁴⁰ of all these together is greater than that of those who, individually or in small groups, hold the great offices. Let these matters, then, be determined^{1282b1} in this way.

The difficulty first mentioned makes nothing else so clear as this: laws rightly established must be sovereign, while the ruler, whether one or more, must be sovereign in those matters about which the laws cannot^{1282b5} speak precisely, because it is not easy to define everything in universal terms. What sort of laws rightly established ought to be is not yet clear at all; the earlier difficulty still remains. For laws must be bad or good, just or unjust, together with and in the same way as constitutions.¹⁰ This, at least, is clear: laws must be established to suit the constitution. If this is so, it is evident that laws conforming to correct constitutions must be just, and those conforming to deviant constitutions unjust.

Since in every science and art^{1282b15} the end is a good, and the greatest good, good in the highest degree, is the end of the most authoritative of them all, which is political capacity, and since the political good is the just, and this is the common advantage, everyone thinks the just is a certain equality. Up to a point, at least, they agree with the philosophical arguments in which²⁰ ethical matters have been defined (for they say that the just is something for certain people, and that it must be equal for equals). But equality and inequality in what must not escape us. For this presents a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Someone might perhaps say that offices should be distributed unequally according to superiority in any good,²⁵ if people differ in none of the other respects but are alike. For people who differ have different claims to the just and to what accords with merit. But if this is true, superiority in color, stature, or any good whatever will give those who possess it a larger share of political rights.³⁰ Or is the falsehood here apparent on the surface? It is clear in the other sciences and capacities. Among flute players equal in their art, those of better birth should not receive a greater share of the flutes (for they will play no better); rather, superiority in the instruments should be granted to the one superior in the work. If³⁵ what is said is not yet clear, it will become clearer as we carry it further. Suppose someone is superior in flute playing but falls far short in birth or beauty. Even if each of these is a greater good than flute playing (I mean birth and beauty), and even if, in⁴⁰ proportion, they surpass flute playing more than he surpasses the others in flute playing, still he must be given the superior^{1283a1} flutes.

For superiority in wealth and birth would have to contribute to the work, and they contribute nothing.

Further, by this argument every good would be comparable with every other. For if a certain stature counts for more, then^{1283a5} stature in general would compete with wealth and freedom. Thus, if this person exceeds that one more in stature than that one exceeds him in virtue, and virtue in general is superior to stature, everything would be comparable. For if so much stature is better than so much virtue, clearly a certain amount is equal to it. But since this is impossible,¹⁰ it is evident that in political matters too people reasonably do not

claim offices on the basis of every inequality (for if some are slow and others fast, that is no reason for some to have more and others less; rather, their difference receives its honor in athletic contests). Instead, those things of which a city is composed¹⁵ must be the basis of the claim. This is why the wellborn, the free, and the wealthy reasonably lay claim to honor. For there must be people who are free and who contribute property: a city could not consist entirely of the poor, any more than of slaves. But if these are needed, it is clear that²⁰ justice and political virtue are needed too, for without these a city cannot be governed. The difference is that without the former a city cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be governed well.

As regards a city's existence, then, all or at least some of these would seem to make a just claim; as regards the good life, however,^{1283a25} education and virtue would make the most just claim, as was said before. Since those who are equal in only one respect ought not to have an equal share in everything, nor those unequal in one respect an unequal share, all constitutions of this kind must be deviations. It was also said earlier³⁰ that everyone makes a just claim in a certain sense, but not everyone makes a just claim without qualification. The wealthy do so because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common, and because they are also generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free and the wellborn do so because they are closely related (for fuller citizenship³⁵ belongs to those of nobler birth than to those of low birth, and noble birth is honored in each people's homeland); further, because those descended from better people are likely to be better, for noble birth is virtue of a family. Likewise, we shall say that virtue too makes a just claim, for we say that justice is a communal virtue, which must be followed by⁴⁰ all the other virtues. But the greater number also makes a claim against the lesser, for they are stronger, wealthier, and better, when the greater number is taken collectively against the lesser.

So,^{1283b1} if all were in one city—I mean, for example, the good, the wealthy, the wellborn, and also some other multitude of citizens—would there be a dispute over who ought to rule, or not? In each of the constitutions mentioned, beyond dispute⁵ is the judgment as to who ought to rule (for they differ from one another in who is sovereign: one, for example, has rule through the wealthy,

another through good men, and each of the others in the same way). Nevertheless, let us examine how the matter should be determined when all these are present at the same time. If, then,¹⁰ those who possess virtue are very few in number, how ought we to decide? Or must we consider their fewness in relation to the task, asking whether they can govern the city, or whether they are numerous enough to form a city by themselves? There is a difficulty that bears on all those who dispute over political honors. For it would seem¹⁵ that those who claim to rule because of wealth, and likewise those who claim it because of family, have no just argument. For it is clear that if, in turn, one person is wealthier than all the rest, by the same principle of justice this one must rule over all; and likewise the person distinguished in noble birth must rule over those who lay claim²⁰ on the basis of freedom. Perhaps the same will occur with virtue in aristocracies. For if one man is better than the other good men in the citizen body, by the same principle of justice he must be sovereign. Thus, if the multitude ought to be sovereign because they are stronger than²⁵ the few, then if one person, or more than one but fewer than the many, is stronger than the others, these should be sovereign rather than the multitude. All these considerations seem to make it clear that none of these standards is correct as a basis on which people claim that they themselves should rule and that the others should be ruled by them,³⁰ all of them. For even against those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the basis of virtue, and likewise those who claim it on the basis of wealth, the multitudes could advance a certain just argument. Nothing prevents the multitude from sometimes being better than the few and wealthier, not individually but³⁵ collectively. For this reason, the difficulty that some people investigate and put forward can also be answered in this way. Some ask whether the lawgiver who wishes to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the advantage of the better people or for that of the greater number, when the situation described occurs.⁴⁰ What is correct must be understood as equitable; and what is equitably correct looks to the advantage of the whole city and to the common advantage of its citizens. One who shares in ruling and being ruled, in the general sense,^{1284a1} is a citizen,

but differs according to each constitution; in the best constitution, he is one who is able and chooses to be ruled and to rule with a view to the life of virtue.

But if there is one person so exceptionally superior in virtue, or more than one, though not^{1284a5} enough to provide the full complement of a city, that the virtue of all the others and their political capacity cannot be compared with theirs, if there are several, or with his alone, if there is one, these people should no longer be regarded as part of the city. For they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal shares, when they are so unequal in¹⁰ virtue and political capacity; such a person would naturally be like a god among human beings. Hence it is clear that legislation too must concern those who are equal in birth and capacity; but there is no law for such people, for they themselves are law. It would be ridiculous for anyone to legislate¹⁵ for them. They might perhaps say what Antisthenes said the lions said when the hares were making speeches and demanding that everyone have an equal share. For this reason democratic cities institute ostracism: these cities are thought to pursue equality above all,²⁰ so that they ostracized those who seemed to be superior in power through wealth, many friends, or some other political strength, and removed them from the city for fixed periods. The story is told that the Argonauts too left Heracles behind for such a reason: the Argo refused to carry him²⁵ with the other voyagers, because he surpassed them so greatly. Thus those who condemn tyranny and Periander's advice to Thrasybulus should not be thought entirely correct in their criticism. For they say that Periander said nothing to the herald sent to seek his advice, but cut off³⁰ the ears of grain that rose above the others and leveled the field. The herald did not understand the reason for what was done, but reported what had happened, and Thrasybulus realized that he must eliminate the men who stood above the rest. For this is not advantageous only to tyrants, nor do tyrants alone do it;³⁵ the same holds for oligarchies and democracies. For ostracism has, in a sense, the same effect as cutting down and exiling those who stand above the rest. Those who control power do the same to cities and peoples: the Athenians, for example, to the Samians,⁴⁰ Chians, and Lesbians (for as soon as they had a firm hold on their empire, they humbled them contrary to their agreements),

and the Persian^{1284b1} king often cut down the Medes, Babylonians, and others whose pride arose from having once held power.

The problem applies generally to all constitutions, including the correct ones. For deviant constitutions^{1284b5} do this with a view to their own advantage; yet the same holds for those that look to the common good. This is clear also in the other arts and sciences. A painter would not allow the figure to have a foot that exceeds its proper proportion, even if¹⁰ it were exceptionally beautiful; nor would a shipbuilder allow this in the stern or any other part of the ship, nor would a chorus trainer allow someone whose voice is louder and finer than the whole chorus to sing with it. Thus, on this ground, nothing prevents monarchs from agreeing with cities, provided their own rule is advantageous¹⁵ to the cities when they act in this way. Hence, where the superiorities are acknowledged, the argument concerning ostracism contains an element of political justice. It is better, then, for the lawgiver to construct the constitution from the beginning so that it needs no such remedy; but as a second course, if the situation arises, he should try through some such²⁰ remedial measure to correct it. This was not what happened in cities: they did not look to the advantage of their own constitution but used ostracisms for factional purposes. In deviant constitutions, then, it is clear that this is advantageous and just for them in particular; and perhaps it is also clear that it is not unconditionally²⁵ just. But in the best constitution there is a great difficulty—not concerning superiority in other goods, such as strength, wealth, and many friends, but if someone becomes outstanding in virtue: what should be done? Surely no one would say that such a person should be expelled and removed;³⁰ yet neither should people rule over him. That would be much the same as claiming to rule over Zeus by dividing the offices. What remains, then, and what seems natural, is that everyone should willingly obey such a person, so that such people are kings in their cities for life.

^{1284b35} Perhaps, after the arguments given, it is appropriate to pass on to examine kingship; for we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. We must examine whether it is advantageous for a city and territory that are to be well governed to be ruled by a king, or not, but rather by some other constitu-

tion,⁴⁰ or whether it is advantageous for some and not for others. First, then, we must distinguish whether there is one kind of kingship or whether it has several^{1285a1} varieties.

It is easy to see at least this: that it includes several kinds, and that the manner of rule is not the same in all. For kingship in the Spartan constitution seems to be kingship according to law in the fullest sense, but it is not sovereign over everything;^{1285a5} rather, when the king goes beyond the country's borders, he leads in matters of war. Further, matters relating to the gods have been assigned to the kings. This kingship, then, is a kind of generalship with full powers and held for life. For the king has no authority to put anyone to death except in a particular circumstance, as among the ancients on¹⁰ military expeditions, under the law of force. Homer makes this clear: Agamemnon endured abuse in the assemblies, but once they went out he had authority even to put someone to death. At any rate, he says: "Whomever I find far from battle ... he will not be sure of escaping the dogs and birds; for death is in my hands." (Hom. Il. 2.391)

Book III, 1285a–1288b



One, ^{1285a15} then, is this form of kingship: generalship for life. Some of these are hereditary, others elective. Beside this there is another form of monarchy, such as the kingships found among certain barbarian peoples. All these have power resembling that of tyrannies, but they are both lawful and ancestral. For ²⁰ because the barbarians are by nature more slavish in character than the Greeks, and those in Asia more so than those in Europe, they endure a master's rule without resentment. Thus these kingships are tyrannical for this reason, but secure because they are ancestral and lawful. Their guard too is kingly, ²⁵ not tyrannical, for the same reason. For citizens guard their kings with arms, whereas tyrants are guarded by a foreign force. Kings rule according to law and over willing subjects, tyrants over unwilling ones; thus the former have a guard supplied by the citizens, the latter a guard against the citizens.

These, then, are two forms ^{1285a30} of monarchy; another is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, whose rulers are called aisymnetes. This, to speak simply, is an elective tyranny, differing from the barbarian form not in being unlawful, but only in not being ancestral. Some held this office for life, others for certain fixed ³⁵ periods or tasks. For example, the Mytileneans once chose Pittacus to oppose the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. Alcaeus makes it clear that they chose Pittacus as tyrant in one of his drinking songs: he reproaches them: “Lowborn Pittacus, over the spiritless and ^{1285b1} ill-fated city, they set up as tyrant, all together praising him highly.”

These forms, then, are and were tyrannical because they involve a master's rule, but kingly because they are elective and accepted by willing subjects. A fourth form of kingly monarchy consists of the kingships of the heroic^{1285b5} ages, which arose with willing subjects and were ancestral and lawful. For because the first kings became benefactors of the multitude through the arts or war, or by bringing them together or providing land, they became kings over willing subjects, and the kingship was ancestral for their successors. They were sovereign over leadership in war¹⁰ and over sacrifices not belonging to the priesthood, and in addition they judged lawsuits. Some did this without swearing an oath, others under oath; the oath consisted in raising the scepter. The kings of ancient times thus ruled continuously over affairs in the city, in the country, and beyond its borders. Later,¹⁵ as the kings themselves relinquished some powers and the masses took others away, in the other cities only the sacrifices were left to the kings; and wherever there remained what deserved to be called kingship, they retained only leadership in warfare beyond the borders.

^{1285b20} These, then, are the forms of kingship, four in number. One is that of the heroic ages (this was over willing subjects, but in certain defined matters: the king was a general and a juror, and sovereign over matters relating to the gods). The second is the barbarian form (this is hereditary rule by a master²⁵ according to law). The third is what they call *aisymneteia* (this is an elective tyranny). The fourth of these is the Spartan form (this, to speak simply, is hereditary generalship held for life). These, then, differ from one another in this way. There is a fifth form of kingship, when, over everything,³⁰ one person is sovereign, as each people and each city is over its common affairs, organized on the model of household management. For just as household management is a kind of kingship over a household, so absolute kingship is household management of a city and of one people or several.

There are, broadly speaking, two forms of kingship we must examine: this one^{1285b35} and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these: their kings are sovereign over less than in absolute kingship and over more than in the

Spartan form. Thus our examination concerns broadly two questions: one, whether it is advantageous for cities to have a general for life, either hereditary or appointed in turn,

^{1286a1} or whether it is not advantageous; the other, whether it is advantageous for one person to be sovereign over everything or not. Examining this sort of generalship is more a matter of laws than of a constitution (for it can occur under every constitution),⁵ so let us set the first question aside. The remaining manner of kingship is a form of constitution, so we must consider it and go through the difficulties it contains. The starting point of the inquiry is this: is it more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws?

Those ^{1286a10} who think it advantageous to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only in universal terms and do not give commands suited to the circumstances as they arise. Thus, in any art, governing by written rules is foolish (in Egypt too, physicians are allowed to alter the treatment after the fourth day, but if they do so earlier, it is at their own risk). It is clear, then, that¹⁵ for the same reason the constitution based on written rules and laws is not the best. Yet rulers too must possess that universal account. What has no element of passion at all is better than what has it by nature. Law has no such element, but every human soul must²⁰ have it. Yet someone might perhaps say that, in compensation for this, the king will deliberate better about particulars. It is clear, then, that he must be a lawgiver, and that laws must be established, though they must not be sovereign where they go astray, since in other matters they must be sovereign. But in matters which the law cannot judge either²⁵ at all or well, should the one best person rule, or everyone? Even now people come together to judge lawsuits, deliberate, and decide, and all these decisions concern particulars. Any one of them, taken individually, may perhaps be inferior; but the city consists of many, and just as a feast to which many contribute³⁰ is finer than one provided by a single person alone, so for this reason the masses judge many things better than any one person.

Further, a large number is less easily corrupted. Just as a greater quantity of water is less easily spoiled, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. When one person is overcome by anger or some other such passion, his judg-

ment must be corrupted;^{1286a35} but in the other case it is difficult for everyone to become angry and go wrong at once. Let the multitude consist of free people who do nothing contrary to law except in matters where the law necessarily falls short. If this is not easy to secure among many, still, if there were several who were good both as men and as citizens, would one person be less easily corrupted as⁴⁰ ruler, or rather several good men,^{1286b1} good without exception?

Is it not clear that the several would be? But they will form factions, whereas the one person is free from faction. To this we should perhaps reply that they are good in soul, just like that one person. If, then, the rule of several men, all good, is to be^{1286b5} named aristocracy, and that of one kingship, aristocracy would be preferable to kingship for cities, whether the rule possesses force or lacks it, provided that several similar men can be found. Perhaps this is why they were ruled by kings in earlier times: it was rare to find men greatly distinguished in virtue, especially since they then¹⁰ lived in small cities. Further, they appointed kings because of their benefactions, which are the work of good men. But when it came about that there were many alike in virtue, they no longer endured kingship, but sought something shared and established a constitution. When, becoming worse, they made money from the common funds,¹⁵ it is reasonable to suppose that oligarchies arose from some such beginning; for they made wealth the object of honor. From these they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy. For by constantly reducing the number of those in power through shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, so that it attacked them and democracies arose.²⁰ Since cities have also come to be larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any constitution other than democracy to arise.

If someone were to hold that being ruled by a king is best for cities, how will matters stand with the king's children? Must his family too be kings? But if they turn out to be whatever sort of people^{1286b25} chance produces, this is harmful. But, it may be said, though sovereign, he will not hand power over to his children. Yet this is no longer easy to believe: it is difficult and requires a virtue greater than human nature allows. There is also a difficulty concerning his force: must the future king have some strength about him with which he

can³⁰ compel those unwilling to obey, or how can he administer his rule? For even if he were sovereign according to law, doing nothing contrary to law at his own wish, he must nevertheless possess a force with which to guard the laws. Perhaps, then, what concerns a king of this sort is not difficult³⁵ to determine. He must possess strength, but this strength must be such that it exceeds that of each individual and of several together, yet is less than that of the multitude. This was how the ancients granted guards when they appointed someone over the city whom they called an *aisymnetes* or a tyrant; and when Dionysius requested guards, someone advised⁴⁰ the Syracusans to give him that number of guards.

^{1287a1} Our argument has now reached the king who does everything according to his own wish, and we must examine him. For the so-called king according to law is not, as we have said, a form of constitution (for in all constitutions⁵ there can be a generalship for life, for example in democracy and aristocracy, and many people make one person sovereign over administration: there is such an office at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, though with somewhat lesser powers). But concerning so-called absolute kingship (this is the form in which the king rules over everything according to¹⁰ his own wish), some think that it is not even by nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the city is composed of people who are alike. For those alike by nature must by nature have the same claim to the just and the same worth. Thus, if indeed giving unequal people equal food or¹⁵ clothing is harmful to their bodies, the same holds for honors; and likewise, then, for giving unequal shares to equals. Hence it is no more just for anyone to rule than to be ruled, and therefore it is just to do so in turn. But this is already law, for an orderly arrangement is law. It is therefore preferable that law should rule rather than any one of the citizens,²⁰ and by this same argument, even if it is better for certain people to rule, they should be appointed guardians and servants of the laws. For there must be certain offices, but it is not just, they say, that one person should hold this position, at least when all are alike. Moreover, whatever the law seems unable to determine, a human being²⁵ would be unable to know either. But the law, having educated the rulers expressly for this purpose, sets them to judge and

administer the remaining matters according to the most just judgment. Further, it allows them to correct whatever, through experience, seems better than the existing provisions. Thus one who commands that law should rule seems to command that god and intellect³⁰ alone should rule; but one who commands that a human being should rule adds a beast as well. For appetite is such a thing, and anger distorts rulers, even the best men. Hence law is intellect without desire. The example drawn from the arts seems false: the claim that treatment according to written rules is bad, and that it is preferable to employ³⁵ those who possess the arts. For these do nothing contrary to reason because of friendship, but earn their fee by making the sick well; those in political offices, however, are accustomed to do many things out of spite or favor. Indeed, when people suspect physicians of being bribed by their enemies to destroy them⁴⁰ for profit, they would then prefer to seek treatment according to written rules.

Moreover, people call in assistance for themselves: ^{1287b1} physicians, when sick, call in other physicians, and physical trainers, when training, call in other trainers, because they cannot judge the truth when judging their own affairs and while under the influence of feeling. Thus it is clear that in seeking the just they seek the impartial; for law is the⁵ impartial. Further, laws based on custom are more authoritative, and concern more authoritative matters, than written laws, so that even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws, he is not more reliable than those based on custom.

Moreover, it is not easy for one person to oversee many things. He will therefore have to appoint several rulers under him, ^{1287b10} so what difference does it make whether this arrangement exists from the outset or the one person establishes it in this way? Further, as has been said before, if the good man has a just claim to rule because he is better, two good men are better than one. This is the meaning of “When two go together” (Hom. Il. 10.224) and of Agamemnon’s prayer:¹⁵ “If only I had ten such fellow counselors.” (Hom. Il. 2.372) Even now, officeholders have authority to judge certain matters, as the juror does, where the law cannot determine them. For in matters where it can, no one disputes that the law would rule and judge best. But since some things can be encompassed by laws and others²⁰ cannot, these are what cause the diffi-

culty and the inquiry whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. For it is impossible to legislate about matters on which people deliberate. Thus they do not dispute that a human being must judge such matters, but contend that it should not be²⁵ one alone, but many.

For each ruler educated by the law judges well; and perhaps it would seem absurd if one person, judging with two eyes and two ears and acting with two feet and hands, should see better than many people with many. Even now monarchs make many eyes^{1287b30} and ears and hands and feet for themselves: they make those friendly to their rule and to themselves fellow rulers. If these are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's choice; but if they are friends to him and his rule, a friend is equal and alike, so that if he thinks these should rule, he thinks that equals and those alike should rule³⁵ equally. These, then, are broadly the arguments of those who dispute the claims of kingship.

But perhaps these matters stand in this way for some people and not so for others. For some are by nature suited to a master's rule, others to kingly rule, and others to political rule; and different arrangements are just and advantageous for different people. But none is suited to tyranny under^{1287b40} nature's order, nor to any of the other constitutions that are deviations; for these arise contrary to nature.

From what has been said,^{1288a1} at least, it is clear that among those alike and equal it is neither advantageous nor just for one person to be sovereign over all, whether there are no laws and he himself is law, or there are laws; whether he is good and rules over good people, or not good and rules over people who are not good; nor even if in virtue he is⁵ better, except in a certain way. We must say what this way is; it has already been mentioned to some extent before.

First, we must define what sort of people is suited to kingship, what to aristocracy, and what to polity. A multitude suited to kingship is one naturally capable of bearing a family superior in virtue for political leadership; a multitude suited to aristocracy^{1288a10} is one naturally capable of bearing a body of people able to be ruled with the rule appropriate to free people by those fitted through virtue to lead in political rule; a multitude suited to polity is one in which there naturally arises a body capable of war, able to be ruled and to rule

according to a law that distributes, in proportion to merit,¹⁵ offices to the well-off. When, then, either a whole family or one person among the rest happens to become so distinguished in virtue that his virtue surpasses that of all the others, it is then just that this family should be kingly and sovereign over everything, and that this one person should be king. For, as was said before,²⁰ this holds not only according to the principle of justice usually advanced by those who establish constitutions, whether aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic (for all make their claims on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority), but also according to what was said earlier. For killing or²⁵ exiling or ostracizing such a person is certainly not fitting, nor is requiring him to be ruled in turn. For it is not natural for the part to surpass the whole, yet this is what has happened to the person possessing such exceptional superiority. Thus only one course remains: to obey such a person and let him be sovereign, not in turn but without qualification.³⁰ Let kingship, then, its varieties, and whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous for cities, and for which cities and in what way, be determined in this manner.

Since we say that there are three correct constitutions, and the best of these must be the one administered by the best people, and such a constitution is one in which it happens^{1288a35} that one person surpasses all together, or a whole family or multitude is superior in virtue, with some able to be ruled and others to rule with a view to the most desirable life; and since it was shown in our first arguments that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen of the best city must be the same, it is clear that in the same way⁴⁰ and by the same means a man becomes good and someone could establish a city governed by aristocracy or kingship,

so that^{1288b1} the education and habits that make a good man and those that make a statesman and a king will be practically the same. Having determined these matters, we must now try to speak about the best constitution: in what manner it naturally arises and how it is established.⁵ Anyone who is to undertake the appropriate inquiry into it must, then, do so.

Book IV, 1288b–1291b



^{1288b10} In all arts and sciences that concern not a part of their subject but a whole single kind, it belongs to one science to consider what is fitting for each kind: for example, what sort of bodily exercise benefits what sort of body, and which is best (for the best exercise, in the case of the body best endowed by nature and supplied with resources,¹⁵ must be the one that suits it), and which single exercise suits most bodies alike (for this too is the work of physical training). Further, if someone does not desire the appropriate condition or knowledge for athletic competition, it nonetheless belongs to the trainer and the instructor in physical training to provide him with this lesser capacity as well. We see the same²⁰ thing happen in medicine, shipbuilding, the making of clothing, and every other art. It is clear, therefore, that it also belongs to the same science to consider what the best constitution is, and what character it would have to fulfill our wishes most completely if nothing external stood in the way, and which constitution suits which people (for many²⁵ may perhaps find it impossible to attain the best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must know both the constitution that is best without qualification and the best under given conditions); and, third, the constitution assumed as a starting point (for one must also be able to consider a given constitution: how it might arise in the first place, and, once it has arisen,³⁰ how it might be preserved for the longest time. I mean, for example, if a city happens neither to live under the best constitution, being without even the necessary resources, nor

under the constitution possible with the means it has, but under some inferior one). Besides all these, the constitution best suited to all cities³⁵ must be known. Thus most of those who pronounce on constitutions, even if they speak well in other respects, miss what is useful. For one must consider not only the best constitution but also the possible, and likewise the one that is easier to establish and more generally suited to all. As things stand, the most exalted constitution, requiring abundant⁴⁰ resources, is all that some seek; others, though discussing a more common sort, sweep aside existing constitutions; the Spartan constitution^{1289a1} or some other is what they praise.

But one should propose an order in which, starting from existing conditions, people will readily be persuaded to share and will be able to do so. For correcting a constitution is no less a task than establishing one from the beginning, just as learning anew is no less a task^{1289a5} than learning from the beginning. For this reason, in addition to what has been said, the statesman must also be able to assist existing constitutions, as was said before. But this is impossible without knowing how many kinds of constitution there are. Some now suppose that there is one democracy and one oligarchy; but this is not¹⁰ true. Therefore one must be aware of the differences among constitutions, how many there are and in how many ways they are combined. After this, the same practical wisdom must discern both the best laws and those suited to each constitution. For laws must be framed to suit constitutions, and everyone does frame them so, not constitutions¹⁵ to suit laws. A constitution is the order of a city's offices: how they are distributed, what is sovereign in the constitution, and what is the end of each community. Laws, apart from those that define the constitution, are the rules according to which the rulers must rule and watch over those²⁰ who transgress them. It is clear, therefore, that one must grasp the differences and the definition of each constitution with a view to framing laws as well. For the same laws cannot benefit all oligarchies or all democracies, if indeed several forms, and not just one democracy or one oligarchy alone,²⁵ exist.

In our first inquiry into constitutions we distinguished three correct constitutions—kingship, aristocracy, and polity—and three deviations from these: tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and democracy^{1289a30} from polity. Aristocracy and kingship have been discussed (for to consider the best constitution is also to speak of the forms bearing these names, since each aims to be founded on virtue supplied with resources). Further, how aristocracy and kingship differ from each other, and when³⁵ kingship should be adopted, have already been determined. It remains to discuss the constitution designated by the common name, and the other constitutions: oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. It is evident which of these deviations is worst and which comes second. For⁴⁰ the deviation from the first and most divine constitution must be the worst. Kingship must either possess the name alone without^{1289b1} being kingship in fact,

or rest upon the great superiority of the man who reigns. Therefore tyranny, being the worst, must stand furthest from a constitution; oligarchy comes second (for aristocracy is far removed from this constitution), and the most moderate is^{1289b5} democracy. One of our predecessors has already pronounced this judgment, though not with the same consideration in view as ours. For he judged that, when all are decent—for example, a good oligarchy and the other forms—democracy is worst, but when they are bad it is best. We, however, maintain that these constitutions are wholly mistaken,¹⁰ and that it is not right to call one oligarchy better than another, but rather less bad. Let this sort of judgment be set aside for now. We must first distinguish how many varieties of constitution there are, if there are indeed several kinds of democracy and oligarchy; next, which is most generally applicable and¹⁵ which most desirable after the best constitution, and, if there happens to be another that is aristocratic and well constituted but unsuited to most cities, what it is. Next, we must also consider which of the other constitutions is desirable for which people (for perhaps democracy is more necessary than oligarchy for some, and oligarchy more necessary than democracy for others).²⁰ After this, we must consider how someone who wishes to establish these constitutions should do so: I mean each kind of democracy, and likewise each kind of oligarchy. Finally,

when we have given all these matters as brief an account as possible, we must try to examine what destroys and what preserves constitutions,²⁵ both in general and in each separate case, and through what causes these things chiefly tend to occur.

The reason there are several constitutions is that every city has several parts in number. First, we see that all cities are composed of households; next, within this multitude^{1289b30} some must be rich, some poor, and some of the middle class. Of both the rich and the poor, some are armed and some unarmed. We also see that some of the people are farmers, some traders, and some artisans. Among the notables too there are differences in wealth and in the size³⁵ of their estates, for example, in keeping horses (for this is not easy for those who are not wealthy. For this very reason, in ancient times all cities whose strength lay in their horses had oligarchies. They used horses in wars against their neighbors, as did the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnesians on⁴⁰ the Maeander, and many other peoples in Asia). Further, besides differences in wealth there is difference in birth and in^{1290a1} virtue,

and any other such quality that has been said, in the discussion of aristocracy, to constitute a part of a city. For there we distinguished the necessary parts of which every city consists. Sometimes all these parts share in the constitution, sometimes^{1290a5} fewer, and sometimes more. It is evident, then, that there must be several constitutions differing in kind from one another, for these parts themselves also differ in kind. A constitution is the order of offices, and everyone distributes these either according to the power of those who share in them or according to some equality¹⁰ common to them: I mean, for example, an equality among the poor or among the rich, or one common to both. There must therefore be as many constitutions as there are arrangements corresponding to the superiority and the differences of the parts.

But there seem chiefly to be two: just as winds are called northern or southern, and^{1290a15} the others deviations from these, so too constitutions are taken to be two, democracy and oligarchy. For people count aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, since it is a sort of oligarchy, and what is called polity as democracy, just as among winds they count the west wind as northern and the east wind as

southern. The same²⁰ holds of musical modes, as some say: there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian, and call the other arrangements either Dorian or Phrygian. This is how people are chiefly accustomed to conceive of constitutions. But the distinction we have drawn is truer and better: there are two²⁵ or one well-constituted forms, and the others are deviations—deviations from the well-blended harmony in the one case, and from the best constitution in the other. The tighter and more masterful constitutions are oligarchic, the relaxed and soft ones democratic.

^{1290a30} But we should not define democracy, as some now commonly do, simply as a constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for in oligarchies too, and everywhere, the larger part is sovereign), nor oligarchy as one in which a few are sovereign over the constitution. For if there were thirteen hundred people in all, and a thousand of them were rich,³⁵ and did not grant a share in office to the three hundred, who were poor but free and like them in other respects, no one would say that these people lived under a democracy. Likewise, if the poor were few but stronger than the rich, who were more numerous, no one would call this an oligarchy either, if the others, though⁴⁰ rich, had no share in honors.

Rather, then, we should say that ^{1290b1} there is democracy when the free are sovereign, and oligarchy when the rich are sovereign; it happens, however, that the former are many and the latter few, for the free are many and the rich few. Indeed, if offices were distributed according to height, as⁵ some say they are in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, there would be an oligarchy, for both the beautiful and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless, these constitutions are not adequately distinguished by these features alone either. Since both democracy and oligarchy have several parts, we must make the further distinction that, if¹⁰ a few free people rule a greater number who are not free, this is not democracy: for example, in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera (for in each of these cities those distinguished by noble birth, who first occupied the colonies, held the honors, though they were few among many). Nor, if the rich rule because¹⁵ they are more numerous, is this democracy, as in Colophon in ancient times (for there the majority possessed large estates before the war

against the Lydians). Rather, there is democracy when the free and poor, being more numerous, are sovereign in rule, and oligarchy when the rich and better-born are²⁰ few and sovereign.

It has been said, then, that there are several constitutions, and for what reason. Let us now say why there are more than those mentioned, and what they are and why, taking as our starting point what was said before. For we agree that every city has not one part but several.^{1290b25} Thus, if we undertook to determine the kinds of animal, we would first distinguish what every animal must have (for example, certain sense organs, the organs for processing and receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and, besides these, the parts by which each animal moves). If there were only so many parts, but these had³⁰ varieties (I mean, for example, several kinds of mouth, stomach, and sense organs, and also of the parts used for movement), the number of their combinations would necessarily produce several kinds of animal (for the same animal cannot have several different kinds of mouth, nor, similarly, of ears). Thus, when³⁵ all their possible pairings have been determined, they will produce kinds of animal, and there will be as many kinds of animal as there are combinations of their necessary parts—the same holds for the constitutions we have mentioned. For cities too consist not of one part but of many, as has often been said. One⁴⁰ part, then, is the multitude concerned with food, those called farmers;

^{1291a1} a second is that called the artisan class (this consists of those concerned with the arts without which a city cannot be inhabited: some of these arts must exist out of necessity, others for luxury or for living well); a third is the trading class (by the trading class I mean⁵ those occupied with selling and buying, foreign trade and retail trade); a fourth is the laboring class; and a fifth kind is the class that will fight in the city's defense. Its existence is no less necessary than that of the others, if they are not to be enslaved by invaders. For surely it is impossible for a community that is a slave by nature to deserve the name of city:¹⁰ a city is self-sufficient, but what is enslaved is not self-sufficient. For this reason the account of this in the Republic is ingenious but inadequate. For Socrates says that a city consists of the four most necessary people, naming a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a builder. Then he adds more, since these

are not self-sufficient:¹⁵ a smith and those concerned with the necessary livestock, and also a merchant and a retailer; all these make up the first city. It is as though every city were constituted for the sake of necessities and not rather for the noble, and needed shoemakers and farmers equally. As for the fighting class,²⁰ he does not assign it a place until the territory grows and encroaches on that of the neighbors, bringing them into war. Yet even among the four, or among any number whatever of partners, there must be someone who will dispense and judge what is just. If, then, one would count the soul as a part of an animal²⁵ more than the body, we must also count parts of this sort as parts of cities more than those serving necessary uses: the military part, the part that shares in judicial justice, and, besides these, the deliberative part, which is the work of political understanding. Whether these functions belong separately to different people or to the same people makes no difference³⁰ to the argument; for the same people often both serve as infantry and farm. Thus, if both these and those are to be counted as parts of a city, it is evident that the infantry class, at least, is a necessary part of the city.

A seventh part is the class that performs public services with its property, whom we call the rich. An eighth is the class that serves the public^{1291a35} and performs the services connected with offices, if indeed a city cannot exist without rulers. There must therefore be some who are able to rule and who perform this public service for the city, either continuously or in turn. The remaining parts are those we have just distinguished: the part that deliberates and the part that judges⁴⁰ the just in disputes. If, then, these functions must be performed in cities, and performed well and justly,

^{1291b1} there must also be some who share in the virtue of statesmen. Many people think that the other capacities can belong to the same people: for example, that the same people may be defenders, farmers, and artisans, and also those who deliberate⁵ and judge. All also lay claim to virtue and think themselves capable of holding most offices. But it is impossible for the same people to be both poor and rich. For this reason these seem above all to be parts of a city: the rich and the poor. Further, because the former are generally few and

the latter¹⁰ many, these appear as opposed parts among the city's parts. Therefore people also establish constitutions according to the predominance of these, and there seem to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

That there are several constitutions, and through what^{1291b15} causes, has been said before. Let us now say that there are also several kinds of democracy and oligarchy. This is evident from what has been said as well. For there are several kinds both of the people and of those called the notables. For example, among the kinds of the people, one consists of farmers, another of those engaged in the arts, another of the trading class occupied with²⁰ buying and selling, another of those concerned with the sea; and of this last, one part is naval, another concerned with wealth-getting, another with ferrying, and another with fishing (for in many places each of these is very numerous: for example, fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium, the crews of triremes in Athens, merchant seamen in Aegina and Chios, and ferry workers²⁵ in Tenedos). Besides these there is the class of manual laborers, and those whose property is too small to allow them leisure; further, those who are free but not born of two citizen parents, and any other such kind of multitude. Among the notables, the distinctions are wealth, noble birth, virtue, education, and the qualities spoken of under the same³⁰ distinction as these.

The first democracy, then, is the one so called chiefly on the basis of equality. For the law of such a democracy defines equality as the poor having no greater predominance than the rich, neither group being sovereign, but both alike. For if freedom is found most fully in democracy,^{1291b35} as some suppose, and so is equality, they would be found most fully in this way, when all share as equally as possible in the constitution. Since the people are more numerous, and what the majority decides is sovereign, this must be a democracy. This, then, is one kind of democracy: for offices, a property qualification⁴⁰ is required, though it is small. Anyone acquiring the qualification must be permitted to share, and anyone losing it must not share.

Book IV, 1292a–1295a



^{1292a1} Another kind of democracy is that in which all citizens whose status is beyond challenge share, but the law rules; another is that in which everyone shares in offices, provided only that he is a citizen, but the law rules. Another kind of democracy is that in which the other features⁵ are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law. This occurs when decrees are authoritative rather than the law, and it comes about through demagogues. For in cities governed democratically under law a demagogue does not arise, but the best citizens occupy the leading position;¹⁰ where the laws are not authoritative, however, demagogues arise. For the people become a monarch, one composite ruler made up of many: the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Which sort of rule by many Homer means when he says it is not good—this sort or the sort in which there are several rulers acting as individuals—¹⁵ is unclear. Such a people, then, being a monarch, seeks to exercise monarchical rule because it is not ruled by law, and becomes masterful, so that flatterers are honored. Such a people corresponds, among monarchies, to tyranny. For its character is the same: both rule as masters over the better people, and decrees²⁰ are like the commands issued there; the demagogue and the flatterer are the same and correspond to one another. Each has the greatest influence with his respective ruler: flatterers with tyrants, and demagogues with peoples of this sort. They are responsible for decrees being authoritative rather than the laws,²⁵ because they refer everything to the people. For they themselves become

great because the people are sovereign over everything, while they are sovereign over the people's opinion: the multitude obeys them. Further, those who bring charges against the officeholders say that the people must judge, and the people gladly accept the invitation. Thus dissolved are³⁰ all offices. Someone who says that such a democracy is not a constitution would seem to make a reasonable criticism. For where laws do not rule there is no constitution. The law must rule over all, and the offices over particular cases, and we must judge this to be a constitution. Therefore, if democracy is³⁵ one of the constitutions, it is evident that such an arrangement, in which everything is administered by decrees, is not even democracy in the proper sense; for no decree can be universal. Let the kinds of democracy, then, be distinguished in this way.

Of the kinds of oligarchy, one rests on property qualifications:^{1292a40} these determine offices and are so high that the poor, though more numerous, do not share, but anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to share in the constitution;

another^{1292b1} is that in which offices depend on large property qualifications, and the officeholders themselves choose those who fill vacancies (if they do this from all those qualified, it seems rather aristocratic, but if from a certain defined group, oligarchic). Another kind of oligarchy⁵ is that in which a son enters in place of his father; a fourth is that in which the condition just mentioned exists and not the law but the rulers rule. This has its counterpart in tyranny among monarchies and in the democracy we discussed last among democracies. They call¹⁰ such an oligarchy rule by a powerful group.

There are, then, this many kinds of oligarchy and democracy. But we must not overlook that in many places the constitution as laid down in the laws happens not to be democratic, yet through custom and upbringing people take part in public life democratically. Likewise,^{1292b15} among others the constitution as laid down in the laws is more democratic, but in upbringing and customs they are governed more oligarchically. This happens especially after changes in constitutions. For they do not change over at once, but at first are content to gain small advantages from one another,²⁰ so that the previously existing laws remain, while those who changed the constitution hold power.

That there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy is evident from what has been said itself. For either all the parts of the people that have been mentioned must share in the constitution,^{1292b25} or some must share and others not. When the farming class and those who possess moderate property are sovereign over the constitution, they conduct public life under laws (for they earn their living by working and cannot have leisure, so they set the law over them and attend only the necessary meetings of the assembly). Others are permitted to share when³⁰ they acquire the property qualification defined by the laws. Therefore all who acquire it are permitted to share. For, in general, it is oligarchic not to permit everyone to share; but it is impossible to have leisure without revenues. This, then, is one kind of democracy, for these reasons. Another kind arises from the³⁵ next distinction: it is possible to permit everyone whose birth is beyond challenge to share, though only those able to have leisure actually do so. For this reason the laws rule in such a democracy, because there is no revenue. A third kind permits all who are free to share in the constitution, though they do not⁴⁰ actually share, for the reason mentioned before, so that in this form too the law must rule.

A fourth kind of democracy^{1293a1} is the one that has arisen latest in time in the cities. For because the cities have become much larger than they originally were, and abundant revenues are available, everyone shares in the constitution owing to the predominance of the multitude. They also share in its activities and⁵ take part in public life because even the poor can have leisure, receiving pay. Indeed, such a multitude has the most leisure, for attention to their own affairs does not hinder them at all, whereas it hinders the rich, so that these often do not take part in the assembly or in judging. Therefore the multitude of the poor becomes¹⁰ sovereign over the constitution, rather than the laws.

The kinds of democracy, then, are this many and of this character because of these necessities; those of oligarchy are the following. When a larger number possess property, but in smaller amounts and not very much, this is the first kind of oligarchy. For they permit a share^{1293a15} to anyone who acquires it, and because those who share in the citizen body are numerous, not the people but the law must be sovereign (for the further they stand from monarchy, possess-

ing neither so much property that they can have leisure while neglecting it nor so little that they must be supported by the city,²⁰ the more they must require the law to rule for them, rather than rule themselves). But if those who possess property are fewer than those in the preceding case, yet have more of it, the second kind of oligarchy arises. For being stronger, they claim a greater share; therefore they themselves choose from among the others those who enter the citizen body,²⁵ but because they are not yet strong enough to rule without law, they establish a law of this kind. If they intensify this by being fewer and possessing larger estates, the third stage of oligarchy arises: they retain the offices among themselves, but according to a law ordering that those who die be succeeded by their³⁰ sons. When they greatly increase their preponderance in property and in their many connections, such rule by a powerful group is close to monarchy, and the individual rulers become sovereign rather than the law. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of democracy.

^{1293a35} There are also two constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. One of these is recognized by everyone and has been described as one of the four kinds of constitution (they speak of four: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and, fourth, what is called aristocracy). The fifth is the one designated⁴⁰ by the name common to all (for they call it polity); but because it does not occur often, it escapes those who try to enumerate the kinds of constitution, and they use only the four^{1293b1} (as Plato does) in their accounts of constitutions.

It is right, then, to call aristocracy the constitution we discussed in our first arguments (for only the constitution composed of those best in virtue without qualification, and not of men good in relation to some assumption, deserves^{1293b5} the name aristocracy. In it alone the same man is both a good man without qualification and a good citizen; those in the other constitutions are good in relation to their own constitution). Nevertheless, there are some constitutions that differ both from oligarchic constitutions and from what is called polity, and are called aristocracies.¹⁰ For where offices are chosen not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis of merit, this constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in cities that do not make

virtue a common concern, there are nonetheless some who enjoy a good reputation and seem to be decent. Where, then, the constitution looks to¹⁵ wealth, virtue, and the people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic; and so are those that look only to two, as does that of the Lacedaemonians, to virtue and the people, and are a mixture of these two, democracy and virtue. These, then, are two kinds of aristocracy besides the first and best constitution,²⁰ and a third comprises those forms of what is called polity that incline more toward oligarchy.

It remains for us to speak of what is called polity and of tyranny. We have placed them in this order, although neither polity nor the aristocracies just mentioned are deviations, because^{1293b25} in truth all fall short of the most correct constitution; and, further, they are counted along with these, and the constitutions we mentioned at the beginning are deviations from them. It is reasonable to mention tyranny last, because it is least of all a constitution, while our³⁰ inquiry concerns constitutions. The reason for this order has now been stated. We must now give our account of polity. For its character is clearer now that the matters concerning oligarchy and democracy have been distinguished. Polity is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. People are accustomed³⁵ to call those that incline toward democracy polities, and those that incline more toward oligarchy aristocracies, because education and noble birth belong more often to the richer people. Further, the rich are thought to possess those things for the sake of which wrongdoers do wrong; hence “noble and good” and “notables”⁴⁰ are also names given to them. Since, then, aristocracy aims to assign predominance to the best citizens, people also say that oligarchies are composed rather of the noble and good.

^{1294a1} It seems impossible that a city should be well governed by laws if it is ruled not by the best but by the wicked; and likewise that it should be ruled by the best if it is not well governed by laws. Yet good government by laws does not consist in the laws being well framed but not obeyed. Therefore one aspect of good government by laws⁵ must be understood as obedience to the established laws, and another as the laws that people abide by being well framed (for it is possible to obey badly framed laws too). This latter is possible in two ways: the laws may be either the best possible for them or the best without qualification.

Aristocracy seems chiefly to consist in ^{1294a10} honors being distributed according to virtue (for virtue is the defining feature of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy). But the authority of what the majority decides exists in all: in oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracies alike, whatever the greater part of those sharing in the constitution decides is authoritative.¹⁵ In most cities, then, this is called a kind of polity; for the mixture aims only at the rich and the poor, wealth and freedom (for among most people the rich seem to occupy the place of the noble and good). Since there are three things that lay claim to equality²⁰ in the constitution—freedom, wealth, and virtue (the fourth, which they call noble birth, follows upon two of these, for noble birth is ancient wealth and virtue)—it is evident that the mixture of the two, the rich and the poor, should be called polity, and the mixture of the three aristocracy, more than any of the others apart from the²⁵ true and first aristocracy. It has been said, then, that there are also other kinds of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy; what these are; and how the aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracy. It is also evident that these are not far removed from one another.

^{1294a30} Let us next discuss how what is called polity arises alongside democracy and oligarchy, and how it should be established. At the same time, the features by which democracy and oligarchy are defined will also become clear. For we must grasp their distinction, and then, taking from each³⁵ as though a token of recognition, combine them. There are three ways of combining and mixing them. Either we must take both provisions that the two enact, as in the matter of judging (for in oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as jurors, but give the poor no pay; in democracies,⁴⁰ they give the poor pay, but impose no fine on the rich. Both these provisions together form a common and intermediate arrangement, and for this reason it is also ^{1294b1} characteristic of polity, since it is mixed from both).

This, then, is one way of combining them. Another is to take the middle between what each prescribes: for example, some require no property qualification, or an entirely small one, for attendance at the assembly, while others require a large qualification. The common arrangement, ^{1294b5} however, is nei-

ther, but a qualification midway between the two. A third is to take, from the two arrangements, some provisions from the oligarchic law and others from the democratic. I mean, for example, that it is thought democratic for offices to be assigned by lot and oligarchic for them to be assigned by choice; and democratic for them not to depend on¹⁰ a property qualification, oligarchic for them to depend on one. It is therefore aristocratic and characteristic of polity to take one feature from each: from oligarchy, to make offices a matter of choice, and from democracy, to make them independent of a property qualification.

This, then, is the way to mix them. For democracy and oligarchy to be well mixed,^{1294b15} the criterion is that the same constitution can be called both democracy and oligarchy. For it is evident that those who describe it in this way do so because it is well mixed. This also holds of the middle, for each extreme shows itself in it. This is what happens with the constitution of the Lacedaemonians. For many²⁰ try to describe it as a democracy because its order has many democratic features: first, for example, the rearing of children (for the children of the rich are reared in the same way as those of the poor, and educated in a manner that the children of the poor could also receive); likewise at the next²⁵ stage of life, and when they become men, it is the same (for in this respect the rich man is in no way distinguished from the poor). Food is the same for everyone in the common messes, and the rich wear clothing of the sort that any poor man could also provide. Further, of the two greatest offices, one³⁰ is chosen by the people and the other is shared by them (for they choose the elders and share in the office of ephor). Others call it an oligarchy because it has many oligarchic features: for example, all offices are assigned by choice and none by lot, a few have authority over death and exile, and there are many other such features. But in³⁵ a well-mixed constitution, both forms should seem to be present and neither; and it should be preserved through itself, not from outside. It should be preserved through itself not because those who want it are more numerous outside it (for this could also hold of a bad constitution), but because no part of the city would want any other constitution⁴⁰ at all. How polity should be established, and likewise what are called aristocracies, has now been said.

^{1295a1} It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not because there is much to say about it, but so that it may receive its share of the inquiry, since we count it too as a kind of constitution. We distinguished kingship in our first arguments,⁵ in which we examined kingship in the fullest sense: whether it is disadvantageous or advantageous to cities, what sort of king should be established and from what source, and how. We distinguished two kinds of tyranny in our examination of kingship, because their character overlaps in a certain way¹⁰ with kingship also, since both these forms of rule are according to law (for among some non-Greek peoples they choose monarchs with absolute power, and in ancient times among the early Greeks certain monarchs arose in this way, whom they called *aisymnetes*). These forms have certain¹⁵ differences from one another, but were kingly because they were according to law and because the monarch ruled over willing subjects, and tyrannical because they ruled as masters and according to their own judgment. A third kind of tyranny, which seems to be tyranny in the fullest sense, is the counterpart of absolute kingship. Such tyranny must be a monarchy²⁰ that rules without accountability over all who are its equals or betters, to its own advantage rather than that of the ruled. For this reason it is against their will: no free person willingly submits to such rule. These, then, are the kinds of tyranny, this many in number, for the reasons that have been stated.

Book IV, 1295a–1299a



^{1295a25} What constitution is best, and what life is best, for most cities and most human beings, if we judge neither by a virtue beyond that of ordinary people, nor by an education that requires natural gifts and a fortunate provision of resources, nor by a constitution that fulfills our wishes, but by a life that³⁰ most can share and a constitution in which most cities can participate? For even the constitutions called aristocracies, which we have just discussed, either lie beyond the reach of most cities or border on what is called polity (and therefore we must speak of both as one). The judgment concerning³⁵ all these matters rests on the same principles. For if the Ethics rightly says that the happy life is a life according to virtue, free from impediments, and that virtue is a mean, then the middle life must be best: the life at the mean that each can attain. These same criteria must apply⁴⁰ to a city's virtue and vice and to its constitution; for a constitution^{1295b1} is a certain way of life for a city.

In every city there are three parts of the city: the very wealthy, the very poor, and, third, those between them. Since, then, it is agreed that what is moderate and intermediate is best, it is evident that, among^{1295b5} the gifts of fortune too, a moderate possession is best of all. For it is most readily obedient to reason. But for someone exceptionally beautiful, strong, wellborn, or rich, or, on the contrary, exceptionally destitute, weak, or lacking in honor, it is difficult to follow reason. The former tend to become insolent and wicked on a grand scale,¹⁰ the latter malefactors and excessively petty in their wickedness; and unjust acts

arise either from insolence or from malice. Moreover, those in the middle are least inclined either to shun office or to pursue it eagerly, and both these tendencies harm cities. Besides this, those who possess an excess of fortune's gifts—strength, wealth, friends,¹⁵ and other such things—neither wish nor know how to be ruled (and this begins at home when they are children: because of their luxury they are not accustomed to being ruled even at school). Those who are excessively deprived of these things are altogether abject. Thus the latter do not know how to rule, but only how to submit to²⁰ the rule imposed on slaves, while the former know how to submit to no rule, but only how to exercise a master's rule. The city therefore becomes a city of slaves and masters, not of free people, with one group envious and the other contemptuous. Nothing is farther from friendship and political community than this; for community involves friendship. Even on a journey, people do not wish²⁵ to share company with their enemies. Yet a city wishes to consist, as far as possible, of people who are equal and alike, and this is true above all of the middle class. Necessarily, then, the city consisting of those whom we say form a city by nature has the best constitution. These citizens are also the safest in cities. For neither³⁰ do they themselves desire others' possessions, as the poor do, nor do others desire theirs, as the poor desire those of the rich. Because they neither suffer nor devise plots, they live without danger. For this reason Phocylides prayed well: "Many things are best for those in the middle; I wish to be in the middle in the city."

It is clear,^{1295b35} then, that the political community formed through the middle class is best, and that cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and stronger, preferably than both the other parts together, but otherwise than either one. For when it joins either side, it tips the balance and prevents the opposing extremes from arising. Hence it is good fortune⁴⁰ of the highest kind for those who take part in public life to possess moderate and sufficient property,

^{1296a1} since where some possess an enormous amount and others nothing, either an extreme democracy arises or an unmixed oligarchy, or tyranny arises through both extremes. For tyranny arises both from the most headstrong democracy and from oligarchy, but⁵ from the middle constitutions and those

near them much less often. We shall state the reason later, in our discussion of changes in constitutions. That the middle constitution is best is evident: it alone is free from faction. For where the middle element is numerous, faction and divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. Large cities too are less subject to faction¹⁰ for the same reason, because the middle element is numerous. In small cities it is easy to divide everyone into two groups, leaving nothing in the middle, and nearly everyone is either poor or wealthy. Democracies too are more secure and longer-lasting than oligarchies because of the middle class (for they are more numerous¹⁵ and have a greater share in honors in democracies than in oligarchies). For when the poor, without this class, become overwhelmingly numerous, things go badly and the constitutions swiftly perish. We must also regard as evidence the fact that the best legislators belong to the middle class of citizens. Solon was one of them²⁰ (as his poetry shows), as were Lycurgus (for he was not a king), Charondas, and nearly all the others.

From this it is also evident why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. Because the middle element in them is often small, whichever group gains the upper hand,^{1296a25} whether the property owners or the people, oversteps the middle and draws the constitution toward itself, so that either democracy or oligarchy arises. Besides this, because faction and conflict arise between the people and the wealthy, whichever side happens to prevail over its opponents does not establish³⁰ a common or equal constitution, but takes supremacy in the constitution as the prize of victory, one side establishing a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Moreover, those who attained leadership in Greece each looked to their own constitution: democracies in the cities were what one side³⁵ established, and oligarchies the other, considering not the cities' advantage but their own. For these reasons the middle constitution either never arises or does so rarely and in few places. For only one man among those who formerly held leadership was persuaded that this⁴⁰ arrangement should be conferred. By now, among those in the cities, a custom^{1296b1} has arisen: not even to desire equality,

but to seek either to rule or to endure being dominated. What constitution is best, and for what reason, is therefore evident from this. As for the other constitutions, since we say that several democracies and several oligarchies^{1296b5} exist, it is not difficult, once the best has been defined, to see which should be ranked first and second, and in this way next in order, according as one is better and another worse. For the constitution nearest to this must always be better, and the one farther removed from the middle worse, unless one judges in relation to a particular assumption. I mean¹⁰ by judging in relation to an assumption that often, though one constitution is more desirable, nothing prevents a different constitution from being more advantageous for certain people.

Next after what has been said, we must examine which constitution is advantageous for whom, and what kind for what kind of people. First we must grasp^{1296b15} the same universal principle concerning all of them: the part of the city that wishes the constitution to remain must be stronger than the part that does not. Every city consists of both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth; by quantity, superiority in numbers. Quality may²⁰ belong to one of the parts of which the city consists, and quantity to another. For example, those without noble birth may outnumber the wellborn, or the poor the rich, yet not be as superior in quantity as they are inferior in quality. Therefore these must be compared with one another. Where,²⁵ then, the multitude of the poor exceeds the proportion just stated, democracy naturally exists, and each form of democracy corresponds to the superiority of each kind of people. For example, if the multitude of farmers predominates, the first democracy arises; if the multitude of artisans and wage earners,³⁰ the last; and similarly for the others between these. But where the wealthy and the notables are more superior in quality than they are inferior in quantity, oligarchy naturally exists, and likewise each form of oligarchy corresponds to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude.

It is necessary^{1296b35} for the legislator always to bring the middle class into the constitution. For whether he lays down oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class, or democratic laws, he must attach these citizens to the laws.

Where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both extremes together or even just one of them, there it is possible⁴⁰ for a constitution to endure.

For there is no fear that^{1297a1} the rich will ever agree with the poor against them. Neither side will ever wish to be enslaved to the other, and if they seek a constitution more common to both, they will find none other than this. For they would not endure ruling in turn because of their distrust⁵ of one another. Everywhere the arbitrator is the most trusted, and the person in the middle is an arbitrator. The better a constitution is mixed, the more lasting it is. Many, even among those who wish to make aristocratic constitutions, err not only in assigning more to the wealthy, but also in¹⁰ deceiving the people. For in time a real evil must arise from counterfeit goods. The grasping of the rich destroys the constitution more than that of the people.

The devices contrived in constitutions under a pretext^{1297a15} to deal with the people are five in number, concerning the assembly, offices, law courts, the possession of arms, and physical training. Concerning the assembly, everyone is permitted to attend, but a fine for failing to attend is imposed on the wealthy, either on them alone or a much heavier one. Concerning offices,²⁰ those who meet the property qualification are not permitted to excuse themselves by oath, while the poor are permitted to do so. Concerning law courts, the wealthy are fined if they do not serve as jurors, while the poor are exempt, or the wealthy receive a large fine and the poor a small one, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places everyone who registers is permitted²⁵ to attend the assembly and serve as a juror, but if, after registering, they neither attend nor serve, heavy fines are imposed on them. The intention is that the fine should make them avoid registering, and their failure to register should prevent them from serving as jurors or attending the assembly. The same manner concerning the possession of arms³⁰ and physical training is followed in legislation. The poor are permitted not to possess arms, but the wealthy are fined for not possessing them. If they do not train, there is no fine for the poor, but a fine for the wealthy, so that the latter participate because of the fine, while the former, having nothing to fear, do not participate. These,³⁵ then, are oligarchic devices in legislation; in democracies they devise corresponding measures against these. For they provide

pay for the poor who attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but impose no fine on the wealthy. Thus it is evident that, if anyone wishes to make a just mixture, he must combine the arrangements of both⁴⁰ and provide pay for the one group and a fine for the other. For in this way everyone would participate, whereas in the other way the constitution belongs^{1297b1} to only one of the two groups.

The constitution must consist only of those who possess arms. But as for the amount of the property qualification, we cannot define it unconditionally and say that so much is required. Rather, we must consider the highest level that can be set so that^{1297b5} those who participate in the constitution outnumber those who do not, and establish this. For the poor are willing to remain quiet even without a share in honors, provided no one insults them or takes any of their property away. But this is not easy; one cannot always count on decency among those who belong¹⁰ to the citizen body. In wartime, too, the poor are usually reluctant if they receive no provisions and lack resources; but if someone provides them with provisions, they are willing to fight.

Among some peoples the constitution consists not only of those currently serving as heavy infantry but also of those who have served. Among the Malians the constitution^{1297b15} consisted of these, but they chose officeholders from those on active service. The first constitution among the Greeks after kingship also consisted of the fighting men, initially of the cavalry (for the strength and superiority in war lay with the cavalry: without formation, nothing useful can be achieved²⁰ with heavy infantry, and in ancient times experience and arrangements in these matters did not exist, so that the strength lay with the cavalry). But as cities grew and those bearing arms became stronger, more people participated in the constitution. Hence what we now call polities, people formerly called²⁵ democracies. The ancient constitutions were oligarchic and kingly, as might be expected. For because of their small populations they did not have a numerous middle class, so that, being both few in number and poorly organized, they endured being ruled. Why there are several constitutions, and why³⁰ there are others besides those named (for democracy is not one in number, and the same holds for the others); moreover, what their differences are and

why these occur; and, besides this, which constitution is best, generally speaking, and which of the other constitutions suits which people: all this has therefore been stated.

^{1297b35} Let us again discuss what follows, both in general and separately for each constitution, taking the appropriate starting point. There are three parts of all constitutions, concerning which the serious legislator must consider what is advantageous for each. When these are well arranged, the constitution must be well arranged, and ⁴⁰ constitutions differ from one another as each of these differs. Of these three, one is the element that deliberates ^{1298a1} about common affairs;

the second concerns offices, namely what offices there must be, over what they must have authority, and how the choice of their holders must be made; the third is the element that judges. The deliberative element has authority over war and peace, alliances ^{1298a5} and their dissolution, laws, death, exile, and confiscation, and the choice of officeholders and the scrutiny of their accounts. All these decisions must be assigned either to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for example, to one office or several, or different decisions to different offices), or some to all and others to some.

For ^{1298a10} all to decide about everything is democratic; for the people seek this kind of equality. There are several ways in which all may participate. One is by turns, rather than all together (as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus; in other constitutions too, the boards of officeholders meet to deliberate, ¹⁵ and everyone enters office by turns from the tribes and the very smallest divisions until it has passed through them all), while they assemble only to enact laws, to consider matters concerning the constitution, and to hear what the rulers announce. Another way is for ²⁰ all to assemble together, but only to choose officeholders, to legislate, to consider war and peace, and to scrutinize accounts, while the offices appointed for each matter, filled by choice or lot from everyone, deliberate about the rest. Another way is for ²⁵ the citizens to meet concerning offices and the scrutiny of accounts, and to deliberate about war and alliances, while the offices administer the rest, being filled by choice wherever possible; such are the offices which necessarily require knowledgeable rulers. A

fourth way is for everyone to assemble and deliberate about everything,³⁰ while the offices decide nothing but merely conduct a preliminary examination. This is the way in which the last form of democracy is now administered, which we say corresponds to oligarchy ruled by a dominant group and to tyrannical monarchy. All these ways, then, are democratic; but for some to deliberate about everything is oligarchic.³⁵ This too has several varieties. When they are chosen on the basis of more moderate property qualifications and are more numerous because of the moderation of the qualification, and when they do not alter what the law forbids but follow it, and anyone who acquires the qualification is permitted to participate, such a constitution is oligarchic but constitutional⁴⁰ because of its moderation. When in deliberation not everyone^{1298b1} participates, but only those selected beforehand,

and they rule according to law, as before, it is oligarchic. But when those with authority to deliberate also choose themselves, and when a son enters in place of his father and they are sovereign over the laws, this arrangement must be^{1298b5} oligarchic. When some decide certain matters—for example, everyone decides about war, peace, and the scrutiny of accounts, but rulers decide the rest, and these are chosen, not appointed by lot—the constitution is an aristocracy. If some are chosen and others appointed by lot, and the latter either without restriction or from those selected beforehand, or if those chosen¹⁰ and those appointed by lot act together, some of these arrangements belong to an aristocratic constitution, others to polity itself.

The deliberative element has therefore been distinguished in relation to constitutions in this way, and each constitution administers it according to the distinction stated. For the democracy now thought to be democracy most of all (I mean^{1298b15} one in which the people are sovereign even over the laws), it is advantageous, in order to deliberate better, to do the same as is done with the law courts in oligarchies (for they impose a fine on those whom they wish to serve as jurors, so that they will serve, while democrats provide pay for the poor): to do this, then, with assemblies too²⁰ (for all will deliberate better when they deliberate together, the people with the notables and these with the multitude). It is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be chosen, or

appointed by lot in equal numbers from the different parts. And if the democrats greatly outnumber those who favor a constitutional government, it is advantageous either not to²⁵ give pay to everyone, but only to a number proportionate to the multitude of notables, or to exclude the excess by lot. In oligarchies it is advantageous either to choose some additional members from the multitude or, after establishing an office like those in certain constitutions called preliminary councilors and guardians of the laws, to conduct business on matters³⁰ which these have considered beforehand (for in this way the people will participate in deliberation and will be unable to undo anything in the constitution); moreover, either for the people to vote for the same measures or at least for nothing contrary to those introduced, or for all to share in giving counsel while the rulers deliberate. They must also do the opposite³⁵ of what occurs in polities. For the multitude must have authority when it votes to reject, but not when it votes to approve; rather, the matter must be referred back to the rulers. In polities they do the reverse: the few have authority when they vote to reject, but when they vote to approve,⁴⁰ they do not have authority; instead, the matter is referred to the greater number^{1299a1} always.

Book IV, 1299a–1301a



Let the deliberative element, which must also be sovereign in the constitution, be defined in this way.

Next comes the distinction concerning offices. For this part of the constitution too has many differences: ^{1299a5} how many offices there are, over what they have authority, and, concerning time, how long each office lasts (some make offices last six months, others less, others a year, and others longer); whether offices must be perpetual or long-lasting or neither, but the same people hold them several times, or ¹⁰ the same person not twice but only once; and moreover, concerning the establishment of offices, from whom their holders must be appointed, by whom, and how. For in all these matters we must be able to distinguish how many ways are possible, and then determine which ways are advantageous for which constitutions. Nor is it ¹⁵ easy to define which positions we should call offices. For the political community needs many supervisors, and therefore we must not regard all those chosen or appointed by lot as rulers: first, for example, the priests (for this must be considered something different from political offices). Moreover, sponsors of choruses, heralds, and ambassadors are also chosen. ²⁰ Some responsibilities are political, concerning either all citizens in a particular activity, as a general supervises those on military service, or a part of them, as the supervisor of women or the supervisor of children does. Others concern household management (for they often choose distributors of grain); others are subordinate services, to which they assign slaves if

they have the means.²⁵ Generally speaking, those positions should most properly be called offices to which the power has been assigned to deliberate about certain matters, to judge, and to command, especially this last; for commanding is more characteristic of rule. But these distinctions make virtually no difference in practice (for no legal decision has yet arisen from a dispute about³⁰ the name), though they afford a further subject for intellectual inquiry.

Which offices, and how many, are necessary if a city is to exist, and which, though not necessary, are useful for a good constitution: these are questions one might find more perplexing, concerning every constitution and particularly small cities. For in^{1299a35} large cities it is both possible and necessary to assign one office to one task (for many can enter offices because the citizens are numerous, so that some offices are held again only after a long interval and others only once, and each task receives better attention when the attention is devoted to one thing^{1299b1} rather than many).

In small cities, however, many offices must be brought together in a few hands (for because the population is small it is not easy to have many people in office: who, then, will be left to succeed them?). Yet sometimes small cities need^{1299b5} the same offices and laws as large ones. But the latter often need the same services, while in the former the need arises only after long intervals. Therefore nothing prevents several responsibilities from being assigned at once (for they will not obstruct one another), and because of the small population offices must be made like¹⁰ combined spits and lamp stands. If, then, we can say how many offices every city must have, and how many, though not necessary, it ought to have, knowledge of this would make it easier to see which offices it is fitting to combine into one. It is also fitting not to overlook which matters require¹⁵ many offices to supervise them in different places and which require a single office with authority everywhere: for example, whether good order requires a market supervisor in the marketplace and someone else in another place, or the same person everywhere. And should the division follow the matter at hand or the people concerned? I mean, for example, should one person supervise good order, or one supervise children²⁰ and another women? And regarding constitutions, does the kind of office also differ in each, or not at

all? For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy, do the same offices have authority, though their holders are not drawn from equal or similar people, but from different people in different constitutions: for example, in²⁵ aristocracies from the educated, in oligarchies from the rich, and in democracies from the free? Or do some constitutions differ in the offices themselves, with the same offices advantageous in some places and different ones in others (for in one place it is fitting that the same offices should have great³⁰ powers, and in another small ones)?

Yet some offices are peculiar to particular constitutions, such as that of the preliminary councilors; for this is not democratic. A council, however, is democratic. There must be some such body responsible for considering matters beforehand for the people, so that the people will be occupied; but if its members are few in number, this is oligarchic. The^{1299b35} preliminary councilors must be few in number, so this is oligarchic. But where both these offices exist, the preliminary councilors are set over the councilors; for the councilor is democratic, the preliminary councilor oligarchic. The council's power is also dissolved in those democracies in^{1300a1} which the people themselves assemble and transact all business.

This commonly happens when there are ample means to pay those attending the assembly. For, having leisure, they assemble often and decide everything themselves. A supervisor of children and a supervisor of women,^{1300a5} and any other ruler with authority over such responsibilities, is aristocratic, not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out?), nor oligarchic (for the wives of those who hold power in oligarchies live in luxury).

Let this be enough for now concerning these matters. As for the appointment of officeholders,^{1300a10} we must attempt to examine it from the beginning. The differences lie in three terms, by combining which all the ways must be included. Of these three, one is who appoints the officeholders, the second from whom, and the remaining one in what manner. For each of these three, three differences¹⁵ exist. For either all the citizens appoint or some; and either from all or from certain people defined by a qualification (for example, proper-

ty, birth, virtue, or some other such thing, as at Megara from those who returned together and fought together against the people). And they do this either by choice or by lot (with these, again, combined:²⁰ I mean that some offices are filled by some citizens and others by all, some from all and others from some, and some by choice and others by lot).

Each of these differences will have four ways. For either all appoint from all by choice, or all from all by lot—and either from everyone, or by turns,^{1300a25} for example, according to tribes, demes, and phratries, until it has passed through all the citizens, or always from everyone—or some offices in one way and others in the other. Again, if some appoint, they do so either from all by choice or from all by lot, or from some by choice or from some by lot, or some offices in one way and others in the other. I mean³⁰ some from all by choice and others by lot, and some from some by choice and others by lot. Thus there are twelve ways apart from the two combinations. Of these, three modes of appointment are democratic: for all to appoint from all by choice, by lot, or by both, some offices by lot and others by choice. But for not all to appoint at the same time,³⁵ yet to appoint from all or from some, by lot or by choice or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by both I mean some by lot and others by choice), belongs to polity; and for some to appoint from all either by choice or by lot or by both (some by lot and others by choice)⁴⁰ is oligarchic. Appointment from both groups is still more oligarchic. But appointing to some offices from all and to others from some belongs to polity with an aristocratic tendency,

^{1300b1} or appointing to some by choice and to others by lot. For some to appoint from some by choice is oligarchic, as is for some to appoint from some by lot (though this does not occur, it is so nonetheless), and for some to appoint from some by both. But for some to appoint from all, and for all to appoint from some by choice,⁵ is aristocratic. These, then, are the number of ways concerning offices, and they are distinguished according to constitutions in this manner. Which are advantageous for whom, and how appointments should be made, will become evident together with the powers of the offices and what the offices are. By the power of an office I mean, for example, authori-

ty¹⁰ over revenues or authority over the guard. For the power of a generalship is of a different kind from that of the office with authority over contracts in the marketplace.

Of the three parts, it remains to discuss the judicial element. Its ways too must be considered on the same basis. The^{1300b15} law courts differ in three terms: from whom they are constituted, what matters they concern, and how. By “from whom” I mean whether from all or from some; by “what matters,” how many kinds of law court there are; by “how,” whether by lot or by choice. First, then, let us distinguish how many kinds of law court there are. They are eight in number: one for scrutinizing accounts,²⁰ another for offenses against common interests, another for matters affecting the constitution, a fourth for disputes concerning penalties, involving both rulers and private individuals, a fifth for substantial private transactions, and besides these the courts for homicide and for foreigners (the kinds of homicide court, whether²⁵ judged by the same jurors or by different ones, concern intentional killings, unintentional killings, and killings that are admitted but whose justice is disputed; a fourth concerns charges brought against those exiled for homicide regarding their return, as the court at Phreatto in Athens is said to do. Such cases occur³⁰ rarely over the whole course of time, even in large cities. Of the courts for foreigners, one concerns foreigners against foreigners and another foreigners against citizens). Besides all these there is a court for small transactions, involving one drachma, five drachmas, or a little more. For these too require a decision, but do not³⁵ fall to a large body of jurors.

But let us leave aside these courts and those for homicide and foreigners, and speak of the political courts: when these are not well arranged, divisions and upheavals in constitutions arise. Either all must judge all the matters distinguished, being appointed by choice^{1300b40} or by lot, or all must judge all matters, some appointed by lot and others by choice, or, concerning certain of the same matters, some must be appointed by lot and others^{1301a1} by choice.

These ways, then, are four in number; and there are as many other ways involving only a part. For, again, those who judge all matters may be appointed from some by choice, or from some for all matters by lot, or some by lot and

others by choice, or certain courts^{1301a5} for the same matters may consist of those appointed by lot and those chosen. These, then, as stated, are the ways corresponding to those already described. Moreover, the same arrangements may be combined: I mean, for example, some courts from all, others from some, and others from both (for example, if some members of the same court were drawn from all and others from some), and either¹⁰ by lot or by choice or by both. We have therefore stated how many ways law courts can be constituted. Of these, the first are democratic,¹² those drawn from all to judge all matters; the second are oligarchic, those drawn from some to judge all matters; and the third are aristocratic and belong to polity, those drawn partly from all and partly¹⁵ from some.

Book V, 1301a–1304b



^{1301a19} As for the other matters we proposed to discuss, nearly ²⁰ all have now been spoken of. What causes constitutions to change, how many such causes there are and of what kinds; what destroys each constitution, and from which forms they chiefly pass into which others; further, what preserves them, both in general and each separately, and by what means each constitution might best be preserved—all these must be examined ²⁵ next, following what has been said.

We must first take as our starting point that many constitutions have arisen because, though everyone acknowledges the just and proportional equality, people miss their meaning, as we have said before. Democracy arose from the belief that those who are equal in any respect are equal without qualification ^{1301a30} (for because everyone is equally free, they think they are equal without qualification); oligarchy, from the assumption that those who are unequal in one respect are unequal altogether (for because they are unequal in property, they assume they are unequal without qualification). Then the first group, on the ground that they are equal, claim an equal share in everything; the others, on the ground that they are unequal, ³⁵ seek a greater share, for a greater share is unequal. All these constitutions therefore contain something just, but without qualification they are mistaken. For this reason, when either group does not share in the constitution according to the conception it happens to hold, it forms factions. Some would have the most just grounds of all for faction, ⁴⁰ yet are least inclined to engage in it: those who surpass others in virtue;

^{1301b1} for these alone have the strongest reasonable claim to be unequal without qualification. There are also some who, because they excel in birth, do not consider themselves entitled to equal shares on account of this inequality; for those whose ancestors possessed virtue and wealth are thought to be wellborn.

Beginnings^{1301b5} and sources of factions, so to speak, are these, from which people engage in faction. Hence changes also occur in two ways. Sometimes they are directed against the constitution, to replace the established one with another—for example, democracy with oligarchy, or oligarchy with democracy, or these with polity and aristocracy,¹⁰ or those with these. Sometimes they are not directed against the established constitution: people choose to retain the same arrangement, but want it in their own hands, whether oligarchy or monarchy. Again, change may concern a greater or lesser degree: for example, making an existing oligarchy more oligarchical¹⁵ or less so, or an existing democracy more democratic or less so, and likewise with the other constitutions, either intensifying or relaxing them. Again, it may be directed at changing some part of the constitution, such as establishing or abolishing a particular office. Thus some say that at Lacedaemon Lysander²⁰ attempted to abolish kingship, and King Pausanias the office of the ephors. At Epidamnus too the constitution changed in one part (for they instituted a council in place of the tribal rulers, but the officeholders among the citizen body are still required to attend the popular court whenever²⁵ an office is put to the vote, and the single ruler was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For everywhere faction arises because of inequality, unless unequal people receive proportionate shares (for perpetual kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). In general, people form factions in pursuit of equality. Equality is of two kinds: one is³⁰ numerical, the other according to worth. By numerical equality I mean sameness and equality in number or size; by equality according to worth, equality in ratio. Thus three exceeds two numerically by the same amount as two exceeds one, whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio as two exceeds one; for two is the same fraction of four as³⁵ one is of two: both are halves. Although people agree that what accords with worth is just without qualification, they differ, as was said before, because some think that if they are equal in any respect, they

are equal altogether, while others, if they are unequal in any respect, claim unequal shares in everything. Hence chiefly two arise:⁴⁰ the constitutions of democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue^{1302a1} belong to few,

but these other qualities to more. For nowhere are there a hundred well-born and good men, whereas in many places there are a hundred wealthy ones. Yet to arrange everything without qualification according to either kind of equality is bad. This is evident from what happens: none^{1302a5} of such constitutions is lasting. The reason is that, when the first principle and starting point are mistaken, it is impossible not to encounter some evil in the end. Therefore numerical equality must be used in some matters, and equality according to worth in others.

Nevertheless, democracy is more secure and less subject to faction than oligarchy. For in^{1302a10} oligarchies two kinds of faction arise, that of the few against one another and that against the people; in democracies only the faction against the oligarchy arises, while no faction worth mentioning arises within the people against themselves. Further, the constitution based on the middle class is closer to democracy than to the constitution of the few;¹⁵ and it is the most secure of such constitutions.

Since we are examining the causes from which factions arise and constitutions change, we must first grasp their beginnings and causes generally. Broadly speaking, they are three in number, and each must be distinguished by itself in outline^{1302a20} first. For we must grasp the disposition in which people engage in faction, the ends for which they do so, and third, the beginnings of political disturbances and factions against one another. As the general cause of their disposition toward change, we should chiefly posit what we have already spoken of. Those who²⁵ seek equality form factions if they think they have less, though they are equal to those who have more; those who seek inequality and superiority do so if they suppose that, though unequal, they have not more but an equal or smaller share (these desires may be just, but they may also be unjust). For those who are inferior³⁰ form factions to become equal, and those who are equal to become superior. We have therefore stated the disposition in which people engage in faction. The objects over which they do so are profit and

honor and their opposites. For people also form factions in cities to escape dishonor and loss, either for themselves or for their friends. The causes and beginnings³⁵ of disturbances, from which people acquire the disposition described and become concerned with the objects mentioned, are in one sense seven in number, and in another more. Two of them are the same as those already mentioned, but not in the same way. For people are also incited against one another by profit and honor, not to acquire them⁴⁰ for themselves, as was said before,

but because others^{1302b1} are seen taking a greater share of them, some justly, others unjustly. Further causes are insolence, fear, superiority, contempt, and disproportionate growth; and, in another way, electioneering, neglect, small changes,⁵ and dissimilarity. The power of insolence and profit among these causes, and how they operate as causes, is fairly evident. For when those in office behave insolently and take more than their share, people form factions both against one another and against the constitutions that give them their power. This grasping for more is sometimes at the expense of¹⁰ private property, sometimes of public property.—Honor too is evident, both in its power and in how it causes faction. For people form factions both when they themselves are dishonored and when they see others honored. These things happen unjustly when people are honored or dishonored contrary to their worth, and justly when according to their worth.¹⁵ —Superiority causes faction when someone, whether one person or more, is greater in power than accords with the city and the strength of its citizen body; for monarchy or the rule of a powerful group commonly arises from such conditions. Hence in some places they customarily ostracize people, as at Argos and Athens. Yet it is better to see from the beginning that there will be no people²⁰ so greatly superior than to let them arise and seek a remedy afterward.—Through fear, both those who have done wrong, fearing punishment, and those about to suffer wrong, wishing to act before they suffer it, engage in faction. Thus at Rhodes the notables banded together against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them.²⁵ —Through contempt people both form factions and attack: in oligarchies, for example, when those without a share in the constitution are more numerous (for they think themselves stronger); and in democracies, when the

wealthy despise the disorder and lack of rule. Thus at Thebes, after the battle at Oenophyta,³⁰ poor government destroyed the democracy; and the democracy of the Megarians was destroyed when they were defeated through disorder and lack of rule. The same happened at Syracuse before Gelon's tyranny, and to the people at Rhodes before the uprising.

Changes in constitutions also arise through disproportionate growth. For just as^{1302b35} a body is composed of parts, which must grow proportionately if its symmetry is to remain, and otherwise it is ruined, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal, if not only in quantity but also in quality⁴⁰ it grew disproportionately, so a city too is composed^{1303a1} of parts,

one of which often grows unnoticed, as does the multitude of the poor in democracies and polities. Sometimes this also happens through accidents: at Tarentum, for example, when many notables were defeated and killed by the^{1303a5} Iapygians shortly after the Persian Wars, democracy arose from polity. At Argos, when those of the seventh were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, they were forced to admit some of the surrounding inhabitants. At Athens, when they suffered defeats on land, the notables became fewer because they were on the citizen list¹⁰ for military service during the Spartan War. This also happens in democracies, though less often: as the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, they change into oligarchies and the rule of powerful groups.—Constitutions also change without faction, through electioneering, as¹⁵ at Heraea (for they changed the offices from elective to allotted because people were choosing those who canvassed); and through neglect, when they let men unfriendly to the constitution enter the sovereign offices. Thus at Oreus the oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus became one of the rulers: from an oligarchy he²⁰ constructed a polity and democracy.—Again, through small changes. By small changes I mean that a great alteration in the laws often develops unnoticed when people overlook a small one. Thus at Ambracia the property qualification was small, and in the end people held office without any qualification, on the ground that a small amount is close to nothing or no different²⁵ from nothing.

Difference of stock also fosters faction until people come to share a common spirit. For just as a city does not arise from any chance multitude, neither does it arise in any chance interval of time. Hence most of those who have admitted fellow settlers or later settlers have fallen into faction. For example, Achaeans settled Sybaris together with Troezenians; then the more numerous group,^{1303a30} the Achaeans, expelled the Troezenians, and from this came the curse upon the Sybarites. At Thurii the Sybarites quarreled with their fellow settlers (for, claiming a greater share because the land was theirs, they were expelled). At Byzantium the later settlers were caught plotting against the Byzantines and were driven out by fighting. As for the people of Antissa, those from Chios³⁵ whom they admitted as exiles they expelled by fighting; the people of Zancle admitted Samians and were themselves expelled. The people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea brought in later settlers and fell into faction;

and the Syracusans, after the tyrannies, the foreigners^{1303b1} and mercenaries they made citizens, then fell into faction and came to battle. The people of Amphipolis admitted settlers from Chalcis, and most of them were expelled by these newcomers. In oligarchies the many engage in faction because they believe they are wronged, since⁵ they do not receive equal shares, as was said before, though they are equal; in democracies the notables do so because they receive equal shares though they are not equal. Cities sometimes also fall into faction because of their locations, when the territory is not naturally suited to being one city. Thus at Clazomenae those at Chytrum oppose those¹⁰ on the island, and the Colophonians oppose the people of Notium. At Athens too the inhabitants are not alike: those who live in the Piraeus are more democratic than those in the city proper. For just as in wars the crossings of ditches, even very small ones, break up the battle lines, so every difference seems to produce division.¹⁵ Perhaps the greatest division is between virtue and wickedness; next comes that between wealth and poverty, and then others, some greater than others, one of which is the difference just mentioned.

Factions, then, arise not over small matters but from small matters, and people engage in faction over great ones. Small differences are particularly powerful when among those in authority^{1303b20} they arise, as happened at Syracuse in

ancient times. For the constitution changed because two young men holding office quarreled over a love affair. While one was away, the other won over his beloved; in return, the first, angered by this, the other's wife²⁵ he persuaded to come to him. From this, by drawing in members of the citizen body, they divided everyone into factions. Therefore such things must be guarded against at their beginnings, and factions among leaders and powerful men must be dissolved. For the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning is said to be half of everything,³⁰ so that even a small error there is proportionate to errors in the other parts. In general, factions among the notables make the whole city share in their consequences. Thus at Hestiaea after the Persian Wars two brothers disputed over the division of their father's estate. The poorer brother,³⁵ claiming that the other had not disclosed the property or the treasure their father had found, enlisted the democrats; the other, who had much property, enlisted the wealthy. At Delphi too a disagreement arising from a marriage connection became the beginning of all the factions^{1304a1} that followed;

for when the bridegroom came for his bride, he took some occurrence as an omen and went away without taking her. The others, considering themselves insulted, planted some of the sacred money on him while he was sacrificing and then killed him as a temple robber. At Mytilene too, over heiresses^{1304a5} a faction arose and became the beginning of many evils and of the war against the Athenians, in which Paches captured their city. For Timophanes, a wealthy man, left two daughters; Dexander, who was rebuffed and failed to obtain them for his sons, began the faction and incited the Athenians,¹⁰ whose city's representative he was. Among the Phocians too, a faction over an heiress between Mnaseas, Mnason's father, and Euthycrates, Onomarchus's father, became the beginning of the Sacred War for the Phocians. At Epidamnus also the constitution changed because of a marriage dispute. A man had betrothed¹⁵ his daughter to another; when the father of the man to whom she was betrothed became a ruler and fined him, the other, believing himself mistreated, brought in those outside the constitution.

Constitutions also change into oligarchy, democracy, and polity because an office or a part of the city gains prestige or grows stronger.^{1304a20} For example, the council on the Areopagus, having won prestige in the Persian Wars, was thought to have tightened the constitution; and, on the other hand, the naval masses, having brought about the victory at Salamis and thereby the city's leadership through its sea power, made the democracy stronger.²⁵ At Argos the notables, having won prestige in the battle at Mantinea against the Lacedaemonians, attempted to overthrow the people. At Syracuse the people, having brought about victory in the war against the Athenians, changed the polity into democracy. At Chalcis, Phoxus³⁰ the tyrant was killed by the people together with the notables, and the people immediately took control of the constitution. At Ambracia too, in the same way, the people helped those who attacked Periander the tyrant to drive him out and transferred the constitution to themselves. In general, we must not overlook this: those who have brought about an increase in power,³⁵ whether private individuals, offices, tribes, or any part or multitude whatever, stir up faction. For either those who envy them their honors begin the faction, or these people, because of their superiority, are unwilling to remain on equal terms. Constitutions are also disturbed when the parts of the city thought to be opposed become equal^{1304b1} to one another,

such as the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only a very small one. For if either part is greatly superior, the other is unwilling to risk itself against a plainly stronger opponent. Hence those who excel in virtue do not engage in faction,^{1304b5} so to speak; for they are few against many. In general, then, the beginnings and causes of factions and changes in all constitutions are of this kind. People change constitutions sometimes through force and sometimes through deception; by force, either compelling people immediately from the beginning or doing so afterward.¹⁰ For deception too is of two kinds. Sometimes they first deceive people into consenting to a change in the constitution, and afterward hold it by force against their will. Thus under the Four Hundred they deceived the people by saying that the King would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians; having lied,¹⁵ they tried to

retain the constitution. Sometimes, having persuaded people from the outset, they continue afterward to rule them with their willing consent. Generally, then, changes in all constitutions arise from the causes that have been stated.

Book V, 1304b–1308a



Distinguishing the effects of these causes for each kind of constitution,^{1304b20} we must examine the consequences. Democracies chiefly change through the outrageous conduct of demagogues. For by bringing malicious charges against property owners individually, they draw them together (a common fear unites even the bitterest enemies), while publicly they stir up the multitude against them. As for this,²⁵ one can see it happening in many cases. At Cos, for example, the democracy changed when wicked demagogues arose (for the notables banded together); and at Rhodes too. For the demagogues procured pay for public service and prevented the repayment of what was owed to the trierarchs; the latter, because of the impending³⁰ lawsuits against them, were forced to band together and overthrow the people. At Heraclea too the people were overthrown soon after the colony was founded, because of the demagogues. For the notables, wronged by them, were driven into exile; then the exiles gathered together, returned, and overthrew the people. In much the same way³⁵ the democracy at Megara was also overthrown. For the demagogues, to have property to confiscate, expelled many of the notables, until they had made the exiles numerous. The exiles returned, defeated the people in battle, and established the oligarchy.

The same thing happened at^{1305a1} Cyme in the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. In nearly all the other cases too, one would find on examination that the changes followed this pattern. For sometimes, to win

favor, demagogues wrong the notables and so unite them: either their property⁵ is redistributed or their revenues are consumed through public services; sometimes they slander them, so that they can confiscate the possessions of the rich.

In ancient times, when the same man became both demagogue and general, democracies changed into tyranny. For nearly all the ancient tyrants arose from demagogues.^{1305a10} The reason this happened then but does not happen now is that the demagogues then came from among the generals (for people were not yet skilled in speaking), whereas now, with the growth of rhetoric, those able to speak act as demagogues, but their inexperience in military matters keeps them from attempting tyranny, except where there has been some small development¹⁵ of this kind. Tyrannies also arose more often in earlier times than now because important offices were entrusted to individuals, as at Miletus the tyranny arose from the presidency (for the president was sovereign over many important matters). Further, because cities then were not large, but in the countryside lived the²⁰ people, busy with their work, the leaders of the people, when they became capable soldiers, attempted tyranny. All did this after gaining the people's trust, and the ground of that trust was hostility toward the rich. Thus at Athens Pisistratus engaged in faction against the men of the plain; and at Megara Theagenes²⁵ slaughtered the livestock of the wealthy, seizing it as they pastured it beside the river. Dionysius, by accusing Daphnaeus and the rich, was judged worthy of tyranny, since his hostility won him trust as a friend of the people. Democracies also change from the ancestral form to the newest one. For where election is used³⁰ for offices without property qualifications, and the people make the choice, those eager for office act as demagogues and bring things to the point where the people are sovereign even over the laws. A remedy that prevents this or makes it less frequent is for the tribes to elect the rulers, rather than the people as a whole. As for democracies,³⁵ nearly all their changes, then, occur through these causes.

Oligarchies change chiefly in two especially evident ways. One is when they wrong the multitude, for anyone becomes a sufficient leader against them, especially when^{1305a40} the leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, as did

Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterward also became tyrant of the^{1305b1} Naxians.

The beginning of faction from outside also takes different forms. Sometimes the overthrow comes from the wealthy themselves, though not those in office, when those holding honors are exceedingly few, as happened at Massalia,^{1305b5} Istrus, Heraclea, and other cities. For those without a share in the offices stirred up change until first the elder brothers gained a share, and later the younger brothers in turn. In some places a father and son do not hold office together; in others one elder and one younger¹⁰ brother cannot hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more constitutional, at Istrus it ended in democracy, and at Heraclea it expanded from fewer members to six hundred. At Cnidos too the oligarchy changed when the notables themselves fell into faction with one another because few had a share and, as has been said, if a father held office,¹⁵ his son could not share in it, nor, if there were several brothers, could anyone but the eldest. For the people seized their opportunity while they were divided, took a leader from among the notables, attacked, and prevailed; for what is divided by faction is weak. At Erythrae too, under the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient times, although²⁰ those within the constitution administered it well, the people nevertheless resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution.

Oligarchies are also disturbed from within by the rivalry of those who act as demagogues (demagoguery is of two kinds: one occurs among the few themselves—for a demagogue arises^{1305b25} even when they are very few; thus among the Thirty at Athens, Charicles and his associates gained power by playing the demagogue to the Thirty, and among the Four Hundred Phrynichus and his associates did the same—the other occurs when those within the oligarchy play the demagogue to the masses. Thus at Larissa the citizen guardians, because they were chosen by³⁰ the masses, acted as demagogues; and the same happens in all oligarchies where officeholders are not chosen by those from whom they are drawn, but the offices are filled from those with high property qualifications or from political clubs, while the heavy-armed soldiers or the people choose them, as happened at Abydos; and where the law courts are not drawn from the citizen body—for by playing the demagogue³⁵ in court proceedings they

change the constitution, as happened at Heraclea on the Pontus. Again, it happens when some pull the oligarchy into fewer hands, for those seeking equality are forced to call in the people as an ally). Changes in oligarchy also arise when⁴⁰ men squander their private property by living extravagantly. For such men seek innovations: either they attempt tyranny themselves or^{1306a1} set up someone else

(as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse; and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus brought in settlers from Chalcis, and when they arrived he set them at odds with the wealthy; and at Aegina the man who carried on the dealings^{1306a5} with Chares attempted to change the constitution for such a reason). Sometimes, then, they attempt to stir up some change; sometimes they steal public funds, from which faction against one another arises, either among these men themselves or from those who fight against their theft, as happened at Apollonia on the Pontus. But an oligarchy united in concord¹⁰ is not easily destroyed from within. Evidence is the constitution at Pharsalus: though few, they are sovereign over many because they treat one another well.

Oligarchies are also overthrown when they create another oligarchy within the oligarchy. This happens when, although the whole citizen body is small,^{1306a15} not all the few share in the highest offices, as once happened at Elis. For although the constitution was in the hands of a few, exceedingly few of them became elders, because the elders held office for life and numbered ninety, and their choice was controlled by a powerful group, resembling the choice of the elders at Lacedaemon. Change also occurs²⁰ in oligarchies both in war and in peace: in war because distrust of the people forces them to employ mercenaries (for the man to whom they entrust them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; if they entrust them to several, these secure the rule of a powerful group for themselves;²⁵ sometimes, fearing these outcomes, they give the multitude a share in the constitution because they are forced to use the people). In peace, through distrust of one another, they entrust their defense to mercenaries and a neutral ruler, who sometimes becomes sovereign

over both sides, as happened at Larissa³⁰ under the rule of the Aleuadae led by Simus, and at Abydos under the political clubs, one of which was that of Iphiades.

Factions also arise because some members of the oligarchy are thrust aside by others and driven into faction over marriages or lawsuits. Examples arising from marriage disputes are those mentioned^{1306a35} before (and Diagoras also overthrew the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria after being wronged over a marriage). A verdict in a law court gave rise to the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes, when punishment on a charge of adultery was inflicted justly but in a factious manner: at Heraclea upon Eurytion,^{1306b1} and at Thebes upon Archias

(for their enemies pressed the matter so that they were bound in the pillory in the marketplace). Many oligarchies have also been overthrown because they were excessively despotic, causing some of those within the constitution to grow discontented,^{1306b5} as with the oligarchies at Cnidos and Chios. Changes also arise by accident both in the so-called polity and in those oligarchies where people serve on the council, sit as jurors, and hold the other offices on the basis of a property qualification. For often the property qualification originally fixed to suit¹⁰ the circumstances of the time, so that in the oligarchy few might share in office and in the polity the middle class might do so, is overtaken by prosperity arising from peace or some other good fortune: the same possessions become worth many times the qualification, so that everyone shares in everything. Sometimes by stages¹⁵ the change occurs, little by little and unnoticed, and sometimes more quickly. Oligarchies, then, undergo change and faction through causes of this kind (and in general both democracies and oligarchies sometimes change not into the opposite constitutions, but into those of the same kind: for example,²⁰ from law-governed democracies and oligarchies into those that are themselves sovereign, and from these into the former).

In aristocracies some factions arise because few share in the honors, which, as has been said, also disturbs oligarchies, since the description of aristocracy too as oligarchy^{1306b25} is true in a way (for in both the rulers are few, though they are few for different reasons). Indeed, for these reasons aristocracy is also

thought to be oligarchy. This is especially bound to happen when there is a multitude of people who have a proud sense that they are alike in virtue, as at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae³⁰ (for they were descended from the peers), whom the Lacedaemonians, after discovering their plot, sent out to found Tarentum; or when certain men of greatness, inferior to none in virtue, are dishonored by others enjoying higher honors, as Lysander was by the kings; or when a courageous man has no share in honors, as Cinadon,³⁵ who organized the attack upon the Spartans in the time of Agesilaus. Again, faction arises when some are exceedingly poor and others wealthy (this happens especially in wars, and it happened at Lacedaemon during the Messenian War; this is also evident from Tyrtaeus's poem called^{1307a1} *Eunomia*;

for some, hard pressed by the war, demanded that the land be redistributed). Again, it arises if someone is great and capable of becoming still greater, so that he may rule alone, as is thought to have been the aim at Lacedaemon of Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian^{1307a5} War, and at Carthage of Hanno.

Polities and aristocracies are chiefly dissolved through a deviation from the just within the constitution itself. For the beginning lies in the failure to mix democracy and oligarchy well in a polity, and these together with virtue in an aristocracy,^{1307a10} particularly the first two—by the two I mean democracy and oligarchy. For polities and most of the so-called aristocracies attempt to mix these. Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect, and because of it some of them are less lasting and others more so.¹⁵ For those that lean more toward oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those that lean toward the multitude, polities. Hence the latter are more secure than the former: the larger number is stronger, and people are more content when they have an equal share, whereas the wealthy, if the constitution gives them superiority,²⁰ seek to act insolently and take more. In general, whichever way the constitution inclines, it shifts in that direction, as each side increases its own power: for example, polity shifts into democracy, and aristocracy into oligarchy. Or they shift into their opposites: aristocracy, for example, into democracy (for, on the ground of being wronged, it is pulled toward²⁵ the opposite by the poorer peo-

ple), and polities into oligarchy (for only equality according to worth and the possession of what is one's own are lasting). What has been described happened at Thurii. Because office depended upon a high property qualification, they shifted to a lower one and a greater number of offices; and because all the land³⁰ had been acquired by the notables contrary to the law (for the constitution was rather oligarchical, so they could take more than their share), the people, trained in war, became stronger than the guards, until those who held too much land relinquished it.

Further, the oligarchical character of all aristocratic constitutions^{1307a35} means that the notables take more than their share. Thus at Lacedaemon property passes into few hands; and the notables have greater freedom to do whatever they wish and to form marriage connections with whomever they wish. Hence the city of the Locrians was ruined by its marriage connection with Dionysius, which would not have happened in a democracy, nor⁴⁰ in a well-mixed aristocracy.

Especially unnoticed are^{1307b1} aristocracies as they change, because they are dissolved little by little. As was said earlier about all constitutions generally, even a small thing is a cause of change. For when people abandon some matter concerning the constitution, afterward⁵ they alter another, slightly greater one more readily, until they have altered the entire order. This happened to the constitution of Thurii. For although there was a law that one could serve as general only at intervals of five years, some younger men became skilled in war and gained prestige among the mass of the guards; despising those in¹⁰ charge of affairs and thinking they would easily gain control, they first attempted to abolish this law, so that the same men could serve continuously as generals, seeing that the people would eagerly vote for them. The rulers appointed to deal with this, called councilors, at first moved to oppose them,¹⁵ but were persuaded to join them, supposing that after altering this law they would leave the rest of the constitution alone. Later, when other things were being altered and they wished to prevent it, they could no longer accomplish anything: the entire order of the constitution changed into the rule of the powerful men who had attempted the innovations.

All constitutions^{1307b20} are dissolved sometimes from within, sometimes from outside, when an opposite constitution is either nearby or far away but powerful. This happened in the time of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians: for the Athenians everywhere overthrew oligarchies, and the Spartans democracies. The sources from which changes²⁵ in constitutions and factions arise have now been stated for the most part.

Next we must speak about preservation, both generally and for each constitution separately. First, then, it is clear that if we possess the means through which constitutions are destroyed, we also possess those through which they are preserved; for opposite causes produce opposite effects, and destruction is^{1307b30} the opposite of preservation. In well-blended constitutions, then, if anything must be watched, it is that no breach of law occurs, and above all the small breach must be guarded against. For lawlessness slips in unnoticed, just as a small expense, often repeated, destroys a fortune. The expense goes unnoticed³⁵ because it does not occur all at once; the mind is led astray by these expenses, as by the sophistical argument that if each is small, all are small. This is true in one sense, but in another it is not: for the whole and the total are not small, but are composed of small things.

This, then, is one safeguard, at the outset,^{1307b40} that must be taken. Next, we must not trust sophistical tricks^{1308a1} devised against the multitude,

for they are exposed by events (what we mean by constitutional sophistries has been stated before). Further, we must observe that some aristocracies and even oligarchies endure, not because security^{1308a5} belongs to their constitutions, but because those who hold office treat both those outside the constitution and those within the citizen body well. They treat those without a share well by not wronging them, by bringing their leading men into the constitution, by not wronging the ambitious through dishonor or the many¹⁰ in their gain; and they treat themselves and those who share in the constitution well by dealing democratically with one another. For the equality that democrats seek for the multitude is not only just but also advantageous among peers. Hence, if there are many within the citizen body, many democratic laws are advantageous,¹⁵ such as making offices last six months, so that all the peers may

share in them; for the peers are already like a people (hence demagogues often arise among them too, as was said before). Further, oligarchies and aristocracies fall less often into the rule of powerful groups (for it is not equally easy to do wrong²⁰ when holding office for a short time and for a long one; indeed, for this reason tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies. For either the most powerful in each attempt tyranny—demagogues in the one, powerful men in the other—or those holding the highest offices, when they hold them for a long time).

Book V, 1308a–1311b



Constitutions are preserved^{1308a25} not only because the things that destroy them are far away, but sometimes also because they are near. Fear makes people keep a firmer hold on their constitution. Those who care for the constitution must therefore create occasions for fear, so that people guard it and do not abandon, as they would a night watch,³⁰ their watch over the constitution, and must bring what is distant near. Moreover, they must try, by means of the laws as well, to guard against the rivalries and factions of the notables, and to protect those outside the rivalry before they too are drawn into it. For recognizing an evil as it begins is not the work of just anyone, but requires political³⁵ judgment. As for the change from oligarchy and polity that arises through property qualifications, when this happens because the same qualifications remain in place while money becomes more plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total assessed value of the community against its previous value: in those⁴⁰ cities where assessments are made annually, at that interval,

^{1308b1} and in larger cities every three or five years. If it is a multiple or a fraction of the earlier value, at which the constitution's assessments were established, there should be a law to raise or lower the property qualifications: if the value has increased, raising them⁵ in proportion to the increase; if it has declined, lowering them and making the assessment smaller. For in oligarchies

and polities, if they do not do this, in the one case an oligarchy arises in some places and the rule of a powerful clique in others, while in the other case a polity changes into a democracy, and an oligarchy¹⁰ into a polity or democracy.

A measure common to democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and every constitution is not to enlarge anyone's power excessively, beyond due proportion, but rather to try to grant small honors over a long period than great ones quickly. For people are corrupted, and not every man can bear^{1308b15} good fortune. If this is not done, at least do not take back all at once honors that were given all at once, but withdraw them gradually. Above all, try to regulate matters by the laws so that no one arises with a great preponderance of power through either friends or money; failing that, arrange for such people to spend their time abroad.²⁰ Since people also seek revolution because of their private lives, an office should be established to oversee those whose lives are at odds with the constitution: in a democracy, with democracy; in an oligarchy, with oligarchy; and similarly in each of the other constitutions. As for prosperity within the city,²⁵ one must guard against it in any particular section for the same reasons. The remedy is always to entrust business and offices to the opposing parts—I mean that the respectable oppose the multitude, and the poor the wealthy—and to try either to blend together the multitude of the poor and, on the other side,³⁰ that of the wealthy, or to enlarge the middle class. For this dissolves factions arising from inequality. The most important thing in every constitution is for the laws and the rest of its administration to be so arranged that offices offer no opportunity for profit.

This must be watched especially in oligarchic constitutions. For the many are not so indignant at being excluded^{1308b35} from rule; indeed, they are pleased if they are left free to attend to their private affairs. But if they think the rulers are stealing public funds, then both things distress them: their exclusion from honors and from profits. There is only one way in which democracy and aristocracy can exist together,⁴⁰ and that is if someone establishes this arrangement.

For it would be possible for both the^{1309a1} notables and the multitude to have what they want. For everyone to be permitted to rule is democratic, while for the notables to hold office is aristocratic. This will happen when offices offer no opportunity for profit. For the poor⁵ will not wish to rule if they gain nothing, but will prefer to attend to their private affairs, while the wealthy will be able to do so because they need nothing from public funds. Thus the poor will become wealthy by spending their time at their work, and the notables will not be ruled by just anyone.¹⁰ To prevent public funds from being stolen, let the transfer of money take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the accounts be deposited with the phratries, companies, and tribes. To encourage service in office without profit, honors for those who earn distinction must be established by law. In democracies, the¹⁵ wealthy must be spared: not only must their property not be redistributed, but neither must its produce—a practice that passes unnoticed in some constitutions. It is better also to prevent them, even when they are willing, from undertaking costly but useless public services, such as sponsoring choruses, organizing torch races, and all other services of this kind.²⁰ In an oligarchy, much care should be taken for the poor, and offices that provide income should be assigned to them. If one of the wealthy outrages them, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged someone of his own class. Inheritances should pass by descent rather than by gift, and no more than one inheritance²⁵ should pass to the same person. For in this way properties would be more equal, and more of the poor would attain prosperity. In both democracy and oligarchy it is advantageous to allot either equality or precedence in other matters to those who have less share in the constitution: in a democracy to the wealthy, and in an oligarchy³⁰ to the poor. The exception is offices sovereign over the constitution: these should be entrusted only, or for the most part, to those who belong to the constitution.

Those who are to hold the sovereign offices must possess three things: first, friendship toward what is established:^{1309a35} the constitution; next, the greatest capacity for the work of the office; and third, in each constitution, the virtue and justice appropriate to that constitution. For if the just is not the same

under all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice. But a difficulty arises when these qualities do not⁴⁰ all coincide in the same person: how should the choice be made?

^{1309b1} For example, if one man is skilled in generalship but vicious and no friend of the constitution, while another is just and friendly toward it, how should the choice be made? It seems that we must look to two things: which quality everyone shares more widely, and which less widely. Thus in choosing a general,⁵ we should look more to experience than to virtue, since fewer people share the skills of generalship, and more share decency; but in choosing a guardian or treasurer, the reverse, since this requires more virtue than most people possess, while the knowledge is common to all.

Someone might ask: if capacity and friendship toward the constitution are present,^{1309b10} what need is there of virtue? For the two together will achieve what is advantageous. Is it because people who possess both may lack self-control? Just as they do not serve their own interests, although they know and love themselves, so nothing prevents some of them from being similarly disposed toward the community. In general, all the things in the laws that we say are advantageous¹⁵ to constitutions preserve those constitutions; and the greatest element is what has often been stated: ensuring that the multitude who want the constitution is stronger than those who do not. Besides all this, we must not overlook what the deviant constitutions now overlook: the mean.²⁰ For many things thought democratic destroy democracies, and many thought oligarchic destroy oligarchies. Those who think this is the sole virtue draw it toward excess, not knowing that a nose may depart from the straightness that is most beautiful toward being hooked or snub,²⁵ yet still be beautiful and pleasing to the eye. But if someone presses it still further toward excess, it will first lose the proper proportion of the part, and finally he will make it appear not even to be a nose, because of the excess and deficiency of the opposing features. The same holds for³⁰ the other parts, and this also happens with the other constitutions. For an oligarchy or a democracy can be in a satisfactory condition, although it has departed from the best arrangement. But if someone pushes either of them further, he will first make the constitution worse, and finally

make it no constitution at all.³⁵ Therefore the legislator and statesman must not be ignorant of which democratic measures preserve democracy and which destroy it, or which oligarchic measures preserve or destroy oligarchy. For neither can exist and endure without both the wealthy and the multitude; but when equality⁴⁰ of property arises, this constitution must necessarily become another one.

^{1310a1} Thus by destroying these elements through laws carried to excess, they destroy the constitutions.

Mistakes are also made in democracies and oligarchies. In democracies, the demagogues err where the multitude is sovereign over the laws: for two opposing sides^{1310a5} they always create within the city by fighting the wealthy, whereas they should, on the contrary, always appear to speak on behalf of the wealthy. In oligarchies, the oligarchs should speak on behalf of the people, and swear oaths opposite to those they swear now. For now in some oligarchies they swear, “I will be ill-disposed toward the people, and will devise¹⁰ whatever harm I can.” But they should adopt and profess the opposite attitude, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.”

The greatest of all the things mentioned for making constitutions endure, which everyone now neglects, is education suited to the constitutions. For there is no benefit in^{1310a15} even the most beneficial laws, approved by all who take part in public life, unless people are habituated and educated in the constitution: democratically if the laws are democratic, and oligarchically if they are oligarchic. For if a single person can lack self-control, so can a city. Being educated²⁰ to suit the constitution does not mean doing what pleases the oligarchs or those who want democracy, but what will enable the former to rule oligarchically and the latter to live under democracy. As things stand, in oligarchies the sons of the rulers live in luxury, while those of the poor become trained and hardened by toil,²⁵ so that they are both more willing and more able to bring about revolution. In democracies thought to be especially democratic, the opposite of what is advantageous has become established. The cause is that they define freedom badly. For democracy seems to be defined by two things: the majority’s being sovereign, and³⁰ freedom. For the just is thought to be equal;

and equality means that whatever the multitude decides is sovereign; while freedom and equality mean doing whatever one wishes. Thus in such democracies everyone lives as he wishes, and “toward whatever he desires,” as Euripides says. But this is bad. For we must not³⁵ think that living in accordance with the constitution is slavery, but preservation. These, then, broadly speaking, are the causes through which constitutions change and are destroyed, and the means through which they are preserved and endure.

It remains to examine monarchy as well: the causes through which^{1310a40} it is destroyed and the means through which it naturally preserves itself.

Nearly the same^{1310b1} as what has been said about constitutions are the events concerning kingships and tyrannies. For kingship corresponds to aristocracy, while tyranny is composed of the most extreme oligarchy and democracy.⁵ For this reason it is also the most harmful to the ruled, since it is composed of two evils and possesses the deviations and errors of both constitutions. The two forms of monarchy have opposite origins from the outset. For help against the people¹⁰ came through kingship to the respectable, and a king is appointed from among the respectable because of his preeminence in virtue, or in actions springing from virtue, or through the preeminence of a family of this kind. But the tyrant comes from the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, so that the people may suffer no injustice at their hands. The events make this clear. For nearly¹⁵ all tyrants, one might say, have arisen from demagogues, winning trust by slandering the notables. Some tyrannies were established in this way after the cities had grown; those before them arose from kings who departed from ancestral ways, a more masterful form of rule²⁰ being what they sought; others from those elected to the sovereign offices—for in ancient times the peoples made civic magistracies and sacred missions long-lasting—and others from oligarchies that chose one man as sovereign over the greatest offices. For all these ways offered the possibility of accomplishing this easily,²⁵ if only they wished, because power was already available to them: to some through royal rule, to others through the honor of office. Thus Pheidon at Argos and others became tyrants when a kingship already existed; those in Ionia and Phalaris rose from offices; Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth,³⁰

Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and others rose in the same way from leadership of the people. As we said, then, kingship is ranked with aristocracy. For it rests on merit, whether personal virtue, family, benefactions, or these together with power. All³⁵ who received this honor had benefited, or were capable of benefiting, cities or peoples: some by preventing their enslavement in war, like Codrus; others by freeing them, like Cyrus; or by founding settlements or acquiring territory, like the kings of Lacedaemon, Macedonia, and⁴⁰ the Molossians. The king wishes to be a guardian,

so that^{1311a1} those who possess property suffer no injustice, and the people suffer no outrage. Tyranny, as has often been said, looks to no common interest, except for the sake of its own benefit. The tyrant's aim is pleasure,⁵ and the king's is the noble. Therefore, among the objects they seek in excess, money is more characteristic of a tyrant, and honor of a king; and a king's guard consists of citizens, while a tyrant's consists of foreigners.

It is clear that tyranny possesses the evils of both democracy and oligarchy. From oligarchy it takes^{1311a10} wealth as its end, for only in this way can the guard and its luxury be maintained, and complete distrust of the multitude, which is why tyrants confiscate their arms. Ill-treatment of the masses, driving them out of the urban center, and dispersing them among settlements are common to both¹⁵ oligarchy and tyranny. From democracy it takes warfare against the notables, destroying them secretly and openly and exiling them as rivals and obstacles to its rule. For plots arise from these men: some wish to rule themselves, while others wish not²⁰ to be slaves. This is the source of Periander's advice to Thrasybulus, the cutting down of the outstanding ears of grain, meaning that the outstanding citizens must always be removed. As was more or less said, then, we must suppose that the beginnings of changes are the same for constitutions and for monarchies.²⁵ For many of the ruled attack monarchies because of injustice, fear, or contempt; and among forms of injustice, especially because of outrage, though sometimes also because they are deprived of their private property.

The ends sought in tyrannies and kingships are also the same as in those constitutions.^{1311a30} For monarchs possess great wealth and honor, which everyone desires. Some attacks are directed against the rulers' persons, others against their rule. Those arising from outrage are directed against their persons. Since outrage takes many forms, each becomes a cause of anger; and of those who are angry,³⁵ most attack for the sake of revenge, not preeminence. For example, the attack on the Pisistratids arose because they insulted Harmodius's sister and affronted Harmodius: Harmodius acted on account of his sister, and Aristogeiton on account of Harmodius. A plot was also made against Periander,⁴⁰ the tyrant at Ambracia, because, while drinking with^{1311b1} his beloved, he asked the young man whether he was already pregnant by him.

Philip was attacked by Pausanias because he allowed Pausanias to be outraged by Attalus and his companions; Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he boasted of having enjoyed Derdas's youth; and^{1311b5} Evagoras of Cyprus by the eunuch, who killed him because his son had taken away the eunuch's wife and he felt outraged. Many attacks have also occurred because certain monarchs inflicted sexual dishonor. Such was Crataeus's attack on Archelaus. For he always resented their intercourse, so that sufficient¹⁰ would have been even a lesser pretext—or because Archelaus, despite his promise, gave him neither of his daughters, but, pressed by war against Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, gave the elder to the king of Elimeia, and the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that in this way Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel¹⁵ with his son by Cleopatra. But the beginning of the estrangement was his resentment at the sexual service. Hellanocrates of Larissa joined the attack for the same reason. For since Archelaus enjoyed his youth but did not restore him to his homeland as promised, outrage rather than erotic desire²⁰ was, he thought, the reason for their intercourse. Python and Heraclides of Aenus destroyed Cotys to avenge their father; and Adamas revolted against Cotys because Cotys had castrated him as a boy, and he felt outraged.

Book V, 1311b–1315a



Many, too, have been angered by bodily mistreatment through blows: some have killed,^{1311b25} others have attempted to kill, because they felt outraged, even men holding offices and royal power. For example, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and killed the Penthilids, who went about striking people with clubs. Later Smerdis, after being beaten,³⁰ was dragged away from his wife and killed Penthilus. Decamnichus also became a leader in the attack on Archelaus, being the first to incite the attackers. The cause of his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over to Euripides the poet to be whipped. Euripides was angry because Decamnichus had said something about his bad breath. Many others, too,³⁵ have been killed or plotted against for such reasons. The same holds for fear: this was one of the causes, in monarchies as in constitutions. For example, Artapanes attacked Xerxes, fearing an accusation over Darius, whom he had hanged without Xerxes' orders, but thinking⁴⁰ that Xerxes would pardon him, having forgotten the matter because he was dining. Other attacks arise from^{1312a1} contempt,

as when someone saw Sardanapalus carding wool with the women—if those who tell the story speak the truth; and if not of him, it could certainly be true of someone else. Dion also attacked Dionysius the Younger because he^{1312a5} despised him, seeing the citizens similarly disposed and Dionysius himself continually drunk. Some friends also attack out of contempt: because they are trusted, they despise the ruler, thinking they will escape notice. Those who

think they can seize power also attack, in a sense, out of contempt.¹⁰ For, believing themselves capable and despising the danger because of their power, they readily make the attempt, as do those who serve as generals under monarchs: Cyrus, for example, attacked Astyages, despising both his way of life and his power, because the power had fallen idle while Astyages lived in luxury; and Seuthes the Thracian attacked Amadocus, whose general he was.¹⁵ Others attack for several of these reasons, for example both out of contempt and for profit, as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes. Those who are bold by nature and hold military honors under monarchs attempt it especially for this reason. For courage joined to power is audacity; and because of these²⁰ two things they make their attacks, thinking they will prevail easily.

For those who attack from love of honor, the cause takes a different form from those mentioned earlier. Some attempt to overthrow tyrants because they see great profits and great honors awaiting them; but this is not why each of those who attack from love of honor^{1312a25} chooses to run the risk. The former act for the reason stated, while the latter, just as they would undertake some other extraordinary deed through which they become renowned and known to others, make an attempt against monarchs, wishing to acquire not³⁰ monarchy but glory. Yet those who set out for this reason are very few in number. For they must presuppose that they care nothing for survival if they are not going to accomplish the deed. They must adopt Dion's conviction, though it is not easy for many to acquire it.³⁵ For he marched against Dionysius with a few men, saying that his attitude was this: however far he could advance, it would be enough for him to have taken that much part in the enterprise. For example, if he happened to die immediately after setting foot on a small stretch of land, such a death would be acceptable to him.

Tyranny is destroyed, in one case,^{1312a40} in this way, like each of the other constitutions, from outside,

^{1312b1} if an opposing constitution is stronger. For plainly the wish to destroy it will be present because their purposes are opposed, and everyone does what he wishes when he has the power. Constitutions opposed to tyranny are democracy, in Hesiod's sense,⁵ as potter opposes potter—for the most extreme

democracy is also a tyranny—and kingship and aristocracy, because their constitutions are opposed to it. Hence the Lacedaemonians overthrew the greatest number of tyrannies, as did the Syracusans in the period when their public life was well ordered. Another way is from within, when those who share in the tyranny¹⁰ form factions, as happened with Gelon's tyranny, and now with that of Dionysius. Gelon's was destroyed when Thrasybulus, Hieron's brother, courted Gelon's son and urged him toward pleasures so that he himself might rule. The family organized to overthrow Thrasybulus, but not the tyranny as a whole; those¹⁵ who joined their cause, however, seized the opportunity and expelled them all. Dion, who was related by marriage to Dionysius, marched against him and enlisted the people; after expelling him, Dion was himself killed. Of the two chief causes for which people attack tyrannies, hatred and contempt, one is always present²⁰ for tyrants: hatred. But contempt brings about many overthrows. The evidence is this: most of those who acquired power also kept it, while almost all who inherited it lose it immediately, one might say. For by living for enjoyment they become easy to despise and²⁵ provide many opportunities for their attackers. Anger too should be counted as a kind of hatred, for in a sense it causes the same actions. Often it is even more effective than hatred: people attack more vehemently because this passion does not employ calculation. It happens especially³⁰ that people follow their anger because of outrage; this was the cause of the overthrow of the Pisistratids' tyranny and many others. But hatred is more effective overall. For anger is accompanied by pain, so that calculation is not easy, whereas enmity is without pain.

To put it in summary, all the causes we have stated^{1312b35} for the destruction of unmixed and extreme oligarchy, and of the most extreme democracy, must also be assigned to tyranny. For these too are tyrannies divided among many. Kingship is least likely to be destroyed from outside, which is why it is long-lasting; most of its destructions from within⁴⁰ arise. It is destroyed in two ways:

one is when^{1313a1} those who share in the kingship form factions; the other is when kings try to govern more tyrannically, claiming sovereignty over more things, even contrary to law. Kingships no longer arise now; if monarchies do

arise, they are tyrannies⁵ rather than kingships, because kingship is rule over willing subjects, but sovereign over greater matters, while there are many equals and no one so superior as to measure up to the extent and dignity of the office. For this reason they do not willingly submit. But if someone gains rule through deceit or force,¹⁰ this is already thought to be tyranny. In hereditary kingships we must add to the stated causes of destruction the fact that many kings become easy to despise, and that they commit outrages although they possess not tyrannical power but royal honor. For overthrow becomes easy: when people no longer wish it,¹⁵ the king at once ceases to be king, whereas a tyrant remains even against their will. Monarchies, then, are destroyed through these causes and others like them.

It is clear that, generally speaking, they are preserved through the opposite causes; more particularly, kingships are preserved by bringing them^{1313a20} toward greater moderation. For the fewer things kings are sovereign over, the longer the whole of their rule must last. They themselves become less masterful and more equal to others in character, and they are less envied by the ruled. For this reason the kingship among the Molossians also lasted a long time,²⁵ as did that of the Lacedaemonians, because its rule was divided into two parts from the beginning, and again because Theopompus moderated it in other respects and established the office of the ephors alongside it. For by diminishing its power he enlarged the kingship in duration, so that in a sense he made it not smaller but³⁰ greater. This is also what they say he replied to his wife when she asked whether he was not ashamed to hand down to his sons a kingship smaller than the one he had received from his father: "Certainly not," he said, "for I am handing down one that will last longer."

Tyrannies are preserved in two entirely opposite ways.^{1313a35} One is the traditional way, by which most tyrants administer their rule. Most of these practices are said to have been established by Periander of Corinth, and many similar ones may also be taken from Persian rule. They include the measures mentioned long ago for preserving, as far as possible,⁴⁰ tyranny: cutting down those who stand out, killing the high-spirited, and allowing neither common messes, associations, education, nor anything else of the kind,

but everything^{1313b1} from which two things usually arise, high spirit and mutual trust, must be guarded against. They must allow neither schools nor other gatherings for leisurely study, and must do everything possible to make⁵ all people strangers to one another, for acquaintance creates greater trust between them. Those staying in the city must always be visible and spend their time at the palace doors, for in this way what they do would be least likely to escape notice, and constant servitude would accustom them to think little of themselves. There are all the other such practices of Persian origin¹⁰ and the barbarian practices characteristic of tyranny, for they all have the same effect. Tyrants must also try to ensure that nothing any of the ruled happens to say or do escapes notice, but employ spies, such as the women called “informers” at Syracuse, and the “listeners” whom Hieron sent out wherever there was a gathering or meeting.¹⁵ For people speak less freely in fear of such spies, and if they do speak freely, they are less likely to escape notice. Another practice is to slander people to one another and set them at odds: friends against friends, the people against the notables, and the rich against one another. Making the ruled poor is also characteristic of tyranny, so that no guard²⁰ can be maintained, and they are too busy with their daily needs to plot. Examples are the pyramids in Egypt, the votive offerings of the Cypselids, the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids, and the works of Polycrates on Samos. For all these²⁵ have the same effect: keeping the ruled occupied and poor. So does the imposition of taxes, as at Syracuse, where under Dionysius people paid in the whole value of their property in five years. The tyrant is also a maker of war, to keep people occupied and in continual need of a leader. While³⁰ kingship is preserved through friends, it is characteristic of tyranny to distrust friends most of all, on the assumption that everyone wishes to overthrow it, but these especially have the power.

Everything that occurs in the most extreme democracy is also characteristic of tyranny: women’s dominance in households, so that they may report against their^{1313b35} husbands, and license for slaves, for the same reason. For slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and when they prosper they must be well-disposed toward both tyrannies and democracies. For the people too wish to be

a monarch. Hence the flatterer is honored by both: among⁴⁰ the peoples, the demagogue—for the demagogue is the people’s flatterer—and among tyrants, those who associate with them in a servile manner,^{1314a1} which is the work of flattery.

For this reason, too, tyranny loves the vicious: tyrants enjoy being flattered, but no one with a free spirit would do this. Decent people show affection, or at least do not flatter. The vicious are also useful for vicious deeds:^{1314a5} “one nail drives out another,” as the proverb says. Disliking anyone dignified or free is also characteristic of tyranny. For the tyrant claims to be the only person of this kind, while anyone who matches his dignity and acts freely takes away the tyranny’s preeminence and mastery. Tyrants therefore hate such people as if they were overthrowing their¹⁰ rule. It is also characteristic of tyranny to take foreigners rather than citizens as table companions and daily associates, on the assumption that citizens are enemies while foreigners make no rival claim. These and similar practices are characteristic of tyranny and preserve its rule, but lack nothing in wickedness. All of them, one might say, are comprised¹⁵ in three kinds. For tyranny aims at three things: first, that the ruled should think little of themselves, for no small-spirited person would plot against anyone; second, that they should distrust one another, for a tyranny is not overthrown until some people trust one another. Hence tyrants also make war on the decent as harmful²⁰ to their rule, not only because they refuse to be ruled by a master, but also because they are trustworthy toward one another and toward others, and do not inform against one another or anyone else. Third is incapacity for action, for no one attempts the impossible, and therefore no one attempts to overthrow a tyranny without²⁵ the power to do so. These, then, are the three ends to which the tyrants’ counsels are directed. For all tyrannical measures can be referred to these aims: some to prevent mutual trust, others to prevent power to act, and others to make people think little of themselves.

This^{1314a30} then, is one way in which tyrannies are preserved. The other follows a course of management almost opposite to what has been said. It can be understood from the destruction of kingships. For just as one way of destroying a kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical, so for tyranny³⁵ preservation

consists in making it more kingly, while safeguarding just one thing: the power to rule not only willing but also unwilling subjects. For if the tyrant lets this go, he also lets go of being a tyrant. This must remain as a foundation; in other matters he must do some things and appear to do others,⁴⁰ playing the kingly role well. First, he must appear^{1314b1} to care for public funds,

not spending on gifts of the kind that anger the multitudes, when rulers take money from people who labor and toil for a meager living, but give it lavishly to courtesans, foreigners, and artists, and, as for an account,^{1314b5} he should render one of receipts and expenses, as some tyrants have already done. For someone who administers affairs in this way would appear to be a household manager rather than a tyrant. He need not fear ever running short of money, since he is sovereign over the city. Indeed, for tyrants who go away from their own territory,¹⁰ this is more advantageous than leaving behind accumulated funds, since the guards would be less likely to attack their government. For when tyrants are abroad, the guards are more to be feared than the citizens: the guards go abroad with them, while the citizens remain. Next, the taxes and public services¹⁵ he collects must appear to be for the sake of administration and for use in emergencies of war, should the need arise. In general he must present himself as a guardian and treasurer of funds that are public, not private. He must appear not harsh but dignified, and such that those who encounter him do not fear him²⁰ but rather respect him. Yet this is not easy to achieve if he is contemptible. Thus, even if he takes no care for the other virtues, he must care for military virtue and create this reputation for himself. Moreover, not only must he himself appear to outrage none of the ruled, neither young man nor²⁵ young woman, but neither must anyone around him. His own women must likewise conduct themselves toward other women, since many tyrannies have also perished through outrages committed by women. In bodily pleasures he must do the opposite of what some tyrants now do: not only do they indulge in these from the very³⁰ break of day and continuously for many days, but they also wish others to see them doing so, in order to be admired as happy and blessed. Rather, he should above all be moderate in such things; failing that, he should at least escape being seen by others. For the one easy to attack or

despise³⁵ is not the sober man but the drunk, and not the wakeful man but the sleeper. He must also do the opposite of almost everything mentioned earlier, for he must equip and adorn the city as though he were its steward, not its tyrant. Moreover, he must always appear exceptionally earnest in matters concerning the gods. For people are less⁴⁰ afraid of suffering anything unlawful from such rulers,

^{1315a1}if they think the ruler fears the gods and cares for them; and they plot against him less, believing that he has the gods too as allies. Yet he must appear so without foolishness. He must honor those who become good at anything in such a way⁵ that they would not think they could ever be more honored by citizens living under their own laws; and he should confer such honors himself, but inflict punishments through other rulers and law courts. A safeguard common to every monarchy is to make no single person great, but, if any, several, for they will watch one another.¹⁰ If someone must be made great, at least he must not be bold in character, for such a character is most inclined to attack in every undertaking. If the tyrant decides to diminish someone's power, he should do this gradually, and not strip away all his authority at once. Moreover, he should refrain from every outrage,¹⁵ but above all from two: bodily punishment and sexual outrage against the young. He must exercise this caution especially toward those who love honor. For lovers of money deeply resent disregard for their money, while lovers of honor resent dishonor, as do the decent among²⁰ men. Therefore he should either not employ such treatment, or appear to inflict punishments in a fatherly way, not out of contempt, and to enter into sexual relations with the young from erotic motives, not because of his power. In general he should redeem apparent dishonors with greater honors. Of those who attempt²⁵ to kill him, the most dangerous, and those requiring the greatest vigilance, are those who do not choose to preserve their own lives after killing him. Therefore he must be especially wary of those who think that they themselves or those they care for have been outraged. For those who attack in anger have no regard for themselves,³⁰ as Heraclitus also said, declaring that it is hard to fight anger, because it purchases its desires at the price of life.

Book V, 1315a–1316b



Since cities consist of two parts, people without means and people with means, above all both must believe that their safety depends on the ruler, and that neither group is ^{1315a35} subjected to any injustice by the other. Whichever group is stronger, he should make especially attached to his rule. For if this condition is secured, the tyrant need neither free slaves nor confiscate arms: either part, added to his own power, is enough to make him stronger than ⁴⁰ those who attack him. But to discuss each such measure is needless elaboration; the aim is clear:

he must appear to the ruled not as a tyrant ^{1315b1} but as a household manager and a king, not as a usurper but as a trustee; he must pursue moderation in his way of life, not excess, and further, associate with the notables and court the people. For from ⁵ these things it necessarily follows not only that his rule is nobler and more enviable, because he rules better people, not people who have been abased, and does not remain an object of hatred and fear, but also that his rule lasts longer. Further, his own character will be either well disposed toward virtue or half decent, ¹⁰ not wicked but half wicked.

Yet of all constitutions, oligarchy and tyranny are the shortest-lived. The longest-lasting tyranny was that at Sicyon, belonging to Orthagoras himself and his descendants: it endured for a hundred years. The reason for this was ^{1315b15} that they treated the ruled moderately and in many matters were subject to the laws; Cleisthenes, moreover, being a capable soldier, was not easily despised,

and for the most part they courted the people by attending to their needs. Cleisthenes, at any rate, is said to have crowned the man who judged against his victory; some say that²⁰ the seated statue in the marketplace is an image of the man who gave this judgment. They also say that Pisistratus once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. Second was the tyranny of the Cypselids at Corinth: this too lasted seventy-three years and six months. Cypselus was tyrant for²⁵ thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus son of Gordius for three years. The reasons in this case were the same: Cypselus courted the people and throughout his rule had no bodyguard; Periander was tyrannical, but a capable soldier. Third came³⁰ the tyranny of the Pisistratids at Athens. It was not continuous, for Pisistratus went into exile twice during his tyranny. Thus, of thirty-three years, he was tyrant for seventeen, and his sons for eighteen, making thirty-five years in all. Among the rest was the tyranny of Hieron and Gelon at³⁵ Syracuse. This too endured for no great number of years, but eighteen in all: Gelon, after seven years as tyrant, died in the eighth; Hieron ruled for ten, and Thrasybulus was expelled in his eleventh month. Most tyrannies have all been very short-lived indeed.

^{1315b40}As for constitutions and monarchies, then, the causes of their destruction and, in turn, of their preservation have nearly^{1316a1} all been discussed.

In the Republic, Socrates does discuss revolutions, but not well. For he does not explain the revolution of the best and first constitution in terms peculiar to it. He says that the cause is that^{1316a5} nothing remains, but everything changes in a certain cycle; and the beginning of these changes is when the “base in the ratio of four to three, coupled with five, yields two harmonies,” meaning when the number of this figure becomes a cube, as though nature sometimes produced inferior people whom education cannot overcome. In saying this very thing,¹⁰ perhaps he is not wrong (for there may be people who cannot be educated and become worthy men). But why should this revolution be peculiar to what he calls the best constitution, rather than to all the others and to everything that comes into being? And because of the time through which, he says,¹⁵ everything changes, do things that did not begin to exist together also

change together? For instance, if something came into being on the day before the turning point, does it therefore change at the same time? Besides, for what reason does this constitution change into the Laconian one? All constitutions change more often into their opposite than into²⁰ the constitution nearest them. The same argument applies to the other revolutions too. For from the Laconian constitution, he says, it changes into oligarchy, from this into democracy, and from democracy into tyranny. Yet they also change in the reverse direction, for example from popular rule into oligarchy, and more often than into monarchy.

^{1316a25} Further, he does not say whether tyranny will undergo a revolution or not, or, if it will, for what reason and into what constitution. The reason is that he could not easily say: it is undetermined, since on his account it must change into the first and best constitution; for in this way there would be continuity and a cycle. But a tyranny also changes³⁰ into a tyranny, as at Sicyon, from Myron's into Cleisthenes'; and into oligarchy, as Antileon's at Chalcis; and into democracy, as Gelon's at Syracuse; and into aristocracy, as Charilaus' at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage. And a change into tyranny³⁵ also occurs from oligarchy, as happened with almost all the ancient oligarchies in Sicily: at Leontini into the tyranny of Panaetius, at Gela into that of Cleander, at Rhegium into that of Anaxilaus, and likewise in many other cities. It is also absurd to think that the change into oligarchy is due to⁴⁰ the fact that those who are lovers of money and devote themselves to wealth-getting are the people^{1316b1} in office,

rather than because those who far surpass others in property think it unjust that those who own nothing should have an equal share in the city with those who own property. In many oligarchies, moreover, wealth-getting is not permitted, but laws^{1316b5} forbid it; whereas at Carthage, under democratic rule, they pursue wealth-getting and have not yet undergone a revolution.

It is also absurd to say that the oligarchic city is two cities, one of rich people and one of poor. For why should this be truer of it than of the Laconian city, or any other where not everyone owns equal property or not everyone is equally^{1316b10} good? Even when no one has become poorer than before, they

nonetheless change from oligarchy to popular rule if those without means become more numerous, and from popular rule to oligarchy if the wealthy part is stronger than the multitude and the one group is inattentive while the other is alert. Though there are many causes through¹⁵ which revolutions occur, he names only one: that people become poor through extravagant living and the burden of interest, as though all or most were rich at the outset. But this is false. Rather, when some of the leaders lose their property, they seek innovations; when others do, nothing alarming²⁰ happens, and even then the change is no more likely to be into popular rule than into another constitution. Further, people form factions and change constitutions if they have no share in honors, or are wronged or treated with arrogance, even if they have not squandered their property, because they are free to do whatever they wish; and excessive freedom²⁵ is its cause, he says. Though there are several oligarchies and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one of each.

Book VI, 1316b–1320b



^{1316b31} The number and kinds of the deliberative element sovereign in the constitution, of the arrangement of offices, and of law courts; which arrangement belongs with which constitution; and further, the destruction and preservation of constitutions,³⁵ from what conditions they arise and through what causes—all these have been discussed before. Since there happen to be several forms of democracy, and likewise of the other constitutions, it would be well to examine at the same time anything still left to discuss about them, and to set out the arrangement appropriate and advantageous to each. Further,⁴⁰ we must examine the combinations of all the previously mentioned^{1317a1} arrangements themselves.

For when these are combined, they make constitutions overlap, so that aristocracies are oligarchic and polities more democratic. I mean the combinations that ought to be examined but have not yet been examined: for example, if^{1317a5} the deliberative element and the choice of offices are arranged oligarchically, but the law courts aristocratically; or if these and the deliberative element are arranged oligarchically, but the choice of offices aristocratically; or if in some other way not all the elements of the constitution are combined¹⁰ appropriately.

Which democracy suits which city, and likewise which oligarchy suits which multitude, and which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous to which people, has been stated before. Nevertheless, since we must make clear not only

which of these constitutions is best for cities, but also^{1317a15} how these and the others should be established, let us go through the matter briefly. First let us speak of democracy; for at the same time the opposite constitution will become clear, the one some call oligarchy. For this inquiry we must take up all democratic features and all those thought²⁰ to accompany democracies. For the forms of democracy result from combining these, and so there are several democracies, not one, and they differ. There are two causes for democracies being several: first, the one mentioned earlier, that peoples differ (for²⁵ one multitude is agricultural, another consists of artisans and hired laborers; when the first is added to the second, and again the third to both, the difference is not merely that the democracy becomes better or worse, but also that it is not the same democracy); second, the cause we are now discussing. For the features that³⁰ accompany democracies and are thought appropriate to this constitution make democracies different when combined. One will have fewer of them, another more, and another all of them. It is useful to know each, both for establishing whichever of these democracies one happens to wish for,³⁵ and for making corrections. For those who establish constitutions seek to bring together all the features appropriate to their underlying principle, but in doing this they go wrong, as was said earlier in the discussion of the destruction and preservation of constitutions. Now let us state their claims, their characters, and their aims.

^{1317a40}The underlying principle of a democratic constitution, then, is freedom (for this is what people usually say, claiming that only in this constitution^{1317b1} do they share in freedom;

for they say that every democracy aims at this). One feature of freedom is being ruled and ruling in turn. For democratic justice consists in having equality according to number, not according to worth; and if this^{1317b5} is the just, the multitude must be sovereign, and whatever the majority decides must be final and must be the just. For they say that each citizen ought to have an equal share. Thus in democracies those without means are more sovereign than those with means: they are more numerous, and what¹⁰ the majority decides is authoritative. This, then, is one sign of freedom, which all supporters of democracy set down as a defining feature of the constitution. Another is living

as one wishes. For they say that this is the function of freedom, if indeed living not as one wishes is the condition of a slave. This, then, is the second defining feature of democracy. From it has arisen¹⁵ the wish not to be ruled, preferably by no one, but otherwise only in turn; and in this way it contributes to freedom based on equality.

With these assumptions and this starting point, the following features are democratic: that everyone should choose the offices from among everyone; that everyone should rule^{1317b20} each person, and each person in turn everyone; that offices should be assigned by lot, either all or those that do not require experience and skill; that offices should depend on no property qualification, or the smallest possible; that the same person should hold no office twice, or only rarely, or only a few offices, apart from military offices; that terms should be short for²⁵ all offices, or as many as possible; that everyone, drawn from everyone, should sit in judgment on all matters, or on most and on the greatest and most authoritative, such as the scrutiny of officials, the constitution, and private transactions; that the assembly should be sovereign over all matters or the greatest, and no office³⁰ over any, or over as few as possible, or that a council should be sovereign over the greatest matters (of offices, a council is the most democratic where there is no abundance of pay for everyone; for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power: the people brings all decisions before itself when it has abundant pay, as was said earlier in the inquiry preceding³⁵ this one); next, that preferably everyone should receive pay, the assembly, the law courts, and the offices, but otherwise the offices, the law courts, the council, and the principal assemblies, or those offices whose holders must eat together. Further, since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth, and education,⁴⁰ the democratic features are thought to be their opposites: low birth, poverty, and manual work. Further, no office should be perpetual;

^{1318a1} and if any is left over from an ancient revolution, its power should at least be taken away, and its holders appointed by lot instead of chosen. These, then, are the features common to democracies. From what is agreed to be democratic justice⁵ (that everyone should have equality according to number) arises what is thought most truly to be democracy and popular rule. For equal-

ity means that those without means should rule no more than those with means, nor be alone sovereign, but that everyone should share equally according to number. For in this way they would think the constitution possessed equality¹⁰ and freedom.

The next difficulty is how they will have equality. Should the property assessments of the five hundred be divided among a thousand, and should the thousand have equal power with the five hundred? Or should equality in this respect be established not in this way, but by dividing^{1318a15} them in this way and then taking equal numbers from the five hundred and from the thousand, and making these sovereign over choices and law courts? Which, then, is the most just constitution according to democratic justice: this one, or rather the one based on numbers? For supporters of democracy say that the just is whatever the majority decides,²⁰ while supporters of oligarchy say it is whatever the greater property decides; for they say that judgment should follow the amount of property. But both contain inequality and injustice. For if whatever the few decide prevails, there is tyranny (indeed, if one person owns more than the other wealthy people, according to oligarchic justice it is just for him alone to rule); but if²⁵ whatever the numerical majority decides prevails, they will commit injustice by confiscating the property of the rich, who are fewer, as was said before.

What equality both groups would agree to must therefore be examined from the conceptions of the just by which both define their positions. For they say that whatever the majority of citizens decides must be authoritative.^{1318a30} Let this stand, then, but not without qualification. Since there happen to be two parts of which the city consists, rich and poor, let what both decide, or the majority in both, be authoritative; but if they decide opposite things, let it be what is decided by the greater number whose property assessment is greater. For example, if one group numbers ten and the other twenty, and of the rich³⁵ six resolve one way, and of the poorer fifteen resolve the opposite; four of the rich have joined the poor and five of the poor have joined the rich. Whichever side's property assessment is greater, when both groups on each side are

counted together, let its decision be authoritative. If they turn out equal, this must be regarded as a difficulty common to both systems, just as⁴⁰ now, if the assembly or the law court is divided in two;

for either^{1318b1} the matter must be decided by lot or something else of the kind must be done. But concerning equality and the just, even if it is very difficult to find the truth about them, it is still easier to attain it than to persuade those who can take more than their share. For equality and the⁵ just are always sought by the weaker; those who prevail pay no attention to them.

Of the four democracies, the first in order is the best, as was said in the earlier discussions; and this is also the oldest of all. By first I mean according to the way one might divide the peoples. For the agricultural people^{1318b10} is the best, so that democracy can also be established where the multitude lives from agriculture or pasture. Because it has little property, it has no leisure, and so does not often attend the assembly; and because they have the necessities, they spend their time at their work and do not desire what belongs to others. Rather, they find¹⁵ working more pleasant than taking part in public life and holding office, where offices do not yield large profits. For most people desire gain more than honor. Here is evidence: they endured the ancient tyrannies and endure oligarchies, if no one prevents them from working or²⁰ takes anything away from them. For some of them quickly become rich, and the others are not destitute. Further, being sovereign over choice and scrutiny makes up for what they lack, if they have any ambition for honor. For among some peoples, even if they have no share in the choice of offices, but some persons are chosen in turn from everyone,²⁵ as at Mantinea, yet they are sovereign over deliberation, the many are satisfied; and this too must be regarded as a form of democracy, such as once existed at Mantinea. Therefore it is both advantageous to the democracy mentioned earlier, and usual in it, for everyone to choose the offices, scrutinize their holders, and³⁰ sit in judgment, but for the greatest offices to be held by people chosen subject to property qualifications, the greater offices requiring greater qualifications; or for no office to depend on property qualifications, but for capable people to hold them. Those who take part in public life in this way necessarily do so well (for the offices will always be in the hands of the best, with

the people's consent and without envy of the³⁵ decent). This arrangement must also satisfy the decent and the notables: they will not be ruled by others worse than themselves, and they will rule justly because others are sovereign over their scrutiny. For having a restraint hanging over one, and not being free to do everything one pleases, is advantageous. The freedom⁴⁰ to do whatever one wishes cannot restrain the baseness in^{1319a1} each human being.

Thus what is most beneficial in constitutions must follow: the decent rule without going wrong, while the multitude suffers no disadvantage.

That this is the best of the democracies, then, is clear,^{1319a5} and so is the reason: because the people is of a certain character. To make the people agricultural, some of the laws established long ago among many peoples are entirely useful: either forbidding anyone to own more land than a certain measure altogether, or within a certain distance of the town¹⁰ and the city (long ago many cities had a law forbidding even the sale of the original allotments; and the law said to be Oxylyus' has something of this effect, forbidding loans secured on a certain part of each person's land). At present, corrections should also be made through the law of the Aphytaeans,¹⁵ for it is useful for what we are describing. Though they are many and own little land, they all nonetheless farm: they assess not whole properties, but divide them into portions small enough that even the poor can exceed the required assessments.

After the agricultural multitude,^{1319a20} the best people is one composed of herdsmen who live from livestock. For this has many features similar to agriculture, and for military actions these people are especially well trained in their habits, useful in their bodies, and able to camp in the open. Almost all the other multitudes, from²⁵ which the remaining democracies are constituted, are far inferior to these. For their life is inferior, and none of the work undertaken by the multitude of artisans, marketplace people, and hired laborers involves virtue. Further, because virtually all this class frequents the marketplace and the town,³⁰ it readily attends the assembly; whereas farmers, because they are scattered over the countryside, neither meet together nor have the same need for this gathering. Where the territory also happens to be so situated that the countryside lies far from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy³⁵ and con-

stitution; for the multitude is compelled to make its settlements in the fields. Thus, even if there is a marketplace mob, assemblies in democracies must not be held without the multitude from the countryside. How the best and first democracy should be established, then, has been stated; it is clear⁴⁰ how the others should be established too. For one must deviate in sequence^{1319b1} and single out a worse multitude at each stage.

The last democracy, because everyone shares in it, is neither something every city can bear nor something that can easily endure unless well constituted in its laws and customs (nearly all the things that bring destruction upon both this^{1319b5} and the other constitutions have been stated before). To establish this democracy and make the people strong, its leaders usually admit as many as possible, and make citizens not only of those of legitimate birth, but also of those of illegitimate birth and those with either¹⁰ parent a citizen—I mean, for example, a father or a mother. For all this is more appropriate to such a people. This, then, is how demagogues usually establish it; but they should admit people only until the multitude exceeds the notables and the middle class, and not go beyond this. For by exceeding it¹⁵ they make the constitution more disorderly and further provoke the notables to resent enduring democracy. This proved to be the cause of faction at Cyrene. For a small evil is overlooked, but as it grows large it is more conspicuous. Further,²⁰ measures of the following kind are useful for such a democracy, like those Cleisthenes employed at Athens when he wished to enlarge the democracy, and those employed by the founders of popular rule at Cyrene. New and more numerous tribes and brotherhoods should be created, and private religious rites should be brought together into a few²⁵ common ones; and every device should be used to mix everyone with everyone else as much as possible, and to break up their former associations. Further, all tyrannical measures also seem democratic: I mean, for example, the lack of control over slaves (this might be advantageous up to a point), over women, and over³⁰ children, and overlooking people's living as they please. For there will be much support for such a constitution: most people find living without order more pleasant than living with self-restraint.

For the legislator and those wishing to establish some such constitution, the greatest task is not its establishment,^{1319b35} nor is this the only task; rather, it is to ensure its preservation. For it is not difficult to remain under any sort of constitution for one or two or three days. Therefore, from the matters examined earlier concerning the preservation and destruction of constitutions, they must try to establish security, guarding against the things that destroy them,⁴⁰ and laying down laws, both unwritten and written,

^{1320a1} that will most fully embrace the things that preserve constitutions. They must not regard as democratic or oligarchic whatever will make the city as thoroughly democratic or oligarchic as possible, but whatever will make it so for the longest time. Yet present-day demagogues,⁵ to please the peoples, confiscate much property through the law courts. Therefore those who care for the constitution must oppose these practices by legislating that none of the property forfeited by judgment should become public and pass into the common treasury, but should be sacred. For wrongdoers will be no less cautious¹⁰ (for they will suffer the same penalty), but the masses will be less inclined to condemn defendants, since they will receive nothing. Further, public prosecutions should always be kept as few as possible, by restraining those who bring charges recklessly with heavy penalties. For it is not supporters of democracy but the notables whom they usually bring to trial; yet¹⁵ in this constitution too, all citizens should preferably be well disposed toward it, or otherwise at least not regard its sovereign members as enemies.

Since the last democracies have large populations and it is difficult to get people to attend the assembly without pay, and where there are no revenues this is hostile to the notables^{1320a20} (for it must come from a levy, confiscation, and corrupt law courts, things that have already overturned many democracies), where there are no revenues few assemblies should be held, and law courts should have many members but sit for few days (for this contributes both to keeping²⁵ the rich from fearing the expenses, even if the wealthy receive no juror's pay but the poor do, and to having cases judged far better: the wealthy are unwilling to be absent from their own affairs for many days, but are willing for a short time). Where there are revenues, one must not do what³⁰ the dema-

gogues do now (for they distribute the surplus; people receive it and at once need the same again: such help to those without means is a jar full of holes). Rather, someone truly devoted to democracy must see to it that the multitude is not excessively poor; for this is what makes democracy defective.³⁵ Means must therefore be devised to bring about lasting prosperity. Since this is advantageous to the wealthy too, the proceeds from revenues should be accumulated and distributed to those without means in substantial sums, preferably, if one can collect enough, for the acquisition of a small plot of land; otherwise, as capital for trade and^{1320b1} agriculture,

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and, if this is not possible for everyone, distribute it by tribes or some other division in turn. Meanwhile, for the necessary meetings, the prosperous should contribute the pay, being released from useless public services. In something like this fashion, the Carthaginians^{1320b5} conduct their public life and have secured the friendship of the people; for by continually sending some of the people out to the neighboring settlements, they make them prosperous. It also belongs to generous and intelligent notables to divide the poor among themselves and, by giving them a start, turn them toward productive work. It is also good to imitate the practices of the people of Tarentum.¹⁰ For by making their property available for the poor to use in common, they secure the goodwill of the multitude. Moreover, they have made all their offices twofold, some elective and others allotted: the allotted offices so that the people may share in them, the elective so that they may conduct public life better. This can also be done by¹⁵ dividing the same office, making some of its holders allotted and others elective. How democracies should be established has therefore been stated.

From these considerations it is also fairly clear how oligarchies should be established. For each oligarchy must be assembled from the opposite elements,^{1320b20} with reference to the corresponding democracy. The best-blended and first kind of oligarchy is the one close to what is called polity. In it the property qualifications must be divided, making some lower and others higher: the lower for participation in the necessary offices,²⁵ the higher for the

more authoritative ones. Anyone who acquires the property qualification must be allowed to share in the constitution, and enough of the people must be admitted through the qualification to make the participants stronger than those who do not participate. The partners must always be drawn from the better part of the people. Similarly, the next³⁰ kind of oligarchy must be established by tightening the requirements a little. But the oligarchy opposed to the last kind of democracy, the most cliquish and tyrannical of oligarchies, needs all the more safeguarding the worse it is. For just as bodies in good condition for health, and ships well equipped for sailing³⁵ with their crews, admit of more errors without being destroyed by them, whereas sickly bodies and unsound ships with poor crews cannot bear even small errors, so too the worst constitutions need the greatest^{1321a1} safeguarding.

Democracies, then, are generally preserved by a large population (for this stands opposed to the just according to merit). But oligarchy must clearly, on the contrary, find its preservation in good order.

^{1321a5} Since there are chiefly four parts of the multitude—the farmers, the artisans, the traders, and the laborers—and four forces useful for war—cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry, and a navy—where the territory happens to be suited to horses, there are naturally favorable conditions for establishing a strong oligarchy¹⁰ (for the inhabitants' preservation depends on this force, and keeping horses belongs to those who possess large estates). Where the territory is suited to heavy infantry, the next kind of oligarchy is appropriate (for heavy infantry belongs more to the prosperous than to the poor), whereas the light-armed force and the navy are wholly democratic. As things are now,¹⁵ where there is a large multitude of this kind, the oligarchs often fare worse in battle when faction breaks out. The remedy for this must be taken from generals experienced in war, who combine with the cavalry and heavy infantry the appropriate force of light infantry. This is how the people prevail in factions²⁰ over the prosperous: being lightly armed, they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry.

To form this force out of these people, then, is to form it against themselves. Instead, since ages are divided and some are older and others young, they must have their own sons, while still young, taught^{1321a25} the duties of light and lightly armed troops; and once they have been selected out of boyhood, they must be practiced contestants in these duties. A share in the citizen body should be given to the multitude either, as stated before, to those who acquire the property qualification; or, as at Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain time from artisans' work; or, as³⁰ at Massalia, by judging the merits of those within the citizen body and those outside it. Moreover, the most authoritative offices, which those within the constitution must hold, must carry public services, so that the people will willingly refrain from sharing in them and will excuse the rulers as paying a high price for their³⁵ office. It is fitting that on entering office they should offer magnificent sacrifices and construct some public work, so that the people, sharing in the feasts and seeing the city adorned with votive offerings in one place and buildings in another, will gladly see the constitution endure. The notables will also have⁴⁰ memorials of their expenditure. But those concerned with oligarchies now do not do this; they do the opposite. For they seek profits no less than honor. For this reason it is apt to say^{1321b1} that these are small democracies.

Let this, then, be our account of how democracies and oligarchies should be established.

Following upon what has been said, we must properly distinguish^{1321b5} the matters concerning offices: how many there are, what they are, and what they concern, as was also said before. For without the necessary offices a city cannot exist, and without those directed toward good order and adornment it cannot be well administered. Moreover, it is necessary that in small cities there should be fewer offices and in large ones¹⁰ more, as has already been stated. We must therefore be clear about which it is fitting to combine and which to separate. The first of the necessary responsibilities is that concerning the marketplace. There must be an office to oversee contracts and good order there; for it is virtually necessary¹⁵ for all cities to buy some things and sell others to meet one another's necessary needs. This is the most immediate means to self-sufficiency,

for the sake of which they seem to have come together into a single constitution. Another responsibility, following and closely related to this, concerns public and private property in the town: ensuring²⁰ good order, preserving and repairing dilapidated buildings and roads, keeping boundaries between properties free from dispute, and whatever other responsibilities are of a similar kind. Most people call this office town supervision. It has several parts, for²⁵ which they appoint different people in the more populous cities: for example, wall-builders, overseers of fountains, and guardians of harbors. Another office is necessary and similar to this one; for it concerns the same matters, but in the countryside and the areas outside the town. These rulers are called³⁰ by some field-supervisors, by others forest-wardens. These, then, are three responsibilities for these matters. Another office is that to which public revenues are brought; its holders keep them and distribute them to each branch of administration. They call these officials receivers and treasurers. Another office is that with which private contracts must be registered,³⁵ along with judgments from the law courts. These same officials must also receive the written charges in lawsuits and bring the cases to court. In some places they divide this office too among several officials, while elsewhere one has authority over all these matters. They are called sacred recorders, overseers, recorders, and other⁴⁰ similar names.

Following this comes what is virtually the most necessary and most difficult of the offices: that concerned with enforcing judgments against those convicted, collecting the fines posted^{1322a1} in the registers, and keeping people in custody.

It is difficult because it arouses great hatred, so that where there is no great profit to be made, people neither consent to hold it nor, if they do consent, are willing to act according to the laws.^{1322a5} But it is necessary, because it is of no use to hold trials concerning the just if the judgments are not carried out. Hence, if it is impossible to live together without trials, it is also impossible without enforcement. For this reason it is better that this should not be a single office, but that different officials should enforce the judgments of different courts. As for the posted notices¹⁰ in the registers, we should likewise try to

divide this responsibility. Moreover, some judgments should be enforced by other offices, those of the previous year preferably by the new officials, and those of the current officials by an office other than the one that passed the judgment: for example, the town-supervisors should enforce those of the market-supervisors, and others those of the town-supervisors.¹⁵ For the less hatred the enforcing officials arouse, the more readily the judgments will be carried out. When those who pass judgment and those who enforce it are the same, they incur a double hatred; and when the same people do this in every matter, it makes them enemies of everyone. In many places the office that keeps prisoners is indeed distinct from that which²⁰ enforces judgments, as is the office of the so-called Eleven at Athens. It is therefore better to separate this office too, and to seek an ingenious arrangement for it as well. For it is no less necessary than the one mentioned; but decent people tend especially to shun this office, while it is unsafe to give authority to the wicked. They themselves²⁵ need to be guarded more than they are able to guard others. Hence there must not be a single office assigned to them, nor the same one continually. Instead, where there is an organized body of youths or guards, different members of it, and of the offices, must take responsibility in turn.

These^{1322a30} offices, then, must be placed first as the most necessary. After them come those no less necessary but ranked in higher dignity; for they require much experience and trustworthiness. Such would be the offices concerned with guarding the city and all those assigned to the needs of war. There must be,³⁵ in peace and war alike, overseers of the guarding of gates and walls, and of the inspection and organization of the citizens. In some places there are several offices for all these matters, in others fewer; in small cities, for example, one concerns itself with all of them. The names generals and war-commanders are given to^{1322b1} such officials.

Moreover, if there are cavalry, light infantry, archers, or a navy, sometimes an office is established over each of these as well. These are called naval commands, cavalry commands, and infantry commands; their subdivisions are

commands of triremes, companies,^{1322b5} and tribal contingents, and whatever parts these have. The whole is one kind of responsibility: the oversight of military affairs.

So much, then, for this office. Since some offices, if not all, handle considerable public funds, there must be another to receive the accounts and examine them,^{1322b10} itself handling nothing else. Some call these officials auditors, others accountants, others examiners, and others public advocates. Besides all these offices there is the one with the highest authority over everything. For the same office often has authority over the final decision and the introduction of business, or presides over the multitude where sovereignty lies with the¹⁵ people; for the body that convenes the sovereign body must have authority within the constitution. In some places they are called preliminary councilors because they deliberate beforehand; where there is a multitude, it is more commonly called a council. Such, roughly, are the political offices. Another kind of responsibility concerns the gods: for example, priests and overseers of²⁰ sacred places, charged with preserving what exists and restoring dilapidated buildings and other things dedicated to the gods. In some places this responsibility falls to a single office, as in small cities; in others to many, distinct from the priesthood, such as officials who conduct sacrifices,²⁵ temple-guardians, and treasurers of sacred funds. Following this is the office set apart for all the common sacrifices that the law does not assign to the priests, whose holders instead receive their honor from the common hearth. Some call these officials rulers, others kings, and others presidents.

The^{1322b30} necessary responsibilities, then, concern the following matters, to state them in summary: divine affairs, military affairs, revenues and expenditure, the marketplace, the town, harbors, and the countryside; further, the law courts, the registration of agreements,³⁵ enforcement of judgments, custody, accounts, examinations, and audits of rulers; and finally the offices concerned with deliberation about public affairs. Peculiar to cities with more leisure and greater prosperity, which also take care for good order, are the supervision of women, guardianship of laws, supervision of children,^{1323a1} and supervision of gymnasia,

and, besides these, oversight of athletic and Dionysian contests and any other such public spectacles that happen to be held. Some of these offices are clearly not democratic, such as the supervision of women and of children;^{1323a5} for the poor are compelled to use their wives and children as attendants because they have no slaves. There are three offices through which some select the authoritative offices: guardians of laws, preliminary councilors, and a council. Guardians of laws are aristocratic, preliminary councilors oligarchic, and a council democratic. Concerning the¹⁰ offices, then, we have now spoken in outline of virtually all of them.

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^{1323a}¹⁴ Concerning the best constitution, anyone intending to undertake the ¹⁵ appropriate inquiry must first determine which life is most worthy of choice. For if this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear; those who take part in public life under the best arrangements their circumstances allow should fare best, unless something contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. Therefore we must first ²⁰ agree on which life is most worthy of choice for virtually everyone, and after this whether it is the same or different for a community and for an individual. Since we consider that much has been said adequately about the best life in the external discourses, we must use those discussions now as well. For in truth, at least as regards one division, no one would dispute ²⁵ that, since there are three classes of goods—external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—the blessed must possess all of these. For no one would call blessed a person with no share in courage, moderation, justice, or practical wisdom, but who fears the passing ³⁰ flies, who abstains from none of the most extreme acts if he desires food or drink, who ruins his dearest friends for a quarter-obol, and whose mind is likewise as senseless and mistaken as that of a child or a madman. Everyone would agree to these statements, as it seems; ³⁵ but they differ about the amount and the relative superiority of the goods. For they think any amount of virtue sufficient, however small, but seek an unlimited excess of wealth, money, power, reputation, and everything of

that kind. We shall tell them that it is easy to gain conviction about these matters even from the⁴⁰ facts, by observing that people acquire and preserve not the virtues through external goods, but external goods through the virtues,

^{1323b1}and that living happily, whether for human beings it lies in enjoyment, in virtue, or in both, belongs more to those whose character and mind are adorned to the highest degree, but who are moderate in the acquisition of external goods, than to those⁵ who possess more of those goods than is useful, but fall short in these qualities. Nevertheless, the matter is also easy to grasp when examined by reasoning. For external goods have a limit, like an instrument (and everything useful is useful for something); an excess of them must either harm or be of no benefit to their¹⁰ possessors. But each of the soul's goods is more useful the more abundant it is, if we ought to apply to these not only the term noble but also useful. In general, it is clear that we shall say the best conditions of things stand in relation to one another according to the superiority¹⁵ of the things whose conditions we say they are. So if the soul is more honorable than property and the body, both without qualification and for us, the best condition of each of these must stand in the same proportion. Moreover, these things are by nature worthy of choice for the soul's sake, and all must²⁰ choose them for its sake if they think sensibly, not the soul for theirs.

Let us therefore agree that each person has as much happiness as he has virtue and practical wisdom, and activity in accordance with them. We call the god as witness, who is happy and blessed not through any^{1323b25} external goods, but through himself and the character of his nature. For these reasons good fortune must also be different from happiness (for chance and fortune cause the goods external to the soul, but no one is just or moderate by chance or through fortune). It follows,³⁰ and requires the same arguments, that the best city is also happy and acts well. But those who do not perform noble actions cannot act well; and no noble deed of either a man or a city exists without virtue and practical wisdom. A city's courage, justice, and practical wisdom³⁵ have the same power and form as those through participation in which each human being is called just, practically wise, and moderate. Let this suffice as a preface to the argument; for it is neither possible to leave these matters untouched nor to pur-

sue all the arguments appropriate to them, since another inquiry concerns⁴⁰ these matters. For now let this much be assumed: the best life, both for each individual separately and for cities in common,

is the life with virtue sufficiently supported^{1324a1} to allow participation in actions according to virtue. As for those who dispute this, we must leave them aside in the present inquiry and examine their objections later, if anyone happens not to be persuaded by what has been said.

^{1324a5} It remains to say whether we must declare the happiness of each individual human being and of a city to be the same or not the same. This too is evident; for everyone would agree that it is the same. Those who place living well in wealth for an individual also regard the whole city, if it is rich,¹⁰ as blessed; those who most esteem the tyrannical life would also declare the city that rules over the most people the happiest; and if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city is happier. But there are now two matters requiring examination. One is which is more worthy of choice:¹⁵ the life of taking part in public life together and sharing in a city, or rather the life of an outsider, released from the political community. The other is which constitution and which arrangement of a city must be held best, whether sharing in a city is worthy of choice for everyone, or not for some but for most. Since political²⁰ thought and study are concerned with this, not with what is worthy of choice for each individual, and since this is the inquiry we have now chosen, the former question would be incidental, while the latter is the task of this investigation. The best constitution must be that arrangement under which anyone whatever would act best and live²⁵ a blessed life: this, then, is clear. But even those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice dispute whether the political and active life is worthy of choice, or rather the life released from all external affairs, a contemplative life of some kind, which some say is the only philosophical life. For these are roughly the³⁰ two lives that those most ambitious for virtue appear to choose, both in former times and now: I mean the political and the philosophical. Which view holds the truth makes no small difference; for a sensible person must direct himself toward the better aim, and so must each³⁵ individual and the constitu-

tion in common. Some think that ruling one's neighbors as a master involves an injustice of the greatest kind, while ruling them politically involves no injustice but does impede one's own well-being. Others hold what is virtually the opposite opinion: only⁴⁰ the active and political life, they say, is worthy of a man, for in the exercise of each virtue private individuals have no more scope for action^{1324b1} than those who conduct public affairs and take part in public life.

Some, then, suppose this; others say that only the masterful and tyrannical manner of constitution is happy. Among some peoples this is also the aim of their constitution and laws: to exercise mastery^{1324b5} over their neighbors. Therefore, although among most peoples most laws are laid down in a haphazard fashion, so to speak, still, wherever the laws look toward a single object, they all aim at conquest. At Lacedaemon and in Crete, for instance, education and the mass of laws are organized almost entirely for wars. Moreover, among¹⁰ all nations capable of gaining ascendancy, such power is honored: for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. In some there are even laws that spur people toward this virtue. At Carthage, for example, they say that a person receives an ornament of rings corresponding to the number of¹⁵ campaigns in which he has served. There was once a law in Macedonia that a man who had killed no enemy must wear a halter around his waist. Among the Scythians, a man who had killed no enemy was not allowed to drink from the cup passed around at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, a matching number of stakes²⁰ is planted around a man's tomb for the enemies he has slain. Among other peoples there are many other such practices, some embodied in laws, others in customs.

Yet perhaps it would seem altogether strange to those willing to examine the matter if this were the task of the political expert: to be able to consider how to rule^{1324b25} and exercise mastery over one's neighbors, whether they are willing or unwilling. For how could this belong to political expertise or legislation, when it is not even lawful? It is not lawful to rule unjustly as well as justly, but conquest can also be unjust. Nor indeed do we see this in the other sciences; for neither³⁰ a doctor's nor a pilot's task is to persuade or compel, in the one case his patients, in the other his passengers. But most people seem to think the art

of mastery is political expertise, and what each of them says is neither just nor advantageous for himself, they are not ashamed to practice upon others.³⁵ For among themselves they seek just rule, but toward others they have no concern for the just. Yet it would be strange if there were no natural distinction between what is fit for mastery and what is not. Therefore, if this is how things stand, we must not try to exercise mastery over everyone, but over those fit for it, just as we must not hunt for a feast or sacrifice⁴⁰ human beings, but what is fit to be hunted for that purpose; and what is fit to be hunted is a wild animal suitable for eating. Moreover, there could even be^{1325a1} a happy city on its own,

provided, of course, that it conducts its public life well, if it is possible for a city to be established somewhere on its own, using excellent laws. The organization of its constitution will not be directed toward war or toward conquering enemies;^{1325a5} for let us suppose that nothing of that kind exists. It is clear, then, that all preparations for war must be held noble, but not as the highest end of all; rather, they are for the sake of that end. It is the excellent legislator's task to consider, for a city, a race of human beings, or any other community, how a good life¹⁰ and the happiness possible for them can be enjoyed. Some of the laws laid down will, however, differ; and it belongs to legislation to see, if there are neighbors, which practices should be adopted toward which peoples, or how to apply to each the measures appropriate to them. But this question may later receive its proper¹⁵ examination: toward what end the best constitution must be directed.

As for those who agree that the life with virtue is most worthy of choice, but differ about how it is to be lived, we must address both groups (for some reject political offices, thinking that for a free person^{1325a20} the life is different from the political life and is the most worthy of choice of all, while others hold the latter to be best, since it is impossible for one who does nothing to act well, and acting well and happiness are the same). Both are right in some things they say and wrong in others. The former are right that a free person's life is better than a master's.²⁵ For this is true: there is nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave, since giving orders about necessities has no share in the noble. Yet it is not right to think that every kind of rule is mastery; for rule over free people

differs from rule over slaves no less than what is free by nature itself differs from what is³⁰ a slave by nature. These matters have been adequately distinguished in our opening discussions. But it is not true that doing nothing should be praised more than acting. For happiness is activity, and the actions of just and moderate people achieve many noble ends.

Yet perhaps someone might suppose, now that these distinctions have been made,^{1325a35} that being sovereign over everything is best; for in this way he would have authority over the most numerous and noblest actions. Hence someone capable of ruling should not yield to his neighbor but rather take rule away from him; neither a father should take account of his children, nor children of their father, nor, in general, any friend of a friend, nor⁴⁰ pay any heed to them in this regard. For the best is most worthy of choice, and acting well is best. Perhaps, then, what they say is true,

if indeed^{1325b1} those who rob others and use force will possess what is most worthy of choice among things that exist. But perhaps it cannot belong to them, and their assumption is false. For the actions of a person cannot any longer be noble unless he is as far superior as a man is to a woman, or a father⁵ to his children, or a master to slaves. Hence the transgressor could not subsequently achieve any success so great as his existing departure from virtue. For among those who are alike, the noble and the just lie in taking turns, since this is equal and alike. But inequality among equals and unlikeness among those alike are contrary to nature, and nothing¹⁰ contrary to nature is noble. Therefore, if someone else is superior to the best in virtue and in the power to act, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. He must possess not virtue alone but also the power by which he will be able to act. But if these things are rightly stated, and happiness¹⁵ must be held to be acting well, the active life would be best both for every city in common and for each individual. Yet the active life need not be directed toward others, as some think; nor are only those thoughts active that arise for the sake of the results of action. Much more so are²⁰ the contemplations and thoughts complete in themselves and undertaken for their own sake; for acting well is an end, and therefore also a kind of activity. Even in external actions, we say that those who direct them through thought

are most properly acting. Nor indeed must cities established on their own, which have²⁵ chosen to live in this way, be inactive; for activity can occur among their parts, since the parts of a city have many associations with one another. The same holds for any individual human being. For the god and the whole universe could hardly be in a good condition if this were not so, since they have no external actions³⁰ beyond those proper to themselves. It is therefore clear that the same life must be best for each individual human being and for cities and human beings in common.

Since what we have now said about these matters has served as a preface, and we have previously examined the other constitutions,^{1325b35} the starting point for what remains is to state first what assumptions must be made about the city that is to be constituted as we would wish. For the best constitution cannot come into being without suitable resources. We must therefore assume many conditions beforehand, as though expressing wishes, yet none of them must be impossible. I mean,⁴⁰ for example, the number of citizens and the territory. For just as other craftsmen, such as a weaver or a shipbuilder,

must have^{1326a1} material suited to their work (for the better this happens to have been prepared, the finer the product of their craft must also be), so the political expert and the legislator must have their proper material⁵ in a suitable condition.

The first resource for political expertise is the multitude of human beings: how many there must be and of what natural character; and likewise with the territory, how large it must be and of what kind. Most people think a happy city ought to be large; but if this is^{1326a10} true, they do not know what makes a city large or small. For they judge its largeness by the number of inhabitants, whereas we should look not so much to numbers as to capacity. A city too has a certain task; hence the city most capable of accomplishing it must be thought the greatest. For example,¹⁵ one might say that Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a doctor, than someone superior in bodily size. Nevertheless, even if we must judge by looking to numbers, we must not do so by looking at just any multitude (for cities must perhaps contain large numbers of slaves,²⁰ resident foreigners, and strangers), but at those who are parts of the city and constitute

it as its proper members. A great number of these is a sign of a large city; but a city from which many artisans go out and few heavy infantry cannot be large. For a large²⁵ city and a populous one are not the same.

Moreover, experience makes this too evident: it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, for an excessively populous city to be well governed by laws. At any rate, we see that none of the cities thought to conduct public life well is unrestricted in its population. This is also clear from the evidence of reasoning. For^{1326a30} law is a kind of order, and good government by laws must be good order, but an excessively great number cannot share in order. For that is surely the work of divine power, which also holds together this universe. Therefore a city that combines magnitude with the limit just mentioned must be the finest;³⁵ for beauty ordinarily arises in number and magnitude. But there is also a certain measure for a city's size, just as for everything else—animals, plants, instruments. Each of these, when excessively small or excessively large, will not possess its proper capacity, but will sometimes be wholly deprived of its nature, sometimes⁴⁰ be in a poor condition. A ship a span long, for example, will not be a ship at all, nor will one two stades long.

Book VII, 1326a–1329b



But when it reaches a certain size, it will sometimes^{1326b1} make sailing poor through being too small, and sometimes through being excessive. Likewise, a city with too few inhabitants is not self-sufficient (and a city is something self-sufficient), while one with far too many is self-sufficient in necessities, like a nation, but⁵ not a city; for it is not easy for it to have a constitution. Who will be general of a vastly excessive multitude, or who its herald, unless he has the voice of Stentor? Therefore the first city must consist of a multitude large enough to be, for the first time, self-sufficient for living well in a political community. A city that¹⁰ exceeds this in numbers may also be a larger city, but this increase is not unlimited, as we have said. It is easy to see from the city's functions what the limit of the excess is. For the city's actions are those of rulers on the one hand and of the ruled on the other, and the ruler's function is command and judgment. To judge¹⁵ questions of justice and to distribute offices according to merit, the citizens must know one another's character. Where this does not happen, the distribution of offices and judgments must be poor. For in neither case is it just to proceed haphazardly, as happens²⁰ plainly when the population is far too large. Moreover, foreigners and resident aliens can easily share in the constitution; for it is not difficult to escape notice when numbers are excessive. Clearly, then, the best limit for a city is the largest multitude sufficient for a self-sufficient life that can readily be surveyed. Let²⁵ this, then, be our determination of the city's size.

The territory stands in much the same relation. As for its character, clearly everyone would praise the territory most self-sufficient (and such a territory must produce everything; for having everything and needing nothing^{1326b30} is self-sufficiency). In extent and size it should be such that the inhabitants can live at leisure, in a manner both generous and temperate. Whether we are right or wrong in stating this limit must be examined more precisely later, when property and abundance of possessions are generally³⁵ discussed: how they should stand, and in what manner, with regard to their use. For there are many disputes about this inquiry because some draw life toward one extreme and some toward the other, some toward stinginess and others toward luxury. It is not difficult to say what the shape of the territory should be (though on some matters⁴⁰ we must also follow those experienced in generalship): it should be difficult for enemies to enter but easy for its own people to leave.

^{1327a1} Furthermore, just as we said that the number of inhabitants should be readily surveyed, so should the territory. By readily surveyed I mean that the territory can easily be defended. If the city's position is to be as we would wish, then in relation to the sea⁵ it should be well situated, and in relation to the territory as well. One requirement, then, is that already stated (for it should be accessible from every part of the territory for sending assistance); the remaining requirement concerns the conveyance of the crops produced, and also of timber, and of any other product that the territory happens to yield which is¹⁰ easily transported.

As for access to the sea, whether it is advantageous or harmful to well-governed cities, there is much dispute. For people say that the residence of strangers brought up under other laws is detrimental to^{1327a15} good government, and so is a large population. For using the sea to send and receive goods brings a multitude of merchants, and this, they say, is opposed to taking part well in public life. It is clear, then, that if these consequences do not follow, it is better, both for security and for an abundant supply of necessities, for²⁰ the city and its territory to have access to the sea. For to endure wars more easily, those who are to be preserved must be able to receive assistance in both ways, by land and by sea. And to inflict harm on attackers, if that is not possible in

both ways, it will at least be²⁵ more possible in one of them if they have access to both. It is also necessary to import whatever they do not happen to possess themselves, and to export the surplus of what they produce. For the city should engage in trade for itself, not for others. Those who make themselves a marketplace for everyone have revenue³⁰ as their motive; but a city that should have no share in this kind of acquisitiveness should not possess such a trading port either. Since even now we see many territories and cities with naval stations and harbors conveniently situated in relation to the city, so that they neither occupy the same urban area nor lie too far away,³⁵ but are controlled by walls and other such defenses, it is evident that if any good results from contact with them, the city will possess that good, while if anything harmful results, it is easy to guard against it by laws specifying and defining who should not and who should associate⁴⁰ with one another.

As for naval power, it is clear that it is best to possess it up to a certain strength

(for not^{1327b1} only for their own sake but also for that of some of their neighbors they must be formidable and able to give assistance by sea as by land). But the number and size of this force must be considered in relation to the city's way of life. For if⁵ it is to lead a life of leadership and public activity, this force too must be proportionate to its actions. The large population associated with the naval masses need not belong to the cities; for these men need not be any part of the city. The marines¹⁰ are free men and belong to the infantry; they have authority over and control the fleet. If there is a large population of outlying inhabitants and people farming the territory, there must also be an abundant supply of sailors. We see this even now in some places, for example in the city of the Heracleots: they man many¹⁵ triremes, although their city is more moderate in size than others.

Let this, then, be our determination concerning the territory and harbors of cities, the sea, and naval power. As for the number of citizens, we have already said what limit it should have; as for what sort of people^{1327b20} they should be by nature, let us now speak.

One might understand this, at least in broad outline, by looking both at the Greek cities held in high esteem and at the whole inhabited world, as it is divided among nations. The nations in cold regions and those of Europe are full of spirit; in intelligence^{1327b25} and skill, however, they are deficient. Therefore they remain freer, but without organized constitutions and unable to rule their neighbors. Those of Asia are intelligent and skillful in soul, but lack spirit; therefore they continue to be ruled and enslaved. The Greek race, just as it lies midway³⁰ in geographical position, shares in both qualities. For it is both spirited and intelligent; therefore it remains free, has the best constitutions, and is capable of ruling all peoples if it obtains a single constitution. The Greek nations also have this same difference among themselves: some have³⁵ a one-sided nature, while others are well blended with respect to both these capacities. Clearly, then, those whom the legislator is to lead readily toward virtue must be both intelligent and spirited by nature. For as to what some say the guardians should possess, namely that they should be affectionate⁴⁰ toward those they know but fierce toward strangers, it is spirit that produces affection; for this is the soul's^{1328a1} capacity by which we love.

Here is a sign of this: spirit rises more against acquaintances and friends than against strangers when it believes it has been slighted. Therefore Archilochus, in reproaching his friends, fittingly addresses his spirit:^{1328a5} "For you are choked by friends."

Rule and freedom, too, belong to everyone through this capacity; for spirit is commanding and unconquerable. But it is not right to say that they should be harsh toward strangers; for they should be so toward no one, nor are the magnanimous^{1328a10} fierce by nature, except toward wrongdoers. They feel this still more strongly toward acquaintances, as was said before, if they believe they are being wronged. And this happens reasonably: for from those whom they suppose to owe them kindness, they suffer not only harm but also the loss of that kindness,¹⁵ they believe. Hence the saying, "For wars between brothers are bitter," (Eur. Fr. 965) and "Those who have loved beyond measure also beyond measure hate." (Anon. fr. 78 (Nauck))

We have now determined in broad outline how many people should take part in public life and what sort they should be by nature, and also how large the territory should be and of what kind (for we must not seek the^{1328a20} same precision in arguments as in things that become known through perception).

Since, as with other things constituted by nature, those things without which the whole could not exist are not all parts of its entire constitution, it is clear that we should not count as parts of a city everything that cities must possess,^{1328a25} nor should we count all necessities as parts of any other community that forms a single kind (for there must be something one, common, and the same for the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally), whether this is food, an extent of territory, or something else of this sort. But when one thing is for the sake of another, and the other is that for whose sake it exists, they have nothing³⁰ in common in these relations except that one produces and the other receives. I mean, for example, the relation of every tool and of craftsmen to the work produced. For a house and a builder have nothing that comes to be common to them; rather, the builders' art exists for the sake of the house. Therefore cities need property, but property is no part of the³⁵ city. Yet many parts of property are living things. The city is a community of similar people, for the sake of the best life possible. Since happiness is the best thing, and this is an activity and a complete exercise of virtue, and since it so happens that some can share in it, while others share little or⁴⁰ not at all, it is clear that this is the cause of the different forms of city and of the plurality of constitutions.

For in different ways and through^{1328b1} different means, each group pursues this and makes its ways of life and its constitutions different. We must also examine how many things there are without which a city could not exist. For among these will be the things we call parts of the city, and therefore they must exist. We must therefore establish⁵ the number of its functions, for from these the matter will be clear. First, then, there must be food; next, crafts (for life needs many tools); third, arms (for the members of the community must also possess arms among themselves, both to maintain rule over the disobedient and against wrongdoing by outsiders¹⁰ who attempt it); further, a certain abun-

dance of wealth, so that they have resources both for their own needs and for those of war; fifth, and first in importance, care for the divine, which they call priestly service; and sixth in number, and most necessary of all, judgment about matters of advantage and about justice in their¹⁵ relations with one another. These, then, are the functions that virtually every city requires (for a city is not just any multitude, but one self-sufficient for life, as we say; if any of these things happens to be lacking, this community cannot be altogether self-sufficient). Therefore, in accordance with the activities²⁰ just mentioned, the city must be constituted. There must therefore be a multitude of farmers who will provide food, craftsmen, the military element, the wealthy element, priests, and judges of matters of necessity and advantage.

With these things determined, it remains to consider whether everyone^{1328b25} should share in all these functions (for it is possible for the same people all to be farmers, craftsmen, deliberators, and judges), or whether different people should be assigned to each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of them must be separate and others shared. It is not the same in every constitution. For, as we have said,³⁰ it is possible both for everyone to share in everything and for not everyone to share in everything, but some in some things. These differences also make the constitutions different: in democracies everyone shares in everything, while in oligarchies the opposite holds. Since we are investigating the best constitution, and this³⁵ is the one under which the city would be happiest, and since it has already been said that happiness cannot exist apart from virtue, it is evident from this that in the city with the finest constitution, which possesses men just without qualification and not merely relative to a given assumption, neither the life of a mechanic nor that of a trader should be lived⁴⁰ by the citizens (for such a life is ignoble and opposed to virtue); nor should anyone be a farmer who is going to^{1329a1} be a citizen

(for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for political actions).

Since the military element and the element that deliberates about matters of advantage and judges questions of justice are also present, and seem to be parts of the^{1329a5} city above all, should these too be assigned to different people, or

should both be given to the same people? This too is clear: in one sense to the same people, and in another to different people. Insofar as each function belongs to a different prime of life, and one needs practical wisdom while the other needs strength, they should belong to different people. But insofar as it is impossible¹⁰ for those capable of using force and preventing coercion to submit to being ruled forever, they should belong to the same people. For those who have authority over arms also have authority over whether the constitution endures or not. It remains, then, to assign both functions of this constitution to the same people, but not at the same time. Just as by nature¹⁵ strength is found in younger men and practical wisdom in older men, so it seems advantageous that both functions should be distributed accordingly; and this is just, for the division accords with merit. Moreover, property too must belong to these men. For the citizens must have ample resources, and these are the citizens. The²⁰ mechanical element has no share in the city, nor does any other class that does not produce virtue. This is clear from our assumption: happiness must exist together with virtue, and we should call a city happy not by looking at some part of it, but at all its citizens. It is²⁵ also evident that property must belong to these men, if the farmers must be slaves or barbarian inhabitants of the outlying districts. Of the classes enumerated, the priestly class remains. Their place too is evident. Neither a farmer nor a mechanic should be appointed priest (for it is fitting that the citizens³⁰ honor the gods). Since the citizen body has been divided into two parts, namely the armed element and the deliberative element, and since it is fitting both to offer service to the gods and for those exhausted by age to find rest in their service, the priesthoods concerned with the gods should be assigned to these men.

As for the things without which^{1329a35} a city is not constituted and how many parts a city has, these have now been stated (for farmers, craftsmen, and the entire laboring element must be present in cities, but the city's parts are the armed and the deliberative elements), and each of these has been separated, some permanently and others in turn.

^{1329a40} It seems that those who philosophize about constitutions have recognized, not only now or recently, that separate classes should be distinguished ^{1329b1} within the city, and that the military class and the farming class should be different.

For this arrangement still holds even now in Egypt, and also in Crete: in Egypt, they say, Sesostris legislated in this way, and Minos did so in ^{1329b5} Crete. The institution of common messes also seems ancient: those in Crete originated in the reign of Minos, while those in Italy are much older than these. For the learned among the inhabitants there say that a certain Italus became king of Oenotria, from whom their name ¹⁰ was changed, and they were called Italians instead of Oenotrians; and this coast of Europe received the name Italy, the part that lies within the Scylletic and Lametic gulfs. These are half a day's journey apart. They say that this Italus made the nomadic ¹⁵ Oenotrians into farmers, established other laws for them, and first instituted common messes. Hence even now some of his descendants still use common messes and some of his laws. The country toward Tyrrhenia was inhabited by the Opicans, called both formerly and now ²⁰ Ausonians; that toward Iapygia and the Ionian Sea, the region called the Syrtis, by the Chonians. The Chonians too were Oenotrians by race. The institution of common messes, then, first arose here, but the division of the citizen population into classes came from Egypt; for the reign that far precedes in time ²⁵ Minos' is that of Sesostris. We should suppose that most other things, too, have been discovered many times in the long course of time, or rather infinitely many times. For need itself is likely to teach what is necessary; and once these things are present, it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and abundance should develop. ³⁰ Therefore we must suppose that matters concerning constitutions follow the same course. That all these things are ancient is indicated by Egypt: its people seem to be the most ancient, yet they have always possessed laws and political organization. Therefore we must make adequate use of what has been discovered and, as for what has been left out, ³⁵ try to seek it.

Book VII, 1329b–1333a



We have already said that the territory should belong to those who possess arms and share in the constitution, that those who farm it must be different from them, and how large and of what kind the territory should be. As for its ^{1329b40} distribution and the farmers, who they should be and of what kind, we must speak first, since we say neither that there should be common ^{1330a1} property, as some have said,

but that it should be common in use through friendship, nor that any citizen should lack food. As for common messes, everyone agrees that their presence is useful in well-organized cities; why this seems useful ^{1330a5} to us too, we shall say later. All the citizens must share in them, but it is not easy for the poor both to contribute the prescribed amount from their own resources and to manage the rest of their household. Furthermore, expenses relating to the gods are common to the whole city. Into two parts, therefore, ¹⁰ the territory must be divided, one common and the other belonging to private individuals, and each of these must in turn be divided in two: one part of the common land for services to the gods, the other for the expense of the common messes; and of the privately owned land, one part toward the frontier, ¹⁵ the other toward the city, so that with two allotments assigned to each person, everyone has a share in both locations. For this arrangement provides both equality and justice, and greater concord in wars against neighboring cities. Where the arrangement is otherwise, some, where their border neighbors are concerned, are indifferent

to²⁰ hostility, while others care too much, even beyond what is noble. Hence in some places there is a law that those whose land adjoins the border must not share in deliberation about wars against their neighbors, on the ground that their private interest would prevent them from deliberating well. The territory, then, must be divided in this way for the already stated²⁵ reasons. As for those who are to farm it, the best arrangement, if things are to be as we wish, is that they should be slaves, neither all of the same race nor spirited (for in this way they would both be useful for work and safe from attempts at revolution); the second best is that they should be barbarian inhabitants of the outlying districts, similar in nature to those just described.³⁰ Of these, those on private estates should be the private property of the owners of those estates, while those on the common land should be common property. How slaves should be treated, and why it is better for freedom to be held out as a prize to all slaves, we shall say later.

That the city should be accessible from the mainland^{1330a35} and equally, as far as possible, from the sea and the whole territory, has been said already. We should wish its own position to lie on a slope, with four considerations in view. First, as a necessity, health (for cities inclined toward the east and toward the winds⁴⁰ blowing from the sunrise are healthier; next come those facing north, for these have milder winters).

Of the remaining considerations,^{1330b1} the position should be favorable for political and military actions. For military actions, it should be easy for the inhabitants to leave, but difficult for opponents to approach or surround. As for waters and springs, there should preferably be an abundant supply⁵ of their own; failing this, a remedy has been found by constructing plentiful large cisterns for rainwater, so that the supply never fails when war cuts them off from the territory. Since the inhabitants' health must be considered, and this depends on the site's being well situated both in such a place and toward¹⁰ such a quarter, and secondly on using healthy water, this matter too must be attended to with more than passing care. For what we use for the body in the greatest quantities and most frequently contributes most to health; and the

influence of water and air is of this nature. Therefore in ¹⁵ prudent cities, if not all the water is alike and there is no abundant supply of such springs, water for nourishment must be kept separate from water for other uses.

As for defensible positions, the advantage is not the same for all constitutions. For example, an acropolis suits oligarchy and monarchy, ^{1330b20} a level site suits democracy, and neither suits aristocracy, but rather several strong positions. The arrangement of private dwellings is thought more pleasant and more useful for other activities if it is laid out in straight streets, in the newer manner of Hippodamus; but for military ²⁵ security, the opposite is preferable, as things were arranged in ancient times. For that arrangement is difficult for foreign troops to enter and for attackers to find their way through. Therefore the city should share in both arrangements (for this is possible if one lays it out in the way farmers arrange what some call clumps of vines), and should not ³⁰ make the whole city regularly laid out, but only particular sections and places. For in this way it will be well arranged both for security and for beauty.

As for walls, those who say that cities laying claim to virtue should not have them hold an altogether antiquated view, even though they see that cities that prided themselves in this way have been refuted by events. ^{1330b35} Against equals and those not greatly superior in numbers, it is not noble to try to preserve oneself through the strength of walls. But since it is possible for the superiority of the attackers to exceed the human virtue of a small number, if the city is to be preserved ⁴⁰ and not suffer harm or outrage, we must regard the greatest possible strength of walls as the most effective means for war,

^{1331a1} especially now that missiles and siege engines have been brought to precision for besieging cities. To demand that cities not be surrounded by walls is like seeking to make the territory easy to invade and to remove its ⁵ mountainous places, or likewise not to enclose private dwellings with walls, on the ground that their inhabitants will become cowardly. Moreover, we must not overlook this: those who have put walls around their city can use their city in both ways, both as a city with walls and as one without ¹⁰ them, while those who have none cannot. If this is so, not only must walls be built around the city, but care must also be taken that they suit the city both as an adornment

and for military needs, both the other needs and those newly discovered. For just as attackers¹⁵ take care to discover the means of gaining an advantage, so defenders too have discovered some means and must search out and investigate others. For people do not even attempt to attack those who are well prepared.

Since the multitude of citizens must, among common messes,^{1331a20} be divided, and the walls must be divided by guard posts and towers at suitable points, it is clear that these considerations invite us to establish some of the common messes in these guard posts. These things, then, might be arranged in this way. The buildings assigned to the gods,²⁵ and the most authoritative of the officials' common messes, should occupy the same suitable site, except for those shrines which the law or some other pronouncement of the Pythian oracle sets apart. Such a site would be one sufficiently prominent to display the excellence of its position, and more strongly defended in relation to the adjoining³⁰ parts of the city. Below this site it is fitting to establish a marketplace of the kind customary in Thessaly, which they call the free marketplace. This must be clear of all merchandise, and neither a mechanic nor a farmer nor anyone else of this sort should enter³⁵ unless summoned by the rulers. The place would be agreeable if the gymnasia of the older men were also situated here; for this arrangement too should be divided according to age, and some rulers should spend their time with the younger men, while the older men should be with⁴⁰ the rulers. For being present in the rulers' sight is especially effective in instilling true respect and, in free men,^{1331b1} fear.

The marketplace for merchandise must be different from this one and separate, in a place convenient for bringing together everything sent from the sea and from the territory.

Since the city's leadership is divided into priests^{1331b5} and rulers, the priests' common messes too should be situated near the sacred buildings. Those official establishments concerned with contracts, the filing of lawsuits, summonses, and other administration of this sort, and also with the supervision of the marketplace and what is called¹⁰ the supervision of the city, should be established near a marketplace and a common meeting place. The place around the marketplace for necessities is of this kind: we assign the upper marketplace to leisure,

but this one to necessary activities. The arrangements in the territory should imitate those just described. For there too the¹⁵ rulers whom some call forest wardens and others country wardens must have guard posts and common messes for their duties of protection. Shrines must also be distributed through the territory, some for gods and others for heroes. But to spend time now discussing these things in detail is idle. Such things are not²⁰ difficult to conceive, but rather to put into practice; for describing them is the work of wishing, while their realization is the work of chance. Therefore, for the present, let us leave further discussion of such things aside.

As for the constitution itself, we must say from what elements, and of what kind,^{1331b25} the city that is to be blessed and to take part well in public life must be constituted. Since doing well in any matter depends on two things, one of which is setting the aim and the end of our actions correctly, and the other finding the actions that lead to the end (for it is possible³⁰ for these to be at variance with one another or in harmony: sometimes the aim is rightly set, but in acting people fail to attain it; sometimes they succeed in all the means to the end, but have set themselves a bad end; and sometimes they fail in both, as in medicine, for sometimes they neither³⁵ judge correctly what a healthy body should be like nor attain the means that produce the standard they have set themselves; but in the arts and sciences both must be mastered, the end and the actions toward the end), living well and happiness are desired⁴⁰ by everyone, as is evident, but some have the opportunity and others do not, owing to some chance or natural condition

(for living nobly also needs a supply of resources^{1332a1} of some kind, less for those better constituted and more for those worse). Others, though they have the opportunity, seek happiness wrongly from the outset. Since our task is to discern the best constitution, and this⁵ is the one under which a city would conduct its public life best, and it would conduct its public life best under the constitution that allows the city to be happiest, it is clear that we must not be ignorant of what happiness is.

We say (and have determined in the Ethics, if those arguments are of any use) that it is an activity and a complete exercise of virtue, and that this^{1332a10} is not conditional but unqualified. By conditional I mean what is necessary, and by unqualified what is noble. For example, in matters of just actions, just acts of retribution and punishment spring from virtue, but are necessary, and possess nobility through necessity (for it is preferable that neither a man nor a city should need any such¹⁵ things); but actions directed toward honors and abundant resources are noblest without qualification. For the former kind is the removal of some evil, while actions of the latter kind are the opposite: they establish and bring forth good things. A good man would make noble use even of poverty, illness, and²⁰ other bad turns of fortune; but blessedness lies in their opposites (for this too has been determined in our ethical arguments: the good man is one for whom, through virtue, the things that are good without qualification are good; and it is evident that his uses of these things too must be good and noble²⁵ without qualification). Hence people also think that external goods are the causes of happiness, as if they attributed brilliant and beautiful lyre-playing to the lyre rather than to the art.

Therefore, from what has been said, some things must already be present, while others the legislator must provide. Hence we pray to obtain^{1332a30} in the city's formation those things over which chance is sovereign (for we assume that it is sovereign over them); but for the city to be good is no longer the work of chance, but of knowledge and deliberate choice. Yet a city is good through the goodness of the citizens who share in its constitution; and in our city all the citizens³⁵ share in the constitution. We must therefore examine how a man becomes good. For even if it is possible for all the citizens collectively to be good without each citizen being so, the latter is preferable; for the goodness of all follows from that of each. Now people become good and virtuous through three things. These three⁴⁰ are nature, habit, and reason. For first one must be born, for example, a human being and not some other animal; and then with a certain character of body and soul. But with some qualities it is of no use^{1332b1} to be born with them;

for habits cause change. Some qualities are by nature capable of going either way, and are turned by habits toward worse or better. The other animals live chiefly by nature, though some are also influenced to a small extent by habits; but a human being lives^{1332b5} also by reason, for he alone has reason. Therefore these things must be in harmony with one another. For people do many things contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason, if they are persuaded that some other course is better. We have already determined what sort of nature those whom the legislator is to handle readily must have;¹⁰ the remaining task now belongs to education. For people learn some things by becoming habituated and others by hearing.

Since every political community is constituted of rulers and the ruled, we must consider whether the rulers and the ruled should be different people or the same people throughout^{1332b15} life. For it is clear that education too must follow this division. If, then, one group differed from the others as much as we believe gods and heroes differ from human beings, possessing from the outset great superiority first in body and then in²⁰ soul, so that the superiority of the rulers was unquestionable and evident to the ruled, clearly it would be better for the same people always to rule and the others to be ruled, once and for all. But since this is not easy to find, and the kings do not differ so greatly as Scylax says they do among the Indians²⁵ from the ruled, it is evident that, for many reasons, everyone must share equally in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality consists in the same treatment of similar people, and it is difficult for a constitution established contrary to justice to endure. For standing with the ruled in revolution are³⁰ all those throughout the territory who wish for it, and for the citizen body to be so numerous as to be stronger than all these is one of the impossibilities. Yet it is beyond dispute that the rulers must differ from the ruled. How this is to come about and how they are to share must be considered by³⁵ the legislator. We have spoken of this before. For nature has provided the division by making what is the same in kind partly younger and partly older; of these, it is fitting for the former to be ruled and the latter to rule. No one

resents being ruled on account of his age, or thinks himself superior, especially⁴⁰ when he is going to receive this contribution in return once he reaches the appropriate age.

In one sense, therefore, we must say that the same people rule and are ruled, and in another sense different people.

Consequently their^{1333a1} education too must in one sense be the same and in another different. For they say that anyone who is going to rule well must first have been ruled. (As we said in our first discussions, one kind of rule is for the sake of the ruler and another for the sake of the ruled.⁵ Of these, we say that one is a master's rule and the other the rule of free people. Some of the tasks commanded differ not in the work itself, but in the person for whose sake it is done. Therefore it is noble for the young among free people to perform many of the tasks that seem to be menial; for with regard to being noble or not noble, actions differ not so much¹⁰ in themselves as in their end and that for whose sake they are done.) Since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same person must first become one of the ruled and later a ruler, the legislator's concern should be how good men¹⁵ come to be, through what practices, and what the end of the best life is.

The soul is divided into two parts, one of which has reason in itself, while the other does not have reason in itself but can obey reason. We say that their virtues are those by which a man is called good in some sense. In which of these^{1333a20} the end chiefly lies is not obscure for those who divide them as we say. For the worse always exists for the sake of the better, and this is equally evident in things made by art and in things constituted by nature; and the part that has reason is better. It is itself divided in two, in the way we customarily divide it:²⁵ one kind of reason is practical, the other contemplative. Clearly, then, this part too must be divided accordingly. We shall also say that the actions stand in a corresponding relation, and that the actions of the part better by nature should be preferable for those capable of attaining either all of them or both kinds; for what is always most desirable for each person is³⁰ the highest thing he can attain. The whole of life is also divided into work and leisure, war and peace, and actions into those directed toward what is necessary and useful and those

directed toward what is noble. In these matters the same choice must be made as with the parts of the soul and the actions³⁵ of those parts: war for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure, and things necessary and useful for the sake of things noble. Therefore the statesman must legislate with all these things in view, both the parts of the soul and their actions, but more especially the better things and the ends. In the⁴⁰ same way he must consider ways of life and choices of activities; for one must be able to work and to wage war,

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^{1333b1}but rather live in peace and enjoy leisure; and they must do what is necessary and useful, but still more what is noble. Therefore toward these ends we must educate both those who are still children and people of every other age that needs⁵ education.

Yet those Greeks who now seem to have the best constitutions, and the legislators who established these constitutions, appear neither to have ordered their constitutional arrangements toward the best end nor to have directed their laws and education toward all the virtues. Instead, they have crudely inclined ^{1333b10} toward the virtues that seem useful and better suited to gaining an advantage. In much the same way, some later writers have also declared this same opinion. For in praising the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, they admire the legislator's purpose, because he framed all his laws with a view to conquest and war. These claims¹⁵ are easily refuted by argument, and have now been refuted by events. Just as most people covet mastery over many, because it brings an abundant supply of the goods of fortune, so Thibron too evidently admired the legislator of the Laconians, as did each of the other²⁰ writers on their constitution, because their training to face dangers enabled them to rule over many. Yet it is clear that, since the Laconians no longer possess their empire, they are not happy, nor is their legislator good. And this is absurd, if, while they abide by his laws and nothing prevents²⁵ their use of them, they have lost the ability to live nobly. Nor do they understand correctly the kind of

rule that a legislator ought evidently to honor. For rule over free people is nobler than rule as a master, and more in keeping with virtue. Moreover, we must not on this account consider a city happy³⁰ and praise its legislator, because he trained it to conquer so as to rule its neighbors. Such things bring great harm. For clearly any citizen capable of this must also try to pursue it, so that he may rule his own city. This is precisely the charge the Laconians bring against King Pausanias, although³⁵ he held so great an honor.

None of these arguments or laws, then, is suited to a city, or beneficial, or true. For the same things are best both for individuals and for the community, and the legislator must implant them in people's souls. Nor should they practice training in warfare for the purpose of enslaving^{1333b40} those who do not deserve it, but first so that they themselves may not be enslaved to others, and next so that they may seek leadership for the^{1334a1} benefit of the ruled,

and not mastery over everyone; and third, to exercise mastery over those who deserve to be slaves. That the legislator should take greater care to arrange his laws concerning warfare, as well as his other legislation, with leisure^{1334a5} and peace as their purpose is an argument to which events bear witness. For most cities of this kind survive while they are at war, but perish when they have gained an empire. They lose their temper, like iron, when they live in peace. The legislator is responsible, because he did not educate them to be capable of leisure.

^{1334a10} Since the end appears to be the same for people collectively and individually, and the same standard must apply to the best man and the best constitution, it is evident that the virtues directed toward leisure must be present. For the end,¹⁵ as has often been said, is peace for war, and leisure for occupation. Among the virtues useful for leisure and the conduct of life are both those whose activity belongs to leisure and those whose activity belongs to occupation. For many necessities must be available if leisure is to be possible. Therefore the city ought to be temperate,²⁰ courageous, and enduring. For, as the proverb says, there is no leisure for slaves, and those unable to face danger courageously are slaves to their attackers. Courage and endurance, then, are needed for occupation, philosophy for leisure, and temperance and justice at

both times,²⁵ but more especially when people live in peace and enjoy leisure. For war compels them to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in peace make them more insolent. Much justice and much temperance, then, are needed by those who seem to fare best³⁰ and who enjoy everything accounted blessed—as would any who dwell, as the poets say, in the Isles of the Blessed. For these people will most need philosophy, temperance, and justice, the more they enjoy leisure amid an abundance of such goods. It is therefore evident why a city that is to be happy³⁵ and good must share in these virtues. For if it is shameful to be unable to use good things, it is still more shameful to be unable to use them in leisure: to appear good when occupied and at war, but slavish when living in peace and at leisure.⁴⁰ Therefore virtue must not be cultivated as the city of the Lacedaemonians cultivates it.

For they differ from others not in this respect,^{1334b1} that they do not regard the same things as the greatest goods, but in the fact that these are attained more through a certain virtue. But since these are greater goods, and the enjoyment of them greater than that of the virtues [...]. [...] and that it is for its own sake, is evident⁵ from these considerations. How, and by what means, it will be attained is what we must now examine.

We have already distinguished the need for nature, habit, and reason. Of these, what sort of people they must be by nature has been determined earlier; it remains to examine whether they should first be educated through reason or through habits. For these must^{1334b10} accord with one another in the best possible harmony. Reason may miss the best starting point, and habits may likewise have led one astray. First, then, this much is evident, as in other matters: coming to be proceeds from a starting point, and the end proceeds from a starting point that is itself another end.¹⁵ Reason and intellect are the end of our nature, so our coming to be and the cultivation of our habits must be prepared with a view to them. Next, just as soul and body are two, so we see two parts in the soul, the irrational and the part possessing reason; and their dispositions are two in number,²⁰ one being desire and the other intellect. Just as the body is prior to the soul in coming to be, so the irrational part is prior to the part pos-

sessing reason. This too is evident. For spirit and wish, and also appetite, are present in children from birth, whereas reasoning and intellect, as they advance²⁵ in age, naturally develop. Therefore care for the body must necessarily come before care for the soul, and care for desire must come next; yet care for desire must be for the sake of intellect, and care for the body for the sake of the soul.

If, then, the legislator must see from the beginning that^{1334b30} the bodies of those brought up become as good as possible, he must first attend to their union: when, and in what condition, they should enter into marital intercourse with one another. He must legislate for this partnership with an eye both to the partners themselves and to their span of life, so that they reach the decline of their years³⁵ at the same time, and their capacities do not fall out of harmony, with the man still able to beget children but the woman unable, or the woman able but the man unable. For this causes both faction and differences between them. Next he must consider the succession of children. For children must neither be too far behind in⁴⁰ age compared with their fathers, since the benefit from the children is then of no use to the elderly, nor, from the^{1335a1} fathers, assistance to the children,

nor be too close to them in age. For this brings many difficulties: such children have less reverence, as though they were of the same age, and closeness in age leads to complaints concerning household management. Further, there is the matter from which we began and came^{1335a5} to this discussion: how the bodies of those born may conform to the legislator's intention.

Almost all these things are secured by attention to one point. For since the limit of procreation is fixed, generally speaking, at seventy years at the latest for men, and fifty^{1335a10} for women, the beginning of their union, in respect of age, must be timed to reach these limits together. The mating of the young is poor for the production of children. For in all animals the offspring of the young are imperfect, more often female, and small in form; hence the same must necessarily occur¹⁵ among human beings. Here is evidence: in all cities where it is customary to pair young men and young women, their offspring are imperfect and small in body. Moreover, young women suffer more in childbirth, and more of

them die. For this reason, some say that the oracle was given on such an account²⁰ to the Troezenians, because many women were dying through marrying too young, and not with reference to the gathering of the harvest. It is also advantageous for temperance to give women in marriage when they are older, since those who have sexual intercourse when young are thought to be more intemperate. The bodies of males too²⁵ seem to be injured in their growth if they have intercourse while their seed is still increasing. For this too has a definite period, beyond which its increase does not continue, or only a little. Therefore it is fitting to unite women in marriage at about eighteen years of age, and men at thirty-seven or a little earlier.³⁰ For at these ages their union will take place while their bodies are in their prime, and will arrive at the cessation of child-bearing at a suitable time for both. Moreover, the children's succession will come as they begin their prime, if birth follows at once as may reasonably be expected, while the parents' age will already have declined³⁵ toward the number of seventy years.

We have spoken, then, about when their union should take place. As for the season of the year, they should follow the times most people use: even now they rightly determine to begin this life together in winter. The partners themselves should also attend, with a view to producing children, both to^{1335a40} what physicians say and to what students of nature say. For physicians give sufficient advice about the right bodily conditions,

^{1335b1}and students of nature about the winds, favoring northerly over southerly winds. What bodily conditions in the parents would most benefit their offspring must be discussed more carefully in our treatment of the supervision of children;⁵ but it is enough even now to give an outline. For neither the condition of athletes is useful for civic fitness, or for health and the production of children, nor a pampered condition or one excessively worn by toil, but the condition between these. Their condition, then, must be trained, but trained by exertions that are not violent, nor directed toward only one¹⁰ activity, as is the condition of athletes, but toward the activities of free people. These things must hold alike for men and women.

Pregnant women must also care for their bodies, neither remaining inactive nor taking insufficient food. The legislator can readily bring this about by prescribing each^{1335b15} day a walk to worship the gods who have been allotted the honor of presiding over birth. But their minds, unlike their bodies, should pass the time more gently. For offspring evidently draw upon the woman carrying them, just as plants draw upon the earth. As for the exposure and²⁰ rearing of offspring, let there be a law that no deformed child is to be reared; but if the established customs forbid the exposure of any offspring because of their number, a limit must be set to the number of children. If some couples conceive beyond this limit, before sensation and life arise,²⁵ an abortion must be procured. For sensation and life will determine what is holy and what is not. Since the initial age has been determined for a man and a woman, at which they should begin their union, let the length of time for which they should perform this service of producing children also be determined. For older parents'³⁰ offspring, like those of younger parents, are imperfect in both body and mind, while those of the aged are weak. Therefore the limit should accord with the prime of the mind. In most people this occurs at the age mentioned by some of the poets who measure age in periods of seven years, around fifty³⁵ years. Thus, when a man exceeds this age by four or five years, he should be released from producing children for the community; for the rest of his life, intercourse should evidently be for health or some other such reason. As for intercourse with another woman or another man, let it simply be regarded as ignoble⁴⁰ for anyone to be found engaging in it in any way whatever, when he is and is called a husband.

During the period of producing children,^{1336a1} if anyone is found doing such a thing, let him be punished by a loss of honor appropriate to the offense.

Once children are born, we must consider that nourishment makes a great difference to the strength of their bodies, depending on what kind^{1336a5} it may be. An examination both of other animals and of peoples who take care to develop a warlike condition shows that nourishment rich in milk is most suited to their bodies, and that it should contain less wine because of diseases. Moreover, as much movement as is possible at this age is beneficial.¹⁰ To pre-

vent their limbs from becoming distorted through their softness, some peoples even now use certain mechanical devices that keep the bodies of such children straight. It is also beneficial to accustom them to cold from early childhood. For both health and military¹⁵ activities, this is most useful. Hence among many non-Greek peoples there is a custom: some immerse newborn children in a cold river, while others clothe them in little covering, as the Celts do. For in everything to which they can be accustomed, it is better to accustom them from the beginning, but to do so gradually.²⁰ Children's bodily condition, through its warmth, is naturally well suited to training in enduring cold.

For their earliest age, then, it is beneficial to provide care of this kind and similar care. In the age following this, up to five years, when it is not yet fitting to introduce any learning^{1336a25} or compulsory exertions, lest they hinder growth, children must receive enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity. This should be provided both through other activities and through play. Their games must be neither unworthy of free people, nor exhausting, nor lax.³⁰ The rulers called supervisors of children should also attend to the kinds of stories and tales that children of this age ought to hear. For all such things must prepare the way for their later pursuits. Hence most games should be imitations of the things they will later do in earnest. As for the straining³⁵ of children and their crying, those who forbid them in their laws are wrong to prohibit them, for they contribute to growth. In a way they exercise the body: holding the breath produces strength in those exerting themselves, and this also happens in children when they strain.

Inspection is required: ^{1336a40} the supervisors of children must examine how they pass their time, in other respects and also to ensure that they spend as little time as possible with slaves. For at this age,

^{1336b1} and up to seven years, they must be brought up at home. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, even at this age, they will acquire what is unworthy of free people from what they hear and see. In general, then, foul speech from the city, as much as anything else, must be⁵ banished by the legislator, for speaking readily of anything shameful brings doing it close at hand. Above all, it must be kept from the young, so that they neither say nor hear anything of

the kind. If anyone is found saying or doing any of the forbidden things, a free person who is not yet deemed worthy to recline¹⁰ at the common messes should be punished by dishonor and blows; but one older than this age should be punished with forms of dishonor suited to slaves, for his slavish conduct. Since we banish speaking of such things, it is clear that we also banish viewing indecent pictures or hearing indecent stories. Care should therefore be taken by the¹⁵ rulers that no statue or picture represents such acts, except in the precincts of certain gods to whom the law also assigns ribaldry. To these the law permits people whose age is sufficiently advanced to honor the gods on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives.²⁰ But younger people should not be allowed to attend performances of iambic verse or comedy before they reach the age at which they may also take part in reclining at meals and in intoxication, and their education will make them altogether immune to the harm arising from such things.

For now we have treated this subject in passing.^{1336b25} Later we must consider it carefully and determine it more fully, first examining whether these things should be permitted or not, and how they should be permitted. For the present we have mentioned it as necessary. Perhaps Theodorus, the tragic actor, spoke well on this point. For he never allowed anyone to appear before him, not even³⁰ one of the lesser actors, on the ground that audiences grow attached to what they first hear. The same thing happens in our relations both with people and with things: we always cherish the first more. Hence we must make everything base unfamiliar to the young, especially whatever³⁵ contains depravity or ill will. Once the five years have passed, during the two years up to seven they should already observe the studies they will have to learn themselves. There are two ages into which education must necessarily be divided: the period from seven to puberty, and then the period from⁴⁰ puberty to twenty-one years. For those who divide ages into periods of seven years speak, for the most part, not^{1337a1} without reason,

but we must follow nature's divisions. For every art and education seeks to fill out what nature leaves lacking. First, then, we must examine whether some system should be established for children; next, whether a common arrange-

ment is advantageous^{1337a5} for their care, or an individual one, as happens now in most cities; and third, what this care ought to be.

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^{1337a11} No one would dispute, then, that the legislator must concern himself above all with the education of the young. For where this does not happen in cities, it harms their constitutions. People must be educated to suit each constitution, since the character¹⁵ proper to each constitution both habitually preserves it and establishes it in the first place: democratic character a democracy, for example, and oligarchic character an oligarchy. A better character is always the cause of a better constitution. Moreover, for all capacities and arts there are things that must be learned beforehand²⁰ and habits that must be formed beforehand for the work of each; so clearly this also holds for the activities of virtue. Since the whole city has one end, it is evident that education must also be one and the same for all, and that care for it must be common, not private, as it is now,²⁵ when each person cares privately for his own children and teaches them whatever private course of study he thinks fit. Training in common concerns must also be common. At the same time, we should not think that any citizen belongs to himself, but that all belong to the city, for each is a part of the city. Care³⁰ for each part naturally looks to care for the whole. In this respect one might praise the Lacedaemonians: they devote the greatest attention to children, and do so in common.

It is evident, then, that laws must be laid down concerning education, and that it must be made common. But what education is to be, and how^{1337a35} people should be educated, must not escape our attention. For at present the

tasks are disputed. Not everyone supposes that the young should learn the same things, either for virtue or for the best life; nor is it evident whether education should be directed more toward the intellect or toward the soul's character. From the current⁴⁰ education the inquiry grows confused, and it is not at all clear whether we should cultivate what is useful for life, what tends toward virtue, or the more refined accomplishments. For all these have found advocates^{1337b1} of one sort or another.

Nor is there any agreement about what leads to virtue. For not everyone honors the same virtue to begin with, so it is reasonable that they also differ about its cultivation. That the necessary among useful things should be taught^{1337b5} is not unclear; but that not all should be taught is evident from the distinction between activities worthy of free people and those unworthy of them. It is also evident that we should share in those useful things that will not make the participant vulgar. We must consider vulgar any work, art, or study that, for the exercise and¹⁰ activities of virtue, renders the body, soul, or intellect of free people useless. Hence we call vulgar both those arts that cause the body to be in a worse condition and those occupations performed for wages, for they leave the intellect without leisure and debase it.¹⁵ Even among the liberal sciences, it is not unworthy of a free person to engage in some up to a point; but excessive application to precision is liable to the harms just mentioned. The purpose for which one acts or learns also makes a great difference. For doing something for oneself, for friends, or for virtue is not unworthy of a free person,²⁰ whereas doing this same thing for others might often be thought the work of a hired laborer or a slave.

The studies now established, as was said earlier, are of an ambiguous character. There are roughly four things that people customarily teach:

letters, physical training, music, and,^{1337b25} as a fourth, in some cases, drawing. Letters and drawing are taught as useful for life and having many uses, and physical training as contributing to courage. But about music one might already raise a difficulty. At present most people engage in it for pleasure; but those who first included it in education³⁰ did so because nature itself seeks, as has often been said, not only to be rightly occupied, but also to be capable of

enjoying leisure nobly. This is the one principle of everything; let us speak of it again. If both are needed, but leisure is more worthy of choice than occupation and is its end, we must inquire³⁵ what we should do when enjoying leisure. Surely we should not play, for then play would necessarily be the end of our life. But if this is impossible, and play should rather be used amid our occupations—for the person who toils needs rest, and play is for the sake of rest, while occupation involves⁴⁰ toil and strain—we must therefore introduce play, watching for the right time to use it, as though administering a remedy. For such movement of the soul is a release,^{1338a1} and, through its pleasure, a rest.

Leisure itself seems to contain pleasure, happiness, and blessed living. This belongs not to those who are occupied but to those who enjoy leisure. For the occupied person is occupied for the sake of some^{1338a5} end that he does not yet possess; but happiness is an end, and everyone thinks it involves not pain but pleasure. Yet they no longer take this pleasure to be the same: each determines it according to himself and his own disposition, while the best person takes it to be the best pleasure, arising from the noblest things. It is therefore evident that¹⁰ some things must also be learned, and education given, for the leisure in which we conduct our lives. These branches of education and study must be for their own sake, whereas those directed toward occupation are necessary and for the sake of other things. Hence our predecessors included music in education not as something necessary¹⁵ —for it has nothing of this kind—nor as something useful, as letters are for earning money, household management, learning, and many activities of public life, while drawing also seems useful for judging the work of craftsmen better. Nor, again, is it like physical training, which contributes to²⁰ health and strength, for we see neither of these resulting from music. It remains, then, that music serves the conduct of life in leisure, and this is evidently the purpose for which they introduce it. For they assign it a place in what they consider the way of life of free people. Hence Homer wrote as follows:²⁵ “But he alone should be called to the abundant feast,” and, after speaking beforehand of certain others, “who call the singer,” he says, “who may

delight them all.” Elsewhere, too, Odysseus says that this is the best way to pass the time, when people are rejoicing and “the diners throughout the hall listen to the singer, sitting in order.” (Hom. Od. 9.5)

^{1338a30} It is evident, then, that there is a kind of education in which sons must be educated not as useful or necessary, but as worthy of free people and noble. Whether it is one in number or several, and what these kinds are and how they are taught, must be discussed later. For now we have made this much³⁵ progress: we have some testimony from the ancients too, in the established subjects of education, for music makes this clear. Moreover, children must also be educated in some useful things not only because they are useful—for example, the study of letters—but also because many⁴⁰ other studies can arise through them. Likewise, drawing is to be learned not so that they may avoid mistakes in their own purchases and remain undeceived in the^{1338b1} buying and selling of furnishings,

but rather because it makes them observant of bodily beauty. To seek the useful everywhere is least fitting for the great-souled and for free people. Since it is evident that through habits before reason^{1338b5} we must be educated, and in the body before the intellect, it is clear from this that children must be entrusted to physical training and bodily instruction. For the former gives the body a certain condition, and the latter teaches its activities.

At present, among the cities thought most attentive^{1338b10} to children, some produce an athletic condition, damaging the form and growth of their bodies; while the Laconians have not made this mistake, but make their children beast-like through exertions, supposing that this contributes most to courage. Yet, as has often been said, neither¹⁵ one virtue alone nor chiefly this virtue should be the aim in providing care. Even if it were directed toward this, they do not achieve it. For neither among other animals nor among peoples do we see courage accompanying the most savage, but rather the gentler and lionlike characters. There are many²⁰ peoples readily inclined to killing and cannibalism, such as the Achaeans and Heniochi around the Black Sea, and other peoples inland, some resembling these and others surpassing them, who are predatory but have no share in courage. Moreover, we know that the Laconians them-

selves,²⁵ so long as they alone devoted themselves to arduous training, surpassed the rest, but now fall behind others both in athletic contests and in warfare. For they differed not by training their young in this way, but only by training in competition with people who did not train. Therefore the noble, not the beastlike,³⁰ must take the leading role. For neither a wolf nor any other beast would face any noble danger, but rather a good man would. Those who turn children too far toward these things, and leave them uneducated even in necessities, in truth make them vulgar, rendering them useful for only one task³⁵ of civic life, and even at this task worse than others, as the argument shows. We must judge not from their earlier achievements but from their present ones. For now they have rivals in education, whereas formerly they did not.

It is agreed, then, that physical training should be used, and how it should be used^{1338b40}—for up to puberty lighter exercises should be applied, excluding the forced diet and compulsory exertions, so that there may be no hindrance to growth.

For it is no^{1339a1} small indication that these can have this effect that among Olympic victors one would find only two or three who have won both as men and as boys. For those who train when young are robbed of their strength by compulsory exercises. But when, after⁵ puberty, they have spent three years on the other studies, it is then fitting to devote the following age both to exertions and to forced feeding. For we must not make both intellect and body labor intensely at the same time. Each kind of labor naturally produces a contrary effect: labor of the¹⁰ body hinders the intellect, and labor of the intellect hinders the body.

We have already raised some difficulties about music in our discussion, but it is well now to take them up again and carry them further, so that they may serve as a prelude to the arguments one might offer in declaring a judgment about it. For it is not easy to distinguish what^{1339a15} power it has, nor for what purpose we should engage in it. Is it for play and rest, like sleep and intoxication? For these are not in themselves among serious things, but are pleasant and, as Euripides says, give rest from care. Hence people also place music in this class and²⁰ use all these alike—sleep, intoxication, and music—and they also

include dancing among them. Or should we rather think that music tends in some degree toward virtue, since, just as physical training gives the body a certain condition, music can give character a certain quality, habituating people to be capable of taking pleasure²⁵ rightly? Or does it contribute something to the conduct of life and to practical wisdom? For this must be counted as the third of the possibilities mentioned. That the young should not be educated for the sake of play is not unclear, for they are not playing when they learn: learning involves pain. Nor, indeed, is it fitting to assign the conduct of life to children³⁰ and people of such ages, for an end belongs to nothing incomplete. But perhaps children's serious study might be thought to be for the sake of play when they have become men and reached maturity. Yet if this is so, why should they learn themselves, rather than, like the kings of the Persians and³⁵ Medes, share in the pleasure and the learning through others who perform it? For those who have made this their work and art must perform better than those who devote to it only the time needed for learning. If they must labor at such things themselves, then they would also have to prepare⁴⁰ the dishes for their meals themselves; but that is absurd. The same difficulty arises if music can improve character. For why should they learn these things themselves,

rather than,^{1339b1} by listening to others, take pleasure rightly and be able to judge, like the Laconians? For although they do not learn, they can nevertheless judge correctly, as they say, which melodies are good and which are not. The same argument also holds if music should be used for enjoyment⁵ and a way of life worthy of free people. Why should they learn themselves, rather than enjoy it when others perform? We may also consider the belief we hold about the gods. For in the poets Zeus himself does not sing and play the lyre. Indeed, we call such performers vulgar, and consider performing unworthy¹⁰ of a man unless he is drunk or playing.

But perhaps these matters should be examined later. Our first inquiry is whether music should or should not be included in education, and which of the three things whose difficulties we have discussed it can provide: education, play, or the conduct of life. It is reasonably assigned to all, and^{1339b15} evidently shares in them. For play is for the sake of rest, and rest must be pleasant, since it

is a kind of remedy for the pain caused by toil. And it is agreed that the conduct of life must contain not only the noble but also pleasure, for happiness consists of both these.²⁰ We all say that music is among the most pleasant things, both instrumental music alone and music with song. Indeed, Musaeus says that singing is the sweetest thing for mortals; hence people reasonably introduce music into their gatherings and pastimes as something capable of giving delight. Thus on this ground too one might suppose education²⁵ in it to be necessary for the young. For harmless pleasures are fitting not only for the end but also for rest. Since people attain the end only seldom, but often rest and make use of play, not only for the sake of further activity but also³⁰ for pleasure, it would be useful to take their rest in the pleasures music provides.

Yet people have come to make play their end. For perhaps the end too contains some pleasure, though not a chance pleasure; and in seeking this they accept the one as the other, because, in relation to the end of their activities,^{1339b35} it bears a certain resemblance. For the end is worthy of choice not for the sake of anything to come, and pleasures of this kind are likewise not for the sake of anything to come, but of what has already occurred, such as toil and pain. As for the reason why they seek to attain happiness through these pleasures, one might reasonably suppose this to be⁴⁰ the cause. As for engaging in music, it seems that they do so not only for this reason, but also because it is useful for rest. Nevertheless, we must investigate whether perhaps^{1340a1} this is incidental,

and its nature is more honorable than the use just mentioned. We should not merely share in the common pleasure it provides, which everyone perceives—for music has a certain natural pleasure, and therefore people of every age^{1340a5} and every character love its use—but see whether it also contributes in some way to character and the soul. This would be evident if we acquire certain qualities of character through it. But that we do acquire certain qualities is clear from many other instances, and not least from Olympus's¹⁰ melodies. For these admittedly fill souls with inspired excitement, and such excitement is an

affection of the soul's character. Moreover, when listening to imitations, everyone comes to share in their emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies themselves.

Since music is one of the pleasant things,^{1340a15} and virtue concerns taking pleasure, loving, and hating rightly, clearly nothing must be learned and made habitual so much as judging rightly and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions. In rhythms and melodies there are likenesses, very close to their true natures, of anger²⁰ and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites, and of the other qualities of character. This is evident from experience, for our souls change when we listen to such things. Habituation to feeling pain and pleasure in likenesses comes close to having toward the truth the same²⁵ disposition. For example, if someone delights in looking at a person's image for no other reason than the form itself, then looking at the person himself whose image he sees must also be pleasant to him. Among objects of sense, the others contain no likeness of characters—for example, objects of³⁰ touch and taste—but visible objects contain a little. For there are shapes of this kind, though only to a small degree, and not everyone shares in such perception. Moreover, these are not likenesses of characters, but the shapes and colors that arise are rather signs of characters, and these are manifest³⁵ in the emotions. Nevertheless, to the extent that looking at these things too makes a difference, the young should look not at the works of Pauson but at those of Polygnotus, and of any other painter or sculptor who portrays character. But in melodies themselves there are imitations of characters (and this is evident.⁴⁰ For the nature of the musical modes differs from the outset, so that listeners are affected differently and do not have the same disposition toward each: toward some they become more mournful^{1340b1} and more subdued,

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as with the so-called Mixolydian mode; at others their minds are softened, as with the relaxed modes; at another they are most of all brought into a moderate and settled state, as the Dorian alone among the modes seems to do; into an inspired state,^{1340b5} the Phrygian brings them. For those who have studied this education philosophically speak well on these matters: they draw the evidence for their arguments from the facts themselves.) The same holds also for rhythms. (Some have a more settled character, others a stirring one; and among the latter some have more vulgar¹⁰ movements, others more liberal ones.) From these considerations, then, it is evident that music can impart a certain quality to the character of the soul; and if it can do this, it is clear that the young must be introduced to it and educated in it. Suited to the nature of this age is instruction¹⁵ in music. For the young, because of their age, willingly endure nothing without sweetness, and music is by nature among the things that have sweetness. There also seems to be a certain kinship with modes and rhythms. Hence many of the wise say, some that the soul is a harmony, others that it possesses harmony.

^{1340b20} Whether they should learn by singing and playing themselves or not, as was questioned earlier, must now be discussed. It is certainly not unclear that taking part in the activities oneself makes a great difference to the sort of person one becomes. For it is among the impossible or difficult things for those who have not taken part²⁵ in the activities to become sound judges. At the same

time, children must have some occupation, and Archytas's rattle must be thought a good invention: people give it to little children so that, occupied with it, they will break none of the things in the house; for the young cannot keep still. This, then, is suitable for³⁰ infant children, while education is a rattle for older young people. That music must be taught in such a way that the learners also take part in its activities is evident from considerations of this kind. It is not difficult to distinguish what is appropriate and what inappropriate at each age, or to answer those who say that the pursuit³⁵ is vulgar. For, first, since they must take part in the activities for the sake of judging, they should therefore engage in them while young, but when older leave the activities aside and be able to judge what is noble and enjoy it rightly because of the learning they acquired in youth.⁴⁰ As for the reproach some make, that music makes people vulgar, it is not difficult to answer it by considering how far participation in the activities should go for those whose virtue^{1341a1} is being developed for civic life,

and what kinds of melodies and rhythms they should take part in, and further, on what instruments they should learn; for this too is likely to make a difference. The answer to the reproach lies in these matters: nothing prevents certain forms^{1341a5} of music from producing the result mentioned. It is evident, then, that learning it must neither hinder their later activities nor make the body vulgar and useless for military and civic exercises, for some uses now and for others later.

This would be achieved^{1341a10} in their learning if they labored neither at what is directed toward professional contests nor at the astonishing and elaborate feats that have now entered the contests and, from the contests, education; rather, they should practice even the less elaborate things only until they can enjoy noble melodies and rhythms,¹⁵ and not merely what is common to music, as do some other animals, and also the mass of slaves and children. From this it is clear, too, what instruments should be used. Neither flutes nor any other professional instrument, such as the cithara or any other of that kind, should be introduced into education, but²⁰ only those that will make them good listeners, whether to musical education or to education of another kind. Further, the flute does not express character, but rather excites religious frenzy,

so it should be used on occasions when listening can bring about purification rather than learning. Let us add that flute-playing has another feature contrary to²⁵ education: it prevents the use of speech. Hence earlier generations rightly rejected its use by the young and by free people, although they had used it at first. For, as they gained more leisure through prosperity and became more high-minded in their pursuit of virtue, and both earlier³⁰ and after the Persian Wars were filled with pride by their achievements, they took up every kind of learning, making no distinctions but seeking it out. Hence they also introduced flute-playing among the subjects of learning. Indeed, in Lacedaemon a certain sponsor of a chorus himself played the flute for it, and in Athens it became so customary that roughly the³⁵ majority of free people took part in it. This is evident from the tablet Thrasippus dedicated when he sponsored a chorus for Ecphantides. Later it was rejected through experience of the practice itself, when people could better judge what contributed to virtue and what did not. The same happened with many of the ancient instruments,⁴⁰ such as pectides and barbitoi, and those directed toward giving pleasure to listeners through their players: seven-sided and triangular instruments and^{1341b1} sambucae,

and all that require skilled manual knowledge. The story told by the ancients about flutes is also reasonable. For they say that Athena invented flutes and then threw them away. It is not unreasonable to say that the goddess did this also because^{1341b5} she was displeased by the disfigurement of her face. Nevertheless, it is more likely that she did so because instruction in flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, while we attribute knowledge and art to Athena. Since we reject professional education both in instruments and in performance¹⁰ (by professional we mean education directed toward contests, for in these the performer practices not for the sake of his own virtue but for the pleasure of the listeners, and a vulgar pleasure at that; hence we judge the activity to be not for free people but more suited to hired labor, and indeed the performers become vulgar, for it is a bad¹⁵ aim that they make their end: the spectator, being vulgar, habitually alters the music, so that he gives a certain character both to the professionals themselves who practice for him and to their bodies, through their movements),

we must now consider the modes and rhythms,^{1341b20} and whether all modes and all rhythms should be used for education, or distinctions should be made; then, whether we shall lay down the same distinction for those who labor at music for education, or whether some other, third distinction is needed. Since we see that music consists of melody-making and rhythms, we must not fail to understand, in the case of each,²⁵ what power it has for education, and whether music with good melody should be preferred to music with good rhythm. Believing, then, that both some present-day musicians and those philosophers who have experience of musical education say many sound things on these matters, we shall leave³⁰ precise examination of each detail to those who wish to seek it from them; for now let us make distinctions in the manner of a lawgiver, stating only the outlines of these matters.

Since we accept the division of melodies made by some philosophers, who distinguish those that express character, those that prompt action, and those that inspire ecstasy,^{1341b35} and assign to each of these the kind of mode naturally suited to it, a different one to each division; and since we say that music should be used not for one benefit alone but for several (for education and for purification—what we mean by purification we state simply for now, but in our discussion of⁴⁰ poetry we shall speak of it again more clearly—and third, for the occupation of leisure, for relaxation and for rest from exertion),

^{1342a1} it is evident that all modes should be used, but not all in the same way: for education those that most express character, but for listening to others perform, those that prompt action and those that inspire ecstasy as well. For the⁵ feeling that affects certain souls strongly is present in all, though it differs in being weaker or stronger: pity and fear, for example, and also ecstasy. Indeed, some people are possessed by this disturbance; yet we see from sacred melodies that, when they use the frenzied¹⁰ melodies that excite the soul, they become settled, as though they had received healing and purification. This same experience must also come to those prone to pity and fear, and to the emotional in general, and to others insofar as each has a share in such feelings; all must undergo a certain purification and be relieved¹⁵ with pleasure. Likewise, melodies that prompt action also afford people harmless joy. Hence competi-

tors who practice theatrical music should be allowed to use such modes and such melodies. Since spectators are of two kinds, one free and educated, the other²⁰ vulgar, consisting of artisans, hired laborers, and others of that sort, contests and spectacles must also be provided for these people for their rest. Just as their souls are distorted from their natural condition, so there are deviations among the modes, and among melodies those that are strained and over-colored.²⁵ What is naturally congenial gives pleasure to each; hence performers competing before this sort of spectator must be allowed to use some such kind of music. For education, however, as has been said, we should use melodies that express character and modes of that kind. Such³⁰ is the Dorian, as we said earlier; but we must also accept any other that those who share in philosophical study and musical education approve for us. Socrates in the Republic is wrong to retain the Phrygian alone along with the Dorian, especially when he has rejected^{1342b1} the flute among the instruments.

For the Phrygian has the same power among modes as the flute among instruments: both excite religious frenzy and emotion. Poetry makes this clear. For every form of Bacchic frenzy and every such disturbance^{1342b5} is expressed most of all, among instruments, by flutes; and among modes, these find their appropriate expression in Phrygian melodies. Poetry makes this clear: the dithyramb, for instance, is generally agreed to be Phrygian. Those versed in this subject give many examples of it, including the fact that Philoxenus tried, in¹⁰ the Dorian mode, to compose his dithyramb, the Mysians, but could not: the nature of the composition itself drove him back into the Phrygian, the appropriate mode. About the Dorian all agree that it is the most settled and has above all a courageous character. Further, since we praise the mean between extremes¹⁵ and say that it should be pursued, and the Dorian has this nature in relation to the other modes, it is evident that Dorian melodies are more appropriate for the education of the young.

There are two aims: what is possible and what is appropriate. For each group should practice especially what is possible and what is appropriate for them.^{1342b20} These too are determined by age. For example, those worn out by time cannot easily sing the strained modes; rather, nature suggests the relaxed

modes to people of that age. Hence some musicians rightly reproach Socrates on this point too, because he rejected the relaxed modes²⁵ for amusement, taking them to be intoxicating—not in the sense of the power of intoxication, for intoxication produces rather a Bacchic frenzy, but in the sense of being enfeebled. Therefore, with a view also to the age that will come, that of older people, one must engage with modes and melodies of this kind; and further,³⁰ with any mode that is appropriate to the age of children because it can possess both orderliness and educational value, as the Lydian seems to do most of all among the modes. It is clear, then, that these three limits must be set for education: the mean, the possible, and the appropriate.