



Toward Perpetual Peace

IMMANUEL KANT

Plain English Translation

MOUSEIA



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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

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Title and preface



Toward Perpetual Peace

A philosophical outline by Immanuel Kant.

New expanded edition.

Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius. 1796.

Toward Perpetual Peace

A Dutch innkeeper put this satirical heading on a sign painted with a graveyard. Who was it aimed at? *Human beings* in general? Heads of state in particular, who can never get enough of war? Or perhaps just the philosophers who dream that sweet dream? We can leave that question open. But the author of this work makes one condition. The practical politician treats the theoretical politician with smug contempt, as an armchair scholar. He thinks the scholar's empty ideas pose no danger to a state, which must base its actions on experience. They can always let him knock down all eleven pins at once without the *worldly-wise* statesman having to pay attention. So if the statesman gets into a dispute with him, he must be consistent. He must not sniff out a danger to the state behind the views the theorist has taken a chance on and expressed publicly. With this *safeguard clause*, the author expressly declares, in due form, that he is protected against any malicious interpretation.

Preliminary articles



First section,
containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace between states.

- ¹ “No peace agreement may count as one if it is made with a secret reservation of grounds for a future war.”

That would be only a truce, a delay in the fighting, not *peace*. Peace means the end of all hostilities. Adding the word *perpetual* to it is already a suspicious redundancy. A peace agreement wipes out every existing cause of a future war, even those the parties themselves may not yet know about. It does not matter how cleverly or keenly someone might dig them out of archival documents. A secret reservation (*reservatio mentalis*) about old claims still to be thought up later is another matter. Neither side wants to mention them now, because both are too exhausted to continue the war. But they have the bad intention of using the first favorable opportunity to do so. This belongs to the Jesuits’ moral hair-splitting. Judged on its own merits, it is beneath the dignity of rulers, just as a willingness to supply such arguments is beneath the dignity of their ministers. But suppose that, according to enlightened ideas of statecraft, a state’s true honor lies in constantly increasing its power, whatever the means. Then that judgment will of course look academic and pedantic.

- ² “No independent state, large or small—it makes no difference here—may be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.”

A state is not property (*patrimonium*), as the land on which it stands might be. It is a society of human beings that no one but itself has the right to command or control. It is a tree trunk with roots of its own. To graft it onto another state as a shoot is to end its existence as a moral person and turn that person into a thing. This contradicts the idea of the original contract. Without that idea, no right to rule over a people is conceivable¹. Everyone knows the danger that this assumed way of acquiring states has brought on Europe, even in the most recent times. The other parts of the world have never known it. It is the idea that states, too, can marry each other. Family alliances become a new kind of business: a way to gain overwhelming power without expending any strength, and also a way to extend territorial possessions. Hiring out one state's troops to another against an enemy they do not share also belongs here. Subjects are used and used up as things to be handled at will.

³ “Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) must eventually cease altogether.”

Standing armies constantly threaten other states with war by always appearing ready for it. They provoke these states to outdo one another in the number of armed men, a competition with no limit. The costs eventually make peace even more burdensome than a short war. So standing armies themselves cause wars of aggression, undertaken to get rid of that burden. There is another consideration. Being paid to kill or be killed seems to involve using human beings as mere machines and tools in someone else's hands—the state's. That is hard to reconcile with the rights we have as human beings. It is quite different when citizens voluntarily take part in regular weapons training to protect themselves and their country against attacks from outside. The same would happen with accumulating a treasury: other states would see it as a threat of war and be driven to launch preventive attacks. Of the three powers, *military power*, *alliance power*, and *financial power*, the last might well be the most reliable tool of war, if its size were not so difficult to discover.

⁴ “No state debts may be incurred for dealings with other states.”

There is nothing suspect about this resource when a state seeks help, at home or abroad, for its domestic economy: improving roads, establishing new settlements, providing stores against feared crop failures, and similar needs. But it is different when powers use a credit system as a machine against one another. The debts grow without any foreseeable limit, yet payment of current claims is always secure, since not all creditors will demand payment at once. This ingenious invention of a trading people in this century is a dangerous financial power. It is a war chest greater than the treasuries of all other states put together. Only the eventual loss of tax revenues can exhaust it. Even that can be delayed for a long time by stimulating commerce, with its effects in turn on industry and earnings. This makes war easy. Combined with rulers' inclination toward war, which seems ingrained in human nature, it is a major obstacle to perpetual peace. Prohibiting it must therefore be a preliminary article of that peace. There is all the more reason for this because the state's ultimately unavoidable bankruptcy must entangle many other states in losses through no fault of their own. That would be a public violation of their rights. So at least other states have the right to form an alliance against such a state and its pretensions.

- 5 “No state may use force to interfere in another state’s constitution and government.”

What could give it that right? Perhaps the bad example a state sets for another state’s subjects? Instead, a state can serve as a warning through the example of the great evils a people has brought on itself by its lawlessness. In general, the bad example one free person sets for another (*an offense taken*) does not violate the other’s rights. There is a case that would not count as such interference. Internal conflict might split a state into two parts, each presenting itself as a separate state and claiming the whole. An outside state could then assist one of them without being charged with interfering in the other’s constitution, since there would then be anarchy. But as long as this internal struggle has not been

decided, interference by outside powers would violate the rights of an independent people struggling only with its own internal sickness. That interference would itself set a bad example and put every state's self-rule at risk.

- ⁶ “No state at war with another may allow itself acts of hostility that must make mutual trust impossible in a future peace. These include employing *assassins* (*percussores*) or *poisoners* (*venefici*), *breaking a surrender agreement*, *inciting treason* (*perduellio*) in the state it is fighting, and the like.”

These are dishonorable tactics. Even in the middle of a war, some trust in the enemy's way of thinking must remain. Otherwise no peace could be agreed on, and the hostility would turn into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*). War is only the sad last resort in a state of nature, where there is no court able to give a binding judgment. It is a way to assert one's rights by force. Neither side can be declared an unjust enemy, since that would already require a judge's ruling. Instead, the *outcome* decides which side is in the right, as in a so-called trial by ordeal. Nor can there be a war of punishment (*bellum punitivum*) between states, since neither is a superior and the other its subordinate. It follows that a war of extermination could destroy both sides and, with them, all right. It would bring perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war, and therefore the use of means that lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. The means just mentioned inevitably lead there. Those hellish practices are base in themselves. Once they come into use, they do not stay within the limits of war for long, as the use of spies (*uti exploratoribus*) does, which only exploits the dishonorable conduct of *others*—something that cannot be eradicated. Instead they spread into peacetime as well and completely defeat its purpose.

All the laws listed above are objectively, that is, in the intention of those in power, *prohibitory laws* (*leges prohibitivae*). But some are *strict* laws, valid regardless of circumstances (*leges strictae*). They insist on doing away with the prohibited practice *immediately*, as in Articles 1, 5, and 6. Others, such as Articles 2, 3, and 4, give those concerned more latitude *subjectively*, depending on circumstances (*leges latae*). This does not make them exceptions to the rule

of right. It concerns only the rule's *application*. They permit *postponing* its implementation without losing sight of the goal. That goal allows a delay, for example, in *restoring* the freedom that certain states have been deprived of, as described in Article 2. But it does not allow that restoration to be put off forever—as Augustus used to promise, *ad calendas graecas* (a date that never comes)—and so never carried out. It allows a delay only to avoid acting too hastily and defeating the purpose itself. The prohibition here concerns only the *way of acquiring* a state, which must no longer be accepted. It does not concern the *existing possession*. That possession lacks the required legal title. But at the time of its supposed acquisition, all states considered it lawful according to the public opinion of that time².

- ¹ A hereditary kingdom is not a state that can be inherited by another state. Rather, its right to govern can be inherited by another individual. The state then acquires a ruler. The ruler, as someone who already possesses another kingdom, does not acquire the state.
- ² There has been good reason to doubt whether pure reason can have *permissive laws* (*leges permissivae*) in addition to commands (*leges praeceptivae*) and prohibitions (*leges prohibitivae*). Laws in general provide a basis for the objective practical necessity of an action. Permission, on the other hand, provides a basis for certain actions being optional in practice. A *permissive law* would therefore require an action that someone cannot be required to perform. This would be a contradiction if the law's object meant the same thing in both respects. But here, in a permissive law, the assumed prohibition concerns only a future way of acquiring a right, for example through inheritance. The exemption from that prohibition, or permission, concerns existing possession. During the transition from the state of nature to a civil society, this possession can continue under a permissive law of natural right. Although unlawful, it is still *possession held in good faith* (*possessio putativa*). Yet in the state of nature, possession based on a supposed right is forbidden once it is recognized as such. A similar way of acquiring it is also forbidden in the later civil society, after the transition has taken place. This right to continued possession would not exist if the supposed

acquisition had occurred within civil society. In that case, the possession would violate someone's rights and would have to end as soon as its unlawfulness was discovered.

I only wanted to draw the attention of teachers of natural right, in passing, to the concept of a *permissive law*. Reason naturally encounters this concept when it divides things up systematically. This is especially relevant because civil, statutory law often uses it, but with a difference. The prohibitory law stands on its own. Permission is not incorporated into that law as a limiting condition, as it should be, but is thrown in among the exceptions. The wording then runs: this or that is forbidden, *unless* number 1, number 2, number 3, continuing without any foreseeable end. Permissions are added to the law only by chance, not according to a principle, but by feeling one's way among the cases that arise. Otherwise the conditions would have had to be included *in the formula of the prohibitory law*. That would have made it a permissive law at the same time. It is therefore regrettable that the ingenious prize question of the equally wise and perceptive *Count von Windischgrätz*, which called for precisely this, was dropped so quickly without being solved. The possibility of such a formula, like a mathematical one, is the only genuine test of legislation that remains consistent. Without it, so-called *legal certainty* will always remain a pious wish. Otherwise we will have only *general* laws, which hold *for the most part*, but no universal laws, which hold *in every case*. Yet the very concept of a law seems to require the latter.

Definitive articles: introduction



Second section,

containing the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.

Peace among people living side by side is not a state of nature (*status naturalis*). The state of nature is instead a state of war. This does not always mean open hostilities, but it does mean a constant threat of them. Peace must therefore be *established*. Simply refraining from hostilities gives no assurance of peace. Unless each neighbor gives the other that assurance—which can happen only under a *legal* order—the one who has asked for it may treat the other as an enemy³.

- ³ People generally assume that I may act with hostility toward someone only if that person has already *harmed* me by an action. This is quite right when both of us live under a *civil legal* order. By entering that order, the other person gives me the necessary assurance through the authority that has power over us both. But a person (or a people) in a mere state of nature deprives me of this assurance. Simply by being beside me in that condition, that person already harms me. This is not harm through an action (*facto*), but through the lawless condition itself (*statu iniusto*, a condition without justice), which keeps me under constant threat. I may force that person either to enter a shared legal order with

me or to leave my neighborhood. The basic requirement underlying all the following articles is therefore this: All people who can affect one another must belong to some civil constitution.

Every legal constitution, in terms of the persons who belong to it, falls into one of these categories:

- 1) A constitution based on the *right of citizens* within one people (*ius ciuitatis*).
- 2) A constitution based on the *right of nations*, governing states in their relations with one another (*ius gentium*).
- 3) A constitution based on the *right of world citizenship*, insofar as people and states stand in external relations that affect one another and are to be regarded as citizens of a universal human state (*ius cosmopoliticum*). This division is not arbitrary. It is necessary for the idea of perpetual peace. If even one of these persons or states could physically affect another while still living in a state of nature, a state of war would follow. Freedom from that state of war is precisely what we are seeking here.

First definitive article



First definitive article for perpetual peace.

The civil constitution of every state must be republican.

A constitution is *republican*⁴ when it is established on these principles: first, the *freedom* of society's members as human beings; second, everyone's *dependence* on a single shared system of legislation as subjects; and third, their *equality as citizens*. This is the only constitution that follows from the idea of the original contract, on which all of a people's rightful legislation must be based. In matters of right, then, it is in itself the original basis of every kind of civil constitution. The only question now is whether it is also the only constitution that can lead to perpetual peace.

The republican constitution has a pure origin: it comes from the pure source of the concept of right. Beyond this, it also offers the prospect of the result we want—perpetual peace. Here is why. If the citizens' agreement is required to decide “whether there should be war or not”—as it must be under this constitution—nothing is more natural than that they will think very carefully before starting such a harmful game. They would be deciding to bring all the hardships of war on themselves. They would have to fight in person, pay the costs of war from their own possessions, and struggle to repair the destruction it leaves behind. To make matters worse, they would finally have to take on a burden of debt themselves. This would spoil even the peace, and could never be paid off, because more wars would always be close at hand. Under a constitution where

the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, deciding on war is the easiest thing in the world. The head of state is not a fellow member of the state but its owner. War does not cost him the slightest loss in his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivities, and the like. He can therefore decide on it for trivial reasons, as if it were a pleasure outing. For the sake of appearances, he can leave its justification to the diplomatic corps, which is always ready for the task, without giving it another thought.

To avoid confusing a republican constitution with a democratic one, as people generally do, we need to make the following distinction. The forms of a state (*ciuitas*) can be classified in two ways. One concerns which persons hold supreme state power. The other concerns the *way the people are governed* by their head of state, whoever that may be. The first is properly called the form of rule (*forma imperii*). Only three forms are possible. Either *one person, some people* joined together, or *everyone* who makes up civil society holds the ruling power. These are *autocracy*, *aristocracy*, and *democracy*: rule by a prince, rule by the nobility, and rule by the people. The second classification is the form of government (*forma regiminis*). It concerns how the state uses its full power on the basis of its constitution—the act of the general will that turns a multitude into a people. In this respect, government is either *republican* or *despotic*. *Republicanism* is the principle that separates the executive power, the government, from the legislative power. Despotism is the principle by which the state carries out, on its own authority, laws that it has made itself. In other words, the ruler handles the public will as his private will. Of the three forms of state, *democracy*, in the strict sense of the word, is necessarily a *despotism*. It establishes an executive power in which everyone decides about one person, and if necessary against that person, who therefore does not agree. Thus everyone decides, yet they are not everyone. This puts the general will in conflict with itself and with freedom.

Any form of government that is not *representative* is really a *misshapen form*. The lawmaker cannot also be the person who carries out that same will. In a logical argument, the general rule in the major premise likewise cannot also be the act of placing a particular case under that rule in the minor premise. The

other two constitutions are always defective insofar as they leave room for a nonrepresentative form of government. Still, they at least allow the possibility of adopting a way of governing that follows the *spirit* of a representative system. For example, Frederick II at least *said* that he was merely the state's highest servant⁵. A democratic constitution, by contrast, makes this impossible, because everyone there wants to be the ruler. So we can say this: The fewer people hold state power—the smaller the number of rulers—and the greater their representation, the closer the constitution comes to making republicanism possible. It can then hope to reach republicanism eventually through gradual reforms. For this reason, reaching this sole fully rightful constitution is harder under aristocracy than under monarchy. Under democracy, it is impossible without violent revolution. But the way of governing⁶ matters incomparably more to the people than the form of state. Even so, much also depends on how well or poorly the form of state suits that goal. If the way of governing is to fit the concept of right, it must include a representative system. Only that system makes republican government possible. Without it, whatever the constitution may be, government is despotic and violent. None of the ancient so-called republics knew this system. As a result, they inevitably had to fall apart into despotism. Of all forms of despotism, the one under a single supreme ruler is still the most bearable.

⁴ *Legal* (and therefore external) *freedom* cannot be defined, as people often define it, as the permission “to do whatever you want, as long as you do no one any wrong.” For what does *permission* mean? The possibility of an action insofar as it does no one any wrong. So the definition would run: “Freedom is the possibility of actions through which you do no one any wrong (whatever you may do), as long as you do no one any wrong.” This is an empty repetition. Instead, my external (legal) *freedom* should be defined as follows: It is the permission not to obey any external laws except those to which I could have given my consent. Similarly, external (legal) *equality* within a state is a relation among citizens in which no one can place another under a legal obligation without also submitting to a law under which they *can* be placed under the same kind of

obligation by the other in return. (The principle of *legal* dependence needs no explanation, since it is already included in the concept of a state constitution as such.) These rights are inborn, necessarily belong to humanity, and cannot be given up. Their validity is confirmed and raised still higher by the principle of human beings' legal relations even to higher beings, if they conceive of such beings. For human beings picture themselves as citizens of a world beyond the senses under these very same principles. As for my freedom, even divine laws that I can know through reason alone impose no obligation on me except insofar as I could have given my consent to them myself. For only through my own reason's law of freedom do I first form a concept of the divine will. Now consider the principle of *equality* in relation to the highest being in the world apart from God that I might imagine—a great *Aeon*. Suppose I do my duty in my position, just as that Aeon does in its own. There is then no reason why I should have only a duty to obey, while it has a right to command. The reason this principle of *equality*, unlike the principle of freedom, does not also apply to our relation to God is that God is the only being to whom the concept of duty does not apply.

As for the right to equality of all citizens as subjects, the question of whether *hereditary nobility* is permissible depends on this alone: "Must the *rank* granted by the state to one subject above another come before *merit*, or must merit come before rank?" Clearly, if rank is tied to birth, it is entirely uncertain whether merit—ability and faithfulness in office—will follow. This amounts to granting the favored person a rank, the position of commander, without any merit at all. The general will of the people would never decide on this in an original contract, which is, after all, the principle of all rights. Being a nobleman does not automatically make someone a *noble* man. As for *nobility of office*—as we might call the rank of a higher magistrate, which must be earned through merit—the rank does not belong to the person as property. It belongs to the position. This does not violate equality. When the person leaves office, they also give up the rank and return to the people.

- ⁵ The lofty titles often given to a ruler—God’s anointed, administrator of the divine will on earth, and God’s representative—have often been criticized as crude flattery that makes his head spin. But I think this criticism is unfounded. Far from making the ruler arrogant, these titles must humble him in his own soul, if he has any understanding, as we must assume he does. He must consider that he has taken on an office too great for a human being: to administer the holiest thing God has on earth, *human rights*. He must always fear that he may have harmed in some way this apple of God’s eye.
- ⁶ In language that sounds brilliant but is hollow and empty of substance, Mallet du Pan boasts that many years of experience have finally convinced him of the truth of *Pope’s* familiar saying: “Let fools argue about the best government; the best-run is the best.” If this means that the best-run government is the best-run, then, to use Swift’s expression, he has cracked a nut that rewarded him with a maggot. But if it means that this is also the best way of governing, that is, the best state constitution, it is completely false. Examples of good governments prove nothing about the way of governing. Who has governed better than *Titus* and *Marcus Aurelius*? Yet one left *Domitian* as his successor, and the other *Commodus*. This could not have happened under a good state constitution. Their unfitness for the position was known early enough, and the ruler also had enough power to exclude them.

Second definitive article



Second definitive article for perpetual peace.

The right of nations must be based on a *federation* of free states.

Peoples, as states, can be judged in the same way as individual human beings. In their natural condition—that is, independent of external laws—they harm one another simply by existing side by side. For its own security, each can and should demand that the others join it in an arrangement like a civil constitution, where everyone’s rights can be secured. This would be a *league of nations*, but not necessarily a state made up of nations. Such a state would involve a contradiction. Every state involves a relationship between a *superior* who makes laws and an *inferior* who obeys them, namely, the people. But many peoples within one state would form just one people. That contradicts our starting point. We are considering the rights of *peoples* in relation to one another, as so many separate states, not as peoples that are to merge into one state.

We look with deep contempt at the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom. They would rather fight endlessly than submit to legal restraints that they themselves would establish. They prefer a mad freedom to a rational one. We see this as crudeness, lack of refinement, and a degradation of humanity to the level of animals. So we might expect civilized peoples, each united in a state of its own, to hurry out of such a degraded condition as soon as possible. Instead, every *state* places its majesty precisely in being subject to no external legal restraint at all. For “the majesty of the people” is an absurd expression. The

glory of its ruler consists in having many thousands at his command who can be made to sacrifice themselves for a cause that does not concern them, without his having to put himself in danger.⁷ The main difference between European and American savages is this: some tribes of the latter have been completely eaten by their enemies. The former know how to make better use of those they defeat than to eat them. They prefer to use them to increase the number of their subjects, and so the number of tools available for still more widespread wars.

Human nature's wickedness shows itself openly in the unrestricted relations between peoples. Within a state governed by law, the government's restraints largely conceal it. Given this wickedness, it is surprising that the word *right* has not yet been completely dismissed from the politics of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet dared to declare itself publicly in favor of that view. *Hugo Grotius*, *Pufendorf*, *Vattel*, and others—all of them miserable comforters—are still faithfully cited to *justify* an attack. Yet their code, whether written in philosophical or diplomatic terms, does not have, and cannot have, the slightest *legal* force. States as such are not subject to a common external power of enforcement. Nor is there any example of a state ever being persuaded to abandon its plans by arguments backed by the testimony of such important men. Still, every state's respect for the concept of right, at least in words, proves something. Human beings have an even greater moral capacity, though it is dormant for now, eventually to master the evil principle within them, which they cannot deny, and to hope that others will do the same. Otherwise, the word *right* would never pass the lips of states that want to fight one another, unless only to mock it. As that Gallic prince put it: "Nature has given the stronger this advantage over the weaker: the weaker must obey him."

States can pursue their rights only through war, never through a lawsuit as they could before an external court. But war and its favorable outcome, *victory*, do not decide what is right. A *peace treaty* ends the current war, but not the state of war, for which a new pretext can always be found. Nor can this condition simply be declared unjust, since in it everyone judges their own case. Yet what natural law says of human beings in a lawless condition—that "they ought to

leave this condition”—does not apply in quite the same way to states under the right of nations. As states, they already have a lawful constitution internally. They are therefore beyond being forced by others into a broader legal constitution according to those others’ ideas of right. Even so, from its throne as the supreme authority for moral legislation, reason absolutely condemns war as a way to settle questions of right. It makes a state of peace an immediate duty. But peace cannot be established or secured without an agreement among peoples. So there must be a special kind of league, which can be called a *peace league* (*foedus pacificum*). It would differ from a *peace treaty* (*pactum pacis*) in this: the treaty seeks to end just *one* war, while the league seeks to end *all* wars forever. This league does not aim to acquire any of a state’s power. It aims only to preserve and secure a state’s *freedom*, both for itself and for the other states allied with it. Those states would not, for that reason, have to submit to public laws and their enforcement, as human beings in the natural condition must. We can show that this idea of *federation* is workable—that it has objective reality. It is to spread gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace. Suppose good fortune allows a powerful and enlightened people to form a republic, which by its nature must favor perpetual peace. This republic provides a center for a federal union that other states can join. In this way they can secure the freedom of states in keeping with the idea of the right of nations. Through further alliances of this kind, the union can gradually spread farther and farther.

It makes sense for a people to say: “There must be no war among us, because we want to form ourselves into a state. That is, we want to establish over ourselves a supreme power to make laws, govern, and judge, which will settle our disputes peacefully.” But suppose this state says: “There must be no war between me and other states, although I recognize no supreme lawmaking power that guarantees my rights and whose rights I guarantee in return.” Then it is impossible to understand what could give me confidence in my rights, unless it is a substitute for the compact that establishes civil society: a free federation. Reason must connect this federation with the concept of the right of nations, if that concept is to have any meaning at all.

The concept of a right of nations as a right *to* war really makes no sense. It would be a right to determine what is right by force, according to one-sided rules, rather than by universally valid external laws that limit each individual's freedom. It could mean only that people who think this way get what they deserve when they wear one another out and so find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence along with those responsible for them. For states in their relations with one another, reason allows only one way out of the lawless condition that contains nothing but war. Like individuals, they must give up their wild, lawless freedom, accept public laws backed by force, and form a *state of nations* (*ciuitas gentium*). This state would, of course, keep growing until it finally included all the peoples of the earth. But their idea of the right of nations makes them utterly unwilling to do this. They reject *in practice* what is right *in principle*. So, if all is not to be lost, only a *negative* substitute can take the place of the positive idea of a *world republic*: a lasting, continually expanding *league* that keeps war away. Only this can hold back the flood of hostile tendencies that shun law, though there is a constant danger of their breaking out (*Godless fury rages within, hideous with its bloodstained mouth. Virgil.*).⁸

⁷ A Bulgarian prince once gave this answer to the Greek emperor, who had kindly offered to settle their dispute by single combat: "A blacksmith who has tongs will not use his hands to pull the red-hot iron out of the coals."

⁸ When a war has ended and peace has been concluded, it might be fitting for a people to proclaim a day of repentance after the festival of thanksgiving. In the state's name, they would ask heaven's forgiveness for the great sin that the human race still commits: refusing to accept a legal constitution in its relations with other peoples. Proud of its independence, it prefers the barbaric means of war, even though war does not decide the very thing being sought, namely, the rights of each state. The thanksgiving festivals held during a war for a *victory*, and the hymns sung, in true Israelite fashion, to the *Lord of Hosts*, clash no less sharply with the moral idea of the Father of humankind. They show indiffer-

ence to the way peoples seek to establish their rights against one another, which is sad enough. But they also add joy at having destroyed a great many people or their happiness.

Third definitive article



Third definitive article for perpetual peace.

“The *right of world citizenship* must be limited to the conditions of universal *hospitality*.”

Here, as in the earlier articles, the subject is not benevolence but *right*. In this context, *hospitality* means a stranger’s right not to be treated as an enemy because of arriving on someone else’s land. The person whose land it is can turn the stranger away, if this can be done without causing the stranger’s destruction. But as long as the stranger behaves peacefully where they are, that person must not treat them as an enemy. A stranger cannot claim a *right to stay as a guest*. That would require a special agreement granting the benefit of becoming a member of the household for a certain time. The stranger has only a *right to visit*: a right belonging to all human beings to offer to associate with others. This follows from their right to shared possession of the earth’s surface. Since that surface is spherical, they cannot spread out endlessly. In the end they must tolerate one another’s presence. Originally, no one has more right than anyone else to be in any particular place on earth. Uninhabitable parts of this surface—the sea and sandy deserts—divide this community. Yet the *ship* and the *camel*, the *ship* of the desert, make it possible for people to approach one another across these ownerless regions. They can use their shared right to the earth’s *surface* to make contact possible. So the inhospitable behavior found on some coasts, such as the Barbary coast—robbing ships in nearby seas or enslav-

ing shipwrecked sailors—is contrary to natural law. So is the behavior found in sandy deserts, among the Arab Bedouins, who take the approach of people to their nomadic tribes as a right to plunder them. But this right of hospitality, the right of arriving strangers, extends only to the conditions that make it possible to *try* to enter into relations with the existing inhabitants. In this way, distant parts of the world can enter into peaceful relations with one another. These relations can eventually be governed by public law and so bring the human race ever closer to a constitution for world citizenship.

Compare this with the *inhospitable* conduct of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the trading states. The injustice they display in *visiting* foreign lands and peoples, which they treat as the same thing as *conquering* them, goes to horrifying lengths. When they discovered America, the lands of Black peoples, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so on, they regarded them as lands belonging to no one. They counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies, Hindustan, they brought in foreign troops on the pretext that they only intended to set up trading posts. With the troops came oppression of the native inhabitants, incitement of the various states there to widespread wars, famine, rebellion, treachery, and the rest of the litany of evils that afflict the human race.

China⁹ and Japan (*Nippon*) had tried admitting guests of this kind. Wisely, China has therefore allowed access but not entry. Japan has allowed even access only to a single European people, the Dutch. Even then, it keeps them like prisoners, cut off from contact with the native inhabitants. The worst of it—or the best, from the standpoint of a moral judge—is that those committing this violence do not even benefit from it. All these trading companies are on the verge of collapse. The sugar islands, the home of the cruelest and most elaborate slavery, produce no real return. They serve only indirectly, and for a purpose that is not very praiseworthy: training sailors for war fleets, and so, once again, waging wars in Europe. And this is what those who make a great show of piety want. They drink injustice like water, yet want to be regarded as the chosen ones because of their orthodox beliefs.

The closer or looser community that has now developed among all the earth's peoples has reached a point where a violation of rights in *one* place on earth is felt in *all* places. So the idea of a right of world citizenship is not a fanciful or exaggerated way of thinking about right. It is a necessary addition to the unwritten code of both the law within states and the right of nations, completing them as public human rights in general, and so leading to perpetual peace. Only on this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually approaching that peace.

- ⁹ To write the name of this great empire as it calls itself—namely, *China*, not Sina or anything that sounds like it—we need only consult *Georgii Alphab. Tibet. pag. 651 - 654.*, especially *Nota b* at the bottom. According to Professor *Fischer* of St. Petersburg, it actually has no definite name by which it calls itself. The most common is still the word *Kin*, meaning gold, which the Tibetans express by *Ser*. Hence the emperor is called king of *gold*, of the most splendid country in the world. This word may well sound like *Chin* in the empire itself, but the Italian missionaries may have pronounced it *Kin* because of the guttural letter. This shows that the country the Romans called the land of the *Seres* was China. Silk was carried to Europe through *Greater Tibet*, presumably through *Lesser Tibet* and Bukharia, across Persia, and onward. This leads to various reflections on the antiquity of this remarkable state compared with Hindustan, through its connection with *Tibet* and, through Tibet, with Japan. By contrast, the name Sina or Tschina, which its neighbors are said to give the country, leads nowhere. Perhaps Europe's very ancient contact with Tibet, though never properly understood, can also be explained from what *Hesychius* preserved for us: the cry *Κονξ Ομπαςξ* (*Konx Ompax*) of the hierophant in the Eleusinian mysteries. (See *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis*, part 5, pp. 447 ff.) According to *Georgii Alph. Tibet.*, the word *Concioa* means *God*, and it bears a striking resemblance to *Konx. Pah-cio. (ib. p. 520)*, which the Greeks could easily have pronounced *pax*, means proclaimer of the law, the deity spread throughout nature, also called *Cencresi*, *p. 177*. But *Om*, which *La Croze* translates as *benedictus, blessed*, can surely mean nothing other than *the one praised*

as *blessed* when applied to the deity, *p. 507*. Now, whenever *P. Franz. Horatius* asked the Tibetan *lamas* what they understood by God (*Concioa*), they answered: “*It is the assembly of all the saints.*” He asked them often. These saints are the souls of the blessed who, through Lamaist rebirth, have wandered through all kinds of bodies and finally returned to the deity, transformed into *Burchane*, that is, beings worthy of worship (*p. 223*). So that mysterious expression, *Konx Ompax*, was probably meant to signify the *holy* (*Konx*), *blessed* (*Om*), and *wise* (*Pax*) supreme being spread everywhere throughout the world: nature personified. Used in the Greek *mysteries*, it probably indicated *monotheism* for the fully initiated, as opposed to the people’s *polytheism*, although *P. Horatius* (*loc. cit.*) suspected *atheism* in it. How that mysterious expression reached the Greeks through Tibet can be explained in the way described above. Conversely, this can also make it probable that Europe had early contact with China through Tibet, perhaps even earlier than with Hindustan.

First supplement



First supplement.

On the guarantee of perpetual peace.

What provides this guarantee is nothing less than the great artist *nature* (*natura daedala rerum*). Purposefulness clearly shines out of nature's mechanical course, and nature makes concord rise out of human discord even against their will. For that reason we call it *fate*, as though it were the compulsion of a cause whose laws of operation we do not know. But when we consider its purposefulness in the course of the world, we call it *providence*¹⁰: the deep-lying wisdom of a higher cause that aims at the objective final end of the human race and predetermines this world course. Strictly, we do not *know* providence from these artistic arrangements of nature, nor can we even *infer* it from them. We can only (as with every reference of the form of things to ends in general) *think it in addition*, and must do so in order to form a concept of its possibility by analogy with human works of art. To imagine its relation and agreement with the end that reason directly prescribes for us, namely the moral end, is an idea that is extravagant for *theoretical* purposes, but dogmatic, and well grounded in its reality, for practical ones (for instance in regard to the concept of the duty of *perpetual peace*, in order to use that mechanism of nature for it).—When the word *nature* is used, as it is here, merely for theory (not for religion), it also suits the limits of human reason better (reason must keep within the bounds of possible experience as regards the relation of effects to their causes) and is *more*

modest than the expression of a *providence* that we could know, with which one presumptuously fits oneself with Icarus wings in order to come closer to the secret of its unfathomable intention.

Before we define this guarantee more closely, we must first look for the condition that nature has arranged for the actors on its great stage, the condition that in the end makes their securing of peace necessary; and only then say how nature provides it.

Its provisional arrangement consists in this: 1) nature has seen to it that people can live in every region of the earth; 2) it has driven them everywhere by *war*, even into the most inhospitable regions, so as to populate them; 3) by the same war it has forced them into more or less lawful relations.—It is already wonderful that moss still grows in the cold deserts by the Arctic Ocean, which the *reindeer* scrapes out from under the snow, so as to be food, and also the draught animal, for the Ostyak or the Samoyed; or that the salty sand deserts still hold the *camel*, which seems almost created for traveling them, so that they are not left unused. But the end shines out still more clearly when one notices that, besides the furred animals on the shore of the Arctic Ocean, seals, walruses and whales provide food with their flesh and fuel with their blubber for the people who live there. Most of all, nature's care through driftwood awakens admiration: it brings wood to these treeless regions (no one quite knows from where), without which material those people could make neither boats and weapons nor huts to live in; and then they have enough to do with war against the animals, so as to live at peace among themselves.— But what *drove* them there was presumably nothing other than war. The first *instrument of war* among all the animals that humans learned to tame and domesticate within the time of the earth's peopling was the *horse* (the elephant belongs to a later time, that of the luxury of states already established), just as the art of cultivating certain grasses, now no longer recognizable to us in their original character, called *grain*, and likewise the multiplication and refinement of *fruit kinds* by transplanting and grafting (perhaps in Europe only two kinds, crab apples and wild pears), could arise only in the condition of already established states, where secure landed property existed. Before that, people in lawless freedom had

pushed through from the *hunting*¹¹, fishing and herding life to the *farming* life; then *salt* and *iron* were invented, and perhaps these became the first articles, sought far and wide, of a trade between different peoples, through which those peoples first came into a *peaceful relation* with one another, and so, even with more distant peoples, into understanding, community and peaceful relation among themselves.

In seeing to it that people *could* live in every region of the earth, nature has also despotically willed that they *should* live everywhere, even against their inclination, and without this “should” presupposing a concept of duty that would bind them to it by means of a moral law. To reach this end of its own, nature chose war.—We see peoples who make the unity of their descent recognizable by the unity of their language: the *Samoyeds* on the Arctic Ocean on one side, and a people of similar language two hundred miles away in the *Altai* mountains on the other, with another people, the Mongol, mounted and therefore warlike, pressing in between them and scattering that part of the stock far from the rest into the most inhospitable ice regions, where they would certainly not have spread out of their own inclination¹². So too the *Finns* in the northernmost region of Europe, called *Lapps*, separated from the *Hungarians*, now equally far away but related to them in language, by Gothic and Sarmatian peoples who pushed in between. And what else could have driven the *Eskimos* (perhaps ancient European adventurers, a stock wholly different from all other Americans) into the north, and the *Pescheräs* into the south of America as far as Tierra del Fuego, but war, which nature uses as its means to populate the earth everywhere? War itself needs no special motive; it seems grafted onto human nature, and even to count as something noble, for which a person is animated by the desire for honor without self-interested drives. Thus *warlike courage* (of American savages as much as of Europeans in the age of chivalry) is judged to be of immediate great worth not only *when* there is war (as is fair), but also so *that* there be war; and war is often begun merely to show that courage, so that an inner *dignity* is placed in war itself, to the point that even philosophers sometimes deliver a eulogy on it as a certain ennoblement of humanity,

unmindful of that Greek's saying: "War is bad in this, that it makes more bad people than it takes away."—So much for what nature does for *its own end* with regard to the human species as a class of animals.

Now comes the question that concerns the essential part of the aim of perpetual peace: "What does nature do for this aim, with reference to the end that man's own reason makes a duty for him, and therefore in favor of his *moral aim*, and how does it give the guarantee that what man *ought* to do by laws of freedom, but does not do, is secured by a compulsion of nature that he *will* do it, without prejudice to that freedom, and indeed in all three relations of public right, of *state*, *international* and *cosmopolitan right*?"—When I say of nature that it *wills* that this or that should happen, that does not mean that it lays a duty on us to do it (only free practical reason can do that), but that nature *does* it itself, whether we will or not (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*).

- ¹ Even if a people were not forced by internal discord to submit to the compulsion of public laws, war from outside would do it. For, by the arrangement of nature mentioned above, every people finds another people pressing upon it as a neighbor, and against that neighbor it must form itself inwardly into a *state* in order to be armed against it as a *power*. Now the *republican* constitution is the only one that is perfectly suited to the right of human beings, but it is also the hardest to establish, and still harder to preserve, so much so that many maintain that a state would have to consist of *angels*, because human beings with their selfish inclinations are not capable of a constitution of such sublime form. But then nature comes to the aid of the general will, which is revered but powerless in practice and grounded in reason, and it does so precisely through those selfish inclinations. So everything depends on a good organization of the state (which is indeed within human capacity), which directs those forces against one another in such a way that one holds the others back in their destructive effect, or cancels it out. The outcome for reason is then as if neither were there at all, and so the human being is forced to be a good citizen, even if not a morally good human being. The problem of establishing a state, hard as it sounds, is solvable even for a people of devils (if only they have understanding),

and it runs like this: “A multitude of rational beings who all together require general laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, is to be ordered and its constitution set up in such a way that, although they strive against one another in their private dispositions, these dispositions hold one another back so that in their public conduct the outcome is exactly the same as if they had no such evil dispositions.” Such a problem *must* be solvable. For what the task asks us to know is not the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature, and how one can use it on human beings so as to direct the conflict of their unpeaceful dispositions within a people in such a way that they force one another to submit to coercive laws, and so must bring about the condition of peace in which laws have force. One can see this even in the states that actually exist, still very imperfectly organized: in their external conduct they already come very close to what the idea of right prescribes, although the inner side of morality is certainly not the cause of it (and indeed a good moral formation of a people is rather to be expected from a good state constitution than the reverse). Thus the mechanism of nature, through selfish inclinations that naturally also work against one another externally, can be used by reason as a means to make room for its own end, the prescription of right, and so, as far as the state itself is concerned, to promote and secure inner as well as outer peace.—So here it is said: nature *will* irresistibly that right should in the end gain the upper hand. What is neglected here is at last done by itself, though with much discomfort.—“Bend the reed too hard and it breaks; and whoever wills too much wills nothing.” *Bouterwek*.

- ² The idea of the right of nations presupposes the *separation* of many neighboring states independent of one another; and although such a condition is in itself already a condition of war (unless a federal union of them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), still, by the idea of reason, even this condition is better than the merging of those states through a power that overgrows one of them and passes over into a universal monarchy. For as the extent of a government grows, its laws lose more and more of their emphasis, and a soulless despotism, after it has eradicated the seeds of good, at last falls into anarchy. Meanwhile it

is the desire of every state (or of its head) to put itself into the lasting condition of peace in this way, by ruling the whole world if possible. But *nature wills it otherwise*.—Nature uses two means to keep peoples from mixing and to separate them: the difference of *languages* and of *religions*¹³. That difference does carry with it a tendency to mutual hatred and a pretext for war, but with growing culture and the gradual approach of human beings it leads to greater agreement in principles, and so to understanding in a peace that is brought about and secured not, as in that despotism (in the churchyard of freedom), by the weakening of all forces, but by their equilibrium, in the liveliest competition of those forces.

³ Just as nature wisely separates the peoples that the will of each state, even on grounds of the right of nations, would gladly unite under itself by cunning or force, so on the other side it unites peoples that the concept of cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war, by their mutual self-interest. It is the *spirit of commerce*, which cannot coexist with war and which sooner or later takes hold of every people. For since among all the powers (means) subordinate to state power the *power of money* is likely to be the most reliable, states find themselves compelled (though certainly not by drives of morality) to promote the noble peace, and wherever in the world war threatens to break out, to ward it off by mediations, as if they stood in constant alliance for that purpose. For great unions for war can, by the nature of the thing, occur only very seldom, and still more seldom succeed.— In this way nature guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanism of human inclinations themselves, though with a certainty that is not sufficient to *prophecy* its future (theoretically), but does suffice for practical purposes and makes it a duty to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end.

¹⁰ In the mechanism of nature, to which the human being (as a sensible being) also belongs, there shows itself a form that already lies at the ground of its existence, and that we can make intelligible to ourselves only by placing under it the end of a world-author who determines it beforehand. We call that author's fore-determination *providence* (the divine providence) in general; and insofar as

it is placed in the *beginning* of the world, we call it the *founding* providence (*prouidentia conditrix*; *semel iussit, semper parent, Augustine*); insofar as it maintains nature in its *course* according to general laws of purposefulness, the *governing* providence (*prouidentia gubernatrix*); insofar as it serves particular ends that the human being cannot foresee but only surmises from the outcome, the *guiding* providence (*prouidentia directrix*); and finally, in regard to single events as divine ends, we no longer call it providence but *dispensation* (*directio extraordinaria*). To want to recognize dispensation as such (since it really points to miracles, though the events are not called that) is foolish presumption in the human being. For to infer from a single event to a particular principle of the efficient cause (namely that this event is an end, and not merely a natural-mechanical side effect from another end wholly unknown to us) is absurd and full of self-conceit, however pious and humble the language about it may sound.—Likewise the division of providence (*materialiter* considered), as it goes to *objects* in the world, into *general* and *particular*, is false and contradicts itself (as if providence were indeed a care for the preservation of the kinds of creatures, but left the individuals to chance). For it is called general precisely with the intention that no single thing should be thought of as excepted from it.—What was presumably meant here is the division of providence (*formaliter* considered) according to the manner in which it carries out its end: namely into *ordinary* (for instance the yearly dying and reviving of nature with the change of seasons) and *extraordinary* (for instance the bringing of wood to the ice coasts, where it cannot grow, by the ocean currents, for the inhabitants there, who could not live without it). There, although we can explain the physical-mechanical cause of these appearances well enough (for instance through the wooded banks of rivers in temperate lands, into which those trees fall, and which are then carried further by the Gulf Stream, perhaps), we must still not overlook the teleological cause as well, which points to the care of a wisdom ruling over nature.—Only as regards the concept of a divine *assistance* or cooperation (*concursus*) in an effect in the sensible world, which is customary in the schools, that concept must be dropped. For to want to pair things of unlike kind (*gryphes jungere equis*), and to let him who is himself the complete cause

of the changes in the world *supplement* his own predetermining providence during the course of the world (which would therefore have had to be defective)—for instance to say that *next to God* the doctor set the sick person right, and so was present as an assistant—is *first*, in itself contradictory. For *causa solitaria non iuvat*. God is the author of the doctor together with all his remedies, and so, if one wants to climb to the highest original ground, which is theoretically incomprehensible to us, the effect must be ascribed *wholly* to God. Or one can ascribe it *wholly* to the doctor, insofar as we follow this event as explicable according to the order of nature in the chain of world causes. *Second*, such a way of thinking also deprives us of all determinate principles for judging an effect. But for *moral-practical* purposes (which are therefore directed entirely at the supersensible)—for instance in the faith that God will also supplement the lack of our own righteousness, if only our disposition was genuine, by means we cannot comprehend, so that we should not slacken in our striving for the good—the concept of a divine *concursus* is quite fitting and even necessary. Here it goes without saying that no one must try to *explain* a good action (as an event in the world) from it, which would be a pretended theoretical cognition of the supersensible, and therefore absurd.

- 11 Of all ways of life the *hunting life* is without doubt the most contrary to a civilized constitution, because the families that must isolate themselves there soon become *strange* to one another and so, scattered in wide forests, soon *hostile*, since each of them needs much space to obtain its food and clothing.—The *Noachic prohibition of blood*, Genesis IX, 4–6 (which, often repeated, was later even made a condition for newly received Christians coming from heathenism, though in another respect, by the Jewish Christians, Acts XV, 20; XXI, 25) seems originally to have been nothing other than the prohibition of the *hunter's life*, because in that life the case of eating flesh raw must often occur, so that with the latter the former is forbidden at the same time.
- 12 One could ask: if nature willed that these ice coasts should not remain uninhabited, what will become of their inhabitants when nature one day (as is to be expected) brings them no more driftwood? For it is to be believed that, with

advancing culture, the inhabitants of the temperate zones will use the wood that grows on the banks of their rivers better, and will not let it fall into the rivers and be washed out to sea. I answer: the people on the *Ob*, the Yenisei, the Lena and so on will bring it to them by trade, and take in exchange the products of the animal kingdom, of which the sea on the ice coasts is so rich—once nature has first forced peace among them.

- ¹³ *Difference of religions*: a strange expression! as if one also spoke of different *morals*. There can well be different *kinds of faith*, historical, belonging not to religion itself but to the history of the means used to promote it, and falling in the field of scholarship, and likewise different *books of religion* (Zendavesta, Vedam, Koran and so on); but there is only one single *religion*, valid for all human beings and in all times. Those differences can therefore contain nothing other than the vehicle of religion, which is contingent and can be different according to differences of times and places.

Second supplement



Second supplement.

Secret article on perpetual peace.

A secret article in negotiations about public law is, objectively—that is, looking at what it says—a contradiction. But subjectively, judging by the kind of person who dictates it, there can very well be a secret in it: that person may think it beneath their dignity to announce publicly that they are its author.

There is only one article of this kind, and it is contained in the proposition: “*The maxims of philosophers about the conditions that make public peace possible shall be taken into counsel by states armed for war.*”

Now, the legislative authority of a state must naturally be credited with the greatest wisdom. It seems beneath that authority to seek instruction from its *subjects*, the philosophers, about the principles of its conduct toward other states. And yet it is very advisable to do so. So the state will *silently* ask them to do this—that is, it makes a secret of doing so. This amounts to saying that the state will let them speak freely and publicly about the general maxims of waging war and making peace (for they will do that by themselves, so long as no one forbids them). And agreement among states on this point needs no special arrangement among them for that purpose: it already lies in the obligation imposed by universal human reason as a moral legislator.—This does not mean that the state must give the philosopher’s principles precedence over the pronouncements of the jurist, who is the representative of state power. It means

only that the philosopher should be *heard*. The jurist has taken as his symbol the *scales* of right and, beside them, the *sword* of justice. He commonly uses the sword not merely to keep every foreign influence away from the scales, but to throw it in when one pan refuses to go down: (*vae victis*), woe to the conquered. A jurist who is not also a philosopher (in moral matters as well) is strongly tempted to do this, because his office is only to apply laws that already exist, not to examine whether those laws themselves need improvement. And since his calling is accompanied by power (as are the other two), he counts its really lower rank among the higher ones.—The philosophical faculty stands at a very low level beneath this allied power. Philosophy, for example, is called the *maid* of theology (and the same is said of the other two).—But it is not quite clear “whether she carries the torch before her gracious lady or carries her train behind her.”

That kings should philosophize, or that philosophers should become kings, is not to be expected, and not to be wished for either, since possession of power inevitably spoils the free judgment of reason. But kings, or kingly peoples (peoples governing themselves by laws of equality), must not let the class of philosophers die out or fall silent; they must let them speak publicly. This is indispensable to both for the light it throws on their business. And since this class is by its nature incapable of forming factions or alliances of clubs, it is above any suspicion of *propaganda*.

Appendix I



Appendix.

I.

On the disagreement between morality and politics with a view to perpetual peace.

Morality is already in itself a practice in the objective sense: it is the sum of laws that command unconditionally, laws according to which we *ought* to act. Once one has granted this concept of duty its authority, it is plainly absurd still to say that one cannot do it. For then the concept drops out of morality by itself (*ultra posse nemo obligatur*). So there can be no conflict of politics, as an applied doctrine of right, with morality as such, which is a theoretical doctrine (and so no conflict of practice with theory), unless by the latter one means a general *doctrine of prudence*, that is, a theory of the maxims for choosing the most useful means to one's aims as calculated for advantage, which would be to deny that there is any morality at all.

Politics says: "*Be wise as serpents*"; morality adds, as a limiting condition: "*and without guile, as doves*." If the two cannot stand together in one command, then there really is a conflict of politics with morality. But if both are to be united through and through, the concept of the opposite is absurd, and the question how that conflict is to be reconciled cannot even be set up as a task. The proposition that *honesty is the best policy* contains a theory that practice, unfortunately, very often contradicts. Yet the equally theoretical proposition

that *honesty is better than all policy* is infinitely above every objection, and indeed it is the indispensable condition of policy. The god of the border of morality does not yield to Jupiter, the god of the border of power. For Jupiter still stands under fate: that is, reason is not enlightened enough to survey the series of predetermining causes that would let it predict with certainty, by the mechanism of nature, the happy or bad outcome of human action and omission (though it may let us hope for that outcome as we wish). But as to what one has to do in order to stay in the track of duty, according to rules of wisdom, and so as to reach the final end, reason lights the way brightly enough everywhere.

But the practical man, to whom morality is mere theory, grounds his comfortless rejection of our good-hearted hope (even when *ought* and *can* are conceded) on this: he claims to foresee from human nature that people will *never want* what is required to bring about the end that leads to perpetual peace.—To be sure, the willing of *every single* human being to live in a lawful constitution according to principles of freedom (the *distributive* unity of the will of all) is not sufficient for this end. What is further required is that *all together* will this condition (the *collective* unity of the united will), and that is the solution of a hard task, so that a whole civil society may come about. And since, over and above this variety of the particular willing of all, a unifying cause of that willing must be added to bring out a common will, which none of them all can do, there is in the *execution* of that idea, in practice, no other beginning of the lawful condition to be counted on than *force*, on whose compulsion public right is afterwards founded. This then, since one can hardly count on the lawgiver's moral disposition here, and since after the wild crowd has been united into a people he leaves it to that people to bring about a lawful constitution through their common will, lets us expect in advance great deviations from that idea (the theory) in actual experience.

Then it is said: whoever once has power in his hands will not let the people prescribe laws to him. A state that is once in possession of not standing under any external laws will not make itself dependent on their tribunal as regards the way in which it is to seek its right against other states. And even a continent, if it

feels itself superior to another that does not otherwise stand in its way, will not leave the means of strengthening its power unused, by robbing that other or even by ruling it. And so all the plans of theory for the right of the state, of nations and of world citizenship melt away into empty, unexecutable ideals, whereas a practice grounded on empirical principles of human nature, which does not think it beneath itself to draw instruction for its maxims from the way things go in the world, might alone hope to find a secure foundation for its building of statecraft.

To be sure, if there is no freedom and no moral law grounded on it, and everything that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, then politics, as the art of using that mechanism to govern human beings, is the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right is an empty thought. But if one finds it indispensable to unite that concept with politics, indeed to raise it to the limiting condition of politics, then the compatibility of the two must be conceded. Now I can indeed think a *moral politician*, that is, one who takes the principles of statecraft in such a way that they can stand together with morality, but not a *political moralist*, who forges himself a morality as suits the advantage of the statesman.

The moral politician will make it his principle: if defects are met with in the state constitution or in the relation between states, defects that one could not prevent, then it is a duty, above all for heads of state, to see to it that they be improved as soon as possible and made appropriate to natural right as it stands before our eyes as a model in the idea of reason, even if this should cost sacrifices of their self-interest. Now since tearing apart a bond of the union of states or of world citizens, before a better constitution is ready to take its place, is contrary to all statecraft that is at one with morality here, it would indeed be absurd to demand that those defects be changed at once and with violence. But that at least the maxim of the necessity of such a change should dwell most inwardly in the holder of power, so that he remains in constant approach to the end, the best constitution according to laws of right, that can be demanded of him. A state can already *govern itself* in a republican way even when, by the constitution before it, it still possesses despotic *ruling power*, until gradually the

people becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law (as though that idea possessed physical force), and so is found fit for its own legislation, which is originally grounded on right. And even if, by the violence of a *revolution* produced by a bad constitution, a more lawful one had been won unlawfully, it would still not be permitted afterwards to lead the people back to the old one, although during the revolution everyone who meddled in it by force or cunning would rightly be subject to the punishments of a rebel. But as regards the external relation between states, no state can be required to lay aside its constitution, even a despotic one (which is yet the stronger in relation to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being swallowed at once by other states. Hence, with its resolve, a postponement of the execution until a better opportunity must also be permitted¹⁴.

So let it always be the case that the moralists who play the despot, and fail in the execution, offend in many ways against statecraft by measures taken or praised too hastily; experience will nevertheless bring them by and by onto a better track, in spite of this offense against nature. Whereas the moralizing politicians, by glossing over unlawful principles of the state, under the pretext of a human nature that is supposedly not *capable* of the good as reason prescribes it, make improvement *impossible* as far as in them lies, and perpetuate the violation of right.

In place of the practice these state-wise men boast of, they deal in *practices*. They are concerned only to deliver the people, and if possible the whole world, to the power that currently rules, by speaking to its taste so as not to miss their private advantage. This is the way of genuine jurists, of the craft rather than of *legislation*, when they climb up to politics. For since their business is not to reason about legislation itself but to carry out the present commands of the law of the land, every legal constitution that exists at the time, and, when that is changed by higher authority, the one that follows it, must always be the best for them. Then everything is in its proper mechanical order. But if this skill of being just right for every saddle gives them the delusion that they can also judge the principles of a *state constitution* in general according to concepts of right (hence a priori, not empirically), if they make much of knowing *human beings*

(which is indeed to be expected, since they deal with many), without knowing *the human being* and what can be made of him (which requires a higher standpoint of anthropological observation), and with these concepts then approach the right of states and of nations as reason prescribes it: then they cannot make this step except in the spirit of chicanery. They follow their usual procedure, that of a mechanism according to despotically given coercive laws, even there where the concepts of reason want a coercion that is lawful only according to principles of freedom, and by which alone a state constitution that stands firm in right becomes possible. This task the supposed practical man believes he can solve empirically, from experience, by setting up the state constitutions that have so far held up best, though for the most part unlawfully, while passing over that idea.—The maxims he uses for this, though he does not let them be heard, come down roughly to the following sophistical maxims.

- ¹ *Fac et excusa*. Seize the favorable opportunity for taking possession on your own authority, whether of a right of the state over its people or over a neighboring people. The justification can be presented far more easily and elegantly *after the deed*, and the force glossed over, especially in the first case, where the higher power within is at the same time the legislative authority, which one must obey without reasoning about it. This is easier than to think out convincing grounds beforehand and then wait for the counter-grounds. This very boldness gives a certain appearance of inner conviction of the lawfulness of the deed, and the god *bonus euentus* is afterwards the best advocate of right.
- ² *Si fecisti nega*. What you yourself have done wrong, for instance to drive your people to despair and so to revolt, deny that it is *your* fault. Claim instead that it is the fault of the disobedience of the subjects, or, when you have taken possession of a neighboring people, the fault of human nature, which, if it does not forestall the other by force, can surely count on the other forestalling it and taking possession of it.

3 *Diuide et impera*. That is: if there are certain privileged heads in your people who chose you merely as their head (*primus inter pares*), then set them at variance among themselves and set them against the people. Then stand by the people, with the promise of greater freedom, and everything will depend on your unconditional will. Or, if they are external states, then stirring up disagreement among them is a fairly sure means of subjecting them to yourself one after another, under the appearance of supporting the weaker one.

By these political maxims no one is deceived, for they are all already generally known. Nor is there any reason to be ashamed of them, as though the injustice were too plainly visible. For great powers are never ashamed before the judgment of the common crowd, only one before another; and as regards those principles, it is not their becoming known but only their *failure* that can make them ashamed (since in regard to the morality of maxims they all agree among themselves). So *political honor* always remains to them, and on that they can surely count: the honor of *increasing their power*, by whatever path it may have been acquired¹⁵.

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Out of all these serpentine turnings of an immoral doctrine of prudence, which seeks to bring the condition of peace among human beings out of the warlike condition of nature, at least this much is clear: human beings can no more escape the concept of right in their public relations than in their private ones, and they do not dare to base politics publicly on mere tricks of prudence. They do not dare to renounce all obedience to the concept of a public right (which is most striking in the right of nations), but let all due honor be done to it, even if they should think up a hundred evasions and disguises in order to avoid it in practice, and to ascribe to cunning force the authority of being the origin and bond of all right.—In order to put an end to this sophistry (though not to the injustice it glosses over), and to bring the false *representatives* of the mighty of the earth to admit that it is not right but force in whose favor they speak, and from which they take their tone as though they had something to command in the matter, it will be good to uncover the illusion with which people deceive themselves and others, to find the supreme principle from which the aim of

perpetual peace proceeds, and to show that all the evil that stands in its way comes from this: that the political moralist begins where the moral politician rightly ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, hitching the horses behind the wagon), defeats his own aim of bringing politics into agreement with morality.

To make practical philosophy at one with itself, it is necessary first to decide this question: in the tasks of practical reason, must the beginning be made from the *material* principle, the *end* (as object of choice), or from the *formal* principle, that is, the one that rests solely on freedom in the external relation, and that runs: act so that you can will your maxim to become a universal law (let the end be whatever it may)?

Without any doubt the latter principle must come first, for as a principle of right it has unconditional necessity. The former, by contrast, is necessitating only under the presupposition of empirical conditions of the proposed end, namely its execution; and even if that end (for instance perpetual peace) were a duty, that duty itself would still have to be derived from the formal principle of maxims of external action.—Now the first principle, that of the *political moralist* (the problem of the right of the state, of nations and of world citizenship), is a mere *task of art* (*problema technicum*). The second, by contrast, as the principle of the *moral politician*, for whom it is a *moral task* (*problema morale*), is as different as heaven from earth in its procedure. It seeks to bring about perpetual peace, which one then wishes not merely as a physical good but as a condition arising from the recognition of duty.

For the solution of the first, namely the problem of statecraft, much knowledge of nature is required, in order to use its mechanism for the intended end, and yet all of this is uncertain as regards its result, perpetual peace, whichever of the three divisions of public right one takes. Whether a people is better kept in obedience and at the same time in flourishing condition by severity or by the bait of vanity, by the supreme power of one man or by the union of several heads, perhaps also merely by an order of service nobility or by the power of the people, and that within, and over a long time, is uncertain. Of all kinds of government (except the only truly republican one, which can come into the mind

only of a moral politician) history has examples of the opposite.—Still more uncertain is a right of nations supposedly set up by statutes after ministerial plans, which in truth is only a word without a thing, and rests on treaties that in the very act of their conclusion contain the secret reservation of their transgression.—By contrast the solution of the second, namely the *problem of state wisdom*, presses itself on one, so to speak, of itself. It is evident to everyone, puts all artifice to shame, and yet leads straight to the end, though with the reminder of prudence not to bring it about too hastily by force, but to approach it unceasingly according to the circumstances that favor it.

Then it is said: “First seek the kingdom of pure practical reason and its *rightness*, and your end (the benefit of perpetual peace) will fall to you of itself.” For this is peculiar to morality, and indeed as regards its principles of public right (and so in relation to a politics knowable a priori): the less it makes conduct depend on the proposed end, the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more it nevertheless agrees with that end in general. This comes about because it is precisely the general will given a priori (in a people, or in the relation of different peoples to one another) that alone determines what is right among human beings. And this union of the will of all, if only one proceeds consistently in the execution, can also, by the mechanism of nature, be the cause that produces the intended effect and gives the concept of right effect.—Thus, for example, it is a principle of moral politics that a people should unite into a state according to the sole concepts of right of freedom and equality, and this principle is grounded not on prudence but on duty. Now let political moralists reason as much as they like against this, about the natural mechanism of a crowd of human beings entering into society, which would supposedly weaken those principles and defeat their aim, or let them try to prove their assertion by examples of badly organized constitutions of old and new times (for instance democracies without a system of representation): they deserve no hearing. This is especially so because such a pernicious theory itself brings about the evil it predicts, and by it the human being is thrown into one class

with the other living machines, which would only need the consciousness of not being free beings to make them, in their own judgment, the most miserable of all beings in the world.

The proposition that sounds somewhat boastful, and has come into circulation as a proverb, but is true, is this: *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*, in German: “let justice rule, even if all the scoundrels in the world should perish with it.” It is a sturdy principle of right that cuts off all the crooked paths marked out by cunning or force. Only it must not be misunderstood, as though it allowed one to pursue one’s own right with the greatest severity (which would conflict with ethical duty). It is to be understood as the obligation of those in power not to refuse or diminish anyone’s right out of disfavor or pity for others. For this there is required above all an internal constitution of the state set up according to pure principles of right, and then also the union of that state with other neighboring or even distant states in a lawful settlement of their disputes, analogous to a universal state.—This proposition means nothing else than this: political maxims must not start from the welfare and happiness of each state to be expected from following them, hence not from the end that each state makes its object (from willing), as the supreme but empirical principle of state wisdom, but from the pure concept of the duty of right (from the ought, whose principle is given a priori by pure reason), whatever physical consequences may follow. The world will by no means perish because there are fewer bad people in it. Moral evil has the property inseparable from its nature that in its aims (especially in relation to others of the same mind) it is contrary to itself and destructive, and so makes room for the moral principle of the good, even if by slow steps.

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Objectively, then, in theory, there is no conflict at all between morality and politics. Subjectively, however, in the selfish inclination of human beings (which, because it is not grounded on maxims of reason, need not yet be called practice), the conflict will and may always remain, because it serves as a whetstone for virtue. The true courage of virtue (according to the principle: *tu ne cede*

malis, sed contra audentior ito) consists in the present case not so much in opposing with firm resolve the evils and sacrifices that must be taken on here, as in looking in the eye the far more dangerous, lying and treacherous, yet reasoning evil principle in ourselves, which holds up the weakness of human nature to justify every transgression, and in defeating its cunning.

In fact the political moralist can say: ruler and people, or people and people, do *one another* no wrong when they attack each other by force or by cunning, although they do wrong in general by refusing all respect to the concept of right, which alone could establish peace for ever. For since the one transgresses his duty toward the other, and the other is just as unlawfully disposed toward him, both are treated quite rightly when they wear each other down, though in such a way that enough of this race always remains to keep the game going into the most distant times, so that a late posterity may one day take a warning example from them. Providence in the course of the world is justified in this. For the moral principle in the human being never dies out, and the reason that is pragmatically fit to carry out the ideas of right according to that principle grows constantly through ever advancing culture, and with it the guilt of those transgressions. The creation alone, namely that such a breed of corrupt beings should have been on earth at all, seems incapable of justification by any theodicy (if we assume that it will never be, and can never be, better with the human race). But this standpoint of judgment is far too high for us to put our concepts of wisdom under the supreme power, which is inscrutable to us, in a theoretical aim.—We are inevitably driven to such desperate conclusions unless we assume that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, that they can be carried out, and that accordingly the people within the state, and further the states toward one another, must act on them, whatever empirical politics may object.

True politics, then, cannot take a single step without first having paid homage to morality. And although politics is in itself a hard art, its union with morality is no art at all, for morality cuts in two the knot that politics cannot untie as soon as the two conflict.—The right of human beings must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. Here one cannot halve

matters and think out a middle thing of a pragmatically conditioned right, between right and utility. All politics must bend its knee before the former, and may then hope, though slowly, to reach the level where it will shine steadfastly.

- ¹⁴ These are laws of permission of reason, allowing the condition of a public right tainted with injustice to persist until everything has either ripened of itself toward a complete transformation, or been brought near to ripeness by peaceful means. For some *lawful* constitution, even one only slightly in accordance with right, is better than none at all, and the latter fate, anarchy, would befall a *hasty* reform.—State wisdom will therefore, in the condition in which things now are, make reforms conformable to the ideal of public right a duty. But revolutions, where nature itself brings them about, it will use not to gloss over an even greater oppression, but as a call of nature to bring about, by thorough reform, a lawful constitution grounded on principles of freedom, as the only durable one.
- ¹⁵ Even if a certain malice rooted in human nature among *human beings* living together in a state is still doubted, and instead of it the lack of a culture not yet far enough advanced (rawness) is cited with some appearance of reason as the cause of the unlawful appearances of their way of thinking, in the external relation of *states* to one another it strikes the eye entirely unveiled and irrefutably. Within each state it is veiled by the compulsion of civil laws, because a greater power, that of the government, works mightily against the citizens' inclination to mutual violence. In this way the government gives the whole not only a moral appearance (*causae non causae*), but, by putting a bolt before the outbreak of unlawful inclinations, really makes the development of the moral disposition, toward immediate respect for right, much easier.—For each person now believes of himself that he would surely hold the concept of right sacred and follow it faithfully, if only he could expect the same from everyone else, and the government secures that in part for him. Thereby a great step *toward* morality is taken (though not yet a moral step): to cling to this concept of duty also for its own sake, without regard to reciprocation.—But since each person, with his good opinion of himself, nevertheless presupposes the evil disposition

in all others, they pass judgment on one another: that they are all, as regards the *fact*, of little worth (where this comes from, since it cannot be blamed on the *nature* of the human being as a free being, may be left undiscussed). But since respect for the concept of right, which the human being absolutely cannot shed, most solemnly sanctions the theory of the capacity to become conformable to it, each person sees that he for his part must act in accordance with it, let others do as they please.

Appendix II



II.

On the agreement of politics with morality, according to the transcendental concept of public right.

If I set aside all the *content* of public right (the various empirically given relations of people within a state, or of states with one another), as jurists usually think of it, I am still left with the *form of publicity*. Every claim of right contains the possibility of that form, because without it there would be no justice (which can only be thought of as *publicly knowable*), and so no right either, since right is granted only by justice.

Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity. It is very easy to judge whether the capacity is present in a case at hand, that is, whether the claim can be reconciled with the principles of the person acting or not. So it can serve as a criterion that is easy to use and is found a priori in reason, one that lets us recognize at once, in the latter case, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falseness (the contradiction to right) of the claim in question (*praetensio iuris*).

If we set aside everything empirical contained in the concept of the right of the state and of the right of nations (the wickedness of human nature, for example, which makes coercion necessary), we can call the following proposition the *transcendental formula* of public right:

“All actions that bear on the right of other people, whose maxim is not compatible with publicity, are wrong.”

This principle must be regarded not merely as *ethical* (belonging to the doctrine of virtue) but also as *juridical* (concerning the right of human beings). For take a maxim that I cannot *say aloud* without at the same time defeating my own purpose, that absolutely must be *kept secret* if it is to succeed, and that I cannot *declare publicly* without inevitably provoking everyone's resistance to my plan. The opposition that everyone is bound to mount against me, universal and necessary and therefore knowable a priori, can have no source other than the injustice with which that maxim threatens everyone.—The principle is further merely *negative*, that is, it serves only to recognize, by means of it, what is *not right* toward others.—It is like an axiom, certain though it cannot be proved, and it is also easy to apply, as the following examples from public right show.

- ¹ *As far as the right of the state* (ius ciuitatis), namely the internal kind, *is concerned*: a question arises in it that many consider hard to answer and that the transcendental principle of publicity resolves very easily: “Is rebellion a lawful means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant (non titulo sed exercitio talis)?” The rights of the people have been violated, and no wrong is done to him (the tyrant) by his dethronement; there is no doubt about that. Nonetheless it is wrong in the highest degree for the subjects to seek their right in this way. They could no more complain of injustice if they lost in this struggle and then had to endure the harshest punishment for it.

Here a great deal can be argued with sophistry for and against, if one wants to settle the matter by a dogmatic deduction of the grounds of right. The transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this long-windedness. By that principle, the people ask themselves, before the civil contract is made, whether they would dare to make known publicly the maxim of resolving to rebel on occasion. It is easy to see that if, in founding a constitution, one wanted to make it a condition that force may be used against the head of state in certain cases that might arise, the people would have to claim for themselves a lawful power over the head of state. But then there would be no head of state. Or, if both were made conditions of founding the state, no state

would be possible at all, which was nonetheless the people's intention. The wrong of rebellion is therefore plain from this: if one *declared it publicly*, the maxim of rebellion would make its own purpose impossible. So it would necessarily have to be kept secret.—The head of state, however, has no such need. The head of state can say openly that every uprising will be punished with the death of the ringleaders, even if the ringleaders believe, as they may, that the head of state was the first to break the fundamental law. For if the head of state is aware of possessing *irresistible* supreme power (which must be assumed in every civil constitution, because someone who does not have power enough to protect each person among the people against the others also has no right to command them), there is no need to worry that making the maxim known will defeat the head's own purpose. It fits well with this that if the rebellion succeeded, that head of state would have to step back into the position of a subject. The former head would equally have to refrain from starting a rebellion to regain power, but would also have nothing to fear in the way of being called to account for the earlier conduct of the state.

- ² *As far as the right of nations is concerned.*—The right of nations can be spoken of only on the assumption of some lawful condition (that is, the external condition under which a person can actually be given a right). For as a public right it already contains in its concept the publication of a general will that assigns to each what is theirs. This *status iuridicus* must arise from some contract. The contract need not (like the one from which a state arises) be founded on coercive laws; if need be it can also be the contract of a *continually free* association, such as the federation of different states mentioned above. For without some *lawful condition* that actively connects different persons (physical or moral), and so in the state of nature, there can be no right other than merely private right.—Here a conflict of politics with morality (taken as the doctrine of right) also arises, and the criterion of the publicity of maxims again finds easy application, but only in this way: the contract binds the states only for the purpose of keeping themselves at peace with one another and together against other states,

and by no means to make acquisitions.—The following cases of antinomy between politics and morality now arise, and the solution of each comes with it.

a) “If one of these states has promised the other something, whether assistance, or the cession of certain territories, or subsidies and the like, the question is whether, in a case on which the welfare of the state depends, it can release itself from keeping its word by wanting to be regarded as two persons: first as *sovereign*, answerable to no one in its state, and then again merely as the highest *state official*, who must give an account to the state. The conclusion then comes out that whatever it bound itself to in the first capacity, it is released from in the second.”—But if a state (or its head) were to say this maxim of its own aloud, then naturally either everyone else would avoid it, or would unite with others to resist its presumptions. This proves that politics, for all its cunning, would defeat its own purpose on these terms (of openness), and so that maxim must be wrong.

b) “If a neighboring power that has grown to a fearsome size (*potentia tremenda*) arouses concern, can one assume that because it *can* oppress, it also *wants* to? And does that give the less powerful a right to attack it (jointly), even without any prior offense?”—A state that wanted to *announce* its maxim here in the affirmative would bring about the evil only more certainly and more quickly. For the greater power would get ahead of the smaller ones, and as for the union of the smaller ones, that is only a frail staff of reed against someone who knows how to use *diuide et impera*.—This maxim of statecraft, declared publicly, therefore necessarily defeats its own purpose, and is consequently unjust.

c) “If a smaller state, by its position, breaks the continuity of a larger one, which the larger one nevertheless needs for its preservation, is the larger one not entitled to subjugate the smaller and merge it with its own?”—It is easy to see that the larger state must on no account say such a maxim aloud beforehand. For either the smaller states would unite early, or other powerful states would fight over this prey, and so the maxim makes itself unworkable through its

openness. That is a sign that it is unjust, and can be so to a very high degree. For the smallness of the object of injustice does not prevent the injustice shown toward it from being very great.

- 3 *As far as the right of world citizenship is concerned*, I pass over it here in silence, because, owing to its analogy with the right of nations, its maxims are easy to state and to assess.

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In the principle that the maxims of the right of nations are incompatible with publicity, we do have a good mark of the *disagreement* of politics with morality (as the doctrine of right). But we also need to be taught what the condition is under which their maxims agree with the right of nations. For one cannot conclude the reverse: that maxims which tolerate publicity are therefore also just. Someone who has decisive superior power need not hide their maxims.—The condition for the possibility of a right of nations at all is that a *lawful condition* first exists. For without it there is no public right; all right that one may imagine outside it (in the state of nature) is merely private right. Now we saw above that a federal condition of states, whose only purpose is to remove war, is the only *rightful* condition compatible with their *freedom*. So the agreement of politics with morality is possible only in a federal union (which is therefore given a priori according to principles of right, and is necessary). The lawful basis of all statecraft is the founding of this federal union, to the greatest possible extent. Without this aim, all of statecraft's scheming is folly and veiled injustice.—This sham politics has its own *casuistry*, which can hold its own against the best Jesuit school: the *reservatio mentalis*, in drafting public treaties, with terms that one can interpret on occasion to one's own advantage, as one likes (for example, the difference between the *status quo de fait* and *de droit*);—*probabilism*: contriving evil intentions in others, or making the probabilities of their possible superiority the legal ground for undermining other peaceful states;—and finally the *peccatum philosophicum* (*peccatillum*, *bagatelle*): regarding the swallowing of a *small* state, if a much *larger* one gains by it for the supposedly greater good of the world, as an easily forgivable trifle¹⁶.

This practice is encouraged by the double tongue of politics toward morality, which uses one branch of it or the other for its purposes.—Both love of humanity and respect for the right of human beings are duties; but the first is only a *conditional* duty, the second an *unconditional* duty that commands absolutely. Whoever wants to give themselves over to the sweet feeling of doing good must first be fully assured of not having violated the second. Politics readily agrees with morality in the first sense (as ethics), in order to give up the right of human beings to their superiors. But with morality in the second sense (as the doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knee, politics finds it advisable to make no contract with it at all, to deny it all reality, and to reinterpret all duties as mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily foil this trickery of a politics that shuns the light, through the publicity of politics's maxims, if politics would only dare to grant publicity to the philosopher's own maxims.

To this end I propose another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right, whose formula would be this:

"All maxims that *need* publicity (in order not to miss their purpose) agree with right and politics united."

For if they can reach their purpose only through publicity, they must conform to the general purpose of the public (happiness), and the proper task of politics is to agree with that purpose (to make the public content with its condition). But if this purpose is to be attainable only through publicity, that is, through the removal of all distrust of politics's maxims, then these maxims must also stand in harmony with the right of the public; for only in that right is the union of everyone's purposes possible.—I must put off the fuller development and discussion of this principle to another occasion. That it is a transcendental formula can be seen from this: all empirical conditions (those of the doctrine of happiness), which are the content of the law, are removed, and only the form of universal lawfulness is considered.

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If it is a duty, and at the same time there is well-founded hope, to make the condition of a public right real, even if only in an approximation that advances without end, then *perpetual peace*, which follows the so-called peace treaties made until now (falsely so called; they are really truces), is no empty idea but a task. Solved little by little, it comes steadily closer to its goal (since the periods in which equal progress is made will, one hopes, grow ever shorter).

- ¹⁶ The evidence for such maxims can be found in the essay by Court Councillor Garve: “On the connection of morality with politics, 1788.” This worthy scholar admits right at the start that he cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question. But to approve them nonetheless, even with the admission that he cannot fully remove the objections stirring against them, seems to be a greater indulgence toward those who are very inclined to abuse them than it would probably be advisable to grant.