

Critique of Judgment

IMMANUEL KANT

Plain English Translation

MOUSEIA



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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant's notes. The faculty table is given as lines.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

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GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The faculty table is set as lines in source order. Emphasis uses one level of italics, including bold nested in spaced type. Source page labels are kept as supplied.

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Title



Critique [166] *of the Power of Judgment*
by
Immanuel Kant.

Preface



Preface [A III] [167] *to the first edition, 1790.*

We can call the ability to gain knowledge from *a priori* principles *pure reason*, and the investigation of its possibility and limits in general the critique of pure reason. We may do this even if we understand this ability only as reason in its theoretical use. This was also how the term was used in the first work bearing that title, without yet intending to investigate reason's ability as practical reason according to its special principles. In that case the investigation concerns only our ability to know things *a priori*. It deals only with the *faculty of cognition*, excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire. Within the faculties of cognition, it deals with the *understanding* and its *a priori* principles, excluding the *power of judgment* and *reason* (as faculties [A IV] that likewise belong to theoretical cognition). For the investigation shows that no faculty of cognition other than the understanding can supply constitutive *a priori* principles of cognition. The critique examines them all, testing whatever share each of the other faculties might claim in the actual stock of knowledge derived from its own resources. It leaves standing only what the *understanding* prescribes *a priori* as law for nature, understood as the whole of appearances, whose form is likewise given *a priori*. It assigns all other pure concepts to the ideas. These go beyond our theoretical faculty of cognition, but they are not therefore useless or dispensable. Instead, they serve as regulative principles. On the one hand, they check the understanding's dangerous pretensions: because it

can state *a priori* the conditions under which all the things it can know are possible, [168] it might suppose it has thereby confined the possibility of all things whatsoever within these limits. On the other hand, they guide the understanding itself in studying nature according to a principle of completeness, even though [A V] it can never reach that completeness. In this way they advance the final aim of all cognition.

So it was really the *understanding* that the work generally called the critique of pure reason was meant to establish in secure, exclusive possession against all rival claimants. The understanding has its own domain within the *faculty of cognition*, insofar as it contains constitutive *a priori* principles of cognition. Similarly, the *Critique of Practical Reason* assigned to *reason* its own possession. Reason contains constitutive *a priori* principles nowhere except in relation to the *faculty of desire*.

The present critique of the power of judgment therefore addresses these questions. Does the *power of judgment*, which stands between understanding and reason in the order of our cognitive faculties, also have *a priori* principles of its own? Are these constitutive, or merely regulative and thus unable to establish a domain of their own? And does it give the feeling of pleasure and displeasure—which stands between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, just as understanding prescribes *a priori* laws to the former and reason to the latter—[A VI] an *a priori* rule?

A critique of pure reason—that is, of our ability to judge according to *a priori* principles—would be incomplete without treating the critique of the power of judgment as a separate part. For the power of judgment, as a faculty of cognition, also claims such principles for itself. Its principles, however, must not form a separate part between the theoretical and the practical in a system of pure philosophy. If necessary, they can be attached to either part as occasion requires. For if such a system is ever to be completed under the general name of metaphysics—and completing it in full is possible and extremely important for every use of reason—the critique must first investigate the ground for this

building. It must go as deep as the first foundation of our ability to have principles independent of experience. Otherwise some part of the building might sink, which would inevitably bring down the whole. [169]

We can readily see from the nature of the power of judgment that finding a principle peculiar to it must involve great difficulties. Its proper use [A VII] is so necessary and so universally required that the name common sense means precisely this faculty and no other. It must contain some *a priori* principle, or it would not be subject even to the most ordinary criticism as a distinct faculty of cognition. Yet this principle must not be derived from *a priori* concepts. Those belong to the understanding, while the power of judgment concerns only their application. It must therefore itself supply a concept through which, strictly speaking, no thing is known. This concept serves only as a rule for the power of judgment itself, not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgment. That would require yet another power of judgment to decide whether or not the case fell under the rule.

This difficulty about a principle, whether subjective or objective, occurs mainly in the judgments called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or [A VIII] art. Yet critically investigating a principle of the power of judgment in these judgments is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. Although on their own they contribute nothing at all to our knowledge of things, they still belong solely to the faculty of cognition. They show that this faculty has a direct relation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some *a priori* principle. This does not mix it with what can determine the faculty of desire, since that faculty has its *a priori* principles in concepts of reason.—Logical judgment of nature is a different matter. Experience sometimes presents a lawfulness in things that the understanding's general concept of what is sensible no longer suffices to understand or explain. Here the power of judgment can draw from itself a principle for relating a natural thing to the unknowable supersensible, though it must use this principle to know nature only with regard to itself. Such an *a priori* principle can and must be applied to the *cognition* of beings in the world. It also opens up [A IX] prospects useful to practical reason. But it has no direct relation to the feeling of pleasure and dis-

pleasure. That relation is precisely what is puzzling in the principle of the power of judgment and makes a separate section of the critique necessary [170] for this faculty. Logical judgment according to concepts, from which no direct inference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can ever be drawn, could otherwise have been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy, together with a critical restriction of it.

The investigation of the faculty of taste as the aesthetic power of judgment is undertaken here not to train and cultivate taste, but solely for a transcendental purpose. The cultivation of taste will continue on its course without any such investigations, as it has in the past. I therefore hope the investigation will be judged leniently for its shortcomings in serving the former purpose. As for the latter purpose, it must be prepared for the strictest examination. Even there, however, I hope that the great difficulty of solving a problem nature has made so complicated can excuse some obscurity [A X] in the solution that cannot entirely be avoided. What matters is that I have shown clearly enough that the principle has been correctly stated. The way the phenomenon of the power of judgment is derived from that principle may not have all the clarity we can rightly demand elsewhere, namely in cognition through concepts. I believe I have achieved that clarity in the second part of this work.

With this, then, I conclude my entire critical undertaking. I will move without delay to doctrinal work, to win from my advancing age, if possible, the time that is still reasonably favorable for it. It goes without saying that this will contain no separate part for the power of judgment, since for this faculty the critique takes the place of theory. Instead, following the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy into the same parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals will make up that undertaking.

Introduction I



Introduction. [A XI] [171]

I. *On the division of philosophy.*

Philosophy contains principles for knowing things through reason by means of concepts. Unlike logic, it does not merely contain principles of the form of thought in general, without distinguishing objects. If we divide philosophy, as usual, into *theoretical* and *practical*, we are entirely right to do so. But the concepts that assign an object to the principles of this rational cognition must then also differ in kind. Otherwise they would not justify a division. Every such division presupposes an opposition between the principles of rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.

But there are only two kinds of concepts that allow two different kinds of principles of the possibility of their objects: *concepts of nature* and the *concept of freedom*. The former make *theoretical* cognition according to *a priori* principles possible. The [A XII] latter, considered in relation to these principles, contains only a negative principle in its concept, that of mere opposition to them. Yet it establishes principles that extend the determination of the will, and these are therefore called practical. Philosophy is thus rightly divided into two parts whose principles are entirely different: theoretical philosophy as *philosophy of nature*, and practical philosophy as *moral philosophy*. The latter is the name for reason's practical legislation according to the concept of freedom. Until now, however, these terms have been seriously misused in dividing different princi-

ples and, with them, philosophy itself. What is practical according to concepts of nature has been treated as the same as what is practical according to the concept of freedom. Under the same names of theoretical and practical philosophy, people have thus [172] made a division that in fact divided nothing, since both parts could have the same principles.

The will, as a faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world: specifically, the one that acts according to concepts. Everything represented as possible or necessary through a will is called practically possible or necessary. This distinguishes it from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect whose cause is determined to act not by concepts, but by mechanism, as in lifeless [A XIII] matter, or by instinct, as in animals.—Here, however, calling something practical leaves undecided whether the concept that supplies the rule for the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.

That distinction is essential. If the concept determining causality is a concept of nature, the principles are *technically practical*. If it is a concept of freedom, they are *morally practical*. Dividing a rational science depends entirely on differences between objects whose cognition requires different principles. The former principles therefore belong to theoretical philosophy, as the study of nature. The latter alone make up the second part, practical philosophy, as the study of morals.

All technically practical rules must be counted only as corollaries of theoretical philosophy, insofar as their principles rest on concepts. These include rules of art and skill in general, and also of prudence, understood as skill in influencing people and their wills. They concern only the possibility of things according to concepts of nature. This includes not just the means found in nature, but the will itself, as a faculty of desire and thus a natural faculty, insofar as natural incentives can determine it in accordance with those rules. [A XIV] Such practical rules, however, are not called laws, as physical laws are, but only prescriptions. This is because the will falls not only under the concept of nature but also under the concept of freedom. In relation to freedom, its principles are called laws. Together with their consequences, these alone constitute the second, practical part of philosophy.

Solving problems of pure geometry does not belong to [173] a separate part of that science. Nor does surveying deserve the name practical geometry, as distinct from pure geometry, as though it were a second part of geometry in general. Still less may the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or observation count as a practical part of the study of nature. Nor may household management, agriculture, political economy, social skills, rules for healthy living, or even the general study of happiness count as practical philosophy. This applies even to controlling inclinations and restraining emotions for the sake of happiness. These certainly cannot make up the second part of philosophy as a whole. They all contain only rules of skill, and are therefore only technically practical: they aim to produce an effect possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. These concepts belong to theoretical philosophy. The prescriptions in question, as mere [A XV] corollaries of that philosophy—the science of nature—are subject to them, and cannot claim a place in a separate philosophy called practical. Morally practical prescriptions, by contrast, rest entirely on the concept of freedom, completely excluding natural grounds for determining the will. They form an entirely distinct kind of prescription. Like the rules nature obeys, they are called laws without qualification. Unlike those rules, however, they rest not on sensible conditions but on a supersensible principle. Alongside the theoretical part of philosophy, they require a separate part of their own, called practical philosophy.

This shows that a body of practical prescriptions supplied by philosophy does not form a separate part alongside theoretical philosophy simply because the prescriptions are practical. They could be practical even if their principles came entirely from theoretical knowledge of nature, as technically practical rules do. They form a separate part only if, and because, their principle is not borrowed from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned. Their principle must instead rest on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes known through formal laws. They must therefore be morally practical: not merely [A XVI] prescriptions and rules for this or that purpose, but laws that make no prior reference to ends and intentions.

Introduction II

II. [174] *On the domain of philosophy in general.*

The use of our faculty of cognition according to principles, and with it philosophy, extends as far as *a priori* concepts can be applied.

The whole set of objects to which these concepts are related, with the aim of knowing them if possible, can be divided according to the different degrees to which our faculties are adequate or inadequate for this purpose.

Concepts have a field insofar as they are related to objects, whether knowledge of these objects is possible or not. This field is determined solely by the relation their object has to our faculty of cognition in general.—The part of this field in which knowledge is possible for us is a territory (*territorium*) for these concepts and for the faculty of cognition required for them. The part of the territory in which they legislate is the domain (*ditio*) of these concepts and their corresponding faculties of cognition. Empirical concepts thus have their territory in nature as the whole [A XVII] of all objects of the senses. But they have no domain, only a dwelling place, *domicilium*. Although they are generated according to laws, they do not legislate. The rules founded on them are empirical and therefore contingent.

Our faculty of cognition as a whole has two domains: that of concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom. Through both it legislates *a priori*. Philosophy is accordingly divided into theoretical and practical. Yet the territory on which its domain is established and its legislation is *exercised* is always

only the whole of the objects of all possible experience, insofar as they are taken to be nothing more than mere appearances. Otherwise no legislation of the understanding concerning them could be thought.

Legislation through concepts of nature is carried out by the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom is carried out by reason and is solely practical. Reason can legislate only in the practical sphere. In theoretical cognition of nature it can only, through its knowledge of laws supplied by the understanding, [175] draw conclusions from given laws by inference. These conclusions always remain confined to nature. Conversely, where rules are practical, reason is not immediately *legislative* just for that reason, since the rules [A XVIII] may also be technically practical.

Understanding and reason therefore have two different legislations on one and the same territory of experience, without either being allowed to interfere with the other. The concept of nature has no influence on legislation through the concept of freedom, and the latter equally does not disturb the legislation of nature.—The critique of pure reason proved that we can at least think without contradiction of these two legislations and their corresponding faculties coexisting in the same subject. It did so by exposing the dialectical illusion in the objections to this coexistence and thereby defeating them.

These two different domains do not constitute *one* domain, even though they constantly limit one another in their effects in the sensible world, if not in their legislation. The reason is this: the concept of nature represents its objects in intuition, but not as things in themselves, only as appearances. The concept of freedom, by contrast, represents in its object a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Neither can therefore provide theoretical cognition of its object, or even of the thinking subject, as things in themselves. Such cognition would be cognition of the supersensible. We must place the idea of the supersensible beneath the possibility of all those objects of experience [A XIX], but can never raise and extend this idea itself into cognition.

There is therefore a boundless but also inaccessible field for our faculty of cognition as a whole: the field of the supersensible. We find no territory there for ourselves, and so can have no domain there for theoretical cognition, either for

concepts of the understanding or for concepts of reason. We must occupy this field with ideas for both the theoretical and the practical use of reason. But we can give these ideas only practical reality, in relation to the laws arising from the concept of freedom. This does not extend our theoretical cognition to the supersensible in the slightest.

An immeasurable gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, [176] as the supersensible. No passage from the former to the latter, and thus no passage through reason's theoretical use, is possible. It is as though they were two different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second. Yet the second *ought* to influence the first. The concept of freedom ought to make the end set by its laws actual in the sensible world. Consequently, nature must also be capable of being thought in such a way that the lawfulness [A XX] of its form agrees at least with the possibility of the ends to be achieved in it according to laws of freedom.—There must therefore be a ground for the *unity* of the supersensible underlying nature with what the concept of freedom contains practically. The concept of this ground does not achieve knowledge of it either theoretically or practically, and therefore has no domain of its own. Yet it makes possible a passage from thinking according to the principles of the one to thinking according to the principles of the other.

Introduction III

III. *On the critique of the power of judgment as a means of joining the two parts of philosophy into a whole.*

The critique of the cognitive faculties, with regard to what they can accomplish *a priori*, has strictly speaking no domain of objects. It is not a doctrine. It need only investigate whether and how a doctrine is possible through these faculties, given their character. Its field extends to all their claims, in order to confine them within the limits of their legitimacy. But something that cannot enter into the division of philosophy can still enter as a [A XXI] main part into the critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general: namely, if it contains principles that in themselves are fit for neither theoretical nor practical use.

Concepts of nature, which contain the basis of all theoretical cognition a priori, rested on the understanding's legislation.—The concept of freedom, which contained the basis of all *a priori* practical prescriptions independent of sensible conditions, rested on reason's legislation. Both faculties, then, can be applied, in terms of logical form, to principles whatever their origin. But beyond that, each also has its own legislation [177] regarding content, above which there is no other (*a priori*) legislation. This justifies dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical.

Yet within the family of higher cognitive faculties there is still an intermediate member between understanding and reason. This is the *power of judgment*. Analogy gives us reason to suppose that it too may contain *a priori*, if not a leg-

islation of its own, then at least a principle of its own for seeking laws, perhaps a merely subjective one. Even if no field of objects belonged to this principle as its domain, it could still have some territory, and some feature of that territory for which [A XXII] precisely this principle alone might hold.

There is also a further reason, judging by analogy, to connect the power of judgment with another ordering of our powers of representation. This seems even more important than its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties. For all the faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three that cannot be derived further from a common ground: the *faculty of cognition*, the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, and the *faculty of desire*[1]. [178] For the faculty of cognition, the understanding alone legislates when [A XXIII] that faculty—as it must be, if considered by itself without mixing it [A XXIV] with the faculty of desire—is related to nature as a faculty of *theoretical cognition*. Only with respect to nature, as appearance, can we give laws through *a priori* concepts of nature, which are really pure concepts of the understanding.—For the faculty of desire, considered as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, reason alone legislates *a priori*, since that concept has a place in reason alone.—Now the feeling of pleasure stands between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire, just as the power of judgment stands between understanding and reason. We may therefore at least provisionally suppose that the power of judgment likewise contains an *a priori* principle of its own. Pleasure or displeasure is necessarily connected with the faculty of desire: in its lower form, pleasure precedes its principle; in its [A XXV] [179] higher form, pleasure follows only from its determination by the moral law. We may therefore also suppose that the power of judgment will bring about a passage from the pure faculty of cognition, that is, from the domain of concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the passage from understanding to reason.

Philosophy, then, can be divided into only two main parts, theoretical and practical. Everything we might have to say about the power of judgment's own principles would have to be assigned within philosophy to the theoretical part, that is, rational cognition according to concepts of nature. Yet the critique of

pure reason must settle all this before that system is undertaken, in order to make it possible. It consists of three parts: the critique of pure understanding, of pure power of judgment, and of pure reason. These faculties are called pure because they legislate *a priori*.

1 It is useful to attempt a transcendental definition of concepts we use as empirical principles when we have reason to suspect that they are related *a priori* to the pure faculty of cognition. Because of this relation, we should define them through pure categories, insofar as these alone already distinguish the concept in question sufficiently from others. Here we follow the example of the mathematician. He leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation, in their pure synthesis, under the concepts of pure arithmetic. In this way he generalizes its solution.—I have been criticized for a similar procedure (Krit. der prakt. V., S. 16 [9] der Vorrede). The definition of the faculty of desire as the *ability, through one's representations, to cause the actuality of the objects of those representations* was faulted on the grounds that mere wishes are also desires, although everyone admits that wishes alone cannot produce their object.—But this proves only that human beings also have desires through which they contradict themselves. Through their representation alone they work toward producing an object, yet cannot expect any success. They are aware that their mechanical powers, if I may so call the nonpsychological ones, would have to be determined by that representation in order to produce the object indirectly. But these powers are either inadequate, or directed at something impossible: for example, undoing what has happened (*Oh, if only my past years, and so on!*) or, in impatient waiting, being able to erase the time until the wished-for moment.—In such fanciful desires we are aware that our representations are inadequate, or even unfit, to be the *cause* of their objects. Still, every *wish* contains a relation of these representations as cause, and thus a representation of their *causality*. This becomes especially visible when the wish is an emotion, namely *longing*. Such desires stretch and weaken the heart and so exhaust our powers. This proves that representations repeatedly put our powers under strain, yet, as the mind considers the impossibility, continually let it sink back

into exhaustion. Even prayers to avert great and, as far as we can see, unavoidable evils, as well as many superstitious means of achieving ends impossible by natural means, show this causal relation of representations to their objects. Even awareness that the representations are inadequate to produce the effect cannot stop the effort to do so.—Why our nature contains a tendency toward desires we know to be empty is an anthropological and teleological question. It seems that if we were not moved to exert our powers until we had assured ourselves that they were sufficient to produce an object, these powers would largely go unused. For generally we first learn what our powers are only by trying them. This illusion in empty wishes is therefore merely the consequence of a beneficial arrangement in our nature.

Introduction IV



IV. *On the power of judgment as a faculty that legislates a priori.*

The power of judgment in general is the ability to think of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal—the rule, [A XXVI] principle, or law—is given, the power of judgment that places the particular under it is *determining*. This remains so even when, as transcendental power of judgment, it states *a priori* the conditions under which alone something can be placed under that universal. But if only the particular is given, and judgment must find the universal for it, the power of judgment is merely *reflective*.

The determining power of judgment, operating under universal transcendental laws supplied by the understanding, only places things under those laws. The law is prescribed for it *a priori*, so it does not need to devise a law for itself in order to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal.—But nature has many different forms, as though they were so many modifications of the universal transcendental concepts of nature. The laws supplied *a priori* by the pure understanding leave these forms undetermined, since those laws concern only the possibility of a nature in general, as an object of the senses. Yet there must [180] also be laws for these forms. As empirical laws, they may be contingent to *our* understanding's insight. Still, if they are to be called laws, as the concept of a nature requires, they must be regarded as necessary on the basis of some principle unifying the manifold, even if we do not know it.—The reflective power of judgment must rise from the particular in nature to the universal. To fulfill

this [A XXVII] task, it therefore needs a principle it cannot borrow from experience. For this principle is meant to ground the unity of all empirical principles under higher principles that are likewise empirical, and thus the possibility of their systematic subordination to one another. The reflective power of judgment can therefore only give such a transcendental principle to itself as a law. It cannot take it from elsewhere, since it would then be determining judgment. Nor can it prescribe it to nature, because reflection on nature's laws takes its direction from nature. Nature does not take its direction from the conditions under which we try to acquire a concept of it that, in relation to those conditions, is entirely contingent.

This principle can only be the following. Universal laws of nature are grounded in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature, though only according to its general concept as nature. Particular empirical laws, as regards what those universal laws leave undetermined in them, must therefore be considered according to a unity of the following kind: as though an understanding, though not necessarily ours, had given them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, to make possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws. This does not mean that such an understanding must actually be assumed. The idea serves as a principle only for reflective judgment, for reflecting, not for determining. [A XXVIII] Through it, this faculty gives a law only to itself, not to nature.

Now the concept of an object, insofar as it also contains the ground of that object's actuality, is called an end. A thing's agreement with the character of things that is possible only according to ends is called the *purposiveness* of its form. The principle of judgment concerning the form of natural things under empirical laws in general is therefore the *purposiveness of nature* in its diversity. That is, through this concept nature [181] is represented as though an understanding contained the ground of unity in the diversity of its empirical laws.

The purposiveness of nature is therefore a special *a priori* concept that originates solely in the reflective power of judgment. We cannot attribute to natural products anything like a relation of nature in them to ends. We can only use this concept to reflect on them in relation to the connection of nature's appear-

ances given according to empirical laws. This concept is also entirely different from practical purposiveness, whether that of human art or of morals, although it is thought by analogy with it.

Introduction V



V. [A XXIX] *The principle of nature's formal purposiveness is a transcendental principle of the power of judgment.*

A transcendental principle is one through which we represent *a priori* the universal condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition in general. A principle is called metaphysical, by contrast, if it represents *a priori* the condition under which alone objects whose concept must be given empirically can be further determined *a priori*. Consider the principle for knowing bodies as substances and as changing substances. It is transcendental if it says their change must have a cause. But it is metaphysical if it says their change must have an *external* cause. In the first case, to know the proposition *a priori*, the body need only be thought through ontological predicates, that is, pure concepts of the understanding, such as substance. In the second, however, the proposition must be based on the empirical concept of a body as a movable thing in space. But once this is given, we can understand entirely *a priori* that the latter predicate—motion only through an external cause—belongs to the body.—Similarly, as I will show shortly, the principle of nature's purposiveness in the diversity of its empirical [A XXX] laws is a transcendental principle. For the concept of objects, insofar as they are thought to stand under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible experiential cognition [182] in general, and contains nothing empirical. By contrast, the principle of practical purposiveness, which must be thought in the idea of the *determination* of a

free *will*, would be a metaphysical principle. For the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must be given empirically and does not belong to the transcendental predicates. Yet neither principle is empirical; both are *a priori* principles. No further experience is needed to connect the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject in their judgments. That connection can be understood entirely *a priori*.

We can see sufficiently that the concept of nature's purposiveness belongs among transcendental principles from the maxims of judgment that underlie the investigation of nature *a priori*. These concern nothing but the possibility of experience, and thus of knowing nature—not simply as nature in general, but as nature determined by a diversity of particular laws.—These maxims occur often enough in the course of this science, though only scattered through it, as sayings of metaphysical wisdom. They appear in connection with various rules whose necessity [A XXXI] cannot be demonstrated from concepts. "Nature takes the shortest way (*law of economy*); yet it makes no leap, either in the sequence of its changes or in the arrangement of forms that differ in kind (*law of continuity in nature*); its great diversity in empirical laws is nevertheless unity under a few principles (*principles must not be multiplied beyond necessity*)," and other sayings of this kind.

But if we try to explain the origin of these principles through psychology, we go entirely against their meaning. They do not say what happens—that is, according to what rule our cognitive powers actually operate, and how people judge. They say how people ought to judge. This logical, objective necessity cannot emerge if the principles are merely empirical. The purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use, which clearly shines through these maxims, is therefore a transcendental principle of judgments. It consequently also requires a transcendental deduction, through which the ground for judging in this way must be sought in the *a priori* sources of cognition.

In the grounds of the possibility of experience [183], we first find something necessary: the universal [A XXXII] laws without which nature in general, as an object of the senses, cannot be thought. These rest on the categories applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us, insofar as this intuition

too is given *a priori*. Under these laws the power of judgment is determining. It has only to place things under given laws. For example, the understanding says, "Every change has its cause," a universal law of nature. Transcendental judgment then has only to state *a priori* the condition for placing something under this given concept of the understanding. That condition is the succession of determinations of one and the same thing. For nature in general, as an object of possible experience, that law is known to be absolutely necessary.—But besides this formal condition of time, the objects of empirical cognition are determined in many other ways, or, as far as we can judge *a priori*, are capable of being so determined. Things of specifically different natures, besides what they share as belonging to nature in general, can therefore be causes in infinitely many different ways. Each of these ways must, according to the concept of a cause in general, have its rule, which is a law and therefore carries necessity with it. Yet given the character and limits of our cognitive faculties, we have no insight at all into this necessity. Thus [A XXXIII], with regard to nature's merely empirical laws, we must think of the possibility of infinitely many different empirical laws that are nevertheless contingent to our insight: they cannot be known *a priori*. In this respect we judge nature's unity according to empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience as a system according to empirical laws, to be contingent. Yet such a unity must necessarily be presupposed and assumed. Otherwise there would be no complete connection of empirical cognitions into a whole of experience. Universal natural laws provide such a connection among things generically, as natural things in general, but not specifically, as particular natural beings of this kind. For its own use, then, the power of judgment must adopt the following *a priori* principle. What is contingent to human insight in particular empirical laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity that we cannot fathom but [184] can think, connecting their diversity into an experience possible in itself. Now a lawful unity in a connection that we recognize as agreeing with a necessary aim—a need of the understanding—yet also as contingent in itself, is represented as a purposiveness of the objects, here of nature [A XXXIV]. The power of judgment, which is merely reflective regarding things under possible empirical laws still to be discovered, must therefore think

nature, with respect to these laws, according to a *principle of purposiveness* for our faculty of cognition. This is expressed in the maxims of judgment given above. This transcendental concept of nature's purposiveness is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom. It attributes nothing at all to the object, nature. It represents only the way we must proceed in reflecting on natural objects with a view to completely connected experience. It is therefore a subjective principle, or maxim, of judgment. That is also why finding such systematic unity under merely empirical laws makes us glad—strictly speaking, relieves a need—as though it were a lucky accident favoring our aim. Yet we necessarily had to assume that such unity existed, without being able to understand or prove it.

To be convinced that this deduction of the concept in question is correct, and that we must adopt it as a transcendental principle of cognition, consider the size of the task. We must turn given perceptions of a nature that may contain an infinite diversity of empirical laws into connected [A XXXV] experience. This task lies *a priori* in our understanding. The understanding possesses *a priori* universal laws of nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all. But it also needs a certain order in nature's particular rules, which it can know only empirically and which are contingent in relation to it. Without these rules there would be no advance from the general analogy of a possible experience in general to particular experience. It must think of these rules as laws, that is, as necessary, because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, although it does not know their necessity and could never understand it. So although it cannot determine anything about these [185] objects *a priori*, in tracing these so-called empirical laws it must base all reflection on nature on an *a priori* principle: that a knowable order of nature according to them is possible. Such a principle is expressed by the following propositions. Nature contains a subordination of genera and species that we can grasp. The genera in turn approach one another according to a common principle, allowing a passage from one to another and thereby to a higher genus. Assuming as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences in natural effects [A XXXVI] at first seems unavoidable to our understanding. Yet

these may still fall under a small number of principles that we must occupy ourselves with finding, and so forth. Judgment presupposes *a priori* this agreement of nature with our faculty of cognition for the sake of reflecting on nature according to its empirical laws. At the same time, the understanding recognizes this agreement as objectively contingent. Judgment alone attributes it to nature as transcendental purposiveness in relation to the subject's faculty of cognition. Without presupposing it, we would have no order of nature according to empirical laws, and thus no guide for experiencing and investigating these laws in all their diversity.

For we can certainly think the following possibility. Natural things may conform to the universal laws without which the form of experiential cognition in general would be impossible. Yet the specific differences among nature's empirical laws and their effects could still be so great that our understanding could not discover an order in nature it could grasp. It could not divide nature's products into genera and species, so as to use the principles for explaining and understanding one also to explain and comprehend another. Nor could it turn material so confused [A XXXVII] for us—strictly speaking, merely infinitely diverse and unsuited to our capacity to grasp it—into connected experience.

The power of judgment therefore also contains an *a priori* principle for the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective respect. Through it, judgment prescribes a law not to nature, as autonomy, but to itself, as heautonomy, [186] for reflecting on nature. We could call this the *law of the specification of nature* with regard to its empirical laws. Judgment does not know this law in nature *a priori*. It assumes it for the sake of an order in nature that our understanding can know, in the division it makes of nature's universal laws when it seeks to subordinate a diversity of particular laws to them. We may therefore say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principle of purposiveness for our faculty of cognition. This means that it suits the human understanding in its necessary task: finding the universal for the particular offered by perception, and finding, for what differs, a connection in the unity of a principle, even though each species itself has something universal. In saying this, we neither prescribe a law to nature nor learn one from nature through observation,

although observation can confirm the principle. For it is not a principle of determining [A XXXVIII] judgment, but only of reflective judgment. What we mean is simply that, however nature may be arranged according to its universal laws, we must trace its empirical laws entirely according to that principle and the maxims grounded on it. Only insofar as it holds can we advance in using our understanding in experience and gain knowledge.

Introduction VI

VI. *On the connection of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of nature's purposiveness.*

The agreement we have in mind is that of nature, in the diversity of its particular laws, with our need to find universal principles for them. According to all our insight, we must judge this agreement contingent. Yet we must also judge it indispensable for our understanding's needs, and therefore a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our aim, which is directed solely at cognition.—The universal laws of the understanding, which are also laws of nature, are as necessary to nature as the laws of motion are to matter, although they arise from spontaneity. Their generation presupposes no intention concerning our cognitive faculties. Only through them do we first acquire a concept of what knowledge of things—of nature—is [A XXXIX] [187], and they necessarily belong to nature as the object of our cognition in general. But nature's order according to its particular laws may display a diversity and variety beyond our capacity to grasp. That this order is nevertheless actually suited to that capacity is, as far as we can see, contingent. Discovering this order is a task the understanding pursues with a view to a necessary end of its own: bringing unity of principles into nature. Judgment must then attribute this end to nature, since the understanding can prescribe no law to nature in this respect.

Achieving any aim is connected with a feeling of pleasure. If the condition of that achievement is an *a priori* representation, as here a principle for reflective judgment in general, then an *a priori* ground also determines the feeling of pleasure validly for everyone. It does so solely through the object's relation to the faculty of cognition. Here the concept of purposiveness takes no account whatever of the faculty of desire, and so differs entirely from all practical purposiveness of nature.

In fact, we find not the slightest effect on our feeling of pleasure when perceptions agree with laws according to universal concepts of nature, the categories. [A XL] Nor can we find such an effect, since the understanding necessarily proceeds in this way according to its nature, without intention. By contrast, discovering that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be brought under a principle embracing them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure. It often even produces admiration that continues after we have become quite familiar with its object. We no longer feel any noticeable pleasure in nature's comprehensibility and its unity in the division into genera and species. Yet this alone makes empirical concepts possible, through which we know nature according to its particular laws. Certainly that pleasure existed at one time. Only because even the most ordinary experience would be impossible without it has it gradually merged with mere cognition and ceased to be noticed separately.—Something is therefore needed to draw attention, when judging nature, to its purposiveness for our understanding. We must study how to bring its heterogeneous laws, if possible, under higher laws, though these remain empirical. [188] If this succeeds, we can feel pleasure in their agreement with our faculty of cognition, an agreement we regard as merely contingent. Conversely, we would be thoroughly displeased by a representation of nature predicting that the slightest investigation [A XLI] beyond the most ordinary experience would confront us with such heterogeneity in its laws that our understanding could not unite its particular laws under universal empirical ones. This would conflict with the principle of nature's subjectively purposive specification into genera, and with the aim of our reflective power of judgment in this regard.

Yet this presupposition of judgment leaves entirely undetermined how far nature's ideal purposiveness for our faculty of cognition should extend. If we are told that deeper or wider knowledge of nature through observation must eventually encounter a diversity of laws that no human understanding can reduce to a principle, we accept this too. Still, we prefer to hear others offer the hope that the better we know nature internally, or can compare it with external members now unknown to us, the simpler we will find it in its principles as our experience advances, and the more harmonious despite the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For our power of judgment commands us to proceed according to the principle of nature's suitability to our faculty of cognition as far as it reaches. Since it is not determining judgment that gives us this rule, it does not decide [A XLII] whether that principle has limits anywhere. We can determine limits regarding the rational use of our cognitive faculties, but in the empirical field no determination of limits is possible.

Introduction VII

VII. *On the aesthetic representation of nature's purposiveness.*

What is merely subjective in the representation of an object—that is, what constitutes its relation to the subject rather than to the object—is its aesthetic character. What serves, or can be used, to determine [189] the object, to know it, is its logical validity. In knowing an object of the senses, both relations occur together. In the sensory representation of things outside me, the quality of the space in which we intuit them is what is merely subjective in my representation of them. It leaves undecided what they may be as objects in themselves. Because of this relation, the object is thereby thought only as an appearance. Yet despite its merely subjective quality, space is still an element in knowing things as appearances. *Sensation*, here external sensation, likewise expresses what is merely subjective in our representations of things outside us, but more specifically [A XLIII] their material or real element, through which something existing is given. Space, by contrast, expresses merely the *a priori* form of the possibility of intuiting them. Yet sensation too is used to know objects outside us.

But the subjective element in a representation *that can never become an element of cognition* is the *pleasure* or *displeasure* connected with it. Through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it may indeed be the effect of some cognition. Now a thing's purposiveness, insofar as it is represented in perception, is also not a feature of the object itself, since such a feature cannot be perceived, although it can be inferred from knowledge of

things. A purposiveness that precedes knowledge of an object, and is even connected directly with its representation without our wanting to use that representation for cognition, is therefore the subjective element that can never become an element of cognition. The object is then called purposive only because its representation is directly connected with the feeling of pleasure. This representation itself is an aesthetic representation of purposiveness.—The only question is whether [A XLIV] there is any such representation of purposiveness at all.

Suppose pleasure is connected with merely taking in (*apprehension*) the form of an object of intuition, without relating that form to a concept for a definite cognition. The representation is then related not to the object, but solely to the subject. The pleasure can express nothing other than the object's suitability to the cognitive faculties that are at play in reflective judgment [190], insofar as they are at play there. It thus expresses only a subjective, formal purposiveness of the object. For the imagination can never take in forms without reflective judgment comparing them, even unintentionally, at least with its ability to relate intuitions to concepts. If, in this comparison, a given representation unintentionally brings imagination, as the faculty of *a priori* intuitions, into agreement with understanding, as the faculty of concepts, and thereby awakens a feeling of pleasure, the object must be regarded as purposive for reflective judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment about the object's purposiveness. It rests on no existing concept of the object and supplies none. Suppose the form of an object—not the material element of its representation as sensation—is judged in mere [A XLV] reflection on it, without intending to acquire a concept of it, as the ground of pleasure in the representation of such an object. This pleasure is then also judged to be necessarily connected with its representation: not merely for the subject who takes in this form, but for everyone who judges at all. The object is then called beautiful, and the ability to judge through such pleasure, and thus with universal validity, is called taste. For the ground of the pleasure is placed solely in the object's form for reflection in general. It lies in no sensation of the object, and involves no relation to a concept containing any aim. Hence it is solely the lawfulness of judgment's empiri-

cal use in general within the subject—the unity of imagination with understanding—with which the object's representation agrees in reflection, whose conditions hold universally *a priori*. Since this agreement of the object with the subject's faculties is contingent, it produces the representation of the object's purposiveness with respect to the subject's cognitive faculties.

Here, then, is a pleasure that, like all pleasure or displeasure not produced through the concept of freedom—that is, through pure reason's prior determination of the higher faculty of desire—can never [A XLVI] be understood from concepts as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. We must always recognize it as connected with that representation only through [191] perception reflected upon. Consequently, like all empirical judgments, it can declare no objective necessity or claim *a priori* validity. But a judgment of taste claims only, like every other empirical judgment, to hold for everyone. This is always possible despite its inner contingency. What is strange and different is simply this: it is not an empirical concept but a feeling of pleasure, and thus no concept at all, that the judgment of taste expects everyone to have and connect with the object's representation, as though it were a predicate connected with knowledge of the object.

An individual judgment of experience—for example, that of someone who perceives a moving drop of water in a rock crystal—rightly demands that everyone else must find the same thing. The person has made this judgment according to the general conditions of determining judgment under the laws of possible experience in general. Similarly, someone who feels pleasure in merely reflecting on an object's form, without reference to a concept, although this judgment is empirical and an individual judgment, rightly [A XLVII] claims everyone's agreement. For the ground of this pleasure lies in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments: the purposive agreement of an object, whether a product of nature or art, with the mutual relation of the cognitive faculties required for every empirical cognition, imagination and understanding. Thus pleasure in a judgment of taste does depend on an empirical representation and cannot be connected *a priori* with any concept. We cannot determine *a priori* which object will or will not suit taste; we must try it. Yet pleasure

determines this judgment only because we are aware that it rests solely on reflection and on the universal, though merely subjective, conditions of reflection's agreement with knowing objects in general, for which the object's form is purposive.

This is why judgments of taste are also subject to a critique regarding their possibility: that possibility presupposes an *a priori* principle. Yet this principle is neither a principle of cognition [192] for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will, and so is not determining *a priori* at all.

But receptiveness to pleasure from reflecting on the forms [A XLVIII] of things, in nature as well as art, indicates more than a purposiveness of objects in relation to reflective judgment in the subject, according to the concept of nature. It also indicates, conversely, a purposiveness of the subject with regard to objects, in respect of their form and even their formlessness, according to the concept of freedom. As a result, aesthetic judgment relates not only to the beautiful as a judgment of taste, but also to the *sublime*, as a judgment arising from a feeling of the spirit. The critique of aesthetic judgment must therefore divide into two main parts corresponding to these.

Introduction VIII



VIII. *On the logical representation of nature's purposiveness.*
Purposiveness can be represented in an object given in experience in either of two ways. It can rest on a merely subjective ground: the agreement of its form, in *taking it in* (*apprehension*) before any concept, with the cognitive faculties, in order to unite intuition with concepts into cognition in general. Or it can rest on an objective ground: the agreement of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it that precedes [A XLIX] the form and contains its ground. We have seen that the representation of the first kind of purposiveness rests on direct pleasure in the object's form in mere reflection on it. The representation of the second kind, however, relates the object's form not to the subject's cognitive faculties in taking it in, but to a definite cognition of the object under a given concept. It therefore has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but with the understanding in judging them. When the concept of an object is given, judgment's task in using it for cognition consists in *presentation* (*exhibition*): placing a corresponding intuition alongside the concept. This may be done through our own imagination, as in art, [193] when we realize a preconceived concept of an object that is an end for us. Or it may be done through nature in its technique, as with organized bodies, when we place our concept of an end beneath nature in order to judge its product. In this case we represent not just nature's *purposiveness* in the form of the thing, but this product of nature as a *natural end*.—Our concept of a subjective pur-

posiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is not a concept of the object at all. It is only a [A L] principle of judgment for acquiring concepts in nature's immense diversity, for finding our way in it. Yet through it we attribute to nature, as it were, a regard for our faculty of cognition, by analogy with an end. We can thus regard *natural beauty* as the *presentation* of the concept of formal, merely subjective purposiveness, and *natural ends* as the presentation of the concept of real, objective purposiveness. We judge the former through taste, aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure; the latter through understanding and reason, logically, according to concepts.

This grounds the division of the critique of judgment into the critiques of *aesthetic* and *teleological* judgment. The former means the ability to judge formal purposiveness, also called subjective purposiveness, through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The latter means the ability to judge nature's real, objective purposiveness through understanding and reason.

The part concerning aesthetic judgment belongs essentially to a critique of judgment. For aesthetic judgment alone contains a principle that judgment places entirely *a priori* at the basis of its reflection on nature: the principle of nature's formal purposiveness, according to its particular empirical laws, for our faculty of cognition. Without this, the understanding could not find its way in nature. By contrast, [A LI] no *a priori* ground can be given for the claim that there must be objective ends of nature, things possible only as natural ends. Even the possibility of this claim cannot be seen from the concept of nature as an object of experience, whether in general or in particular. Rather, judgment alone contains the rule for using the concept of ends in the service of reason in cases that arise, involving certain products, without itself containing an *a priori* principle for doing so. The transcendental [194] principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end, at least in form, to nature.

The transcendental principle allows us to represent a purposiveness of nature in the form of a thing, in subjective relation to our faculty of cognition, as a principle for judging nature. But it leaves entirely undetermined where and in what cases I must judge something as a product according to a principle of pur-

posiveness rather than merely according to universal natural laws. It leaves it to *aesthetic* judgment, in taste, to decide the suitability of the product's form to our cognitive faculties, insofar as taste decides not through agreement with concepts but through feeling. By contrast, judgment used teleologically states definite conditions [A LII] under which something, for example an organized body, is to be judged according to the idea of an end of nature. But it can cite no principle from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorizing us to attribute to nature *a priori* a relation to ends, or even to assume such a relation indeterminately from actual experience of such products. The reason is that many particular experiences must be undertaken and considered under the unity of their principle before we can know, even empirically, an objective purposiveness in a particular object.—Aesthetic judgment is therefore a special ability to judge things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. Teleological judgment is not a special faculty. It is simply reflective judgment in general, proceeding, as everywhere in theoretical cognition, according to concepts. But for certain natural objects it proceeds according to special principles: those of a merely reflective judgment, not one determining objects. In its application it therefore belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy. Because its special principles are not determining, as they must be in a doctrine, it must also form a separate part of the critique. Aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, contributes nothing to knowledge of its objects. It must therefore be assigned *only* to the critique of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties insofar as they [A LIII] are capable of *a priori* principles, whatever use those principles may have, theoretical or practical. This critique is the preparatory study for all philosophy.

Introduction IX

IX. [195] *On the connection of the legislations of understanding and reason through the power of judgment.*

The understanding legislates *a priori* for nature as an object of the senses, for theoretical knowledge of it in possible experience. Reason legislates *a priori* for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for unconditionally practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of the concept of freedom under the other, are entirely separated from any mutual influence they could have on one another on their own, each according to its fundamental laws. They are separated by the great gulf dividing the supersensible from appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing regarding theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing regarding the practical laws of freedom. To that extent it is impossible [A LIV] to build a bridge from one domain to the other.—But although the grounds determining causality according to the concept of freedom and the practical rule it contains are not located in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, the reverse is possible. This concerns not knowledge of nature, but the consequences of the supersensible for the sensible. It is already contained in the concept of causality through freedom, whose *effect* ought to occur in the world according to freedom's formal laws. When used of the supersensible, however, the word *cause* means only the *ground* for determining the causality of natural things toward

an effect according to their own natural laws, yet at the same time in harmony with the formal principle of reason's laws. We cannot understand how this is possible, but we can sufficiently refute the objection that it allegedly contains a contradiction[2].—The effect according to the concept of freedom is the [A LV] [196] final end that ought to exist, or whose appearance in the sensible world ought to exist. This presupposes the condition of its possibility in nature: the nature of the subject as a sensible being, namely a human being. The power of judgment presupposes this condition *a priori* and without regard to the practical. In the concept of nature's *purposiveness*, it supplies the mediating concept between concepts of nature and the concept of freedom. This makes possible the passage from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness according to the former to the final end according to the latter. Through it we recognize the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in agreement with its laws.

Through the possibility of its *a priori* laws for nature, the understanding proves that we know nature only as appearance [A LVI]. It thereby also points to a supersensible substrate of nature, but leaves it entirely *undetermined*. Through its *a priori* principle for judging nature according to its possible particular laws, the power of judgment gives this supersensible substrate, both within and outside us, *determinability through the intellectual faculty*. Reason, however, gives that same substrate its *determination* through its *a priori* practical law. In this way judgment makes possible the passage from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.

Consider the faculties of the soul in general insofar as they are regarded as higher faculties, that is, as containing autonomy. For the *faculty of cognition*, theoretical cognition of nature, the understanding contains the *constitutive a priori* principles. For the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, it is the power of judgment, independently of concepts and sensations that relate to determining the faculty of desire [197] and could thereby be directly practical. For the *faculty of desire*, it is reason, which is practical without any pleasure acting as intermediary, whatever its source. Reason determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which at the same time brings with it pure intellectual satis-

faction in the object.—Judgment's concept of nature's purposiveness still belongs among concepts of nature [A LVII], but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition. Yet the aesthetic judgment about certain objects of nature or art that occasions this concept is a constitutive principle regarding the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, whose agreement grounds this pleasure, makes the concept suitable for mediating the connection between the domains of the concept of nature and the concept of freedom in their consequences. At the same time, this spontaneity promotes the mind's receptiveness to moral feeling.—The following table may make it easier to survey all the higher faculties in their systematic unity[3].

All the faculties of the mind — Cognitive faculties — A priori principles — Application to [A LVIII] [198]

Faculty of cognition — Understanding — Lawfulness — Nature

Feeling of pleasure and displeasure — Power of judgment — Purposiveness — Art

Faculty of desire — Reason — Final end — Freedom.

[2] One of the various alleged contradictions in this complete distinction between natural causality and causality through freedom is the following objection. If I speak of *obstacles* nature places in the way of causality according to laws of freedom, the moral laws, or of nature's *support* for it, I am admitting that nature has an *influence* on freedom. But this misreading is very easy to avoid if one is willing to understand what has been said. The resistance or support is not between nature and freedom, but between nature as appearance and the *effects* of freedom as appearances in the sensible world. Even the *causality* of freedom, of pure practical reason, is the *causality* of a natural cause subordinate to freedom: the subject considered as a human being and thus as an appearance. The intelligible thought under freedom contains the ground of this cause's *determination* in a way that is otherwise inexplicable, just like what constitutes nature's supersensible substrate.

[3] Some have found it troubling that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always have three parts. But this lies in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made *a priori*, it will either be *analytic*, according to the principle of contradiction, in which case it always has two parts (*every being is either A or not A*), or it will be *synthetic*. If in the latter case it is to be made from *a priori concepts*, rather than, as in mathematics, from the intuition corresponding *a priori* to the concept, then the division must necessarily have three parts, in accordance with what synthetic unity in general requires: 1) a condition, 2) something conditioned, 3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition.

Division of the Work



Division [A LIX] [199] *of the whole work.*
- *First Part.*
- *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.*
- *First Section.*
- Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment.
- *First Book.*
- Analytic of the Beautiful.
- *Second Book.*
- Analytic of the Sublime.
- *Second Section.*
- Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment.
- *Second Part.* [A LX]
- *Critique of Teleological Judgment.*
- *First Division.*
- Analytic of Teleological Judgment.
- *Second Division.*
- Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.
- *Appendix.*
- Methodology of Teleological Judgment.

Of the [201] *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

PART I

Analytic of the Beautiful

First Part. Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.
First Section. [203] *Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment.*
First Book. Analytic of the Beautiful.
First Moment of the Judgment of Taste[4]*, according to Quality.*

1 *A judgment of taste is aesthetic.*

To distinguish whether something is beautiful or not, we do not relate its representation through the understanding to the object for cognition. Instead, through imagination, perhaps combined with understanding, [A 4] we relate it to the subject and the subject's feeling of pleasure or displeasure. A judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, and so is not logical but aesthetic. By this we mean a judgment whose determining ground can be *nothing but subjective*. Every relation of representations, even of sensations, can be objective, in which case it signifies the real element of an empirical representation. The exception is their relation to [204] the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This indicates nothing at all in the object. Instead, in this relation the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

Grasping a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive faculty, whether in a clear or a confused way of representing it, is quite different from being aware of this representation with a sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is related entirely to the subject, specifically to its feeling of life, under the name

of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This grounds a quite distinct ability to discriminate and judge, which contributes nothing to cognition. It only compares the given representation in the subject [A 5] with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind becomes aware in feeling its own state. The representations given in a judgment may be empirical, and thus aesthetic. Yet the judgment made through them is logical if in that judgment they are related only to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations were rational, but in a judgment were related solely to the subject and its feeling, they are to that extent always aesthetic.

2 *The satisfaction that determines a judgment of taste is free of all interest.*

Interest is the name for the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object's existence. Such satisfaction therefore always also relates to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or at least as necessarily connected with that ground. But when the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know whether we or anyone else care, or even could care, about the thing's existence. We want to know how we judge it in mere contemplation, in intuition or reflection. If someone asks whether I find the palace I see before me [A 6] beautiful, I may say that I do not like things made merely to be stared at. Or, like that Iroquois *chief*, I may say that nothing in Paris pleases me more than the cookshops. I may even denounce, in true *Rousseau* style, the vanity of the great, who spend the people's sweat on such dispensable things. Finally, I can [205] easily convince myself that if I were on an uninhabited island with no hope of ever returning to human company, and could conjure up such a magnificent building by merely wishing for it, I would not even take that trouble if I already had a comfortable enough hut. All this can be granted and approved. But that is not what is being discussed now. The question is only whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied by satisfaction in me, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object of that representation. It is easy to see that to say it is *beautiful*, and to show that I have taste, what matters is what I make of this representation within myself, not how I depend on the object's existence. Everyone must admit that a

judgment about beauty mixed with even the slightest interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. To act as judge in matters of taste, we must not be biased in the least toward the thing's existence, but must be entirely indifferent [A 7] in that respect.

We can best explain this especially important proposition by contrasting pure, disinterested[5] satisfaction in a judgment of taste with satisfaction connected with interest. This is especially so if we can also be certain that there are no kinds of interest beyond those we are about to name.

3 *Satisfaction in the agreeable is connected with interest.*

The agreeable is what pleases the senses in sensation. Here we immediately have an opportunity to point out and challenge a very common confusion between the two meanings the word sensation can have. People say or think that all satisfaction is itself a sensation of pleasure. Consequently [206], everything that pleases is agreeable precisely because it pleases, and, according to [A 8] its different degrees or its relations to other agreeable sensations, is *delightful, charming, entertaining, gratifying*, and so on. But if we grant this, sensory impressions that determine inclination, principles of reason that determine the will, and merely reflected forms of intuition that determine judgment are all exactly the same in their effect on the feeling of pleasure. For this effect would be agreeableness in the sensation of one's state. Ultimately all cultivation of our faculties must aim at the practical and unite in it as their goal. We could therefore expect from them no assessment of things and their worth except one based on the enjoyment they promise. How they achieve this would not matter in the end. Since only the choice of means could make any difference, people could accuse one another of folly and lack of understanding, but never of baseness and malice. For all of them, each according to their own way of seeing things, would be pursuing a goal that for everyone is enjoyment.

When a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, this expression means something quite different from what it means when I call the representation of a thing sensation, through the senses as a receptivity belonging to the faculty of cognition. In the latter [A 9] case, the representa-

tion is related to the object. In the former, it is related solely to the subject and serves no cognition at all, not even the cognition through which the subject *knows* itself.

In the definition above, however, by sensation we mean an objective representation of the senses. To avoid the constant risk of being misunderstood, we will use the otherwise customary name feeling for what must always remain merely subjective and can never constitute a representation of an object. The green color of meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, as perception of an object of sense. Its agreeableness, however, belongs to *subjective* sensation, through which no object is represented: that is, to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction, which is not knowledge of it.

My judgment declaring an object [207] agreeable clearly expresses an interest in it. This is already evident from the fact that, through sensation, it arouses desire for an object of that kind. The satisfaction therefore presupposes not merely a judgment about the object, but a relation of its existence to my state insofar as such an object affects it. That is why we say of the agreeable not merely that it *pleases*, but that it *gratifies*. What I give it is not [A 10] mere approval: it produces inclination. And what is agreeable in the liveliest way requires so little judgment about the object's character that people who aim only at enjoyment —the word for the intimate character of gratification—gladly spare themselves all judging.

4 *Satisfaction in the good is connected with interest.*

Good is what pleases through reason by means of the mere concept. We call something *good for something*, or useful, when it pleases only as a means. We call something else *good in itself* when it pleases for its own sake. Both always contain the concept of an end, and thus a relation of reason to willing, at least possible willing. Consequently, they contain satisfaction in the *existence* of an object or an action: that is, some interest.

To find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, that is, have a concept of it. I do not need this to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, and lines intertwined without an aim under

the [A 11] name of foliage patterns signify nothing and depend on no definite concept, yet they please. Satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on reflection on an object that leads to some concept, though which concept remains undetermined. This also distinguishes it from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

The agreeable and the good do seem to be the same in many cases. People commonly say that all enjoyment, especially lasting enjoyment, is good in itself. This amounts more or less to saying that being lastingly agreeable and being good are the same. But we soon see that this is merely a mistaken substitution of words. The concepts peculiar to these expressions can by no means [208] be exchanged. The agreeable as such represents the object solely in relation to sense. It must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end before it can be called good as an object of the will. Calling what gratifies *good* as well places it in an entirely different relation to satisfaction. We can see this because, with the good, the question always arises whether it is merely indirectly good or directly good, useful or good in itself. With the agreeable, however, this question cannot arise at all, since the word always means something that pleases directly. The same applies to what [A 12] I call beautiful.

Even in the most ordinary speech, people distinguish the agreeable from the good. We readily say that a dish whose flavor is enhanced by spices and other additions is agreeable, while admitting that it is not good. It directly *pleases* the senses, but indirectly displeases when considered through reason, which looks ahead to the consequences. We can notice this distinction even in judging health. Health is directly agreeable to everyone who has it, at least negatively, as the absence of all bodily pain. But to say it is good, we must also use reason to relate it to ends: it is a state that makes us fit for all our activities. Finally, regarding happiness, everyone believes they can call the greatest sum of life's agreeable experiences, in both amount and duration, a true good, indeed the highest good. But reason resists this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. If enjoyment alone were the aim, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it, whether it were passively received through nature's generosity or acquired through our own activity and effort. But reason will never be per-

suaded that the existence of someone who lives merely [A 13] *to enjoy* has worth in itself, however busy that person may be in pursuing this aim. This remains true even if, as a means to enjoyment, that person greatly benefits others who likewise seek only enjoyment, and does so because sympathy allows them to share every pleasure. Only through what a person does without regard to enjoyment, in complete freedom and independently of what nature might provide even without their activity, do they give their existence as a person [209] absolute worth. Happiness, with all its abundance of agreeableness, is far from being an unconditional good[6].

Despite all these differences between the agreeable and the good, both agree in always being connected with an interest in their object. This applies not just to the agreeable, § 3, and to the indirectly good, the useful, which pleases as a means to some agreeableness. It also applies to what is good absolutely and in every respect: the morally good, which carries the highest interest with it. For the good is the object of the will, that is, [A 14] a faculty of desire determined by reason. Willing something and taking satisfaction in its existence, that is, taking an interest in it, are identical.

5 *Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.*

The agreeable and the good both relate to the faculty of desire. In this respect, the former carries with it a pathologically conditioned satisfaction, conditioned by attractions or stimuli; the latter carries a pure practical satisfaction. This satisfaction is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented connection of the subject with its existence. Not merely the object, but its existence too, pleases. A judgment of taste, by contrast, is merely *contemplative*: indifferent to an object's existence, it only compares the object's character with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is not directed toward concepts either. For a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, whether theoretical or practical. It is therefore neither *grounded* on concepts nor *aimed* at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In [A 15] [210] relation to this feeling we distinguish objects or ways of representing them from one another. The appropriate expressions used to designate satisfaction in each are also different. A person calls *agreeable* what *gratifies* them, *beautiful* what merely *pleases* them, and *good* what they *esteem* or *approve*, that is, what they assign an objective worth. Agreeableness holds even for animals without reason. Beauty holds only for human beings: beings that are animal yet rational, and not merely rational, as spirits might be, but animal as well. The good, however, holds for every rational being in general. This proposition can receive its full justification and explanation only later. We can say that, of these three kinds of satisfaction, taste's satisfaction in the beautiful alone is disinterested and *free*. No interest, whether of the senses or of reason, compels approval. We could therefore say that satisfaction in the three cases relates to *inclination*, *favor*, or *respect*. For *favor* is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that a law of reason requires us to desire, leave us no freedom to make something into an object of pleasure for ourselves. Every interest presupposes a need or produces [A 16] one. As a ground determining approval, it no longer allows judgment about the object to be free.

Regarding inclination's interest in the agreeable, everyone says that hunger is the best cook, and that people with a healthy appetite like anything edible. Such satisfaction therefore shows no choice according to taste. Only when the need is satisfied can we distinguish who among many people has taste and who does not. Similarly, there are manners or conduct without virtue, politeness without goodwill, propriety without integrity, and so on. Where the moral law speaks, objectively there is no longer any free choice about what to do. Showing taste in one's conduct, or in judging that of others, is quite different from expressing one's moral way of thinking. The latter contains a command and produces a need. Moral taste, by contrast, merely plays with objects of satisfaction without attaching itself to any one of them.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the first moment. [211]

Taste is the ability to judge an object or a way of representing it through satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such satisfaction is called *beautiful*.

Second Moment [A 17] *of the judgment of taste, according to its quantity.*

6 *The beautiful is what, without concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.*

This definition of the beautiful can be derived from its previous definition as an object of satisfaction without any interest. If someone is aware that their satisfaction in something involves no interest at all, they cannot help judging that it must contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. Their satisfaction is not based on any inclination of the subject, or on any other deliberate interest. The person judging feels completely *free* regarding the satisfaction they take in the object. They therefore cannot discover, as grounds for that satisfaction, any private conditions on which their subject alone depends. They must regard it as grounded in what they can also presuppose in everyone else. Consequently, they must believe they have grounds to expect a similar satisfaction from everyone. They will therefore speak of the beautiful as though beauty [A 18] were a feature of the object and the judgment were logical, constituting knowledge of the object through concepts of it. Yet the judgment is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the object's representation to the subject. It does, however, resemble a logical judgment in allowing its validity for everyone to be presupposed. But this universality cannot arise from concepts either. There is no passage from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, except in pure practical laws. These, however, carry an interest of a kind not connected with a pure judgment of taste [212]. Consequently, a judgment of taste, together with awareness that it is separated from all interest, must carry a claim to validity for everyone without a universality directed at objects. That is, it must be connected with a claim to subjective universality.

7 *Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good through the characteristic given above.*

Regarding the *agreeable*, everyone accepts that their judgment, which they base on a private feeling and through which they say an object pleases them, is confined to their own person. They are therefore quite content if, on saying "Canary wine [A 19] is agreeable," someone else corrects the expression and reminds them to say, "It is agreeable *to me*." This applies not only to the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also to whatever may be agreeable to each person's eyes and ears. One person finds violet gentle and lovely, another finds it dead and lifeless. One loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments. It would be foolish to argue over this in order to condemn another person's different judgment as incorrect, as though it logically contradicted our own. Regarding the agreeable, therefore, the principle holds: *everyone has their own taste*, the taste of sense.

The beautiful is quite different. Here, on the contrary, it would be ridiculous if someone who prided themselves on their taste tried to justify it by saying, "This object is beautiful *for me*"—whether the building we see, the clothes someone is wearing, the concert we hear, or the poem submitted for judgment. They must not call it *beautiful* if it merely pleases them. Many things may be attractive and agreeable to them; no one cares about that. But in declaring something beautiful, they expect the same satisfaction from others. They judge not merely for themselves but for [A 20] everyone, and speak of beauty as though it were a property of things. They therefore say, "The *thing* is beautiful." They do not count on others' agreement with their judgment of satisfaction [213] merely because they have repeatedly found others agreeing with them. They *demand* it. They criticize others who judge differently and deny them taste, while still requiring them to have it. In this respect we cannot say that everyone has their own particular taste. That would mean there is no taste at all, that is, no aesthetic judgment that could rightfully claim everyone's agreement.

Yet even regarding the agreeable, we find agreement among people in judging it. With reference to this agreement, we deny taste to some and grant it to others, not as a bodily sense but as an ability to judge the agreeable in general. Thus we say that someone has taste if they know how to entertain their guests with agreeable experiences, with enjoyment through all the senses, in a way that

pleases them all. But here universality is taken only comparatively. There are only *general* rules, as all empirical rules are, not *universal* rules of the kind a judgment of taste about the beautiful undertakes to establish or claims to follow. It [A 21] is a judgment relating to sociability insofar as that rests on empirical rules. Judgments about the good also rightly claim validity for everyone. But the good is represented as an object of universal satisfaction only *through a concept*, which is not the case with either the agreeable or the beautiful.

8 *In a judgment of taste, the universality of satisfaction is represented only as subjective.*

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, found in a judgment of taste, is remarkable. Not for the logician, but for the transcendental philosopher, it calls for considerable effort to discover its origin. In return, it reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that would have remained unknown without this analysis.

First, we must be completely convinced that through a [214] judgment of taste about the beautiful we expect *everyone* to take satisfaction in an object, without basing this on a concept, for then it would be the good. This claim to universal validity [A 22] is so essential to a judgment declaring something *beautiful* that without thinking of it, no one would think to use that expression. Everything that pleases without a concept would instead be counted as agreeable. In that case everyone is allowed their own opinion, and no one expects another to agree with their judgment of taste, as always happens in a judgment of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of sense, the second the taste of reflection. The former makes merely private judgments; the latter makes supposedly universally valid, public judgments. Both, however, make aesthetic, not practical, judgments about an object solely in regard to the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now experience shows not only that the judgment of the taste of sense, its pleasure or displeasure in something, does not hold universally. Everyone is also modest enough on their own not to expect this agreement from others, although very widespread agreement is often actually found even in these judgments. Yet the taste of reflection, whose

claim to the universal validity of its judgment about the beautiful for everyone is also often rejected, as experience teaches, still finds it possible [A 23]—and actually does so—to represent judgments that could demand this agreement universally. Indeed, it expects this agreement from everyone for each of its judgments of taste. This is strange. Those judging do not dispute the possibility of such a claim. They disagree only, in particular cases, about the correct use of this faculty.

Here we must first note that a universality not resting on concepts of the object, even merely empirical ones, is not logical but aesthetic. It contains no objective quantity of the judgment, only a subjective one. For this I also use the expression *common validity*. It designates the validity for every subject of a representation's relation not to the faculty of cognition but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The same expression can also be used for the logical quantity of a judgment, [215] provided we add *objective* universal validity, to distinguish it from merely subjective universal validity, which is always aesthetic.

An *objectively universally valid* judgment is also always subjectively valid. That is, if the judgment holds for everything contained under a given concept, it also holds for everyone who represents an object through that concept. But from *subjective universal validity*, that is, aesthetic validity, which rests on no concept [A 24], we cannot infer logical validity, because judgments of this kind do not concern the object at all. For that very reason, the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgment must be of a special kind. It does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the *object* considered throughout its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that same predicate over the whole sphere *of those judging*.

As regards logical quantity, all judgments of taste are *singular* judgments. I must compare the object directly with my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, not through concepts. Such judgments therefore cannot have the quantity of objectively universally valid judgments. Yet a logically universal judgment can result if the singular representation of the object of a judgment of taste is transformed by comparison into a concept, according to the conditions determining that judgment. For example, through a judgment of taste I declare the rose I am

looking at beautiful. By contrast, the judgment arising from comparing many singular judgments, "Roses in general are beautiful," is now expressed not merely as an aesthetic judgment, but as a logical judgment grounded on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment "The rose is agreeable in its smell" is also aesthetic and singular, but is a judgment of sense, not of taste. It differs from the latter in this: a judgment of taste carries an *aesthetic* [A 25] *quantity* of universality, of validity for everyone, that cannot be found in a judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good have logical, not merely aesthetic, universality, although they too determine satisfaction in an object. For they hold of the object as knowledge of it, and therefore hold for everyone.

If we judge objects merely according to concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. There can therefore be no rule by which someone should be forced to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether [216] clothes, a house, or a flower are beautiful is not a judgment we let anyone talk us into through reasons or principles. We want to put the object before our own eyes, as though our satisfaction depended on sensation. Yet when we then call the object beautiful, we believe we have a universal voice on our side and claim everyone's agreement. A private sensation, by contrast, would decide only for the observer and their own satisfaction.

Here we can see that in a judgment of taste nothing is postulated but such a *universal voice* regarding satisfaction without concepts acting as intermediaries. Thus what is postulated is the *possibility* of an [A 26] aesthetic judgment that could also be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not *postulate* everyone's agreement; only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can give reasons. It only *expects* this agreement from everyone, as a case of the rule, for which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. The universal voice is therefore only an idea. What it rests on is not yet investigated here. It may be uncertain whether someone who believes they are making a judgment of taste actually judges in accordance with this idea. But by using the expression beauty they announce that they do relate the judgment to it, and thus that it is meant to be a judgment of taste. For themselves, they can become certain of this simply by being aware

that they have separated everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains. This is all for which they expect everyone's agreement. Under these conditions their claim would also be justified, if only they did not so often violate them and therefore make an erroneous judgment of taste.

9 [A 27] *Investigation of the question: in a judgment of taste, does the feeling of pleasure precede judging the object, or does judging precede pleasure?*

Solving this problem is the key to the critique of taste and therefore deserves our full attention.

Suppose pleasure in the given object came first, and a judgment of taste were only to attribute the [217] universal communicability of this pleasure to the representation of the object. Such a procedure would contradict itself. For this pleasure would be nothing but mere agreeableness in sensory sensation. By its nature it could therefore have only private validity, since it would depend directly on the representation through which the object *is given*.

It must therefore be the universal communicability of the mental state in the given representation that underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and has pleasure in the object as its consequence. But nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation insofar as it belongs to cognition. Only to that extent is a representation objective, and only through this does it have a universal point of reference with which everyone's power of representation is compelled [A 28] to agree. Now if the determining ground of the judgment about this universal communicability of the representation is to be thought as merely subjective, without a concept of the object, it can only be the mental state found in the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they relate a given representation to *cognition in general*.

The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here in free play, because no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. The mental state in this representation must therefore be a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for cognition

in general. For a representation through which an object is given to become cognition at all, it requires *imagination* to combine the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* for the unity of the concept that unites the representations. This state of *free play* of the cognitive faculties in a representation through which an object is given must be universally communicable. For cognition, as the determination of the object with which given representations, in whatever subject, ought to agree [A 29], is the only kind of representation that holds for everyone.

The subjective universal communicability of the way of representing in a judgment of taste is supposed to occur without presupposing a definite concept. It can therefore be nothing other than the mental state in the [218] free play of imagination and understanding, insofar as they agree with each other as is required for *cognition in general*. We are aware that this subjective relation suited to cognition in general must hold for everyone and therefore be universally communicable, just as every definite cognition is. Such cognition always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

This merely subjective, aesthetic judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, thus precedes pleasure in it and grounds this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. The universal subjective validity of the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object we call beautiful rests solely on that universality of the subjective conditions for judging objects.

Being able to communicate one's mental state, even just regarding the cognitive faculties, carries pleasure with it. This could easily be shown from the human being's natural tendency toward sociability, empirically [A 30] and psychologically. But that is not enough for our purpose. In a judgment of taste we expect everyone else necessarily to have the pleasure we feel. When we call something beautiful, we speak as though beauty were a feature of the object determined in it according to concepts. Yet beauty in itself is nothing without a relation to the subject's feeling. We must reserve discussion of this question until we answer whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible *a priori*.

For now, we are still concerned with the smaller question: how do we become aware, in a judgment of taste, of a mutual subjective agreement of the cognitive powers? Is it aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through awareness of the intentional activity by which we bring them into play?

If the given representation occasioning the judgment of taste were a concept that united understanding and imagination in judging the object so as to know it, awareness of this relation would be intellectual, as in the objective schematism of judgment discussed in the critique. But the judgment would then not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure, [219] and would therefore not be a judgment of taste. Now a judgment of taste [A 31] determines the object independently of concepts in regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. That subjective unity of the relation can therefore make itself known only through sensation. The sensation whose universal communicability the judgment of taste postulates is the enlivening of both faculties, imagination and understanding, into an activity that is undetermined yet harmonious on the occasion of the given representation: the activity belonging to cognition in general. An objective relation can indeed only be thought. Yet insofar as it is subjective in its conditions, it can be sensed in its effect on the mind. Where a relation has no concept as its basis, as with the relation of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition in general, no awareness of it is possible except through the sensation of its effect. This effect consists in the easier play of the two mental powers, imagination and understanding, enlivened by their mutual agreement. A representation that, though singular and not compared with others, nevertheless agrees with the conditions of universality, which constitutes the understanding's task in general, brings the cognitive faculties into the proportionate attunement we require for all cognition. We therefore also consider it valid for everyone whose task is to judge through understanding and [A 32] senses in combination: for every human being.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the second moment.

Beautiful is what pleases universally without a concept.

Third Moment of judgments of taste, according to the relation of ends considered in them.

10 *On purposiveness in general.*

If we want to explain what an end is according to its transcendental determinations, without presupposing anything empirical such as the feeling of pleasure, [220] then an end is the object of a concept insofar as that concept is regarded as the object's cause, the real ground of its possibility. The causality of a *concept* with regard to its *object* is purposiveness (*final form*). Thus we think of an end wherever not merely knowledge of an object, but the object itself, its form or existence, is thought as an effect possible only through a concept of that effect. The representation of the effect here determines its cause [A 33] and precedes it. Awareness of a representation's causality with regard to the subject's state, toward *keeping* the subject in that state, can here designate in general what we call pleasure. Displeasure, by contrast, is that representation which contains the ground for determining the state of representations toward its own opposite, for holding them off or removing them.

The faculty of desire, insofar as it can be determined only through concepts, that is, to act in accordance with the representation of an end, would be the will. But an object, a mental state, or an action is also called purposive even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end. This is simply because we can explain and understand its possibility only insofar as we assume as its basis a causality according to ends: a will that would have arranged it in this way according to the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can therefore exist without an end, insofar as we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, yet can make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always need to understand through reason the possibility of what we observe. So we can at least observe a purposiveness of form without placing an end [A 34] beneath it as the matter of the *connection of ends*. We can notice it in objects, although only through reflection.

11 [221] *A judgment of taste is grounded on nothing but the form of purposiveness of an object or of the way of representing it.*

Every end, when regarded as the ground of satisfaction, always carries an interest as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of pleasure. Thus no subjective end can underlie a judgment of taste. But neither can any representation of an objective end—that is, of the possibility of the object itself according to principles of a connection of ends—and hence no concept of the good determine a judgment of taste. For it is an aesthetic judgment, not a cognitive one. It therefore concerns no *concept* of the object's character and its inner or outer possibility through this or that cause. It concerns only the relation of the powers of representation to one another insofar as they are determined by a representation.

Now when an object is determined [A 35] as beautiful, this relation is connected with a feeling of pleasure that the judgment of taste also declares valid for everyone. Consequently, neither an agreeableness accompanying the representation, nor a representation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good, can contain the determining ground. Nothing, then, can constitute the satisfaction we judge universally communicable without a concept, and thus the determining ground of a judgment of taste, except subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end, objective or subjective. It is therefore the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is *given* to us, insofar as we are aware of that form.

12 *A judgment of taste rests on a priori grounds.*

It is absolutely impossible to establish *a priori* a connection between a feeling of pleasure or displeasure as an effect and any representation, whether sensation or concept, as its cause. This would be a causal relation, which among objects of experience can [222] always be known only *a posteriori*, through experience itself. [A 36] In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, we did indeed derive the feeling of respect *a priori* from universal moral concepts. Respect is a special and distinctive modification of this feeling, which does not quite coincide with either the pleasure or displeasure we receive from empirical objects. But there

we could also go beyond the limits of experience and call upon a causality resting on a supersensible character of the subject: the causality of freedom. Yet even there we did not really derive this *feeling* from the idea of morality as its cause. Only the determination of the will was derived from it. The mental state of a will determined in any way is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and identical with it. It does not follow from that determination as an effect. We would have to assume the latter only if the concept of morality as a good preceded the determination of the will by the law. In that case we would try in vain to derive the pleasure connected with the concept from that concept as a mere cognition. Pleasure in an aesthetic judgment is similar. The difference is that here pleasure is merely contemplative and produces no interest in the object, whereas in a moral judgment it is practical. Awareness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers [A 37] in a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself. For in an aesthetic judgment this awareness contains a ground determining the subject's activity toward enlivening its cognitive powers. It thus contains an inner causality, which is purposive, with regard to cognition in general, but without being restricted to a definite cognition. It therefore contains merely the form of a representation's subjective purposiveness. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like pleasure arising from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor like pleasure arising from the intellectual ground of the represented good. Yet it does contain causality: that of *maintaining* the state of representation itself and the activity of the cognitive powers without any further aim. We *linger* over contemplating the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. This is analogous to, but not identical with, the lingering that occurs when an attraction in the object's representation repeatedly awakens attention, while the mind is passive.

13 [223] *A pure judgment of taste is independent of sensory attraction and emotion.* Every interest spoils a judgment of taste and deprives it of impartiality. This is especially true when, unlike the interest of reason, [A 38] it does not place purposiveness before the feeling of pleasure, but grounds purposiveness on that

feeling. The latter always occurs in an aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it gratifies or pains. Judgments affected in this way can therefore make no claim to universally valid satisfaction, or their claim diminishes to the extent that sensations of this kind enter among taste's determining grounds. Taste is still barbaric whenever it needs an admixture of *sensory attractions* and *emotions* for satisfaction, and even makes these the standard of its approval.

Yet sensory attractions are often counted not only as contributions to beauty, which strictly should concern form alone, and to universal aesthetic satisfaction. They are even passed off as beauties in themselves, and thus the matter of satisfaction is passed off as its form. Like many other misunderstandings that still have some truth at their basis, this can be removed by carefully defining these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which sensory attraction and emotion have no influence, although they can be combined with satisfaction in the beautiful, and which therefore has only the purposiveness of form as its determining ground, is a *pure judgment of taste*.

14 [A 39] *Explanation through examples.*

Aesthetic judgments, like theoretical or logical judgments, can be divided into empirical and pure. The former assert agreeableness or disagreeableness of an object or of the way of representing it. The latter assert beauty. The former are judgments of sense, material aesthetic judgments; the latter, as formal judgments, alone are judgments of taste in the proper sense.

224 A judgment of taste is therefore pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mixed into its determining ground. But such a mixture always occurs when sensory attraction or emotion has a share in the judgment intended to declare something beautiful.

Here various objections arise again. In the end they make sensory attraction appear not merely a necessary ingredient of beauty, but even sufficient on its own to be called beautiful. Most people declare a mere color, such as the green of a lawn, or a mere tone, as distinct from sound and noise, such as that of a violin, beautiful in itself. Yet both seem based only on the matter of representa-

tions, on sensation alone, and therefore seem to deserve only the name agreeable. [A 40] But we also notice that sensations of both color and tone are considered entitled to count as beautiful only insofar as both are *pure*. This determination already concerns form, and is also the only thing about these representations that can with certainty be communicated universally. For we can hardly assume that the quality of the sensations themselves agrees in all subjects, or that everyone judges in the same way the agreeableness of one color over another, or of the tone of one musical instrument over another.

Suppose we assume with *Euler* that colors are successive pulses (*beats*) of the ether occurring at equal intervals, just as tones are such pulses of air set vibrating in sound. Suppose, most importantly, that the mind perceives not only, through sense, their effect in enlivening the organ, but also, through reflection, the regular play of the impressions, and thus the form in the combination of different representations. I have no doubt about the latter. Color and tone would then not be mere sensations, but already formal determinations of the unity of a manifold of sensations. They could then also be counted as beauties in themselves.

The purity of a simple kind of sensation means that its uniformity is not disturbed [A 41] or interrupted by any sensation of a different kind. It belongs solely to form, because we can abstract here from the quality of that kind of sensation: whether it represents a color and which one, or a tone and which one. All simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are therefore considered beautiful. Mixed colors do not have this [225] advantage, precisely because, since they are not simple, we have no standard for judging whether to call them pure or impure.

As for the beauty attributed to an object because of its form, it is a common error to suppose that sensory attraction can actually heighten it. This error is very harmful to genuine, unbiased, well-grounded taste. Attractions can certainly be added alongside beauty to interest the mind in the object's representation beyond its bare satisfaction. They can thus help recommend taste and its cultivation, especially when it is still rough and unpracticed. But they actually undermine a judgment of taste if they draw attention to themselves as grounds

for judging beauty. Far from contributing to it, they must instead be tolerated as foreign elements when taste is still weak and unpracticed, and only insofar as they do not disturb that beautiful form.

In painting, sculpture, indeed all the visual arts, in [A 42] architecture and garden design insofar as they are fine arts, *drawing* is essential. Here the basis of everything arranged for taste is not what gratifies in sensation, but merely what pleases through its form. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to sensory attraction. They can make the object itself lively for sensation, but cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful. Rather, the requirements of beautiful form usually restrict them very greatly. Even where sensory attraction is permitted, it is ennobled by that form alone.

Every form of objects of the senses, both the outer senses and indirectly the inner sense, is either *shape* or *play*. In the latter case it is either a play of shapes, as in mime and dance in space, or a mere play of sensations in time. The *attraction* of colors or of an instrument's agreeable tones may be added. But *drawing* in the first case and composition in the latter constitute the actual object of a pure judgment of taste. The purity of colors and tones, or their variety and contrast, may seem to contribute to beauty. This does not mean that, because they are agreeable in themselves, they add something of the same kind to satisfaction in form. [A 43] It means instead that they make the form more precisely, distinctly, and fully [226] visible, and also enliven the representation through their attraction by arousing and sustaining attention to the object itself.

Even what we call *ornaments* (accessories)—what belongs to the whole representation of the object not internally as a component but only externally as an addition, and increases the satisfaction of taste—does so only through its form. Examples are picture frames, clothing on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful form, and is added merely to recommend the painting to approval through its attraction, like a gold frame, it is then called *finery* and detracts from genuine beauty.

Emotion is a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only through a momentary check of the vital force followed by a stronger outpouring of it. It has no place in beauty at all. Sublimity, with which the feeling of emotion is connected, requires a different standard of judgment from the one taste takes as its basis. Thus a pure judgment of taste has neither sensory attraction nor emotion—in a word, no sensation as the matter of an aesthetic judgment—as its determining ground.

15 [A 44] *A judgment of taste is entirely independent of the concept of perfection.*

Objective purposiveness can be known only through the relation of the manifold to a definite end, and thus only through a concept. This alone already shows that the beautiful is entirely independent of the representation of the good. For judging the beautiful rests on a merely formal purposiveness, a purposiveness without an end, whereas the good presupposes objective purposiveness, the relation of the object to a definite end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, the object's *usefulness*, or internal, its *perfection*. The two preceding main divisions sufficiently show that the satisfaction in an object for which we call it beautiful cannot rest on the representation of its usefulness. It would then not [227] be a direct satisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But objective inner purposiveness, perfection, comes closer to the predicate of beauty. Distinguished philosophers have therefore considered it identical with beauty, though with the qualification, *when it is thought confusedly*. [A 45] In a critique of taste, it is of the greatest importance to decide whether beauty can actually be reduced to the concept of perfection.

To judge objective purposiveness, we always need the concept of an end. If that purposiveness is to be internal rather than external [usefulness], we also need the concept of an internal end containing the ground of the object's inner possibility. An end in general is something whose *concept* can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself. Thus, to represent objective purposiveness in a thing, a concept of it, of *what sort of thing it is supposed to be*, will come first. The agreement of the manifold within it with this concept,

which gives the rule for combining that manifold in it, is a thing's *qualitative perfection*. Entirely different from this is *quantitative* perfection, the completeness of each thing of its kind. This is a mere concept of magnitude, of totality. Here *what the thing is supposed to be* is already thought as determined in advance. The question is only whether *everything* required for it is present. The formal element in the representation of a thing, the agreement of the manifold into one, leaving undetermined what that one is supposed to be, gives [A 46] no knowledge at all of objective purposiveness on its own. For when we abstract from this one *as an end*, from what the thing is supposed to be, nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of representations in the mind of the person intuiting it. This does indicate a certain purposiveness of the subject's state of representation, and a comfort in taking a given form into imagination. But it indicates no perfection of any object, since here the object is not thought through any concept of an end. For example, if I come across a grassy clearing in a wood, with trees standing around it in a circle, and do not represent an end to myself—perhaps that it is meant for a country dance—the mere form gives not the slightest concept of [228] perfection. But to represent a formal *objective* purposiveness without an end, a mere form of *perfection* without any matter or *concept* of what the agreement is directed toward, even if this were only the idea of lawfulness in general, is an outright contradiction.

Now a judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, one resting on subjective grounds. Its determining ground cannot be a concept, and therefore cannot be the concept of a definite end. Thus beauty, as formal subjective purposiveness, in no way means a perfection of the object as an allegedly [A 47] formal yet still objective purposiveness. It is therefore invalid to distinguish the concepts of the beautiful and the good as though they differed only in logical form: the first being merely a confused concept of perfection, the second a clear one, while both were otherwise identical in content and origin. There would then be no *specific* difference between them. A judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment declaring something good. It would be like an ordinary person saying that fraud is wrong and grounding the judgment on confused principles, while a philosopher grounds it on clear principles, though

fundamentally both rely on the same rational principles. But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgment is unique in its kind and provides absolutely no knowledge, not even confused knowledge, of the object. Only a logical judgment does that. An aesthetic judgment instead relates the representation through which an object is given solely to the subject. It indicates no feature of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation occupied with it. The judgment is called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling, through inner sense, of that harmony in the play of the mental powers, insofar as it can only be felt. By contrast, if we called confused concepts and the objective [A 48] judgment based on them aesthetic, we would have an understanding judging sensibly, or a sense representing its objects through concepts. Both are self-contradictory. The understanding is the faculty of concepts, whether confused or clear. Although understanding also belongs to a judgment of taste as an aesthetic judgment, as it does to all judgments, it belongs to it [229] not as a faculty for knowing an object. It belongs as a faculty for determining the judgment and its representation, without a concept, according to their relation to the subject and its inner feeling, insofar as this judgment is possible according to a universal rule.

16 *A judgment of taste declaring an object beautiful under the condition of a definite concept is not pure.*

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*unattached beauty*) and merely dependent beauty (*adhering beauty*). The former presupposes no concept of what the object is supposed to be. The latter presupposes such a concept and the object's perfection according to it. Kinds of the former are called self-standing beauties of this or that thing. The latter, as adhering to a concept [A 49], as conditioned beauty, is attributed to objects that fall under the concept of a particular end.

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be. Even the botanist, who recognizes in it the plant's reproductive organ, takes no account of this natural end when judg-

ing it through taste. No perfection of any kind, no internal purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold relates, is therefore placed at the basis of this judgment. Many birds—the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise—and a great many sea creatures with shells are beauties in themselves. They do not belong to any object determined by concepts with regard to its end, but please freely and on their own. Similarly, designs *in the Greek style*, foliage patterns on borders or wallpaper, and so forth, mean nothing in themselves. They represent nothing, no object under a definite concept, and are free beauties. We can also count in this kind what are called fantasies in music, without a theme, and indeed all music without words.

In judging a free beauty according to mere form, the judgment of taste is pure. No concept of any end is presupposed, no concept of what the manifold in the given object should serve or what [230] the object should therefore represent. Such a concept would only restrict the freedom of imagination, [A 50] which plays, as it were, in observing the shape.

But the beauty of a human being, and within this kind the beauty of a man, woman, or child; the beauty of a horse; or the beauty of a building, whether a church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse, presupposes a concept of the end determining what the thing is supposed to be. It thus presupposes a concept of its perfection and is merely dependent beauty. Combining the agreeable, sensation, with beauty, which properly concerns form alone, prevented the judgment of taste from being pure. Similarly, combining the good with beauty detracts from its purity: here the good means what the manifold contributes to the thing itself according to its end.

We could add many features to a building that would please directly in intuition, if only it were not supposed to be a church. We could beautify a figure with all kinds of flourishes and light yet regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being. And a human being could have much finer features and a more pleasing, gentler facial outline, if only they were not supposed to represent a man, especially a warrior.

Now satisfaction in the manifold in a thing [A 51], in relation to the internal end determining its possibility, is satisfaction grounded on a concept. Satisfaction in beauty, however, presupposes no concept. It is directly connected with the representation through which the object is given, not through which it is thought. If the judgment of taste concerning the latter is made dependent on the end in the former, a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

Taste does gain something from this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction: it becomes fixed. Although it does not become universal, rules can still be prescribed for it regarding certain objects determined by ends. But these are not rules of taste. They are merely rules for reconciling taste with reason, the beautiful with the good. Through them the beautiful becomes useful as an instrument for the aim concerning the good. The mental attunement that maintains itself and has [231] subjective universal validity is placed beneath a way of thinking that can be maintained only through strenuous resolve, but is objectively universally valid. Strictly speaking, however, perfection gains nothing through beauty, nor beauty through perfection. [A 52] Rather, when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object, as regards what it is supposed to be, through a concept, we cannot avoid also comparing it with sensation in the subject. It is therefore the *entire capacity* of the power of representation that gains when both mental states agree.

A judgment of taste regarding an object with a definite internal end would be pure only if the person judging either had no concept of that end or abstracted from it in the judgment. In that case, although they made a correct judgment of taste by judging the object as free beauty, they would still be criticized and accused of false taste by someone who considered its beauty only as a dependent feature, looking to the object's end. Yet both would judge correctly in their own way: one according to what they have before their senses, the other according to what they have in mind. This distinction can settle many disputes among judges of beauty. We show them that one is concerned with free beauty, the other with dependent beauty; the former makes a pure judgment of taste, the latter an applied one.

17 [A 53] *On the ideal of beauty.*

There can be no objective rule of taste determining through concepts what is beautiful. Every judgment from this source is aesthetic: the subject's feeling, not a concept of an object, is its determining ground. Seeking a principle of taste that gives the universal criterion of the beautiful through definite concepts is a fruitless effort. What is being sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal communicability of sensation, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, occurring without a concept; the agreement, as far as possible, of all times and [232] peoples regarding this feeling in representing certain objects: this is the empirical criterion that a taste confirmed by such examples descends from the deeply hidden ground, common to all human beings, of agreement in judging the forms under which objects are given to them. Yet this criterion is weak and scarcely enough to support a conjecture.

Some products of taste are therefore regarded as *exemplary*, not as though taste could be acquired by imitating others. Taste must be a faculty of one's own. Someone who imitates a model shows skill insofar as they reproduce it, [A 54] but shows taste only insofar as they can judge the model itself.[7] It follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea that everyone must produce within themselves. By it they must judge everything that is an object of taste or an example of judging through taste, and even everyone's taste itself. *Idea*, strictly speaking, means a concept of reason; *ideal* means the representation of an individual being adequate to an idea. This archetype of taste rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, yet cannot be represented through concepts, only in an individual presentation. It is therefore better called the ideal of the beautiful. Even if we do not possess such an ideal, we still strive to produce it within ourselves. But it will be only an ideal of imagination, precisely because it rests not on concepts but on presentation, and the faculty [A 55] of presentation is imagination.—How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? *A priori* or empirically? And what kind of beauty is capable of an ideal?

First, we must note that the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought cannot be *unattached* beauty. It must be beauty *fixed* by a concept of objective purposiveness. It must therefore belong not to the object of a wholly pure judgment of taste, but to the object of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste [233]. In other words, wherever an ideal can occur among grounds of judgment, some idea of reason according to definite concepts must underlie it, determining *a priori* the end on which the object's inner possibility rests. We cannot think an ideal of beautiful flowers, beautiful furnishings, or a beautiful view. But we cannot represent an ideal even of beauty dependent on definite ends, such as a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, and so forth. Presumably this is because the ends are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, so that purposiveness is almost as free as in *unattached* beauty. The *human being* has the end of its existence within itself and can determine its own ends through reason. Or, where it must take them from external perception, it can still compare them with essential and universal ends, and then [A 56] judge their agreement with these aesthetically as well. Thus among all objects in the world, this *human being* alone is capable of an ideal of *beauty*, just as humanity in the human person, as intelligence, is capable of the ideal of *perfection*.

Two elements belong to this. *First*, the aesthetic *normal idea*: an individual intuition of imagination representing the standard for judging the human being as a thing belonging to a particular animal species. *Second*, the *idea of reason*: this makes the ends of humanity, insofar as they cannot be represented sensibly, the principle for judging the human figure. Through the figure, as their effect in appearance, these ends reveal themselves. The normal idea must take from experience its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular kind. Yet the greatest purposiveness in constructing that figure, suitable as a universal standard for aesthetically judging every individual of the species, lies solely in the idea of the person judging. It is the image that seems to have intentionally underlain nature's technique, an image to which only the species as a whole, but no separate individual, is adequate. Yet this idea, with its proportions, can be fully presented as an aesthetic idea in a model image *in a concrete instance*.

To make it somewhat understandable how this happens [A 57]—for who can coax nature's secret from it entirely?—we will attempt a psychological explanation.

We should note that in a way wholly beyond our understanding, [234] imagination knows not only how to recall on occasion the signs for concepts, even from long ago. It can also reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an inexpressibly large number of objects of different kinds, or of one and the same kind. Indeed, when the mind sets about making comparisons, imagination in all probability actually lets one image fall upon another, though not sufficiently for us to be aware of it. Through the coincidence of many images of the same kind, it obtains an average that serves as a common measure for them all. Suppose someone has seen a thousand adult men and now wants to judge the normal size to be estimated by comparison. In my view, imagination lets a large number of the images, perhaps all thousand, fall upon one another. If I may use the analogy of optical presentation here, the *average size* becomes recognizable in the space where most of them unite, within the outline where the area is illuminated with the most heavily applied color. In height and width it is equally distant from the outer limits of the largest and smallest figures. This is the [A 58] stature of a beautiful man. We could obtain the same result mechanically by measuring all thousand, adding their heights together, and separately their widths (and thicknesses), and dividing each sum by a thousand. But imagination does this through a dynamic effect arising from repeatedly taking in such figures upon the organ of inner sense. If we similarly seek the average head for this average man, the average nose for that head, and so on, this figure underlies the normal idea of a beautiful man in the country where the comparison is made. Under these empirical conditions, a Black person must therefore have a different normal idea of beauty of figure from a white person, and a Chinese person a different one from a European. The same would apply to the *model* of a beautiful horse or dog of a particular breed.—This *normal idea* is not derived from proportions taken from experience *as definite rules*. Rather, rules of judgment first become possible according to it. It is the image for the whole genus hovering among all the individual intuitions of individuals differ-

ing in many ways. Nature placed it beneath its productions in the same species as an archetype, [235] yet seems not to have fully achieved it in any individual. It is by no means [A 59] the whole *archetype* of *beauty* in this genus. It is only the form constituting the indispensable condition of all beauty, and thus merely *correctness* in presenting the genus. It is the *rule*, as *Polykleitos's* famous *Spear-Bearer* was called. *Myron's* cow could also serve the same purpose in its own genus. For this very reason it cannot contain anything specifically characteristic; otherwise it would not be the *normal idea* for the genus. Nor does its presentation please through beauty, but merely because it contradicts none of the conditions under which alone a thing of this genus can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.[8]

The *ideal* of the beautiful remains distinct from its *normal idea*. For the reasons already given, we can expect this ideal only in the *human figure*. Here the ideal consists in the expression of the *moral*, without which the object [A 60] would not please universally and also positively, rather than merely negatively in an academically correct presentation. The visible expression of moral ideas that govern human beings inwardly can indeed be taken only from experience. But combining them with everything our reason connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness, and making goodness of soul, purity, strength, serenity, and so forth, as it were visible in bodily expression as the effect of the inner state, requires pure ideas of reason united with great imaginative power. This is needed even in someone who merely wants to judge them, and still more in someone who wants to present them. The correctness of such an ideal [236] of beauty is shown in this: it allows no sensory attraction to mix with satisfaction in its object, yet lets us take a great interest in it. This in turn proves that judging according to such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging according to an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of [A 61] taste.

Definition of the beautiful concluded from this third moment.

Beauty is the form of an object's *purposiveness*, insofar as this is perceived in it *without the representation of an end*.[9]

Fourth Moment [A 62] *of the judgment of taste, according to the modality of satisfaction in the object.*

18 *What the modality of a judgment of taste is.*

Of every representation I can at least say that it is *possible* for it, as cognition, to be connected with pleasure. Of what I call *agreeable*, I say that it *actually* produces pleasure in me. But we think of the *beautiful* as having a necessary relation to satisfaction. This necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical, objective necessity by which we can know *a priori* [237] that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a practical necessity in which, through concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is the necessary consequence of an objective law. Such a necessity would mean only that we ought absolutely, without any further aim, to act in a certain way. Instead, as a necessity thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can be called only *exemplary*: the necessity of *everyone's* agreement with a judgment regarded as an example of a universal [A 63] rule we cannot state. An aesthetic judgment is not an objective, cognitive judgment. This necessity therefore cannot be derived from definite concepts and so cannot be demonstrated as necessary. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience, from complete agreement in judgments about the beauty of a particular object. Experience could scarcely supply enough evidence for this. Moreover, no concept of the necessity of these judgments can be grounded on empirical judgments.

19 *The subjective necessity we attribute to a judgment of taste is conditional.*

A judgment of taste expects everyone's agreement. Whoever declares something beautiful wants everyone to approve the object in question and likewise declare it beautiful: everyone *ought* to do so. The *ought* in an aesthetic judgment is therefore still expressed only conditionally, even after all the data required for judging are given. We seek everyone else's agreement because we have a ground for it common to all. We could count on this agreement if only we were always certain that the case had been correctly placed under that ground as [A 64] a rule of approval.

20 *The condition of the necessity claimed by a judgment of taste is the idea of a common sense.*

If judgments of taste, like cognitive judgments, had a definite objective principle, someone who made them according to [238] that principle would claim unconditional necessity for their judgment. If they lacked all principle, like judgments of mere sensory taste, we would never think of any necessity in them at all. They must therefore have a subjective principle determining only through feeling, not concepts, yet with universal validity, what pleases or displeases. Such a principle could be regarded only as a *common sense*. This is essentially different from ordinary understanding, which is sometimes also called common sense (*shared sense*). The latter judges not according to feeling but always according to concepts, though usually as principles represented only obscurely.

By a common sense, however, we mean not an external sense but the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers. Only if we presuppose that there is such a common sense—only on this presupposition, [A 65] I say—can a judgment of taste be made.

21 *Whether we can justifiably presuppose a common sense.*

Cognitions and judgments, together with the conviction accompanying them, must be universally communicable. Otherwise they would have no agreement with the object. They would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism maintains. But if cognitions are to be communicable, the mental state must also be universally communicable: the attunement of the cognitive powers for cognition in general, specifically the proportion suited to a representation through which an object is given to us, so as to turn it into cognition. Without this as the subjective condition of knowing, cognition could not arise as its effect. This actually happens whenever a given object, through the senses, activates imagination to combine the manifold, and imagination in turn activates understanding to unite it in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the different objects given. Yet there must be one [A 66] in which this

inner relation for enlivening each through the other is the most beneficial for both mental powers with regard to cognition of given [239] objects in general. This attunement can be determined only through feeling, not according to concepts. Now this attunement itself must be universally communicable, and therefore so must the feeling of it in a given representation. But the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. We can therefore justifiably assume such a common sense, without basing it on psychological observations. We assume it as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in every logic and every nonskeptical principle of cognition.

22 *The necessity of universal agreement thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity represented as objective on the presupposition of a common sense.*

In every judgment declaring something beautiful, we allow no one to hold another opinion. Yet we base our judgment not on [A 67] concepts but only on our feeling. We therefore take this as a shared feeling, not a private one. Now common sense cannot for this purpose be grounded on experience. It claims to authorize judgments containing an ought. It does not say that everyone *will* agree with our judgment, but that everyone *ought* to agree. Thus common sense, whose judgment I here give my judgment of taste as an example of, and because of which I attribute *exemplary* validity to it, is a mere ideal norm. On its presupposition, we could rightly make a judgment agreeing with it, and the satisfaction in an object expressed in that judgment, a rule for everyone. For although the principle is only subjective, if accepted as subjectively universal, as an idea necessary for everyone, it could demand universal agreement concerning the harmony of different people judging, just like an objective principle. We would only have to be certain that we had correctly placed the case under it.

We actually presuppose this indeterminate norm of a common sense, as our claim to make judgments of taste proves. [240] Whether such a common sense actually exists as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a still higher principle of reason only makes it a regulative principle for us, requiring us first to produce a common sense [A 68] within ourselves for

higher ends, is another question. Is taste an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of an artificial faculty still to be acquired? In the latter case, a judgment of taste, with its expectation of universal agreement, would actually be only a demand of reason to produce such agreement in our way of sensing. The ought, the objective necessity of everyone's feeling merging with each person's particular feeling, would mean only the possibility of achieving harmony in this. A judgment of taste would then provide only an example of this principle's application. We do not intend to investigate this here yet, nor can we. For now we have only to analyze the faculty of taste into its elements and finally unite them in the idea of a common sense.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the fourth moment.

Beautiful is what, without a concept, is recognized as the object of a *necessary* satisfaction.

General remark on the first section of the Analytic.

If we draw the result from the preceding analyses, we find that everything comes down to this concept of taste: it is the ability to judge an object in relation to the [A 69] *free lawfulness* of imagination. Now if imagination must be considered in its freedom in a judgment of taste, it is first taken not as reproductive and subject to laws of association, but as productive and self-active, as the originator of freely chosen forms of possible intuitions. In taking in a given object of the senses, it is admittedly bound to a definite form of this object and has no free play in that respect, as it does in poetic invention. Yet we can still understand that the object might supply it with just such a form, containing a [241] combination of the manifold of the kind imagination would design if left free to itself, in agreement with the *understanding's lawfulness* in general. But that *imagination is free* and yet *lawful of itself*, that is, that it possesses autonomy, is a contradiction. Understanding alone gives the law. If imagination is compelled to proceed according to a definite law, its product's form is determined through concepts as to what it ought to be. But then, as shown above, the satisfaction is not in the beautiful but in the good, in perfection, even if merely formal perfection. The judgment is not a judgment through taste. Thus only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective agreement of imagination

with understanding without an objective agreement in which the representation is related to a definite concept of an object, can coexist with the understanding's free lawfulness, also called purposiveness without an end, and with the distinctive character of a judgment of taste.

Critics of taste commonly cite geometrically regular shapes—a circle, [A 70] a square, a cube, and so on—as the simplest and most unquestionable examples of beauty. Yet they are called regular precisely because we can represent them only as mere presentations of a definite concept prescribing the rule for that shape, the rule according to which alone it is possible. One of two judgments must therefore be mistaken: either the critics' judgment attributing beauty to these shapes, or ours, which finds purposiveness without a concept necessary for beauty.

Hardly anyone will think a person of taste is needed to find more satisfaction in a circular shape than in a scribbled outline, or in a quadrilateral with equal sides and angles than in a crooked, unequal, almost deformed one. That requires only ordinary understanding and no taste at all. Where an aim is perceived—for example, judging the size of an area, or making the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole comprehensible in a division—regular shapes, and indeed the simplest kinds, are needed. Satisfaction rests not directly on the sight of the shape but on its usefulness [242] for all kinds of possible aims. A room whose walls meet at oblique angles, a garden plot of this kind, indeed any violation of symmetry in the shape of animals, such as being one-eyed, or of buildings or flower beds, displeases because it is contrary to an end. This is so not only practically, regarding a definite use of these things, but also for judging them with regard to any possible aim. That is not the case in a judgment of taste. When pure, it connects satisfaction [A 71] or dissatisfaction directly with mere *contemplation* of the object, without regard to use or an end.

The regularity leading to a concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (*a condition without which it is impossible*) for grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end regarding cognition. In relation to cognition it is also always connected with satisfaction, which accompanies the achievement of any aim,

even a merely possible one. But this is then only approval of a solution that satisfies a problem. It is not a free and indeterminately purposive occupation of the mental powers with what we call beautiful, in which understanding serves imagination, not imagination understanding.

In a thing possible only through an intention—a building, even an animal—the regularity consisting in symmetry must express the unity of intuition accompanying the concept of the end, and belongs to cognition. But where only a free play of the powers of representation is to be maintained, provided the understanding takes no offense, regularity announcing itself as constraint is avoided as far as possible. This applies to pleasure gardens, interior decoration, all kinds of tasteful furnishings, and the like. English taste in gardens and baroque taste in furniture therefore tend to push freedom of imagination almost to the grotesque. In this separation from every constraint of a rule, they place the very case in which taste can show its [A 72] greatest perfection in imagination's designs.

Everything stiffly regular, approaching mathematical regularity, has something contrary to taste about it. It provides no lasting occupation in contemplating it, but, unless [243] it expressly aims at cognition or a definite practical end, becomes boring. By contrast, what imagination can play with naturally and purposively is always new to us, and we do not tire of looking at it. In his description of Sumatra, *Marsden* remarks that the free beauties of nature surround the spectator there on every side and therefore have little attraction left. A pepper garden, by contrast, in which the poles supporting the climbing plants form avenues between parallel lines, greatly attracted him when he came across it in the middle of a forest. He concludes that wild, apparently irregular beauty pleases as a change only someone who has had their fill of regular beauty. But he needed only to try staying at his pepper garden for a day. He would have discovered that once regularity had put his understanding into the mood for the order it needs everywhere, the object would no longer occupy him, but would instead impose a burdensome constraint on imagination. By contrast, nature there, lavish to the point of luxuriance in its variety and subject to no constraint of artificial rules, could constantly nourish his taste.—Even bird-

song, which we cannot bring under any musical rule, seems to contain more freedom and therefore more for taste than human singing conducted according to all the rules of music. We [A 73] grow tired of the latter much sooner when it is repeated often and for a long time. But here we are probably confusing our sympathy with the cheerfulness of a small, well-loved creature with the beauty of its song. When a human being imitates it exactly, as sometimes happens with the nightingale's song, it seems entirely tasteless to our ear.

We must also distinguish beautiful objects from beautiful views of objects, which often can no longer be clearly recognized because of their distance. In the latter case taste seems to attach not so much to what imagination *takes in* within this field as to what it is prompted to *invent*: the actual fantasies with which the mind occupies itself, continually stimulated by the variety encountered by the eye. Something similar happens when we look at the changing shapes of a fire in a fireplace or a rippling brook. Neither is a [244] beauty, yet both attract imagination because they sustain its free play.

4 The definition of taste taken as the basis here is that it is the ability to judge the beautiful. What is required to call an object beautiful must be discovered by analyzing judgments of taste. I have sought the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection by following the logical functions of judging, since a judgment of taste still always contains a relation to understanding. I have considered the moments of quality first, because aesthetic judgment about the beautiful takes account of these first.

5 A judgment about an object of satisfaction can be wholly *disinterested* yet very *interesting*. That is, it rests on no interest, but produces an interest. All pure moral judgments are of this kind. But judgments of taste do not in themselves ground any interest at all. Only in society does it become *interesting* to have taste. The reason for this will be shown later.

6 An obligation to enjoy is an obvious absurdity. So too must be an alleged obligation to all actions whose goal is merely enjoyment, however spiritual this enjoyment may be conceived or dressed up to be, even if it were a mystical, so-

called heavenly enjoyment.

7 Models of taste in the arts of speech must be composed in a dead and learned language. The first requirement prevents them from undergoing the change that inevitably affects living languages: noble expressions become commonplace, ordinary ones become obsolete, and newly created ones enter circulation only briefly. The second ensures that the language has a grammar subject to no arbitrary changes of fashion, but possessing its unchanging rule.

8 We find that a perfectly regular face, the kind a painter might ask to sit as a model, usually says nothing. It contains nothing characteristic and therefore expresses the idea of the genus more than what is specific to a person. An exaggeration of the characteristic of this kind, one that impairs the normal idea itself, the purposiveness of the genus, is called *caricature*. Experience also shows that those entirely regular faces usually reveal only a mediocre person within. Presumably, if we may assume that nature expresses the proportions of the inner person in the outer appearance, this is because none of the mental dispositions stands out beyond the proportion required merely to make a person free of faults. We can then expect nothing of what is called *genius*, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the mental powers in favor of a single one.

9 Someone might offer this counterexample to the definition: there are things in which we see a purposive form without recognizing an end. For example, stone tools often dug out of ancient burial mounds have a hole as if for a handle. Although their shape clearly reveals a purposiveness whose end we do not know, they are not therefore declared beautiful. But merely regarding them as artifacts is enough to force us to admit that we relate their shape to some intention and a definite end. There is therefore no direct satisfaction in intuiting them. A flower, by contrast, such as a tulip, is considered beautiful because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness that, as we judge it, is related to no end at all.

PART I

Analytic of the Sublime

Second Book [A 74] *Analytic of the Sublime.*

23 *Transition from the ability to judge the beautiful to the ability to judge the sublime.*

The beautiful agrees with the sublime in that both please for their own sake. They also agree in presupposing neither a judgment of sense nor a logically determining judgment, but a judgment of reflection. Consequently, satisfaction depends neither on a sensation, like satisfaction in the agreeable, nor on a definite concept, like satisfaction in the good. Yet it is still related to concepts, though which concepts remains undetermined. Satisfaction is thus tied to mere presentation or the capacity for it. In a given intuition, the faculty of presentation, imagination, is considered as agreeing with the understanding's or reason's *faculty of concepts*, as promoting the latter. Hence both kinds of judgments are *singular* judgments, yet announce themselves as universally valid for every subject, although they claim only the feeling of pleasure and no knowledge of the object.

But important differences between the two are also [A 75] obvious. Natural beauty concerns the object's form, which consists in limitation. The sublime, by contrast, can also be found in a formless object, insofar as *limitlessness* is represented in it or occasioned by it, yet its totality is also thought along with it. Thus the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate

concept of understanding, and the sublime as that of a corresponding concept of reason. Satisfaction in the former is therefore connected with the representation of *quality*, in the latter with that of *quantity*. The latter satisfaction also differs greatly in kind from the former. The beautiful directly carries a feeling of life's advancement and is therefore compatible with sensory attractions and an [245] imagination at play. But the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure arising only indirectly. It is produced by the feeling of a momentary check of the vital powers, followed immediately by their stronger outpouring. As an emotion, it therefore seems to involve not play but seriousness in imagination's activity. It is consequently incompatible with sensory attractions. Since the mind is not merely attracted by the object but is alternately also repeatedly repelled, satisfaction in the sublime contains not so much positive pleasure as admiration [A 76] or respect. It therefore deserves to be called negative pleasure.

But perhaps the most important inner difference between the sublime and the beautiful is this. As is proper, we will first consider only the sublime in natural objects; the sublime in art is always restricted by the conditions of agreement with nature. Self-standing natural beauty carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems, as it were, predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus constitutes in itself an object of satisfaction. By contrast, what arouses the feeling of the sublime in us without reasoning, merely in taking it in, may appear in its form contrary to the ends of our judgment, unsuited to our faculty of presentation, and almost violent to imagination. Yet it is judged all the more sublime for that very reason.

This immediately shows that in general we speak incorrectly when we call any *object of nature* sublime, although we can quite correctly call many of them beautiful. How can what is taken in as contrary to an end in itself be designated by an expression of approval? We can say only that the object is suitable for presenting a sublimity that can be found in the mind. For the genuinely sublime [A 77] cannot be contained in any sensible form. It concerns only ideas of reason. Although no presentation adequate to them is possible, these ideas are stirred and called into the mind precisely by this inadequacy, which can be presented sensibly. Thus the vast ocean churned up by storms cannot be called

sublime. Its appearance is terrifying. The mind must already be filled with various ideas [246] if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself sublime. The mind is prompted to leave sensibility behind and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher purposiveness.

Self-standing natural beauty reveals to us a technique of nature. This represents nature as a system according to laws whose principle we do not find anywhere in our faculty of understanding: the principle of a purposiveness relative to judgment's use regarding appearances. These must therefore be judged as belonging not merely to nature in its mechanism without ends, but also to an analogy with art. Natural beauty thus really extends not our knowledge of natural objects, but our concept of nature as mere mechanism into a concept of that same nature as art. This invites deep investigations into the possibility of such a form. But in what we commonly call sublime [A 78] in nature, there is nothing at all leading to particular objective principles and corresponding natural forms. Rather, nature most arouses ideas of the sublime in its chaos, its wildest and most irregular disorder and devastation, provided only that magnitude and power are visible. From this we see that the concept of the sublime in nature is far less important and rich in consequences than the concept of the beautiful in it. In general, it indicates nothing purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible *use* of its intuitions to make us feel within ourselves a purposiveness entirely independent of nature. For natural beauty we must seek a ground outside ourselves; for the sublime, only within ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature. This is a very necessary preliminary remark. It completely separates the ideas of the sublime from the idea of a purposiveness of *nature*, and makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging of nature's purposiveness. For it represents no particular form in nature, but develops only a purposive use that imagination makes of its representation.

24 [A 79] [247] *On dividing an investigation of the feeling of the sublime.*

As regards dividing the moments of aesthetically judging objects in relation to the feeling of the sublime, the Analytic can proceed according to the same principle used in analyzing judgments of taste. For as a judgment of aesthetic reflective judgment, satisfaction in the sublime, like satisfaction in the beautiful, must represent universal validity according to *quantity*, freedom from interest according to *quality*, subjective purposiveness according to *relation*, and this purposiveness as necessary according to *modality*. The method will therefore not differ from that of the preceding section, unless we count the following as a difference. There, because aesthetic judgment concerned the object's form, we began by investigating quality. Here, because formlessness may belong to what we call sublime, we will begin with quantity as the first moment of an aesthetic judgment about the sublime. The reason for this can be seen from the preceding §.

But the analysis of the sublime needs a division not required by the analysis of the beautiful: into the *mathematically* and the *dynamically sublime*.

For the feeling of the sublime has as its characteristic a *movement* of the mind connected with judging the [A 80] object, whereas taste for the beautiful presupposes and maintains the mind in *calm* contemplation. This movement is to be judged subjectively purposive, since the sublime pleases. Through imagination it is therefore related either to the *faculty of cognition* or to the *faculty of desire*. In both relations, however, the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only with regard to these *faculties*, without an end or interest. The first is then attributed to the object as a *mathematical* attunement of imagination, the second as a *dynamic* one. The object is therefore represented as sublime in these two ways.

A. [248] *On the mathematically sublime.*

25 *Definition of the term sublime.*

We call *sublime* what is *absolutely great*. But being great and being a magnitude are entirely different concepts (*greatness* and *quantity*). Likewise, *simply* (*without qualification*) *saying* that something is great is quite different from saying it is *absolutely great* [A 81] (*great absolutely, not comparatively*). The latter is what

is *great beyond all comparison*.—But what does it mean to say something is great, small, or medium-sized? What this designates is not a pure concept of understanding, still less a sensory intuition, and no more a concept of reason, because it carries no principle of cognition with it. It must therefore be a concept of judgment, or derive from such a concept, and take as its basis a subjective purposiveness of the representation in relation to judgment. We can recognize from the thing itself, without any comparison with others, that something is a magnitude (*a quantity*): namely, when a multiplicity of things of the same kind together make up one. But *how great* it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude, as its measure. In judging magnitude, however, what matters is not merely multiplicity, number, but also the size of the unit, the measure. The size of this unit always in turn needs something else as a measure with which it can be compared. We thus see that every determination of the magnitude of appearances can supply no absolute concept of a magnitude at all, but always only a comparative concept.

When I simply say something is great, it seems that I have no comparison in mind, at least with no [A 82] objective measure, because this does not determine at all how great the object is. Yet although the standard of comparison is merely subjective, the judgment still claims universal agreement. The judgments "The man is beautiful" and "He is tall" are not confined merely to the subject judging. Like theoretical judgments, they demand everyone's agreement.

249 A judgment that simply designates something as great does not merely mean that the object has a magnitude. It also attributes that magnitude to it as a distinction over many others of the same kind, without definitely stating the distinction. Such a judgment certainly has a standard at its basis, one we presuppose can be assumed the same for everyone. But it is usable not for logical, mathematically determined judging of magnitude, only for aesthetic judging. For it is a merely subjective standard underlying judgment as it reflects on magnitude. It may be empirical, like the average size of the human beings we know, animals of a certain kind, trees, houses, mountains, and so on. Or it may be a

standard given *a priori* that the shortcomings of the judging subject restrict to subjective conditions of concrete presentation. In the practical sphere, examples are the magnitude of a certain virtue or of public freedom and justice in a country; [A 83] in the theoretical sphere, the magnitude of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an observation or measurement, and the like.

What is remarkable here is that even if we have no interest in the object, if we are indifferent to its existence, its mere magnitude can still carry a universally communicable satisfaction, even when it is considered formless. This therefore contains awareness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties. Because the object here may be formless, this is not satisfaction in it as in the case of the beautiful, where reflective judgment finds itself purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general. It is instead satisfaction in the expansion of imagination itself.

When we say simply that an object is large (with the restriction mentioned above), this is not a mathematically determining judgment. It is only a reflective judgment about our representation of it, which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in estimating magnitude. We then always connect a kind of respect with the representation, just as we connect contempt with what we call simply small. Besides, judging things as large or small extends to everything, even to all their qualities. So we even call beauty great or small. [250] The reason is that anything we can present in intuition under the direction of the power of judgment [A 84] (and so represent aesthetically) is an appearance, and therefore also a quantity.

But when we call something not only large but absolutely large, large in every respect and beyond all comparison—that is, sublime—we soon see that we allow no standard adequate to it to be sought outside it, but only within it. It is a magnitude equal only to itself. It follows that the sublime must be sought not in things in nature but only in our ideas. Which ideas these are must be left for the deduction.

The explanation above can also be put this way: *The sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small.* We can easily see that nothing in nature, however large we judge it, could not be reduced to something infinitely small

when viewed in another relation. Conversely, nothing is so small that comparison with still smaller standards could not enlarge it to the size of a world for our imagination. Telescopes have given us plenty of material for the first observation, and microscopes for the second. So, viewed on this [A 85] basis, nothing that can be an object of the senses can be called sublime. But our imagination strives to advance to infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea. For this very reason, the inadequacy of our power to estimate the magnitude of things in the sensible world for this idea awakens the feeling of a supersensible power in us. What is absolutely large is the use judgment naturally makes of certain objects to produce this feeling, not the object of the senses. Compared with that use, every other use is small. So it is the state of mind produced by a certain representation occupying reflective judgment, and not the object, that must be called sublime.

We can therefore add this to the earlier formulas explaining the sublime: *The sublime is what we cannot even think of without showing a power of the mind that exceeds every standard of the senses.*

26 [251] *Estimating the magnitude of natural things as required for the idea of the sublime.*

Estimating magnitude through numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical. Estimating it in mere intuition, by the eye, is aesthetic. We can indeed get definite concepts of [A 86] *how large* something is only through numbers (or at least approximations through numerical series continuing to infinity), whose unit is the measure. In this respect all logical estimation of magnitude is mathematical. But we must assume that the magnitude of the measure is known. If we had to estimate this in turn only through numbers whose unit would have to be another measure, and thus mathematically, we could never have a first or basic measure, and so could never have a definite concept of a given magnitude. Estimating the magnitude of the basic measure must therefore consist simply in grasping it directly in an intuition and using it

through imagination to present numerical concepts. That is, all estimation of the magnitude of natural objects is ultimately aesthetic: determined subjectively, not objectively.

Now there is no greatest magnitude for mathematical estimation, since the power of numbers extends to infinity. But there certainly is a greatest magnitude for aesthetic estimation. I maintain that when we judge this as an absolute measure, beyond which no greater measure is subjectively possible for the judging subject, it brings with it the idea of the sublime. It produces an emotion that no mathematical estimation of magnitude through numbers can produce —except insofar [A 87] as that aesthetic basic measure is kept alive in the imagination. Mathematical estimation always presents only relative magnitude by comparison with others of the same kind. Aesthetic estimation presents magnitude absolutely, as far as the mind can grasp it in a single intuition.

Taking a quantity into imagination through intuition, so that it can serve as a measure or unit for estimating magnitude through numbers, requires two acts of this power: *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) and *comprehension* (*comprehensio aesthetica*). Apprehension presents no difficulty, since it can continue to [252] infinity. But comprehension becomes harder as apprehension advances. It soon reaches its maximum: the aesthetically greatest basic measure for estimating magnitude. For when apprehension has advanced so far that the partial representations of sensible intuition first apprehended begin to fade in the imagination while it moves on to apprehend more, it loses as much on one side as it gains on the other. Comprehension thus has a maximum beyond which it cannot go.

This explains *Savary's* observation in his accounts of Egypt: to feel the full impact [A 88] of the pyramids' size, we must be neither very close to them nor too far away. If we are too far away, the parts apprehended—their stones laid one above another—are represented only indistinctly, and their representation has no effect on the subject's aesthetic judgment. But if we are too close, the eye needs some time to complete its apprehension from base to summit. During that time the earlier parts always partly fade before the imagination has taken in the later ones, and comprehension is never complete.—The same thing can also

explain the bewilderment, or kind of embarrassment, that reportedly comes over a viewer on first entering St. Peter's in Rome. Here there is a feeling that the imagination is inadequate to present the idea of a whole. In doing so imagination reaches its maximum, and in trying to expand it collapses back into itself. Yet this puts it into a state of deeply felt satisfaction.

For now I will say nothing about the basis of this satisfaction. It is connected with a representation from which we would least expect it: one that makes us aware of the inadequacy of the representation for judgment in estimating magnitude, and thus of its subjective lack of purposiveness. I will only note that if the aesthetic judgment is to be *pure* (*not mixed with any teleological judgment*, which is a judgment of reason [A 89]), and if we are to give an example fully suited to a critique of *aesthetic* judgment, we must not exhibit the sublime in products of art, such as buildings, columns, and so on. In these a human end determines both form and size. Nor should we exhibit it in natural things *whose concept already involves a definite end* [253], such as animals with a known natural function. We must exhibit it in raw nature, merely insofar as it contains magnitude—and even there only insofar as it carries no charm in itself or emotion arising from actual danger. In this way of representing it, nature contains nothing monstrous, nor anything magnificent or horrifying. The magnitude apprehended may have grown as much as we like, provided imagination can comprehend it in a whole. An object is *monstrous* when its size destroys the end that constitutes its concept. But a mere presentation of a concept that is almost too large for any presentation, bordering on the relatively monstrous, is called *colossal*. This is because presenting the concept is made harder when the intuition of its object is almost too large for our power of apprehension.—But a pure judgment about the sublime must not have any end of the object as its determining ground, if it is to be aesthetic [A 90] and not mixed with any judgment of understanding or reason.

Everything that is to please merely reflective judgment without interest must involve, in its representation, subjective purposiveness that as such is universally valid. Yet here the judgment is not based on any purposiveness in the object's *form*, as it is with the beautiful. So we must ask: What is this subjective purpo-

siveness? And what prescribes it as a norm, so that it provides a basis for universally valid satisfaction in the mere estimation of magnitude—even when this estimation is pushed as far as the inadequacy of our imagination to present the concept of a magnitude?

In putting together what is needed to represent magnitude, imagination naturally goes on to infinity without anything stopping it. Understanding guides it through numerical concepts, for which imagination must provide the schema. This procedure belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude. It contains something objectively purposive in accordance with the concept of an end, as every measurement does, but nothing purposive and pleasing for aesthetic judgment. Nor does this intentional purposiveness contain anything [A 91] [254] that requires us to increase the size of the measure, and thus the *comprehension* of a multiplicity in one intuition, to the limit of imagination's power—as far as it can possibly reach in presenting things. In intellectual estimation of magnitude, or arithmetic, we get just as far whether we comprehend units up to 10, in the decimal system, or only up to 4, in the quaternary system. We then produce further magnitudes by putting things together, or, if the quantity is given in intuition, by apprehending it, in a merely progressive rather than comprehensive way, according to an assumed principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude, understanding is served and satisfied equally well whether imagination chooses as its unit a magnitude we can grasp at a glance, such as a foot or a rod, or a German mile or even the earth's diameter. These last can be apprehended, but cannot be comprehended in one intuition by imagination—not through *comprehensio aesthetica*, though they can certainly be brought into a numerical concept through *comprehensio logica*. In both cases logical estimation of magnitude goes on to infinity without obstruction.

But the mind now listens to the voice of reason within it. Reason demands totality for all given magnitudes, even those that can never be apprehended completely but are nevertheless judged, in sensible representation, [A 92] as completely given. It therefore demands their comprehension in *one* intuition, and a *presentation* of all the members of an ever-increasing numerical series. It

does not exempt even the infinite—space and elapsed time—from this demand. Instead, it makes it unavoidable for ordinary reason, in judging, to think of the infinite as *given as a whole*, in its totality.

But the infinite is absolutely, not merely comparatively, large. Compared with it, everything else of the same kind of magnitude is small. Most importantly, even to be able to think it as *a whole* indicates a power of mind that exceeds every standard of the senses. For this would require a comprehension providing a standard as its unit that stood in a definite, numerically expressible relation to the infinite. That is impossible. Yet *even to be able to think* the given infinite without contradiction requires a power in the human mind that is itself supersensible. Only through this power and [255] its idea of a noumenon can the infinity of the sensible world be comprehended *as a whole under* one concept in a purely intellectual estimation of magnitude. This noumenon admits no intuition of itself, but is laid down as the substrate of our intuition of the world as mere appearance. [A 93] In mathematical estimation, by contrast, the infinite can never be thought as a whole *through numerical concepts*. Merely having the power to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as given in its intelligible substrate exceeds every standard of sensibility. It is great beyond any comparison even with the power of mathematical estimation. Admittedly this is not for a theoretical purpose, in the service of cognition. But it does expand the mind, which feels able to cross the limits of sensibility for another purpose: the practical one.

Nature is therefore sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition involves the idea of its infinity. This can happen only through the inadequacy of even our imagination's greatest effort to estimate an object's magnitude. For mathematical estimation, however, imagination is equal to every object and can provide a sufficient measure for it. Understanding's numerical concepts can, by progression, make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. It must therefore be *aesthetic* estimation in which we feel the effort to comprehend progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition—an effort beyond imagination's power. At the same time we perceive that this power, though unlimited [A 94] in its advance, is inadequate to grasp and use a basic measure suitable for esti-

mating magnitude with the least expenditure of understanding. Now the true, unchanging basic measure of nature is its absolute whole, which, in nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But this basic measure is a self-contradictory concept, because the absolute totality of an endless progression is impossible. So a magnitude in a natural object on which imagination fruitlessly spends its whole power of comprehension must lead our concept of nature to a supersensible substrate underlying both nature and our power of thought. This substrate is great beyond every standard of the senses. It thus leads us to judge as *sublime* not so much [256] the object as our state of mind in estimating it.

In judging the beautiful, aesthetic judgment relates imagination in its free play to the *understanding*, so that it agrees with the understanding's *concepts* in general, without determining them. In the same way, when judging a thing as sublime, it relates that same power to *reason*, so that it agrees subjectively with reason's *ideas*, without specifying which. In other words, it produces a state of mind that accords with, and is compatible with, the one [A 95] that the influence of definite practical ideas would produce in feeling.

This also shows that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the person judging, not in the natural object that brings about this state when we judge it. Who would call shapeless mountain masses, piled on one another in wild disorder with their pyramids of ice, or the dark, raging sea, and so on, sublime? But the mind feels lifted up in its own judgment. In contemplating these things without regard to their form, it gives itself over to imagination and to a reason connected with imagination, though without any definite end, simply to expand it. Yet it finds the whole power of imagination inadequate to reason's ideas.

Every case in which imagination is given not so much a larger numerical concept as a large unit of measure, to shorten numerical series, provides an example of the mathematically sublime in nature in mere intuition. A tree whose height we estimate against a person's height can serve as a measure for a mountain. If this mountain were, say, a mile high, it could serve as the unit for the number expressing the earth's diameter, to make that diameter intuitive. The earth's diameter could serve for the planetary system known to us, [A 96] and that sys-

tem for the Milky Way. The immeasurable multitude of such Milky Way systems, called nebulae, which presumably form another such system among themselves, gives us no reason to expect a limit here. In the aesthetic judgment of so immeasurable a whole, the sublime lies not so much in the size of the number as in our reaching ever larger units as we advance. The systematic division of the universe [257] helps in this. It makes everything large in nature appear small in turn. More precisely, it makes our imagination in all its boundlessness, and nature with it, appear to vanish before reason's ideas when imagination is supposed to provide a presentation adequate to them.

27 *The quality of satisfaction in judging the sublime.*

The feeling that our power is inadequate to attain an idea *that is a law for us* is *respect*. Now the idea of comprehending any appearance that may be given to us in the intuition of a whole is imposed on us by a law of reason. Reason recognizes no other definite, universally valid, and unchanging measure than the absolute whole. [A 97] But even in its greatest effort to comprehend a given object in a whole of intuition, as demanded of it, and thus to present reason's idea, our imagination shows its limits and inadequacy. At the same time, however, it shows its vocation to bring about adequacy to this idea as a law. So the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation. Through a certain substitution—confusing respect for the object with respect for the idea of humanity in ourselves—we show this respect to a natural object. The object makes, as it were, intuitively clear to us the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive powers over the greatest power of sensibility.

The feeling of the sublime is therefore a feeling of displeasure because imagination, in its aesthetic estimation of magnitude, is inadequate to estimation by reason. At the same time, pleasure is aroused because this very judgment of the inadequacy of our greatest sensible power agrees with reason's ideas, insofar as striving toward them is a law for us. For it is a law of reason for us, and belongs to our vocation, to estimate everything large that nature offers us as an object of the senses as small compared with reason's ideas. Whatever awakens the feeling of this supersensible [A 98] vocation in us agrees with that law. [258] Now

imagination's greatest effort to present a unit for estimating magnitude refers to something *absolutely large*. It therefore also refers to reason's law of accepting this alone as the highest measure of magnitudes. So our inner perception that every sensible standard is inadequate to reason's estimation of magnitude agrees with reason's laws. It is a displeasure that awakens in us the feeling of our supersensible vocation. In relation to that vocation, finding every standard of sensibility inadequate to reason's ideas is purposive, and therefore pleasurable.

In representing the sublime in nature the mind feels *moved*, whereas in an aesthetic judgment about nature's beauty it is in *calm* contemplation. This movement, especially at first, can be compared with a shaking: a rapid alternation of repulsion from and attraction to the very same object. What overwhelms imagination, and toward which it is driven in apprehending intuition, is like an abyss in which it fears losing itself. Yet producing such an effort of imagination does not overwhelm reason's idea of the supersensible; it accords with its law. [A 99] So it is attractive to the very degree that it was repellent to mere sensibility. Yet the judgment itself always remains merely aesthetic. Without being based on a definite concept of the object, it represents the subjective play of the mental powers, imagination and reason, as harmonious even through their contrast. In judging beauty, imagination and *understanding* produce subjective purposiveness of the mental powers through their agreement. Here imagination and *reason* do so through their conflict. They produce a feeling that we possess pure, independent reason, or a power of estimating magnitude whose superiority can be made intuitive only through the inadequacy of that power which is itself unlimited in presenting magnitudes of sensible objects.

Measuring a space, as apprehension, is also tracing it, and so is an objective movement in imagination and a progression. Comprehending a multiplicity in the unity not of thought but of intuition—bringing what was apprehended successively into a single instant—is, by contrast, a regression. It cancels the condition of time in [259] imagination's progression and makes *coexistence* intuitive. Since succession in time is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition, this is a subjective movement of [A 100] imagination that does violence to inner sense. This violence must be more noticeable the greater the quantity

imagination comprehends in one intuition. Trying to take into a single intuition a measure of magnitude whose apprehension requires a noticeable amount of time is therefore a way of representing that, subjectively considered, runs against our purpose. Objectively, however, it is required for estimating magnitude and is thus purposive. Yet the very same violence that imagination inflicts on the subject is judged purposive *for the mind's whole vocation*.

The *quality* of the feeling of the sublime is this: it is a feeling of displeasure concerning our power of aesthetic judgment of an object, yet this displeasure is also represented as purposive. This is possible because our own incapacity reveals the awareness of an unlimited power in the same subject. The mind can judge this latter power aesthetically only through the former.

In logical estimation of magnitude, the impossibility of ever reaching absolute totality by progressively measuring things of the sensible world in time and space was recognized as objective. That is, it was an impossibility of *thinking* the infinite as given, and not merely [A 101] a subjective inability to *grasp* it. For there we pay no attention to the degree of comprehension in one intuition as a measure; everything depends on a numerical concept. But in aesthetic estimation of magnitude the numerical concept must be dropped or changed. Only imagination's comprehension into the unity of a measure is purposive for it, thus avoiding concepts of a law for successively producing concepts of magnitude.—Now suppose a magnitude nearly reaches the utmost limit of our ability to comprehend it in one intuition. Suppose imagination is nevertheless called upon, by numerical magnitudes for which we are aware that our power is unlimited, to comprehend it aesthetically in a larger unit. Then we feel aesthetically confined within limits in our mind. Yet the displeasure is represented as purposive in relation to the necessary expansion of imagination to match what is unlimited in our reason: the [260] idea of the absolute whole. Thus imagination's lack of purposiveness is represented as purposive for reason's ideas and their awakening. This in turn makes the aesthetic judgment itself subjectively purposive for reason as the source of ideas—that is, of an intellectual compre-

hension compared with which every aesthetic comprehension is small. And the object is received as sublime with a pleasure [A 102] that is possible only through displeasure.

B. The dynamically sublime in nature.

28 *Nature as a power.*

Power is an ability superior to great obstacles. It is called *dominion* when it is also superior to the resistance of something that itself has power. Nature, considered in an aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime*.

For us to judge nature dynamically as sublime, we must represent it as arousing fear, although the reverse does not follow: not every object that arouses fear is found sublime in our aesthetic judgment. For in aesthetic judgment, without a concept, superiority to obstacles can be judged only by the magnitude of the resistance. Now what we try to resist is an evil, and if we find our ability unequal to it, it is an object of fear. So nature can count for aesthetic judgment as a power, and thus as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is considered an object of fear. [A 103]

But we can consider an object *fearsome* without being *afraid of* it. We do this when we judge it by merely *thinking* of the case in which we might wish to resist it, and recognizing that all resistance would then be utterly useless. In this way a virtuous person fears God without being afraid of him. Such a person does not think of wanting to resist God and his commands as a case to be feared *on their own part* [261]. Yet in any such case, which they think is not in itself impossible, they recognize God as fearsome.

Someone who is afraid cannot judge the sublime in nature, any more than someone captured by inclination and appetite can judge the beautiful. A frightened person flees the sight of an object that inspires dread, and it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously felt. So the agreeableness that comes from the ending of a distress is *relief*. But relief at being freed from dan-

ger comes with the resolve never to expose oneself to it again. We do not even like to think back on that feeling, much less seek an opportunity to experience it ourselves.

Bold, overhanging, seemingly threatening rocks; thunderclouds piling up in the sky [A 104], advancing with lightning and crashes; volcanoes in all their destructive force; hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind; the boundless ocean in turmoil; a mighty river's high waterfall, and the like—all make our power of resistance seem an insignificant trifle compared with their might. But their sight becomes all the more attractive the more fearsome it is, provided we are in safety. We readily call these objects sublime because they raise the strength of the soul above its usual average. They reveal in us a power of resistance of an entirely different kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against nature's seeming omnipotence.

For nature's immeasurability, and our inability to find a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its *domain*, revealed our own limitations. Yet at the same time we found in our reason another, nonsensible standard. It includes even that infinity under itself as a unit, and everything in nature is small compared with it. We thus found in our mind a superiority over nature even in its immeasurability. In the same way, the irresistibility of nature's power makes us recognize our physical helplessness as natural beings. [A 105] But it also reveals a power to judge ourselves independent of nature and a superiority over it. On this rests a self-preservation of quite another kind from the one that external nature can attack and endanger [262]. Here the humanity in our person remains undiminished, even though the human being would have to succumb to that force. In this way nature is judged sublime in our aesthetic judgment not because it arouses fear, but because it calls up our strength—which is not nature—to regard the things we worry about, property, health, and life, as small. It thus calls us to regard nature's power, to which we are certainly subject in these respects, as nevertheless having no dominion over us and our personality to which we would have to bow when our highest principles, and maintaining or abandoning them, were at

stake. So nature is called sublime here simply because it raises imagination to present those cases in which the mind can make itself feel the sublimity of its own vocation, even above nature.

This self-esteem loses nothing because we must find ourselves safe to feel this inspiring satisfaction. It does not follow that because the danger is not serious, the sublimity of our mental power is not serious either, as might seem to be the case. [A 106] For here the satisfaction concerns only the *vocation* of our power disclosed in such a case, just as the predisposition to it lies in our nature. Developing and exercising it remains our responsibility and task. There is truth in this, however aware a person may be of their present actual helplessness when they extend their reflection this far.

This principle may seem far-fetched and contrived, and thus beyond the scope of an aesthetic judgment. But observation of human beings proves the contrary. It shows that this principle can underlie the most ordinary judgments, even when we are not always aware of it. For what is an object of the greatest admiration even to an uncivilized person? Someone who does not panic or become afraid, and so does not retreat from danger, yet acts energetically with full deliberation. Even in the most civilized condition this special respect for the warrior remains. We only demand in addition that the warrior display all the virtues of peace: gentleness, compassion, and even proper care for their own person. This is precisely because these show that danger cannot overpower their mind. So however much people may argue, in comparing a statesman with a general, about which deserves greater [A 107] [263] respect, aesthetic judgment decides for the latter. Even war, when conducted in an orderly way and with sacred respect for civil rights, has something sublime about it. It also makes the way of thinking of the people who wage it in this way all the more sublime, the more dangers they have faced and courageously withstood. A long peace, by contrast, generally makes a merely commercial spirit dominant, along with base self-interest, cowardice, and softness, and lowers the people's way of thinking.

There seems to be an objection to this analysis of the concept of the sublime as applied to power. In thunderstorms, tempests, earthquakes, and the like, we usually represent God as showing himself in his wrath, but also in his sublimity.

Yet to imagine our mind superior to the effects, and seemingly even to the intentions, of such a power would be both foolish and sacrilegious. Here the state of mind suited to the appearance of such an object seems to be not a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature, but submission, dejection, and a feeling of complete helplessness. This is also what is usually connected with the idea of God during such natural events. In religion generally, prostration [A 108] and worship with bowed head and with contrite, anxious gestures and voices seem the only appropriate conduct in the deity's presence. Most peoples have therefore adopted this conduct and still observe it. But this state of mind is by no means intrinsically and necessarily connected with the idea of the *sublimity* of a religion and its object. A person who is truly afraid because they find grounds for fear within themselves—being aware that their corrupt disposition offends a power whose will is irresistible and also just—is in no state of mind to admire divine greatness. That requires a disposition toward calm contemplation and a wholly free judgment. Only when a person is aware of a sincere disposition pleasing to God do those effects of power serve to awaken the idea of this being's sublimity. For then the person recognizes in themselves a sublimity of disposition that accords with God's will. They are thereby raised above fear of such natural effects, which they do not regard as outbreaks [264] of his wrath. Even humility, as an unsparing judgment of our faults, is a sublime state of mind. These faults might otherwise easily be excused by the frailty of human nature when we are conscious of good intentions. In humility we voluntarily [A 109] submit to the pain of self-reproach in order gradually to root out its cause. Only in this way does religion differ inwardly from superstition. Superstition bases itself in the mind not on reverence for the sublime, but on fear and anxiety before an overpowering being to whose will the terrified person sees themselves subject without esteeming it. From this, of course, nothing can arise but attempts to win favor and ingratiate oneself, instead of a religion of good conduct.

So sublimity is contained in no natural thing, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become aware of being superior to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us insofar as it influences us. Everything that arouses this feeling

in us, including nature's power which challenges our strength, is then called sublime, though improperly. Only by presupposing this idea in us, and in relation to it, can we reach the idea of the sublimity of that being who produces deep respect in us. He does so not merely through the power he shows in nature, but still more through the ability placed in us to judge that power without fear and to think of our vocation as sublime above it.

29 [A 110] *The modality of the judgment about the sublime in nature.*

There are countless things in beautiful nature concerning which we can directly demand that everyone agree with our judgment, and can expect agreement without being far wrong. But we cannot so readily expect our judgment about the sublime in nature to find acceptance with others. For it seems to require a far greater cultivation, not only of aesthetic judgment but also of the cognitive powers underlying it, to judge this excellence of natural objects.

265 The mind's disposition toward the feeling of the sublime requires receptivity to ideas. For what repels sensibility yet also attracts it consists precisely in nature's inadequacy to these ideas. It thus presupposes them and the straining of imagination to treat nature as a schema for them. This is a force reason exercises on imagination, but only to expand it in keeping with reason's own practical domain and to let it look out toward the infinite, which for imagination is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, what we call sublime when prepared by cultivation [A 111] will seem merely repellent to an unrefined person. In the evidence of nature's force in its destructiveness, and in the vast scale of its power beside which their own vanishes into nothing, such a person will see only the hardship, danger, and distress that would surround anyone confined there. Thus, as Mr. de Saussure relates, a good and otherwise sensible Savoyard peasant unhesitatingly called all lovers of the icy mountains fools. And who knows whether he would have been entirely wrong if that observer had exposed himself to these dangers merely as an enthusiast, as most travelers do, or to be able to give dramatic descriptions of them later? But his aim was to instruct humanity. This excellent man felt that uplifting emotion and gave it to the readers of his travels as an extra part of their purchase.

But although the judgment about the sublime in nature requires cultivation—more than judgment about the beautiful—it is not first produced by cultivation or introduced into society merely by convention. Its basis lies in human nature: in something that, along with common understanding, we can attribute to and demand of everyone, namely the predisposition [A 112] to feel for practical ideas, that is, moral feeling.

This is the basis for the necessary agreement of other people's judgments about the sublime with ours, a necessity we include in our own judgment. We accuse someone who is indifferent when judging a natural object we find beautiful of lacking *taste*. Likewise, we say that someone who remains unmoved by what we judge sublime has no *feeling*. We demand both of everyone, and also assume both in anyone [266] who has some cultivation. The difference is that we demand the first directly of everyone, because here judgment relates imagination only to understanding as the power of concepts. But we demand the second only on a subjective presupposition, since here judgment relates imagination to reason as the power of ideas. This presupposition is moral feeling in human beings, which we believe we are entitled to require of everyone. In this way we also attribute necessity to this aesthetic judgment.

A major point for the critique of judgment lies in this modality of aesthetic judgments: the necessity they claim. For this is what reveals an a priori principle in them. It raises them out of empirical psychology, where they would otherwise remain buried [A 113] among feelings of pleasure and pain, with only the meaningless label of a *finer* feeling. It places them, and through them the power of judgment, among those based on *a priori* principles, and as such brings them into transcendental philosophy.

General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments.

In relation to the feeling of pleasure, an object is counted as either *agreeable*, *beautiful*, *sublime*, or *good* absolutely (*iucundum*, *pulchrum*, *sublime*, *honestum*).

As an incentive to desires, the *agreeable* is always of one and the same kind, whatever its source and however specifically different the representation of sense and sensation may be when considered objectively. So in judging its influ-

ence on the mind, all that matters is the number of attractions, simultaneous and successive, and, as it were, the sheer amount of agreeable sensation. It can therefore be understood only through *quantity*. Nor does it cultivate us; it belongs merely to enjoyment.—The *beautiful*, by contrast, requires the representation of a certain *quality* of the object, which can also be made intelligible and brought under concepts, though it is not brought under them in an aesthetic judgment. It cultivates us by teaching us also to attend to purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure.—The *sublime* consists solely in the *relation* in which [A 114] [267] the sensible in our representation of nature is judged suitable for a possible supersensible use.—The *absolutely good*, judged subjectively by the feeling it inspires, is the object of moral feeling: the determinability of the subject's powers through the representation of a law that *unconditionally obligates*. It is distinguished above all by the *modality* of a necessity based on *a priori* concepts. This contains not merely a *claim* to everyone's approval, but a *command* that everyone approve. In itself it belongs not to aesthetic but to pure intellectual judgment. It is attributed not to nature but to freedom, and not in a merely reflective but in a determining judgment. Yet the *determinability of the subject* through this idea—that is, moral feeling—is related to aesthetic judgment and its *formal conditions* in a certain respect. Such a subject can feel within themselves both the *obstacles* of sensibility and a superiority to them through overcoming them, as a *modification of their state*. Moral feeling can therefore serve to represent the lawfulness of action from duty as also aesthetic, that is, sublime or even beautiful, without losing any of its purity. This would not be possible if we tried to connect it naturally with the feeling of the agreeable.

If we draw the result from the exposition so far of both kinds of aesthetic judgment, we get these short explanations:

Beautiful is what pleases in mere judging, and thus not through sensory sensation in accordance with a concept of understanding. [A 115] It follows at once that it must please without any interest.

Sublime is what pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the senses.

Both, as explanations of universally valid aesthetic judgment, refer to subjective grounds. On one side sensibility is purposive for contemplative understanding; on the other, against sensibility, it is purposive for the ends of practical reason. Yet both are united in the same subject in relation to moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime prepares us to esteem it even against our sensible interest.

268 We can describe the sublime in this way: it is an object of nature *whose representation determines the mind to think of nature's inability to attain a presentation of ideas*.

Taken literally and considered logically, ideas cannot be presented. But if we expand our empirical power of representation, mathematically or dynamically, for the intuition of nature, reason inevitably enters as the power of independence of absolute totality. It produces the mind's effort, though a fruitless one, to make the representation of the senses adequate to that totality. This effort, and the feeling that imagination cannot attain the idea, is itself a presentation of our mind's subjective purposiveness in using imagination for its supersensible vocation. It compels us subjectively to *think* even nature in its totality as a presentation of something supersensible, [A 116] without being able to achieve this presentation *objectively*.

For we soon realize that nature in space and time entirely lacks the unconditioned, and thus also absolute magnitude, which even the most ordinary reason demands. This also reminds us that we are dealing only with nature as appearance, and that even this must be viewed as a mere presentation of nature in itself, which reason has in its idea. This idea of the supersensible cannot be further determined by us. So we cannot *cognize* nature as its presentation, but can only *think* it. The idea is awakened in us by an object that, when judged aesthetically, strains imagination to its limit, either in its expansion, mathematically, or in its power over the mind, dynamically. This judgment is based on the feeling of a vocation of the mind that entirely exceeds imagination's domain—on moral feeling. In relation to this feeling, the object's representation is judged subjectively purposive.

In fact, a feeling for the sublime in nature can hardly be thought without connecting it with a state of mind similar to the one required for moral feeling. Immediate pleasure in nature's beauty also presupposes and cultivates a certain *liberality* of thought: satisfaction independent of mere sensory enjoyment. But it represents freedom more in *play* than in an *occupation* under laws. This latter is the [269] true character of human morality, where reason must do violence to sensibility. The difference is that in aesthetic judgment about [A 117] the sublime, this violence is represented as exercised by imagination itself as an instrument of reason.

Satisfaction in the sublime in nature is therefore only *negative*, whereas satisfaction in the beautiful is *positive*. It is a feeling that imagination deprives itself of freedom by being purposively determined under a law other than that of empirical use. Imagination thereby gains an expansion and power greater than what it sacrifices. But the basis of this gain remains hidden from imagination itself; instead, it *feels* the sacrifice or deprivation, and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected. The *astonishment* bordering on terror, the dread and sacred awe that seize a viewer at the sight of mountain masses rising to the sky, deep chasms with raging waters, deeply shadowed wildernesses inviting melancholy reflection, and so on, are not actual fear when the viewer knows they are safe. They are only an attempt to enter into such a situation in imagination, in order to feel the power of this very faculty to unite the resulting movement of the mind with its state of rest. In this way we feel superior to nature within us, and thus also to nature outside us insofar as it can influence our feeling of well-being. For imagination under the law of association makes our state of contentment physically dependent. But that same imagination, under the principles of judgment's schematism and therefore subordinated to freedom, is an instrument of reason and its ideas. As such it is a power to assert our independence against nature's influences, to reduce to smallness what is large by the first standard, and thus to place the [A 118] absolutely large only in the subject's own vocation. This reflection of aesthetic judgment, raising itself into adequacy

with reason, though without a definite concept of reason, represents even the object as subjectively purposive through the objective inadequacy of imagination in its greatest expansion to reason as the power of ideas.

Here we must bear in mind a point already made above. In the transcendental aesthetics of judgment [270] we must deal only with pure aesthetic judgments. So our examples must not be taken from beautiful or sublime natural objects that presuppose the concept of an end. For then the purposiveness would either be teleological or rest on mere sensations of an object, pleasure or pain. In the first case it would not be aesthetic, and in the second it would not be merely formal purposiveness. So when we call the sight of the starry sky *sublime*, we must not base our judgment on concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, and then regard the bright points filling the space above us as their suns, moving in orbits arranged very purposively for them. We must judge it simply as we see it: a vast vault enclosing everything. Only under this representation must we place the sublimity a pure aesthetic judgment attributes to this object. Likewise, we must not judge the ocean as we *think* it when enriched with all kinds of knowledge not contained in immediate intuition: as a vast realm of aquatic creatures, as the great reservoir for the evaporation that fills [A 119] the air with clouds for the benefit of the land, or as an element that separates continents yet makes the greatest communication among them possible. These yield nothing but teleological judgments. Instead, we must be able to find the ocean sublime simply as poets do, by what meets the eye: when calm, as a clear mirror of water bounded only by the sky; when restless, as an abyss threatening to swallow everything. The same applies to the sublime and beautiful in the human figure. We must not look back to concepts of the ends *for which* all its limbs exist as determining grounds of our judgment. Nor must we let their agreement with those ends *influence* our aesthetic judgment, which would then no longer be pure. Admittedly, their not conflicting with those ends is a necessary condition even of aesthetic satisfaction. Aesthetic purposiveness is the lawfulness of judgment in its *freedom*. Satisfaction in the object depends on the relation in which we wish to place imagination, provided it

keeps the mind freely occupied on its own. If something else, whether sensory sensation or a concept of understanding, [271] determines the judgment, it is indeed lawful, but not the judgment of a *free* power of judgment.

So when we speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity, *first*, these expressions are not entirely accurate. These are aesthetic ways of representing, which would not occur in us at all if we were merely pure intelligences, or even placed ourselves in that position in thought. *Second*, although both as objects of [A 120] intellectual, moral satisfaction are compatible with aesthetic satisfaction insofar as they do not *rest on* an interest, they are difficult to reconcile with it in another respect. They are supposed to *produce* an interest. If their presentation is to agree with satisfaction in aesthetic judgment, this could occur there only through a sensory interest connected with their presentation. But this impairs and contaminates intellectual purposiveness.

The object of a pure and unconditional intellectual satisfaction is the moral law in the power it exercises within us over each and every incentive of the mind *preceding it*. This power really makes itself aesthetically known only through sacrifices. These are a deprivation, though for the sake of inner freedom, yet they disclose in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible power, with consequences stretching beyond our view. So satisfaction, considered aesthetically in relation to sensibility, is negative, that is, opposed to this interest. Considered intellectually, however, it is positive and connected with an interest. It follows that the intellectually good, which is purposive in itself—the morally good—must, when aesthetically judged, be represented not so much as beautiful as sublime. It should awaken more the feeling of respect, which scorns charm, than that of love and familiar affection. For human nature agrees with that good not spontaneously, but only through the violence reason does to sensibility. Conversely, what we call sublime in nature outside us, or even within us, such as certain affects, is represented only as a [A 121] power of the mind to rise above *certain* obstacles of sensibility through moral principles, and becomes interesting through this.

I will dwell a little on the latter point. The idea of the good accompanied by [272] affect is called *enthusiasm*. This state of mind seems so sublime that people commonly maintain that nothing great can be achieved without it. But every affect[10] is blind, either in choosing its end or, even if reason has given that end, in carrying it out. For it is that movement of the mind which makes it incapable of freely considering principles in order to determine itself by them. So it cannot in any way deserve reason's satisfaction. Yet aesthetically enthusiasm is sublime, because it is a straining of our powers through ideas that give the mind an impetus far more powerful and lasting than the impulse from sensory representations. But, strange as this may seem, even *absence of affect* (*Apatheia, Phlegma in significatu bono*—apathy or calmness in the good sense), in a mind vigorously pursuing [A 122] its unchanging principles, is sublime, and in a far superior way, because it also has the satisfaction of pure reason on its side. Such a disposition alone is called noble. The expression is later applied also to things such as buildings, clothing, writing style, bodily bearing, and the like, when they arouse not so much *astonishment*—an affect at the representation of something novel that exceeds expectation—as *admiration*, an astonishment that does not end when the novelty is lost. This occurs when ideas in their presentation agree with aesthetic satisfaction unintentionally and without artifice.

Every affect of the *vigorous kind*, one that awakens awareness of our power to overcome every resistance (*animi strenui*, of a vigorous spirit), is *aesthetically sublime*: anger, for example, and even despair—*indignant*, not *despondent* despair. But affect of the *melting* kind, which makes the very effort to resist an object of displeasure (*animum languidum*, a languid spirit), has nothing *noble* [273] about it, though it may be counted among beautiful dispositions. So the *emotions* that can grow strong enough to become affects are also very different. There are *courageous* emotions and *tender* ones. The latter, when they rise to affect, are entirely worthless; the tendency toward them is called *sentimentality*. A sympathetic grief that refuses comfort, or one we deliberately indulge over fictional evils until imagination deceives us into treating them as real, shows and produces a soft but also weak soul. It displays a beautiful side and may be

called fanciful, but not even enthusiastic. Novels, tearful plays, [A 123] and shallow moral instructions toy with so-called noble sentiments, though the name is false. In fact they make the heart slack and insensitive to duty's strict command, incapable of any respect for the dignity of humanity in our person and for human rights—which are something quite different from human happiness—and generally incapable of any firm principles. Even religious preaching that recommends crawling, base attempts to win favor and ingratiate oneself, giving up all trust in our own power to resist the evil within us, instead of the vigorous resolve to try the powers still left to us despite all our frailty in overcoming inclinations; and false humility that treats self-contempt, whining pretended remorse, and a merely passive state of mind as the only way to please the highest being: these are incompatible even with what could be counted as beauty of disposition, much less with its sublimity.

But turbulent emotions, too, cannot claim the honor of a *sublime* presentation, however much they strain imagination, unless they leave behind a state of mind that influences, even if only indirectly, our awareness of our strength and resolve for what involves pure intellectual purposiveness—the supersensible. This applies whether they are connected with religious ideas under the name of edification, or, as belonging merely to cultivation, with ideas involving a social interest. Otherwise all these emotions belong only to the *exercise* we welcome for our health. The agreeable fatigue that [A 124] follows such a shaking through the play of affects is an enjoyment [274] of well-being arising from the restored balance of the various vital forces within us. Ultimately it amounts to the same thing as the enjoyment Eastern sensualists find so comfortable when they have their bodies kneaded, as it were, and all their muscles and joints gently pressed and bent. The only difference is that in the first case the moving principle is mostly within us, and in the second entirely outside us. Thus someone believes a sermon has built them up, though nothing—no system of good maxims—has been built within them; or that a tragedy has improved them, when they are merely pleased to have dispelled their boredom. So the sublime must always refer to our *way of thinking*: to maxims that give the intellectual and reason's ideas supremacy over sensibility.

We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such an abstract presentation, which becomes entirely negative regarding the sensible. For although imagination finds nothing beyond the sensible to hold on to, this very removal of its limits also makes it feel unbounded. This abstraction is therefore a presentation of the infinite. For that very reason it can never be anything but a merely negative presentation, yet it still expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish law book than the commandment: "You shall not make for yourself any image or any likeness, of anything in heaven, on earth, or under the earth," and so on. This commandment alone can explain the enthusiasm the Jewish people felt for their religion during their civilized period when comparing themselves with other peoples, or the pride Islam [A 125] inspires. The same applies to the representation of the moral law and our predisposition to morality. It is an entirely mistaken worry that if we strip this representation of everything that could recommend it to the senses, it will bring only cold, lifeless approval, with no moving force or emotion. Exactly the opposite is true. Where the senses now see nothing before them, yet the unmistakable and indelible idea of morality remains, it would be more necessary to moderate the impetus of an unbounded imagination so that it does not rise to enthusiasm than, from fear that these ideas lack force, to seek help for them in images and childish apparatus. Governments [275] have therefore readily permitted religion to be richly supplied with this equipment. They have thereby tried to take away from subjects the trouble, but also the ability, of extending their spiritual powers beyond the limits arbitrarily set for them, by which they can be handled more easily as merely passive beings.

By contrast, this pure, uplifting, merely negative presentation of morality carries no danger of *fanaticism*: the *delusion of wanting to see something beyond every limit of sensibility*, that is, to dream according to principles, or rave with reason. This is precisely because the presentation is merely negative. For *the inscrutability of the idea of freedom* entirely blocks the way to every positive presentation. But the moral law is itself sufficient and originally determining within us, so that it does not even permit us to look for a determining ground outside it. If [A 126] enthusiasm can be compared with *delirium*, fanaticism

can be compared with *delusional insanity*. Of all states this latter is least compatible with the sublime, because it is broodingly ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an affect, imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-rooted, brooding passion, it is lawless. The first is a passing accident that sometimes affects even the soundest understanding; the second is a disease that wrecks it.

Simplicity—purposiveness without artifice—is, as it were, nature's style in the sublime, and also the style of morality. Morality is a second, supersensible nature, of which we know only the laws. We cannot reach by intuition the supersensible power within us that contains the ground of this legislation.

We should also note that satisfaction in the beautiful, just like satisfaction in the sublime, is distinguished from other aesthetic judgments not only by its universal *communicability*. Through this quality it also acquires an interest in relation to society, in which it can be communicated. Yet *separation from all society* is also regarded as sublime when it rests on ideas that look beyond every sensory interest. Being sufficient to oneself, and therefore not needing society, without being unsociable—that is, without fleeing it—approaches the sublime, as does every rising above needs. By contrast, fleeing people from *misanthropy*, because we hate them, [276] or from *anthropophobia*, fear of people as enemies, is in the one case ugly and in the other contemptible. Yet there is a disposition, very improperly called misanthropy, that often develops [A 127] with age in many well-intentioned people. It is philanthropic enough as regards *benevolence*, but long, sad experience has led it far away from *liking* people. Evidence of this is the tendency toward seclusion, the fanciful wish to spend one's life with a small family on a remote country estate, or, among young people, the dreamed-of happiness of an island unknown to the rest of the world. Novelists and writers of Robinson Crusoe stories know well how to exploit this wish. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, and the childishness of the ends we ourselves consider important and great, in pursuing which people inflict every imaginable evil on one another, contradict so sharply the idea of what people could be if they wished, and so oppose the lively wish to see them better, that giving up all social pleasures seems a small sacrifice to avoid hating those we cannot love. This sadness concerns not the evils fate brings upon other people—a sadness

caused by sympathy—but those they inflict on themselves, and rests on opposition in principles. Because it rests on ideas, it is sublime, whereas the first kind can likewise count only as beautiful.—*Saussure*, as insightful as he is thorough, says of *Bonhomme*, one of the Savoyard mountains, in his account of his Alpine travels: "A certain *tasteless sadness* prevails there." So he also knew an *interesting* sadness, inspired by the sight of a wilderness to which people might wish to withdraw so as to hear [A 128] and learn nothing more of the world. Yet it must not be so completely inhospitable that it offers only an extremely difficult place for human beings to live.—I make this remark only to remind us that grief, too, though not dejected sadness, can be counted among the *vigorous* affects when grounded in moral ideas. But when it is based on sympathy, and as such is also lovable, it belongs only to the *melting* affects. This draws attention to the state of mind, which is *sublime* only in the first case. [277]

We can now compare the transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments just completed with the physiological one developed by *Burke* and many perceptive thinkers among us, to see where a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and beautiful leads. *Burke*[11], who deserves to be named the leading author in this approach, concludes by this route, on page 223 of his work, "that the feeling of the sublime rests on the drive for self-preservation and on *fear*, that is, on a pain which, because it does not go as far as actually damaging the body's parts, produces movements that clear the finer or coarser vessels of dangerous and burdensome blockages. These movements can arouse agreeable sensations —not pleasure, but a kind of pleasing shudder, a certain calm mixed with [A 129] terror." He bases the beautiful on love, though he wants desire distinguished from it, and traces it, on pages 251–252, "to the relaxation, release, and slackening of the body's fibers, and thus to a softening, dissolving, weakening, sinking, dying away, and melting in enjoyment." He then confirms this explanation not only through cases in which imagination, in connection with understanding, can arouse the feeling of the beautiful and sublime in us, but even through sensory sensation.—As psychological observations these analyses of our mental phenomena are excellent. They provide rich material for the most popular investigations of empirical anthropology. Nor can we deny that

all representations in us, whether objectively merely sensible or entirely intellectual, can still be subjectively connected with pleasure or pain, however imperceptible either may be. For they all affect the feeling of life, and none, insofar as it modifies the subject, can be indifferent. We cannot even deny that, as Epicurus maintained, *pleasure* and *pain* are always ultimately bodily, whether they begin in imagination or even in representations of understanding. For without [278] feeling through the bodily organ, life would be merely awareness of its existence, not a feeling of well-being or distress, that is, of the promotion or inhibition of vital forces. The mind by itself is entirely life—the vital principle itself—so obstacles and aids must be sought outside it yet within the human being, and thus in the mind's connection with the body.

But if we place satisfaction in an object entirely [A 130] in its giving enjoyment through charm or emotion, we must not expect anyone *else* to agree with the aesthetic judgment *we* make. On this matter everyone rightly consults only their private sense. But then all criticism of taste also ends completely, unless we make the example of other people's accidentally agreeing judgments into a *command* that we approve. We would presumably resist this principle and appeal to our natural right to subject a judgment based on the immediate feeling of our own well-being to our own sense, not to anyone else's.

So if a judgment of taste must be regarded not as *egoistic* but, by its inner nature, as necessarily *pluralistic*—on its own account, not because of the examples others give of their taste—and if we regard it as entitled to demand everyone's agreement, then some *a priori* principle, whether objective or subjective, must underlie it. We can never reach this principle by tracking down empirical laws of changes in the mind. Such laws show only how people judge, but do not command how they ought to judge, much less command this *unconditionally*. Judgments of taste presuppose such a command, since they insist that satisfaction be connected *immediately* with a representation. So an empirical exposition of aesthetic judgments may certainly begin the inquiry by supplying material for a higher investigation. Yet a transcendental discussion of this power

is possible and essential to the critique of taste. [A 131] For without *a priori* principles, taste could not possibly judge other people's judgments or pronounce approval or rejection of them with even a semblance of right.

The remaining material belonging to the analytic of aesthetic judgment begins with the following:

10 *Affects* are specifically different from *passions*. Affects relate only to feeling; passions belong to the faculty of desire and are inclinations that make any determination of choice through principles difficult or impossible. Affects are turbulent and unintentional; passions are lasting and deliberate. Thus indignation as anger is an affect, but as hatred, or desire for revenge, it is a passion. Passion can never in any relation be called sublime, because in affect the mind's freedom is indeed *inhibited*, but in passion it is abolished.

11 According to the German translation of his work: Philosophical Investigations into the Origin of Our Concepts of the Beautiful and Sublime. Riga, Hartknoch, 1773.

PART I

Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments

Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments. [279]

30 *The deduction of aesthetic judgments about natural objects must address not what we call sublime in nature, but only the beautiful.*

An aesthetic judgment's claim to universal validity for every subject requires a deduction, that is, a justification of its claim, because it must rest on some *a priori* principle. This deduction must be added to its exposition when the judgment concerns satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the *form of the object*. Judgments of taste about beauty in nature are of this kind. For purposiveness then has its ground in the object and its shape, even though it does not indicate the object's relation to other objects according to concepts, for a cognitive judgment. Instead, it concerns only the apprehension of this form in general, insofar as it proves suited to the mind's *power* both [A 132] of concepts and of presenting them, which is one and the same power as apprehension. We can therefore raise various questions about beauty in nature that concern the cause of this purposiveness of its forms. For example, how are we to explain why nature has spread beauty so lavishly everywhere, even at the bottom of the ocean, where the human eye, for which alone that beauty is purposive, rarely reaches? And so on.

But the sublime in nature can be considered entirely formless or shapeless and still be an object of pure satisfaction, displaying subjective purposiveness of the given representation. This applies when we make a pure aesthetic judgment about it, not mixed with concepts of perfection as objective purposiveness, which would make it a teleological judgment. The question now is whether, beyond an exposition of what is thought in an aesthetic judgment of this kind, we can also demand a deduction of its claim to some subjective *a priori* principle.

280 The answer is that the sublime in nature is only improperly so called. Strictly it must be attributed only to our way of thinking, or rather to its basis in human nature. Apprehending an [A 133] otherwise formless and unpurposive object merely gives us the occasion to become aware of this basis. The object is thus *used* in a subjectively purposive way, but is not judged purposive *in itself* and because of its form—as it were, *species finalis accepta, non data*, a purposive form accepted, not given. So our exposition of judgments about the sublime in nature was also their deduction. For when we analyzed the reflection of judgment in them, we found a purposive relation of the cognitive powers. This relation must be assumed *a priori* as underlying the faculty of ends, the will, and is therefore itself purposive *a priori*. This immediately contains the deduction: the justification of such a judgment's claim to universally necessary validity.

We therefore need seek only the deduction of judgments of taste, judgments about the beauty of natural things. In this way we will satisfy the task for the entire power of aesthetic judgment as a whole.

31 *The method of deducing judgments of taste.*

The duty to provide a deduction, that is, a guarantee of legitimacy, for a kind of judgment arises only when the judgment claims [A 134] necessity. This is also the case when it demands subjective universality, everyone's agreement, although it is not a cognitive judgment but only a judgment of pleasure or displeasure in a given object. It thus claims a subjective purposiveness valid without exception for everyone, which, because it is a judgment of taste, is not supposed to be based on any concepts of the thing.

In this last case we are not dealing with a cognitive judgment: neither a theoretical one based on understanding's concept of *nature* in general, nor a pure practical one based on the idea of *freedom* as given *a priori* by reason. So we do not have to justify the *a priori* validity of a judgment representing what a thing is, or that I ought to do something to produce it. We need show only the *universal validity*, for judgment in general, of a [281] *singular* judgment expressing the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of an object's form. This will explain how something can please merely in being judged, without sensory sensation or a concept, and how, just as judging an object for the sake of *cognition* in general has universal rules, [A 135] each person's satisfaction may also be announced as a rule for everyone else.

Now this universal validity is not to be based on collecting votes and asking others about their way of feeling. Rather, it is to rest, as it were, on the autonomy of the subject judging the feeling of pleasure in the given representation—that is, on their own taste. Yet it is not to be derived from concepts either. Such a judgment, which is what a judgment of taste actually is, has two distinctive logical features. *First*, it has a priori universal validity, but not logical universality according to concepts: it is the universality of a singular judgment. *Second*, it has a necessity, which must always rest on *a priori* grounds, yet does not depend on any *a priori* proofs whose representation could compel the approval a judgment of taste demands from everyone.

Resolving these logical peculiarities, which distinguish a judgment of taste from all cognitive judgments, will alone be sufficient for the deduction of this unusual power. Initially we will abstract from all its content, the feeling of pleasure, and compare only its aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments prescribed by logic. So we will first present these characteristic properties of taste, illustrated by examples [A 136].

32 *The first peculiarity of a judgment of taste.*

A judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction, as beauty, while claiming *everyone's* agreement, as if it were objective.

To say "This flower is beautiful" amounts merely to repeating its own [282] claim to everyone's satisfaction. Through the agreeableness of its smell it has no claim at all. One person enjoys the smell; it gives another a headache. What else should we infer but that beauty must be regarded as a property of the flower itself, one that does not conform to the differences between people's minds and their many senses, but to which these must conform if they wish to judge it? Yet this is not how things stand. For the very nature of a judgment of taste is that it calls a thing beautiful only in respect of the character in which it conforms to our way of receiving it.

Moreover, every judgment meant to demonstrate the subject's taste must meet a requirement: the subject must judge for themselves, without having to [A 137] grope through other people's judgments by experience and first learn from their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the same object. They must therefore pronounce their judgment not as an imitation, because a thing perhaps actually pleases everyone, but *a priori*. Yet one would think that an *a priori* judgment must contain a concept of the object, for knowledge of which it contains the principle. But a judgment of taste is not based on concepts at all. It is not cognition of any kind, but only an aesthetic judgment.

So a young poet cannot be dissuaded from the conviction that their poem is beautiful by the judgment of either the public or their friends. If the poet listens to them, it is not because they now judge it differently. Rather, even if the entire public has false taste, at least in the poet's eyes, their desire for approval gives them a reason to accommodate themselves to the common delusion, even against their own judgment. Only later, when their power of judgment has been sharpened by practice, do they voluntarily abandon their earlier judgment. They do the same with judgments based entirely on reason. Taste claims only autonomy. Making other people's judgments the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy.

We rightly recommend the works of the ancients as models and [A 138] call their authors classical, like a certain nobility among writers whose example gives laws to the people. This seems to point to *a posteriori* sources of taste and to refute its autonomy in every subject. But we could just as well [283] say that the

ancient mathematicians, still regarded as virtually indispensable models of the greatest rigor and elegance in the synthetic method, proved that our reason is imitative and unable on its own to produce strict proofs with the greatest intuitive clarity by constructing concepts. No use of our powers, however free, could avoid falling into faulty attempts if each subject always had to begin entirely from their raw natural predisposition and others had not gone before them with their own attempts. This holds even for reason, which must draw all its judgments from the common *a priori* source. The predecessors are not there to make later people mere imitators. Their procedure puts others on the track of seeking the principles within themselves and thus taking their own, often better, path. Even in religion, everyone must certainly draw the rule of their conduct from themselves, since they remain personally responsible for it and cannot shift the blame for their offenses [A 139] to others as teachers or predecessors. Yet general precepts, received from priests or philosophers or drawn from ourselves, will never accomplish as much as an example of virtue or holiness set out in history. Such an example does not make the autonomy of virtue, arising from our own original *a priori* idea of morality, dispensable or turn it into a mechanism of imitation. *Following*, referring to a precedent, rather than imitation, is the correct expression for any influence the works of an exemplary creator can have on others. This means only drawing from the same sources from which that person drew, and learning from a predecessor only how to go about it. But among all powers and talents, taste is precisely the one most in need of examples of what has won the longest-lasting approval as culture advances. For its judgment cannot be determined by concepts and precepts, and without such examples it would soon become uncouth again and fall back into the crudeness of its first attempts.

33 [A 140] [284] *The second peculiarity of a judgment of taste.*

A judgment of taste cannot be determined by proofs at all, as though it were merely *subjective*.

First, if someone does not find a building, a view, or a poem beautiful, a hundred voices praising it highly cannot force inward approval on them. They may pretend to like it too, to avoid being thought tasteless. They may even begin to doubt whether they have sufficiently developed their taste through acquaintance with enough objects of a certain kind. This is like someone who thinks they see a forest in the distance, while everyone else sees a town, and so doubts their own eyesight. Yet they clearly recognize that other people's approval provides no valid proof for judging beauty. Others may perhaps see and observe for them, and what many have seen in the same way may serve as sufficient proof for a theoretical, hence logical, judgment by someone who thinks they saw it differently. But what pleased others can never serve as the ground of an aesthetic judgment. Other people's judgment against ours can rightly make us hesitate about [A 141] our own, but can never convince us that it is incorrect. So there is no empirical *proof* by which to force a judgment of taste on anyone.

Second, still less can an *a priori* proof according to definite rules determine a judgment about beauty. If someone reads me their poem or takes me to a play that ultimately does not suit my taste, they may cite *Batteux* or *Lessing*, or still older and more famous critics of taste, and all the rules they have established, to prove that the poem is beautiful. Certain passages that displease me may even agree perfectly with rules of beauty as given there and generally acknowledged. I stop my ears, refuse to hear arguments or reasoning, and would sooner assume those critics' rules are false, or at least inapplicable here, than allow my judgment to be determined by *a priori* proofs [285]. For it is supposed to be a judgment of taste, not of understanding or reason.

This seems to be one of the main reasons this aesthetic power of judgment has been given precisely the name taste. Someone may list all the ingredients [A 142] of a dish and point out that I otherwise find each of them agreeable. They may also rightly praise how healthy the food is. But I am deaf to all these arguments, try the dish on *my own* tongue and palate, and judge accordingly, not by universal principles.

In fact, a judgment of taste is always made as a singular judgment about an object. By comparing the object in respect of what pleases with other people's judgments, understanding can make a universal judgment, such as "All tulips are beautiful." But this is then not a judgment of taste but a logical judgment, which makes an object's relation to taste a predicate of things of a certain kind in general. Only the judgment through which I find a particular given tulip beautiful—that is, find my satisfaction in it universally valid—is a judgment of taste. Its peculiarity consists in this: although it has only subjective validity, it nevertheless lays claim to *all* subjects as fully as it possibly could if it were an objective judgment resting on grounds of cognition and enforceable through proof.

34 [A 143] *No objective principle of taste is possible.*

A principle of taste would mean a basic rule under whose condition we could subsume the concept of an object, then infer that it was beautiful. But this is absolutely impossible. For I must feel pleasure immediately in the representation of it, and no proofs can talk me into that pleasure. So although critics, as *Hume* says, can reason more plausibly than cooks, they share the same fate. They cannot expect the determining ground of their judgment from the force of proofs, but only from the [286] subject's reflection on their own state of pleasure or displeasure, rejecting all precepts and rules.

Yet critics can and should reason in a way that corrects and broadens our judgments of taste. This does not mean stating the determining ground of this kind of aesthetic judgment in a universally usable formula, which is impossible. Rather, it means investigating the cognitive powers and their activities in these judgments, and explaining through examples their reciprocal subjective purposiveness [A 144]. We showed above that the form of this purposiveness in a given representation is the beauty of its object. So the critique of taste is itself only subjective regarding the representation through which an object is given to us. It is the art or science of bringing under rules the mutual relation of understanding and imagination in the given representation, without reference to a preceding sensation or concept, and thus their agreement or disagreement,

and determining their conditions. It is *art* when it shows this only through examples. It is *science* when it derives the possibility of such judgment from the nature of these powers as cognitive powers in general. Here we are concerned throughout only with the latter, as transcendental critique. It is to develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an *a priori* principle of judgment. Critique as art merely seeks to apply to the judgment of objects the physiological—here psychological—and thus empirical rules by which taste actually proceeds, without reflecting on their possibility. It criticizes the products of fine art, whereas *transcendental critique* criticizes the very power of judging them.

35 [A 145] *The principle of taste is the subjective principle of judgment in general.*
A judgment of taste differs from a logical judgment in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, while the former does not subsume it under a concept at all. Otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. Yet it resembles the logical judgment in claiming universality and [287] necessity, though not according to concepts of the object, and therefore only subjectively. Now concepts in a judgment constitute its content, what belongs to cognition of the object. But a judgment of taste cannot be determined through concepts, so it rests only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the ability to judge itself, or the power of judgment. Used in relation to a representation through which an object is given, this requires agreement between two powers of representation: imagination, for intuition and the composition of its manifold, and understanding, for the concept representing the unity of this composition. Since no concept of the object underlies the judgment here, it can consist only in subsuming imagination [A 146] itself, in a representation through which an object is given, under the condition that understanding in general proceeds from intuition to concepts. That is, imagination's freedom consists precisely in its schematizing without a concept. So a judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of imagination in its *freedom* and understanding in its *lawfulness*, each enlivening the other. It thus rests on a feeling that allows us to judge the object by the purposiveness of the representation through

which it is given for promoting the cognitive powers in their free play. Taste, as subjective judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, but not of intuitions under *concepts*. It subsumes the *power* of intuitions or presentations, imagination, under the power of concepts, understanding, insofar as the former *in its freedom* agrees with the latter *in its lawfulness*.

To discover this rightful basis through a deduction of judgments of taste, we can be guided only by the formal peculiarities of this kind of judgment, and thus by considering merely their logical form.

36 [A 147] *The task of a deduction of judgments of taste.*

The perception of an object can be connected immediately, in a cognitive judgment, with the concept of an object in general whose empirical [288] predicates the perception contains. This produces a judgment of experience. It rests on *a priori* concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition, so that we can think it as the determination of an object. These concepts, the categories, require a deduction, which was also provided in the Critique of Pure Reason. This made it possible to solve the problem: How are synthetic cognitive judgments *a priori* possible? That problem thus concerned the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.

But a perception can also be connected immediately with a feeling of pleasure or displeasure and a satisfaction that accompanies the representation of the object and serves as its predicate. This gives rise to an aesthetic judgment, which is not a cognitive judgment. If such a judgment is not merely one of sensation but a formal judgment of reflection demanding this satisfaction from everyone as necessary, it must have something as an *a priori* principle [A 148] underlying it. This may perhaps be merely subjective, if an objective principle is impossible for this kind of judgment. But even as subjective it requires a deduction, to make it comprehensible how an aesthetic judgment can claim necessity. This is the basis of the problem now occupying us: How are judgments of taste possible? This problem thus concerns the *a priori* principles of pure judgment in

aesthetic judgments. Here judgment does not merely subsume under objective concepts of understanding and stand under a law, as in theoretical judgments. Rather, it is subjectively both object and law to itself.

The problem can also be put this way: How is a judgment possible that, merely from one's *own* feeling of pleasure in an object and independently of its concept, judges *a priori* that this pleasure attaches to the representation of that same object *in every other subject*—without having to wait for others' agreement?

It is easy to see that judgments of taste are synthetic. They go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object and add as a predicate something that is not even cognition: the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Their claim also already implies that, although the predicate, one's *own* pleasure connected with the representation, is empirical [A 149], they are nevertheless *a priori* judgments, or wish to be regarded as such, concerning the agreement demanded *from everyone* [289]. So this task of the critique of judgment belongs under the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?

37 *What is actually asserted a priori about an object in a judgment of taste?*

That the representation of an object is immediately connected with pleasure can be perceived only inwardly. If we meant to state nothing more than this, it would yield a merely empirical judgment. For I cannot connect a definite feeling of pleasure or displeasure with any representation *a priori*, except where an *a priori* principle determining the will lies in reason. In that case pleasure, in moral feeling, is its consequence. But for that very reason it cannot be compared at all with pleasure in taste, because it requires a definite concept of a law. Pleasure in taste, by contrast, is supposed to be connected immediately with mere judging, before any concept. So all judgments of taste are singular judgments [A 150], because they connect their predicate of satisfaction not with a concept but with a given singular empirical representation.

So what a judgment of taste represents *a priori* as a universal rule of judgment valid for everyone is not the pleasure itself, but the *universal validity of this pleasure*, which we perceive in the mind as connected with merely judging an object. That I perceive and judge an object with pleasure is an empirical judgment. But that I find it beautiful—that I may demand this satisfaction from everyone as necessary—is an *a priori* judgment.

38 *Deduction of judgments of taste.*

Suppose we grant that in a pure judgment of taste satisfaction in the object is connected with merely judging its form. Then what we feel connected with the representation of the object in our mind is nothing other than the subjective purposiveness [290] of that form for judgment. Now with regard to the formal rules of judging, without any matter, whether sensory sensation or concept, judgment can be directed only toward the subjective [A 151] conditions of the use of judgment in general, which is limited neither to a particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding. It is therefore directed toward that subjective element which we may presuppose in all people as required for possible cognition in general. So we must be able to assume *a priori* that the agreement of a representation with these conditions of judgment is valid for everyone. That is, we may rightly demand from everyone the pleasure, or subjective purposiveness of the representation, for the relation of the cognitive powers in judging a sensible object in general[12].

Remark. [A 152]

This deduction is so easy because it need not justify the objective reality of a concept. Beauty is not a concept of an object, and a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment. It asserts only that we are entitled to presuppose universally in every person the same subjective conditions of judgment that we find in ourselves, and further only that we have correctly subsumed the given object under these conditions. This last step does have unavoidable difficulties not attached to logical judgment. In logical judgment we subsume under concepts, whereas in aesthetic judgment we subsume under a [291] merely felt relation of imagination and understanding agreeing with one another in the represented

form of the object. Here subsumption can easily deceive us. Yet this takes nothing away from the legitimacy of judgment's claim to count on universal agreement. That claim amounts only to judging the correctness of the principle from subjective grounds as valid for everyone. The difficulty and doubt about whether subsumption under that principle is correct no more call into question the legitimacy of an aesthetic judgment's claim to this validity in general, and therefore the principle itself, than the likewise fallible subsumption of logical judgment under its principle can make that objective principle doubtful, though mistakes there occur less often and less easily. But if the question were "How is it possible to assume *a priori* that nature is a totality of objects of taste?", this problem would concern teleology. For we would have to regard producing forms purposive for our judgment as an end of nature [A 153] essentially attached to its concept. But the correctness of this assumption remains very doubtful, while the actuality of natural beauties lies open to experience.

39 *The communicability of a sensation.*

When sensation, as what is real in perception, is related to cognition, it is called sensory sensation. The specific character of its quality can be represented as communicable in exactly the same way to everyone only if we assume that everyone has a sense like ours. But we cannot simply presuppose this of a sensory sensation. Thus this kind of sensation cannot be communicated to someone who lacks the sense of smell. Even if they do not lack it, we cannot be sure they have exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have. Still greater differences must be assumed between people concerning the *agreeableness* or *disagreeableness* of the sensation of the very same object of the senses. We simply cannot demand that everyone acknowledge pleasure in such objects. Since pleasure of this [292] kind enters the mind through sense, so that we are passive in it, we may call it the pleasure of *enjoyment*.

Satisfaction in an action because of its moral character [A 154], by contrast, is not a pleasure of enjoyment, but of self-activity and its conformity with the idea of one's vocation. But this feeling, called moral feeling, requires concepts

and presents not free but lawful purposiveness. So it can be communicated universally only through reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind in everyone, through very definite practical concepts of reason.

Pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of reasoning contemplation, also claims universal participation. Yet it already presupposes another feeling: the feeling of one's supersensible vocation. However obscure this may be, it has a moral basis. But I am not entitled simply to presuppose that other people will attend to this and find satisfaction in contemplating nature's rugged magnitude. This satisfaction certainly cannot be attributed to its appearance, which is more likely to repel. Nevertheless, since those moral predispositions ought to be attended to on every suitable occasion, I can demand this satisfaction from everyone too. But I can do so only through the moral law, which in turn is based on concepts of reason.

By contrast, pleasure in the beautiful is a pleasure neither of enjoyment nor [A 155] of lawful activity, nor of reasoning contemplation according to ideas, but of mere reflection. Without any end or principle as a guide, this pleasure accompanies the ordinary apprehension of an object by imagination, the power of intuition, in relation to understanding, the power of concepts. This occurs through a procedure of judgment that it must also exercise for the sake of the most ordinary experience. The difference is that in experience it must do this to obtain an empirical objective concept, whereas in aesthetic judgment it must do so merely to perceive the representation's adequacy for the harmonious, subjectively purposive activity of both cognitive powers in their freedom—that is, to feel the representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must necessarily rest on the same conditions in everyone, because they are subjective conditions of the possibility of cognition in general. And the proportion of these [293] cognitive powers required for taste is also required for ordinary, sound understanding, which we may presuppose in everyone. For this very reason, someone judging with taste may demand this subjective purposiveness, that is, [A 156] their satisfaction in the object, from everyone else, and assume their

feeling is universally communicable without the mediation of concepts—provided only that they are not mistaken in this awareness, and do not take matter for form or charm for beauty.

40 *Taste as a kind of sensus communis, or common sense.*

We often call judgment a sense when what stands out is not so much its reflection as merely its result. We speak of a sense of truth, of propriety, of justice, and so on. Yet we know, or at least ought to know, that these concepts cannot have their seat in a sense, still less that a sense has the slightest ability to pronounce universal rules. No representation of this kind—truth, propriety, beauty, or justice—could ever enter our thoughts if we could not rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers. *Common human understanding*, regarded as merely sound and not yet cultivated understanding, is considered the least we can possibly expect from someone claiming the name of human being. It therefore also has the insulting honor of being called common sense, *sensus communis*. Here the word *common*—not only in our language, which really contains an ambiguity [A 157] here, but in many others—is understood as meaning the *vulgar*, what is found everywhere and whose possession is no merit or distinction at all.

But by *sensus communis*, common sense, we must understand the idea of a *shared* sense: a power of judgment that in its reflection takes account in thought, *a priori*, of everyone else's way of representing. It thus holds its judgment, *as it were*, up to human reason as a whole, avoiding the illusion that would harmfully influence judgment through subjective private conditions easily mistaken for objective ones. [294] We do this by comparing our judgment not so much with others' actual judgments as with their merely possible ones, and putting ourselves in everyone else's position. We abstract only from the limitations that happen to attach to our own judgment. We do this in turn by leaving out, as far as possible, what is matter in our representational state—that is, sensation—and attending only to the formal peculiarities of our representation or representational state. This reflective operation may seem too artificial to attribute to the power we call *common* sense. But it seems so [A 158] only

when expressed in abstract formulas. In itself nothing is more natural than abstracting from charm and emotion when seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule.

The following maxims of common human understanding do not belong here as parts of the critique of taste, but can serve to explain its principles. They are: 1. Think for oneself; 2. Think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always think consistently with oneself. The first is the maxim of an *unprejudiced*, the second of an *enlarged*, and the third of a *consistent* way of thinking. The first is the maxim of a reason that is never *passive*. The tendency toward passivity, and thus toward heteronomy of reason, is called *prejudice*. The greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to rules that understanding lays down for it through its own essential law: that is, *superstition*. Liberation from superstition is called *enlightenment*[13]. Although this name also applies to liberation from prejudices in general, superstition especially deserves to be called a prejudice (*in sensu* [A 159] *eminenti*, in the highest sense). For the blindness into which superstition puts us, and even demands as a duty, [295] makes especially clear our need to be guided by others, and thus the state of passive reason. As for the second maxim, we ordinarily call someone limited—*narrow-minded*, the opposite of *enlarged*—whose talents do not suffice for any great use, especially an intensive use. But here we are speaking not of the power of cognition, but of the *way of thinking* that makes purposive use of it. However small the range and degree of a person's natural gifts, they still display an *enlarged way of thinking* if they rise above the subjective private conditions of judgment within which so many others remain confined, and reflect on their own judgment from a *universal standpoint*. They can determine this standpoint only by putting themselves in others' positions. The third maxim, that of a *consistent* [A 160] way of thinking, is the hardest to attain. It can be reached only by combining the first two and following them often enough to turn this into an acquired skill. We can say that the first is the maxim of understanding, the second of judgment, and the third of reason.—

I return to the thread interrupted by this digression and say that taste can more rightly be called *sensus communis* than sound understanding can. Aesthetic judgment, rather than intellectual judgment, can bear the name of a shared sense[14], if we are willing to use the word sense for an effect of mere reflection on the mind. For then sense means the feeling of pleasure. We could even define taste as the power of judging what makes our feeling in a given representation *universally communicable* without the mediation of a concept.

People's ability to communicate their thoughts also requires a relation between imagination and understanding, to associate intuitions with concepts and concepts in turn with intuitions, [A 161] so that they come together in cognition. But then the agreement of the two mental powers is *lawful*, under the constraint of definite [296] concepts. Only where imagination in its freedom awakens understanding, and understanding without concepts puts imagination into a regular play, is the representation communicated not as a thought but as an inner feeling of a purposive state of mind.

Taste is therefore the power to judge *a priori* the communicability of feelings connected with a given representation without the mediation of a concept.

If we could assume that the mere universal communicability of our feeling must itself already involve an interest for us, we could explain why the feeling in a judgment of taste is demanded from everyone almost as a duty. But we are not entitled to infer this from the nature of a merely reflective power of judgment.

41 *The empirical interest in the beautiful.*

We have sufficiently shown above that the judgment of taste declaring something beautiful must have no interest *as its determining ground*. But it does not follow that once it has been made as a [A 162] pure aesthetic judgment, no interest can be connected with it. This connection can always be only indirect. Taste must first be represented as connected with something else, so that satisfaction in merely reflecting on an object can be joined to a *pleasure in its existence*, which is what all interest consists in. For here the same holds for an aesthetic judgment as is said of a cognitive judgment about things in general: *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*, we cannot validly infer actuality from possi-

bility. This other thing can be empirical, an inclination belonging to human nature, or intellectual, a property of the will by which it can be determined *a priori* through reason. Both contain a satisfaction in an object's existence, and so can ground an interest in what has already pleased on its own, without reference to any interest.

Empirically, the beautiful interests us only in *society*. If we admit that the drive toward society is natural to human beings, and that fitness and inclination for it—*sociability*—are required [297] of human beings as creatures destined for society, and thus belong to *humanity*, then we cannot fail to regard taste as a power of judging [A 163] everything through which we can communicate even our *feeling* to everyone else. We will thus regard it as a means of promoting what everyone's natural inclination demands.

Alone, someone abandoned on a deserted island would adorn neither their hut nor themselves, nor seek flowers, still less plant them, to decorate themselves. Only in society do they think of being not merely human but also refined in their own way: the beginning of civilization. For we judge someone refined when they are inclined and able to communicate their pleasure to others, and are not satisfied with an object unless they can feel satisfaction in it in company with others. Everyone also expects and demands that everyone else consider universal communication, as if under an original contract dictated by humanity itself. So at first only charms become important in society: colors for painting oneself, such as annatto among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois; or flowers, shells, and beautifully colored bird feathers. In time beautiful forms too, as on canoes, clothes, and so on, become important and connected with great interest, even though they bring no gratification, that is, no satisfaction of mere enjoyment. Finally civilization at its highest point [A 164] makes this almost the main occupation of refined inclination, and sensations are valued only insofar as they can be universally communicated. Then, although the pleasure each person takes in such an object is slight and in itself without noticeable interest, the idea of its universal communicability increases its value almost infinitely.

But this empirical interest, attached indirectly to the beautiful through our inclination toward society, has no importance for us here. We need attend only to what may have an *a priori* relation to a judgment of taste, even if only indirectly. For if an interest connected with it were discovered in this form too, taste would reveal a transition in our power of judgment from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling. This would not only better guide us [298] in giving taste a purposive occupation. It would also display a link in the chain of human *a priori* powers, on which all legislation must depend. We can certainly say this much about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste itself: since taste serves inclination, however refined, it readily merges [A 165] with all the inclinations and passions that reach their greatest variety and highest degree in society. An interest in the beautiful based on this can provide only a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good. But we have reason to investigate whether taste, taken in its purity, might nevertheless promote this transition.

42 *The intellectual interest in the beautiful.*

Those who wanted to direct all the activities prompted by human beings' inner natural predisposition toward humanity's final end, the morally good, had good intentions in regarding interest in the beautiful in general as a sign of good moral character. But others have objected, not without reason. They appeal to experience: virtuosos of taste are not only often but perhaps even usually vain, willful, and devoted to corrupting passions, and may be still less entitled than others to claim the distinction of attachment to moral principles. It thus seems that the feeling for beauty is not only specifically different from moral feeling, as it really is, but that the interest we can connect with it is also difficult to reconcile with moral interest [A 166], and certainly not reconcilable through any inner affinity.

I readily admit that interest in the *beauty of art*, including the artificial use of natural beauties for adornment and thus vanity, gives no evidence of a way of thinking attached to the morally good or even inclined toward it. But I maintain that taking an *immediate interest* in the beauty of *nature*, not merely having the taste to judge it, is always a sign of a good soul. And [299] if this interest

is habitual, it at least indicates a state of mind favorable to moral feeling when it readily joins with the *contemplation of nature*. But remember that here I really mean nature's beautiful *forms*. I am still setting aside the *charms* that nature usually combines with them so richly, because interest in these, though also immediate, is empirical.

Someone who alone, and with no intention of communicating their observations to others, contemplates the beautiful shape of a wildflower, bird, insect, and so on, to admire and love it, and would not willingly have it absent from nature altogether, takes an immediate and indeed intellectual interest [A 167] in nature's beauty—even if it caused them some harm, with no apparent benefit from it. That is, not only the form of nature's product but also its existence pleases them, without any part being played by sensory charm or any end being connected with it.

But it is noteworthy that if someone had secretly deceived this lover of beauty by planting artificial flowers, which can be made entirely like natural ones, or placing artificially carved birds on tree branches, and the person then discovered the deception, their previous immediate interest would disappear at once. Perhaps another interest would take its place: the vanity of decorating their room with these objects for other people's eyes. The thought that nature has produced this beauty must accompany intuition and reflection. On this thought alone rests our immediate interest in it. Otherwise what remains is either a mere judgment of taste without any interest, or one connected only with an indirect interest relating to society. The latter gives no reliable indication of a morally good way of thinking.

Natural beauty has this advantage over artistic beauty: even if artistic beauty surpasses it in form, natural beauty alone [A 168] can awaken an immediate interest. This agrees with the purified and thorough way of thinking of all who have cultivated their moral feeling. Suppose someone has enough taste to judge products of fine art with the greatest correctness and subtlety [300], yet readily leaves the room containing beauties that sustain vanity and perhaps social pleasures, and turns to nature's beauty. Here they find, as it were, delight for their spirit in a train of thought they can never fully unfold. We will regard this

choice itself with respect and assume a beautiful soul in them. No art connoisseur or lover can claim this merely because of the interest taken in their objects. —What, then, accounts for such different estimates of two kinds of objects that could scarcely dispute each other's standing in the judgment of mere taste?

We have a merely aesthetic power of judgment that judges forms without concepts and finds satisfaction in merely judging them. We also make this satisfaction a rule for everyone, although the judgment neither rests on nor produces an interest.—On the other hand, we also have an intellectual power of judgment that determines *a priori* a satisfaction in the mere forms of practical maxims, insofar as they qualify by themselves for universal legislation [A 169]. We make this a law for everyone, although our judgment rests on no interest, *yet produces one*. The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is called that of taste; in the second, that of moral feeling.

But reason is also interested in the objective reality of the ideas in which it produces an immediate interest through moral feeling. That is, reason wants nature at least to show a trace or give a hint that it contains some ground for assuming a lawful agreement of its products with our satisfaction independent of all interest. We recognize this satisfaction *a priori* as a law for everyone, without being able to base it on proofs. So reason must take an interest in every sign from nature of an agreement resembling this. Consequently, the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of *nature* without also finding itself interested in it. By its affinity, however, this interest is moral. Someone who takes it in nature's beauty can do so only insofar as they have already firmly grounded their interest in the morally good. So where nature's beauty [301] interests someone immediately, we have reason to suspect at least a predisposition [A 170] toward a good moral disposition.

People will say this interpretation of aesthetic judgments through their relation to moral feeling looks too contrived to be the true reading of the cipher in which nature speaks figuratively to us through its beautiful forms. But first, this immediate interest in natural beauty is in fact not common. It belongs only to those whose way of thinking is either already developed toward the good or especially receptive to such development. Second, there is an analogy between a

pure judgment of taste, which lets us feel a satisfaction independent of any interest and at the same time represents it *a priori* as fitting for humanity in general, and a moral judgment, which does exactly the same through concepts. Even without clear, subtle, deliberate reflection, this analogy leads to a similar immediate interest in the object of the first as in that of the second. The only difference is that the first is a free interest and the second is based on objective laws. Added to this is admiration for nature, which in its beautiful products shows itself as art, not merely by chance but as if intentionally, according to a lawful arrangement and as purposiveness without an end. Since we find this end nowhere outside us, we naturally seek it within ourselves, and specifically in [A 171] what constitutes the final end of our existence: our moral vocation. This inquiry into the ground of the possibility of such natural purposiveness will first be discussed in teleology.

It is also easy to explain why satisfaction in fine art in a pure judgment of taste is not connected with an immediate interest in the same way as satisfaction in beautiful nature. Fine art is either an imitation of nature carried to the point of deception, in which case it has the effect of natural beauty because it is taken for such, or it is art visibly and intentionally directed toward our satisfaction. In the latter case satisfaction in the product would indeed arise immediately through taste, but would awaken only an indirect interest in its underlying cause: an art that can interest us only through its end, never in itself. Someone may say this is also the case when a natural object interests us through its beauty only insofar [302] as a moral idea is associated with it. But what interests us immediately is not this association. It is nature's own character, which qualifies it for such an association, a capacity that therefore belongs to it inwardly.

The charms in beautiful nature, so often found seemingly blended with beautiful form, belong either [A 172] to modifications of light, in coloring, or of sound, in tones. For these are the only sensations that allow not just sensory feeling but also reflection on the form of these modifications of the senses. Thus they contain, as it were, a language nature addresses to us that seems to have a higher meaning. The lily's white color seems to dispose the mind toward

ideas of innocence. In the order of the seven colors from red to violet, the colors seem to dispose it toward the ideas of 1) sublimity, 2) boldness, 3) candor, 4) friendliness, 5) modesty, 6) constancy, and 7) tenderness. Birds' song proclaims joy and contentment with their existence. At least this is how we interpret nature, whether or not it intends anything of the kind. But this interest we take in beauty absolutely requires it to be natural beauty. It disappears entirely once we notice we have been deceived and it is only art—so much so that taste can then find nothing beautiful in it, nor sight anything charming. What do poets praise more highly than the enchantingly beautiful song of the nightingale in a lonely thicket on a quiet summer evening in soft moonlight? Yet there are examples of a cheerful innkeeper, where no such singer was to be found [A 173], deceiving guests who had come to enjoy the country air, to their great satisfaction. He hid a mischievous lad in a thicket who could imitate the song exactly like nature with a reed or tube in his mouth. But as soon as people realize it is a trick, nobody will long endure listening to the song previously thought so charming. The same holds for every other songbird. It must be nature, or taken by us to be nature, for us to take an immediate *interest* in the beautiful as such. This is even more necessary if we are entitled to expect others to take such an interest, as we actually do [303] when we regard the way of thinking of people without any *feeling* for beautiful nature as crude and ignoble. By feeling we mean receptivity to an interest in contemplating nature. Such people stick to enjoying mere sensory sensations over a meal or a bottle.

43 *Art in general.*

1) *Art* is distinguished from *nature* as making (*facere*) is distinguished from acting or working in general (*agere*). The product or consequence of the first is a *work* (*opus*), distinguished from the consequence of the second as an effect (*effectus*). [A 174]

Strictly, only production through freedom should be called art: through a power of choice that bases its actions on reason. People may like to call what bees produce—their regularly built wax combs—a work of art, but only by

analogy with art. As soon as we recall that bees do not base their work on rational deliberation of their own, we immediately say it is a product of their nature, their instinct. It is attributed as art only to their creator.

If, while searching a peat bog, we find a piece of carved wood, as has sometimes happened, we do not call it a product of nature but of art. Its producing cause conceived an end to which the wood owes its form. We also see art in anything made in such a way that a representation of it must have preceded its actuality in its cause, as even with bees, without the cause having had to *think* the effect. But when we simply call something a work of art to distinguish it from an effect of nature, we always mean a work of human beings.

2) *Art*, as human skill, is also distinguished from [A 175] *science—being able* from *knowing*—as practical from theoretical ability, technique from theory, as surveying is distinguished from geometry. What we *can do* as soon as we *know* what should be done, and thus merely know the desired effect sufficiently, is not on that account called art. Only what we do not immediately have the skill to make [304] simply by knowing it, even knowing it most completely, belongs to art to that extent. *Camper* describes very precisely what the best shoe should be like, but he certainly could not make one[15].

3) *Art* is also distinguished from *craft*. The first is called *free* art, while the second can also be called *paid* art. We regard the first as capable of being purposive, or succeeding, only as play: an occupation agreeable in itself. We regard the second as labor: an occupation disagreeable or burdensome in itself, attractive only through its result, such as pay, and therefore capable of being compulsorily [A 176] imposed. Whether watchmakers should count as artists and blacksmiths as craftsmen in the ranking of guilds requires a different standpoint of judgment from ours here: the proportion of talents that must underlie either occupation. I will not discuss whether among the so-called seven liberal arts some should be counted as sciences and others compared to crafts. But it is worth remembering that all free arts nevertheless require something compulsory, or, as it is called, a *mechanism*. Without it the *spirit*, which must be *free* in art and alone brings the work to life, would have no body and would evaporate completely. Examples in poetry are correctness and richness of language, as well

as prosody and meter. This reminder matters because some modern educators believe they best promote a free art by removing all constraint and changing it from labor into mere play.

44 *Fine art.*

There is no science of the beautiful, only a critique; and no beautiful science, only fine art. As for the first [A 177], such a science would have to decide scientifically, through proofs, [305] whether something should be regarded as beautiful. A judgment about beauty, if it belonged to science, would therefore not be a judgment of taste. As for the second, a science that is supposed to be beautiful as such is an absurdity. For if we asked it for reasons and proofs as a science, it would put us off with tasteful sayings and witty remarks.—The familiar expression *fine sciences* was undoubtedly prompted by a perfectly correct observation: fine art in its full perfection requires much scientific knowledge, such as knowledge of ancient languages, wide reading of authors regarded as classics, history, knowledge of antiquities, and so on. Because these historical sciences form the necessary preparation and basis for fine art, and partly because they include knowledge of the products of fine art themselves—eloquence and poetry—people confused the words and called them fine sciences.

If art, in accordance with the *cognition* of a possible object, merely performs the actions required to make it actual, it is *mechanical*. But if its immediate aim is the feeling of pleasure, it is called *aesthetic* art. This is either [A 178] *agreeable* or *fine* art. It is agreeable when its end is that pleasure accompany representations as mere *sensations*, and fine when pleasure is to accompany them as *modes of cognition*.

Agreeable arts are those aimed merely at enjoyment. They include all the attractions that can entertain company at table: telling entertaining stories, putting the company into a frank and lively conversational mood, and using joking and laughter to put it into a certain cheerful tone. In this mood, as people say, much can be casually talked about over drinks, and nobody wants to be held responsible for what they say. The aim is only momentary entertainment, not lasting material for reflection or repetition. This also includes how the table is

furnished for enjoyment, or even, at large banquets, the dinner music: a curious thing intended only as agreeable noise to sustain a cheerful state of mind. Without anyone paying the slightest attention to its composition, it encourages free conversation between neighbors. [306] Also included are all games that involve no further interest than making time pass unnoticed.

Fine art, by contrast, is a way of representing that is purposive in itself [A 179] and, though without an end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of mental powers for social communication.

The very concept of the universal communicability of a pleasure implies that this must be a pleasure not of enjoyment from mere sensation, but of reflection. So aesthetic art as fine art takes reflective judgment, not sensory sensation, as its standard.

45 *Fine art is art insofar as it also seems to be nature.*

In a product of fine art we must be aware that it is art, not nature. Yet the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. This feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive powers, which must nevertheless also be purposive, grounds the only pleasure that is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature was beautiful when it also looked like art; art can be called beautiful only when we are aware that it is art and yet it looks like nature to us.

For we can say universally, whether of natural or artistic beauty [A 180]: *beautiful is what pleases in merely being judged*, not in sensory sensation or through a concept. Now art always has a definite intention to produce something. If this were mere sensation, something merely subjective, which was to be accompanied by pleasure, the product would please in judgment only through sensory feeling. If the intention aimed at producing a definite object, then when art achieved it the object would please only through concepts. In both cases, however, art would please not *in merely being judged*, and thus not as fine art but as mechanical art.

So purposiveness in a product of fine art, though [307] intentional, must not seem intentional. That is, fine art must *look like* nature, although we are aware of it as art. An artistic product appears as nature when it shows all the *precision* in agreeing with rules by which alone it can become what it is supposed to be, but without *laboriousness*, without letting the academic form show through. It must show no trace that the rule hovered before the artist's eyes and put fetters on their mental powers.

46 [A 181] *Fine art is the art of genius.*

Genius is the talent, or natural gift, that gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the artist's inborn productive power, itself belongs to nature, we could also put it this way: *Genius* is the inborn mental predisposition (*ingenium*) *through which* nature gives the rule to art.

Whatever the status of this definition, whether it is merely arbitrary or agrees with the concept usually connected with the word *genius*—a question to be discussed in the next section—we can already prove that, in the meaning of the word adopted here, fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of *genius*.

For every art presupposes rules. Only by laying these down as a basis can a product, if it is to be called artistic, be represented as possible. But the concept of fine art does not allow the judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule that has a *concept* as its determining ground, and thus is based on a concept of how the product is possible. So fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring its product [A 182] about. Yet without a preceding rule a product can never be called art. Therefore nature in the subject, through the attunement of the subject's powers, must give the rule to art. That is, fine art is possible only as a product of genius.

From this we see: 1) Genius is a *talent* for producing what no definite rule can be given for, not an aptitude for learning something by some rule. [308] So *originality* must be its first property. 2) Since there can also be original nonsense, its products must also be models, that is, *exemplary*. Though not themselves arising through imitation, they must serve others as a standard or rule of judgment. 3) Genius cannot itself describe or scientifically explain how it pro-

duces its work; rather, it gives the rule as *nature*. So the creator of a product owed to genius does not themselves know how the ideas for it arise in them. Nor is it in their power to devise such ideas at will or according to a plan, and communicate them to others in precepts enabling them to produce similar works. Presumably this is why the word genius derives from *genius*, the particular protecting and guiding spirit given to a person at birth [A 183], whose inspiration was the source of those original ideas. 4) Through genius, nature prescribes the rule not to science but to art, and even there only insofar as the art is to be fine art.

47 *Explanation and confirmation of the above account of genius.*

Everyone agrees that genius must be set entirely against the *spirit of imitation*. Since learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest ability to learn, or capacity, cannot as such count as genius. But even if someone thinks or creates for themselves, rather than merely grasping what others have thought, and even makes many discoveries for art and science, this is still not the proper ground for calling such an often great *mind* a *genius*. Such a mind contrasts with someone called a *blockhead* because they can never do more than learn and imitate. For those discoveries too *could have* been learned, and thus lie on the natural path of inquiry and reflection according to rules. They are not specifically different from what diligence can acquire through imitation. Thus we can certainly learn everything *Newton* presented in his immortal Principles of Natural Philosophy, however great a mind [A 184] was required to discover such things. But we cannot learn to write inspired poetry, however detailed [309] all the precepts for poetry and however excellent its models may be. The reason is that Newton could make all the steps he had to take, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, fully clear to intuition, not only to himself but to everyone else, showing them precisely how to follow his steps. Yet no *Homer* or *Wieland* can explain how their ideas, rich in imagination yet also full of thought, arise and come together in their mind. They do not know this themselves and so cannot teach it to anyone else. In science, then, the greatest discoverer differs only in degree from the most laborious imitator and appren-

tice, but differs specifically from someone nature has gifted for fine art. This does not lower those great men, to whom humanity owes so much, beneath nature's favorites in talent for fine art. Their talent has a great advantage precisely because it is suited to an ever-advancing perfection of knowledge, to all the benefit dependent on it, and to teaching others the same knowledge. For those who deserve the honor of being called geniuses, art comes to a standstill somewhere [A 185], since a limit is set to it beyond which it cannot go, a limit presumably reached long ago that cannot be extended further. Moreover, such skill cannot be communicated. It must be bestowed on each person directly by nature's hand, and so dies with them, until nature again gifts someone else in the same way. This person needs only an example to let the talent of which they are aware work in a similar way.

Since the natural gift must give the rule to art as fine art, what kind of rule is it? It cannot be stated in a formula to serve as a precept, since then judgment about the beautiful could be determined by concepts. Rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, the product, by which others may test their own talent, using it as a model not for *copying* but for *imitation*. How this is possible is hard to explain. The artist's ideas arouse similar ideas in their pupil if nature has provided the pupil with a similar proportion of mental powers. So models of fine art are [310] the only means of passing it on to later generations. Mere descriptions could not do this, especially in the arts of speech. And even in these arts, only works [A 186] in ancient, dead languages, now preserved only as learned languages, can become classical.

Mechanical and fine art are very different: the first is merely the art of diligence and learning, the second the art of genius. Yet no fine art lacks something mechanical that can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something *academically correct*, as an essential condition. For something in it must be thought of as an end. Otherwise its product could not be attributed to art at all; it would be a mere product of chance. But carrying out an end requires definite rules from which we may not exempt ourselves. Since originality of talent is one essential feature of genius, though not the only one, shallow minds believe they can best show themselves to be budding geniuses by renouncing

the academic constraint of all rules. They think they cut a better figure on an unruly horse than on a trained one. Genius can supply only rich *material* for products of fine art. Working this material up and giving it *form* requires a talent trained through schooling, to put it to a use that can stand before judgment. But when someone speaks and decides like a genius even in matters requiring the most careful rational investigation [A 187], it is utterly ridiculous. We hardly know whether to laugh more at the charlatan spreading so much fog around them, in which nothing can be clearly judged but all the more can be imagined, or at the public. The public naively imagines its inability to recognize and grasp this masterpiece of insight clearly comes from having new truths thrown at it in great masses, while detailed work through measured explanations and academically correct testing of principles seems mere bungling.

48 [311] *The relation of genius to taste.*

Taste is required to *judge* beautiful objects as such. But *genius* is required for fine art itself, that is, for *producing* such objects.

If we regard genius as talent for fine art, as the word's proper meaning implies, and want to analyze it into the powers that must combine to make up such a talent, we must first determine precisely the difference between natural beauty, whose judgment requires only taste, and artistic beauty, whose possibility requires genius. This possibility must also be considered in judging [A 188] such an object.

A beauty of nature is a *beautiful thing*. Artistic beauty is a *beautiful representation* of a thing.

To judge a natural beauty as such, I do not first need a concept of what sort of thing the object is supposed to be. I do not need to know its material purposiveness, its end. Its mere form, without knowledge of its end, pleases on its own in judgment. But if the object is given as a product of art and is to be declared beautiful as such, then art always presupposes an end in its cause and that cause's causality. So we must first base our judgment on a concept of what the thing is supposed to be. The agreement of the manifold in a thing with an

inner determination of it as an end is the thing's perfection. Thus in judging artistic beauty we must also take the thing's perfection into account, whereas in judging a natural beauty as such this is not in question at all.—Admittedly, when judging especially living objects of nature, such as a human being or a horse, we generally also consider objective purposiveness in judging their beauty [A 189]. But then the judgment is no longer purely aesthetic, a mere judgment of taste. We no longer judge nature as it appears as art, but insofar as it really *is* art, though superhuman art. The teleological judgment serves the aesthetic one as its [312] basis and condition, which it must take into account. In such a case, when we say, for example, "That is a beautiful woman," we really mean nothing other than "In her shape, nature beautifully presents the ends of the female structure." For we must look beyond mere form to a concept, if the object is to be thought in this way through a logically conditioned aesthetic judgment.

Fine art shows its excellence precisely in beautifully describing things that would be ugly or displeasing in nature. The Furies, diseases, the devastations of war, and the like can be very beautifully described as evils, and even represented in painting. Only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented true to nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and thus artistic beauty: that which arouses *disgust*. In this peculiar sensation, based entirely on imagination, the object is represented as if it were forcing itself on us for enjoyment, while we resist it [A 190] violently. So in our sensation the artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished from the nature of the object itself, and the representation then cannot possibly be considered beautiful. Sculpture too, because art in its products is almost confused with nature, has excluded the immediate representation of ugly objects from its creations. Instead it has allowed death, for example, to be represented by a beautiful spirit, and martial courage by Mars, through an allegory or attributes that look pleasing. It thus represents them only indirectly through an interpretation by reason, not for merely aesthetic judgment.

So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is really only the form of presenting a concept through which it is universally communicated.—Giving a product of fine art this form requires only taste. After exercising and correcting taste through many examples of art or nature, the artist measures their work against it, and after many often laborious attempts to satisfy it finds the form that meets its demands. So form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of a free sweep of the mental powers, but of slow and painstaking revision, to make it adequate to the thought [A 191] [313] without harming those powers' freedom in play.

But taste is merely a judging, not a productive, power. What conforms to it is not therefore a work of fine art. It may be a product belonging to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, according to definite rules that can be learned and must be followed exactly. The pleasing form given to it is only the vehicle of communication and, as it were, a manner of presentation. In this respect we remain free to some degree, although otherwise bound to a definite end. Thus we demand that tableware, or a moral treatise, even a sermon, have this form of fine art without seeming *contrived*. But we will not therefore call them works of fine art. A poem, a piece of music, a picture gallery, and the like are counted as fine art. In a supposed work of fine art we can often find genius without taste, and in another taste without genius.

49 [A 192] *The mental powers that constitute genius.*

Of certain products expected to show themselves, at least partly, as fine art, we say they are without *spirit*, although we find nothing to criticize in them as regards taste. A poem can be quite neat and elegant, yet lack spirit. A history is accurate and orderly, but without spirit. A ceremonial speech is thorough and also graceful, but without spirit. Many conversations are entertaining enough, but without spirit. Even of a woman people may say she is pretty, talkative, and pleasant, but without spirit. What, then, does spirit mean here?

In an aesthetic sense, *spirit* means the enlivening principle in the mind. What this principle uses to enliven the soul, the material it employs, is what purposively sets the mental powers in motion, in a play that maintains itself and even

strengthens the powers for it.

Now I maintain that this principle is nothing other than the power [314] to present *aesthetic ideas*. By an aesthetic idea I mean a representation of imagination that prompts much thought, yet to which no definite thought, [A 193] that is, *concept*, can be adequate. Consequently no language can fully reach it and make it intelligible.—We easily see that it is the counterpart of an *idea of reason*, which, conversely, is a concept to which no *intuition*, no representation of imagination, can be adequate.

For imagination, as a productive cognitive power, is very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature out of the material actual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too ordinary. We also reshape experience, still according to laws of analogy, but also according to principles lying higher up in reason. These are as natural to us as the principles by which understanding grasps empirical nature. In doing so we feel our freedom from the law of association attached to imagination's empirical use. Under that law, nature lends us the material, but we can work it up into something entirely different: something surpassing nature.

We can call such representations of imagination *ideas*. One reason is that they at least strive toward something beyond the limits of experience, and so try to approach a presentation of reason's concepts, intellectual ideas. This [A 194] gives them the appearance of an objective reality. The other and main reason is that, as inner intuitions, no concept can be fully adequate to them. The poet ventures to make sensible reason's ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, and the like. Or the poet takes things for which experience does offer examples—death, envy, and all vices, as well as love, fame, and the like—and makes them sensible beyond the limits of experience, in a completeness for which no example exists in nature. This is done through an imagination that emulates reason's example in reaching toward a maximum. It is really in poetry that the power of aesthetic ideas can display itself to its full extent. But considered on its own, this power is really only a talent of imagination.

Now suppose a concept is supplied with a representation of imagination [315] that belongs to its presentation, yet by itself prompts more thought than can ever be comprehended in a definite concept, and thus aesthetically expands the concept itself without limit. Then imagination is creative and sets the power of intellectual ideas, reason, in motion. On the occasion of a representation, it prompts more thought—though belonging to the object's concept—than can be grasped and made clear [A 195] in that representation.

Forms that do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself, but only express, as associated representations of imagination, its connected consequences and relations with other concepts, are called the aesthetic *attributes* of an object whose concept, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented. Thus Jupiter's eagle with lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock of the magnificent queen of heaven. Unlike *logical attributes*, these do not represent what lies in our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation. They represent something else that gives imagination occasion to spread over a multitude of related representations, prompting more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. They supply an *aesthetic idea* that serves the idea of reason in place of a logical presentation, but really serves to enliven the mind by opening up a view into an immeasurable field of related representations. Fine art does this not only in painting or sculpture, where the term attributes is usually used. Poetry and eloquence also draw the spirit that enlivens their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of objects. These accompany logical attributes and give imagination [A 196] an impetus to think more, though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept and thus in a definite linguistic expression.—For brevity I must limit myself to a few examples.

In one of his poems the great king expresses himself this way: "Let us leave life without murmuring and without regret, while still leaving the world heaped with benefits. So the sun, after completing its daily course, still spreads a gentle light across the sky; and the last rays [316] it sends into the air are its last sighs for the world's well-being." He thus enlivens his rational idea of a cosmopolitan disposition even at life's end through an attribute imagination associates with

that representation: the memory of all the pleasures of a completed beautiful summer day that a serene evening calls to mind. This awakens a multitude of sensations and associated representations for which no expression can be found. Conversely, even an intellectual concept can serve as an attribute of a sensory representation and so enliven it through the idea of the supersensible. But it does so only by using the aesthetic element subjectively attached to awareness of that idea. Thus [A 197] a certain poet describing a beautiful morning says: "The sun welled forth, as peace wells forth from virtue." Awareness of virtue, even when we merely put ourselves in thought into the position of a virtuous person, spreads through the mind a multitude of sublime and calming feelings and a boundless prospect of a joyful future. No expression adequate to a definite concept can fully reach these.[16]

In a word, an aesthetic idea is a representation of imagination associated with a given concept. In imagination's free use, it is connected with such a variety of partial representations that no expression signifying a definite concept can be found for it. It thus lets us think, in addition to a concept, much that cannot be named. The feeling of this enlivens the cognitive powers and joins spirit to language as mere letter.

So the mental powers whose union in a certain proportion [A 198] constitutes *genius* are imagination and understanding. But in the use of imagination for cognition, imagination is under understanding's constraint and limited to being adequate to its concept. For an aesthetic purpose [317], however, imagination is free to supply understanding, beyond this agreement with the concept, with abundant undeveloped material, without contrivance, that understanding did not consider in its concept. Understanding applies this material not so much objectively to cognition as subjectively to enlivening the cognitive powers, and thus indirectly also to knowledge. Genius therefore consists in the happy relation that no science can teach and no diligence can learn: finding ideas for a given concept, and on the other side finding for them the *expression* through which the resulting subjective state of mind, as accompaniment to a concept, can be communicated to others. The latter talent is really what we call spirit. For to express what is unnameable in the state of mind during a certain

representation, and make it universally communicable, whether in language, painting, or sculpture, requires a power to grasp imagination's rapidly passing play and unite it in a concept communicable without the constraint of rules. For this very reason the concept is original [A 199] and also opens up a new rule that could not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples.

If, after these analyses, we look back at the account given above of what is called *genius*, we find: *first*, it is a talent for art, not for science, in which clearly known rules must come first and determine the procedure. *Second*, as artistic talent it presupposes a definite concept of the product as an end, and thus understanding, but also a representation, even if indefinite, of the material, the intuition, for presenting this concept, and thus a relation of imagination to understanding. *Third*, it shows itself not so much in carrying out the proposed end by presenting a definite *concept*, as in the presentation or expression of *aesthetic ideas* containing rich material for that purpose. It thus represents imagination as free from all guidance by rules, yet purposive for presenting the given concept. Finally, *fourth*, the uncontrived, unintentional subjective purposiveness [318] in imagination's free agreement with understanding's lawfulness [A 200] presupposes a proportion and attunement of these powers that no following of rules, whether scientific or mechanically imitative, can bring about. Only the subject's nature can produce it.

On these assumptions, genius is the exemplary originality of a subject's natural gift in the *free* use of their cognitive powers. In this way a genius's product, in respect of what is attributable to genius rather than to possible learning or schooling, is an example not for imitation—for then what is genius in it and constitutes the work's spirit would be lost—but for another genius to follow. It awakens this other genius to a feeling of their own originality, to exercise freedom from the constraint of rules in art in such a way that art itself gains a new rule. Through this the talent shows itself to be exemplary. But genius is a favorite of nature and must be regarded as a rare occurrence. So its example produces a school for other capable minds: a methodical instruction according

to rules, as far as these can be drawn from such inspired products and their distinctive character. For these minds fine art is to that extent imitation, to which nature gave the rule through a genius.

But this imitation becomes *aping* when the pupil *copies* everything [A 201], including the defects the genius had to allow because they could not easily be removed without weakening the idea. This courage is a merit in a genius alone. A certain *boldness* of expression, and in general many departures from the ordinary rule, suit genius well, but are by no means worth imitating. They always remain faults in themselves, which we must try to remove. Yet genius is, as it were, privileged to have them, since anxious caution would harm the inimitable sweep of its spirit. *Mannerism* is another kind of aping: aping mere *peculiarity*, or originality in general, to get as far as possible from imitators, without possessing the talent to be *exemplary* at the same time.—In general there are two ways, or modes (*modus*), of arranging one's thoughts for presentation. One is called *manner* (*modus aestheticus*, aesthetic mode), the other *method* (*modus logicus*, logical mode). They differ [319] in that the first has no standard other than the *feeling* of unity in presentation, while the second follows definite *principles*. So only the first applies to fine art. But an artistic product is called *mannered* only when the presentation of its idea *aims at* oddity instead of being made adequate to the idea [A 202]. Showiness or preciousness, strained expression, and affectation merely to differ from the ordinary, but without spirit, resemble the behavior of someone said to like hearing themselves talk, or someone who stands and walks as if on a stage to be stared at. This always reveals a bungler.

50 *The combination of taste with genius in products of fine art.*

Asking which matters more in fine art, that it show genius or that it show taste, is the same as asking whether imagination matters more than judgment. An art deserves to be called *inspired* with regard to the first, but *fine* art only with regard to the second. So the latter, at least as an indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*), is the chief thing to consider in judging art as fine art. Richness and originality of ideas are not as necessary for beauty as the adequacy

of imagination in its freedom to understanding's lawfulness. For all imagination's richness, in its lawless freedom [A 203], produces nothing but nonsense. Judgment, by contrast, is the power of adapting it to understanding.

Taste, *like* judgment in general, is the discipline, or training, of genius. It severely clips its wings and makes it civilized or polished. But at the same time it gives genius guidance about where, and how far, it should extend to remain purposive. By bringing clarity and order into the abundance of thoughts, taste makes ideas stable and capable of lasting and universal approval, of being followed by others, and of an ever-advancing cultivation. So if, when these two qualities conflict in a product [320], something must be sacrificed, it should be on the side of genius. Judgment, which pronounces on fine art from its own principles, will sooner allow an impairment of imagination's freedom and richness than of understanding.

Fine art would therefore require *imagination*, *understanding*, *spirit*, and *taste*[17].

51 [A 204] *The division of the fine arts.*

In general, beauty, whether natural or artistic, can be called the *expression* of aesthetic ideas. The difference is that in fine art this idea must be prompted by a concept of the object. In beautiful nature, mere reflection on a given intuition, without a concept of what the object is supposed to be, is enough to awaken and communicate the idea of which that object is regarded as the *expression*.

So if we want to divide the fine arts, we can choose no more convenient principle, at least as an experiment, than the analogy of art with the kind of expression people use in speaking to communicate with one another as fully as possible—not only their concepts but also their sensations[18].—This consists in *word*, *gesture*, and *tone*: articulation, gesticulation, and modulation. Only the combination of these [A 205] three forms of expression constitutes the speaker's complete communication. For through them thought, intuition, and sensation are conveyed to another person simultaneously and in union.

There are therefore only three kinds of fine arts: the *arts of speech*, the [321] *visual arts*, and the art of *the play of sensations*, as external sensory impressions. We could also arrange this division in two branches, dividing fine art into the expression of thoughts or of intuitions, and then dividing the latter according to their form or their matter, sensation. But it would then look too abstract and less suited to ordinary concepts.

1) The *arts of speech* are *eloquence* and *poetry*. *Eloquence* is the art of carrying on a task of understanding as a free play of imagination; *poetry*, of carrying out a free play of imagination as a task of understanding.

So the *orator* announces a task and carries it out as if it were merely a *play* with ideas to entertain the listeners. The *poet* announces merely an entertaining *play* with ideas, yet as much results for understanding as if the intention had been simply to carry out its task. The connection and harmony of these two [A 206] cognitive powers, sensibility and understanding, must seem unintentional and to occur of itself. For although they cannot do without one another, they cannot easily be united without constraint and mutual impairment. Otherwise it is not *fine* art. Thus everything contrived and labored must be avoided. Fine art must be free art in two senses: it must not, as paid employment, be labor whose amount can be judged by a definite standard, compelled, or paid for; and the mind, although occupied, must still feel satisfied and awakened without looking toward another end, independently of payment.

So the orator gives something not promised: an entertaining play of imagination. But the orator also falls somewhat short in what was promised and announced as the task: purposively occupying understanding. The poet, by contrast, promises little, announcing a mere play with ideas, but achieves something worthy of a task: playfully providing nourishment for understanding and giving life to its concepts through imagination. Thus the former fundamentally delivers less, and the latter more, than promised.

2) The *visual* arts, those expressing ideas in [A 207] *sensory intuition*, not through representations of mere imagination [322] aroused by words, are either arts of *sensory truth* or of *sensory appearance*. The first is called *plastic art*, the second *painting*. Both make shapes in space the expression of ideas. Plastic

art makes shapes perceptible to two senses, sight and touch, though not to touch with regard to beauty; painting only to sight. Both are based on the aesthetic idea in imagination, the archetype or original image. But the shape constituting its expression, the ectype or copy, is given either in its bodily extension, as the object itself exists, or in the way this extension depicts itself to the eye, as its appearance on a surface. Or, amounting to the same thing, either a relation to an actual end or only the appearance of one is made a condition for reflection.

Plastic art, as the first kind of fine visual art, includes *sculpture* and *architecture*. The *first* presents in bodily form concepts of things as they *could exist in nature*, though as fine art with regard to aesthetic purposiveness. The *second* is the art of presenting concepts of things possible *only through art*, whose form has as its determining ground not nature but [A 208] an arbitrary end, in keeping with that aim yet also in an aesthetically purposive way. In architecture a certain *use* of the artificial object is the main thing, limiting aesthetic ideas as a condition. In sculpture the mere *expression* of aesthetic ideas is the main aim. Thus statues of human beings, gods, animals, and so on belong to the first kind. Temples, magnificent buildings for public assemblies, dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected as memorials of honor, belong to architecture. Indeed all household furnishings—cabinetmakers' work and similar useful things—can be counted here, because a product's adequacy to a certain use constitutes the essence of a *built work*. By contrast, a mere *sculpted work*, made solely for viewing and intended to please in itself, is as a bodily presentation merely an imitation of nature, though with regard to aesthetic ideas. Here *sensory truth* must not go so far that the work ceases to appear as art and a product of choice.

As the second kind of visual art, *painting* artificially presents [323] *sensory appearance* in connection with ideas. I would divide it into the art of beautifully *depicting nature* and that of beautifully *arranging its products*. The first would be *painting proper* [A 209], the second *landscape gardening*. Painting gives only the appearance of bodily extension. Gardening gives bodily extension in reality, but only the appearance of utilization and use for ends other than

merely the play of imagination in contemplating its forms[19]. Gardening is nothing but decorating the ground with the same variety—grasses, flowers, shrubs, trees, even waters, hills, and valleys—with which nature presents it to our view, but arranged differently and in accordance with certain ideas. Yet a beautiful arrangement of bodily things is [A 210] given only for the eye, like painting. Touch can provide no intuitive representation of such a form. Under painting in the broad sense I would also count decorating rooms with wallpaper, ornaments, and all beautiful furnishings serving merely for *viewing*, as well as the art of dressing with taste, including rings, snuffboxes, and so on. For a bed of varied flowers or a room with varied decorations, including the ladies' adornment, forms a kind of painting at a splendid celebration. Like paintings properly so called, which are not intended to *teach* history or natural knowledge, this exists merely to be looked at, to entertain imagination in free play with ideas and occupy aesthetic judgment without a definite end. The making of all this decoration may be mechanically very different [324] and require quite different artists. Still, judgment of taste about what is beautiful in this art is determined in the same way: we judge only the forms as they appear to the eye, without regard to an end, singly or in combination, by their effect on imagination.—That visual art can be counted, by analogy, as gesture in a language is justified [A 211] by the fact that through these shapes the artist's spirit gives bodily expression to what and how it has thought, making the thing itself speak, as it were, through mime. This is a very common play of our imagination, which attributes to lifeless things, according to their form, a spirit speaking from them.

3) The art of the *beautiful play of sensations*, produced from outside yet nevertheless having to be universally communicable, can concern nothing but the proportion between different degrees of attunement or tension of the sense to which the sensation belongs, that is, its tone. In this broad meaning of the word, it can be divided into the artistic play of sensations of hearing and of sight, and thus into *music* and the *art of colors*.—It is noteworthy that besides their receptivity to impressions sufficient for obtaining concepts of external objects through them, these two senses are capable of a special connected sensa-

tion. We cannot quite determine whether this is based on sense or reflection. This capacity to be affected can sometimes be absent even though the sense is otherwise not deficient at all for cognizing objects, but may even be exceptionally acute [A 212]. That is, we cannot say with certainty whether a color or tone, a sound, is merely an agreeable sensation, or already in itself a beautiful play of sensations that as such brings satisfaction in form in aesthetic judgment. Consider the speed of the vibrations of light, or in the second case of air. This probably far exceeds our ability to judge directly in perception the proportion in which they divide time. So one would think that only the *effect* of these vibrations on our body's elastic parts is sensed, while the *division of time* through them is not noticed or [325] taken into account in judgment. Colors and tones would thus be connected only with agreeableness, not with beauty in their composition. But consider, on the other hand, *first*, what mathematics can say about the proportions of these vibrations in music and their judgment, and judge color contrasts, as we should, by analogy with music. *Second*, consult the rare examples of people with the best eyesight who could not distinguish colors, or the sharpest hearing who could not distinguish tones. Also consider that those who can distinguish them perceive a changed quality, not merely a degree of sensation, at the different intensities on the color or tonal scale, and that their number [A 213] is fixed for *intelligible* differences. We might then feel compelled to regard both sensations not as mere sensory impressions, but as the effect of judging form in the play of many sensations. The difference either opinion makes in judging music's basis would alter only its definition: we would define it either, as we have done, as the *beautiful* play of sensations through hearing, or as the play of *agreeable* sensations. Only according to the first explanation would music be represented entirely as *fine* art; according to the second it would be, at least partly, *agreeable* art.

52 *The combination of fine arts in one and the same product.*

Eloquence can be combined with a pictorial presentation of its subjects as well as its objects in a *play*; poetry with music in *song*; song also with pictorial, theatrical presentation in an *opera*; the play of sensations in music with the play of

shapes in *dance*; and so on. The presentation of the sublime, insofar as it belongs to fine art, can also unite with beauty in a *rhymed tragedy*, a *didactic poem*, or an *oratorio* [A 214]. In these combinations fine art is still more artful. Whether it is also more beautiful, since such diverse kinds of satisfaction cross one another, can be doubted in some of these cases. But in all fine [326] art the essential thing is form, which is purposive for observation and judgment. Here pleasure is also cultivation and disposes the spirit toward ideas, making it receptive to more such pleasure and entertainment. The essential thing is not the matter of sensation, charm or emotion, where the aim is merely enjoyment. Such enjoyment leaves nothing behind in the idea, dulls the spirit, gradually makes the object disgusting, and makes the mind dissatisfied with itself and moody through awareness that, in reason's judgment, its state is contrary to purpose.

If the fine arts are not connected, closely or remotely, with moral ideas, which alone bring an independent satisfaction, this latter outcome is their ultimate fate. They then serve only as distractions. We need ever more of them the more we use them to drive away the mind's dissatisfaction with itself, by making ourselves still more useless and dissatisfied. In general, natural beauties are most helpful for the first purpose if we are accustomed early [A 215] to observing, judging, and admiring them.

53 *Comparing the aesthetic worth of the fine arts with one another.*

Among all the arts, *poetry* holds the highest rank. It owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least willing to be guided by precepts or examples. It expands the mind by setting imagination free. Within the limits of a given concept, from the unlimited variety of possible forms agreeing with it, poetry offers the one that connects its presentation with an abundance of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate. It thus rises aesthetically to ideas. Poetry strengthens the mind by letting it feel its free, self-active power, independent of determination by nature, to consider and judge nature as appearance from viewpoints that nature does not itself offer to either sense or understanding in experience. It thus lets the mind use nature for the purpose, and as it

were as the schema, of the supersensible. It plays with [327] the illusion it produces at will, yet without deceiving. For it declares its own activity to be mere play, which nevertheless [A 216] can be used purposively by understanding for its task.—Eloquence, insofar as it means the art of persuading, of deceiving through beautiful illusion, as *ars oratoria*, the art of oratory, rather than merely speaking well in eloquence and style, is a dialectic. It borrows from poetry only as much as is needed to win minds over in the speaker's favor before they judge, and to deprive judgment of its freedom. So it cannot be recommended for either the courtroom or the pulpit. Where civil laws, individuals' rights, or lasting instruction and determination of minds toward correct knowledge and conscientious observance of duty are concerned, even a trace of luxuriant wit and imagination is beneath the dignity of so important a task. Still more so is the art of persuading and winning people over to someone's advantage. Even if it can sometimes be used for intentions that are in themselves legitimate and praiseworthy, it is still objectionable because maxims and dispositions are thereby subjectively corrupted, even when the deed is objectively lawful. For it is not enough to do what is right; we must also do it solely because it is right. Moreover, the mere clear concept of these kinds of human concern, connected with a [A 217] lively presentation through examples and without violating the rules of harmonious language or propriety of expression for reason's ideas—which together constitute speaking well—already has sufficient influence on human minds by itself. There is no need to add the machinery of persuasion. Since this can just as well be used to gloss over or conceal vice and error, it can never entirely remove the secret suspicion of an artful trick. In poetry everything proceeds honestly and openly. It declares that it wishes merely to engage in an entertaining play with imagination, one agreeing in form with understanding's laws. It does not seek to steal upon and entangle understanding through sensible presentation.[20]

328 After poetry I would place, *when charm and movement* [A 218] *of the mind are at issue*, the art nearest to it among the arts of expression, which also combines very naturally with it: *music*. Although music speaks through mere sensations

without concepts, and so, unlike poetry, leaves nothing for reflection, it nevertheless moves the mind more variously and, though only temporarily, more deeply. Admittedly, it is more enjoyment than cultivation. The play of thoughts it incidentally arouses is only the effect of a seemingly mechanical association. Judged by reason, it has less worth than any other fine art. So, like every enjoyment, it demands frequent change and cannot endure repeated hearing without producing weariness. Its universally communicable charm seems [A 219] to rest on the following. Every linguistic expression in context has a tone suited to its meaning. This tone more or less indicates an affect in the speaker and also produces it in the listener, in whom it in turn awakens the idea expressed in language with that tone. Since modulation is, as it were, a universal language of sensations intelligible to everyone, music exercises this language on its own in its full force as the language of affects. It thus universally communicates the aesthetic ideas naturally associated with it according to the law of association. But because these [329] aesthetic ideas are not concepts and definite thoughts, the form in which these sensations are combined—harmony and melody—serves only in place of the form of a language. Through a proportioned attunement of the sensations, it expresses the aesthetic idea of a coherent whole containing an unnameable abundance of thought, according to a certain theme that constitutes the dominant affect in the piece. This attunement can be brought mathematically under certain rules, because in tones it rests on the ratio of the numbers of air vibrations in the same time, insofar as tones are combined simultaneously or successively. On this mathematical form alone, although not represented through definite [A 220] concepts, depends the satisfaction that mere reflection on such a multitude of simultaneous or successive sensations connects with their play as the universally valid condition of its beauty. Only according to this form may taste claim a right to pronounce in advance on everyone's judgment.

But mathematics certainly has not the slightest share in the charm and mental movement music produces. It is only the indispensable condition, the *conditio sine qua non*, of that proportion of impressions in their combination and alternation which makes it possible to grasp them together. It prevents them from

destroying one another, so that instead they agree in continuously moving and enlivening the mind through affects in harmony with them, and thereby in a comfortable enjoyment of oneself.

If, by contrast, we estimate the worth of the fine arts by the cultivation they give the mind, taking as our standard the expansion of the powers that must come together in judgment for cognition, music has the lowest place among the fine arts in this respect. Among arts also assessed by their agreeableness, it may have the highest. For it merely plays with sensations. In this [A 221] respect the visual arts therefore stand far above it. By setting imagination into a free play that is nevertheless adequate to understanding, they also carry out a task. They produce something that serves understanding's concepts as a lasting vehicle recommending itself on its own, to promote their union with sensibility and thus, as it were, the refinement of the higher cognitive powers. [330] The two kinds of art take entirely different paths: music goes from sensations to indeterminate ideas; visual art from determinate ideas to sensations. The latter leave a *lasting* impression, the former only a *passing* one. Imagination can recall visual impressions and entertain itself agreeably with them. Musical impressions either disappear entirely or, if involuntarily repeated by imagination, are more burdensome than agreeable. Music also has a certain lack of consideration: chiefly because of the nature of its instruments, it spreads its influence farther than desired, into the neighborhood, and thus, as it were, imposes itself. It therefore impairs the freedom of others outside the musical gathering. Arts speaking to the eyes do not do this, since we need only turn our eyes away if we do not want to admit their impression. It is almost like [A 222] enjoyment through a widely spreading smell. Someone taking a perfumed handkerchief from their pocket treats everyone nearby against their will, forcing them, if they wish to breathe, to enjoy it too. This is also why it has gone out of fashion.[21]—Among the visual arts I would give *painting* preference, partly because, as the art of drawing, it underlies all the others, and partly because it can penetrate much farther into the region of ideas and expand the field of intuition in accordance with them more than the others are permitted to do.

54 *Remark.*

As we have often shown, there is an essential difference between *what pleases us merely when we judge it* and what *gives enjoyment* (pleases us in sensation). We cannot expect everyone to share the latter in the way we can the former. Enjoyment, even when its cause lies in ideas, always seems to consist in [331] a feeling that a person's whole life is being strengthened, including bodily well-being, or health. [A 223] In this respect *Epicurus*, who regarded all enjoyment as basically bodily sensation, may perhaps have been right. He only misunderstood himself when he counted intellectual and even practical satisfaction among enjoyments. Keeping this last distinction in view explains how someone can disapprove of an enjoyment he feels—for example, a poor but decent person's joy at inheriting from his loving but miserly father. It also explains how someone can approve of a deep pain he suffers—a widow's sadness over the death of her worthy husband; how an enjoyment can also win our approval—for example, our enjoyment of the sciences we pursue; or how a pain, such as hatred, envy, or the desire for revenge, can also meet with our disapproval. Here liking or disliking rests on reason and is the same as *approval* or *disapproval*. Enjoyment and pain, however, can rest only on the feeling of, or prospect of, possible *well-being* or *distress*, whatever their cause.

Every changing free play of sensations, when it has no intention behind it, gives enjoyment because it strengthens the feeling of health. It does so whether or not, in judging by reason, we like its object or even the enjoyment itself. This enjoyment can rise to the level of an affect, although we take no interest in the object itself, or at least no interest proportionate to the strength of that affect. We can divide these activities into *games of chance*, *the play of tones*, and *the play of thoughts*. The *first* requires an *interest*, whether vanity or self-interest. But this interest is nowhere near as great as our interest in the way we try to obtain its object. [A 224] The *second* requires only a change of *sensations*, each of which has some relation to an affect without reaching its intensity, and stirs aesthetic ideas. The *third* arises simply from the change of representations in the power of judgment. This produces no thought carrying any interest, but still enlivens the mind.

Our evening gatherings show how much enjoyment games must give, without our needing to assume any interested purpose behind them. Almost no gathering can keep itself entertained without a game. The affects of hope, fear, joy, anger, and mockery [332] play their parts, changing roles every moment. They are so lively that, as an internal exercise, they seem to stimulate all the body's vital activity. The cheerful state of mind they produce proves this, although nothing has been gained or learned. But games of chance are not a beautiful play, so we will leave them aside here. Music and material for laughter, on the other hand, are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or even with representations of the understanding, through which ultimately nothing is thought. They can give lively enjoyment merely through their changes. In this way they show fairly clearly that in both cases the enlivening is merely bodily, although ideas of the mind arouse it. The feeling of health, produced by a movement of the internal organs corresponding to that play, makes up the whole enjoyment of a lively gathering, so often praised as refined and witty. This enjoyment does not consist in judging the harmony of tones or witty remarks. Their beauty serves only as its necessary vehicle. It consists instead in the stimulation of the body's vital activity, in the affect that moves the [A 225] internal organs and diaphragm—in a word, in the feeling of health, which we otherwise cannot feel without some such occasion. We enjoy being able to reach the body through the soul as well, and to use the soul as its physician.

In music this play goes from bodily sensation to aesthetic ideas, the objects of affects, and then returns from them to the body with increased force. In joking —which, like music, deserves to be counted as agreeable rather than beautiful art—the play starts with thoughts. Insofar as these seek sensory expression, they all engage the body too. In this presentation the understanding does not find what it expected, and suddenly relaxes. We feel the effect of this relaxation in the body through the vibration of its organs. This helps restore their balance and has a beneficial effect on health.

Anything meant to produce lively, shaking laughter must contain something absurd, something the understanding therefore cannot like in itself. *Laughter is an affect arising from the sudden transformation of a tense expectation into noth-*

ing. This very transformation, certainly not pleasing to the understanding, nevertheless gives very lively indirect pleasure for a moment. So its [333] cause must lie in the representation's influence on the body and the body's reciprocal influence on the mind. This does not happen because the representation is objectively an object of enjoyment—for how could a disappointed expectation give enjoyment? It happens solely because, as [A 226] a mere play of representations, it produces a balance of vital forces in the body.

Suppose someone tells this story. An Indian at an Englishman's table in Surat saw a bottle of ale opened and all the beer rush out as foam. With many exclamations he expressed great astonishment. The Englishman asked, "What is so astonishing about that?" He answered, "I'm not astonished that it comes out, but at how you managed to get it in." We laugh and feel hearty delight. This is not because we think ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man, or because our understanding notices anything else pleasing in it. Rather, our expectation was tense and suddenly disappears into nothing. Or suppose the heir of a wealthy relative wants to arrange a very solemn funeral for him, but complains that he cannot quite manage it. "The more money I give my mourners to look sad," he says, "the happier they look." We laugh out loud, and the reason is that an expectation suddenly turns into nothing. We must take care to note that it must turn not into the positive opposite of an expected object—which is always something, and can often make us sad—but into nothing. For if someone raises great expectations by telling us a story, and we immediately see at its conclusion that it is untrue, we are displeased. Stories of people whose hair supposedly turned gray overnight from great grief are an example. But suppose another joker answers such a story by telling, in great detail, of a merchant's grief. Returning from India to Europe with his entire fortune [A 227] in goods, the merchant was forced by a violent storm to throw everything overboard. He grieved so much that his *wig* turned gray that very night. Then we laugh and enjoy it. For a while we keep batting back and forth, like a ball, our own failed attempt to grasp an otherwise indifferent object—or rather, the idea we have been pursuing—when all we mean to do is catch it and hold it still. [334] The enjoyment here does not come from putting a liar or a fool in his

place. Even on its own, the latter story, told with pretended seriousness, would make a company burst out laughing; and the former purpose would ordinarily not even be worth our attention.

What is remarkable is that in all such cases the joke must always contain something that can deceive us for a moment. So when the illusion disappears into nothing, the mind looks back to try it once again. Rapidly alternating tension and relaxation throw it back and forth and set it oscillating. The release from what had, so to speak, tightened the string happened suddenly, not through gradual slackening. This oscillation must therefore cause an emotional movement, along with a corresponding internal bodily movement. The movement continues involuntarily and produces fatigue but also cheerfulness—the effects of exercise beneficial to health.

Suppose we assume that all our thoughts are accompanied by some corresponding movement in the body's organs. Then we can fairly well understand how the mind's sudden shift from one standpoint to another, as it considers its object, [A 228] could correspond to an alternating tension and release of the elastic parts of our internal organs. This is communicated to the diaphragm, much like what ticklish people feel. The lungs expel air in rapid bursts and so produce a movement beneficial to health. This alone, and not what goes on in the mind, is the actual cause of enjoyment in a thought that basically represents nothing.—Voltaire said that heaven had given us two things to offset life's many hardships: *hope* and *sleep*. He could have added *laughter*, if only the means of producing it in reasonable people were so readily available. The wit or originality of humor needed for this is as rare as the talent for writing things that *rack the brain*, like mystical brooding, *risk the neck*, like the productions of geniuses, or *break the heart*, like sentimental novels—and sometimes the writings of similar moralists.

So I think we can grant Epicurus that all enjoyment, even when prompted by concepts that [335] arouse aesthetic ideas, is *animal*, that is, bodily sensation. This does not in the least detract from the *spiritual* feeling of respect for moral

ideas. That feeling is not enjoyment but an esteem for ourselves—for the humanity in us—which raises us above the need for enjoyment. Nor does it detract even from the less noble feeling of *taste*.

Something combining both is found in *naivety*. This is an outburst of the sincerity originally natural to humanity, breaking through the art of dissimulation that has become second nature. We [A 229] laugh at a simplicity that has not yet learned to pretend. Yet we also take pleasure in nature's simplicity, which here frustrates that art. We expected the everyday habit of artificial expression, carefully arranged to make a good impression. Instead, here is unspoiled, innocent nature, which we did not expect to find, and which the person revealing it did not mean to expose. The attractive but false appearance that usually counts for so much in our judgment suddenly turns into nothing. It is as though the trickster within us had been exposed. This moves the mind successively in two opposite directions and at the same time gives the body a healthy shaking. But something infinitely better than all adopted manners has not entirely died out in human nature: purity of thought, or at least the capacity for it. This adds seriousness and high regard to the power of judgment's play. Yet the appearance shows itself only briefly, and the curtain of dissimulation is soon drawn again. So regret also enters into it, a tender emotion that can readily join, as play, with such good-natured laughter, and indeed usually does. It also generally makes up to the person who gives rise to it for his embarrassment at not yet having learned the ways of the world.—An art of *being naive* is therefore a contradiction. But presenting naivety in an invented character is quite possible, and is a beautiful though rare art. Naivety must not be confused with openhearted simplicity, which leaves nature unadorned only because it does not understand [A 230] the art of social interaction.

The *humorous* manner [336] can also be counted among things that cheer us up and are closely related to the enjoyment of laughter. It belongs to originality of mind, but not specifically to the talent for beautiful art. In its good sense, *humor* means the talent for putting oneself at will into a certain frame of mind. In that frame, everything is judged quite differently from usual, even in reverse, yet still in keeping with certain principles of reason appropriate to that state of

mind. Someone involuntarily subject to such changes is *moody*. Someone who can adopt them at will and purposefully, to produce a lively presentation through a contrast that arouses laughter, is called *humorous*, as is his presentation. Still, this manner belongs more to agreeable than to beautiful art. The object of beautiful art must always show some dignity of its own. It therefore requires a certain seriousness in its presentation, just as it requires taste in judging it.

Of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment [A 231] [337]

12 To justify a claim to universal agreement with a judgment of the aesthetic power of judgment resting on merely subjective grounds, it is enough to grant two points. 1) In all people the subjective conditions of this faculty are the same as regards the relation of the cognitive powers active in it to cognition in general. This must be true, since otherwise people could not communicate their representations or even their cognition to one another. 2) The judgment has taken only this relation, and thus the *formal condition* of the power of judgment, into account, and is pure. That is, it is mixed neither with concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining grounds. Even if a mistake has been made on this second point, it concerns only the incorrect application to a particular case of an entitlement given us by a law. It does not cancel the entitlement in general.

13 We soon see that enlightenment is easy in principle but difficult and slow to carry out in practice. Not being passive in the use of one's reason, but always giving oneself its law, is quite easy for someone who wants only to live in keeping with his essential end and does not seek knowledge of what exceeds his understanding. But the effort to know the latter is almost impossible to prevent. Nor will there ever be a shortage of others confidently promising to satisfy this curiosity. So it must be very difficult to preserve or establish in people's way of thinking, especially in public thinking, the merely negative attitude that makes up enlightenment proper.

14 Taste could be called *sensus communis aestheticus*, and ordinary human understanding *sensus communis logicus*.

15 In my region, when an ordinary person is given a problem like Columbus's egg, he says, *that is no art, it is only knowledge*. That is, if you know how it is done, you *can* do it. He says the same about all the conjurer's supposed arts. But he will not hesitate to call the tightrope walker's skill an art.

16 Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, nor any thought expressed more sublimely, than in that inscription above the temple of *Isis*, mother *Nature*: "I am all that is, all that was, and all that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil." *Segner* used this idea in an ingenious illustration placed before his natural philosophy. He wanted to fill the pupil he was preparing to lead into this temple with the sacred awe that should put the mind into a state of solemn attention.

17 The first three faculties gain their *unity* only through the fourth. In his history, *Hume* suggests to the English that, although their works yield to no people in the world as evidence of the first three qualities considered *separately*, in the quality that unites them they must rank below their neighbors, the French.

18 The reader should not judge this outline of a possible division of the beautiful arts as a proposed theory. It is only one of the many attempts that can and should still be made.

19 It may seem strange that ornamental gardening can be regarded as a kind of painting, although it presents its forms in solid bodies. But it actually takes its forms from nature: trees, shrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field, at least originally. In this respect it is not an art like sculpture. Nor, like architecture, does it make a concept of the object and its end a condition of their arrangement. Its condition is only the free play of the imagination in contemplation. In this respect it agrees with merely aesthetic painting that has no definite subject, but makes an entertaining arrangement of sky, land, and water through light and shadow.—In general, the reader should judge this only as an

attempt to bring the beautiful arts together under one principle, here that of expressing aesthetic ideas by analogy with a language. It should not be regarded as a derivation of them claimed to be conclusive.

20 I must admit that a beautiful poem has always given me pure enjoyment. By contrast, reading the best speech by a Roman popular orator, or a modern parliamentary speaker or preacher, has always brought an unpleasant feeling mixed with it: disapproval of a deceitful art. This art knows how to move people like machines, in important matters, toward a judgment that must lose all weight for them on calm reflection. Eloquence and fine speaking, together called rhetoric, belong to beautiful art. But oratory (*ars oratoria*), as the art of using people's weaknesses for one's purposes, deserves no *respect* at all, however well intended or genuinely good those purposes may be. In both Athens and Rome it reached its highest level only when the state was hastening toward its ruin and a genuinely patriotic way of thinking had died out. A person who clearly understands the subject, commands the language in its richness and purity, has a fertile imagination able to present his ideas, and takes a lively, heartfelt interest in what is truly good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*: the good man skilled in speaking. He is the speaker without artifice but full of force whom *Cicero* wanted, though Cicero himself did not always remain true to this ideal.

21 Those who recommended singing religious songs as part of household worship did not consider the great burden such *noisy* devotion imposes on the public. For that very reason it is generally pharisaical. It forces the neighbors either to sing along or to stop their own thinking.

PART I

Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment

Second Section. Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.

55 For a power of judgment to be dialectical, it must first make claims through reasoning. That is, its judgments must claim universality, and must do so a priori[22], since dialectic consists in the opposition of such judgments. So the incompatibility of aesthetic judgments of sense, about what is agreeable or disagreeable, is not dialectical. Nor does conflict between judgments of taste constitute a dialectic of taste when each person appeals only to his own taste, because [A 232] no one intends to make his judgment a universal rule. The only remaining concept of a dialectic that could concern taste is therefore a dialectic of the *critique* of taste, not of taste itself, concerning its *principles*. This arises when conflicting concepts about the basis for the possibility of judgments of taste in general emerge naturally and unavoidably. A transcendental critique of taste will therefore contain a part that can be called a dialectic of the aesthetic power of judgment only if there is an antinomy in this faculty's principles that makes its conformity to law, and thus its inner possibility, doubtful.

56 [338] *Presentation of the Antinomy of Taste.*

The first commonplace of taste is contained in the saying with which every tasteless person thinks he can protect himself against criticism: *everyone has his own taste*. This means that the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective—enjoyment or pain—and that the judgment has no right to demand the necessary agreement of others.

Its second commonplace, used even by those who grant a judgment of taste the right to pronounce something valid for everyone, [A 233] is this: *there can be no conclusive dispute about taste*. This means that the determining ground of a judgment of taste may indeed also be objective, but it cannot be put into definite concepts. So nothing about the judgment itself can be *decided* by proofs, although it is quite possible and legitimate to *argue* about it. *Arguing* and *disputing conclusively* are alike in seeking agreement through opposing judgments. They differ in that the latter hopes to achieve this through definite concepts as grounds of proof, and thus assumes *objective concepts* as grounds of judgment. Where this is considered impossible, conclusive disputation is likewise judged impossible.

We can easily see that a proposition is missing between these two commonplaces. It is not current as a proverb, but it is present in everyone's mind: *we can argue about taste*, though we cannot settle it by conclusive dispute. But this proposition contains the opposite of the first one. Wherever argument is to be allowed, there must be hope of reaching agreement. So we must be able to count on grounds of judgment that have more than private validity and are therefore not merely subjective. Yet the principle that *everyone has his own taste* directly opposes this.

The principle of taste therefore shows the following [A 234] antinomy:

1) *Thesis.* A judgment of taste is not based on concepts, since otherwise it could be settled by conclusive dispute, that is, decided by proofs.

2) *Antithesis.* A judgment of taste is based on concepts, since otherwise, despite differences in such judgments, we could not [339] even argue about it, that is, claim that others must agree with this judgment.

57 *Resolution of the Antinomy of Taste.*

There is only one way to remove the conflict between the principles underlying every judgment of taste. These principles are simply the two distinctive features of judgments of taste presented above in the Analytic. We must show that the concept to which the object is referred in this kind of judgment is not taken in the same sense in the two maxims of the aesthetic power of judgment. This double meaning, or twofold standpoint for judging, is necessary for our transcendental power of judgment. But the deceptive appearance arising from mixing the two is also unavoidable as a natural illusion.

A judgment of taste must refer to some concept, since otherwise it could not possibly claim necessary validity for [A 235] everyone. But it must not be provable *from* a concept. A concept can either be determinable or be both undetermined in itself and indeterminable. A concept of the understanding is of the first kind: it can be determined through predicates of the sensory intuition that can correspond to it. The second kind is the transcendental concept of reason concerning the supersensible that underlies all such intuition. It therefore cannot be determined further theoretically.

Now a judgment of taste concerns objects of the senses, but not in order to determine a *concept* of them for the understanding, since it is not a cognitive judgment. As an individual intuitive representation referred to the feeling of pleasure, it is therefore only a private judgment. To that extent, its validity would be limited to the judging individual alone: the object is an object of satisfaction *for me*; for others it may be different—everyone has his own taste.

Yet a judgment of taste undoubtedly contains a wider reference of the representation of the object, and also of the subject. On this we base a necessary extension of this kind of judgment to everyone. Some concept must therefore underlie it, [340] but a concept that cannot be determined by intuition, [A 236] through which nothing can be cognized, and which therefore *cannot supply any proof* for the judgment of taste. Such a concept is the mere pure concept of reason concerning the supersensible that underlies the object, and also the judging subject, as an object of sense and thus as an appearance. Without assuming such a reference, we could not defend the judgment of taste's claim to universal validity. If the concept on which it rests were merely a confused concept of the

understanding—for example, of perfection—to which the sensory intuition of beauty could be supplied as a counterpart, it would at least be possible in itself to base the judgment of taste on proofs. This contradicts the thesis.

But all contradiction disappears if I say this: a judgment of taste rests on a concept of a ground in general for nature's subjective purposiveness for the power of judgment. From this concept, however, nothing about the object can be cognized or proved, since it is indeterminable in itself and unsuitable for cognition. Yet through this very concept the judgment also gains validity for everyone, though for each person it remains an individual judgment immediately accompanying intuition. Its determining ground may lie in the concept of what can be regarded as humanity's supersensible substrate. [A 237]

To resolve an antinomy, all that matters is the possibility that two apparently conflicting propositions do not actually contradict each other but can stand together, even if explaining how their concept is possible exceeds our cognitive faculty. This can also make understandable why the appearance is natural and unavoidable for human reason, and why it remains so, although after the apparent contradiction is resolved it no longer deceives us.

In both conflicting judgments we take in the same sense the concept on which a judgment's universal validity must rest, yet assert two opposite predicates of it. The thesis should therefore say: a judgment of taste is not based on *determinate* concepts. The antithesis should say: a judgment of taste is nevertheless based on a concept, though an *indeterminate* [341] one, namely the concept of the supersensible substrate of appearances. Then there would be no conflict between them.

We can do no more than remove this conflict in taste's claims and counterclaims. It is absolutely impossible to give a definite objective principle of taste by which its judgments could be guided, [A 238] tested, and proved. They would then no longer be judgments of taste. The subjective principle—the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us—can only be identified as the sole key to solving the riddle of this faculty, whose sources remain hidden even from us. Nothing further can make it understandable.

The antinomy presented and reconciled here rests on the correct concept of taste: a merely reflective aesthetic power of judgment. The two apparently conflicting principles were brought together by showing that *both can be true*, which is enough. Suppose instead that, as some do, we took *agreeableness* as the determining ground of taste because of the individual character of the representation underlying its judgment. Or suppose, as others want, we took the principle of *perfection*, because of the judgment's universal validity, and defined taste accordingly. An antinomy would then arise that could be reconciled only by showing that *both opposing propositions are false*, though their opposition is not merely contradictory. This would prove that the concept underlying each contradicts itself. So we see that [A 239] removing the antinomy of the aesthetic power of judgment follows a path similar to the one the Critique followed in resolving the antinomies of pure theoretical reason. Here too, as in the Critique of Practical Reason, the antinomies force us against our will to look beyond the sensible and seek in the supersensible the point where all our a priori faculties unite. No other way remains to make reason agree with itself.

Remark I.

In transcendental philosophy we so often have occasion to distinguish ideas from concepts of the understanding that it may be [342] useful to introduce technical terms suited to their difference. I believe there will be no objection if I suggest a few.—Ideas, in the most general sense, are representations referred to an object according to a certain subjective or objective principle, insofar as they can nevertheless never become cognition of that object. They are either referred to an intuition according to a merely subjective principle of agreement between the cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding, and are then called *aesthetic*; or they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle, yet can never yield cognition of the object, and are called ideas of reason. In the latter case the concept is *transcendent*. It differs from a concept of the understanding, for which an [A 240] adequately corresponding experience can always be supplied and which is therefore called *immanent*.

An *aesthetic idea* cannot become cognition because it is an *intuition* of the imagination for which no adequate concept can ever be found. An *idea of reason* can never become cognition because it contains a *concept* of the supersensible for which no adequate intuition can ever be given.

I think we can therefore call an aesthetic idea an *inexponible* representation of the imagination—one that cannot be fully set out in concepts—and an idea of reason an *indemonstrable* concept of reason—one that cannot be exhibited in intuition. Both are assumed not to be groundless. Rather, according to the explanation of an idea in general given above, they are produced in keeping with certain principles of the cognitive faculties to which they belong: the former with subjective principles, the latter with objective ones.

Concepts of the understanding, as such, must always be demonstrable, if by demonstrating we mean merely *presenting*, as in anatomy. That is, their corresponding object must always be capable of being given in intuition, whether pure or empirical, since only in this way can they become cognitions. The concept of *magnitude* can be given a priori in the intuition of space, for example in a straight line, and so on; the concept of *cause* in impenetrability, the impact of bodies, and so on. Thus both can be supported by an empirical intuition: the thought of them can be shown, demonstrated, or exhibited in an example. This must be [343] possible; otherwise we cannot be sure that the thought is not empty, that is, without any object at all.

In logic, the terms demonstrable and [A 241] indemonstrable are generally used only of *propositions*. The former would be better called propositions certain only indirectly, and the latter *immediately certain* propositions. Pure philosophy also has propositions of both kinds, if we mean true propositions that can and cannot be proved. But as philosophy it can prove from a priori grounds without being able to demonstrate. This holds unless we abandon entirely the meaning of the word: to demonstrate (*ostendere*, *exhibere*) means to present one's concept in intuition at the same time, whether in proving it or merely defining it. When the intuition is a priori, this is called constructing the concept. Even when the intuition is empirical, it remains an exhibition of the

object that secures the concept's objective reality. Thus we say that an anatomist demonstrates the human eye when, by dissecting that organ, he makes intuitively visible the concept he previously presented in words.

Accordingly, reason's concept of the supersensible substrate of all appearances in general, or of what must underlie our power of choice in relation to moral laws—namely transcendental freedom—is an indemonstrable concept and an idea of reason by its very kind. Virtue is so by degree. For the former can in itself have nothing corresponding to its quality given in experience. In the latter case, however, no product in experience of that causality reaches the degree prescribed as a rule by the idea of reason.

Just as, with an idea of reason, the *imagination* and its [A 242] intuitions fall short of the given concept, so, with an aesthetic idea, the *understanding* and its concepts never reach the whole inner intuition that the imagination connects with a given representation. Now to put a representation of the imagination into concepts means to *expound* it. So an aesthetic idea can be called an *inexponible* representation of the imagination in its free play. I will have an opportunity later to say more about ideas of this kind. For now I note only that both kinds [344] of ideas, ideas of reason and aesthetic ideas, must have their principles, and both must have them in reason: the former in the objective principles of its use, the latter in the subjective ones.

Accordingly, *genius* can also be defined as the faculty of *aesthetic ideas*. This also indicates why in products of genius it is the subject's nature, not a deliberate artistic end of producing beauty, that gives the rule. Beauty must be judged not by concepts but by the purposive attunement of the imagination to agreement with the faculty of concepts in general. So neither rule nor instruction can serve as the subjective standard for that aesthetic yet unconditional purposiveness in beautiful art which is to make a rightful [A 243] claim that it must please everyone. Only what is mere nature in the subject, yet cannot be brought under rules or concepts, can do this: the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties, which no concept of the understanding reaches. The ultimate end given by the intelligible element of our nature is to bring all our cognitive

faculties into harmony in relation to this substrate. Only in this way can that purposiveness, for which no objective principle can be prescribed, rest on a subjective yet universally valid a priori principle.

Remark II.

The following important observation naturally arises here: there are *three kinds of antinomy* of pure reason. They all agree in forcing reason to abandon the otherwise very natural assumption that objects of the senses are things in themselves. Instead, reason must regard them merely as appearances and place an intelligible substrate beneath them: something supersensible whose concept is only an idea and permits no actual cognition. Without such an antinomy, reason could never decide to accept a principle that so greatly narrows the field of its speculation, or to make sacrifices that require so many otherwise dazzling hopes to disappear entirely. Even now, when a correspondingly greater use in practical matters opens up to compensate for this loss, reason seems [345] unable to part with those hopes and free itself from its old attachment without pain.

There are three kinds of antinomy because there are three cognitive faculties: understanding, judgment, and reason. Each, as a higher cognitive faculty, must have its a priori principles. When reason judges these principles themselves and their use, it insistently demands the unconditioned for the given [A 244] conditioned in all three. Yet this can never be found if we regard the sensible as belonging to things in themselves, instead of treating it as mere appearance and placing something supersensible beneath it as the thing in itself: the intelligible substrate of nature outside and within us. Thus there is 1) an antinomy of reason concerning the theoretical use of the understanding up to the unconditioned, *for the cognitive faculty*; 2) an antinomy of reason concerning the aesthetic use of judgment, *for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure*; 3) an antinomy concerning the practical use of reason, which gives itself its own law, *for the faculty of desire*. All these faculties have their higher a priori principles. According to reason's unavoidable demand, they must also be able to judge and determine their object *unconditionally* by these principles.

Elsewhere we have already shown two things about two of these antinomies, those concerning the theoretical and practical use of the higher cognitive faculties: their *inevitability* when such judgments do not refer back to a supersensible substrate of the given objects as appearances, and their *resolvability* as soon as they do. As for the antinomy in the use of judgment according to reason's demand, and its resolution given here, there are only two ways of avoiding it. *Either* we deny that an aesthetic judgment of taste rests on any a priori principle. Then every claim that universal agreement is necessary is groundless, empty delusion. A judgment of taste would deserve to be held correct [A 245] only because many people *happen* to agree about it. Nor would this be because we *suspect* an a priori principle behind their agreement, but because, as with taste on the tongue, the subjects happen to be similarly [346] organized. *Or* we must assume that a judgment of taste is really a concealed judgment of reason about perfection discovered in a thing and in the relation of its manifold features to an end. It would be called aesthetic only because our reflection is confused, although fundamentally it is teleological. In that case we could declare the resolution of the antinomy through transcendental ideas unnecessary and invalid, and reconcile those laws of taste with objects of sense regarded not merely as appearances but also as things in themselves. But we have shown at several points in the exposition of judgments of taste how little either escape route accomplishes.

If we grant our deduction at least this much—that it proceeds along the right path, even if not yet made clear enough in every detail—three ideas emerge. *First*, the idea of the supersensible in general, without further determination, as nature's substrate. *Second*, the idea of that same supersensible as the principle of nature's subjective purposiveness for our cognitive faculty. *Third*, the idea of it as the principle of the ends of freedom and of their agreement with nature in morality.

58 [A 246] *On the Idealism of the Purposiveness of Both Nature and Art as the Sole Principle of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.*

To begin with, we can locate the principle of taste either in its always judging by empirical determining grounds, given by the senses only a posteriori, or admit that it judges from an a priori ground. The first would be the *empiricism* of the critique of taste; the second its *rationalism*. On the *first* account, the object of our liking would not differ from the *agreeable*. On the second, if the judgment rested on definite concepts, it would not differ from the *good*. All *beauty* would thus be denied any place in the world. Only a special name would remain in its place, perhaps for a certain mixture of those two kinds of liking. But [347] we have shown that there are also a priori grounds of liking which can coexist with the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be put into *definite concepts*.

Rationalism concerning the principle of taste is, in turn, either *realism* or *idealism* concerning purposiveness. Now a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, and beauty [A 247] is not a property of the object considered on its own. So rationalism concerning taste's principle can never consist in thinking the purposiveness in this judgment as objective. The judgment cannot concern the object's perfection theoretically and thus logically, even if only through confused judging. It can concern only *aesthetically* the agreement, within the subject, of the object's representation in the imagination with the essential principles of judgment in general. Thus, even on the principle of rationalism, a judgment of taste, and the distinction between realism and idealism about it, can lie only in this: in the first case that subjective purposiveness is assumed to be an actual, intentional *end* of nature or art, aimed at agreeing with our power of judgment. In the second, it is assumed to be only a purposive agreement that appears on its own and by chance, without an end, with judgment's need regarding nature and the forms it produces under particular laws.

The beautiful formations in the realm of organized nature strongly support realism about nature's aesthetic purposiveness. This is the view that the production of beauty rested on an idea of beauty in the producing cause, namely an *end* favoring our imagination. [A 248] Flowers, blossoms, even the shapes of whole plants; the elegance of animal forms of every kind, unnecessary for their own use but seemingly selected for our taste; above all, the variety and harmo-

nious combination of colors so pleasing and attractive to our eyes—in pheasants, shellfish, insects, down to the commonest flowers—all seem aimed entirely at outward contemplation. For they concern only the creatures' surfaces, and not even the shape of those surfaces, which might still be required for their internal ends. These things give [348] great weight to an explanation that assumes actual ends of nature for our aesthetic power of judgment.

But reason opposes this assumption through its maxim of preventing unnecessary multiplication of principles wherever possible. Nature itself also shows everywhere, in its free formations, such a strong mechanical tendency to produce forms seemingly made for the aesthetic use of our judgment that it gives us not the slightest reason to suspect that anything beyond its mechanism as mere nature is needed. Under that mechanism, forms can be purposive for our judging without any idea underlying them. By a *free formation* [A 249] of nature I mean one in which, from a *fluid at rest*, part evaporates or separates out—sometimes only the matter of heat—and the rest, as it solidifies, assumes a definite shape or structure, a figure or texture. This differs with the specific kind of matter but is exactly the same within a given kind. This presupposes what is always meant by a true fluid: its matter is completely dissolved, not a mere mixture of solid parts suspended in it.

Formation then occurs through *crystallization*: sudden solidification, not a gradual transition from the fluid to the solid state but, so to speak, a leap. This transition is also called *crystallizing*. The commonest example is freezing water. At first, straight little rays of ice form and join at angles of 60 degrees. Others attach in the same way at every point along them until everything has become ice. During this time the water between the rays of ice does not gradually become thicker. It remains as perfectly fluid as it would be at a much higher temperature, yet has the full coldness of ice. The matter that separates out and suddenly escapes at the moment [A 250] of solidification is a considerable quantity of heat matter. Since it was required only for fluidity, its departure leaves the resulting ice not the least colder than the water that was fluid in it a moment before.

Many salts, and also stones with a crystalline shape, are similarly produced from an earthy material dissolved in water by who knows what means. [349] The clustered configurations of many minerals, cubic galena, ruby silver ore, and the like also presumably form in water through the crystallization of their parts. Some cause forces them to leave this vehicle and join one another in definite external shapes.

But even internally, all materials that were made fluid merely by heat and became solid through cooling show a definite texture when broken. This suggests that, had their own weight or contact with air not prevented it, they would also have displayed their specific characteristic shape externally. This has been observed in some metals that had hardened on the outside after melting but were still fluid within. The still-fluid inner part was drained away, and the remainder left inside was allowed to crystallize undisturbed. Many of these mineral [A 251] crystallizations, such as clusters of spar, botryoidal hematite, and iron flower, often produce forms as beautiful as art could possibly imagine. The splendor in the cave of Antiparos is merely the product of water seeping through beds of gypsum.

Fluid matter appears in general to be older than solid matter. Both plants and animal bodies are formed from fluid nutritional matter as it takes shape at rest. Admittedly, formation in this matter occurs first according to a certain original predisposition directed toward ends. As the second part will show, this must be judged not aesthetically but teleologically, according to the principle of realism. But alongside this, the matter may perhaps also crystallize and form freely according to the universal law of the affinity of materials. Consider how watery fluids dissolved in an atmosphere, which is a mixture of different kinds of air, produce snow figures when loss of heat separates them from it. Depending on the mixture of air at the time, these figures often have shapes that look highly artistic and are extremely beautiful. Similarly, without taking anything away from the teleological principle for judging organization, we can well think that the beauty of flowers, birds' feathers, and shells, in both shape and color, [A 252] can be attributed to nature and its capacity to form itself freely according

to chemical laws, without particular ends directed toward this. By depositing the matter required for [350] organization, it can also form itself in an aesthetically purposive way.

But there is a direct proof of the principle of the *ideality* of purposiveness in natural beauty. This is the principle we always assume in aesthetic judgment itself, and it forbids us to explain nature by a realism of an end aimed at our power of representation. The proof is that, in judging beauty in general, we seek its standard a priori *in ourselves*, and the aesthetic power of judgment gives itself its own law in deciding whether something is beautiful. This could not happen if we assumed realism about nature's purposiveness. We would then have to learn from nature what we should find beautiful, and the judgment of taste would be subject to empirical principles. For such judging concerns not what nature is, or even what it is for us as an end, but how we receive it. If nature had formed its shapes for our satisfaction, this would always be an objective purposiveness of nature, not a subjective purposiveness resting on the play of the imagination in its freedom. [A 253] In the latter case we receive nature with favor; nature is not showing favor to us. Nature gives us occasion, in judging certain of its products, to perceive the inner purposiveness in the relation of our mental powers. Moreover, this purposiveness is to be declared necessary and universally valid on a supersensible ground. This feature of nature cannot be an end of nature—or rather, we cannot judge it as such. Otherwise the judgment it determined would rest on heteronomy, rather than being free and based on autonomy as a judgment of taste should be.

The principle of the idealism of purposiveness is still clearer in beautiful art. Like beautiful nature, it cannot involve aesthetic realism of purposiveness through sensations; otherwise it would be merely agreeable art, not beautiful art. But satisfaction through aesthetic ideas must not depend on achieving definite ends, as mechanically intentional art does. So even within rationalism about the principle, the ideality of ends, not their reality, must be the basis. This is already clear because beautiful art as such must be regarded not as a

[351] product of understanding and science but of genius. It therefore receives its rule through *aesthetic* ideas, which differ essentially from ideas of reason concerning definite ends. [A 254]

The *ideality* of objects of sense as appearances is the only way to explain how their forms can be determined a priori. In the same way, the *idealism* of purposiveness in judging the beauty of nature and art is the only assumption under which the critique can explain the possibility of a judgment of taste that demands a priori validity for everyone, without grounding the purposiveness represented in the object on concepts.

59 *On Beauty as a Symbol of Morality.*

Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called *examples*. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called *schemata*. But to demand that the objective reality of concepts of reason, or ideas, be established for the purpose of theoretical cognition of them is to demand something impossible. No adequate intuition can ever be given for them.

All *hypotyposis*—presentation, *subiectio sub adspectum*—as a making sensible [A 255] is of two kinds. It is either *schematic*, when the intuition corresponding to a concept grasped by the understanding is given a priori; or *symbolic*, when an intuition is supplied for a concept that only reason can think and to which no sensory intuition can be adequate. In the latter case the power of judgment's procedure is merely analogous to its procedure in schematizing. It agrees only in the rule of the procedure, not in the intuition itself, and thus only in the form of reflection, not its content.

Modern logicians have adopted a mistaken usage that distorts the meaning of *symbolic*: they oppose it to the *intuitive* way of representing. But symbolic representation is only one kind of intuitive representation. The intuitive can be divided into *schematic* and *symbolic* representation. [352] Both are hypotyposes, that is, presentations (*exhibitiones*), not mere *characterizations*. The latter designate concepts through accompanying sensory signs that contain nothing belonging to the intuition of the object. Under the imagination's law of associ-

ation, these signs serve only as means of reproducing the concepts, and thus serve a subjective purpose. They are either words or visible signs—algebraic, [A 256] or even gestural—as mere *expressions* for concepts[23].

All intuitions supplied for a priori concepts are therefore either *schemata* or *symbols*. The former contain direct presentations of the concept, the latter indirect ones. The former do this by demonstration, the latter through analogy, which can also use empirical intuitions. In analogy, the power of judgment performs a double task. First it applies the concept to the object of a sensory intuition. Then it applies the mere rule for reflecting on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented by a living body if it is governed by internal laws of the people, but by a mere machine, such as a hand mill, if governed by a single absolute will. In both cases it is represented only *symbolically*. There is no resemblance between a despotic state and a hand mill, but there is one between the rules for reflecting on the two and their causality. This procedure has so far been little analyzed, although [A 257] it deserves deeper investigation. This is not the place to pursue it. Our language is full of such indirect presentations through analogy. In them the expression contains not the actual schema for the concept, but only a symbol for reflection. Thus the words *ground*—support or base—*depend*—be held from above—*flow from*, instead of follow from, *substance*, which Locke calls the bearer of accidents, and countless others are not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes. They express concepts not through direct intuition, but only by analogy with it: by transferring reflection on [353] an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond. We may call a mere way of representing cognition if it is a principle not for theoretically determining what the object is in itself, but for practically determining what the idea of it should become for us and for its purposive use. If we do so, all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. Whoever takes it as schematic, with properties such as understanding and will that prove their objective reality only in beings within the world, falls into anthropomorphism. If he leaves out everything intuitive, he falls into [A 258] deism, through which nothing at all is cognized, even for practical purposes.

Now I say that beauty is the symbol of moral goodness. Only in this respect does it please us with a claim to everyone else's agreement—a relation natural to everyone, which everyone also expects of others as a duty. At the same time the mind is conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere receptivity to pleasure through sensory impressions. It also judges others' worth by a similar maxim of their power of judgment. This is the *intelligible* toward which taste looks, as the previous section indicated. Even our higher cognitive faculties agree in relation to it. Without it, their nature, compared with the claims taste makes, would produce nothing but contradictions. In this faculty the power of judgment does not, as in ordinary empirical judging, find itself subject to the heteronomy of laws of experience. Regarding objects of such pure liking, it gives itself the law, just as reason does regarding the faculty of desire. Both because of this inner possibility within the subject and because of the outer possibility of a nature agreeing with it, judgment finds itself referred to something within and outside the subject [A 259] that is neither nature nor freedom, yet is connected with the ground of freedom, the supersensible. In this, the theoretical and practical faculties are brought into unity in a shared but unknown way. We will give some points of this analogy while also noting their differences.

1) Beauty pleases *immediately*, though only in reflective [354] intuition, not in a concept as morality does. 2) It pleases *without any interest*. Moral goodness, by contrast, is necessarily connected with an interest, but not one that precedes the judgment of liking: the judgment first produces it. 3) In judging beauty, the imagination's *freedom*, and thus the freedom of our faculty's sensibility, is represented as agreeing with the lawfulness of the understanding. In a moral judgment the will's freedom is thought as its agreement with itself under universal laws of reason. 4) The subjective principle for judging beauty is represented as *universal*, valid for everyone, yet not identifiable through any universal concept. The objective principle of morality is also declared universal, valid for all subjects and for all actions of the same subject, but also identifiable through a uni-

versal concept. Thus [A 260] moral judgment is not only capable of definite constitutive principles; it is possible *only* by grounding maxims on those principles and their universality.

Ordinary understanding also commonly considers this analogy. We often give beautiful objects of nature or art names that seem to presuppose moral judgment. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or fields smiling and cheerful. Even colors are called innocent, modest, or tender, because they arouse sensations containing something analogous to awareness of a state of mind produced by moral judgments. Taste makes possible, as it were, a transition from sensory charm to habitual moral interest without too violent a leap. It represents imagination even in its freedom as capable of being determined purposively for the understanding. It even teaches us to find free satisfaction in objects of sense without sensory charm.

60 [A 261] *Appendix. On the Methodology of Taste.*

A critique preceding a science can be divided into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method. This division cannot be applied to the critique of taste, [355] because there is and can be no science of beauty, and a judgment of taste cannot be determined by principles. The scientific element in any art concerns *truth* in the presentation of its object. This is indeed an indispensable condition, a *conditio sine qua non*, of beautiful art, but it is not beautiful art itself. Beautiful art therefore has only a *manner* (*modus*), not a *method of teaching* (*methodus*). The master must show by doing what the pupil is to accomplish and how. The general rules under which he finally brings his procedure serve more to recall its main points when needed than to prescribe them. Yet a certain ideal must be considered, which art must keep in view although it never fully reaches it in practice. There are only certain ways to prevent the pupil from immediately treating the examples put before him as originals and models for imitation, subject to no higher standard or judgment of his own. These are to awaken his imagination into adequacy with a given concept, to point out the inadequacy of the [A 262] expression for the idea, which the concept itself does not reach because it is aesthetic, and to use rigorous criticism. Otherwise genius

would be stifled, and with it imagination's freedom even within its lawfulness. Without that freedom no beautiful art is possible, nor even a sound independent taste for judging it.

The preparation for all beautiful art, insofar as its highest perfection is intended, seems to lie not in prescriptions but in cultivating the mental powers through the preliminary studies called *humaniora*, or the humanities. Presumably this is because *humanity* means both a universal *feeling of sympathy* and the ability to *communicate* intimately and universally. Together these qualities constitute the sociability suited to humanity, distinguishing it from the limitations of animal life. Consider an age and a people in which an active drive toward *lawful* sociability, through which a people forms a lasting commonwealth, struggled with great difficulties. These surround the hard task of combining freedom, and therefore equality, with [A 263] constraint—a constraint based more on respect and submission from duty than on fear. Such an age and people had to [356] discover the art of mutual communication of ideas between the most educated part and the less cultivated part. They had to adjust the breadth and refinement of the former to the natural simplicity and originality of the latter. In this way they first discovered the middle ground between higher culture and self-sufficient nature. This also supplies the correct standard for taste as a universal human sense, a standard that cannot be stated through general rules.

A later age will hardly be able to dispense with those models. It will be increasingly distant from nature. In the end, without lasting examples of nature, it might scarcely be able to conceive the happy union, in one and the same people, of the lawful constraint of the highest culture with the strength and soundness of free nature conscious of its own worth.

But taste is fundamentally a faculty for judging the sensory presentation of moral ideas, through a certain analogy in reflection on both. From this, and from the greater receptivity it should establish for the feeling arising from moral ideas—the feeling called moral—comes the pleasure taste declares valid for humanity in general, not merely for each person's private feeling. [A 264] So it is clear that the true preparation for establishing taste is the development

of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling. Only when sensibility is brought into agreement with this can genuine taste assume a definite, unchanging form.

Of the [A 265] [357] Critique of the Power of Judgment

22 Any judgment announcing itself as universal can be called a reasoning judgment (*iudicium ratiocinans*), since to that extent it can serve as the major premise in an inference of reason. But only a judgment thought as the conclusion of such an inference, and therefore as grounded a priori, can be called a judgment of reason (*iudicium ratiocinatum*).

23 The intuitive element in cognition must be opposed to the discursive, not to the symbolic. The intuitive is either *schematic*, through *demonstration*, or *symbolic*, as representation through mere *analogy*.

PART II

Introduction to Teleological Judgment

Second Part. Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.

61 [A 267] [359] *On Nature's Objective Purposiveness.*

Transcendental principles give us good reason to assume a subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws: a suitability to being grasped by the human power of judgment and to the possibility of connecting particular experiences into a system. Among nature's many products, we can therefore expect as possible some that contain specific forms suited to our judgment, as if designed expressly for it. Through their variety and unity these forms serve, as it were, to strengthen and sustain the mental powers engaged in the play of this faculty. We therefore call them *beautiful* forms.

But the general idea of nature as the totality of objects of sense gives us no basis at all for saying that natural things serve one another as means to ends, or that their very possibility can be adequately understood only through this kind of causality. In the previous [A 268] case, the representation of things, being something in us, could quite well be thought a priori as fit and suitable for the internally purposive attunement of our cognitive faculties. But we have no grounds at all for presuming a priori how ends that are not ours, and that do not belong to nature either, since we do not assume nature to be an intelligent

being, can or should constitute a special kind of causality, or at least a quite distinctive lawfulness of it. Moreover, even experience cannot prove their actuality to us, unless a piece of reasoning has already smuggled the concept of an end into [360] the nature of things. Such reasoning does not draw that concept from the objects and our empirical cognition of them. It uses it more to make nature understandable by analogy with a subjective ground for connecting representations in us than to cognize nature from objective grounds.

Furthermore, objective purposiveness as a principle of the possibility of natural things is far from being *necessarily* connected with their concept. It is precisely what people chiefly appeal to in order to prove the contingency of nature and its form. For example, when they cite a bird's structure, its hollow bones, the position of its wings [A 269] for movement and its tail for steering, and so on, they say that all this would be highly contingent under nature's mere *nexus effectivus*, the connection of efficient causes, unless another special kind of causality were brought in: that of ends, the *nexus finalis*. That is, nature considered as mere mechanism could have formed itself differently in a thousand ways without arriving at unity according to such a principle. So we may hope to find even the slightest a priori ground for this only outside the concept of nature, not within it.

Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly included in natural investigation, at least as a possibility to consider. But this is only to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry by *analogy* with causality according to ends, not to claim to *explain* it that way. Such judging therefore belongs to the reflective, not the determining, power of judgment. The concept of natural connections and forms according to ends is at least *one more principle* for bringing nature's appearances under rules where the laws of causality according to mere mechanism do not suffice. We introduce a teleological ground when we attribute causality regarding an object to a concept of that object as though the concept were in nature, not in us. Or rather, we represent the object's possibility by analogy with such causality, [A 270] which we find in ourselves, and thus think nature as *technical* through its own capacity. Without attributing this way of operating to nature, we would have to represent its causality as blind

mechanism. But suppose we placed *intentionally* acting causes beneath nature, thereby making [361] teleology not merely a *regulative* principle for *judging* appearances, to which nature in its particular laws could be thought subject, but also a *constitutive* principle for *deriving* its products from their causes. Then the concept of a natural end would belong no longer to the reflective but to the determining power of judgment. In fact it would then not belong distinctively to judgment at all, as the concept of beauty as formal subjective purposiveness does. Instead, as a concept of reason, it would introduce a new causality into natural science, one we borrow only from ourselves and attribute to other beings without being willing to assume that they are of the same kind as we are.

PART II

Analytic of Teleological Judgment

First Division. [A 271] [362] *Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.*

62 *On Objective Purposiveness That Is Merely Formal, as Distinct from Material Purposiveness.*

All geometrical figures drawn according to a principle display a varied and often admired objective purposiveness. They are suited to solving many problems by a single principle, and sometimes to solving each of them in infinitely many different ways. The purposiveness here is plainly objective and intellectual, not merely subjective and aesthetic. It expresses the figure's suitability for producing many intended shapes, and is cognized through reason. Yet this purposiveness does not make the concept of the object itself possible. That is, the object is not regarded as possible only in view of this use.

A figure as simple as the circle contains the basis for [A 272] solving a host of problems, each of which on its own would require various preparations. The solution emerges almost by itself as one of this figure's infinitely many excellent properties. Suppose, for example, we want to construct a triangle from a given base and the angle opposite it. The problem is indeterminate: it can be solved in infinitely many ways. Yet the circle includes them all as the geometrical locus of every triangle meeting this condition. Or suppose two lines are to intersect so

that the rectangle formed from the two parts of one equals the rectangle formed from the two parts of the other. The solution appears very difficult. Yet all lines intersecting inside a circle whose [363] circumference bounds each of them divide themselves in this proportion. Other curved lines supply other purposive solutions that were not considered at all in the rule for constructing them. All the conic sections, considered on their own and in comparison with one another, are rich in principles for solving many possible problems, however simple the definition determining their concept may be.—It is a real pleasure to see the enthusiasm with which ancient geometers investigated the properties of lines [A 273] of this kind. They were not distracted by narrow-minded people asking what use this knowledge could have. They studied, for example, the parabola without knowing the law of gravity on earth, which would have supplied its application to the trajectory of heavy bodies whose directions of gravity during motion can be regarded as parallel. They studied the ellipse without suspecting that gravity also exists among heavenly bodies, and without knowing its law at different distances from the center of attraction, which makes them trace this line in free motion. While unknowingly working for posterity, they delighted in a purposiveness in the essence of things that they could nonetheless present as necessary entirely a priori. Plato, himself a master of this science, was carried away by such an original constitution of things, which we can discover without any experience, and by the mind's ability to draw the harmony of beings from their supersensible principle. Added to this were the properties of numbers, with which the mind plays in music. His enthusiasm raised him above empirical concepts to ideas that seemed to him explicable only through an intellectual communion with the source of all beings. No wonder he excluded those ignorant of geometry from his school, since [A 274] he thought he could derive from the pure intuition dwelling within the human mind what Anaxagoras inferred from objects of experience and their purposive connections. For here lies the ground of our great admiration of nature, not so much outside us as in our own reason: something purposive, arranged as if intentionally for our use, is necessary and nevertheless seems to belong origi-

nally to the essence of things without regard to our use. We can [364] well forgive this admiration for gradually rising, through misunderstanding, into extravagant enthusiasm.

Yet although this intellectual purposiveness is objective, unlike subjective aesthetic purposiveness, we can quite well understand its possibility, though only in general, as merely formal rather than real. That is, we can understand it as purposiveness without needing to assume an underlying end and therefore without needing teleology. The figure of a circle is an intuition determined by the understanding according to a principle. I freely adopt this principle and use it as the underlying concept. Its unity, applied to a form of intuition—space—which is likewise found in me merely as a representation, and indeed a priori, makes understandable the unity of the many rules that arise from constructing that concept and are purposive for many possible [A 275] aims. We need not place an *end*, or any other ground, beneath this purposiveness. The case differs from finding order and regularity in trees, flower beds, paths, and so on within a bounded collection of *things* outside me, such as a garden. I cannot hope to infer this a priori from my enclosing a space according to some chosen rule. These are existing things that must be given empirically to be cognized, not a mere representation in me determined according to an a priori principle. Thus the latter, empirical purposiveness, being *real*, depends on the concept of an end.

But we can also understand very well, and as legitimate, the ground of our admiration for a purposiveness perceived in the essence of things, insofar as their concepts can be constructed. The many rules whose unity under one principle arouses this admiration are all synthetic. They do not follow from a *concept* of the object, such as a circle, but require the object to be given in intuition. This gives their unity the appearance of having an empirical, external ground of the rules distinct from our power of representation. [A 276] The object's agreement with the understanding's need for rules thus seems contingent in itself, and possible only through an end expressly directed toward it. Yet [365] this very harmony should naturally lead us to a different conclusion. Despite all this purposiveness, we cognize it not empirically but a priori. The

space whose determination, through imagination in accordance with a concept, alone made the object possible must therefore be not a property of things outside me but a mere way of representing within me. Thus I *introduce purposiveness* into the figure I draw *in keeping with a concept*—that is, into my own way of representing what is given to me externally, whatever it may be in itself. I do not learn this purposiveness empirically from the object, and therefore need no special end outside me in the object to account for it. But this reflection already requires a critical use of reason, so it cannot be immediately included in judging an object's properties. Such judging directly supplies me only with a union of heterogeneous rules, even in their unlike features, under one principle. I nevertheless cognize this union a priori as true without requiring a special ground beyond my concept and, more generally, my a priori representation. [A 277] Now *astonishment* is the mind's shock at the incompatibility of a representation and the rule it supplies with principles already underlying the mind's activity. It therefore produces doubt whether we have seen or judged correctly. *Admiration* is astonishment that keeps returning even after this doubt disappears. The latter is thus a wholly natural effect of observing purposiveness in the essence of things as appearances. It cannot be criticized in this respect either. The agreement of that form of sensory intuition called space with the faculty of concepts, the understanding, is inexplicable to us as to why it is precisely this agreement and no other. Furthermore, it expands the mind to have, as it were, a presentiment of something beyond those sensory representations, in which, though unknown to us, their agreement's ultimate ground may lie. We need not know that ground when concerned only with the formal purposiveness of our a priori representations. But even having to look beyond them in that direction inspires admiration for the object that compels us to do so.

People commonly call the properties just mentioned, of both geometrical [366] figures and numbers, *beauty*, because of a certain a priori purposiveness for many uses in cognition that we would not expect from [A 278] the simplicity of their construction. For example, they speak of this or that *beautiful* property of a circle discovered in this or that way. But the judgment through which we find them purposive is not aesthetic. It is not judgment without a concept,

revealing a merely *subjective* purposiveness in the free play of our cognitive faculties. It is an intellectual judgment according to concepts, clearly revealing an objective purposiveness: suitability for all sorts of ends in infinite variety. We should call it a *relative perfection* rather than a beauty of the mathematical figure. Nor can the term *intellectual beauty* properly be allowed in general. Otherwise either beauty would lose all definite meaning or intellectual satisfaction would lose all advantage over sensory satisfaction. We could more readily call a *demonstration* of such properties beautiful. Through it the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, and the imagination, as the faculty for presenting them a priori, feel strengthened. Together with the precision reason supplies, this is called the demonstration's elegance. Here at least the liking, although grounded in concepts, is subjective, whereas perfection carries an objective [A 279] liking with it.

63 *On Nature's Relative Purposiveness, as Distinct from Its Internal Purposiveness.* Experience leads our power of judgment to the concept of objective and material purposiveness, that is, to the concept of an end of nature, only when we must judge a relation of cause to effect[24] that we find ourselves able to understand as lawful [367] only by placing the idea of the effect beneath the causality of its cause as the condition making that effect possible. This can happen in two ways: we can regard the effect directly as a product of art, or merely as material for the art of other possible natural beings. We thus regard it either as an end or as a means for the purposive use of other causes. The latter purposiveness is called usefulness for human beings, or benefit for any other [A 280] creature, and is merely relative. The former is an internal purposiveness of the natural being.

Rivers, for example, carry along various kinds of soil useful for plant growth, which they deposit sometimes inland and often at their mouths. At some coasts the rising tide carries this silt over the land or deposits it along the shore. Especially when people help prevent the ebb from carrying it away again, fertile land increases, and the plant kingdom gains room where fish and shellfish previously lived. Nature itself probably made most expansions of land of this kind

and still continues them, though slowly.—The question is whether we should judge this as an end of nature because it is useful to human beings. We cannot count its benefit to the plant kingdom itself, since sea creatures lose as much as the land gains.

Or take an example of certain natural things benefiting other creatures as means, if we presuppose those creatures as ends. No soil is more favorable to fir trees than sandy soil. Before withdrawing from the land, the ancient sea left so many stretches of sand in our northern regions that extensive fir forests could [A 281] grow on this ground, otherwise so useless for cultivation. We often accuse our ancestors of thoughtlessly destroying these forests. We may ask whether that ancient deposit of sandy layers was an end of nature for the sake of the fir forests possible on it. This much is clear: if we assume the forests to be an end of nature, we must admit the sand to be one too, but only a relative end, for which the old seashore and its retreat were in turn the means. For in the series of subordinate members of a purposive connection, every intermediate member must be considered an [368] end, though not a final end, for which its immediate cause is the means. Similarly, if cattle, sheep, horses, and so on were to exist in the world, grass had to grow on earth. Salt plants had to grow in sandy deserts if camels were to thrive, and these and other grass-eating animals had to exist in numbers if there were to be wolves, tigers, and lions. Objective purposiveness based on benefit is therefore not an objective purposiveness of things in themselves. It is not as if sand, considered on its own as an effect of its cause, the sea, could not be understood without attributing an end to the sea and regarding its effect, the sand, as a work of art. This purposiveness is merely relative, and merely contingent for the thing to which it is attributed. [A 282] Although the grasses in these examples must be judged on their own as organized natural products, and thus as artfully formed, in relation to the animals feeding on them they are regarded as mere raw material.

Still less can we assume even a relative natural end aimed at human use when human beings, through the freedom of their causality, find natural things beneficial to their often foolish intentions: brightly colored feathers to decorate their clothing, colored earths or plant juices as cosmetics. Sometimes they do so for

reasonable intentions too, using horses for riding, oxen for plowing, and in Minorca even donkeys and pigs. For human reason knows how to make things agree with arbitrary fancies for which nature did not even predestine human beings themselves. Only *if* we assume that human beings were meant to live on earth must at least the means be present without which they could not survive as animals, or even as rational animals, however low their degree of rationality. But then the natural things indispensable for this purpose would also have to be regarded as natural ends.

We can easily see from this that external purposiveness, the benefit of one thing for others, can be regarded as an external natural end only on condition that the [A 283] existence of what it benefits, immediately or indirectly, is itself an end of nature. But mere contemplation of nature can never establish this. It follows that relative purposiveness, [369] although it hypothetically indicates natural ends, never justifies an absolute teleological judgment.

Snow protects crops against frost in cold countries and makes communication between people easier through sleds. The Laplander finds animals there that make this communication possible: reindeer, which find sufficient food in dry moss they must scrape out from under the snow. Yet they are easily tamed and willingly let themselves be deprived of the freedom in which they could survive perfectly well. For other peoples in the same frozen zone, the sea contains an abundant supply of animals. Besides furnishing food and clothing, these animals provide fuel for warming their huts, while the sea virtually floats wood to them for their dwellings. Here we have an admirable convergence of many relations of nature upon one end: the Greenlander, the Lapp, the Samoyed, the Yakut, and so on. But we do not see why human beings must live there at all. So it would be a very rash and arbitrary judgment to say that *for this reason* vapors fall from the air as snow, [A 284] that the sea has currents carrying there the wood grown in warmer countries, and that large sea animals full of oil exist there, *because* the cause supplying all these natural products is based on the idea of benefiting certain poor creatures. Even if all this natural usefulness were absent, we would find nothing lacking in the adequacy of natural causes to that condition. Indeed, merely to demand such an arrangement and expect such an

end from nature would strike us as presumptuous and thoughtless, especially since only people's extreme inability to get along with one another can have scattered them into such inhospitable regions.

64 *On the Distinctive Character of Things as Natural Ends.*

To see that a thing is possible only as an end means having to seek the causality of its origin not in nature's mechanism but in a cause whose capacity to act is determined by concepts. [370] This requires that its form cannot be possible through mere natural laws: laws we can cognize through the understanding alone when applied to objects of sense. Instead, even empirical cognition of its cause and effect [A 285] must presuppose concepts of reason. This *contingency* of its form under all empirical natural laws, in relation to reason, is itself a ground for assuming its causality as if it were possible only through reason. For reason must cognize necessity in every form of a natural product even to understand the conditions connected with its production, yet it cannot assume this necessity in the given form. Reason is then the faculty of acting according to ends, a will; and the object represented as possible only through it would be represented as possible only as an end.

Suppose someone in a country that seems uninhabited noticed a geometrical figure drawn in the sand, perhaps a regular hexagon. As his reflection worked toward a concept of it, reason would make him aware, however dimly, of the unity of the principle of its production. Accordingly, he would not judge the sand, the nearby sea, the winds, the footprints of animals he knows, or any other nonrational cause to be a ground of the possibility of such a shape. The contingency of its agreeing with a concept possible only in reason [A 286] would seem so infinitely great to him that it would be as good as if there were no natural law for it at all. Thus no cause in merely mechanically acting nature, but only the concept of such an object as a concept that reason alone can supply and compare with the object, could contain the causality for such an effect. It could therefore be regarded entirely as an end, but not a natural end: as a product of *art—vestigium hominis video*, "I see a trace of a human being."

But to judge something we recognize as a natural product also as an end, and thus as a *natural end*, requires more, unless the very notion is contradictory. Provisionally I would say: a thing exists as a natural end *if it is both cause and effect of itself*, though in two different senses. [371] This involves a causality that cannot be connected with the mere concept of nature without attributing an end to it. Even then it can be thought without contradiction but cannot be comprehended. Before fully analyzing this idea of a natural end, we will first clarify its definition through an example.

First, a tree produces another tree according to a known natural law. But the tree it produces is of the same kind. [A 287] It thus produces itself with respect to its *kind*. As both effect and cause, continually produced by itself and likewise often producing itself, it constantly preserves itself as a kind.

Second, a tree also produces itself as an *individual*. We call this effect only growth. But growth must be understood here as wholly different from every other increase in size according to mechanical laws, and as equivalent to generation, though under another name. Before adding matter to itself, the plant processes it into a specifically characteristic quality that the mechanism of nature outside it cannot supply. It further develops itself through a material that, in its composition, is its own product. As regards the constituents it receives from external nature, the tree must indeed be regarded only as something drawn out of preexisting material. But in separating and recombining this raw material, natural beings of this kind show such originality in their power of separation and formation that all art remains infinitely far behind. This is so when art attempts to reproduce those products of the plant kingdom either from the elements it obtains by analyzing them or from the material nature supplies for their nourishment.

Third, a part of this creature also produces itself in such a way that [A 288] the preservation of each depends reciprocally on the preservation of the others. A bud at a tree's leaf, grafted onto another tree's branch, produces growth of its own kind on a different stock; so does a graft on another trunk. We can therefore regard each branch or leaf on the same tree as merely grafted or budded onto it: as a tree existing on its own that merely attaches itself to another and

feeds parasitically. [372] At the same time, although the leaves are products of the tree, they also preserve it in return. Repeated stripping of its leaves would kill it, and its growth depends on their effect on the trunk. I will mention only in passing nature's self-help in these creatures when injured: the other parts make up for a missing part that helped preserve its neighbors. There are also abnormal or malformed growths, in which certain parts take entirely new forms because of deficiencies or obstacles, in order to preserve what is there and produce an anomalous creature. These are among the most remarkable properties of organized creatures.

65 [A 289] *Things That Are Natural Ends Are Organized Beings.*

According to the characteristic given in the previous section, a thing that, as a natural product, is nevertheless to be recognized as possible only as a natural end must stand reciprocally to itself as cause and effect. This is a somewhat inexact and indeterminate expression that needs to be derived from a definite concept.

A causal connection thought merely through the understanding is a connection forming a series of causes and effects that always runs downward. The things that, as effects, presuppose others as their causes cannot at the same time reciprocally be causes of those others. This causal connection is called the connection of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). But we can also think a causal connection according to a concept of reason concerning ends. Regarded as a series, this would involve dependence both downward and upward. Something once designated as an effect would nevertheless, looking upward, deserve to be called a cause of the thing of which it is the effect. In practical matters, namely art, such connections are easy to find. A house, for example, is the cause of the money received [A 290] as rent; but conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of building the house. Such a causal connection is called a connection of final causes (*nexus finalis*). Perhaps the first could more suitably be called the connection of [373] real causes, and the second of ideal causes. These names would also convey that there can be no more than these two kinds of causality.

For a thing to be a natural end, *first* its parts must be possible, in their existence and form, only through their relation to the whole. The thing itself is an end, and is therefore included under a concept or idea that must determine a priori everything it is to contain. But insofar as a thing is thought possible only in this way, it is merely a work of art: the product of a rational cause distinct from its matter, its parts. That cause's causality in supplying and joining the parts is determined by its idea of a whole possible through them, not by nature outside it.

But a thing as a natural product is to contain a relation to ends within itself and its internal possibility. That is, it is to be possible only as a natural end, without the causality of concepts belonging to rational beings outside it. This requires, *second*, that its parts [A 291] combine into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of one another's form. Only in this way can the idea of the whole, conversely and reciprocally, determine the form and combination of all the parts. It does so not as a cause, since then the thing would be a product of art, but as a ground for the person judging it to cognize the systematic unity of the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given matter.

For a body to be judged in itself and in its internal possibility as a natural end, its parts must therefore reciprocally produce one another, in both their form and combination, and so produce a whole through their own causality. Conversely, the concept of this whole could be its cause according to a principle, in a being possessing the causality through concepts appropriate to such a product. Thus the connection of *efficient causes* could at the same time be judged as an *effect through final causes*.

In such a natural product, each part is thought as existing only *through* all the others, but also *for the sake of* the others and of the whole: as an instrument or organ. [374] But this is not enough, since it could also be an instrument of art [A 292] and thus represented as possible merely as an end in general. Rather, it must be thought as an organ *producing* the other parts, each therefore reciprocally producing the others. No instrument of art can be like this, but only an

instrument of nature, which supplies all material for instruments, including those of art. Only then and for that reason can such a product, as an *organized* and *self-organizing* being, be called a *natural end*.

In a watch, one part is the instrument for moving the others, but one wheel is not the efficient cause producing another. One part exists for another's sake, but not through it. The cause producing them and their form is therefore contained not in the nature of this matter but outside it, in a being able to act according to ideas of a whole possible through its causality. Thus one wheel in a watch does not produce another, still less does one watch produce other watches by using and organizing other matter. Nor does it replace missing parts by itself, make up for a deficiency in its original construction through the contribution of the remaining parts, or repair itself when out of order. Yet we can expect all this from organized nature.—An organized being is therefore not merely a machine, since a machine has only *motive* force. It possesses [A 293] *formative* force within itself, and one it communicates to materials that lack it, thereby organizing them. It thus has a self-propagating formative force that cannot be explained through the capacity for motion alone, through mechanism.

We say far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products when we call it an *analogue of art*. That makes us think of an artist, a rational being, outside nature. Instead, nature organizes itself. In each species of its organized products it does so according to one overall pattern, yet with suitable deviations required by self-preservation under the circumstances. Perhaps we come closer to this unfathomable property by calling it an *analogue of life*. But then we must either endow matter as mere matter with a property contradicting its essence—hylozoism—or associate it with a different kind of principle, a soul, *in communion with it*. [375] If such a product is to be a natural product, however, we must either already presuppose organized matter as that soul's instrument, thus making it no more understandable, or make the soul the artist of this structure and so remove the product from bodily nature. Strictly speaking, then, nature's [A 294] organization has no analogy with any causality we know[25]. Natural beauty can rightly be called an analogue of art, because we

attribute it to objects only in relation to reflection on their *external* intuition, and thus only because of the form of their surface. But *internal natural perfection*, possessed by things possible only as *natural ends* and therefore called organized beings, cannot be thought or explained by analogy with any physical or natural capacity known to us. Since we ourselves belong to nature in the broadest sense, not even human art supplies an exactly adequate analogy.

The concept of a thing as in itself a natural end is therefore not a constitutive concept of understanding or reason. Yet it can be a regulative concept for the reflective power of judgment. By a [A 295] distant analogy with our causality according to ends in general, it can guide investigation of objects of this kind and reflection on their supreme ground. The latter serves not knowledge of nature or its original ground, but rather that very faculty of practical reason in us by analogy with which we considered the cause of that purposiveness.

Organized beings are therefore the only beings in nature that, even considered on their own without relation to other things, must still be thought possible only as ends of nature. [376] They first give objective reality to the concept of an *end* that is not practical but an end *of nature*. They thereby provide natural science with the basis for a teleology: a way of judging its objects by a special principle. Otherwise we would have absolutely no right to introduce this into natural science, because we cannot understand a priori the possibility of such a kind of causality.

66 *On the Principle for Judging Internal Purposiveness in Organized Beings.*

This principle, which is also their definition, is: *An organized product of nature is one in which everything is* [A 296] *an end and reciprocally also a means.* Nothing in it is pointless, purposeless, or to be attributed to a blind mechanism of nature.

The occasion for this principle is indeed to be traced to experience, specifically experience conducted methodically, which is called observation. But because of the universality and necessity it asserts of such purposiveness, it cannot rest merely on empirical grounds. Some a priori principle must underlie it, even if

that principle were merely regulative, and those ends existed only in the judging person's idea and nowhere in an efficient cause. We can therefore call the above principle a *maxim* for judging the internal purposiveness of organized beings.

It is well known that those who dissect plants and animals assume as indispensably necessary the maxim that nothing in such a creature is *pointless*. They do so to investigate its structure and understand why and for what end it has such parts, such an arrangement and connection of parts, and precisely this internal form. They give this maxim the same authority as the principle of general natural science that *nothing happens by chance*. Indeed, they can no more renounce this teleological principle than the general physical one. Abandoning the latter would leave no experience at all; [A 297] abandoning the former would leave no guide for observing a kind of natural thing that we have once thought teleologically under the concept of natural ends.

377 For this concept leads reason into an entirely different order of things from that of mere natural mechanism, which no longer satisfies us here. An idea is to underlie the possibility of the natural product. But an idea is an absolute unity of representation, whereas matter is a plurality of things that cannot by itself supply any definite unity of composition. So if the unity of the idea is even to serve as an a priori determining ground of a natural law governing the causality of such a composite form, nature's end must extend to *everything* contained in its product. Once we refer such an effect *as a whole* to a supersensible determining ground beyond nature's blind mechanism, we must also judge it wholly by this principle. There is no ground for assuming that the form of such a thing still depends partly on mechanism. Mixing heterogeneous principles in that way would leave no secure rule for judging.

It may well be that some [A 298] parts of an animal body, such as skin, bones, and hair, could be understood as concretions according to merely mechanical laws. Yet the cause that supplies suitable matter, modifies and forms it in this way, and deposits it in its proper places must always be judged teleologically. Everything in the body must thus be regarded as organized, and everything is also, in a certain relation to the thing itself, an organ in turn.

67 *On the Principle of Teleologically Judging Nature in General as a System of Ends.*

We said above that the *external* purposiveness of natural things does not sufficiently justify using them as natural ends to explain their existence. Nor does it justify using the idea of their contingently purposive effects as grounds of their existence according to the principle of final causes. We cannot immediately regard *rivers* as natural ends because they promote communication between peoples inland; or *mountains*, because they contain the rivers' springs and the snow reserves that preserve them in rainless periods; or the *slope* of land, which drains these waters and lets the land [378] dry out. Although [A 299] this shape of the earth's surface was very necessary for the emergence and preservation of the plant and animal kingdoms, it has nothing in itself whose possibility forces us to assume causality according to ends. The same applies to plants that people use for need or pleasure, and to animals—camels, cattle, horses, dogs, and so on—which they use in so many ways for food or service and largely cannot do without. Where we have no reason to regard any of the things on its own as an end, their external relation can be judged purposive only hypothetically.

Judging a thing as a natural end because of its internal form is quite different from holding its existence to be an end of nature. The latter assertion requires not merely the concept of a possible end but knowledge of nature's final end (*scopus*). This requires a relation of nature to something supersensible that far exceeds all our teleological knowledge of nature. For the end of nature's own existence must be sought beyond nature. The internal form of a mere blade of grass can sufficiently prove to our human power of judgment that its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But suppose we leave this behind and consider only the use other natural beings make of it. [A 300] We abandon internal organization and consider only external purposive relations: grass is necessary for cattle, and cattle are necessary for human beings as a means to their existence. If we do not see why human beings need to exist at all—a question perhaps not easily answered if we think of the New Hollanders or Fuegians—we reach no categorical end. Instead, this whole purposive relation

rests on a condition that must always be pushed further back. Taken as unconditioned, as the existence of a thing as a final end, it lies entirely outside a physical-teleological view of the world. But such a thing is then not a natural end either, since it, or its whole kind, is not to be regarded as a natural product.

Only matter insofar as it is organized therefore necessarily carries with it the concept of a natural end, because this specific form of it is also a product of nature. But this concept [379] necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system according to the rule of ends. According to principles of reason, all nature's mechanism must be subordinated to this idea, at least to test natural appearances by it. This principle belongs to reason only subjectively, as a maxim: everything in the world is good for something; nothing in it is pointless. [A 301] The example nature gives in its organic products entitles us, indeed calls on us, to expect from nature and its laws nothing but what is purposive in the whole.

It is understood that this is a principle not for the determining but only for the reflective power of judgment: regulative, not constitutive. It gives us only a guide for considering natural things under a new lawful order in relation to an already given determining ground. It expands natural knowledge by another principle, that of final causes, without harming the principle of mechanism in nature's causality. Moreover, it by no means establishes whether anything we judge by this principle is *intentionally* an end of nature: whether grasses exist for cattle or sheep, or these and other natural things for human beings. It is good to consider from this side even things unpleasant to us and counterpurposive in particular relations. We might say, for example, that the vermin tormenting people in their clothes, hair, or beds are, through a wise natural arrangement, an incentive to cleanliness, itself an important means of preserving health. Or that mosquitoes and other biting insects that make America's wildernesses [A 302] so troublesome for the savages are so many spurs to activity for these developing human beings: to drain swamps, thin the dense forests that block the breeze, and thus, as well as by cultivating the soil, make their homes healthier. Even what seems unnatural in a person's internal organization, treated this way, opens an entertaining and sometimes instructive view

into a teleological order of things. Mere physical examination would not lead us to it without such a principle. Some judge that a tapeworm is given to the person or animal it inhabits as a kind of compensation for some deficiency in the vital organs. [380] Similarly, I would ask whether dreams might be a purposive arrangement of nature. Sleep never occurs without them, though we rarely remember them. While all the body's motive forces relax, dreams serve to move the vital organs deep within through the imagination and its great activity, which in this state generally rises to an affect. When the stomach is overfull and this movement all the more necessary, imagination also generally plays with greater liveliness in sleep. Thus, without this internally moving force and tiring restlessness for which we blame dreams—although [A 303] they may in fact be remedies—sleep even in a healthy state might amount to a complete extinguishing of life.

Natural beauty, too—the agreement of nature with the free play of our cognitive faculties in apprehending and judging its appearance—can in this way be regarded as objective purposiveness of nature as a whole: as a system in which the human being is one member. This is possible once teleological judging, through the natural ends supplied by organized beings, has entitled us to the idea of a great system of nature's ends. We can regard it as a favor[26] nature has shown us that it has distributed beauty and charms so abundantly beyond what is useful. We can love it for this, regard it with respect because of its immensity, and feel ourselves ennobled in contemplating it: [A 304] just as if nature had set up and decorated its magnificent stage expressly for this purpose. In this section we mean only this. Once we have discovered in nature a capacity to produce things we can think only through the concept of final causes, we may go further. We may judge even those products, or their purposive [381] relations, whose possibility does not require seeking a principle beyond the mechanism of blindly acting causes, as nevertheless belonging to a system of ends. The first idea already leads us, as regards its ground, beyond the sensible world. The unity of the supersensible principle must then be regarded as valid in the same way not merely for certain species of natural beings but for nature as a whole, as a system.

68 *On the Principle of Teleology as an Internal Principle of Natural Science.*

A science's principles are either internal to it and called native (*principia domestica*), or are founded on concepts that can have a place only outside it and are *foreign* principles (*peregrina*). Sciences containing the latter [A 305] base their doctrines on borrowed propositions, or *lemmata*. That is, they borrow a concept, and with it a ground for their arrangement, from another science.

Every science is a system in its own right. It is not enough to build within it according to principles, thus proceeding technically. We must also work on it architectonically, as a building standing on its own. We must treat it not as an extension and part of another building but as a whole in itself, even though we may afterward establish a passage from one to the other or in both directions.

So if we introduce the concept of God into natural science and its context to explain nature's purposiveness, and then use this purposiveness in turn to prove that God exists, neither science has inner stability. A deceptive circle makes both uncertain by allowing their boundaries to run into each other.

The expression "an end of nature" already sufficiently prevents this confusion, keeping natural science and the occasion it gives for *teleologically* judging its objects separate from the consideration of God and thus from a *theological* derivation. It is not unimportant whether we confuse that expression [A 306] [382] with "a divine end in the arrangement of nature," or even declare the latter more suitable and more appropriate to a devout soul, on the ground that we must ultimately derive those purposive natural forms from a wise author of the world. Instead, we must carefully and modestly restrict ourselves to the expression that says only what we know: an end of nature. Before we ask about the cause of nature itself, we find in nature and its course of production such products, generated within it under known empirical laws. Natural science must judge its objects by these laws, and must therefore also seek their causality according to the rule of ends within nature itself. It must not overstep its boundary by drawing into itself as a native principle something to whose concept no experience can be adequate, and which we are entitled to venture toward only after completing natural science.

Properties of nature that can be demonstrated a priori, and thus understood as possible from general principles without any contribution from experience, may carry a technical purposiveness. Yet because they are absolutely necessary, they cannot belong to the teleology of nature as a method within physics for solving its questions. Arithmetical [A 307] and geometrical analogies, as well as general mechanical laws, contain no claim to be teleological grounds of explanation in physics, however surprising and admirable we find the union in one principle of different rules seemingly quite independent of one another. They do deserve consideration in the general theory of the purposiveness of natural things as a whole. But that theory would belong elsewhere, to metaphysics, and would constitute no internal principle of natural science. With empirical laws of natural ends in organized beings, by contrast, it is not merely permissible but unavoidable to use the teleological *way of judging* as a principle of natural science concerning a particular class of its objects.

To stay strictly within its boundaries, physics therefore sets aside entirely the question whether natural ends are *intentional* or *unintentional*. That would interfere in a foreign field, [383] metaphysics. It is enough that these are objects *explainable* only under natural laws we can think solely with the idea of ends as a principle, and, as regards their inner form, [A 308] *cognizable* only in this way, indeed only internally. To avoid even the slightest suspicion of presuming to mix into our grounds of cognition something entirely outside physics, namely a supernatural cause, teleology speaks of nature as though its purposiveness were intentional. Yet it does so while attributing this intention to nature, that is, to matter. No misunderstanding can arise here, since no one would attribute intention in the proper sense to lifeless matter. The expression is meant to indicate only a principle of the reflective, not the determining, power of judgment. It is not to introduce a special ground of causality, but merely to add to reason's use a kind of investigation different from inquiry under mechanical laws. This supplements the inadequacy of the latter even for empirically seeking all nature's particular laws. So in teleology, insofar as it is included in physics, we quite rightly speak of nature's wisdom, economy, foresight, and beneficence without making it an intelligent being, which would be absurd. But we also do

not venture to place another intelligent being above it as its maker, since this would be presumptuous[27]. [A 309] Rather, these expressions are meant only to designate a kind of causality of nature by analogy with our own in the technical use of reason, keeping before us the rule for investigating certain natural products.

But why does teleology generally form no separate part of theoretical natural science, and instead serve as a preparation or transition to theology? This is done to keep the

384 study of nature according to its mechanism focused on what we can submit to observation or experiments in such a way that we could produce it ourselves as nature does, at least through similar laws. For we fully understand only as much as we can ourselves make and bring about according to concepts. But organization as an internal end of nature infinitely exceeds all capacity for a similar presentation through art. As for external natural arrangements considered purposive, [A 310] such as winds, rain, and the like, physics does consider their mechanism. But it cannot present their relation to ends insofar as this is supposed to be a condition necessarily belonging to the cause. This necessity of connection concerns entirely the connection of our concepts, not the constitution of things.

24 Pure mathematics concerns not the existence of things but only their possibility, namely an intuition corresponding to their concept, and thus cannot concern cause and effect at all. All purposiveness observed there must therefore be regarded as merely formal, never as a natural end.

25 Conversely, analogy with the immediate natural ends just mentioned can shed light on a certain connection found more in the idea than in actuality. Thus, in the recent attempt to transform a great people entirely into a state, the word *organization* has often been used very aptly for arranging the magistracies and even the whole body of the state. In such a whole, every member should indeed be not merely a means but also an end. As it helps make the whole possible, it should in turn be determined in its place and function by the idea of the whole.

26 In the aesthetic part we said that *we regard beautiful nature with favor*, since we take an entirely free, disinterested satisfaction in its form. In this mere judgment of taste we give no consideration to the end for which these natural beauties exist: whether to arouse pleasure in us or without any reference to us as ends. But in a teleological judgment we also attend to this relation. We can then *regard it as a favor from nature* that it has sought to advance our culture by displaying so many beautiful forms.

27 The German word *vermessen*, "presumptuous," is a good, meaningful word. A judgment in which we forget to estimate the reach of our powers, our understanding, can sometimes sound very humble, yet make great claims and be highly presumptuous. Most judgments pretending to exalt divine wisdom are of this sort when they attribute intentions to it in the works of creation and preservation that are really meant to do credit to the reasoner's own wisdom.

PART II

Dialectic of Teleological Judgment

Second Division. [A 311] [385] *Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.*

69 *What an Antinomy of the Power of Judgment Is.*

The *determining* power of judgment has no principles of its own grounding *concepts of objects*. It is not autonomous, since it merely *subsumes* under given laws or concepts as principles. For that very reason it is not exposed to any danger of an antinomy of its own, or any conflict between its principles. Thus the transcendental power of judgment, which contained the conditions for subsuming under categories, did not itself *give laws*. It merely stated the conditions of sensory intuition under which a given concept, as a law of the understanding, can be given reality or application. About these it could never disagree with itself, at least in principle.

But the *reflective* power of judgment is to subsume under a law [A 312] not yet given. This is therefore really only a principle for reflecting on objects for which, objectively, we entirely lack a law, or a concept of the object sufficient as a principle for the cases that occur. Now no use of the cognitive faculties can be permitted without principles. In such cases reflective judgment must therefore serve as its own principle. Since this principle is not objective and cannot supply a ground for cognizing the object sufficient for the purpose, it is to serve as a

merely subjective principle for the purposive use of the cognitive faculties: for reflecting on a kind of object. Reflective judgment therefore has its maxims regarding such cases, and indeed necessary ones for cognizing natural laws [386] in experience, in order to reach concepts through them. These may even be concepts of reason, if it absolutely needs them merely to become acquainted with nature according to its empirical laws.—A conflict, and thus an antinomy, can arise between these necessary maxims of reflective judgment. This grounds a dialectic which, if each of two opposing maxims is grounded in the nature of the cognitive faculties, can be called a natural dialectic: an [A 313] unavoidable illusion that the critique must expose and resolve so that it does not deceive us.

70 *Presentation of This Antinomy.*

Insofar as reason deals with nature as the totality of objects of the outer senses, it can rest on laws that the understanding partly prescribes to nature itself a priori, and can partly extend without limit through empirical determinations occurring in experience. To apply the first kind, the *universal* laws of material nature in general, judgment needs no special principle of reflection. Here it determines, because the understanding has given it an objective principle. But the particular laws known to us only through experience may exhibit such great variety and heterogeneity that judgment must serve as its own principle even to investigate and discover a law in natural appearances. It needs such a principle as a guide if it is even to hope for connected empirical cognition according to a thoroughgoing lawfulness of nature: nature's unity under empirical laws. Given this contingent unity of particular laws, it may happen that [A 314] judgment begins its reflection from two maxims. Mere understanding supplies one a priori; particular experiences prompt the other, bringing reason into play to judge bodily nature and its laws by a special principle. These two kinds of maxim then seem unable to coexist, [387] and a dialectic emerges that confuses judgment in the principle of its reflection.

Its *first maxim* is the *proposition*: all production of material things and their forms must be judged possible according to merely mechanical laws.

The *second maxim* is the *counterproposition*: some products of material nature cannot be judged possible according to merely mechanical laws. Judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes.

If we now turned these regulative principles for investigation into constitutive principles of the possibility of the objects themselves, they would read:

Proposition: all production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Counterproposition: some production of them is not possible according to merely mechanical [A 315] laws.

In this latter capacity, as objective principles for determining judgment, they would contradict each other, and one of the two propositions would necessarily be false. This would be an antinomy, but not of judgment; it would be a conflict in reason's legislation. Yet reason can prove neither principle, because we can have no a priori determining principle for the possibility of things according to merely empirical natural laws.

By contrast, the maxim of reflective judgment stated first actually contains no contradiction at all. If I say that I must *judge* all events in material nature, and thus all forms as its products, as possible according to merely mechanical laws, I do not say that they *are possible through these alone*, excluding every other kind of causality. It means only this: I *should* always *reflect* on them *according to the principle* of nature's mere mechanism and investigate them by it as far as I can. Unless mechanism underlies inquiry, no proper cognition of nature is possible. This does not prevent the second maxim from being used on occasion: namely, in the case of certain natural forms, and [A 316] through them even nature as a whole, to seek a principle and [388] reflect on them in a way entirely different from explanation through natural mechanism, according to the principle of final causes. Reflection according to the first maxim is not canceled by this; rather, we are commanded to pursue it as far as we can. Nor does this say that those forms could not be possible through nature's mechanism. It asserts only that *human reason*, by following that maxim in this way, can never find the slightest ground for what is distinctive in a natural end, though it can discover other knowledge of natural laws. It remains undecided whether, in nature's

inner ground unknown to us, the physical-mechanical connection and the purposive connection in the same things might unite in one principle. Our reason, however, cannot unite them in such a principle. Thus judgment, as *reflective* on a subjective ground, not as determining according to an objective principle of the possibility of things in themselves, is compelled to think a principle other than natural mechanism as the ground of the possibility of certain natural forms.

71 [A 317] *Preparation for Resolving the Above Antinomy.*

We can by no means prove that organized natural products cannot be produced through nature's mere mechanism. For we do not understand the first inner ground of the infinite variety of particular natural laws. These are contingent for us because we know them only empirically. We therefore cannot possibly reach the inner, thoroughly sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature, which lies in the supersensible. So does nature's productive capacity suffice just as well for what we judge as formed or connected according to the idea of ends as for what we think needs only nature's machinery? And do things as genuine natural ends, as we must necessarily judge them, actually rest on an entirely different kind of original causality, an architectonic understanding, that cannot be contained in material nature or its intelligible substrate? [389] Our reason can give absolutely no answer. It is very narrowly limited regarding the concept of causality when that concept is to be specified a priori.—But it is equally certain beyond doubt that, relative to our cognitive faculty, nature's mere mechanism cannot provide a ground for explaining the production [A 318] of organized beings. *For reflective judgment*, therefore, this is an entirely correct principle: to account for the quite evident connection of things according to final causes, we must think a causality different from mechanism, namely that of an intelligent world-cause acting according to ends. Yet *for determining judgment* the same principle would be hasty and unprovable. In the first case it is a mere maxim of judgment. The concept of that causality is a mere idea, to which we make no attempt to grant reality. We use it only as a guide for reflection, which remains open to all mechanical grounds of explanation and does not stray beyond the

sensible world. In the second case the principle would be an objective principle prescribed by reason, to which judgment would have to submit in determining objects. But in doing so it would stray beyond the sensible world into the transcendent and might be misled.

The entire appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of properly physical, mechanical explanation and teleological, technical explanation therefore rests on a confusion. We confuse a principle of reflective judgment with one of determining judgment, and the former's *autonomy*, which holds only subjectively for our use of reason regarding particular [A 319] empirical laws, with the latter's *heteronomy*, which must follow the universal or particular laws given by the understanding.

72 *On the Various Systems Concerning Nature's Purposiveness.*

No one has yet doubted the correctness of the principle that certain natural things, organized beings, and their possibility must be judged according to the concept of final causes. This holds even when we want only a *guide* for learning their constitution through observation, without venturing into investigation of their first origin. [390] The question can therefore only be whether this principle is merely subjectively valid, merely a maxim of our judgment, or is an objective principle of nature. On the latter account nature would have, besides its mechanism under mere laws of motion, another kind of causality: that of final causes, under which the moving forces would stand only as intermediate causes.

We could leave this speculative question or problem entirely undecided and unresolved. If we keep speculation within the boundaries of mere knowledge of nature, those maxims suffice for studying nature as far as human [A 320] powers reach and searching out its most hidden secrets. So it is probably a certain presentiment of our reason, or a hint seemingly given us by nature, that prompts us to leave natural investigation, in which we have not yet gone far, or at least suspend it for a time. We try first to discover where this stranger in nat-

ural science, the concept of natural ends, might lead. Perhaps through this concept of final causes we could even reach beyond nature and connect nature itself with the highest point in the series of causes.

Here, of course, the undisputed maxim would turn into a problem opening a wide field of controversy. Does the purposive connection in nature *prove* a special kind of causality for nature? Or, considered in itself and according to objective principles, is it rather identical with natural mechanism or based on the same ground? In some natural products this ground often lies too deeply hidden for our investigation. We therefore try a subjective principle, that of art, or causality according to ideas, and apply it to nature by analogy. This expedient succeeds in many cases and seems to fail in some. But in no case does it entitle us to introduce into natural science a special way of operating distinct from [A 321] nature's own causality according to merely mechanical laws. Let us call nature's procedure, its causality, technique because of the end-like character we find in its products. We will divide this into *intentional* technique (*technica intentionalis*) and *unintentional* technique (*technica naturalis*). The first means that nature's productive [391] capacity according to final causes must be regarded as a special kind of causality. The second means that it is fundamentally identical with nature's mechanism. Its accidental agreement with our concepts of art and their rules, which are merely subjective conditions for judging it, is then falsely interpreted as a special kind of natural production.

In discussing systems for explaining nature in terms of final causes, we must note that all their disputes are dogmatic. They concern objective principles of the possibility of things, whether through intentionally or entirely unintentionally acting causes. They do not concern a subjective maxim merely for judging the cause of such purposive products. In the latter case *disparate* principles could still be reconciled; in the former, *contradictorily opposed* principles cancel one another and cannot [A 322] coexist.

There are two kinds of system concerning nature's technique, its productive power according to the rule of ends: *idealism* and *realism* about natural ends. The former asserts that all purposiveness in nature is *unintentional*; the latter, that some of it, in organized beings, is *intentional*. From the latter we could also

draw the hypothetically grounded conclusion that nature's technique is intentional, and thus an end, even regarding all its other products in relation to nature as a whole.

1) *Idealism* about purposiveness, by which I always mean objective purposiveness here, is either an idealism of *chance* or of *fate* in nature's determination of its products' purposive forms. The first principle concerns matter's relation to the physical ground of its form, the laws of motion; the second its relation to its own and all nature's *hyperphysical* ground. Taken literally, the system of *chance* attributed to Epicurus or Democritus is so plainly absurd that it need not detain us. The system of fate, whose originator is said to be Spinoza although it appears much older, appeals to something supersensible, beyond our insight, [A 323] and is not so easy to refute, because its concept of the original being is entirely incomprehensible. But this much is clear: within it the purposive connection in the world must be assumed unintentional. [392] It is derived from an original being, but not from its understanding or therefore its intention. Instead, it is derived from the necessity of its nature and the world's unity arising from it. Fatalism about purposiveness is therefore also idealism about it.

2) *Realism* about nature's purposiveness is likewise either physical or hyperphysical. The *first* grounds ends in nature on an analogue of an intentionally acting capacity: the *life of matter*, either within matter itself or through an animating internal principle, a world-soul. This is called *hylozoism*. The *second* derives them from the original ground of the universe as an intelligent being producing intentionally and originally living. This is *theism*.[28]

73 [A 324] *None of the Above Systems Accomplishes What It Claims.*

What do all these systems want? They want to explain our teleological judgments about nature. One group proceeds by denying their truth, thus declaring them an idealism about nature represented as art. The other accepts them as true and promises to establish the possibility of a nature according to the idea of final causes.

1) The systems defending idealism about final causes in nature admit, on the one hand, a causality according to laws of motion in their principle, through which natural things exist purposively. But they deny its *intentionality*: [393] that it is intentionally determined to produce things purposively, or, in other words, that an end is the cause. This is Epicurus's explanation. It entirely denies any distinction between nature's technique and mere mechanics. Blind chance is assumed as the ground of explanation not only for the agreement of the products with our concepts of [A 325] ends, and thus for technique, but even for the determination of the causes of this production according to laws of motion, and thus for mechanics. Consequently nothing is explained, not even the appearance in our teleological judgment, and its alleged idealism is by no means established.

On the other hand, *Spinoza* wants to relieve us of all inquiry into the ground of the possibility of natural ends and deprive this idea of all reality. He treats them not as products at all but as accidents inhering in an original being. To this being, as the substrate of those natural things, he attributes not causality regarding them but merely subsistence. Because this being, together with all natural things as its inherent accidents, is unconditionally necessary, he secures for natural forms the unity of ground required for all purposiveness. But at the same time he removes their contingency, without which no *purposive unity* can be thought. With it he removes everything *intentional*, just as he removes all understanding from the original ground of natural things.

But Spinozism does not accomplish what it wants. It wants to explain the purposive connection of natural things, which it does not deny, but merely names the unity of the subject in which they all inhere. Even if we grant it this way of existing for beings in the world, [A 326] that ontological unity is not immediately *purposive unity* and by no means makes the latter understandable. Purposive unity is a quite special kind of unity. It does not follow from the connection of things, worldly beings, in one subject, the original being. It necessarily involves a relation to a *cause* possessing understanding. Even if we united all these things in a simple subject, this would never present a purposive relation unless we thought them, first, as internal *effects* of substance as a *cause*, and sec-

ond, of that same substance as a cause *through its understanding*. Without these formal conditions all unity is mere natural necessity. If nonetheless attributed to things we [394] represent as external to one another, it is blind necessity. Suppose, however, we call what the schools name the transcendental perfection of things, in relation to their own essence, nature's purposiveness. According to that perfection, all things contain everything required to be that thing and no other. This is childish play with words instead of concepts. If all things must be thought as ends, so that being a thing and being an end are the same, then fundamentally nothing deserves to be represented specifically as an end.

From this we can see Spinoza's intention. By tracing our concepts [A 327] of purposiveness in nature back to our consciousness of ourselves within an all-encompassing yet simple being, and seeking that form merely in this being's unity, he must have meant to assert not realism but only idealism about nature's purposiveness. Yet he could not establish even that, because the mere representation of the unity of the substrate cannot produce even the idea of unintentional purposiveness.

2) Those who not only assert *realism* about natural ends but also think they can explain it believe they can understand, at least as possible, a special kind of causality: intentionally acting causes. Otherwise they could not undertake to explain those ends. For even the boldest hypothesis requires that the *possibility* of what we assume as a ground be *certain*, and that we can secure objective reality for its concept.

But we cannot even think the possibility of living matter. Its concept contains a contradiction, since lifelessness, *inertia*, constitutes matter's essential character. The possibility of animated matter, and of the whole of nature as an animal, can be used only inadequately [A 328] for a hypothesis about nature's purposiveness on the large scale, insofar as experience reveals it to us in nature's organization on the small scale. We cannot understand its possibility a priori. So we must reason in a circle if we try to derive nature's purposiveness in organized beings from the life of matter, while knowing this life itself only in organized

beings, and thus being unable [395] to form any concept of its possibility without such experience. Hylozoism therefore does not accomplish what it promises.

Finally, *theism* can no more establish dogmatically the possibility of natural ends as a key to teleology. It does have an advantage over all other grounds of explanation: by attributing an understanding to the original being, it best rescues nature's purposiveness from idealism and introduces an intentional causality for producing it.

But to be entitled to place the ground of purposive unity definitely beyond nature, we would first have to prove, sufficiently for determining judgment, that such unity in matter is impossible through its mere mechanism. Yet we can establish only this: given the constitution and limits of our cognitive faculties, since we do not understand the first inner ground even of this mechanism, we [A 329] must not seek a principle of definite purposive relations in matter in any way. No other way remains for us to judge the production of its products as natural ends than through a supreme understanding as world-cause. But this is a ground only for reflective, not determining, judgment, and can justify absolutely no objective assertion.

74 *The Reason We Cannot Treat the Concept of a Technique of Nature Dogmatically Is That a Natural End Cannot Be Explained.*

We treat a concept dogmatically, even if it is empirically conditioned, when we regard it as contained under another concept of the object that constitutes a principle of reason, and determine it accordingly. We treat it merely critically when we consider it only in relation to our cognitive faculty, and thus to the subjective conditions for thinking it, without undertaking to decide anything about its object. Dogmatic treatment of a concept is therefore lawful for determining judgment; critical treatment is lawful only for reflective judgment.

396 Now the concept of a thing as a natural end is a concept [A 330] that subsumes nature under a causality thinkable only through reason, in order to judge by this principle what experience gives us of the object. But to use it dogmatically for determining judgment, we would first have to be assured of this concept's

objective reality, since otherwise we could subsume no natural thing under it. The concept of a thing as a natural end is indeed empirically conditioned: possible only under certain conditions given in experience. Yet it cannot be abstracted from experience, but is possible only in judging the object according to a principle of reason. As such a principle, therefore, it cannot be understood or dogmatically established in its objective reality, that is, as regards whether an object conforming to it is possible. We do not know whether it is a merely reasoning and objectively empty concept (*conceptus ratiocinans*), or a concept of reason that grounds cognition and is confirmed by reason (*conceptus ratiocinatus*). So it cannot be treated dogmatically for determining judgment. That is, we cannot decide whether natural things considered as natural ends require a quite special kind of causality, according to intentions, for their production. We cannot even ask that question, because reason cannot prove the objective reality of the concept of a [A 331] natural end. The concept is not constitutive for determining judgment, but merely regulative for reflective judgment.

That it is not constitutive is clear from this: as the concept of a *natural product*, it includes natural necessity, yet also the contingency of the object's form in relation to mere natural laws, in the very same thing as an end. To avoid contradiction, it must therefore contain both a ground of the thing's possibility in nature and a ground of the possibility of this nature itself and its relation to something that is not empirically knowable nature. This something is supersensible and thus entirely unknowable to us. The concept must contain these grounds if the thing is to be judged according to a kind of causality other than natural mechanism when we seek to establish its possibility. Thus the concept of a thing as a natural end is transcendent *for determining judgment* when we consider the object through reason, although it may be immanent for reflective judgment concerning [397] objects of experience. Objective reality therefore cannot be secured for it for determining judgments. From this we can understand why every system we might devise for dogmatically treating the concept of natural ends and of nature as [A 332] a whole connected through final causes can decide nothing, either by objectively affirming or by objectively denying. When things are subsumed under a merely problematic concept, its

synthetic predicates must yield equally problematic judgments about the object, whether affirmative or negative. Here, for example, the predicate concerns whether the end we think nature has in producing things is intentional or unintentional. We do not know whether we are judging something or nothing. The concept of causality through ends, that of art, certainly has objective reality, as does causality according to nature's mechanism. But the concept of nature's causality according to the rule of ends, and still more that of a being that cannot be given to us in experience at all as nature's original ground, can be thought without contradiction yet cannot serve for dogmatic determinations. Its objective reality can be secured by nothing, since it cannot be drawn from experience and is not required for the possibility of experience either. Even if it could, how could I still count as natural products things explicitly declared products of divine art, when nature's inability to produce such things under its [A 333] laws is precisely what required appeal to a cause distinct from it?

75 *The Concept of Nature's Objective Purposiveness Is a Critical Principle of Reason for Reflective Judgment.*

There is a great difference between saying that certain natural things, or even all of nature, can be produced only by a cause that determines itself to act according to intentions, and saying this: *given the distinctive constitution of my cognitive faculties*, I can judge the possibility of those things and their [398] production only by thinking, as the cause of this production, an intentionally acting cause, a being productive by analogy with the causality of an understanding. In the first case I seek to establish something about the object and am obliged to demonstrate the objective reality of an assumed concept. In the second, reason determines only the use of my cognitive faculties in keeping with their distinctive character and the essential conditions of both their range and their limits. The first principle is therefore an *objective* principle for determining judgment; the second is a subjective principle only for reflective judgment, and thus a maxim [A 334] that reason imposes on it.

We indispensably need to place the concept of an intention beneath nature if we are to investigate even its organized products through continued observation. So this concept is already an absolutely necessary maxim for our reason's empirical use. Clearly, once such a guide for studying nature has been adopted and found reliable, we must at least try this maxim of judgment on nature as a whole. It may enable us to discover further laws that would otherwise remain hidden because our insight into the inner workings of nature's mechanism is limited. In this latter use, however, the maxim is useful but not indispensable, because nature as a whole is not given to us as organized in the strict sense stated above. By contrast, this maxim of reflective judgment is essentially necessary for those natural products that must be judged as intentionally formed this way and no other even to gain empirical knowledge of their internal constitution. For the very thought of them as organized things is impossible without connecting it with the thought of intentional [A 335] production.

Now the concept of a thing whose existence or form we represent as possible on condition of an end is inseparably connected with the concept of its contingency under natural laws. Natural things that we find possible only as ends therefore provide the chief proof of the contingency of the world as a whole. They are the only ground of proof valid equally for ordinary understanding [399] and for the philosopher that the world depends on and originates from a being existing outside it, and indeed, because of that purposive form, an intelligent being. Thus teleology finds a complete answer to its inquiries only in a theology.

But what does even the most complete teleology ultimately prove? Does it prove that such an intelligent being exists? No. It proves only that, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and thus by connecting experience with reason's highest principles, we can form no concept of the possibility of such a world except by thinking a supreme *intentionally acting* cause of it. Objectively, then, we cannot establish the proposition that an intelligent original being exists. We can establish it only subjectively for the use of our judgment in reflecting on the ends [A 336] in nature, which can be thought according to no principle other than the intentional causality of a highest cause.

If we sought to establish that highest proposition dogmatically on teleological grounds, we would become entangled in difficulties from which we could not escape. Such inferences would have to rest on the proposition that organized beings in the world are possible only through an intentionally acting cause. We would inevitably have to assert that, because we can trace these things in their causal connection and cognize its lawfulness only under the idea of ends, we are entitled to presuppose this for every thinking and cognizing being as a necessary condition belonging to the object, not merely to our subject. But we cannot sustain such an assertion. We do not actually *observe* nature's ends as intentional. We merely *add in thought* this concept as a guide for judgment when reflecting on its products. So they are not given to us by the object. It is even impossible for us a priori to justify accepting such a concept in its objective reality. Thus the proposition remains entirely based only on subjective conditions, [A 337] namely reflective judgment suited to our cognitive faculties. Expressed as objectively and dogmatically valid, it would read: there is a God. But for [400] us human beings only this limited formula is permitted: we cannot think or make understandable the purposiveness that must underlie even our cognition of the internal possibility of many natural things except by representing it, and the world in general, as a product of an intelligent cause, a God.

Now if this proposition, grounded on an unavoidably necessary maxim of our judgment, fully satisfies every speculative and practical use of our reason for every *human* purpose, I would like to know what we lose by being unable to prove it valid for higher beings as well, from purely objective grounds that unfortunately exceed our capacity. It is quite certain that we cannot even adequately know organized beings and their internal possibility through merely mechanical principles of nature, much less explain them. This is so certain that we can boldly say it is absurd for human beings even to conceive such a plan, or to [A 338] hope that a Newton might someday arise who could make understandable even the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws arranged by no intention. We must absolutely deny human beings this insight. But it would also be presumptuous to judge that nature, if we could penetrate to its principle for specifying its known universal laws, *could not* conceal a suffi-

cient ground for the possibility of organized beings without an intention underlying their production, and thus in its mere mechanism. How could we know that? Probabilities have no place here, where judgments of pure reason are concerned.—So we cannot judge objectively, either affirmatively or negatively, whether an intentionally acting being as world-cause, and thus as author, underlies what we rightly call natural ends. Only this much is certain: if we are to judge at least according to what our own nature permits us to understand, under the conditions and limits of our reason, we can place nothing but an intelligent being beneath the possibility of those natural ends. This alone agrees with the maxim of our reflective judgment, and thus with a subjective ground [A 339] [401] inseparably attached to the human species.

76 *Remark.*

The following consideration very much deserves detailed development in transcendental philosophy. Here it may enter only as a digression to clarify, not to prove, what has been presented.

Reason is a faculty of principles, and its ultimate demand aims at the unconditioned. The understanding, by contrast, always serves it only under a certain condition that must be given. But without concepts of the understanding, to which objective reality must be given, reason cannot judge objectively or synthetically at all. As theoretical reason it contains by itself absolutely no constitutive principles, only regulative ones. We soon realize that where the understanding cannot follow, reason becomes transcendent. It puts forward well-grounded ideas as regulative principles, but not objectively valid concepts. The understanding cannot keep pace with it, yet would be needed for validity regarding objects. It therefore restricts the validity of reason's ideas to the subject, though universally to all subjects of that kind. That is, it restricts them to this condition: given the nature of our human cognitive faculty, or even the concept *we can form* of the faculty of a finite rational being in general, we can and must think only in this way. Yet this does not assert that the ground of such a judg-

ment [A 340] lies in the object. We will give examples. They are too important and difficult to press on the reader here as already proved propositions, but they can provide material for thought and help clarify our particular task here.

The human understanding unavoidably needs to distinguish the possibility of things from their actuality. The ground lies in the subject and in the nature of its cognitive faculties. If their exercise did not require two entirely heterogeneous elements—understanding for concepts and sensory intuition for objects corresponding to them—there would be no such distinction [402] between the possible and the actual. If our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects except the actual. Both concepts, which concern only the possibility of an object, and sensory intuitions, which give us something without thereby letting us cognize it as an object, would disappear. Now our entire distinction between the merely possible and the actual rests on this: the former means only positing the representation of a thing relative to our concept and to our faculty of thought in general; the latter means positing the thing in itself, outside that concept. Thus the distinction between possible and actual things holds merely subjectively for the human understanding. We can still have something in thought although it does not exist, or represent something as given although we have no concept of it yet. So the propositions that things can be possible without being actual, and that actuality therefore cannot be inferred from mere possibility, hold entirely correctly for human [A 341] reason without proving that this distinction lies in things themselves. That we cannot draw this inference, and that those propositions therefore hold for objects insofar as our sensory-conditioned cognitive faculty deals with objects of sense, but not for things in general, is clear from reason's unceasing demand. It requires us to assume something, the original ground, as existing unconditionally necessarily, in which possibility and actuality are no longer to be distinguished. Our understanding has absolutely no concept for this idea: it can discover no way to represent such a thing and its way of existing. For if it *thinks* the thing, however it may think it, the thing is represented merely as possible. If it is conscious of the thing as given in intuition, the thing is actual, without the understanding thinking anything about possibility in doing so. The concept of an absolutely

necessary being is therefore an indispensable idea of reason but a problematic concept beyond the human understanding's reach. It nevertheless holds for the use of our cognitive faculties according to their distinctive constitution, but not of the object and thus for every cognizing being. I cannot presuppose in every such being thought and intuition as two different conditions for exercising its cognitive faculties, and thus for the possibility and actuality of things. [403] For an understanding in which this distinction did not occur, the statement would be: all objects I cognize *are*, or exist. The possibility of some that nevertheless did not exist—and thus their contingency if they do exist, as well as the necessity distinguished from that contingency—could not enter the representation of such a being at all. [A 342] What makes it so difficult for our understanding to match reason here with its concepts is only this: for it as a human understanding, what reason makes a principle as belonging to the object is transcendent, that is, impossible under the subjective conditions of its cognition.—Here the maxim always holds that wherever cognition of objects exceeds the understanding's capacity, we think them according to the subjective conditions for exercising our faculties necessarily attached to our human nature. If judgments made this way cannot be constitutive principles determining the object as it is constituted—and with transcendent concepts they cannot be—then they still remain regulative principles, immanent and reliable in use, and suited to human purposes.

Just as reason, in considering nature theoretically, must assume the idea of the unconditioned necessity of nature's original ground, so in practical matters it presupposes its own causality as unconditioned in relation to nature: freedom. It does so in being conscious of its moral command. Here, however, an action's objective necessity as a duty is opposed to the necessity it would have as an event if its ground lay in nature rather than freedom, the causality of reason. An action absolutely necessary morally is regarded physically as entirely contingent: what necessarily *ought* to happen often does not happen. So it is clear that only the subjective constitution of our practical faculty requires us to represent moral laws as commands, and actions conforming to them [A 343] as duties. This is why reason expresses their necessity not as a *being* or happening but as

an ought-to-be. This would not occur if reason were considered, in its causality, without sensibility as a subjective condition of its application to natural objects: as a cause in an intelligible [404] world agreeing throughout with the moral law. There would then be no difference between ought and action, between a practical law of what is possible through us and a theoretical law of what is actual through us. Such an intelligible world, where everything would be actual merely because it is possible as something good, and even freedom as its formal condition, are transcendent concepts for us. They cannot serve as a constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality. Nevertheless, given our partly sensory nature and capacity, freedom serves as a universal *regulative* principle for us and for all rational beings connected with the sensible world, insofar as we can represent them according to the constitution of our reason. This principle does not objectively determine the constitution of freedom as a form of causality. Rather, with no less validity than if it did, it makes the rule of actions according to that idea into commands for everyone.

Similarly, in the present case we can grant that we would find no distinction between natural mechanism and nature's technique, its purposive connection, if our understanding were not of a kind that must proceed from the universal to the particular. Judgment therefore cannot cognize any [A 344] purposiveness in the particular, and thus cannot make determining judgments, without a universal law under which to subsume it. But the particular as such contains something contingent in relation to the universal. Yet reason also requires unity, and thus lawfulness, in the connection of particular natural laws; this lawfulness of the contingent is called purposiveness. And it is impossible a priori to derive particular laws from universal ones, as regards their contingent content, by determining the concept of the object. Thus the concept of nature's purposiveness in its products is necessary for human judgment regarding nature, but does not concern the determination of the objects themselves. It is therefore a subjective principle of reason for judgment. As regulative, not constitutive, it holds just as necessarily for our *human judgment* as if it were an objective principle.

77 [405] *On the Distinctive Character of the Human Understanding That Makes the Concept of a Natural End Possible for Us.*

In the remark we cited distinctive features of our cognitive faculty, even its higher part, which we are easily tempted to transfer to things themselves as objective predicates. But these concern ideas for which no adequate object can be given in experience [A 345] and which could then serve only as regulative principles in pursuing experience. The concept of a natural end is similar as regards the cause making such a predicate possible, which can lie only in the idea. But the consequence conforming to it, the product itself, is nevertheless given in nature. The concept of nature's causality as that of a being acting according to ends seems to make the idea of a natural end into a constitutive principle of that product. In this it differs from all other ideas.

But the difference consists in this: the idea is a principle of reason not for the understanding but for judgment. It therefore concerns only the application of an understanding in general to possible objects of experience, specifically where judgment can be not determining but merely reflective. The object is indeed given in experience, but we cannot make even a *determinate judgment* about it according to the idea, much less a fully adequate one; we can only reflect on it.

So this concerns a distinctive feature of *our* human understanding in relation to judgment as it reflects on natural things. If so, the idea of another possible understanding than the human must underlie it. [A 346] Similarly, in the Critique of Pure Reason we had to think of another possible intuition if ours was to count as a particular kind, namely one for which objects count only as appearances. This enables us to say: given the particular constitution of our understanding, certain natural products *must be regarded by us*, in their possibility, as produced intentionally and as ends. Yet we do not thereby require that a special [406] cause actually exists whose determining ground is the representation of an end. Nor do we deny that another, higher understanding than the human might find the ground of the possibility of such natural products even in nature's mechanism: in a causal connection for which an understanding is not exclusively assumed as cause.

What matters here, then, is the relation of *our* understanding to judgment. We seek a certain contingency in our understanding's constitution in order to mark its distinctive character as opposed to other possible understandings.

This contingency is found quite naturally in the *particular* that judgment is to bring under the *universal* in concepts of the understanding. The particular is not determined by the universal of *our* human understanding. It is contingent in how many [A 347] different ways things that agree in a common characteristic can appear in our perception. Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, a discursive understanding. For it, therefore, the kind and great variety of the particular that may be given to it in nature and brought under its concepts must be contingent. But cognition also requires intuition. A faculty of *complete spontaneity of intuition* would be a cognitive faculty distinct from sensibility and entirely independent of it, and thus understanding in the most general sense. So we can also think an *intuitive* understanding, negatively, merely as nondiscursive. It would not proceed from the universal to the particular and then to the individual through concepts. For it there would be none of that contingency in nature's agreement in its products under *particular* laws with the understanding which makes it so difficult for ours to bring nature's manifold into the unity of cognition. Our understanding can accomplish this only through the highly contingent agreement of natural characteristics with our faculty of concepts. An intuitive understanding does not need this.

Our understanding thus has this distinctive feature in relation to judgment: in [A 348] cognition through it, the particular is not determined by the universal and cannot therefore be derived from the universal alone. Yet this particular in nature's manifold [407] is to agree with the universal through concepts and laws so that it can be subsumed under it. Under these circumstances this agreement must be highly contingent and without a definite principle for judgment.

To be able at least to think the possibility of such an agreement of natural things with judgment—an agreement we represent as contingent, and thus possible only through an end directed toward it—we must also think another understanding. In relation to this understanding, and before attributing any

end to it, we can represent as *necessary* that agreement of natural laws with our judgment which our understanding can think only through the connecting means of ends.

Our understanding has the characteristic that in its cognition, for example of a product's cause, it must proceed from the *analytically universal*, from concepts, to the particular, the given empirical intuition. In doing so it determines nothing about the latter's manifold content. It must instead await this determination for judgment [A 349] from subsuming the empirical intuition under the concept, when the object is a natural product. But we can also think an understanding that, being intuitive rather than discursive like ours, proceeds from the *synthetically universal*, the intuition of a whole as such, to the particular: from the whole to the parts. Such an understanding and its representation of the whole would not contain the *contingency* of the parts' connection in making a definite form of the whole possible. Our understanding needs this contingency, since it must proceed from the parts as universally conceived grounds to different possible forms, to be subsumed under them as consequences. Given our understanding's constitution, however, a real whole of nature can be regarded only as the effect of the combined moving forces of its parts. Suppose, then, we wish to represent not the possibility of the whole as dependent on the parts, as suits our discursive understanding, but the possibility of the parts, in their constitution and connection, as dependent on the whole, after the manner of an intuitive, archetypal understanding. Given this same distinctive character of our understanding, this cannot mean that the whole contains the ground making the parts' connection possible, which would contradict the discursive mode of cognition. It can mean only that the [408] *representation* of a whole contains the ground making its form [A 350] and the connection of parts belonging to it possible. The whole would then be an effect, a *product*, whose *representation* is regarded as the *cause* of its possibility. But a product of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of its effect is called an end. It follows that it is merely a consequence of our understanding's particular constitution that we represent natural products as possible only through a kind of causality other than that of matter's natural

laws: the causality of ends and final causes. This principle concerns not the possibility of such things themselves through this mode of production, even considered as phenomena, but only the way of judging them possible for our understanding. We can also see why, in natural science, an explanation of natural products through causality according to ends leaves us far from satisfied. For in such an explanation we ask to judge natural production merely in a way suited to our faculty for judging it—that is, reflective judgment—not to the things themselves for determining judgment. Nor need we prove that such an *intellectus archetypus*, an archetypal understanding, is possible. We need show only that contrasting our discursive understanding, which needs images—*intellectus ectypus*—and the [A 351] contingency of its constitution leads us to that idea of an *intellectus archetypus*, and that this idea contains no contradiction.

Now if we consider a material whole, in its form, as a product of its parts and their forces and capacities for combining on their own, adding in thought other materials they supply to one another, we represent a mechanical mode of producing it. But in this way we obtain no concept of a whole as an end whose internal possibility necessarily presupposes the idea of a whole, on which even the constitution and operation of the parts depend. Yet this is how we must represent an organized body. As just shown, it does not follow that the mechanical production of such a body is impossible. That would mean that *every understanding* would find it impossible, or contradictory, to represent such unity in the connection of the manifold unless the idea of this unity were also its producing cause: unless it were intentionally produced. This [409] would indeed follow if we were entitled to regard material beings as things in themselves. Then the unity grounding the possibility of natural formations would be solely the unity of space. But space is not a real ground of production, [A 352] only its formal condition. It does have some resemblance to the real ground we seek, since no part in it can be determined except in relation to the whole, whose representation therefore underlies the possibility of the parts. Yet it is at least possible to regard the material world as mere appearance and to think something as a thing in itself, which is not appearance, as its substrate, and to supply this with a corresponding intellectual intuition, even if not our

own. There would then be a supersensible real ground for nature, though unknowable to us. We ourselves belong to this nature. We would therefore consider what is necessary in nature as an object of sense under mechanical laws. At the same time we would consider the agreement and unity of its particular laws and the forms under them—which we must judge contingent in relation to those mechanical laws—in nature as an object of reason, indeed in all nature as a system, under teleological laws. We would judge nature by two principles without teleological explanation excluding mechanical explanation as if they contradicted each other.

From this we can also understand something that otherwise we might easily suspect but could hardly assert and prove with certainty: [A 353] a principle for mechanically deriving purposive natural products can coexist with the teleological principle, but can never make the latter dispensable. In a thing we must judge as a natural end, an organized being, we can try all known laws of mechanical production and those still to be discovered. We may hope to make good progress with them. Yet we can never dispense with appeal to a wholly different ground of production, causality through ends, for the possibility of such a product. No human reason, nor any finite reason qualitatively like ours however much greater in degree, can ever hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass from merely mechanical causes. For the teleological connection of causes and [410] effects is entirely indispensable to judgment for the possibility of such an object, even merely to study it with experience as a guide. A sufficient ground relating to ends cannot be found for external objects as appearances. This ground, though also lying in nature, must be sought only in nature's supersensible substrate, into which all possible insight is barred to us. Thus we cannot possibly draw grounds for explaining [A 354] purposive connections from nature itself. Given the constitution of the human cognitive faculty, we must seek their highest ground in an original understanding as world-cause.

78 *On Uniting the Principle of Matter's Universal Mechanism with the Teleological Principle in Nature's Technique.*

It matters immensely to reason not to abandon nature's mechanism in its productions or pass over it in explaining them, because without it we can gain no insight into the nature of things. Even if we are granted that a highest architect directly created natural forms as they have always existed, or predetermined those that continually develop in nature's course according to the same pattern, this does not advance our knowledge of nature in the least. We do not know that being's way of acting or its ideas, which are supposed to contain the principles making natural beings possible. We cannot explain nature from that being from above downward, a priori. But suppose we begin from the forms of objects of experience, from below upward, a posteriori. Because we believe we find purposiveness in them, we appeal to a cause acting according to ends [A 355] to explain it. Our explanation would then be entirely tautological, deceiving reason with words. Moreover, where we stray with this explanation into the transcendent, beyond where natural knowledge can follow, reason is tempted into poetic fantasy. Preventing that is precisely its foremost task.

411 On the other hand, it is an equally necessary maxim of reason not to overlook the principle of ends in nature's products. Even if this principle does not make the way they originate any more understandable to us, it is still a guiding principle for investigating nature's particular laws. This remains true even if we do not want to use it to explain nature itself. For the time being, although these products plainly display an intentional unity of ends, we still call them only natural ends. That is, we do not look beyond nature for the ground of their possibility. But since reason must eventually ask about this possibility, it must think of a special kind of causality, different from the one belonging to the mechanics of natural causes and not found in nature. For alongside matter's receptivity to more and different forms than natural mechanics allows it, we must add the spontaneity of a [A 356] cause—which therefore cannot be matter. Without this, no ground for those forms can be given. Before taking this step, reason must certainly proceed carefully. It must not try to explain every instance of nature's technique teleologically: that is, every productive capacity of nature that displays a purposive shape merely for our apprehension, as regu-

lar bodies do. Instead, it must continue to regard this as mechanically possible for as long as it can. But completely excluding the teleological principle on that account would be just as fanciful. When reason investigates how natural forms are possible through their causes, and their purposiveness undeniably points to another kind of causality, insisting on mere mechanism would send reason wandering among imaginary natural powers that cannot even be thought. An exclusively teleological explanation that disregarded natural mechanism altogether would lead it into an equally extravagant enthusiasm.

We cannot combine the two principles in one and the same natural thing as principles for explaining, or deducing, one from the other. That is, we cannot unite them as dogmatic and constitutive principles of insight into nature for determining judgment. Suppose, for example, I assume that a maggot is a product of matter's mere mechanism: of the new formation matter carries out by itself [A 357] when its elements are freed through decay. I cannot then derive that same product from the very same matter as a causality [412] acting according to ends. Conversely, if I take that product to be a natural end, I cannot count on a mechanical way of producing it, adopt that as a constitutive principle for judging its possibility, and thus unite the two principles. One kind of explanation excludes the other. This holds even if, objectively, both grounds for the possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, but we took no account of it. The principle that is to make the two compatible in judging nature by them must be placed in something outside both—and therefore outside any possible empirical representation of nature—yet containing nature's ground. In other words, it must be placed in the supersensible, and each kind of explanation must be referred to this. Now we can have only an indeterminate concept of this ground, as something that makes it possible to judge nature according to empirical laws. We cannot determine it more closely through any predicate. It follows that the two principles can be united, not on a ground for *explaining* the possibility of a product according to given laws for *determining* [A 358] judgment, but only on a ground for *setting out* that possibility for reflective judgment.—For to explain means to derive from a principle, which we must therefore be able to know and state clearly. Certainly, the prin-

ciple of nature's mechanism and that of its causality according to ends must be connected in one higher principle, and flow together from it, in one and the same natural product. Otherwise they could not coexist in our study of nature. But suppose that this objectively shared principle, which also justifies combining the maxims of natural inquiry that depend on it, is of such a kind that we can point to it but can never know it determinately or state it clearly for use in particular cases. We could then draw no explanation from it: no clear and determinate derivation of the possibility of a natural product possible according to those two different kinds of principle. Now the shared principle of mechanical derivation on the one hand and teleological derivation on the other is the *supersensible* that we must place beneath nature as appearance. But for theoretical purposes we cannot form even the slightest positively determined concept of it. So there is no way to explain how, [413] on this principle, nature in its particular laws forms a system for us that we can recognize as possible both according to the principle of production [A 359] by physical causes and according to that of final causes. We can only make a presupposition when we encounter natural objects whose possibility we cannot think through the principle of mechanism without relying on teleological principles, even though mechanism always has a claim on any natural being. We may then confidently investigate natural laws according to both principles, depending on whether our understanding can recognize the possibility of their product from one or the other. We need not be troubled by the apparent conflict between the principles for judging it. For at least the possibility that the two might also be objectively compatible in one principle is assured, since they concern appearances that presuppose a supersensible ground.

Thus both nature's mechanism and its teleological, intentional technique may fall under a shared higher principle of nature according to particular laws, as regards the very same product and its possibility. Yet because this principle is *transcendent*, the limits of our understanding prevent us from combining the two principles *in explaining* that same natural production when even the product's inner possibility is *understandable* only through a causality according to ends, as is the case with organized [A 360] matter. The above principle of tele-

ology therefore remains: given the character of the human understanding, we can assume no cause for the possibility of organic beings in nature except a cause acting intentionally. Nature's mere mechanism cannot adequately explain these products. But this principle is not meant to decide anything about the possibility of such things in themselves.

For this principle is only a maxim of reflective judgment, not determining judgment. It therefore holds only subjectively for us, not objectively for the possibility of these kinds of things themselves, where both ways of producing them might well be connected in one and the same ground. Moreover, unless we add to the teleologically conceived way of producing them some concept of a mechanism of nature also operating in it, we could not judge such a production to be a natural product [414] at all. The maxim above therefore also requires us to unite the two principles when judging things as natural ends. But this is not so that one can wholly or partly replace the other. No mechanism can take the place of what we, at least, can think as possible only through intention. And no contingency requiring an end as its determining ground [A 361] can take the place of what we recognize as necessary through mechanism. We can only subordinate the one—mechanism—to the other—intentional technique. The transcendental principle of nature's purposiveness fully permits this.

For wherever ends are thought as grounds of the possibility of certain things, we must also assume means whose law of operation *by itself* requires nothing that presupposes an end. Such a law can therefore be mechanical and still be a subordinate cause of intentional effects. Thus, even in nature's organic products, we can think of an extensive, indeed universal, connection between mechanical and teleological laws in nature's productions. This is even more possible if their infinite multitude leads us to adopt intentionality in the connection of natural causes according to particular laws as a *universal principle* of reflective judgment for nature as a whole—the world—at least as a permissible hypothesis. We can do this without confusing the principles for judging these products or replacing one with the other. For in a teleological judgment, even when we judge the form matter takes to be possible only through intention, matter can still, by its nature and according to mechanical laws, be subordi-

nated as a means to the end we represent. Still, [A 362] the ground of this compatibility lies in something that is neither one nor the other—neither mechanism nor a connection of ends—but is nature's supersensible substrate, of which we have no knowledge. For our human reason, therefore, the two ways of representing the possibility of such objects cannot merge. We can judge them only through a connection of final causes grounded in a supreme understanding. This takes nothing away from the teleological kind of explanation.

But just how much nature's mechanism does as a means to [415] every final intention in nature is wholly undetermined and will always remain beyond our reason's power to determine. Because of the intelligible principle of the possibility of nature in general mentioned above, we can even assume that nature is possible throughout according to both kinds of universally harmonious laws: physical laws and laws of final causes. Yet we cannot understand at all how this happens. So we also do not know how far the mechanical explanation available to us can go. We know only this much for certain: however far we may get with it, it will always be inadequate for things we have once recognized as natural ends. Given the character of our understanding, we must therefore subordinate all those grounds to a teleological [A 363] principle.

This gives us the right—and, because studying nature by the principle of mechanism is important for our theoretical use of reason, also the obligation—to explain all nature's products and events mechanically, even the most purposive ones, as far as we possibly can. Within this kind of investigation, we cannot specify the limits of our power to do so. But we must never lose sight of this: some products can be put before reason for investigation at all only under the concept of an end. In keeping with the essential character of our reason, despite those mechanical causes, we must ultimately subordinate these products to causality according to ends.

28 This shows that, in most speculative matters of pure reason, philosophical schools have generally tried every possible solution to a given question, as far as dogmatic assertions are concerned. To account for nature's purposiveness, people have tried either *lifeless matter* or a *lifeless God*, and then either *living mat-*

ter or a *living God*. All that remains for us, if necessary, is to leave behind all these *objective assertions* and consider our judgment *critically*, solely in relation to our cognitive powers. In this way we can secure for its principle the validity of a maxim: a validity that, if not dogmatic, is still sufficient for a reliable use of reason.

PART II

Methodology of Teleological Judgment

Appendix. [A 364] [416] *Methodology of Teleological Judgment.*

79 *Whether teleology must be treated as belonging to the study of nature.*

Every science must have its definite place in the complete system of sciences. If it is a philosophical science, it must be assigned a place in philosophy's theoretical or practical part. If its place is in the former, it must belong either to the study of nature, insofar as this considers what can be an object of experience—and thus to the study of bodies, the study of the soul, or general cosmology—or to theology, the study of the original ground of the world as the totality of all objects of experience.

The question now is: what place belongs to teleology? Does it belong to natural science, properly so called, or to theology? It must be one of the two. No science can belong to the transition from one to the other, since this means only the articulation or organization of the system, not a place within it.

It is clear in itself that teleology does not belong to theology as one of its parts, although [A 365] theology can make the most important use of it. Teleology concerns natural productions and their cause. Although it points beyond this to a ground outside and above nature—a divine author—it does so not for

determining judgment, but only for reflective judgment in considering nature. Its purpose is simply to guide our judgment of things in the world through such an idea, as a regulative principle suited to the human understanding.

417 But teleology seems no more to belong to natural science. That science needs determining principles, not merely reflective ones, to give objective grounds for natural effects. In fact, considering natural phenomena in terms of the relation of ends to one another contributes nothing to the theory of nature, or to the mechanical explanation of its phenomena through their efficient causes. Identifying nature's ends in its products, insofar as they form a system according to teleological concepts, really belongs only to a description of nature drawn up along a particular guiding thread. Here reason carries out a splendidly instructive task, one that serves practical purposes in many ways. But it gives no [A 366] insight into the origin and inner possibility of these forms, which is the real concern of theoretical natural science.

Teleology as a science therefore belongs to no doctrine, but only to critique: specifically, the critique of a particular cognitive power, the power of judgment. But insofar as it contains *a priori* principles, it can and must state the method for judging nature according to the principle of final causes. Its methodology thus has at least a negative influence on the procedure of theoretical natural science. It also influences the relation that natural science, within metaphysics, can have to theology as a preparation for it.

80 *On the necessary subordination of the principle of mechanism to the teleological principle in explaining a thing as a natural end.*

The *right to pursue* a purely mechanical explanation of all natural products is in itself entirely unlimited. But given the character of our understanding, when it deals with things as natural ends, its *ability to make do* with this alone is not just very limited. It also has a definite boundary. Namely, [A 367] according to a principle of judgment, the former procedure alone can do nothing to explain the latter. Our judgment of such products must therefore always be subordinated at the same time to a teleological principle.

418 It is therefore reasonable, indeed worthwhile, to follow nature's mechanism as far as we plausibly can in explaining natural products. We should not abandon this attempt on the grounds that it is *in itself* impossible to encounter nature's purposiveness along this route, but only because it is impossible *for us* as human beings. For it would require an intuition other than a sensible one, and a determinate knowledge of nature's intelligible substrate. From this substrate we could even give a ground for the mechanism of appearances according to particular laws. All this completely exceeds our powers.

So, to avoid working entirely in vain, the investigator of nature must always base judgments of things whose concept as natural ends is undoubtedly well grounded—organized beings—on some original organization. This organization itself uses that mechanism to produce other organized forms, or to develop its own form into new shapes. But these shapes always arise from that end and in keeping with it [A 368].

It is admirable to survey the great creation of organized natures through comparative anatomy, to see whether something like a system can be found in them, specifically in terms of the principle of their generation. We need not stop at the mere principle for judging them, which gives no insight into their generation, and lose heart, giving up every claim to *insight into nature* in this field. So many animal kinds agree in a certain common plan, which seems to underlie not only their bone structure but also the arrangement of their other parts. Through shortening some parts and lengthening others, enclosing these and unfolding those, the remarkable simplicity of the basic design could have produced such a great variety of species. This lets a ray of hope, however faint, enter the mind: perhaps the principle of nature's mechanism, without which there can be no natural science at all, may accomplish something here. Despite all their differences, these forms seem to have been produced according to a common original pattern. This analogy strengthens the suspicion that they are really related through generation from one common original mother. The step-by-step approach of one animal kind [A 369] [419] to another extends from the one in which the principle of ends seems most fully confirmed, namely the human being, down to the polyp; from that even to mosses and lichens; and

finally to the lowest level of nature perceptible to us, raw matter. From this matter and its forces, acting according to mechanical laws like those by which it produces crystals, the whole technique of nature seems to descend. Yet in organized beings this technique is so incomprehensible to us that we believe we must think of another principle to account for it.

Here the *archaeologist* of nature is free to trace the origin of that great family of creatures from the remaining traces of nature's earliest upheavals, using every mechanism of nature known to him or conjectured by him. For we would have to picture them as such a family if the continuous relationship just mentioned is to have a ground. He may picture the earth's womb, just emerging from its chaotic state, as a great animal, so to speak. It initially gives birth to creatures with less purposive forms; these in turn give birth to others that develop forms better suited to their place of generation and their relations to one another. Eventually this womb itself stiffens and ossifies, restricting its offspring to definite species that no longer depart from their type. The diversity would then [A 370] remain just as it stood when that fertile formative power finished its work.

—Still, for this purpose he must attribute to this universal mother an organization purposively arranged for all these creatures. Otherwise the possibility of the purposive form of the products of the animal and plant kingdoms cannot be thought at all.[29] But then [420] he has only pushed the ground of explanation further back. He cannot claim to have made the generation of those two kingdoms independent of the condition of [A 371] final causes.

Even changes that particular individuals of organized kinds happen to undergo must be judged in this way. If we find that their altered character is inherited and incorporated into their reproductive power, we can properly judge it only as the development, on a particular occasion, of a purposive predisposition originally present in the species for preserving the kind itself. For an organized being's production of its own kind, given its thoroughgoing inner purposiveness, is closely bound to this condition: nothing is incorporated into reproductive power unless, within such a system of ends, it also belongs to one of the undeveloped original predispositions. If we abandon this principle, we cannot know with certainty whether several features of a species' present form might

likewise have originated accidentally and without an end. The principle of teleology—that in an organized being we should judge nothing preserved through its reproduction to be unpurposive—would then become very unreliable in application. It would hold only for the original stock, which we no longer know.

Hume objects to those who think it necessary, for all such natural ends, [A 372] to assume a teleological principle of judgment, that is, an architectonic understanding. He says we could ask with equal right how such an understanding is possible: how the various powers and properties that make possible an understanding that also has the power to carry out its plans could have come together so purposively in one being. But this objection is invalid. The whole difficulty surrounding the question of the first production of a thing that contains ends within itself and is understandable only through them rests on asking about the unity of the ground connecting the manifold elements *external to one another* in this product. If this ground is placed in [421] the understanding of a producing cause as a simple substance, that question, insofar as it is teleological, is sufficiently answered. But if the cause is sought merely in matter, as an aggregate of many substances external to one another, there is no unified principle at all for the internally purposive form of their arrangement. Matter's *autocracy* in productions that our understanding can comprehend only as ends is a phrase without meaning.

That is why those who seek a supreme ground of the possibility of matter's objectively purposive forms [A 373] without granting it an understanding nevertheless like to turn the universe into a single, all-encompassing substance—pantheism. Or they turn it into a totality of many determinations inhering in a single *simple substance*—Spinozism, which is only a more specific explanation of the former. Their sole purpose is to obtain that condition of all purposiveness, the *unity* of its ground. By the merely ontological concept of a simple substance, they satisfy *one* condition of the problem: unity in the relation to ends. But they offer nothing for the *other* condition: the substance's relation to its consequence as an *end*, by which that ontological ground must be more closely determined for the question at hand. So they do not answer *the whole* question

at all. Indeed, it remains completely unanswerable for our reason unless we represent that original ground of things as a simple *substance*, and its property corresponding to the specific character of the natural forms grounded in it—their unity of ends—as the property of an intelligent substance. We must also represent its relation to those forms as one of *causality*, because of the contingency we find in everything we can think possible only as an end.

81 [A 374] *On joining mechanism to the teleological principle in explaining a natural end as a natural product.*

As the preceding section showed, nature's mechanism alone cannot enable us to think of the possibility of an organized [422] being. Rather, at least given the character of our cognitive power, it must originally be subordinated to an intentionally acting cause. In the same way, the merely teleological ground of such a being is insufficient for regarding and judging it also as a product of nature. Nature's mechanism must be joined to that ground, as if it were the tool of an intentionally acting cause, to whose ends nature, in its mechanical laws, is nevertheless subordinated. Our reason does not comprehend the possibility of such a union of two entirely different kinds of causality: nature in its universal lawfulness, and an idea that restricts nature to a particular form for which it contains no ground by itself. This possibility lies in nature's supersensible substrate. We can determine nothing positive about this beyond saying that it is the being in itself, of which we know only the appearance. Nevertheless, the following principle remains in force: everything we assume to belong to this nature (*phenomenon*) [A 375] and to be its product must also be thought as connected with nature according to mechanical laws. Without this kind of causality, organized beings, as natural ends, would still not be natural products.

Now if we accept the teleological principle for the generation of these beings—as we cannot avoid doing—we can base the cause of their internally purposive form either on *occasionalism* or on *prestabilism*. According to the former, on the occasion of every act of mating, the supreme cause of the world would directly give organic formation to the matter mingling in it, in keeping with its

idea. According to the second, this cause would have placed in the first products of its wisdom only a predisposition through which an organic being produces its own kind, and the species continually preserves itself. In the same way, the loss of individuals, whose nature also works toward their destruction, would be continuously replaced. If we accept occasionalism in the production of organized beings, all nature in this process is completely lost, and with it every use of reason in judging the possibility of such products. We may therefore assume that no one with any concern for philosophy will accept this system.

Prestabilism, in turn, can proceed in two ways. [A 376] It regards each organic [423] being generated by its own kind either as something *drawn out of* the parent or as the parent's *product*. The system that treats generations as merely drawing out what is already there is called *individual preformation*, or the *theory of evolution*. The system that treats generations as products is called *epigenesis*. The latter can also be called the system of *generic preformation*. For the productive power of the parents, and therefore the specific form, was still preformed *virtually*, according to the inner purposive predispositions given to their stock. Accordingly, the opposing theory of individual preformation might better be called the *theory of involution*, or of nesting.

The supporters of the *theory of evolution* exempt each individual from nature's formative power, making it come directly from the Creator's hand. Yet they did not dare to let this happen according to the hypothesis of occasionalism. On that hypothesis, mating would be a mere formality under which a supreme intelligent cause of the world had decided to form an offspring directly each time, leaving the mother only to unfold and nourish it. They declared themselves for preformation [A 377], as if it made any difference whether such forms originated supernaturally at the beginning of the world or during its course. In fact, occasional creation would save a great many supernatural arrangements. Such arrangements would be needed to keep an embryo formed at the beginning of the world unharmed by nature's destructive forces throughout the long period before its development. It would also save an immeasurably greater number of preformed beings than were ever to develop, and with them as many

acts of creation, which would otherwise be unnecessary and purposeless. But these supporters wanted at least to leave something to nature, rather than fall into a complete hyperphysics that could dispense with every natural explanation. They still clung to their hyperphysics even when they found an admirable purposiveness in malformed births, which cannot possibly be regarded as natural ends. This purposiveness would have to be aimed merely at an anatomist's one day being troubled by it as a purposeless purposiveness and feeling disheartening wonder. But they could not possibly fit the production of hybrids into the system of preformation [424]. They had conceded to the male creatures' semen nothing but the mechanical property of serving as the embryo's first nourishment. They now also had to grant it a [A 378] purposively formative power, even though, in the generation of a complete product by two creatures of the same kind, they were unwilling to concede this power to either parent.

By contrast, even if we did not know the great advantage the defender of *epigenesis* has over the former theory in the empirical evidence supporting it, reason would already be especially well disposed toward this way of explaining things. For with regard to things we can originally represent as possible only through causality according to ends, it at least regards nature as itself productive in reproduction, not merely as unfolding what is already there. Thus, with the smallest possible expenditure of the supernatural, it leaves everything after the first beginning to nature. But it determines nothing about this first beginning, at which physics as a whole founders, whatever chain of causes it may try.

No one has done more to prove this theory of epigenesis, or to establish the genuine principles of its application, partly by restricting an overly bold use of it, than Court Councilor *Blumenbach*. He begins every physical explanation of these formations with organized matter [A 379]. He rightly declares it contrary to reason to suppose that raw matter originally formed itself according to mechanical laws; that life could have sprung from the nature of the lifeless; or that matter could by itself have arranged itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness. At the same time, under this *principle* of an original *organization*, which we cannot fathom, he leaves nature's mechanism a share that can-

not be determined, yet also cannot be denied. Accordingly, he calls matter's capacity in an organized body a *formative drive*, distinguishing it from the merely mechanical *formative power* universally present in matter. This drive stands, as it were, under the higher direction and guidance of the original organization.

82 [425] *On the teleological system in the external relations of organized beings.*

By external purposiveness I mean the case in which one natural thing serves another as a means to an end. Things that have no inner purposiveness, and do not presuppose it for their possibility—for example, earths, air, water, and so on—can nevertheless be very purposive externally, that is, in relation to other beings. But those other beings must [A 380] always be organized beings, or natural ends. Otherwise the former things could not be judged as means either. Thus water, air, and earths cannot be regarded as means for piling up mountains. Mountains contain nothing in themselves that requires a ground of their possibility according to ends. Their cause can therefore never be represented, in relation to them, under the predicate of a means useful for that purpose.

External purposiveness is a completely different concept from inner purposiveness, which is connected with an object's possibility regardless of whether its actuality is itself an end. We can still ask of an organized being, "What is it there for?" But we cannot readily ask this of things in which we recognize only the effect of nature's mechanism. For in organized beings we already represent a causality according to ends—a creative understanding—as required for their inner possibility, and we refer this active capacity to its determining ground, intention. There is only one external purposiveness connected with the inner purposiveness of organization that serves an end in the external relation of a means without requiring us to ask for what end this being, organized in this way, had to exist. This is the organization of the two sexes [A 381] in relation to one another for reproducing their kind. For here, just as with an individual, we can still ask, "Why did such a pair have to exist?" The answer is: only the pair constitutes an *organizing* whole, though not an organized whole within a single body.

Now when we ask what a thing is there for, the answer is either: its existence and generation have no relation at all to a cause acting according to intentions. In that case we always mean [426] that it originates from nature's mechanism. Or the answer is: there is some intentional ground of its existence as a contingent natural being. We can hardly separate this thought from the concept of an organized thing. For once we must place a causality of final causes and an idea underlying that causality beneath its inner possibility, we also cannot think of the existence of this product except as an end. A represented effect whose representation is at the same time the determining ground of an intelligent efficient cause for producing it is called an *end*. In this case, then, we can say either: the end of this natural being's existence lies within itself, so it is not merely an end but also a *final end*. Or we can say: that end lies outside it, in other natural beings, so it exists purposively not as a final end but necessarily also [A 382] as a means.

But if we survey the whole of nature, we find in it, as nature, no being that could claim the distinction of being the final end of creation. Indeed, we can prove *a priori* that whatever might be an *ultimate end* for nature, endowed with every conceivable determination and property, could still never, as a natural thing, be a *final end*.

When we look at the plant kingdom, its immense fertility, through which it spreads over almost every soil, might initially suggest that it is a mere product of nature's mechanism, like the mechanism nature displays in the formations of the mineral kingdom. But a closer knowledge of the indescribably wise organization within it prevents us from staying with this thought. Instead, it prompts the question: what are these creatures there for? If we answer, "For the animal kingdom, which feeds on them, so that it could spread over the earth in so many different kinds," the question returns: what, then, are these plant-eating animals there for? The answer might be: for the predators, which can feed only on what has life [A 383]. Finally, the question is: what are these, together with the previous kingdoms of nature, good for? For human beings, for the many uses their understanding teaches them to make of all those creatures. The

human being is the ultimate end of creation here on earth, because he is the only being on [427] it able to form a concept of ends and, through reason, to make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things.

With the knight Linnaeus, we could also take what seems to be the opposite route and say: plant-eating animals exist to restrain the luxuriant growth of the plant kingdom, which would otherwise choke many of its species; predators exist to limit the voracity of those animals; and finally human beings exist so that, by hunting and reducing the predators, they establish a certain balance between nature's productive and destructive forces. Thus, however much the human being might deserve to count as an end in one respect, in another he would again rank only as a means.

Suppose we take as our principle an objective purposiveness in the diversity of the kinds of earthly creatures and in their external relations to one another as purposively constructed beings. It is then in keeping with reason to think in these relations of a certain [A 384] organization, a system of all nature's kingdoms according to final causes. But here experience seems loudly to contradict reason's maxim, especially concerning an ultimate end of nature. Such an end is required for the possibility of this system, and we can place it nowhere but in the human being. Yet regarding the human being as one among many animal kinds, nature has made no exception at all, either in its destructive or its productive forces, to its practice of subjecting everything to its mechanism without an end.

In an arrangement of earthly natural beings into a purposive whole, the first thing that would have to be intentionally arranged would surely be their dwelling place: the soil and the element on and in which they were to thrive. But closer knowledge of this foundation of all organic generation points only to causes acting wholly unintentionally. Indeed, these causes are more destructive than favorable to generation, order, and ends. Land and sea contain not only monuments of ancient, immense devastations that affected them and every creature on and in them. Their entire structure—the strata of the one and the boundaries of the other—has every appearance of being the product of wild, overpowering forces of a nature working in a chaotic state. [428]

However purposively the present shape, structure, and slope of the [A 385] land may seem arranged to receive water from the air, to provide watercourses between various kinds of strata for various products, and to channel rivers, closer investigation shows that they arose merely as effects of eruptions, partly of fire and partly of water, or of upheavals of the ocean. This applies both to the first production of this shape and especially to its later transformation, together with the destruction of its first organic products.[30] Now if the dwelling place, the maternal soil of the land, and the maternal womb of the sea for all these creatures point to nothing but a wholly unintentional mechanism of their production, how, and [A 386] with what right, can we demand and assert another origin for these later products? The closest examination of the remains of those natural devastations seems, in Camper's judgment, to show that the human being was not involved in these upheavals. Nevertheless, he depends so much on the earth's other creatures that, if we admit a mechanism of nature universally governing the others, we must regard him as included under it too, even if his understanding has largely enabled him to escape their devastations.

But this argument seems to prove more than was intended in putting it forward. It seems to prove not merely that the human being cannot be nature's ultimate end, and that for the same reason the aggregate of organized natural things on earth cannot be a system of ends, but also that the natural products previously regarded as natural ends have no origin other than nature's mechanism.

429 Yet in the solution above to the antinomy between the principles of mechanical and teleological generation of organic natural beings, we saw that these are only principles of reflective judgment [A 387] concerning nature's formative activity according to its particular laws, to whose systematic connection we lack the key. They do not determine these beings' origin in itself. They say only that, given the character of our understanding and reason, we can think their origin only according to final causes. Consequently, the greatest possible effort, even boldness, in trying to explain them mechanically is not only permitted: reason also

calls on us to make it. This is so although we know we can never succeed sufficiently, for subjective reasons arising from the particular kind and limitation of our understanding, not because mechanical generation would in itself contradict an origin according to ends. We also saw that the compatibility of the two ways of representing nature's possibility may well lie in nature's supersensible principle, both outside us and within us. Representation according to final causes is only a subjective condition of our use of reason when reason wants objects judged not merely as appearances. Instead, it demands that these appearances themselves, together with their principles, be referred to the supersensible substrate, to make possible certain laws of their unity that it can represent only through ends. And reason also has ends that are supersensible.

83 [A 388] *On the ultimate end of nature as a teleological system.*

We have shown above that principles of reason give us sufficient grounds to judge the human being not just as a natural end, like every organized being, but also as nature's *ultimate* end here on earth. In relation to him, all other natural things form a system of ends. This holds not for determining but for reflective judgment. Now what is to be promoted as an end through his connection with nature must be found within the human being himself. So either this end [430] must be of a kind that nature itself can satisfy through its beneficence, or it must be his fitness and skill for all kinds of ends for which he could use nature, both external and internal. The first end of nature would be human *happiness*; the second, human *culture*.

The concept of happiness is not one that human beings abstract from their instincts and thus draw from the animal nature within themselves. It is a mere *idea* of a state to which they want to make those instincts adequate under merely empirical conditions—which is impossible [A 389]. Human beings devise this idea for themselves through an understanding entangled with imagination and the senses, and do so in very different ways. They even change it so often that nature, even if it were entirely subject to their choice, could adopt no definite, universal, fixed law for agreeing with this fluctuating concept, and thus with the end each person sets at will. But even if we reduced this end to genuine

natural need, about which our species universally agrees with itself, or, on the other hand, raised as high as we liked our skill in obtaining imagined ends, human beings would still never attain what they understand by happiness. This is, in fact, their own ultimate natural end, not an end of freedom. Their nature is not such that it can ever stop acquiring and enjoying and be satisfied. On the other hand, far from adopting human beings as its special favorites and treating them more generously than all other animals, nature spares them no more than any other animal in its destructive effects: plague, hunger, floods, frost, attacks by other animals large and small, and the like. Still more, the conflicting *natural predispositions* within human beings involve them in plagues of their own devising, as well as afflictions imposed by their own kind through oppressive [A 390] rule, the barbarity of wars, and so on. These bring such misery, and human beings do so much to destroy their own species, that even with the most beneficent nature outside us, nature's end, if directed toward our species' happiness, would not be attained in a system of nature on earth. For the nature within us is not receptive to it. Human beings therefore always remain only a link in the chain of natural ends. They are indeed a principle with regard to many [431] ends for which nature seems to have destined them by their predispositions, since they make themselves so. But they are also a means of preserving purposiveness in the mechanism of the other links. As the only being on earth with understanding, and therefore with the capacity to set ends for himself at will, the human being is certainly the entitled lord of nature. If we regard nature as a teleological system, he is by his vocation its ultimate end. But this is always conditional: he must understand how, and have the will, to give nature and himself a relation to ends that is self-sufficient independently of nature, and can therefore be a final end. This final end, however, must not be sought in nature at all.

To discover what, in the human being, we must at least identify as nature's *ultimate* end, we must pick out what [A 391] nature can accomplish to prepare him for what he himself must do to be a final end. We must separate this from all ends whose possibility rests on conditions we can expect only from nature. Happiness on earth is of the latter kind. By this we mean the totality of all his

ends possible through nature outside and within him. This is the material of all his ends on earth. If he makes it his entire end, it makes him incapable of setting a final end for his own existence and bringing himself into agreement with it. Of all his ends in nature, then, only the formal, subjective condition remains: his fitness to set himself ends in general and to use nature as a means suited to the maxims of his freely chosen ends in general, independently of nature in determining those ends. This is what nature can accomplish with a view to the final end lying outside it, and what can therefore be regarded as its ultimate end. Producing a rational being's fitness for any ends whatsoever, and thus in his freedom, is *culture*. Only culture, then, can be the ultimate end that we have reason to attribute to nature with regard to the human species. It is not human happiness on earth, still less merely being the chief instrument for establishing order [A 392] and harmony in the nonrational nature outside him.

But not every kind of culture is sufficient for this ultimate end of nature. The culture of *skill* is certainly the chief subjective condition of fitness for promoting ends in general. Yet [432] it is not sufficient to develop the *will* in determining and choosing its ends, which is essential to the full scope of fitness for ends. This latter condition of fitness, which we might call the culture of training or discipline, is negative. It consists in freeing the will from the despotism of desires. These attach us to certain natural things and make us incapable of choosing for ourselves. We let drives serve as fetters, although nature gave them to us only as guiding threads, so that we would not neglect or violate the vocation of the animal nature within us. Yet we are free enough to tighten or loosen them, lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require.

Skill can hardly develop in the human species except through inequality among people. The majority provide life's necessities almost mechanically, without needing special art, to supply the comfort and leisure of others. These others cultivate the less necessary parts of culture, science [A 393] and art, and keep the majority in a condition of oppression, hard labor, and little enjoyment. Still, some of the culture of the higher class gradually spreads to this class too. But as culture advances, afflictions increase with equal force on both sides: on one through others' violence, on the other through inner dissatisfaction.

Culture's height is called luxury when the inclination toward the dispensable starts to harm the indispensable. Yet this glittering misery is bound up with the development of natural predispositions in the human species. Nature's own end, although not our end, is nevertheless attained in it. The formal condition under which alone nature can attain this final intention is a constitution governing people's relations to one another in which lawful power counters the damage caused by their mutually conflicting freedom, within a whole called *civil society*. Only in such a society can natural predispositions develop to the fullest. But even if people were clever enough to discover it and wise enough to submit willingly to its constraint, a *cosmopolitan* whole would still be needed: a system of all states that are in danger of harming one another. Without it, and given the obstacle [433] that ambition, lust for power, and greed—especially in those [A 394] who hold power—put in the way of even the possibility of such a plan, *war* is inevitable. Sometimes states split up and dissolve into smaller ones; sometimes one state unites smaller ones with itself and tries to form a larger whole. War is an unintentional human attempt, prompted by unbridled passions. Yet it is also a deeply hidden, perhaps intentional attempt by supreme wisdom, if not to establish, then at least to prepare, lawfulness together with the freedom of states, and thereby the unity of a morally grounded system of them. Despite the most dreadful sufferings it inflicts on the human race, and perhaps the still greater burdens imposed in peacetime by constant readiness for it, war is nevertheless one more incentive to develop to the highest degree all talents serving culture. Meanwhile, the hope of a peaceful state of national happiness recedes ever further.

As for disciplining the inclinations, our natural predisposition toward them is entirely purposive in relation to our vocation as an animal kind. But they make the development of humanity very difficult. Still, with regard to this second requirement for culture too, nature shows a purposive striving toward an education that makes us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can supply. We cannot deny the preponderance of evils poured over us by the refinement of taste to the point of [A 395] idealizing it, and even by luxury in the sciences as nourishment for vanity, through the unsatisfiable multitude of inclinations

they produce. But neither can we overlook nature's end: increasingly to overcome the coarseness and violence of those inclinations that belong more to the animal nature within us and most oppose our development toward our higher vocation—the inclinations toward enjoyment—and to make room for the development of humanity. Fine art and the sciences, through a pleasure that can be universally communicated and through polish and refinement for society, make human beings civilized, even if not morally better. They greatly weaken the tyranny of the propensity toward the senses and thereby prepare human beings for a rule in which reason alone is to have authority. Meanwhile, the evils with which nature and people's quarrelsome selfishness afflict us summon, heighten, and harden the powers of the soul [434] so that we do not succumb to them. In this way they let us feel a fitness for higher ends hidden within us.[31]

84 [A 396] *On the final end of the existence of a world, that is, of creation itself.*

A *final end* is an end that needs no other end as a condition of its possibility.

If we assume nature's mere mechanism as the ground for explaining its purposiveness, we cannot ask what things in the world are there for. According to such an idealist system, we are concerned only with the physical possibility of things. Thinking of them as ends would be mere reasoning without an object. Whether we interpret their form as due to chance or to blind necessity, in either case [A 397] that question would be empty. But suppose we take the connection of ends in the world as real, and assume for it a special kind of causality, that of an *intentionally acting* cause. We then cannot stop with asking why things in the world—organized beings—have this or that form, or have been placed by nature in this or that relation to others. Once we think of an understanding that must be regarded as the cause of the possibility of the forms actually found in things, we must also ask about the [435] objective ground within that same understanding that could have determined this productive understanding to an effect of this kind. This ground is then the final end for which such things exist.

I said above that the final end is not an end that nature could sufficiently bring about and produce in keeping with its idea, because it is unconditioned. For there is nothing in nature, as an object of sense, whose determining ground within nature is not itself always conditioned in turn. This holds not only for nature outside us, material nature, but also for nature within us, thinking nature. It must be understood that I am considering within myself only what is nature. But a thing that, because of its objective character, is necessarily to exist as the final end of an intelligent cause must be such that, in the order of ends, it depends on no condition [A 398] other than its idea alone.

Now there is only one kind of being in the world whose causality is teleological, that is, directed toward ends, yet is also of such a character that these beings themselves represent the law by which they must determine their ends as unconditioned, independent of natural conditions, and necessary in itself. This being is the human being, but considered as a noumenon: the only natural being in which, from his own character, we can nevertheless recognize a supersensible capacity—*freedom*—and even the law of its causality, together with its object, which he can set himself as his highest end: the highest good in the world.

Now of the human being—and thus of every rational being in the world—as a moral being, we can no longer ask for what end (*quem in finem*) he exists. His existence has the highest end within itself. To this end he can subordinate the whole of nature as far as he is able; at least, he must not regard himself as subject to any natural influence that conflicts with it.—If things in the world, as beings dependent in their existence, need a supreme cause acting according to ends, then the human being is creation's final end. Without him, the chain of subordinate ends would lack a complete ground. Only in the human being, and even in him only as the subject of morality [A 399], do we find unconditioned legislation concerning ends. This [436] alone makes him capable of being a final end to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated[32].

85 [A 400] *On physicotheology.*

Physicotheology is reason's attempt to infer nature's supreme cause and its properties from nature's *ends*, which can be known only empirically. A *moral theology*, or ethicotheology, would be the attempt to infer that cause and its properties from the moral end of rational beings in nature, which can be known *a priori*.

The former naturally precedes the second. For if we want to infer a world cause *teleologically* from things in the world, ends of nature must first be given. For these [437] we must then seek a final end, and for this, in turn, the principle of that supreme cause's causality.

Many investigations of nature can and must proceed according to the teleological principle without our having reason to ask about the ground of the possibility of acting purposively that we find in various natural products [A 401]. But if we also want a concept of this ground, we have absolutely no further insight for that purpose beyond the maxim of reflective judgment. Namely, even if just one organic product of nature were given to us, the character of our cognitive power would prevent us from thinking any ground for it other than a cause of nature itself—whether of all nature or only this part of it—that contains the causality for the product through understanding. This principle of judgment takes us no further in explaining natural things and their origin. Yet it opens some prospect beyond nature, so that perhaps we can determine more closely the otherwise so unfruitful concept of an original being.

Now I say: however far physicotheology may be pursued, it can reveal nothing to us about a *final end* of creation. It does not even reach the question of such an end. It can justify the concept of an intelligent world cause as the only concept subjectively suited to the character of our cognitive power for the possibility of things that we can make understandable to ourselves through ends. But it cannot determine this concept further for either theoretical or practical purposes. Its attempt does not achieve its [A 402] intention of grounding a theology. It always remains only a physical teleology, because the relation to ends within it is always, and must always be, regarded as conditioned within nature. It therefore cannot even raise the question of the end for which nature itself

exists, whose ground must be sought outside nature. Yet a determinate concept of that higher intelligent world cause, and thus the possibility of a theology, depends on a determinate idea of this end.

What things in the world are useful to one another for; what the manifold parts in a thing are good for with regard to that thing itself; how we even have reason to assume that nothing in the world is in vain, but everything is good for something *in nature*, on condition that certain things exist as ends: all this the teleological consideration of the world accomplishes splendidly, to our utmost admiration. In doing so, our reason has at its disposal for judgment [438] no other principle of the possibility of the object of its unavoidable teleological judging than to subordinate nature's mechanism to the architectonic of an intelligent author of the world. But the data, and thus the principles, for *determining* this concept of an intelligent world cause as supreme artist are merely empirical. They allow us to infer no further properties than experience reveals in its effects. Since experience can never encompass the whole of nature as a system [A 403], it must often encounter grounds of proof that seem to conflict with that concept and with one another. Yet even if we could empirically survey the entire system insofar as it concerns mere nature, experience could never raise us beyond nature to the end of its very existence, and thereby to a determinate concept of that higher intelligence.

If we make the problem physicotheology seeks to solve a small one, its solution seems easy. Suppose we lavish the concept of a *deity* on any intelligent being we think of—one or several—possessing many very great properties, but not all those required to ground a nature in general that agrees with the greatest possible end. Or suppose we think nothing of supplementing the deficiencies of a theory's evidence with arbitrary additions. Where we have grounds for assuming *much* perfection—and what is much for us?—we then consider ourselves entitled to presuppose *all possible* perfection. Physical teleology can then make impressive claims to the honor of grounding a theology. But if we are required to show what prompts us, and moreover entitles us, to make those additions, we will search in vain for justification in the principles of reason's theoretical use. This use insists that, in explaining an [A 404] object of experience, we

attribute to it no more properties than empirical data supporting their possibility can be found. Closer examination would show that an idea of a highest being really underlies this in us *a priori*, resting on an entirely different use of reason, the practical one. This idea prompts us to complete physical teleology's deficient representation of the original ground of nature's ends into the [439] concept of a deity. We would then not falsely imagine that we had produced this idea, and with it a theology, through the theoretical use of reason in our physical knowledge of the world, much less proved its reality.

We should not blame the ancients too severely for thinking of their gods as differing greatly in their powers, intentions, and purposes of will, but all still limited in human fashion, not even excepting their chief. For when they considered the arrangement and course of things in nature, they certainly found enough grounds to assume something more than mechanical as their cause. They suspected intentions of certain higher causes, which they could think of only as superhuman, behind the machinery of this world. But because [A 405] they found good and evil, the purposive and the counterpurposive, very mixed in it, at least to our insight, they could not permit themselves to assume wise and beneficent ends secretly underlying it when they saw no proof of them, just to support an arbitrary idea of a supremely perfect author. Their judgment about the supreme world cause could hardly have turned out otherwise, insofar as they proceeded consistently according to maxims of the merely theoretical use of reason. Others, who wanted to be theologians as well as physicists, thought they could satisfy reason by providing the absolute unity of the principle of natural things that reason demands. They did so through the idea of a being in which, as the sole substance, all those things would be merely inhering determinations. This substance would not cause the world through understanding, but all the understanding of worldly beings would nevertheless be found in it as their subject. It would therefore be a being that produced nothing according to ends, but within which all things, because of the unity of the subject whose mere determinations they are, must necessarily relate purposively to one another even without end or intention. Thus they introduced the idealism of final causes. Instead of making the hard-to-explain unity of a multitude

of purposively connected substances a causal dependence *on one* substance, they turned it into inherence *in one* [A 406]. Considered from the side of the inhering worldly beings, this system was called *pantheism*; considered from the side of the sole self-subsisting subject as original being, it was later called *Spinozism*. It did not so much [440] solve the question of the first ground of nature's purposiveness as declare it null. For it stripped the latter concept of all reality and turned it into a mere misinterpretation of a general ontological concept of a thing in general.

Thus, from merely theoretical principles of the use of reason, on which alone physicotheology rests, we can never arrive at a concept of a deity adequate for our teleological judgment of nature. Either we declare all teleology a mere deception of judgment in assessing the causal connection of things, and retreat to the sole principle of nature's mere mechanism. Nature would then only seem to contain a universal relation to ends, because of the unity of the substance of which nature is nothing but the manifold of determinations. Or, instead of this idealism of final causes, we remain committed to the principle of the reality of this special kind of causality. We may then place many intelligent original beings beneath nature's ends, or only one. But as soon as we have nothing at hand to ground our concept of it except principles of experience drawn from the actual connection of ends [A 407] in the world, two difficulties arise. On the one hand, we have no answer to the disharmony nature presents in many examples concerning the unity of ends. On the other, from this we can never draw a sufficiently determinate concept of a single intelligent cause, as we arrive at it with justification from experience alone, for a theology useful in any way, theoretically or practically.

Physical teleology certainly prompts us to seek a theology, but cannot produce one, however far we trace nature through experience and supplement the connection of ends discovered in it with ideas of reason, which must be theoretical for physical problems. People will rightly complain: what good is it to place a great understanding, immeasurable to us, beneath all these arrangements and have it order this world according to intentions, if nature tells us nothing, and never can tell us anything, about the final intention? Without that, we can form

no common point of reference for all these natural ends, no adequate teleological principle either for knowing all the ends in a system or for forming a [441] concept of the supreme understanding as the cause of such a nature that could guide our judgment as it reflects teleologically on nature [A 408]. I would then have an *artistic understanding* for scattered ends, but no *wisdom* for a final end, which must really contain the determining ground of that understanding. Only pure reason can supply a final end *a priori*, since all ends in the world are empirically conditioned and can contain only what is good for this or that contingent intention, not what is good without qualification. Such an end alone would teach me what properties, what degree, and what relation I must think in nature's supreme cause in order to judge nature as a teleological system. Without it, how and with what right may I arbitrarily expand my very limited concept of that original understanding, which I can base on my scant knowledge of the world; of this original being's power to make its ideas actual; of its will to do so, and so on, completing it into the idea of an all-wise infinite being? If this were done theoretically, it would presuppose omniscience in me. I would have to understand nature's ends in their complete connection and, moreover, be able to think of every other possible plan, in comparison with which the present one could justifiably be judged the best. Without this complete knowledge of the effect, I cannot infer a determinate concept of the supreme cause—which can be found only in the concept of an intelligence infinite in every [A 409] respect, that is, the concept of a deity—and establish a foundation for theology.

So, however far physical teleology may be extended, we can indeed say, according to the principle stated above, that given the character and principles of our cognitive power, we can think of nature, in the purposive arrangements known to us, only as the product of an understanding to which it is subordinated. But theoretical inquiry into nature can never reveal whether this understanding also had a final intention for nature as a whole and its production—an intention that would then not lie in the nature of the sensible world. With all our knowledge of nature, it remains undecided whether that supreme cause is its original ground according to a final end at all. It might instead act through an under-

standing determined by the mere necessity of its nature to produce certain forms [442], by analogy with what we call artistic instinct in animals. There would then be no need to attribute even wisdom to it, much less supreme wisdom united with all the other properties required for the perfection of its product.

Physicotheology is therefore a misunderstood physical teleology [A 410], useful only as a preparation for theology. It is sufficient for this purpose only when another principle is added on which it can rely, not by itself, as its name would suggest.

86 *On ethicotheology.*

Even the most ordinary understanding cannot escape a certain judgment when it reflects on the existence of things in the world and on the existence of the world itself. All the diverse creatures, however artfully constructed and however variously connected through purposive relations to one another—even the whole of their many systems, which we incorrectly call worlds—would exist for nothing if there were no human beings in them, or rational beings in general. Without the human being, the whole of creation would be a mere wilderness, in vain and without a final end. But it is not his cognitive power, theoretical reason, in relation to which the existence of everything else in the world first acquires its value, as if someone merely had to be there to *contemplate* the world. For if this contemplation presented him only with things without a final end, then [A 411] no value could accrue to their existence from their being known. We must already presuppose a final end of the world, in relation to which contemplating it would itself have value. Nor is it the feeling of pleasure and its total sum in relation to which we think of a final end of creation as given. That is, it is not well-being, enjoyment, whether bodily or intellectual—in a word, happiness—by which we assess that absolute value. For the fact that, once human beings exist, they make happiness their own final intention gives no concept of why they exist at all, or what value they themselves have, such that their existence should be made pleasant. [443] The human being must therefore already be presupposed as creation's final end if we are to have a ratio-

nal ground for nature's having to agree with his happiness when regarded as an absolute whole according to principles of ends.—So it is only the faculty of desire that matters here. But not the faculty that makes him dependent on nature through sensible impulses, not that in relation to which the value of his existence rests on what he receives and enjoys. Rather, it is the value that he alone can give himself, consisting in what he does: how and according to what principles he acts, not as a member of nature, but in the *freedom* of his faculty of desire. That is, a [A 412] good will is what alone can give his existence absolute value, and in relation to which the existence of the world can have a *final end*.

The most ordinary judgment of sound human reason agrees completely with this: the human being can be creation's final end only as a moral being, if we merely direct judgment to this question and encourage it to attempt an answer. People will say: what good is it that this person has so much talent, is very active in using it, and thereby beneficially influences the community, thus having great value both for his own fortunate circumstances and for others' benefit, if he has no good will? Considered inwardly, he is a contemptible object. And if creation is not to be entirely without a final end, then he, who belongs to it as a human being, must, as an evil person in a world under moral laws, lose his subjective end, happiness, in accordance with those laws. This is the sole condition under which his existence can coexist with the final end.

If we now find arrangements of ends in the world and, as reason unavoidably requires, subordinate conditioned ends to an unconditioned supreme end, a final end, we can first easily see that we are then concerned not with an end of nature within [A 413] nature, insofar as it exists, but with the end of its existence together with all its arrangements. Thus we are concerned with the ultimate *end of creation*, and, in this, really with the supreme condition under which alone a final end can occur: the determining ground of a highest understanding for producing beings in the world.

444 Since we recognize the human being as creation's end only as a moral being, we now have, first, a ground, or at least the chief condition, for regarding the world as a whole connected according to ends and as a system of final causes. Above all, for the relation of natural ends to an intelligent world cause that the character of our reason makes necessary for us, we have *a principle* for thinking the nature and properties of this first cause as the supreme ground in the kingdom of ends, and so for determining its concept. Physical teleology could not do this. It could occasion only indeterminate concepts of that cause, and precisely for that reason concepts unfit for theoretical as well as practical use.

From this precisely determined principle of the original being's causality, we must think of it not merely as an intelligence legislating for nature, but also as a legislating head in a moral kingdom of ends. In relation to the *highest good* possible [A 414] only under its rule—the existence of rational beings under moral laws—we must think of this original being as *omniscient*, so that even the innermost dispositions, which constitute the actual moral value of rational worldly beings' actions, are not hidden from it; as *omnipotent*, so that it can make the whole of nature adequate to this highest end; as *all-good* and also *just*, because these two properties, which together constitute *wisdom*, are the conditions of the causality of a supreme cause of the world as the highest good under moral laws. We must likewise think in it all the remaining transcendental properties, such as *eternity*, *omnipresence*, and so on, that are presupposed in relation to such a final end, since goodness and justice are moral properties.—In this way *moral* teleology makes up for the deficiency of *physical* teleology and first grounds a *theology*. For if physical teleology did not borrow unnoticed from moral teleology, but proceeded consistently, it could by itself ground nothing but a *demonology*, incapable of any determinate concept.

But the principle that relates the world to a supreme cause [A 415] as a deity, because of the moral vocation of certain beings in it, does not do this merely by completing the physicotheological proof and thus necessarily basing itself on that proof. It is also sufficient *by itself* for this purpose. It directs [445] attention to nature's ends and encourages investigation of the incomprehensibly great art hidden behind their forms, to give incidental confirmation in natural

ends to the ideas supplied by pure practical reason. For the concept of worldly beings under moral laws is an *a priori* principle according to which human beings must necessarily judge themselves. Reason also recognizes *a priori* the following as a necessary principle for its teleological judgment of things' existence: if there is any world cause acting intentionally and directed toward an end, that moral relation must be just as necessary a condition of the possibility of a creation as the relation according to physical laws, assuming that intelligent cause also has a final end. All that matters now is whether we have any ground sufficient for reason, speculative or practical, to attribute a *final end* to the supreme cause acting according to ends. For if so, we can regard it as certain *a priori* for us that, given our reason's subjective character—and however we may think of the reason of other beings—this end can be none other than *the* [A 416] *human being under moral laws*. By contrast, nature's ends in the physical order cannot be known *a priori* at all. In particular, we cannot in any way understand that a nature could not exist without them.

Remark.

Consider a person at moments when his mind is attuned to moral feeling. Surrounded by beautiful nature and calmly, cheerfully enjoying his existence, he feels a need within himself to be grateful to someone for it. Or suppose that, in the same state of mind on another occasion, he finds himself beset by duties that he can and will fulfill only through voluntary sacrifice. He feels a need to have thereby also carried out something commanded and obeyed an overlord. Or perhaps he has thoughtlessly violated his duty, without thereby becoming answerable to other people. His stern self-reproaches will nevertheless speak within him as though they were the voice of a judge to whom he must [446] account for it. In a word, he needs a moral intelligence, so that for the end for which he exists there is a being that is the cause of that person and the world in keeping with this end. It is futile to invent motives behind these feelings. They are directly connected with the purest moral disposition. For *gratitude*, *obedience*, and *humility*—submission to [A 417] deserved punishment—are particular attitudes of mind toward duty. Here the mind inclined to expand its moral disposition freely thinks of an object outside the world, so as, if possible, to

demonstrate its duty toward such an object too. It is therefore at least possible, and grounded in a moral way of thinking, to represent a purely moral need for the existence of a being under which our morality gains either greater strength or, at least in our representation, greater scope: a new object on which to exercise it. That is, it is possible to assume a morally legislating being outside the world, without regard to theoretical proof, still less to selfish interest, on a purely moral ground free of every foreign influence, though admittedly only subjective, solely on the recommendation of a pure practical reason that legislates by itself alone. Such a state of mind might occur rarely or not last long. It might pass fleetingly, without lasting effect, without any reflection on the object represented in such a shadowy image, and without any effort to bring it under clear concepts. Yet its ground is unmistakable: the moral predisposition within us as a subjective principle for not being satisfied, in contemplating the world, with its purposiveness through natural causes, but for placing beneath it a supreme cause governing nature according to moral principles.—Moreover, we feel driven by the moral law to strive for a universal highest end, yet feel that neither we nor nature as a whole can attain it. We may judge ourselves to accord with the final end of an intelligent world cause, if [A 418] there is one, only insofar as we strive for it. Thus practical reason has a purely moral ground for assuming this cause, since this can be done without contradiction, if for no other reason than to avoid the danger of regarding this striving as entirely futile in its effects and thereby letting it weaken.

447 All this is meant to say only the following: *fear* may first have produced *gods*, or demons, but *reason*, through its moral principles, could first produce the concept of *God*. This remains true even if people were, as commonly happens, very ignorant about nature's teleology, or very doubtful because it is difficult to reconcile its contradictory appearances through an adequately established principle. The inner *moral* determination of the end of one's existence supplied what knowledge of nature lacked. It directed us, with regard to the final end of all things' existence—for which only an *ethical* principle satisfies reason—to think

of the supreme cause with properties enabling it to subordinate the whole of nature to that single intention, for which nature is merely an instrument: that is, to think of it as a *deity*.

87 *On the moral proof of God's existence.*

There is a *physical teleology* that provides a sufficient ground of proof for our theoretically reflective judgment to assume the existence of an intelligent world cause. But we [A 419] also find a *moral teleology* within ourselves, and still more in the concept of a rational being endowed with freedom in its causality in general. Since the relation to ends within us can be determined *a priori* together with its law, and thus known as necessary, this teleology needs no intelligent cause outside us to account for this inner lawfulness. We need such a cause no more than we need to look beyond the purposiveness we find in the geometrical properties of figures, for every possible exercise of art, to a highest understanding that gave it to them. But this moral teleology still concerns us as worldly beings, and thus as beings connected with other things in the world. The same moral laws prescribe that we direct our judgment toward these other things either as ends, or as objects in relation to which we ourselves are the final end. This moral teleology concerns the relation of our own causality to ends, even to a final end we must intend in the world. It also concerns the reciprocal relation of the world to that moral end and the [448] external possibility of carrying it out, about which no physical teleology can guide us. From it now arises the necessary question: does it compel our rational judgment to go beyond the world [A 420] and seek a supreme intelligent principle for this relation of nature to the moral within us, so that we may represent nature as purposive also in relation to our inner moral legislation and its possible realization? There is therefore indeed a moral teleology. It is connected with the *legislation* of freedom on the one hand and that of nature on the other just as necessarily as civil legislation is connected with the question of where executive power is to be sought. Such a connection exists generally wherever reason is to give a principle of the actuality of a certain lawful order of things possible only through ideas.

—We will first present reason's advance from that moral teleology and its relation to physical teleology to *theology*, then consider the possibility and cogency of this kind of inference.

If we assume the existence of certain things, or even only certain forms of things, to be contingent, and thus possible only through something else as their cause, we can seek the supreme ground of this causality, and thus the unconditioned ground of what is conditioned, either in the physical or in the teleological order: according to the *nexus of efficient causes* or the *nexus of final causes*. That is, we can ask: what is the supreme productive cause? Or: what is its supreme, absolutely unconditioned end [A 421], the final end of its production of these products or of all its products in general? Here we admittedly presuppose that this cause can represent ends and is therefore an intelligent being, or at least must be thought by us as acting according to the laws of such a being.

Now, if we follow the latter order, there is a *principle* to which even the most ordinary human reason is compelled to agree immediately: if there is to be any *final end*, which reason must specify *a priori*, it can be none other than *the human being*—every rational worldly being—*under moral laws*.[33] For everyone judges as follows. If the world consisted [A 422] [449] entirely of lifeless beings, or partly of living but nonrational beings, its existence would have no value at all, because no being would exist in it with the slightest concept of value. Suppose, instead, there were also rational beings, but their reason could place the value of things' existence only in nature's relation to them, their well-being, and could not itself originally [A 423] create such value in freedom. There would then be relative ends in the world, but no absolute final end, because the existence of such rational beings would itself always be purposeless. Moral laws, however, have this distinctive character: they prescribe something to reason as an end without condition, exactly as the concept of a final end requires. Thus only the existence of a reason that can itself be the supreme law for itself in the relation to ends—in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral

laws—can be thought as the final end [450] of a world's existence. Otherwise, either no end at all in its cause underlies the world's existence, or ends without a final end underlie it.

The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, binds us by itself alone, without depending on any end as a material condition. Yet it also determines for us, *a priori*, a final end that it obliges us to pursue: the *highest good in the world* possible through freedom.

The subjective condition under which the human being—and, according to all our concepts, every finite rational being—can set himself a final end under the above law is happiness. Consequently, [A 424] the highest physical good possible in the world, which we are to promote as a final end as far as we can, is *happiness*, under the objective condition of human agreement with the law of *morality*, as worthiness to be happy.

But with all our powers of reason, we cannot represent these two requirements of the final end assigned to us by the moral law as *connected* through mere natural causes and as adequate to the idea of that final end. So the concept of the *practical necessity* of such an end through the application of our powers does not agree with the theoretical concept of the *physical possibility* of bringing it about, if we connect our freedom with no causality as a means except nature's.

Consequently, we must assume a moral world cause, an author of the world, in order to set ourselves a final end in accordance with the moral law. As far as the latter is necessary, so far—that is, to the same degree and on the same ground—it is also necessary to assume the former: namely, that there is a God.[34]

This proof, which can easily be given a logically precise form [A 425], does not mean that assuming God's existence [451] is just as necessary as acknowledging the moral law's validity, and that whoever cannot convince himself of the former may therefore judge himself released from obligations under the latter. No! Only the *intention* of realizing the final end in the world through following the moral law would then have to be abandoned: the happiness of rational beings harmoniously coinciding with their observance of moral laws, as the world's highest good. Every rational person would still have to acknowledge himself strictly bound by morality's prescription. For its laws are formal and command

unconditionally, without regard to ends as the material of willing. But one requirement of the final end, as practical reason prescribes it to worldly beings, is an irresistible end placed in them by their nature as [A 426] finite beings. Reason wants only to subject this end to the moral law *as an inviolable condition*, or also to make it universal according to that law. It thus makes promoting happiness in agreement with morality the final end. The moral law commands us to promote this as far as lies within our power, as regards happiness, whatever outcome this effort may have. Fulfilling duty consists in the form of an earnest will, not in the intermediate causes of success.

Suppose, then, that a person persuades himself that there is no God, moved partly by the weakness of all the much-praised speculative arguments, partly by various irregularities he encounters in nature and the moral world. He would still be worthless in his own eyes if he therefore chose to regard the laws of duty as merely imagined, invalid, and nonbinding, and resolved to violate them without hesitation. With that way of thinking, he would remain worthless even if he later became convinced of what he had initially doubted. He might fulfill his duty, but from fear or desire for reward, without [452] a disposition that honors duty, as punctiliously in its effects as could ever [A 427] be demanded. Conversely, suppose that as a believer he follows duty sincerely and unselfishly to the best of his awareness, yet whenever he considers the hypothetical case of one day becoming convinced that there is no God, he immediately thinks himself free of all moral obligation. His inner moral disposition would then be in a very poor state.

We can therefore suppose an upright person, such as Spinoza, firmly convinced that there is no God and no future life, since this has the same consequence regarding morality's object. How will he judge the inner determination of his own end through the moral law, which he actively honors? He seeks no advantage for himself from following it, either in this world or another. Rather, he wants unselfishly only to establish the good toward which that holy law directs all his powers. But his striving is limited. From nature he can expect occasional, accidental support, but never a lawful agreement, occurring according to constant rules—as his maxims inwardly are and must be—with the end he never-

theless feels bound and driven to bring about. Deceit, violence, and envy will always be rife around him, although [A 428] he himself is honest, peaceable, and benevolent. The upright people he encounters will, despite all their worthiness to be happy, still be subjected by nature, which takes no account of this, to all the evils of deprivation, disease, and untimely death, just like the earth's other animals. They will always remain so until one vast grave swallows them all, honest and dishonest alike—it makes no difference here—and throws them, who could believe themselves creation's final end, back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn.—He would therefore have to abandon as impossible the end that this well-disposed person had, and ought to have had, in view when following moral laws. Or suppose he wants to remain faithful here too to the call of his inner moral vocation, and not weaken the respect that the moral law directly inspires in him for obedience by declaring null the only ideal final end adequate to its high demand. This weakening cannot occur without harming his moral disposition. [453] He must then assume, for practical purposes, the existence of a *moral* author of the world, that is, [A 429] God, so as at least to form a concept of the possibility of the final end morally prescribed to him. He can perfectly well do this, since it is at least not contradictory in itself.

88 *Limitation of the validity of the moral proof.*

Pure reason, as a practical capacity—that is, the capacity to determine the free use of our causality through ideas, or pure concepts of reason—contains in the moral law not only a regulative principle for our actions. Through it, reason also supplies a subjectively constitutive principle in the concept of an object that reason alone can think and that is to be made actual in the world by our actions according to that law. The idea of a final end in using freedom according to moral laws therefore has subjective *practical* reality. Reason determines us *a priori* to promote with all our powers the world's highest good. This consists in connecting the greatest well-being of rational worldly beings with the supreme condition of goodness in them: universal happiness with the strictest conformity to morality. In this final end, the possibility of one part, happiness,

is empirically conditioned. It depends on nature's character, whether nature agrees with this end or not, and is problematic theoretically [A 430]. The other part, morality, in relation to which we are independent of nature's cooperation, is established *a priori* as regards its possibility and is dogmatically certain. The objective theoretical reality of the concept of rational worldly beings' final end therefore requires not only that we have a final end set for us *a priori*, but also that creation, the world itself, have a final end with regard to its existence. If this could be proved *a priori*, it would add objective reality to the subjective reality of the final end. For if creation has any final end, we can think it only as necessarily agreeing with the moral end, which alone makes the concept of an end possible [454]. Now we certainly find ends in the world. Physical teleology displays them in such abundance that, if we judge according to reason, we ultimately have grounds to adopt as a principle of natural inquiry that nothing in nature is without an end. Yet we search in vain within nature itself for nature's final end. Just as its idea lies only in reason, so this final end, even as regards its objective possibility, can and must be sought only in rational beings. Their practical reason not only specifies this final end but also determines its concept with regard to the conditions under which alone we [A 431] can think a final end of creation.

The question now is whether the objective reality of the concept of creation's final end can also be demonstrated sufficiently for pure reason's theoretical requirements: if not with demonstrative certainty for determining judgment, then at least sufficiently for the maxims of theoretically reflective judgment. This is the least we can ask of speculative philosophy, which undertakes to connect the moral end with natural ends through the idea of a single end. But even this little is far more than it can ever accomplish.

According to the principle of theoretically reflective judgment, we would say: suppose we have grounds to assume, for nature's purposive products, a supreme cause of nature whose causality regarding nature's actuality—creation—must be thought as different from what nature's mechanism requires, namely as the causality of an understanding. We would then also have sufficient grounds to think in this original being not merely ends everywhere in nature

but also a final end. Even if this did not demonstrate such a being's existence, it would at least, as in physical teleology, convince us that we can make the possibility [A 432] of such a world understandable to ourselves only through ends, and moreover only by placing a final end beneath its existence.

But a final end is solely a concept of our practical reason. It cannot be inferred from any data of experience for the theoretical judgment of nature, or be related to knowledge of nature. No use of this concept is possible except for practical [455] reason alone, according to moral laws. Creation's final end is that character of the world that agrees with the only thing we can specify determinately according to laws: the final end of our pure practical reason, insofar as it is to be practical.—Now the moral law, which imposes this latter end on us, gives us a ground for assuming its possibility and feasibility for practical purposes, namely for applying our powers to bring it about. We may therefore also assume a nature of things agreeing with it. For realizing it would be impossible without nature's cooperation in a condition of it that is beyond our control. So we have a moral ground for thinking in a world a final end of creation as well.

This is not yet the inference from moral teleology [A 433] to theology, that is, to the existence of a moral author of the world. It is only an inference to a final end of creation determined in this way. That this creation—the existence of things according to a *final end*—requires us to assume an author of the world who is, first, intelligent, but second, not merely intelligent as required for the possibility of natural things we were compelled to judge as *ends*, but also *moral*, and thus a *God*: this is a second inference. We can see from its character that it is made solely for judgment according to concepts of practical reason, and as such for reflective, not determining, judgment. For we cannot claim to understand that because moral-practical reason within us differs essentially in its principles from technical-practical reason, this must also be so in the supreme world cause, if we assume it to be an intelligence. We cannot claim that its final end requires a special and different kind of causality from that required merely for natural ends. We therefore cannot claim that our final end gives us not merely a *moral ground* for assuming a final end of creation as an effect, but also grounds for assuming a *moral being* as creation's original ground. But we can say this:

given the character of our rational capacity [A 434], we cannot make the possibility of such purposiveness *related to the moral law* and its object, as found in this final end, understandable to ourselves at all without an author and ruler of the world who is also a moral legislator.

456 The actuality of a highest morally legislating author is therefore sufficiently demonstrated only *for the practical use* of our reason, without determining anything theoretically about his existence. For practical reason needs an idea to make possible its end, which is assigned to us by its own legislation even without this idea. Through that idea, the obstacle arising from our inability to follow reason on the mere natural concept of the world is removed sufficiently for reflective judgment. This gives the idea practical reality, although for speculative knowledge it completely lacks every means of acquiring such reality theoretically, to explain nature and determine the supreme cause. For theoretically reflective judgment, physical teleology sufficiently proved an intelligent world cause from nature's ends. For practical judgment, moral teleology does this through the concept of a final end that it is compelled to attribute to creation for practical purposes. The [A 435] objective reality of the idea of God as a moral author of the world cannot, admittedly, be demonstrated through physical ends *alone*. Nevertheless, when knowledge of them is combined with knowledge of the moral end, they are of great importance. By pure reason's maxim of pursuing unity of principles as far as possible, they support this idea's practical reality through the reality it already has theoretically for judgment.

To prevent a misunderstanding that can easily arise, it is essential to note two things here. First, we can *think* these properties of the highest being only by analogy. For how could we investigate its nature, when experience can show us nothing similar? Second, through this analogy we can only think it, not *know* it accordingly or attribute those properties to it theoretically. That would be a task for determining judgment in reason's speculative use, to understand what the supreme world cause is *in itself*. But here the question is only what concept we must form of it, given the character of our cognitive powers, and whether we must assume its existence in order to give merely practical reality to an end.

Pure practical reason imposes on us *a priori*, without any such presupposition, the duty of realizing this end with all our powers. We need only [A 436] be able to think of an intended effect as possible. That concept may well exceed the bounds of speculative reason [457]. The properties we attribute to the being thought through it may also conceal an anthropomorphism if used objectively. But their use is not intended to determine its nature, which is inaccessible to us, but to determine ourselves and our will accordingly. We name a cause according to our concept of its effect, but only regarding its relation to that effect, without thereby intending to determine its inner character through properties that alone we know in causes of this sort and that must be given through experience. For example, we attribute to the soul, among other things, a *power of locomotion*, because bodily movements actually arise whose cause lies in its representations. We do not thereby intend to attribute to it the only kind of moving forces we know: attraction, pressure, impact, and thus motion, which always presuppose an extended being. In just the same way, we must assume *something* containing the ground of the possibility and practical reality—that is, feasibility—of a necessary moral final end. Given the character of the effect expected from it, we can think of this something as a wise being governing the world according to moral [A 437] laws. Given the character of our cognitive powers, we must think of it as a cause of things distinct from nature. This expresses only the *relation* of this being, which exceeds all our cognitive powers, to the object of *our* practical reason. We must not thereby intend to attribute to it theoretically the only causality of this kind known to us, an understanding and a will. We must not even intend to distinguish objectively, within this being itself, its causality regarding what is a final end *for us* from its causality regarding nature and nature's determinations of ends in general. We can assume this distinction only as subjectively necessary given the character of our cognitive power, and as valid for reflective, not objectively determining, judgment. But in practical matters, such a *regulative* principle for prudence or wisdom is also *constitutive*, that is, practically determining: we are to act in accordance with that as an end which, given our cognitive powers, we can think possible only in a certain way. Yet this same principle, as a principle for judging

things' objective possibility, is by no means theoretically determining. It does not establish that [458] the object itself has only the kind of possibility that our [A 438] capacity can think. It is merely a *regulative* principle for reflective judgment.

Remark.

This moral proof is not newly invented; at most, its ground has only been newly clarified. For it already lay in the human rational capacity before its earliest awakening, and is only developed further as that capacity's culture progresses. As soon as people began reflecting on right and wrong, they inevitably arrived at the judgment that the final outcome could never be indifferent to whether someone had acted honestly or deceitfully, fairly or violently. This happened at a time when they still passed indifferently over nature's purposiveness, using nature without thinking of anything but its accustomed course, even if, at least visibly, they found no good fortune for their virtues or punishment for their crimes up to the end of life. It is as though they heard a voice within themselves saying that things must turn out differently. Thus there must also have been a hidden, though obscure, representation of something they felt bound to pursue, with which such an outcome could not be reconciled. Or, if they regarded the course of the world as the sole order of things, they did not know how to reconcile that inner determination of their mind's end with it. They might imagine in many very [A 439] crude ways how such an irregularity could be corrected—an irregularity that must outrage the human mind far more than the blind chance someone might propose as a principle for judging nature. Yet they could never conceive any principle for the possibility of uniting nature with their inner moral law other than a supreme cause governing the world according to moral laws. For a final end assigned within them as a duty contradicts a nature outside them without any final end, in which that end must nevertheless become actual. They could hatch much nonsense about this world cause's inner character. But that moral relation in the world's government always remained the same, universally understandable even to the most uncultivated reason insofar as it regards itself as practical. Speculative reason, by contrast, cannot [459] come close to keeping pace with it.—In all probability,

this moral interest also first awakened attention to nature's beauty and ends. These then served excellently to strengthen that idea, but could neither ground it nor, still less, dispense with that moral interest. For even the investigation of natural ends acquires only through its relation to the final end that immediate interest displayed so greatly in our admiration of them without regard to any advantage to be gained.

89 *On the usefulness of the moral argument.*

Restricting reason, in all our ideas of the supersensible, to the conditions of its practical use has an unmistakable benefit [A 440] regarding the idea of God. It prevents *theology* from soaring into *theosophy*, into excessive concepts that confuse reason, or sinking into *demonology*, an anthropomorphic way of representing the highest being. It prevents *religion* from falling into *theurgy*, the extravagant delusion that we can feel other supersensible beings and in turn influence them, or into *idolatry*, the superstitious delusion that we can please the highest being through means other than a moral disposition[35].

For suppose we allow the vanity or presumption of reasoning to determine even the slightest thing theoretically, extending knowledge about what lies beyond the sensible world. Suppose we permit people to boast of insights into the existence and character of the [A 441] divine nature, its understanding and will, the laws of both, and the properties flowing from these into the world. I would then like to know where and at what point we mean to [460] limit reason's pretensions. For wherever those insights came from, still more can surely be expected from the same source, if we only exert our reflection, as people think. Such claims would have to be limited according to some principle, not merely because we find that all attempts so far have failed. That proves nothing against the possibility of better success. But no principle is possible here except either to assume that absolutely nothing can be determined theoretically about the supersensible, other than purely negatively, or to assume that our reason contains a still unworked mine of who knows how much expanded knowledge, preserved for us and our descendants.—As for religion, morality in relation to God as legislator, if theoretical knowledge of God had to come first, morality

would have to conform to theology. Not only would an external, arbitrary legislation of a supreme being replace reason's inner, necessary legislation, but every deficiency in our insight into [A 442] that being's nature would also extend into moral prescription, making religion immoral and corrupting it.

As for the hope of a future life, suppose we consult our theoretical cognitive power instead of using the final end we ourselves must realize according to the moral law as the guide for reason's judgment of our vocation—a judgment regarded as necessary or worthy of acceptance only in a practical relation. For this purpose the study of the soul, like theology above, gives nothing more than a negative concept of our thinking being: none of its actions or the appearances of inner sense can be explained materialistically. Thus our entire theoretical cognitive power cannot, on speculative grounds, make any judgment extending or determining our knowledge of its separate nature or of the continuation or noncontinuation of its personality after death. Everything here is left to teleological judgment of our existence in a practically necessary respect, and to assuming our continued existence as a condition required for the final end that reason unconditionally assigns us. This also shows the benefit, though at first it seems a loss: just as theology can never become theosophy for us [A 443] [461], rational *psychology* can never become *pneumatology*, a science extending our knowledge of spirits. On the other hand, it is also protected from falling into *materialism*. Rather, it is merely an anthropology of inner sense: knowledge of our thinking self in *life*. As theoretical knowledge, it also remains merely empirical. By contrast, regarding the question of our eternal existence, rational psychology is no theoretical science at all. It rests on a single inference of moral teleology, and its entire use is necessary only for the sake of that teleology as our practical vocation.

90 *On the kind of acceptance as true in a teleological proof of God's existence.*

First, every proof must not merely *persuade*, but *convince*, or at least work toward conviction. This applies whether the proof proceeds through a direct empirical presentation of what is to be proved, as through observation of the object or experiment, or through reason *a priori* from principles. That is, the

ground of proof or inference must not be merely a subjective [A 444], aesthetic determining ground of assent, a mere semblance. It must be objectively valid and a logical ground of knowledge. Otherwise the understanding is beguiled, not convinced. One such deceptive proof is offered in natural theology, perhaps with good intentions but still with deliberate concealment of its weakness. It draws on the great mass of evidence that natural things originate according to the principle of ends and exploits a merely subjective ground of human reason: its characteristic tendency to substitute one principle for many wherever this can be done without contradiction. Where only some or even many requirements for determining a concept are found in this principle, reason adds the rest in thought, completing the concept of the thing by arbitrary supplementation. After all, if we encounter so many products in nature that indicate an intelligent cause to us, why should we not think of one such cause rather than many? And why should we not attribute to it not merely great understanding [462], power, and so on, but all-wisdom and omnipotence—in a word, think of it as containing the sufficient ground of such properties for all possible things? Moreover, why attribute to this single all-powerful original being not only understanding for nature's laws and products [A 445], but also, as a moral world cause, the highest moral practical reason? Completing the concept in this way gives a principle sufficient both for insight into nature and for moral wisdom, and no even moderately grounded objection can be made against such an idea's possibility. If the mind's moral incentives are also set in motion, and a lively interest in them is added with rhetorical force, of which they are indeed worthy, the result is persuasion of the proof's objective adequacy. A semblance arises that is also beneficial in most cases of its use. It lifts itself entirely above any examination of the proof's logical rigor and even regards such examination with abhorrence and aversion, as if it rested on an impious doubt.—There may be nothing to say against this insofar as popular usefulness is the real concern. But we cannot and must not prevent the argument from being divided into its two different components: what belongs to physical teleology and what belongs to moral teleology. Fusing them makes it impossible to recognize where the proof's real force lies, and which part must be worked on, and how, to make

its validity withstand the strictest examination [A 446], even if we should have to acknowledge the weakness of our rational insight in one part. It is therefore the philosopher's duty, even if he thought nothing of the demand for honesty made on him, to expose the semblance such a mixture can produce, however beneficial it may be. He must separate what belongs merely to persuasion from what leads to conviction—two determinations of assent differing not merely in degree but in kind. This allows him openly to present the mind's attitude in this proof in its full purity and freely submit it to the strictest examination.

A proof intended to convince can itself be of two kinds. It can establish either what the object is *in itself*, or what it is *for us*, human beings in general, according to the [463] rational principles necessary for our judgment of it: a proof "according to truth" or "according to the human being," the latter expression taken generally for humanity as a whole. In the first case it rests on sufficient principles for determining judgment; in the second, only for reflective judgment. In the latter case, if it rests on merely theoretical principles, it can never work toward conviction. But if [A 447] it bases itself on a practical principle of reason, which therefore holds universally and necessarily, it may claim a conviction sufficient for purely practical purposes: a moral conviction. A proof *works toward conviction* without yet convincing when it is merely on the way there: it contains objective grounds that, although not yet sufficient for certainty, are nevertheless of a kind that they do not merely serve persuasion as subjective grounds of judgment.

Now all theoretical grounds of proof are sufficient either 1) for proof through logically strict *inferences of reason*; or, failing that, 2) for an *inference by analogy*; or, if even that is unavailable, 3) for a *probable opinion*; or finally, at the lowest level, 4) for assuming a merely possible ground of explanation as a *hypothesis*.—Now I say that no grounds of proof working toward theoretical conviction can produce acceptance as true of this kind, from its highest to its lowest degree, if what is to be proved is the existence of an original being as a God in the meaning adequate to the concept's entire content: as a *moral* author of the world, such that the final end of creation is also specified through him [A 448].

1) Concerning *logically correct* proof, which proceeds from the universal to the particular, the Critique has sufficiently shown the following. No intuition possible for us corresponds to the concept of a being to be sought beyond nature. Thus this concept itself, insofar as it is to be theoretically determined through synthetic predicates, always remains problematic for us. There can therefore be absolutely no knowledge of it that would extend the scope of our theoretical knowledge in the least. Nor can the particular concept of a supersensible being be subsumed under the universal principles of the nature of things, so that we could infer from those principles to [464] this being. Those principles hold solely for nature as an object of the senses.

2) With two things of different kinds, we can indeed *think* of one by *analogy*[36] with the other precisely at the point where they differ. But we cannot [A 449] *infer* from one to the other by analogy in what makes them different, transferring this feature [A 450] of their specific difference to the other. Thus, by analogy with the law of equality of action and reaction in bodies' mutual attraction and repulsion [465], I can also think of the association of a community's members according to rules of right. But I cannot transfer those specific determinations, material attraction or repulsion, to the members and attribute them to citizens in order to constitute the system called a state.—Likewise, we may think of the original being's causality regarding worldly things as natural ends by analogy with an understanding as the ground of the forms of certain products we call works of art. We do this only for the theoretical or practical use of our cognitive power that we must make of this concept regarding natural things in the world according to a certain principle. But from the fact that, among [A 451] worldly beings, understanding must be attributed to the cause of an effect judged as artfully produced, we cannot infer by analogy that the being entirely distinct from nature also possesses, in relation to nature itself, the very same causality we perceive in human beings. For this concerns precisely the point of difference between a cause sensibly conditioned in its effects and the supersensible original being, a difference thought in the very concept of the latter and therefore not transferable to it.—The requirement that I think divine

causality only by analogy with an understanding, a capacity we know in no being other than the sensibly conditioned human being, itself contains the prohibition against attributing understanding to God in its proper meaning[37].

3) *Opinion* has no place at all in *a priori* judgments. Through them we know either something entirely certain or nothing at all. Even when the given grounds of proof from which we start are empirical, as here from ends in the world, we still cannot use them [A 452] to hold opinions beyond the sensible world or grant such venturesome judgments the slightest claim to probability. For probability is a part of a certainty possible within a certain series of grounds. Its grounds are compared with a sufficient ground as parts with a whole, into which that insufficient [466] ground must be capable of being supplemented. But as grounds determining the certainty of one and the same judgment, they must be of the same kind. Otherwise they would not together make up a magnitude such as certainty is. Thus one part cannot lie within the bounds of possible experience and another outside all possible experience. Mere empirical grounds of proof lead to nothing supersensible, and their deficient series cannot be supplemented by anything. In attempting through them to reach the supersensible and knowledge of it, therefore, there is not the slightest approach toward the goal. Consequently, in a judgment about the supersensible through arguments drawn from experience, there is no probability either.

4) Anything to serve as a *hypothesis* explaining the possibility of a given appearance must at least be completely certain in its possibility. It is enough that with a hypothesis I renounce knowledge of actuality, which is still asserted in an opinion offered as probable [A 453]. I cannot give up more than this. The possibility of what I base an explanation on must at least be beyond doubt; otherwise there would be no end to empty fantasies. But assuming the possibility of a supersensible being determined according to certain concepts would be a wholly groundless presupposition. For none of the conditions required for knowledge insofar as it rests on intuition is given here. So the mere principle of contradiction remains as the criterion of this possibility, although it can prove only the possibility of thinking, not of the object thought itself.

The result is that human reason can produce absolutely no theoretical proof of the existence of the original being as a deity, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, sufficient to bring about even the slightest degree of acceptance as true. The reason is entirely understandable: we have no material at all for determining ideas of the supersensible. We would have to take such material from things in the sensible world, but it is wholly inadequate to that object. So without any determination of these ideas, nothing remains but the concept of a nonsensible something containing the ultimate ground of the sensible world [A 454]. This does not yet constitute knowledge of its inner character through an extension of the concept.

91 [467] *On the kind of acceptance as true through practical faith.*

Suppose we look only at how something can be an object of knowledge *for us*, given the subjective character of our powers of representation—a *knowable thing*. We then compare concepts not with objects, but only with our cognitive powers and the use these can make of the given representation for theoretical or practical purposes. The question whether something is a knowable being is not about the possibility of things themselves, but about our knowledge of them.

Knowable things are of three kinds: *matters of opinion* (*opinabile*), *matters of fact* (*scibile*), and *matters of faith* (*mere credibile*).

1) Objects of mere ideas of reason that cannot be presented in any possible experience for theoretical knowledge are, to that extent, not *knowable* things at all. We therefore cannot even hold an *opinion* about them. Indeed, holding an opinion *a priori* [A 455] is already absurd in itself and leads directly to sheer fantasies. Thus either our *a priori* proposition is certain, or it contains nothing to accept as true. *Matters of opinion* are therefore always objects of experiential knowledge possible at least in itself—objects of the sensible world—but impossible *for us* given the mere degree of this capacity we possess. Thus the ether of modern physicists, an elastic fluid permeating all other matter and intimately mixed with it, is a mere matter of opinion. It is still of such a kind that, if the outer senses were sharpened to the highest degree, it could be perceived; yet it can never be presented in any observation or experiment. Assuming rational

inhabitants of other planets is a matter of opinion. For if we could approach those planets, which is possible in itself, we would determine through experience whether such inhabitants exist. But we will never get so close, so it remains opinion. Yet holding the opinion that pure spirits, thinking without bodies, exist in the material universe—if, as is proper, we reject certain alleged actual appearances of them—is invention, not [468] a matter of opinion at all. It is a mere idea left over when we remove everything material from a thinking being while still leaving it thought. But whether the latter, which [A 456] we know only in human beings, in connection with a body, would then remain, we cannot determine. Such a thing is a *being fabricated by reasoning* (*ens rationis ratiocinantis*), not a *rationally grounded being* (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*). With the latter, it is possible to demonstrate its concept's objective reality sufficiently at least for reason's practical use. For this use, which has its own distinctive and demonstratively certain *a priori* principles, even requires or postulates it.

2) Objects for concepts whose objective reality can be proved are *matters of fact* (*res facti*)[38]. Such proof may come through pure reason or experience, and in the former case from theoretical or practical data of reason, but always through a corresponding intuition. The mathematical properties of magnitudes in geometry are of this kind because they can be *presented a priori* for reason's theoretical use. Further, [A 457] things or their properties that can be demonstrated through experience—our own, or others' through testimony—are likewise matters of fact.—But remarkably, even an idea of reason appears among matters of fact, although in itself it cannot be presented in intuition and thus cannot admit a theoretical proof of its possibility. This is the idea of *freedom*. Its reality as a special kind of causality, whose concept would exceed the bounds of theoretical reason, can be demonstrated through practical laws of pure reason and, in accordance with them, in actual actions, hence in experience.—It is the only idea of pure reason whose object is a matter of fact and must be counted among things knowable.

469 3) Objects that must be thought *a priori* in relation to the dutiful use of pure practical reason, whether as consequences or grounds, but that exceed the bounds of its theoretical use, are mere *matters of faith*. Such an object is the *highest good* to be brought about in the world through freedom. Its concept cannot be sufficiently proved as to its objective reality in any experience possible for us, and thus for reason's theoretical use. Yet pure practical reason commands its use to realize that end as well as possible, so it must be assumed [A 458] to be possible. This commanded effect, *together with the only conditions of its possibility thinkable for us*—God's existence and the soul's immortality—are *matters of faith* (*res fidei*). Indeed, they are the only objects that can be so called[39]. For although we must believe what we can learn only from others' experience through *testimony*, that does not yet make it a matter of faith in itself. For *one* of those witnesses, at least, it was personal experience and a matter of fact, or is presupposed as such. Moreover, it must be possible to reach knowledge by this path of historical belief. The objects of history and geography, like everything that our cognitive powers can at least possibly know, belong not to matters of faith but to matters of fact. Only objects of pure reason can possibly be matters of faith [A 459], but not as objects of merely pure speculative reason. For as such they cannot even be counted with certainty among things, that is, objects of knowledge possible for us. They are ideas: concepts whose objective reality cannot be secured theoretically. By contrast, the highest final end to be realized by us, through which alone we can become worthy of being a creation's final end ourselves, is an idea having objective reality for us practically, and is a thing. But because we cannot give this concept that reality for [470] theoretical purposes, it is a mere matter of faith of pure reason. So too, along with it, are God and immortality, as the conditions under which alone, given the character of our human reason, we can think the possibility of that effect of the lawful use of our freedom. Acceptance as true in matters of faith is acceptance for purely practical purposes: a moral faith. It proves nothing for theoretical knowledge, but only for practical pure rational knowledge directed toward following one's duties. It does not extend speculation, or practical rules of prudence based on self-love, at all. If the supreme principle of all

moral laws is a postulate, then the possibility of their highest object is also thereby postulated, and with it the condition [A 460] under which we can think this possibility. Knowledge of this condition thereby becomes neither knowledge nor opinion about these conditions' existence and character as a theoretical kind of cognition. It is merely an assumption in a practical and commanded relation, for the moral use of our reason.

Even if we could apparently ground a *determinate* concept of an intelligent world cause on the natural ends that physical teleology presents so abundantly, this being's existence would still not be a matter of faith. For since it is assumed not to fulfill my duty but only to explain nature, it would be merely the opinion and hypothesis most suited to our reason. But that teleology by no means leads to a determinate concept of God. Such a concept is found only in the concept of a moral author of the world, because this alone specifies the final end. We can count ourselves as belonging to this end only insofar as we conform to what the moral law imposes on us as a final end, and thus obliges us to do. Consequently, only through relation to the object of our duty, as a condition of the possibility of attaining its final end, does the concept of God gain the privilege of counting as a matter of faith in our acceptance as true. Yet this same [A 461] concept cannot establish its object as a matter of fact. Although the necessity of duty is clear to practical reason, attaining its final end, insofar as this is not entirely within our control, is assumed only for the practical use of [471] reason. It is therefore not practically necessary in the way duty itself is[40].

Faith, as a *habitual disposition*, not an *act*, is reason's moral way of thinking [A 462] in accepting as true what is inaccessible to theoretical knowledge. It is therefore the mind's steadfast principle of accepting as true, because of our obligation to the highest moral final end, what must be presupposed as a condition of that end's possibility[41], although we cannot understand either its possibility [472] or, equally, its impossibility [A 463]. Faith, so called without qualification, is trust in attaining an intention that it is our duty to promote, but whose realization we cannot *understand* as possible, and consequently neither can we understand the possibility of its only conditions thinkable for us. Thus faith relating to particular objects that are not objects of possible knowledge or

opinion is entirely moral. In the latter case, especially in historical matters, it would have to be called credulity rather than faith. Faith is a free acceptance as true, not of what admits dogmatic proofs for theoretically determining judgment, nor of what we consider ourselves obliged to accept, but of what we assume to serve an intention according to laws of freedom. Yet it is not like an opinion without sufficient grounds. It is grounded in reason, though only with regard to its practical use [A 464], *sufficiently for reason's intention*. For without it, the moral way of thinking has no firm persistence when it encounters theoretical reason's demand for proof of the possibility of morality's object. Instead, it wavers between practical commands and theoretical doubts. To be *distrustful* means to follow the maxim of not believing testimony in general. But an *unbeliever* denies all validity to those ideas of reason because they lack a *theoretical* grounding of their reality. He therefore judges dogmatically. Dogmatic *unbelief* cannot coexist with a moral maxim governing one's way of thinking, since reason cannot command pursuit of an end recognized as nothing but a fantasy. But a *doubting faith* can. Here the lack of conviction through grounds of speculative reason is only an obstacle. Critical insight into that reason's limits can remove the obstacle's influence on conduct and [473] replace it with a predominating practical acceptance as true.

When we want to put another principle in place of certain failed philosophical attempts and give it influence, it is deeply satisfying to understand how those attempts failed and why [A 465] they had to fail.

God, *freedom*, and *the soul's immortality* are the problems toward whose solution all the preparations of metaphysics aim, as their ultimate and sole end. Now people believed the doctrine of freedom was needed only as a negative condition for practical philosophy, whereas the doctrines of God and the soul's character belonged to theoretical philosophy and had to be demonstrated by themselves and separately. They were then to be connected with what the moral law commands, which is possible only under the condition of freedom, thereby producing a religion. But we can soon see that these attempts had to fail. From mere ontological concepts of things in general, or of the existence of a necessary being, we can form absolutely no concept of an original being deter-

mined through predicates that can be given in experience and thus serve knowledge. In turn, a concept grounded on experience of nature's physical purposiveness could supply no proof sufficient for morality, and therefore for knowledge of a God. Nor could experiential knowledge of the soul, which we acquire only in this life, provide a concept of its spiritual, immortal nature sufficient for morality. *Theology* and *pneumatology*, as [A 466] tasks for speculative reason's sciences, cannot be established through any empirical data or predicates, because their concept exceeds all our cognitive powers.—Both concepts, God and the soul regarding its immortality, can be determined only through predicates that, although themselves possible only from a supersensible ground, must nevertheless prove their reality in experience. Only in this way can they make knowledge of wholly supersensible beings possible.—The sole concept of this kind found in human reason is [474] that of human freedom under moral laws, together with the final end that reason prescribes through these laws. The laws allow us to attribute to nature's author, and the final end to the human being, those properties containing the necessary condition for the possibility of both. Thus, from this very idea we can infer the existence and character of those beings otherwise entirely hidden from us.

Thus the reason the intention to prove God and immortality fails on the merely theoretical path is that no knowledge of the supersensible is possible along this path of natural concepts. Its success on the moral path, that of the concept of freedom [A 467], has this ground: here the supersensible underlying it, freedom, supplies material for knowledge of the other supersensible objects —the moral final end and the conditions of its feasibility—through a determinate law of causality arising from it. It also demonstrates its reality in actions as a matter of fact. But for that very reason it can provide a valid ground of proof only for practical purposes, which are also the only purposes religion needs.

It always remains remarkable that among the three ideas of pure reason—*God*, *freedom*, and *immortality*—freedom is the only concept of the supersensible that proves its objective reality in nature, through the causality thought in it and its possible effect within nature. Precisely through this it makes possible the connection of the other two with nature, and of all three with one another in a

religion. We therefore have within us a principle capable of determining the idea of the supersensible within us, and thereby also of the supersensible outside us, into knowledge, although possible only for practical purposes. Merely speculative philosophy, which could also give only a negative concept of freedom, had to despair of this. Thus the concept of freedom, as the fundamental concept [A 468] of all unconditionally practical laws, can extend reason beyond the boundaries within which every theoretical concept of nature would have to remain confined without hope.

29 A hypothesis of this kind may be called a daring adventure of reason, and few even among the most perceptive investigators of nature may never have had it cross their minds. For it is not actually absurd, as *spontaneous generation* is, by which we mean the production of an organized being through the mechanics of raw, unorganized matter. It would still be *generation from an organism* in the broadest sense of the term, provided only that something organic was generated from something else organic, though specifically different within this kind of being. For example, certain aquatic animals might gradually develop into marsh animals, and these after several generations into land animals. *A priori*, in the judgment of mere reason, there is no contradiction in this. But experience shows no example of it. Rather, all generation we know is *generation of the same kind*. It is not merely *generation from an organism*, as opposed to generation from unorganized material, but also brings forth a product of the same kind as its parent in its very organization. And *generation of a different kind* is found nowhere within the reach of our experiential knowledge of nature.

30 If the established name *natural history* is to remain in use for the description of nature, we can call what that name literally indicates—the representation of the earth's former, *ancient* state, about which, though we cannot hope for certainty, we venture well-grounded conjectures—the *archaeology of nature*, as distinct from that of art. Fossils would belong to the former, just as engraved stones and so on belong to the latter. For since work on such an inquiry, under the name

of a theory of the earth, does in fact continue steadily, though properly slowly, the name would not designate a merely imagined investigation of nature, but one to which nature itself invites and urges us.

31 The value life has for us when assessed only by *what we enjoy*—the natural end of the sum of all inclinations, happiness—is easy to decide. It falls below zero. For who would choose to begin life again under the same conditions, or even according to a new, self-devised plan, though consistent with nature's course, if it too aimed only at enjoyment? The value life has through what it contains when led according to nature's end for us has been shown above. This consists in *what we do*, not merely enjoy, though we still remain only means to an undetermined final end. Thus nothing seems left but the value we ourselves give our lives through what we not only do, but do purposively in such independence from nature that even nature's existence can be an end only under this condition.

32 It would be possible for the happiness of rational beings in the world to be an end of nature, and it would then also be nature's *ultimate* end. At least we cannot understand *a priori* why nature should not be arranged this way, since its mechanism could, as far as we can understand, produce this effect. But morality and a causality according to ends subordinated to it are absolutely impossible through natural causes. For the principle determining them to act is supersensible. Thus it is the only possibility in the order of ends that is wholly unconditioned with regard to nature, and it alone thereby qualifies its subject as creation's *final end*, to which the whole of nature is subordinated.—*Happiness*, by contrast, as shown from experience in the preceding section, is not even an *end of nature* with regard to human beings in preference to other creatures, far less a *final end of creation*. Human beings may certainly make it their ultimate subjective end. But when I ask about creation's final end, "Why did human beings have to exist?" I am asking about an objective supreme end, such as the highest reason would require for its creation. If the answer is, "So that beings might exist to whom that supreme cause could do good," this contradicts the condition to which human reason itself subjects its deepest wish for happiness: agree-

ment with its own inner moral legislation. This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned end, and the human being can therefore be creation's final end only as a moral being. As for his condition, happiness is connected with it only as a consequence proportionate to agreement with that end as the end of his existence.

33 I deliberately say *under* moral laws. It is not the human being *in accordance with* moral laws, one who behaves in keeping with them, who is creation's final end. The latter expression would say more than we know: namely, that an author of the world has the power to make human beings always behave in accordance with moral laws. This presupposes a concept of freedom and nature —we can think of an external author only for the latter—that would have to contain insight into nature's supersensible substrate and its identity with what makes causality through freedom possible in the world. Such insight goes far beyond our rational understanding. Only of *the human being under moral laws* can we say, without exceeding the limits of our insight, that his existence constitutes the world's final end. This also agrees completely with the judgment of human reason reflecting morally on the world's course. We believe we perceive traces of a wise relation to ends even in evil, provided we see that the impious villain does not die before suffering the well-deserved punishment for his crimes. According to our concepts of free causality, good or evil conduct depends on us. But we place the highest wisdom in the world's government in this: the occasion for good conduct is provided, and for both kinds the outcome is decreed according to moral laws. The latter is what properly constitutes God's glory, which theologians therefore quite appropriately call creation's ultimate end.—It should also be noted that when we use the word creation, we mean nothing other than what has been said here: the cause of the *existence* of a *world*, or of the things, the substances, in it. This is also what the word's proper concept implies (*the actualization of substance is creation*). It therefore does not already carry the presupposition of a freely acting, and consequently intelligent, cause, whose existence we are only now seeking to prove.

34 This moral argument is not meant to supply an *objectively* valid proof of God's existence, or to prove to the doubting believer that there is a God. It is meant to show that if he wants to think morally consistently, he *must include* acceptance of this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason.—Nor does it mean that assuming the happiness of all rational worldly beings in proportion to their morality is necessary *for morality*, but that it is necessary *through morality*. It is therefore an argument sufficient *subjectively*, for moral beings.

35 Idolatry in the practical sense is still any religion that thinks of the highest being with properties according to which something other than morality could by itself be the suitable condition for conforming to his will in what human beings can do. For however purely and free of sensible images we may have conceived that concept theoretically, practically it is then still represented as an *idol*: anthropomorphically in the character of its will.

36 *Analogy*, in the qualitative sense, is the identity of the relation between grounds and consequences, or causes and effects, insofar as this relation holds despite the specific difference of the things themselves, or of the properties containing the ground of similar consequences, considered apart from this relation. Thus, when comparing animals' artful actions with human ones, we think of the ground of these effects in animals, which we do not know, as an analogue of the ground of similar human effects, reason, which we do know. At the same time, we mean to indicate that the ground of animals' capacity for art, called instinct, is actually specifically different from reason, yet has a similar relation to its effect, comparing beavers' construction with human construction.—But from the fact that human beings need *reason* for building, I cannot infer that beavers must also have it and call this an *inference* by analogy. Yet from animals' similar way of acting, whose ground we cannot directly perceive, compared with the human way, of which we are directly conscious, we can quite correctly infer *by analogy* that animals also act according to *representations*. They are not machines, as Descartes maintains, and despite their specific difference, belong with human beings to the same genus, living beings. The principle authorizing this inference lies in the identity of a ground for counting animals, regarding

this determination, in the same genus as human beings as such, insofar as we compare them externally through their actions. There is an equal basis for reasoning. Likewise, by comparing the supreme world cause's purposive products in the world with human works of art, I can think its causality by analogy with an understanding. But I cannot infer by analogy that it has these properties. For the very principle making such an inference possible is missing here: the *equal basis for reasoning* that would place the highest being and the human being in one and the same genus as regards their causality. The causality of worldly beings, always sensibly conditioned, including causality through understanding, cannot be transferred to a being that shares with them no generic concept beyond that of a thing in general.

37 Nothing at all is thereby missing in our representation of this being's relations to the world, regarding either the theoretical or the practical consequences of the concept. Trying to investigate what it is in itself is an idle curiosity as purposeless as it is futile.

38 Here I believe I am right to extend the concept of a matter of fact beyond the word's ordinary meaning. For when speaking of things' relation to our cognitive powers, it is unnecessary, indeed unworkable, to restrict this expression to actual experience alone. A merely possible experience is already sufficient to speak of them simply as objects of a determinate kind of knowledge.

39 Matters of faith are not thereby *articles of faith*, if the latter means matters of faith whose *profession*, inward or outward, can be made obligatory. Natural theology contains no such articles. For since matters of faith cannot rest on theoretical proofs as matters of fact can, accepting them as true is free, and only as such is compatible with the subject's morality.

40 The final end that the moral law imposes on us to promote is not the ground of duty. That ground lies in the moral law, which, as a formal practical principle, guides categorically, regardless of the objects of the faculty of desire, the material of willing, and thus regardless of any end. This formal character of my actions—their subordination to the principle of universal validity—in which

alone their inner moral worth consists, is entirely within our control. I can perfectly well abstract from the possibility or infeasibility of the ends I am obliged to promote according to that law, since only my actions' external value lies in them. They are never fully within my control; I can attend solely to what is my own doing. Yet the law of duty itself imposes the intention of promoting the final end of all rational beings: happiness insofar as it is possible in agreement with duty. But speculative reason has no insight into its feasibility, either through our own physical powers or through nature's cooperation. Rather, as far as we can reasonably judge, it must regard such a result of our good conduct from mere nature within and outside us, without assuming God and immortality, as a groundless and empty expectation, however well meant. If speculative reason could be completely certain of this judgment, it would have to regard the moral law itself as a mere deception of our reason practically. But speculative reason is fully convinced that the latter can never happen, while those ideas whose object lies beyond nature can be thought without contradiction. Thus, for the sake of its own practical law and the task that law imposes, hence morally, it must acknowledge those ideas as real so as not to contradict itself.

41 Faith is trust in the promise of the moral law, but not in a promise contained in that law. It is one I place in it, on a morally sufficient ground. For no law of reason can command a final end without reason also promising its attainability, though uncertainly, and thereby authorizing acceptance as true of the only conditions under which our reason can think it. The word *faith* itself already expresses this. It may seem questionable how this expression and this particular idea enter moral philosophy, since they were first introduced with Christianity, and adopting them might seem merely a flattering imitation of its language. But this is not the only case in which that remarkable religion, in the greatest simplicity of its presentation, has enriched philosophy with far more determinate and purer concepts of morality than philosophy had previously been able to supply. Once present, however, these concepts are *freely* approved by reason and accepted as ones it could and should have reached and introduced by itself.

General Remark on Teleology

General Remark on Teleology. [475]

Suppose we ask what rank the moral argument occupies among the other arguments in philosophy, since it proves God's existence only as a matter of faith for pure practical reason. We can easily survey philosophy's entire resources. It then becomes clear that there is no choice here: before an impartial critique, its theoretical capacity must give up all its claims on its own.

Philosophy must first ground all acceptance as true on a matter of fact if it is not to be wholly groundless. The only distinction in proof can therefore be whether acceptance of the conclusion drawn from this fact can be grounded as *knowledge* for theoretical cognition, or merely as *faith* for practical cognition. All matters of fact belong either to the *concept of nature*, which proves its reality in objects of the senses given, or possibly given, prior to all natural concepts; or to the *concept of freedom*. This sufficiently demonstrates its reality through reason's causality regarding certain effects in the sensible world possible through it, which reason incontrovertibly postulates in the moral law. The concept of nature, which belongs only to theoretical knowledge, is either metaphysical and wholly *a priori*, or physical, that is, *a posteriori*, and necessarily [A 469] thinkable only through determinate experience. The metaphysical concept of nature, which presupposes no determinate experience, is therefore ontological.

Now *the ontological proof* of God's existence from the concept of an original being is of either of two kinds. It infers absolutely necessary existence from ontological predicates through which alone that being can be thought as completely determined. Or it infers the predicates of the original being from the absolute necessity of the existence of something, whatever it may be. For the concept of an original being requires the unconditioned necessity of its existence, so that it is not derived, and, to represent this necessity, its complete determination through its concept. People believed they found both requirements in the ontological idea of a *most real being*. Thus two metaphysical proofs arose.

The proof based on a merely metaphysical concept of nature, called ontological in the proper sense, inferred from the concept of the most real [476] being to its absolutely necessary existence. For, it says, if that being did not exist, it would lack a reality, namely existence.—The other, also called the metaphysical-*cosmological* proof, inferred from the necessity of something's existence to its complete determination as the most real being. Such necessity must be admitted, since an existence is given to me in self-consciousness. For everything existing is completely determined, while what is absolutely necessary—what we are to know as such and thus *a priori*—must be completely determined *through its concept*. But this can be found only in the concept of a most real thing. There is no need here to expose the sophistry in both inferences, which has already been done elsewhere [A 470]. We need only note that even if such proofs could be defended through every kind of dialectical subtlety, they could never move beyond the schools into the community or have the slightest influence on mere common sense.

A proof based on a concept of nature that can only be empirical, yet is supposed to lead beyond nature's bounds as the totality of objects of the senses, can only be a proof from nature's *ends*. Their concept cannot be given *a priori*, but only through experience. Yet it promises a concept of nature's original ground that alone, among all we can think, is appropriate to the supersensible: a highest understanding as world cause. It does in fact fully accomplish this according to principles of reflective judgment, that is, given the character of our

human cognitive power.—But can it supply from the same data this concept of a *supreme*, independent intelligent being also as a God, an author of a world under moral laws? Can it thus determine the concept sufficiently for the idea of a final end of the world's existence? Everything depends on this question, whether we seek a theoretically adequate concept of the original being for the whole of natural knowledge, or a practical one for religion.

This argument drawn from physical teleology deserves respect. It works equally toward conviction in ordinary understanding and in the subtlest thinker. *Reimarus*, in his [A 471] still unsurpassed work, developed this ground of proof at length with his [477] characteristic thoroughness and clarity, thereby earning an enduring distinction.—But how does this proof gain such powerful influence over the mind, especially in judgment by cool reason, producing a calm assent that surrenders itself entirely? For the mind's being moved and elevated by nature's wonders could be counted as persuasion. It is not the physical ends, all pointing to an unfathomable understanding in the world cause. They are insufficient, because they do not satisfy the need of questioning reason. Reason asks: what are all those artfully constructed natural things for? What is the human being himself for, at whom we must stop as the ultimate natural end we can think? What is this entire nature there for, and what is the final end of so great and diverse an art? Reason cannot be satisfied with the answer that the world and human beings were created for enjoyment, or for looking, contemplating, and admiring—which, if we stop there, is also nothing more than enjoyment of a special kind—as the ultimate final end of their existence. For reason presupposes a personal worth that human beings can give themselves alone, as the condition under which alone they and their existence can be a final end. Without this, which alone admits a determinate concept, natural ends do not satisfy reason's inquiry. Above all, they can supply no *determinate concept* of the highest being as an all-sufficient being, and therefore as the single being properly called *highest*, or of the laws according to which its understanding causes the world.

Thus the physicoteleological proof convinces as though it were also [A 472] theological, not because it uses ideas of natural ends as so many empirical grounds of proof of a *highest* understanding. Rather, the moral ground of proof, present in every human being and moving him so deeply, slips unnoticed into the inference. By it, we attribute to the being that reveals itself so incomprehensibly artful in natural ends a final end as well, and thus wisdom, although perceiving the former does not authorize this. We thereby arbitrarily supplement the argument in its remaining deficiency. In fact, then, only the moral ground of proof produces conviction, and even this only morally—a conviction to which everyone feels inward assent [478]. The physicoteleological argument has only the merit of guiding the mind, in contemplating the world, onto the path of ends, and thereby to an *intelligent* author of the world. The moral relation to ends and the idea of a corresponding legislator and author of the world, as a theological concept, then seem to develop by themselves from that ground of proof, although they are purely an addition.

We may continue to leave matters this way in ordinary *presentation*. For ordinary sound understanding generally finds it difficult to distinguish as different in kind the various principles it mixes together, from only one of which it actually and correctly infers, when separating them requires much reflection. But the moral proof of God's existence does not really merely *complete* the physicoteleological proof into a full proof. It is a separate proof that *makes up for* the lack of conviction [A 473] from the latter. For the latter can do nothing more than direct reason's attention, in judging the ground of nature and its contingent but admirable order known to us only through experience, to the causality of a cause containing that ground according to ends. Given our cognitive powers, we must think of this as an intelligent cause. In doing so, the argument makes reason more receptive to the moral proof. For what is required for this latter concept differs so essentially from everything natural concepts can contain and teach that a special ground of proof and proof, entirely independent of the former ones, is needed to specify the original being's concept sufficiently for theology and infer its existence.—The moral proof, which admittedly proves God's existence only in a practical yet unavoidable respect for reason,

would therefore retain its force even if we found no material for physical teleology in the world, or only ambiguous material. We can imagine rational beings surrounded by a nature displaying no clear trace of organization, only effects of the mere mechanism of raw matter. Given these effects and the variability of some merely accidentally purposive forms and relations, there would seem to be no ground for inferring an intelligent author. There would then also be no [479] occasion for physical teleology. Yet reason, receiving no guidance here from natural concepts, would find in the concept of freedom and in the moral ideas grounded on it a practically sufficient ground for postulating the concept of the original being in agreement with these [A 474], as a deity, and for postulating nature, including our own existence, as a final end conforming to those ideas and their laws. It would do this with regard to practical reason's unavoidable command.—But the fact that in the actual world its rational beings have abundant material for physical teleology, which need not have been so, gives welcome confirmation to the moral argument, insofar as nature can present something analogous to reason's moral ideas. For the concept of a supreme cause possessing understanding, though far from sufficient for theology, thereby acquires reality sufficient for reflective judgment. But this concept is not required as a foundation for the moral proof. Nor does the moral proof serve to *complete* that argument, which by itself gives no pointer to morality, into *one* proof through continued inference according to a single principle. Two principles as different as nature and freedom can yield only two different kinds of proof. The attempt to conduct the proof from the former is then found inadequate for what is to be proved.

If the physicoteleological ground of proof were sufficient for the proof sought, it would be very satisfying to speculative reason. For it would give hope of producing a theosophy. This is what we would have to call theoretical knowledge of the divine nature and its existence sufficient to explain the world's character and also to determine moral laws. Likewise, if psychology were sufficient to reach knowledge of the soul's immortality, it would make possible a pneumatology equally welcome to speculative [A 475] reason. But however pleasing both may be to the conceit of curiosity, they do not fulfill reason's wish for a

theory that would have to be grounded in knowledge of things' nature. Whether the first as theology and the second as anthropology, both grounded on the moral principle of freedom and thus suited to reason's practical use, better fulfill their objective final intention is another question, which we need not pursue further here.

480 The physicoteleological ground of proof is insufficient for theology because it does not and cannot give a concept of the original being determined sufficiently for this purpose. We must take this concept entirely from elsewhere, or replace its absence by an arbitrary addition. You infer an intelligent world cause from the great purposiveness of natural forms and their relations. But to what degree of understanding do you infer? Surely you cannot presume to infer the highest possible understanding. That would require you to see that no greater understanding is thinkable than the one whose evidence you perceive in the world, which would mean attributing omniscience to yourselves. Likewise, from the world's magnitude you infer a very great power in its author. But you must admit that this has meaning only comparatively, for your capacity to grasp it. Since you do not know everything possible so as to compare it with the world's magnitude as far as you know it, you cannot infer the author's omnipotence by so small a standard, and so on. Thus you arrive at no determinate concept of an original being suitable for theology. Such a concept can be found only in the totality of perfections united with [A 476] an understanding, which merely *empirical* data cannot help you attain. Without such a determinate concept, you also cannot infer a *single* intelligent original being, but can only assume one, for whatever purpose.—We may certainly allow you, since reason has no grounded objection, arbitrarily to add that where so much perfection is found, we may assume all perfection united in a single world cause. For reason proceeds better theoretically and practically with so determinate a principle. But you still cannot advertise this concept of the original being as proved by you when you have assumed it only to serve a better use of reason. All lamentation or impotent anger at the supposed impiety of doubting the cogency of your

chain of inference is therefore empty boasting. It would like open doubt about your argument to be treated as doubt about sacred truth, merely to let the argument's shallowness slip through under this cover.

Moral teleology, on the other hand, is no less firmly grounded [481] than physical teleology. Indeed, it deserves preference because it rests *a priori* on principles inseparable from our reason. It leads to what the possibility of theology requires: a determinate *concept* of the supreme cause as a world cause according to moral laws, and thus one that satisfies our moral final end. This requires nothing less than omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and so on, as the natural properties belonging to it. These [A 477] must be thought as connected with the moral final end, which is infinite, and therefore as adequate to it. Moral teleology can thus, all by itself, supply the concept of a *single* author of the world suitable for theology.

In this way a theology also leads directly to *religion*, the *recognition of our duties as divine commands*. For knowledge of our duty and of the final end reason imposes on us in it first made possible a determinate concept of God. From its very origin this concept is therefore inseparable from obligation toward this being. By contrast, even if a determinate concept of the original being could be found on the merely theoretical path, as a mere cause of nature, it would afterward be very difficult, perhaps impossible without arbitrary interpolation, to attribute to this being a causality according to moral laws through sound proofs. Without this, however, that allegedly theological concept cannot provide a foundation for religion. Even if a religion could be grounded on this theoretical path, it would really differ in disposition, where its essence lies, from a religion in which the concept of God and practical conviction of his existence arise from fundamental ideas of morality. For if we had to presuppose a world author's absolute power, omniscience, and so on as concepts given from elsewhere, and only afterward apply our concepts of duties to our relation to him, these duties would strongly bear the appearance of compulsion and forced submission. Instead, when respect for the moral law presents us quite freely, according to the prescription of our own [A 478] reason, with the final end of

our vocation, we include in our moral outlook a cause agreeing with that end and its realization, with the truest reverence, wholly distinct from fear arising from feeling [482], and willingly submit to it[42].

If someone asks why we care about having a theology at all, it is clear that we need it subjectively not to extend or correct our knowledge of nature, or any theory in general, but solely for religion: the practical, specifically moral use of reason. If it turns out that the only argument leading to a determinate concept of theology's object is itself moral, it will not be surprising to admit that such an argument sufficiently demonstrates God's existence only for our moral vocation, for practical purposes. Nor will anything be missing regarding the accessibility of acceptance as true from this ground of proof for its final intention. Speculation by no means proves its strength in this argument or extends [A 479] its domain through it. Any surprise, or supposed contradiction, between the possibility of theology asserted here and what the Critique of speculative reason said about the categories will also disappear. The Critique said they can produce knowledge only when applied to objects of the senses, never to the supersensible. Here we see them used for knowledge of God, but not theoretically, concerning what his nature, unfathomable to us, is in itself; solely for practical purposes.—To end, on this occasion, the misinterpretation of that very necessary doctrine of the Critique, which also, to the blind dogmatist's annoyance, sends reason back within its limits, I add the following explanation of it.

When I attribute *moving force* to a body, and thus think of it [483] through the category of *causality*, I also thereby *know* it. That is, I determine its concept as an object in general through what belongs to it in itself as an object of the senses, as a condition of the possibility of that relation. For if the moving force I attribute to it is repulsive, then it has a place in space, even if I do not yet place another body beside it on which it exercises this force. It also has extension, space within itself, and fills this space through its parts' repulsive forces. Finally, it has the law of this filling: the ground of the parts' repulsion must decrease in the same proportion as the body's extension grows and the space it fills with the same parts through this force increases.—By contrast, suppose I think of a

supersensible being as the *first mover*, thus through the category of causality regarding the same determination of the world, the motion of matter [A 480]. I must not think of it as located anywhere in space, nor as extended; indeed, I must not even think of it as existing in time and simultaneously with others. So I have no determinations at all that could make the condition of the possibility of motion through this being as its ground understandable to me. Consequently, through the predicate of cause, as first mover, I do not know this being in itself in the least. I have only the representation of something containing the ground of motions in the world. Its relation to them as their cause gives me nothing further belonging to the character of the thing that is their cause, and so leaves the concept of that cause entirely empty. The reason is this: with predicates whose objects are found only in the sensible world, I can indeed advance to the existence of something that must contain that world's ground, but not to the determination of its concept as a supersensible being, which excludes all those predicates. Thus, through the category of causality, determined by the concept of a *first mover*, I do not know in the least what God is. But perhaps I will succeed better if the world's order prompts me not merely to *think* of his causality as that of a supreme *understanding*, but also to *know* him through this determination of that concept, since the troublesome condition of space and extension then falls away.—Certainly the world's great purposiveness compels us to *think* a supreme cause of it, and to think its causality as operating through an understanding [484]. But this does not authorize us to *attribute* understanding to it. Similarly, we may think God's eternity as existence at every time, since otherwise we can form no concept of mere existence as a magnitude, as duration; or divine omnipresence as existence [A 481] in every place, to make immediate presence to things external to one another understandable to ourselves. Yet we may not attribute either determination to God as something known in him. When I determine a human being's causality regarding certain products explainable only through intentional purposiveness by thinking it as his understanding, I need not stop there. I can attribute this predicate to him as a well-known property and thereby know him. For I know that intuitions are given to human senses and brought by understanding under a concept and

thus under a rule; that this concept contains only the common feature, omitting the particular, and is thus discursive; that understanding supplies the rules for bringing given representations under one consciousness in general even before those intuitions, and so on. I therefore attribute this property to the human being as one through which I *know* him. But if I want to *think* a supersensible being, God, as an intelligence, this is not only permissible in a certain respect of my use of reason, but unavoidable. Yet I am by no means permitted to flatter myself that I can attribute understanding to him and thereby *know* him through one of his properties. For I must then leave out all the conditions under which alone I know an understanding. Thus the predicate that serves only to determine the human being cannot be referred to a supersensible object at all. Through causality determined in this way, therefore, we cannot know what God is. This holds for all categories: they can have no meaning for theoretical knowledge unless applied to objects [A 482] of possible experience.—But by analogy with an understanding, I can, and indeed in a certain other respect must, think even a supersensible being, without intending thereby to know it theoretically. This is the case when this determination of its causality concerns an effect in the world containing a morally necessary intention that sensible beings cannot carry out. Then knowledge of God and his existence, theology, is possible through properties and determinations of his causality thought in him merely by [485] analogy. This knowledge has all the required reality practically, but also *only in this moral respect*.—Ethicotheology is therefore possible. For morality can subsist without theology regarding its rule, but not regarding the final intention that the same rule imposes, without leaving reason unsupported concerning that intention. But a theological ethics of pure reason is impossible. Laws that reason does not originally give itself, and whose observance it does not also bring about as a pure practical capacity, cannot be moral. A theological physics would likewise be an absurdity, since it would present not natural laws but arrangements of a highest will. By contrast, a physical, properly physicoteleological theology can at least serve as preparation for theology proper. By considering natural ends, for which it offers abundant material, it gives occasion for the idea of a final end that nature cannot present.

Thus it can make us feel the need for a theology that would determine the concept of God sufficiently for reason's highest practical use. But it cannot produce that theology or adequately ground it on its own proofs.

42 Admiration of beauty, and the emotion aroused by nature's many diverse ends, which a reflective mind can feel even before having a clear representation of a rational author of the world, have something like a *religious* feeling about them. They therefore seem first to act on moral feeling—gratitude and reverence toward the cause unknown to us—through a way of judging them analogous to moral judgment, and thus to affect the mind by arousing moral ideas. This happens when they inspire the admiration connected with far greater interest than mere theoretical contemplation can produce.