



Toward Perpetual Peace

IMMANUEL KANT

Musean Translation

MOUSEIA



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Translated by Michael Berardi

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TRANSLATOR

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Title and preface



Toward Perpetual Peace.

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New, expanded edition.

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Toward Perpetual Peace.

Whether this satirical inscription on the sign of a Dutch innkeeper, which bore a painting of a graveyard, applies to *human beings* in general, or especially to heads of state who can never have enough of war, or perhaps only to the philosophers who dream that sweet dream, may remain an open question. The author of the present work does, however, make one reservation: since the practical politician regards the theoretical politician with great complacency as a mere academic whose insubstantial ideas pose no danger to a state that must proceed on principles drawn from experience, and whom he may always allow to knock down all eleven of his skittles at once without the *worldly-wise* statesman needing to take notice, the latter must also remain consistent in any dispute with him and not scent danger to the state behind opinions ventured at random and expressed in public. By this *protective clause*, the author hereby expressly safeguards himself, in due form, against every malicious interpretation.

Preliminary articles



First section,
containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states.

- ¹ “No peace settlement shall count as such if it is made with a secret reservation of grounds for a future war.”

For then it would be merely an armistice, a postponement of hostilities, not *peace*, which means the end of all hostilities; to attach the epithet *perpetual* to it would already be a suspicious redundancy. Every existing cause of a future war, even if the parties making peace are themselves perhaps still unaware of it, is extinguished by the peace settlement, however acutely it might be unearthed from archival documents. The reservation (*reservatio mentalis*) of old claims still to be devised in the future, which neither party wishes to mention for the moment because both are too exhausted to continue the war, coupled with the malicious intention of exploiting the first favorable opportunity for this purpose, belongs to Jesuit casuistry. Judged as the matter stands in itself, it is beneath the dignity of rulers, just as a minister’s readiness to entertain such deductions is beneath his own dignity.

But if, according to enlightened notions of statecraft, the true honor of a state lies in the constant enlargement of its power, whatever the means, then of course that judgment appears scholastic and pedantic.

- ² “No independently existing state, whether small or large—that makes no difference here—shall be capable of acquisition by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.”

A state is not a possession (*patrimonium*), as the land on which it stands might be. It is a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to command or dispose. To incorporate it, a trunk with roots of its own, into another state as a graft is to abolish its existence as a moral person and turn that person into a thing. It therefore contradicts the idea of the original contract, without which no right over a people can be conceived.¹ Everyone knows the dangers into which this prejudice about a way of acquiring states has brought Europe down to the most recent times—the other parts of the world have never known it. The prejudice is that states themselves can marry one another: partly as a new kind of industry, to become overwhelmingly powerful through family alliances without even expending strength, and partly to enlarge territorial possessions in this way. The hiring out of one state’s troops to another against an enemy they do not share must be counted here as well, for subjects are thereby used and used up as things to be handled at will.

- ³ “Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time cease altogether.”

For they incessantly threaten other states with war by appearing perpetually prepared for it. They provoke those states to outdo one another in the numbers under arms, an undertaking that knows no bounds. Since the resulting expense eventually makes peace even more burdensome than a short war, standing armies themselves become a cause of wars of aggression intended to cast off this burden. Moreover, being hired to kill or be killed seems to involve using human beings as mere machines and instruments in the hands of another—the state—in a way that can scarcely be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person. The voluntary, periodic training of citizens in arms, to secure themselves and their country against attacks from outside, is an entirely different matter. Accumulating a treasury would have a similar effect: other states would regard it as a threat of war and be driven to anticipatory attacks. For of the

three powers—*military power*, *the power of alliances*, and *financial power*—the last might well be the most dependable instrument of war, were it not for the difficulty of discovering its extent.

- 4 “No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the state’s external affairs.”

Seeking assistance outside or within the state for the purposes of its domestic economy—improving roads, establishing new settlements, providing stores against years of poor harvest, and so forth—is an unobjectionable source of help. But as an instrument by which powers oppose one another, a credit system of debts that grow without limit yet remain secure against present demands, since not all creditors will make their demands at once, is a dangerous financial power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century is a treasury for waging war that exceeds the treasuries of all other states combined. It can be exhausted only by the eventual failure of tax revenues, which can itself be postponed for a long time by the stimulation of commerce through its effect on industry and earnings. This ease of making war, combined with the inclination toward it among those in power—an inclination that seems ingrained in human nature—is therefore a great obstacle to perpetual peace. A preliminary article prohibiting it is all the more necessary because the national bankruptcy that is ultimately inevitable must also entangle other states in losses through no fault of their own, thereby publicly injuring them. Other states are therefore at least entitled to unite against such a state and its pretensions.

- 5 “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”

For what could entitle it to do so? Perhaps the scandal that the other state gives to its subjects? That state can instead serve as a warning through the example of the great evils a people has brought upon itself by its lawlessness. In general, the bad example one free person gives another, as an offense taken (*scandalum acceptum*), does not injure the latter’s rights. A different case would be a state divided by internal dissension into two parts, each constituting a separate state

that claims the whole. To assist one of them could not be charged against an outside state as interference in the constitution of the other, since the condition is then one of anarchy. But so long as this internal conflict remains undecided, interference by external powers would violate the rights of an independent people struggling only with its internal sickness. It would itself therefore be a scandal and make the autonomy of all states insecure.

- ⁶ “No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as must make mutual confidence in a future peace impossible: the employment of *assassins* (*percussores*) and *poisoners* (*venefici*), *breach of a capitulation*, *incitement to treason* (*perduellio*) in the state with which it is at war, and the like.”

These are dishonorable stratagems. Even in the midst of war, some confidence in the enemy’s way of thinking must remain, since otherwise no peace could be concluded and hostilities would turn into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*). War is, after all, only the sad expedient of the state of nature, where no court exists that could deliver a legally binding judgment, for asserting one’s right by force. Neither party can there be declared an unjust enemy, since that already presupposes a judicial verdict; rather, the war’s *outcome*, as before a so-called judgment of God, decides on which side right lies. Nor can a punitive war (*bellum punitivum*) between states be conceived, since they do not stand in the relation of superior and subordinate. It follows that a war of extermination, in which annihilation could overtake both parties together and with them all right, would permit perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war, and therefore the use of means leading to it, must be absolutely forbidden. That the means named above inevitably lead to it is clear from this: those infernal arts, being base in themselves, do not, once they have come into use, remain long within the bounds of war, as the use of spies (*vti exploratoribus*) does, where only the dishonor of *others*, which cannot be eradicated, is exploited, but pass over into the condition of peace as well and thus utterly destroy its purpose.

Although the laws set out above are objectively—that is, in the intention of those in power—all *prohibitive laws* (*leges prohibitiuae*), some are of the *strict* kind, applying without regard to circumstances (*leges strictae*) and demanding abolition *at once*, as do articles 1, 5, and 6. Others, such as articles 2, 3, and 4, are not exceptions to the rule of right, yet circumstances allow a *subjective* extension of discretion regarding their *execution* (*leges latae*), and they permit that execution to be *postponed*. This must never lose sight of its purpose. For instance, postponing the *restoration* of freedom taken from certain states, under article 2, does not permit putting it off until the day that never comes—as Augustus used to promise, *ad calendas graecas*—and thus failing to restore it at all. It permits delay only so that restoration does not take place precipitately and thereby defeat its own purpose. For the prohibition concerns only the *manner of acquisition*, which must cease to be valid in the future, not the *state of possession*. Although the latter lacks the requisite legal title, it was nevertheless regarded as lawful by all states at the time of its supposed acquisition, according to the public opinion prevailing then.²

- ¹ A hereditary realm is not a state that can be inherited by another state. Rather, its right of government can pass by inheritance to another natural person. The state then acquires a ruler; the ruler, as such—that is, as one who already possesses another realm—does not acquire the state.
- ² Whether pure reason can contain *permissive laws* (*leges permissiuae*) in addition to commands (*leges praeceptiuae*) and prohibitions (*leges prohibitiuae*) has so far been doubted, not without reason. Laws in general contain a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permission contains a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions. A *permissive law* would therefore contain compulsion to an action to which no one can be compelled. If the law's object had the same meaning in both respects, this would be a contradiction. Here, however, the prohibition presupposed in the permissive law concerns only the future manner of acquiring a right, for example through inheritance, while exemption from that prohibition—that is, permission—concerns the existing state of possession. In the passage from the state of nature to the civil condi-

tion, this possession, though unlawful, may nevertheless continue as *honest possession* (*possessio putativa*) under a permissive law of natural right. This holds even though a merely supposed possession, as soon as it is recognized as such, is forbidden in the state of nature, as is a similar manner of acquisition in the subsequent civil condition, after the transition. This authorization to continue possessing would not apply if such a supposed acquisition had occurred in the civil condition; for there, as an injury to right, it would have to cease immediately upon discovery of its unlawfulness.

I have wished only incidentally to draw the attention of teachers of natural right to the concept of a *lex permissiva*, which presents itself naturally to a reason that divides things systematically. This is especially pertinent because it is often used in civil, statutory law, with this difference: the prohibitory law stands by itself, while permission is not incorporated into that law as a limiting condition, as it should be, but is relegated to the exceptions. The formula then runs: this or that is forbidden, *unless* it is case 1, case 2, case 3, and so on without end. Permissions thus enter the law merely by chance, not according to a principle, but by groping among the cases that arise. Otherwise the conditions would have had to be incorporated *into the formula of the prohibitory law*, which would thereby have become a permissive law as well. It is therefore regrettable that the ingenious but unresolved prize question proposed by that equally wise and acute gentleman, *Count von Windischgrätz*, which pressed precisely for this, was abandoned so soon. The possibility of such a formula, analogous to a mathematical one, is the sole genuine touchstone of legislation that remains consistent; without it, so-called *ius certum*, certain law, will always remain a pious wish. Otherwise we shall have merely *general* laws, valid *in general*, but no universal laws, valid *universally*, as the very concept of a law seems to require.

Definitive articles: introduction



Second section,

containing the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.

The condition of peace among human beings living beside one another is not the natural condition (*status naturalis*), which is rather a condition of war: even if hostilities do not always break out, their threat is perpetual. Peace must therefore be *established*. For refraining from hostilities does not yet guarantee security against them; unless one neighbor gives another that security, which can happen only in a *lawful* condition, the one who has demanded it may treat the other as an enemy.³

- ³ It is commonly assumed that I may act with hostility toward no one unless he has already actively *injured me*. This is entirely correct when both of us are in a *civil, lawful* condition. For by entering that condition, he gives the other the required security through the authority that has power over both. But a human being—or a people—in the mere state of nature deprives me of this security and injures me by that very condition, simply by being beside me: not actively, in deed (*facto*), yet through the lawlessness of his condition (*statu iniusto*), by which I am constantly threatened. I may compel him either to enter with me

into a shared lawful condition or to withdraw from my neighborhood. The postulate underlying all the following articles is therefore this: all human beings capable of affecting one another must belong to some civil constitution.

Rightful constitutions, considered in relation to the persons within them, are:

1) those founded on the *civic right* of human beings within a people (*ius ciuitatis*);

2) those founded on the *right of nations*, governing states in their relations with one another (*ius gentium*);

3) those founded on *cosmopolitan right*, insofar as human beings and states, standing in relations of external influence upon one another, must be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humanity (*ius cosmopoliticum*). This division is not arbitrary, but necessary in relation to the idea of perpetual peace. For if even one of these persons stood in a relation of physical influence upon another while remaining in the state of nature, that would entail the condition of war, from which it is precisely our purpose here to be freed.

First definitive article



First definitive article for perpetual peace.

The civil constitution of every state shall be republican.

A constitution established, first, on principles of the *freedom* of the members of a society as human beings; second, on principles of the *dependence* of all upon a single common legislation as subjects; and third, on the law of their *equality as citizens*, is the *republican* constitution.⁴ It alone proceeds from the idea of the original contract, on which all rightful legislation of a people must be founded. In respect of right, it is therefore in itself the constitution originally underlying every kind of civil constitution. The only question now is whether it is also the only one that can lead to perpetual peace.

Besides the purity of its origin in the pure source of the concept of right, the republican constitution also offers the prospect of the desired result, perpetual peace. The reason is this. If the consent of the citizens is required to decide “whether there shall be war or not,” as it must be under this constitution, nothing is more natural than that they will think very carefully before embarking on so disastrous a game. They would have to decree all the hardships of war upon themselves: fighting in person, paying its costs from their own property, painfully repairing the devastation it leaves behind, and finally, to complete the burden of evils, taking on a load of debt that embitters peace itself and can never be paid off because new wars are always imminent. By contrast, in a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republi-

can, deciding on war is the most untroubling matter in the world. The head of state is not a fellow member of the state but its owner; war costs him nothing of his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivities, and the like. He may therefore resolve upon it as a kind of pleasure outing, for the most trivial reasons, and indifferently leave its justification, for propriety's sake, to the diplomatic corps that is always ready to provide one.

To avoid confusing the republican constitution with the democratic, as commonly happens, the following distinction must be observed. The forms of a state (*ciuitas*) can be divided either according to the persons who hold supreme state power or according to the *manner of government* exercised over the people by their head, whoever that may be. The first is properly called the form of *sovereignty* (*forma imperii*). Only three are possible: either *one*, *some* united together, or *all* who compose civil society possess ruling power—*autocracy*, *aristocracy*, and *democracy*: the power of a prince, of the nobility, and of the people. The second is the form of government (*forma regiminis*). It concerns the way the state exercises its plenary power on the basis of its constitution—the act of the general will by which a multitude becomes a people. In this respect it is either *republican* or *despotic*. *Republicanism* is the political principle that separates executive power, the government, from legislative power. Despotism is the state's arbitrary execution of laws it has itself given: the public will, in other words, insofar as the ruler handles it as his private will. Of the three forms of state, *democracy*, in the strict sense of the word, is necessarily a *despotism*, because it establishes an executive power in which all decide about, and if necessary against, one who does not agree. Thus all, who are nevertheless not all, decide—a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.

Every form of government that is not *representative* is, properly speaking, a malformed constitution. For the legislator cannot in one and the same person also be the executor of his will, any more than the universal proposition of a syllogism's major premise can also be the subsumption of the particular under it in the minor premise. Although the other two constitutions of state are always defective insofar as they leave room for such a manner of government, it is at

least possible for them to adopt one consistent with the *spirit* of a representative system. Frederick II, for example, at least *said* that he was merely the highest servant of the state.⁵ A democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, because everyone there wishes to be master. We may therefore say: the smaller the personnel of state power—the number of rulers—and the greater its representation, the more the constitution accords with the possibility of republicanism and can hope eventually to rise to it through gradual reforms. For this reason it is already harder in an aristocracy than in a monarchy to attain this sole perfectly rightful constitution, while in a democracy it is impossible except through violent revolution. Yet the manner of government⁶ matters incomparably more to the people than the form of state, although the latter's greater or lesser suitability to that end also matters a great deal. If the former is to accord with the concept of right, it requires the representative system, in which alone a republican manner of government is possible. Without that system, whatever the constitution may be, government is despotic and violent. None of the ancient so-called republics knew this system, and they therefore necessarily dissolved into despotism, which is still most bearable under the supreme power of a single ruler.

⁴ *Rightful*, and therefore external, *freedom* cannot be defined, as is often done, as the authorization “to do whatever one wishes, provided one wrongs no one.” For what does *authorization* mean? The possibility of an action insofar as one thereby wrongs no one. The definition would therefore run: “Freedom is the possibility of actions by which one wrongs no one—one may do whatever one wishes—provided one wrongs no one.” This is an empty tautology. Rather, my external, rightful *freedom* must be defined as the authorization to obey no external laws except those to which I could have given my consent. Similarly, external, rightful *equality* within a state is the relation among citizens in which no one can legally bind another to anything without at the same time submitting to the law under which that other could reciprocally bind him in the same way. The principle of *rightful* dependence needs no explanation, since it already lies in the very concept of a constitution of state. The validity of these

innate, inalienable rights, which necessarily belong to humanity, is confirmed and elevated by the principle governing a human being's rightful relations even to higher beings, if he conceives of such beings. For he represents himself as a citizen of a supersensible world under those very same principles. As regards my freedom, I am bound even by divine laws knowable to me through reason alone only insofar as I could myself have consented to them; for it is through the law of freedom of my own reason that I first form a concept of the divine will. As regards the principle of *equality* in relation to the loftiest being in the world apart from God that I might conceive—a great *Aeon*—there is no reason why, if I perform my duty in my station as that Aeon does in his, I should have only the duty to obey while he has the right to command. The reason this principle of *equality*, unlike that of freedom, does not also apply to the relation to God is that God is the only being to whom the concept of duty does not apply.

As for the right of equality of all citizens as subjects, the question whether *hereditary nobility* is permissible turns entirely on this: “Must the *rank* granted by the state to one subject over another precede *merit*, or must merit precede rank?” Now it is plain that if rank is attached to birth, it is wholly uncertain whether merit—competence and fidelity in office—will follow. It is therefore just as if the favored person were granted the right to command without any merit at all. The general will of the people would never decree this in an original contract, which is the principle of all rights. For a nobleman is not on that account immediately a *noble* man. As for *official nobility*, as the rank of a higher magistracy might be called, which must be earned by merit, rank does not attach to the person as property, but to the office. Equality is not thereby violated, because when the person lays down the office, he also lays down the rank and returns to the people.

- ⁵ The lofty titles often bestowed upon a ruler—God’s anointed, administrator of the divine will on earth, and its representative—have often been censured as crude flattery that makes the head swim. But this seems to me to be without reason. Far from making a sovereign arrogant, they must rather humble him in his soul, if he has understanding, as we must presume, and reflects that he has

undertaken an office too great for a human being: administering the holiest thing God possesses on earth, the *right of human beings*. He must always fear that he may in some respect have encroached upon this apple of God's eye.

- ⁶ Mallet du Pan, with a show of genius in his hollow, insubstantial language, boasts that after many years of experience he has finally become convinced of the truth of *Pope's* familiar saying: "Let fools dispute which government is best; the best conducted is the best." If this means that the government best conducted is best conducted, he has, in Swift's phrase, cracked a nut that rewarded him with a maggot. If it means, however, that it is also the best manner of government—that is, the best constitution of state—it is fundamentally false. Examples of good governments prove nothing about the manner of government. Who ever governed better than *Titus* and *Marcus Aurelius*? Yet one left *Domitian* and the other *Commodus* as successors. This could not have happened under a good constitution of state, since their unfitness for the office was known early enough, and the ruler's power was also sufficient to exclude them.

Second definitive article



Second definitive article for perpetual peace.

The right of nations shall be founded on a *federalism* of free states.

Peoples, considered as states, can be judged like individual human beings who, in their natural condition—that is, in independence from external laws—injure one another merely by existing side by side. Each, for the sake of its security, can and ought to require the other to enter with it into a constitution resembling a civil one, in which each can be assured of its right. This would be a *league of peoples*, which would not, however, have to be a state of peoples. The latter would involve a contradiction. Every state contains the relation of a *superior*, the legislator, to an *inferior*, the obedient subject, namely the people; but many peoples within one state would constitute only one people. That contradicts the presupposition here, since we are considering the right of *peoples* toward one another insofar as they constitute so many different states and are not to be fused into a single state.

We regard with profound contempt the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom: their preference for incessant fighting over submission to a lawful constraint they would themselves establish, and thus for a mad freedom over a rational one. We consider it barbarism, uncouthness, and a bestial degradation of humanity. One would therefore think that civilized peoples, each united in a state of its own, would hasten to escape so debased a condition as soon as possible. Instead, every *state* locates its majesty precisely in being subject to no exter-

nal lawful constraint at all—for the majesty of a people is an absurd expression. Its ruler's splendor consists in having many thousands at his command who can be made to sacrifice themselves for a cause that does not concern them, without his needing to place himself in danger.⁷ The chief difference between European savages and American ones is that, whereas some tribes of the latter have been entirely eaten by their enemies, the former know better how to use their vanquished than to devour them: they prefer to increase the number of their subjects and thereby the number of instruments for still more extensive wars.

Given the wickedness of human nature, which shows itself undisguised in the free relations among peoples, though the government's constraint greatly conceals it in the civil, lawful condition, it is nevertheless remarkable that the word *right* has not yet been wholly banished from the politics of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet dared publicly to declare itself for that view. *Hugo Grotius*, *Pufendorf*, *Vattel*, and others—all sorry comforters—are still candidly cited to *justify* a military attack, although their code, whether composed philosophically or diplomatically, has not the slightest *legal* force and cannot have any, since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint. Yet there is no example of a state ever being moved to abandon its purpose by arguments armed with the testimony of such important men. The homage every state pays to the concept of right, at least in words, nevertheless proves that a still greater moral capacity lies within the human being, though it now slumbers: a capacity eventually to master the evil principle within him, which he cannot deny, and to hope the same of others. Otherwise the word *right* would never enter the mouths of states wishing to make war on one another, except merely to mock it, as that Gallic ruler declared: "It is the advantage nature has given the stronger over the weaker that the latter should obey him."

States can pursue their right only through war, never through a lawsuit before an external court; yet war and its favorable outcome, *victory*, do not decide what is right. A *peace treaty* may end the present war, but not the condition of war, for which a new pretext can always be found. Nor can this condition simply be declared unjust, since in it everyone is judge in his own cause. Nevertheless, what natural right requires of human beings in a lawless condi-

tion—"that they ought to leave this condition"—cannot apply in quite the same way to states under the right of nations. As states, they already possess an internal rightful constitution and have thus outgrown the coercion of others who would bring them, according to their own concepts of right, under a wider lawful constitution. Yet reason, speaking from the throne of supreme moral legislative authority, unconditionally condemns war as a legal procedure and makes the condition of peace an immediate duty. Since that condition cannot be established or secured without a compact among peoples, there must be a league of a special kind, which may be called a *league of peace* (*foedus pacificum*). It would differ from a *peace treaty* (*pactum pacis*) in this: the treaty seeks to end only *one* war, while the league seeks to end *all* wars forever. This league aims at acquiring no power belonging to a state, but solely at preserving and securing the *freedom* of a state for itself and at the same time for its allied states. These states need not therefore submit, as human beings in the state of nature must, to public laws and coercion under them. The feasibility, or objective reality, of this idea of *federation*, which is gradually to extend over all states and thereby lead to perpetual peace, can be shown. If fortune so ordains that a powerful and enlightened people can form itself into a republic, which by its nature must incline toward perpetual peace, that republic provides a center of federal association for other states to join. It can thus secure the condition of freedom among states in accordance with the idea of the right of nations, and gradually extend further through additional associations of this kind.

When a people says, "There shall be no war among us, for we intend to form ourselves into a state—that is, to establish over ourselves a supreme legislative, governing, and judicial power that settles our disputes peacefully," this is intelligible. But when this state says, "There shall be no war between me and other states, although I recognize no supreme legislative authority that secures my right to me, and whose right I secure to it," it is quite unintelligible what could then ground my confidence in my right, unless it is the substitute for the civil social compact: free federalism. Reason must necessarily connect this with the concept of the right of nations if anything at all is to remain thinkable in that concept.

Strictly speaking, nothing can be thought in the concept of the right of nations as a right *to* war. It would mean a right to determine what is right by force, according to unilateral maxims rather than universally valid external laws restricting the freedom of each individual. The only possible meaning would be that human beings who think in this way are treated quite rightly when they wear one another down and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence together with their authors. For states in their relations with one another, reason can offer no way out of the lawless condition of sheer war except that they, like individual human beings, abandon their savage, lawless freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and form a *state of peoples* (*ciuitas gentium*), necessarily always growing, that would ultimately embrace every people on earth. Yet according to their idea of the right of nations they will not have this at all: they reject *in application* what is right *in principle*. If all is not to be lost, therefore, only the *negative* substitute of an enduring and ever-expanding *league* that wards off war can take the place of the positive idea of *a world republic* and check the stream of hostile inclinations that shun right—though always with the danger that they will break out (*“Impious Fury rages within, ghastly and bloody-mouthed.” Virgil.*)⁸

⁷ Thus a Bulgarian prince answered a Greek emperor who good-naturedly wished to settle their dispute by single combat: “A smith who has tongs will not pull the glowing iron out of the coals with his hands.”

⁸ After a war has ended, at the conclusion of peace, it might not be unfitting for a people to proclaim a day of repentance after its thanksgiving celebration, invoking heaven in the name of the state for forgiveness of the great sin of which the human race still makes itself guilty: its refusal to submit to a lawful constitution in relation to other peoples, preferring, in its pride in independence, the barbarous means of war, which does not decide the very thing sought, namely each state’s right. Thanksgiving celebrations during a war for a *victory* won, and hymns sung, in good Israelite fashion, to the *Lord of Hosts*, stand in no less sharp a contrast with the moral idea of the Father of human

beings. Besides indifference to the manner in which peoples seek their mutual right, which is sad enough, they introduce delight at having destroyed a great many human beings or their happiness.

Third definitive article



Third definitive article for perpetual peace.

“*Cosmopolitan right* shall be limited to the conditions of universal *hospitality*.”

Here, as in the preceding articles, the concern is not philanthropy but *right*. In this sense, *hospitality*, or hospitable conduct, means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on another’s soil. The other may turn him away if this can be done without bringing about his destruction; but so long as he conducts himself peacefully where he is, he must not be treated as an enemy. He can claim no *right to be a guest*, which would require a special agreement granting him the favor of membership in the household for a certain time. He has only a *right of visitation*: the right of all human beings to offer to associate with others, by virtue of their right to common possession of the earth’s surface. Since that surface is spherical, they cannot disperse over it without limit but must eventually tolerate one another’s presence; originally, no one has more right than another to be in any particular place on earth. Uninhabitable parts of this surface—the sea and sandy deserts—divide this community, yet the *ship* and the *camel*, the *ship* of the desert, make it possible to approach one another across these unowned regions and use the right to the *surface*, which belongs to humanity in common, for possible intercourse. The inhospitable conduct of coastal peoples, such as the Barbary corsairs, who plunder ships in neighboring seas or enslave shipwrecked sailors, and that of desert peoples, the Arabian Bedouins, who regard an approach to their nomadic

tribes as entitling them to plunder those who come, is therefore contrary to natural right. Yet this right of hospitality, the authorization of foreign arrivals, extends only to the conditions that make it possible to *attempt* intercourse with the established inhabitants. In this way, distant parts of the world can enter peacefully into relations that eventually become publicly lawful, and thus bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.

Compare this with the *inhospitable* behavior of the civilized states of our part of the world, especially the commercial ones. The injustice they display in *visiting* foreign lands and peoples, which they consider equivalent to *conquering* them, reaches terrifying proportions. America, the lands of Black peoples, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were, upon their discovery, lands that in their eyes belonged to no one; for they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies, Hindustan, they brought foreign troops under the pretext of merely intending to establish trading posts. With them came oppression of the inhabitants, the incitement of its different states to extensive wars, famine, rebellion, treachery, and whatever else belongs to the litany of evils that oppress the human race.

China⁹ and Japan, *Nipon*, having tried the experiment with such guests, have therefore acted wisely: China has allowed approach but not entry, while Japan has allowed even the former to only one European people, the Dutch, whom it nevertheless excludes, like prisoners, from contact with the inhabitants. The worst of it—or the best, from the standpoint of a moral judge—is that the perpetrators do not even enjoy the fruits of this violence. All these trading companies stand on the brink of collapse. The sugar islands, that seat of the cruelest and most calculated slavery, yield no genuine return; they serve only indirectly, for a purpose that is not very praiseworthy: training sailors for war fleets, and thus once again for wars in Europe. This is what is wanted by those who make much of their piety and, while drinking injustice like water, wish to be counted among the elect in orthodox belief.

The narrower or wider community that has now everywhere taken hold among the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of right in *one* place is felt in *all*. The idea of cosmopolitan right is therefore no fanciful,

extravagant conception of right. It is a necessary supplement to the unwritten code of civil right and of the right of nations, completing public right for humanity as a whole and thus serving perpetual peace. Only under this condition may we flatter ourselves that we are continually approaching it.

- ⁹ To write this great empire's name as it calls itself—*China*, not Sina or a similar sound—one need only consult *Georgii Alphab. Tibet. pag. 651 - 654.*, especially *Nota b* at the foot of the page. According to the observation of the St. Petersburg professor *Fischer*, it actually has no fixed name by which it calls itself. The most usual is still the word *Kin*, meaning gold, which the Tibetans express by *Ser*; hence the emperor is called King of *Gold*, of the most splendid country in the world. Within the empire itself this word may well sound like *Chin*, though the Italian missionaries may have pronounced it *Kin* because of the guttural letter. This shows that the land the Romans called that of the *Seres* was China, but that silk was conveyed to Europe through *Greater Tibet*, presumably through *Lesser Tibet* and Bukharia, through Persia, and onward. This leads to various reflections on the antiquity of this astonishing state in comparison with Hindustan, given its connection with *Tibet* and, through *Tibet*, with Japan; whereas the name Sina or Tschina, supposedly given to the country by its neighbors, leads nowhere. Perhaps the ancient, though never properly known, connection between Europe and Tibet can also be explained by what *Hesychius* has preserved for us: the hierophant's cry Κονξ Ομπας, *Konx Ompax*, in the Eleusinian mysteries. (See *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis*, part 5, pp. 447 ff.) For according to *Georgii Alph. Tibet.*, *Concioa* means *God*, a striking resemblance to *Konx. Pab-cio. (ib. p. 520)*, which the Greeks could easily have pronounced *pax*, means *promulgator legis*, proclaimer of the law: the deity diffused throughout nature, also called *Cencresi*, p. 177. But *Om*, which *La Croze* translates as *benedictus*, blessed, can, when applied to the deity, surely mean nothing other than the *one proclaimed blessed*, p. 507. Now *P. Franz. Horatius*, who often asked the Tibetan *lamas* what they understood by God, *Concioa*, always received the answer: "*It is the assembly of all saints.*" These are the souls of the blessed who, through Lamaist rebirth, after many wanderings through bodies

of every kind, have finally returned to the deity and been transformed into *Burchane*, that is, beings worthy of worship (*p. 223*). That mysterious expression, *Konx Ompax*, would therefore presumably signify the *holy* (*Konx*), *blessed* (*Om*), and *wise* (*Pax*) supreme being diffused everywhere throughout the world—personified nature. Used in the Greek *mysteries*, it would presumably have indicated *monotheism* to the fully initiated, in contrast to the people's *polytheism*, although *P. Horatius* (*loc. cit.*) scented *atheism* in it. The way this mysterious expression reached the Greeks through Tibet can be explained as above; conversely, this also makes an early connection between Europe and China through Tibet, perhaps earlier even than with Hindustan, probable.

First supplement



On the guarantee of perpetual peace.

What provides this assurance (guarantee) is nothing less than the great artist *nature* (*natura daedala rerum*), from whose mechanical course purposiveness visibly shines forth, and who lets concord arise by means of the discord of human beings, even against their will. For this reason nature, when we think of her as the compulsion of a cause whose laws of operation are unknown to us, is called *fate*; but when we consider her purposiveness in the course of the world as the deep-lying wisdom of a higher cause, directed to the objective final end of the human race and predetermining this course of the world, she is called *providence*¹⁰. Strictly speaking, we cannot *recognize* this providence in the artful arrangements of nature, or even *infer* it from them; rather (as in every relation of the form of things to ends generally) we can and must only *add it in thought*, in order to form a concept of its possibility on the analogy of human works of art. But to represent its relation and accord to the end that reason prescribes to us directly (the moral end) is an idea that, though transcendent for *theoretical* purposes, is dogmatic and well grounded as to its reality for practical ones (for example, with regard to the concept of duty *concerning perpetual peace*, in order to turn that mechanism of nature to its use). The use of the word *nature* is also, when the concern is merely theory (not religion), as it is here, more fitting to the limits of human reason (which, in regard to the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within the bounds of possible experience), and *more modest*

than the expression of a *providence* knowable to us, with which one presumptuously fits on Icarian wings in order to come closer to the mystery of its unfathomable purpose.

Before we define this guarantee more closely, it will be necessary first to inquire into the condition that nature has arranged for the persons acting on her great stage, a condition that in the end makes her securing of peace necessary—and only then the manner in which she provides it.

Her provisional arrangement consists in this: that she 1) has seen to it that human beings can live in every region of the earth; 2) has driven them by *war* everywhere, even into the most inhospitable regions, in order to populate them; 3) by that same means has compelled them to enter into more or less lawful relations. That moss still grows in the cold wastes by the Arctic Ocean, which the *reindeer* scrapes out from under the snow in order itself to be the food, or even the draft team, of the Ostyak or Samoyed; or that the salty sandy deserts still contain the *camel*, which seems as if created for traveling across them, so that they not be left unused, is already admirable. But the purpose shines forth still more clearly when one notices how, besides the fur-bearing animals on the shore of the Arctic Ocean, seals, walruses, and whales also supply the local inhabitants with food in their flesh and with fuel in their blubber oil. Most of all, though, nature's foresight arouses admiration through the driftwood that she brings to these regions bare of vegetation (without anyone quite knowing where it comes from), a material without which the inhabitants could prepare neither their boats and weapons nor their huts for shelter; and there they have enough to do with the war against the animals to live peacefully among themselves. But what *drove them there* was presumably nothing other than war. The first *instrument of war* among all the animals that human beings, in the course of the earth's being populated, had learned to tame and domesticate is the *horse* (for the elephant belongs to a later time, namely that of the luxury of already established states), just as the art of cultivating certain kinds of grass, called *grain*, which in their original nature we can no longer recognize, and likewise the multiplication and refinement of the *varieties of fruit* by transplanting and grafting (perhaps in Europe only two species, crab apples and wild

pears), could arise only in the condition of already established states, where secure ownership of land existed—after human beings, in lawless freedom, had first made their way from the *hunting*¹¹, fishing, and herding life to the *farming life*, and now *salt* and *iron* were discovered and perhaps became the first articles, sought far and wide, of trade among different peoples, by which they were first brought into a *peaceful relation* with one another, and so, even with more distant peoples, into understanding, community, and peaceful relations with one another.

In providing that human beings *could* live everywhere on earth, nature at the same time despotically willed that they *should* live everywhere, even against their inclination, and even without this “should” presupposing a concept of duty that would bind them to it by means of a moral law; instead, to attain this end of hers, she chose war. For we see peoples who make the unity of their descent recognizable through the unity of their language, such as the *Samoyeds* on the Arctic Ocean on one side, and on the other a people of similar language two hundred miles away in the *Altaic* Mountains, between whom another people, a Mongol one, mounted and therefore warlike, has pressed in and so scattered that part of their stock, far from the other, into the most inhospitable icy regions, where they would certainly not have spread of their own inclination¹²; so too the *Finns* in the northernmost region of Europe, called *Lapps*, are separated from the *Hungarians*, now just as far away but related to them in language, by Gothic and Sarmatian peoples who pushed in between; and what else could have driven the *Eskimos* (perhaps ancient European adventurers, a race entirely distinct from all the Americans) in the north, and the *Pescheräs* in the south of America, as far as Tierra del Fuego, if not war, which nature employs as a means to populate the earth everywhere? War itself, however, needs no particular motive but seems to be grafted onto human nature, and even to pass as something noble, to which human beings are inspired by the drive for honor, without self-interested incentives: so that *martial courage* (among the native peoples of America as well as among Europeans in the age of chivalry) is judged to be of great and immediate worth not merely *when* there is war (as is fitting) but also *that* there be war, and war is often begun merely to display that

courage; consequently an inner *dignity* is attributed to war in itself, to the point that even philosophers, as though it were a certain ennobling of humanity, deliver a eulogy upon it, unmindful of the saying of that Greek: "War is bad in that it makes more wicked people than it removes." So much for what nature does for *her own end* with regard to the human species as a class of animals.

Now comes the question that concerns the essential point of the aim of perpetual peace: "What does nature do toward this aim, in relation to the end that human beings' own reason makes their duty, and thus to favor their *moral aim*; and how does she provide the guarantee that what human beings *ought* to do according to laws of freedom, but do not do, is also secured, without prejudice to this freedom, by a compulsion of nature, so that they *will* do it—and this in all three relations of public right: *civil* right, the right of *nations*, and *cosmopolitan right*?" When I say of nature that she *wills* this or that to happen, this does not mean that she lays upon us a duty to do it (for only practical reason, free of coercion, can do that), but that she *does* it herself, whether we want to or not (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*).

- ¹ When a people is not compelled by internal dissension to submit to the constraint of public laws, war from without would still do so, since, by the natural arrangement mentioned earlier, each people finds another people pressing upon it as a neighbor, against which it must form itself internally into a *state* in order to be armed, as a *power*, against that neighbor. Now the *republican* constitution is the only one fully suited to the right of human beings, but it is also the hardest to establish, and harder still to maintain, so much so that many assert it would have to be a state of *angels*, because human beings with their selfish inclinations would be incapable of a constitution of so sublime a form. But now nature comes to the aid of the revered general will, grounded in reason but powerless in practice, and does so precisely by means of those selfish inclinations, so that all that matters is a good organization of the state (which is certainly within the power of human beings) to direct the forces of those inclinations against one another in such a way that one checks the others in their destructive effect, or cancels it; so that, as far as reason is concerned, the result is

as if neither were there at all, and thus a human being, though not a morally good human being, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen. The problem of establishing a state, hard as it sounds, can be solved even for a nation of devils (provided they have understanding), and runs thus: "To order a multitude of rational beings who all demand universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt themselves from them, and so to arrange their constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one another, these check one another in such a way that in their public conduct the result is exactly the same as if they had no such evil dispositions." Such a problem must be *solvable*. For it is not the moral improvement of human beings, but only the mechanism of nature, that the task requires us to know how to use on human beings in order to direct the conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions within a people in such a way that they themselves compel one another to submit to coercive laws, and so must bring about the condition of peace in which laws have force. One can also see this in the states that actually exist, still very imperfectly organized as they are: that in their external conduct they already come very close to what the idea of right prescribes, although the inner side of morality is certainly not the cause of this (just as it is not from morality that a good constitution is to be expected but, conversely, from the good constitution that the good moral formation of a people is first to be expected), and that consequently the mechanism of nature, operating through selfish inclinations that naturally also work against one another outwardly, can be used by reason as a means of making room for reason's own end, the precept of right, and thereby also, so far as it lies with the state itself, of promoting and securing peace both internal and external. Here, then, the rule is: nature irresistibly *wills* that right should in the end gain the upper hand. What one neglects to do here comes about by itself in the end, though with much inconvenience. "Bend the reed too hard and it breaks; and whoever wants too much wants nothing." *Bouterwek*.

- ² The idea of the right of nations presupposes the *separation* of many neighboring states independent of one another; and although such a condition is in itself already a condition of war (unless a federative union among them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), even this, according to the idea of reason, is better than their fusion under a power that overgrows the rest and passes over into a universal monarchy; because laws lose more and more of their force as the scope of government grows, and a soulless despotism, after it has uprooted the seeds of the good, finally lapses into anarchy all the same. Yet it is the desire of every state (or of its head) to establish itself in a lasting condition of peace in this way: by ruling, if possible, the whole world. But *nature wills it* otherwise. She makes use of two means to keep peoples from mixing and to separate them: the difference of *languages* and of *religions*¹³, which does bring with it a propensity to mutual hatred and a pretext for war, but which, with growing culture and the gradual approach of human beings to greater agreement in principles, leads to an accord in a peace that is brought about and secured not, like that despotism (in the graveyard of freedom), by the weakening of all forces, but by their equilibrium, in their liveliest competition.
- ³ Just as nature wisely separates the peoples that the will of every state, even on grounds of the right of nations, would gladly unite under itself by cunning or force, so on the other hand she unites, through reciprocal self-interest, peoples whom the concept of cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war. It is the *spirit of commerce*, which cannot coexist with war and which sooner or later takes hold of every people. For since, among all the powers (means) subordinate to the power of the state, the *power of money* may well be the most reliable, states find themselves impelled (to be sure, not exactly by incentives of morality) to promote noble peace and, wherever in the world war threatens to break out, to avert it by mediation, as if they stood in a permanent alliance for that purpose; for great leagues for war can, by the nature of the case, occur only very rarely, and succeed more rarely still. In this way nature guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanism in human inclinations themselves;

to be sure with a certainty that is not sufficient to *prophesy* its future (theoretically), but that is nonetheless adequate in a practical respect and makes it a duty to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end.

- ¹⁰ In the mechanism of nature, to which the human being (as a sensible being) also belongs, there shows itself a form already underlying its existence, which we can make comprehensible to ourselves only by attributing to it the purpose of an author of the world who determines it beforehand. We call this author's predetermination (divine) *providence* in general; insofar as it is laid into the *beginning* of the world, *founding* providence (prouidentia conditrix; semel iussit, semper parent, *Augustin.*); insofar as it serves, in the *course* of nature, to maintain that course according to universal laws of purposiveness, *governing* providence (prouidentia gubernatrix); further, insofar as it aims at particular ends that human beings cannot foresee but can only surmise from the outcome, *guiding* providence (prouidentia directrix); and finally, with regard to individual events considered as divine ends, no longer providence but *dispensation* (directio extraordinaria). To want to recognize this as such (since it in fact points to miracles, although the events are not so named) is foolish presumption on the part of human beings; for to infer from a single event a particular principle of the operative cause (that this event is an end, and not merely a natural-mechanical by-product of some other end wholly unknown to us) is absurd and full of self-conceit, however pious and humble the language about it may sound. Likewise the division of providence (considered *materialiter*), as it extends to *objects* in the world, into *general* and *particular* providence, is false and self-contradictory (namely that it is, for example, a provision for the preservation of the species of creatures but leaves the individuals to chance); for it is called general precisely so that no single thing may be thought of as exempt from it. Presumably what was meant here is the division of providence (considered *formaliter*) according to the manner in which its purpose is carried out: namely into *ordinary* providence (for example, the yearly dying and reviving of nature with the change of the seasons) and *extraordinary* providence (for example, the conveyance of wood by ocean currents to the icy coasts, where it cannot

grow, for the inhabitants there, who could not live without it), where, although we can explain the physical-mechanical cause of these phenomena well (for example, by the wooded banks of the rivers of temperate lands, into which those trees fall and are carried farther along, perhaps by the Gulf Stream), we must nevertheless not overlook the teleological cause as well, which points to the foresight of a wisdom that governs nature. As for the concept, customary in the schools, of a divine *participation*, or cooperation (*concursum*), in an effect in the sensible world, it must be dropped. For to want to pair things unlike in kind (*gryphes jungere equis*), and to let the complete cause of the changes in the world *supplement* its own predetermining providence during the course of the world (which would then have had to be deficient)—to say, for example, that *next to God* the physician has restored the patient to health, and so was present as an assistant in the matter—is, *first*, contradictory in itself. For *causa solitaria non iuuat*. God is the author of the physician together with all the physician's remedies, and so, if one really wants to ascend to the highest ground, theoretically incomprehensible to us, the effect must be ascribed *wholly* to God. Or one can also ascribe it *wholly* to the physician, insofar as we trace this event, as explicable according to the order of nature, in the chain of the world's causes. *Second*, such a way of thinking also deprives us of all definite principles for judging an effect. But in a *morally practical* respect (which is therefore wholly directed to the supersensible), for example in the belief that God will make up for the deficiency of our own righteousness, provided only that our disposition was genuine, even by means incomprehensible to us, so that we should therefore relax nothing in our striving for the good, the concept of a divine *Concursum* is entirely fitting and even necessary; but it goes without saying that no one is to try to *explain* a good action (as an event in the world) by it, which would be a supposed theoretical cognition of the supersensible, and hence absurd.

- 11 Of all ways of life, the *hunting life* is without doubt the most opposed to a civilized constitution; for the families, which must isolate themselves there, soon become *strangers* to one another and, thus scattered in vast forests, soon *hostile*

as well, since each needs a great deal of space to obtain its food and clothing. The *Noachian prohibition of blood*, Genesis IX, 4:6. (which, repeatedly renewed, was afterward even made a condition by the Jewish Christians for the newly converted Christians from paganism, though in another respect, Acts XV, 20; XXI, 25—) seems originally to have been nothing other than the prohibition of the *hunter's life*; because in that life the case of eating meat raw must often occur, so that with the latter the former is forbidden at the same time.

- 12 One might ask: If nature has willed that these icy coasts should not remain uninhabited, what will become of their inhabitants if she someday (as is to be expected) no longer brings them driftwood? For it is to be believed that, with advancing culture, the settlers of the temperate zones will make better use of the wood that grows on the banks of their rivers, and will not let it fall into the rivers and so be washed away into the sea. I answer: The dwellers along the *Ob*, the Yenisei, the Lena, and so on will bring it to them by trade, and in exchange will obtain the products of the animal kingdom with which the sea along the icy coasts is so rich; provided only that she (nature) shall first have enforced peace among them.
- 13 *Difference of religions*: a curious expression! Just as if one were to speak of different *moralities* too. There may well be different *kinds of faith*, historical ones, which belong not to religion but to the history of the means employed to promote it, means falling within the field of scholarship, and likewise different *religious books* (Zendavesta, Vedam; Koran, and so on), but only a single *religion*, valid for all human beings and at all times. The former, then, can contain nothing but the mere vehicle of religion, which is contingent and can vary according to differences of times and places.

Second supplement



Secret article for perpetual peace.

A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, objectively—that is, considered in its content—a contradiction. Subjectively, however, judged by the standing of the person who dictates it, there may very well be a secret in the fact that this person considers it beneath their dignity to announce publicly that they are its author.

The sole article of this kind is contained in the proposition: “*The maxims of philosophers concerning the conditions that make public peace possible shall be consulted by states armed for war.*”

For the legislative authority of a state, to which the greatest wisdom must naturally be ascribed, it seems demeaning to seek instruction from *subjects*, the philosophers, about the principles governing its conduct toward other states. Yet it is very advisable to do so. The state will therefore *invite* them *tacitly*—thus making a secret of it—to do this. That means it will *let them speak* freely and publicly about the general maxims of making war and establishing peace; for they will do so of their own accord if only they are not forbidden. For states to agree on this point requires no special arrangement among them: their agreement already lies in the obligation imposed by universal human reason as moral legislator. This does not mean that the state must give the philosopher’s principles precedence over the pronouncements of the jurist, the representative of state power, but only that the philosopher should be *heard*. The jurist, who has

adopted as his symbols the *scales* of right and, beside them, the *sword* of justice, commonly uses the latter not merely to keep foreign influences away from the former, but to throw the sword into the scale when one pan refuses to sink: *vae victis*, woe to the vanquished. The jurist who is not also a philosopher, in the moral sense as well, is strongly tempted to do this, since his office is only to apply existing laws, not to examine whether those laws themselves need improvement. He counts his faculty's actually lower rank among the higher ones because it is accompanied by power, as is also the case with the other two. Under this allied power, the philosophical faculty occupies a very low station. Thus philosophy is called the *maid* of theology, and the same is said in relation to the other two faculties. Yet it is not quite clear "whether she carries the torch before her gracious mistress or carries her train behind her."

That kings should philosophize, or philosophers become kings, is neither to be expected nor to be desired, for possession of power inevitably corrupts the free judgment of reason. But kings, or sovereign peoples who govern themselves under laws of equality, must not allow the class of philosophers to disappear or fall silent; they must let them speak publicly. This is indispensable to both for illuminating their business. Such speech is also above suspicion of the *propaganda* alleged against it, since this class is by its nature incapable of forming factions and alliances of clubs.

Appendix I



Appendix.

I.

On the discord between morality and politics, with regard to perpetual peace. Morality is in itself already a practice in the objective sense, as the sum of unconditionally commanding laws according to which we *ought* to act, and it is manifest absurdity, once one has granted this concept of duty its authority, still to want to say that one nonetheless *cannot*. For in that case this concept drops out of morality of itself (*ultra posse nemo obligatur*); consequently there can be no conflict of politics, as applied doctrine of right, with morality, as such a doctrine but a theoretical one (and so no conflict of practice with theory), unless one were to understand by the latter a general *doctrine of prudence*, that is, a theory of maxims for choosing the means best suited to one's aims calculated for advantage, that is, to deny that there is any morality at all.

Politics says: "*Be prudent as serpents*"; morality adds (as a limiting condition): "*and without guile, like doves*." If both cannot subsist together in a single command, there is indeed a conflict between politics and morality; but if the two are nonetheless to be absolutely united, the concept of the opposite is absurd, and the question how that conflict is to be resolved cannot even be posed as a problem. Although the proposition *Honesty is the best policy* contains a theory which practice, alas! very often contradicts, the equally theoretical proposition *Honesty is better than all policy* is infinitely exalted above every objection,

indeed is the indispensable condition of policy. The boundary god of morality does not yield to Jupiter (the boundary god of force); for the latter still stands under fate, that is, reason is not enlightened enough to survey the series of pre-determining causes that would let us foretell with certainty, according to the mechanism of nature, the happy or evil outcome of what human beings do and leave undone (though we may hope for it in accordance with our wish). But what one has to do in order to remain on the track of duty (according to rules of wisdom), for that, and thereby for the final end, reason lights our way clearly enough everywhere.

Now the practical man (for whom morality is mere theory) really grounds his bleak denial of our good-natured hope (even with *ought* and *can* granted) on this: that he professes to foresee from human nature that human beings *will* never *want* what is required to bring about that end which leads to perpetual peace. True, the willing of *each individual* human being to live in a lawful constitution according to principles of freedom (the *distributive* unity of the will of *all*) is not sufficient for this end; rather, that *all together* will this condition (the *collective* unity of the united will), this solution of a difficult problem, is required in addition, so that a whole of civil society may come about. And since, accordingly, a uniting cause must be added to this diversity of the particular willing of all, in order to produce a common will, which none of them is able to do, no other beginning of the rightful condition is to be counted on, in the *execution* of that idea (in practice), than one by *force*, on whose compulsion public right is afterward founded; which, to be sure (since one can in any case reckon little here on the moral disposition of the lawgiver, that once the lawless multitude has been united into a people he will leave it to the people to bring about a rightful constitution through their common will), allows great departures from that idea (the theory) in actual experience to be expected in advance. Then it is said: whoever has once got power into his hands will not let the people prescribe laws to him. A state that is once in possession of the position of standing under no external laws will not, in regard to the manner in which it is to seek its right against other states, make itself dependent on their tribunal; and even a continent, when it feels itself superior to another that is otherwise

not in its way, will not leave unused the means of strengthening its power by plundering or even subjugating it; and so all the plans of theory for the right of the state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right dissolve into insubstantial, unrealizable ideals, whereas a practice founded on empirical principles of human nature, which does not think it too low to draw instruction for its maxims from the way things go in the world, could alone hope to find a secure foundation for its edifice of political prudence.

To be sure, if there is no freedom and no moral law founded upon it, but everything that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, then politics (as the art of using this mechanism for the government of human beings) is the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right an insubstantial thought. But if one finds it indispensably necessary to connect this concept with politics, indeed even to raise it to the limiting condition of the latter, then the compatibility of the two must be conceded. Now I can indeed conceive of a *moral politician*, that is, one who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can subsist together with morality, but not of a *political moralist*, who forges for himself such a morality as the statesman's advantage finds conducive to itself.

The moral politician will make it his principle that, if defects are once found in the constitution of the state or in the relations among states that could not be prevented, it is a duty, above all for heads of state, to take thought how they can be remedied as soon as possible and brought into conformity with natural right, as it stands before our eyes as a model in the idea of reason, even if this should cost their selfishness sacrifices. Now since the severing of a bond of civic or cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is ready to take its place, is contrary to all political prudence, which on this point agrees with morality, it would indeed be absurd to demand that such a defect be changed at once and impetuously; but that the maxim of the necessity of such a change should at least dwell most intimately in the holder of power, so as to remain in constant approach to the end (the best constitution according to laws of right), that can surely be demanded of him. A state can already *govern* itself in a republican manner even while it still possesses, according to its present constitution,

despotic *sovereign power*, until the people gradually becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law (just as if it possessed physical force), and is accordingly found fit for its own legislation (which is originally founded on right). Even if, through the impetuosity of a *revolution* produced by the bad constitution, a more lawful one had been won illegitimately, it would nonetheless have to be held no longer permissible to lead the people back to the old one, although during the revolution anyone who meddled in it by violence or by cunning would justly be subject to the penalties of an insurgent. As for the external relation of states, however, a state cannot be required to lay aside its constitution, despotic though it is (which is nonetheless the stronger one in relation to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being swallowed up at once by other states; consequently, in its resolve too, delay of the execution until a more favorable occasion must be permitted.¹⁴

Granted, then, that despotizing moralists (erring in execution) offend in many ways against political prudence (through measures hastily taken or commended); experience must nonetheless bring them gradually onto a better track, in this offense of theirs against nature; whereas the moralizing politicians, by glossing over principles of state contrary to right, under the pretext of a human nature not *capable* of the good in accordance with the idea as reason prescribes it, as far as in them lies *make impossible* any improvement, and perpetuate the violation of right.

Instead of the practice of which these men of political prudence boast, they deal in *practices*, being intent solely on this: that, by telling the power now ruling what it wishes to hear (so as not to miss their private advantage), they sacrifice the people and, if possible, the whole world; after the manner of genuine jurists (of the trade, not of *legislation*) when they venture up into politics. For since their business is not to quibble about legislation itself but to carry out the present commands of the law of the land, every lawful constitution now in existence, and, when this is altered from above, the one that then follows, must always be the best to them; so that everything is thus in its proper mechanical order. But if this skill of fitting every saddle instills in them the delusion that they can also judge of the principles of a *constitution of the state* in general

according to concepts of right (hence a priori, not empirically): if they make much of knowing *human beings* (which is indeed to be expected, since they have to do with many), without nevertheless knowing *the human being*, and what can be made of him (for which a higher standpoint of anthropological observation is required), but, provided with these concepts, approach the right of the state and the right of nations as reason prescribes them: then they can make this crossing over in no other way than in the spirit of chicanery, since they follow their customary procedure (that of a mechanism according to despotically given laws of compulsion) even where the concepts of reason would have a coercion established that is lawful only according to principles of freedom, through which alone a constitution of the state enduring in accordance with right is possible; a problem which the supposed practical man, passing by that idea, believes he can solve empirically, from experience, from how the constitutions that have so far lasted best, though for the most part contrary to right, were arranged. The maxims of which he makes use for this (though he does not let them be heard aloud) come roughly to the following sophistical maxims.

- ¹ *Fac et excusa*. Seize the favorable opportunity for an unauthorized taking of possession (either of a right of the state over its own people, or over another, neighboring one); the justification will be far easier and more graceful to present *after the deed*, and will serve to gloss over the force (above all in the first case, where the supreme power within is at once also the legislating authority which one must obey without quibbling about it), than if one wanted first to devise convincing grounds and then to await the counter-grounds against them. This very audacity gives a certain appearance of inner conviction of the rightfulness of the deed, and the god *bonus euentus* is afterward the best advocate.
- ² *Si fecisti nega*. What you have yourself done wrong, for example to drive your people to despair and so to rebellion, deny that it is *your* fault; but assert that it is the fault of the subjects' recalcitrance, or else, in your seizure of a neighboring

people, the fault of human nature, since a human being who does not forestall the other by force can reckon with certainty that the other will forestall him and seize him.

- 3 Diuide et impera. That is: if there are certain privileged heads in your people who have chosen you merely as their chief (*primus inter pares*), then set them at variance with one another and divide them from the people; now stand by the latter, under the pretense of greater freedom, and everything will depend on your unconditional will. Or if it is a matter of external states, then the stirring up of discord among them is a fairly sure means of subjecting one after another to yourself, under the semblance of assisting the weaker.

By these political maxims, to be sure, no one is deceived; for they are one and all already generally known; nor are they a cause for shame, as if the injustice shone all too plainly into the eyes. For since great powers are never ashamed before the judgment of the common crowd, but only one before another, and since, as concerns those principles, it is not their coming to light but only their *failure* that can make them ashamed (for with regard to the morality of the maxims they all agree with one another), there always remains to them the *political honor* on which they can surely count, namely that of the *enlargement of their power*, by whatever path it may have been acquired.¹⁵

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From all these serpentine windings of an immoral doctrine of prudence for bringing the condition of peace among human beings out of the warlike condition of the state of nature, this much at least is clear: that human beings can escape the concept of right neither in their private relations nor in their public ones, and do not dare to found politics openly on mere devices of prudence, and thus to renounce all obedience to the concept of a public right (which is especially striking in that of the right of nations), but accord it in itself all due honor, even if they should devise a hundred evasions and cloaks to elude it in practice, and impute to wily force the authority of being the origin and bond of all right. To put an end to this sophistry (though not to the injustice it glosses over), and to bring the false *representatives* of the mighty of the earth to the

confession that it is not right but force in whose favor they speak, and from which they take their tone, as if they themselves had anything to command in the matter, it will be well to uncover the illusion by which one deceives oneself and others, to discover the supreme principle from which the aim at perpetual peace proceeds, and to show that all the evil which stands in its way derives from this: that the political moralist begins where the moral politician properly ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, harnessing the horses behind the wagon), defeats his own purpose of bringing politics into accord with morality.

To bring practical philosophy into agreement with itself, it is necessary first to decide the question whether in problems of practical reason the beginning must be made from its *material principle*, the *end* (as object of choice), or from the *formal* one, that is, from the one (founded merely on freedom in external relations) according to which it is said: act so that you can will that your maxim should become a universal law (whatever the end may be).

Without any doubt the latter principle must come first: for as a principle of right it has unconditional necessity, whereas the former is compelling only on the presupposition of empirical conditions of the end proposed, namely of its execution, and, even if this end (for example perpetual peace) were also a duty, this duty itself would still have to have been derived from the formal principle of maxims for acting externally. Now the former principle, that of the *political moralist* (the problem of the right of the state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right), is a mere *technical problem* (*problema technicum*), the second, on the other hand, as the principle of the *moral politician*, for whom it is a *moral problem* (*problema morale*), is worlds apart from the other in procedure, when perpetual peace is to be brought about, which one now wishes not merely as a physical good but also as a condition proceeding from the recognition of duty.

For the solution of the first, namely the problem of political prudence, much knowledge of nature is required, in order to use its mechanism for the end in view, and yet all of this is uncertain as to its result concerning perpetual peace, whichever of the three divisions of public right one takes. Whether the people

can be kept, in obedience and at the same time in prosperity, better by severity or by the bait of vanity, by the supreme power of a single person or by the union of several heads, perhaps even merely by a nobility of service, or by the power of the people, internally, and indeed for a long time, is uncertain. Of all forms of government (excepting the one genuinely republican, which can occur only to a moral politician) there are examples of the opposite in history. Still more uncertain is a right of nations ostensibly erected upon statutes according to ministerial plans, which is in fact only a word without a thing, and rests on treaties that in the very act of their conclusion contain at the same time the secret reservation of their violation. The solution of the second, on the other hand, namely of the *problem of political wisdom*, presses itself upon us, so to speak, of its own accord, is evident to everyone, puts all artifice to shame, and leads straight to the end; yet with the reminder of prudence not to draw it on in haste by force, but to approach it unceasingly, as favorable circumstances permit.

Here, then, it is said: "Seek first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its *justice*, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will fall to you of itself." For morality has this peculiarity, and indeed in regard to its principles of public right (hence in relation to a politics knowable a priori), that the less it makes conduct dependent on the end proposed, the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more it nonetheless agrees with this in general; which comes about because it is precisely the general will, given a priori (in a people, or in the relation of different peoples to one another), that alone determines what is right among human beings; and this union of the will of all, if only one proceeds consistently in the exercise, can at the same time, according to the mechanism of nature as well, be the cause of producing the effect aimed at and of giving effect to the concept of right. So it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people should unite into a state solely according to the concepts of right of freedom and equality, and this principle is founded not on prudence but on duty. Let political moralists now quibble as much as they like about the natural mechanism of a multitude of human beings entering society, which would invalidate those principles and frustrate their aim, or seek to prove their

contrary assertion by examples of badly organized constitutions of ancient and modern times (for example, of democracies without a representative system): they deserve no hearing, above all since such a pernicious theory itself brings about, perhaps, the very evil that it predicts, a theory according to which the human being is thrown into one class with the other living machines, to which only the consciousness that they are not free beings would still have to be added to make them, in their own judgment, the most wretched of all creatures in the world.

The proposition, which sounds somewhat swaggering, has come into proverbial currency, yet is true: *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*, that is, in German: “let justice reign, even if all the rogues in the world should perish on that account,” is a stalwart principle of right, one that cuts off all crooked paths marked out by cunning or force; only it must not be misunderstood, and perhaps taken as a permission to use one’s own right with the greatest strictness (which would conflict with ethical duty), but understood as an obligation of those in power not to refuse or diminish anyone’s right out of disfavor or compassion toward others; for which there is required above all an internal constitution of the state set up according to pure principles of right, but then also that of its union with other states, neighboring or even distant, for a lawful settlement of their disputes (analogous to a universal state). This proposition means nothing other than this: political maxims must proceed not from the welfare and happiness to be expected from their observance in each state, hence not from the end which each of them makes the object of its aim (from willing), as the supreme (but empirical) principle of political wisdom, but from the pure concept of the duty of right (from the ought, whose principle is given a priori by pure reason), whatever the physical consequences may be. The world will by no means perish through there being fewer evil human beings. The morally evil has the property, inseparable from its nature, that in its aims (above all in relation to others of like mind) it is contrary to itself and self-destructive, and so makes way for the (moral) principle of the good, though by slow progress.

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There is therefore *objectively* (in theory) no conflict at all between morality and politics. *Subjectively*, on the other hand (in the self-seeking propensity of human beings, which, however, because it is not founded on maxims of reason, need not yet be called practice), it will and may always remain, because it serves as the whetstone of virtue, whose true courage (according to the principle *tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito*) in the present case consists not so much in resolutely setting oneself against the evils and sacrifices that must be undertaken here, as in looking squarely in the face the far more dangerous lying and treacherous, yet quibbling, evil principle within ourselves, which feigns the weakness of human nature as a justification for every transgression, and in conquering its cunning.

In fact the political moralist can say: ruler and people, or people and people, do *one another* no wrong when they fight one another violently or insidiously, although in general they do wrong in denying all respect to the concept of right, which alone could found peace forever. For since the one transgresses his duty toward the other, who is disposed in precisely the same unlawful way toward him, it *serves* them both quite right when they wear one another down, yet in such a way that enough of this stock always remains to keep this game from ceasing down to the most remote times, so that a late posterity may some day take a warning example from them. Providence in the course of the world is hereby justified; for the moral principle in the human being never goes out, and reason, competent pragmatically to carry out the ideas of right according to that principle, grows besides constantly through ever-advancing culture, but with it also the guilt of those transgressions. Creation alone: namely, that such a stamp of corrupt beings should have been on earth at all, seems capable of being justified by no theodicy (if we assume that things will never be nor can be better with the human race); but this standpoint of judgment is far too high for us to be able to apply our concepts (of wisdom) to the supreme power, unfathomable to us, for theoretical purposes. To such desperate conclusions we are inevitably driven if we do not assume that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, that they can be carried out; and that action must accordingly be taken, on the part of the people in the state, and further on the

part of states toward one another, whatever empirical politics may object to the contrary. True politics, therefore, cannot take a single step without first having paid homage to morality, and although politics in itself is a difficult art, its union with morality is no art at all; for the latter cuts in two the knot that the former is unable to untie, as soon as the two conflict with one another. The right of the human being must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. One cannot halve matters here and devise the middle thing of a pragmatically conditioned right (between right and utility), but all politics must bend its knee before the former, and can hope in return, though slowly, to reach the stage where it will shine enduringly.

- ¹⁴ These are permissive laws of reason, permitting the condition of a public right afflicted with injustice to persist until, toward complete upheaval, everything has either ripened of itself or been brought near to ripeness by peaceful means; for some *rightful* constitution, even if legitimate only to a slight degree, is still better than none at all, which latter fate (anarchy) would befall a *hasty* reform. Political wisdom will therefore, in the condition in which things now are, make reforms conforming to the ideal of public right a duty; but revolutions, where nature brings them about of itself, it will use not to gloss over a still greater oppression, but as a call of nature to establish through thorough reform a lawful constitution founded on principles of freedom, as the only enduring one.
- ¹⁵ Even if a certain wickedness rooted in human nature may still be doubted among *human beings* who live together in a state, and in its place the lack of a culture not yet advanced far enough (rawness) may, with some plausibility, be adduced as the cause of the lawless appearances of their way of thinking, it is nonetheless, in the external relation of *states* to one another, entirely undisguised and incontestably plain to the eye. In the interior of every state it is veiled by the compulsion of civil laws, because a greater force, namely that of the government, powerfully counteracts the inclination of the citizens to mutual violence, and so not only gives the whole a moral coat of paint (*causae non causae*), but also, by putting a bolt on the outbreak of lawless inclinations, really eases to a great degree the development of the moral predisposition

toward immediate respect for right. For each now believes of himself that he would indeed hold the concept of right sacred and follow it faithfully, if only he could expect the same from every other; which latter the government in part secures to him; by which a great step *toward* morality (though not yet a moral step) is taken, to be attached to this concept of duty even for its own sake, without regard to reciprocation. But since each, with his good opinion of himself, nevertheless presupposes an evil disposition in all the others, they pass upon one another the mutual judgment that, as far as the *fact* is concerned, they are all worth little (how this comes about, since it cannot after all be laid to the charge of the *nature* of the human being as a free being, may remain unexamined). But since respect for the concept of right, of which the human being absolutely cannot rid himself, also most solemnly sanctions the theory of the capacity to become adequate to it, each sees that he for his part must act in accordance with it, let others do as they will.

Appendix II



II.

On the agreement between politics and morality according to the transcendental concept of public right.

If I abstract from all the *matter* of public right (according to the various empirically given relations of human beings within a state, or also of states to one another), as the teachers of right commonly conceive it, there still remains to me the *form of publicity*, whose possibility every claim of right contains in itself. For without that form there would be no justice (which can be thought only as *publicly knowable*), and hence no right either, since it is justice alone that confers right.

Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity. And since it is quite easy to judge whether it obtains in a given case—that is, whether it can be united with the principles of the agent or not—it can furnish an easily used criterion, to be met with a priori in reason, for recognizing at once, in the latter case, the falsity (illegality) of the claim in question (*praetensio iuris*), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.

After such an abstraction from everything empirical that the concept of the right of the state and of the right of nations contains (such as the malevolence of human nature, which makes coercion necessary), one may call the following proposition the *transcendental formula* of public right:

“All actions relating to the right of other human beings, whose maxim is incompatible with publicity, are wrong.”

This principle is to be considered not merely as *ethical* (belonging to the doctrine of virtue), but also as *juridical* (concerned with the right of human beings). For a maxim that I may not *let be known* without thereby at once defeating my own intention, a maxim that must by all means be *kept secret* if it is to succeed, and to which I cannot *publicly confess* without the resistance of all being inevitably provoked against my purpose: such a necessary and universal, and hence a priori knowable, counterworking of all against me can have its source nowhere but in the injustice with which it threatens everyone.—It is further merely *negative*, that is, it serves only to recognize, by its means, what is *not right* against others.—It is, like an axiom, unprovably certain, and besides easy to apply, as may be seen from the following examples of public right.

- ¹ *As regards the right of the state (ius ciuitatis)*, namely the internal right: the question arises here which many hold hard to answer, and which the transcendental principle of publicity resolves quite easily: “Is rebellion a lawful means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant (*non titulo sed exercitio talis*)?” The rights of the people are injured, and no injustice is done to the tyrant by his dethronement; of this there is no doubt. Nevertheless it is in the highest degree wrong in the subjects to seek their right in this way, and they can complain just as little of injustice if they succumb in this struggle and must afterwards endure the harshest punishment on that account.

Here much can now be reasoned for and against, if one will settle the matter by a dogmatic deduction of the grounds of right; but the transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this tediousness. According to that principle, before the institution of the civil contract the people themselves ask whether they could well trust themselves to make publicly known the maxim of the intention to rebel on some occasion. One easily sees that, if the founding of a state constitution were to make it a condition to exercise force against the head in certain given cases, the people would thereby arrogate to themselves a lawful power over him. But then he would not be the head; or, if

both were made conditions of the founding of a state, no state at all would be possible, which was nevertheless the people's aim. The wrongfulness of rebellion is therefore evident from this, that the maxim of it, by the very fact of *publicly confessing to it*, would make its own aim impossible. One would therefore necessarily have to keep it secret.—The latter, however, is by no means necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may freely declare that he will punish every rebellion with the death of the ringleaders, even though these may always believe that he was the first to transgress the fundamental law on his side; for if he is conscious of possessing the *irresistible* supreme power (which must also be assumed in every civil constitution, since whoever lacks power enough to protect every member of the people against every other has also no right to command him), then he need not fear to defeat his own aim by making his maxim known. With this it also agrees very well that, if the rebellion succeeded for the people, that head would step back into the place of a subject, and would then just as little dare to begin a rebellion to regain his position, nor yet have to fear being called to account for his former conduct of the state.

- ² *As regards the right of nations.*—Only under the presupposition of some lawful condition (that is, that external condition under which a right can actually befall a human being) can there be any talk of a right of nations; because, as a public right, it already contains in its concept the publication of a general will determining for each what is his, and this *status iuridicus* must proceed from some contract that need not indeed be founded on coercive laws (like the one from which a state arises), but can also be that of a *permanently free* association, such as the federal union of various states mentioned above. For without some *lawful condition* that actively connects the various (physical or moral) persons, hence in the state of nature, there can be no other than merely a private right.—Here too there now occurs a conflict of politics with morality (considered as a doctrine of right), where that criterion of the publicity of maxims likewise finds its easy application, though only thus: that the contract unites states only with the intention of preserving themselves in peace among

one another and together against other states, by no means in order to make acquisitions.—The following cases of the antinomy between politics and morality now occur, together with their solution.

a) “If one of these states has promised another something—whether assistance, or the cession of certain lands, or subsidies and the like—the question is whether, in a case on which the state’s salvation depends, it can release itself from keeping its word by wanting to be regarded in a double person: first as *sovereign*, in which capacity it is responsible to no one within the state, then again merely as the supreme *state official*, who must give an account to the state. The conclusion then turns out to be that what he bound himself to in the first capacity is remitted to him in the second.”—But if a state (or its head) let this maxim of his be known, then naturally either every other would flee from him, or would unite with others to withstand his presumptions, which proves that politics with all its cunning on this footing (that of openness) would defeat its own aim, and that the maxim must therefore be wrong.

b) “If a neighboring power grown to fearful size (*potentia tremenda*) excites anxiety: may one assume that, because it *can*, it will also *want* to oppress, and does this give the less powerful a right to attack it (in union with others), even without any preceding injury?”—A state that wanted to *proclaim* this maxim of its own affirmatively would only bring the evil about more certainly and more swiftly. For the greater power would anticipate the smaller one; and as for the union of the latter, that is only a weak reed against one who knows how to use *diuide et impera*.—This maxim of political prudence, publicly declared, therefore necessarily defeats its own aim, and is consequently unjust.

c) “If a smaller state by its situation separates the connection of a larger one, which the latter nevertheless needs for its preservation, is the larger not entitled to subject the former and unite it with its own?”—One easily sees that the larger must by no means let such a maxim be known beforehand; for either the smaller states would unite early, or other powerful states would fight over this booty, and thus it makes itself impracticable by its openness: a sign that it is unjust, and can be so in a very high degree; for a small object of injustice does not prevent the injustice shown in it from being very great.

- 3 *As regards cosmopolitan right*, I pass over it here in silence, because, on account of its analogy with the right of nations, its maxims are easy to state and to appraise.

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One now has here, in the principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of the right of nations with publicity, a good mark of the *disagreement* of politics with morality (as a doctrine of right). But now one also needs to be instructed as to the condition under which their maxims agree with the right of nations. For one cannot infer conversely that the maxims which endure publicity are therefore also just, because whoever has the decided superior power need not keep his maxims secret.—The condition of the possibility of a right of nations in general is that first a *lawful condition* exist. For without that there is no public right; rather all right that one may think outside it (in the state of nature) is merely private right. Now we have seen above that a federal condition of states, which has merely the removal of war as its aim, is the only *lawful* condition compatible with their *freedom*. The agreement of politics with morality is therefore possible only in a federal union (which is thus given a priori according to principles of right and is necessary), and all political prudence has as its lawful basis the institution of that union in its greatest possible extent; without which end all its cleverness is unwisdom and veiled injustice.—This pseudopolitics now has its *casuistry* as good as that of the best school of the Jesuits: the *reservatio mentalis*, in drawing up public contracts, with such expressions as one can interpret in one's own favor as one pleases (for instance the distinction between the *status quo de fait* and *de droit*);—*probabilism*: to reason out evil intentions in others, or to make the probabilities of their possible preponderance a ground of right for undermining other peaceful states;—finally the *peccatum philosophicum* (*peccatillum*, *bagatelle*): to hold the swallowing of a *small* state, if a much *larger* one thereby gains, to the supposedly greater world good, for an easily forgivable trifle¹⁶.

The promotion of this is given by the double tongue of politics with regard to morality, using one or the other branch of it for its purpose.—Both, love of human beings and respect for the right of human beings, are duty; the former,

however, only a *conditional* duty, the latter an *unconditional*, absolutely commanding duty, and whoever wants to abandon himself to the sweet feeling of beneficence must first be fully assured that he has not transgressed it. With morality in the former sense (as ethics) politics is easily agreed, so as to surrender the right of human beings to its superiors: but with morality in the second meaning (as doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knees, it finds it advisable not to enter into any contract at all, but rather to deny it all reality, and to interpret all duties as mere benevolence. And this insidiousness of a politics that shuns the light would easily be defeated by philosophy through the publicity of those maxims of politics, if politics would only dare to let the philosopher enjoy the publicity of his own.

With this aim I propose another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right, whose formula would be this:

“All maxims that *need* publicity (in order not to fail of their aim) agree with right and politics united.”

For if they can attain their aim only through publicity, they must be in accordance with the general aim of the public (happiness), and it is the proper task of politics to agree with that aim, that is, to make the public content with its condition. But if this aim is to be attainable only through publicity, that is, through the removal of all mistrust against those maxims, then these must also stand in concord with the right of the public; for in this alone is the union of the aims of all possible.—The further elaboration and discussion of this principle I must reserve for another occasion; only that it is a transcendental formula is to be seen from the removal of all empirical conditions (the doctrine of happiness) as the matter of the law, and from the mere regard to the form of universal lawfulness.

* * *

If it is a duty, and if at the same time there is well-grounded hope, actually to bring about the condition of a public right, though only in an approximation advancing to infinity, then *perpetual peace*, which follows those peace treaties so

falsely so called (actually armistices), is no empty idea, but a task that is solved gradually and steadily approaches its goal (since the times in which equal progress occurs will, it is to be hoped, always become shorter).

- ¹⁶ Evidence of such maxims may be met with in Hofrat Garve's treatise "On the connection of morality with politics, 1788." This worthy scholar admits at the very beginning that he cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question. But to approve of it nevertheless, though with the admission that he cannot entirely remove the objections stirring against it, seems to concede more to those who are very inclined to misuse it than may well be advisable.