

Critique of Judgment

IMMANUEL KANT

Musean Translation

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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

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TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

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Title



Critique [166] *of the Power of Judgment*
by
Immanuel Kant.

Preface



Preface [A III] [167] to the First Edition, 1790.

The faculty of cognition from principles *a priori* may be called *pure reason*, and the inquiry into its possibility and limits in general the critique of pure reason —even if by this faculty we understand reason only in its theoretical use, as was also done in the first work bearing that title, without yet intending to investigate its capacity as practical reason according to its special principles. That critique then concerns only our capacity to cognize things *a priori*, and thus deals solely with the *faculty of cognition*, excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire; and among the cognitive faculties, with the *understanding* according to its principles *a priori*, excluding the *power of judgment* and *reason* (as [A IV] faculties that likewise belong to theoretical cognition). For in the course of the inquiry it emerges that no cognitive faculty but the understanding can supply constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*. The critique, therefore, which examines them all with regard to the share each of the others might claim in the actual possession of cognition from its own root, leaves nothing but what the *understanding* prescribes *a priori* as law for nature, as the sum of appearances (whose form is likewise given *a priori*). It assigns all other pure concepts to the ideas, which transcend our theoretical faculty of cognition, yet are by no means useless or dispensable. Rather, they serve as regulative principles: partly to restrain the understanding's troubling pretensions,

as though, because it can state *a priori* the conditions of the possibility of everything it can cognize, [168] it had thereby confined the possibility of all things in general within these limits; and partly to guide the understanding itself in the contemplation of nature according to a principle of completeness, although [A V] it can never attain that completeness, and thus to advance the ultimate aim of all cognition.

It was therefore properly the *understanding*, which has its own domain within the *faculty of cognition* insofar as it contains constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*, that the work generally called the critique of pure reason was to establish in secure and exclusive possession against all other claimants. In the same way, *reason*, which contains constitutive principles *a priori* only with regard to the *faculty of desire*, was assigned its possession in the critique of practical reason.

Whether the *power of judgment*, which forms a mediating link between understanding and reason in the order of our cognitive faculties, also has principles *a priori* of its own; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative (and thus establish no domain of its own); and whether it gives the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as the mediating link between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire (just as understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to the former, and reason to the latter), [A VI] its rule *a priori*: these are the questions with which the present critique of the power of judgment is concerned.

A critique of pure reason—that is, of our capacity to judge according to principles *a priori*—would be incomplete if the critique of the power of judgment, which as a cognitive faculty also lays claim to such principles in its own right, were not treated as a distinct part of it. Yet its principles must not form a separate part between the theoretical and the practical in a system of pure philosophy; they may instead, as occasion requires, be attached to either. For if such a system is ever to be achieved under the general name of metaphysics (and its complete realization is both possible and of the utmost importance for every use of reason), the critique must first have explored the ground for this building

down to the very foundation of our capacity for principles independent of experience, so that it does not subside at any point, which would inevitably bring the whole down with it. [169]

From the nature of the power of judgment, however (whose proper use [A VII] is so necessary and so universally required that the name common sense means precisely this faculty and no other), it is easy to see that considerable difficulties must attend the discovery of a principle peculiar to it. For it must contain some principle *a priori* within itself, since otherwise it would not, as a distinct cognitive faculty, be subject even to the most ordinary criticism. Yet this principle must not be derived from concepts *a priori*, for these belong to the understanding, while the power of judgment concerns only their application. It must therefore itself supply a concept through which, properly speaking, no thing is cognized, but which serves as a rule for itself alone—not as an objective rule to which it can conform its judgment, since that would in turn require another power of judgment to distinguish whether or not the case fell under the rule.

This difficulty concerning a principle (whether subjective or objective) arises chiefly in those judgments called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and sublime in nature or [A VIII] art. And yet the critical investigation of a principle of the power of judgment in these judgments is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. For although they contribute nothing by themselves to the cognition of things, they nevertheless belong solely to the faculty of cognition and show an immediate relation of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure according to some principle *a priori*, without confusing it with what can be a determining ground of the faculty of desire, since the latter has its principles *a priori* in concepts of reason.—As for the logical judging of nature, however, where experience presents a lawfulness in things that the understanding's general concept of the sensible no longer suffices to understand or explain, and where the power of judgment can draw from itself a principle relating the natural thing to the unknowable supersensible, while having to use it for the cognition of nature only with regard to itself: there such a principle *a priori* can and must indeed be applied to the *cognition* of beings in the world, and at the same time opens [A IX] prospects favorable to practical rea-

son. But it has no immediate relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It is precisely this relation that is puzzling in the principle of the power of judgment and makes a separate division in the critique necessary [170] for this faculty; whereas logical judging according to concepts (from which no immediate inference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can ever be drawn), together with a critical restriction of it, could at most have been appended to the theoretical part of philosophy.

Since the investigation of the faculty of taste, as aesthetic power of judgment, is undertaken here not to form and cultivate taste (for this will continue on its course in the future, as in the past, without any such inquiries), but solely with a transcendental intention, I flatter myself that its shortcomings with regard to the former end will be judged indulgently. With regard to the latter intention, however, it must prepare for the strictest scrutiny. Yet even here the great difficulty of solving a problem that nature has so entangled may, I hope, excuse a certain obscurity [A X] in its solution that cannot entirely be avoided, provided only that the correct statement of the principle has been made sufficiently clear —even if the manner of deriving the phenomenon of the power of judgment from it does not have all the clarity one may rightly demand elsewhere, namely in cognition through concepts, which I believe I have also achieved in the second part of this work.

With this, then, I bring my entire critical undertaking to a close. I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal undertaking, to wrest, if possible, from my advancing age the time still somewhat favorable to it. It goes without saying that the power of judgment will have no separate part in that undertaking, since for it the critique serves in place of theory. Rather, in accordance with the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and of pure philosophy into the same parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals will constitute that undertaking.

Introduction I



Introduction. [A XI] [171]

I. *On the Division of Philosophy.*

If philosophy, insofar as it contains principles of rational cognition of things through concepts (not merely, like logic, principles of the form of thought in general without distinction of objects), is divided, as usual, into *theoretical* and *practical*, the procedure is entirely correct. But then the concepts that assign their object to the principles of this rational cognition must also differ specifically, since otherwise they would warrant no division—a division that always presupposes an opposition between the principles of rational cognition belonging to the different parts of a science.

There are, however, only two kinds of concepts that admit correspondingly different principles of the possibility of their objects: *concepts of nature* and the *concept of freedom*. The former make *theoretical* cognition according to principles *a priori* possible; the [A XII] latter, in relation to these, already carries in its concept only a negative principle (of mere opposition), but establishes expansive principles for the determination of the will, which are therefore called practical. Philosophy is thus rightly divided into two parts wholly distinct in their principles: theoretical philosophy as *philosophy of nature*, and practical philosophy as *moral philosophy* (for this is the name given to reason's practical legislation according to the concept of freedom). Yet these expressions have hitherto been greatly misused in dividing the various principles and, with them, philoso-

phy itself: what is practical according to concepts of nature has been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, and thus [172] a division has been made under the same names of theoretical and practical philosophy in which, in fact, nothing was divided, since both parts could have the same principles.

The will, as a faculty of desire, is namely one of the many natural causes in the world: the one that acts according to concepts. Everything represented as possible (or necessary) through a will is called practically possible (or necessary), as distinct from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect whose cause is determined to causality not through concepts, but—as in lifeless [A XIII] matter—through mechanism, or in animals through instinct.—Here, with regard to the practical, it remains undetermined whether the concept that gives the rule to the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom.

But this last distinction is essential. For if the concept determining causality is a concept of nature, the principles are *technically practical*; if it is a concept of freedom, they are *morally practical*. And since the division of a rational science depends entirely on that difference between objects whose cognition requires different principles, the former will belong to theoretical philosophy (as the doctrine of nature), while the latter alone will constitute the second part, namely practical philosophy (as the doctrine of morals).

All technically practical rules—that is, those of art and skill in general, or also of prudence as a skill in influencing people and their will—insofar as their principles rest on concepts, must be counted only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they concern only the possibility of things according to concepts of nature; and among these belong not only the means to be found in nature, but the will itself (as a faculty of desire and hence a natural faculty), insofar as natural incentives can determine it in conformity with those rules [A XIV]. Such practical rules, however, are not called laws (as physical laws are), but only precepts. This is because the will stands not only under the concept of nature but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles are called laws and, together with their consequences, alone constitute the second part of philosophy, the practical.

Just as the solution of problems in pure geometry does not belong to [173] a separate part of it, and surveying does not deserve the name practical geometry as a second part of geometry in general, distinguished from pure geometry, so—and still less—may the mechanical or chemical art of experiments or observations be counted as a practical part of the doctrine of nature. Nor may household management, agriculture, political economy, the art of social intercourse, the precepts of dietetics, or even the general doctrine of happiness—even the taming of inclinations and the restraint of emotions for the sake of happiness—be counted as practical philosophy, much less constitute the second part of philosophy in general. For all these contain only rules of skill, hence only technically practical rules, for producing an effect possible according to natural concepts of causes and effects. These, since they belong to theoretical philosophy, underlie those precepts as mere [A XV] corollaries of it (natural science), and thus can claim no place in a separate philosophy called practical. By contrast, morally practical precepts, grounded entirely on the concept of freedom to the complete exclusion of grounds determining the will drawn from nature, constitute a wholly distinct kind of precept. Like the rules nature obeys, they too are called laws without qualification, but unlike those rules they rest not on sensible conditions, but on a supersensible principle, and demand a separate part alongside the theoretical part of philosophy, under the name practical philosophy.

We can see from this that a body of practical precepts supplied by philosophy does not constitute a separate part alongside its theoretical part merely because those precepts are practical; for they could be practical even if their principles were drawn entirely from theoretical cognition of nature (as technically practical rules). Rather, it does so because and if its principle is not borrowed at all from the concept of nature, which is always sensibly conditioned, and therefore rests on the supersensible, which the concept of freedom alone makes knowable through formal laws. The precepts are thus morally practical—that is, not merely [A XVI] precepts and rules for this or that intention, but laws without prior reference to ends and intentions.

Introduction II



II. [174] On the Domain of Philosophy in General.

As far as concepts *a priori* find application, so far extends the use of our faculty of cognition according to principles, and with it philosophy.

But the sum of all objects to which those concepts are referred, in order if possible to bring about cognition of them, can be divided according to the differing adequacy or inadequacy of our faculties for this purpose.

Concepts, insofar as they are referred to objects, regardless of whether cognition of them is possible or not, have their field, which is determined solely by the relation their object bears to our faculty of cognition in general.—The part of this field in which cognition is possible for us is a territory (*territorium*) for these concepts and the cognitive faculty required for them. The part of the territory in which they legislate is the domain (*ditio*) of these concepts and of the cognitive faculties to which they belong. Empirical concepts therefore have their territory in nature, as the sum [A XVII] of all objects of the senses, but no domain (only their dwelling place, *domicilium*). For although they are generated according to law, they do not legislate; the rules founded on them are empirical and hence contingent.

Our entire faculty of cognition has two domains, that of concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom; for through both it legislates *a priori*. In accordance with this, philosophy too is divided into theoretical and practical.

But the territory on which its domain is established and its legislation is *exercised* is always only the sum of the objects of all possible experience, insofar as they are taken as nothing more than mere appearances; for otherwise no legislation of the understanding concerning them could be thought.

Legislation through concepts of nature is effected by the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom is effected by reason and is merely practical. Only in the practical can reason legislate; with regard to theoretical cognition (of nature), it can only (as acquainted with laws through the understanding) [175] infer consequences from given laws, and these always remain confined to nature. Conversely, however, where rules are practical, reason is not on that account immediately *legislative*, since they [A XVIII] may also be technically practical.

Understanding and reason thus have two distinct legislations on one and the same territory of experience, neither of which may encroach upon the other. For just as the concept of nature has no influence on legislation through the concept of freedom, so the latter does not disturb the legislation of nature.—The critique of pure reason proved the possibility of thinking, at least without contradiction, the coexistence of both legislations and their corresponding faculties in the same subject, by defeating the objections to it through exposing the dialectical illusion within them.

But these two different domains, which continually restrict each other not in their legislation but in their effects in the sensible world, do not constitute *one* domain. The reason is that the concept of nature can indeed represent its objects in intuition, but not as things in themselves, only as mere appearances; whereas the concept of freedom can indeed represent in its object a thing in itself, but not in intuition. Neither, therefore, can furnish theoretical cognition of its object (or even of the thinking subject) as a thing in itself. This would be the supersensible, the idea of which must indeed be placed beneath the possibility of all those objects of experience [A XIX], but can never itself be raised and extended into cognition.

There is thus an unbounded but also inaccessible field for our entire faculty of cognition: the field of the supersensible, in which we find no territory for ourselves and therefore can have no domain for theoretical cognition, either for concepts of the understanding or for those of reason. It is a field we must indeed occupy with ideas for the sake of both the theoretical and the practical use of reason; but in relation to laws arising from the concept of freedom we can confer on these ideas no reality other than practical reality, through which our theoretical cognition is not extended in the least to the supersensible.

Now although an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, [176] as the supersensible, so that no passage from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, as though they were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second, yet the second *ought* to have an influence on the first. The concept of freedom is to make actual in the sensible world the end enjoined by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being thought in such a way that the lawfulness [A XX] of its form agrees at least with the possibility of the ends to be realized in it according to laws of freedom.—There must therefore be a ground for the *unity* of the supersensible underlying nature with what the concept of freedom contains practically. Although the concept of this ground attains no cognition of it, either theoretically or practically, and thus has no domain of its own, it nevertheless makes possible the transition from the way of thinking according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.

Introduction III



III. *On the Critique of the Power of Judgment as a Means of Uniting the Two Parts of Philosophy into a Whole.*

The critique of the cognitive faculties with regard to what they can accomplish *a priori* has, properly speaking, no domain with regard to objects. For it is not a doctrine, but has only to investigate whether and how, given the constitution of our faculties, a doctrine is possible through them. Its field extends to all their pretensions, in order to confine them within the limits of their legitimacy. But what cannot enter into the division of philosophy can nevertheless enter as a [A XXI] principal part into the critique of the pure faculty of cognition in general, if it contains principles that in themselves are suited neither to theoretical nor to practical use.

Concepts of nature, which contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori, rested on the legislation of the understanding.—The concept of freedom, which contained the ground of all practical precepts *a priori* unconditioned by the sensible, rested on the legislation of reason. Thus both faculties, beyond being applicable in their logical form to principles of whatever origin, also each have their own legislation [177] with regard to content, above which there is no other (*a priori*), and which therefore justifies the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical.

Yet in the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is still a mediating link between understanding and reason. This is the *power of judgment*, concerning which analogy gives us reason to suppose that it too may contain *a priori*, if not a legislation of its own, at least a principle of its own for seeking laws, perhaps a merely subjective one. Even if no field of objects belonged to this principle as its domain, it could still have some territory, and a certain constitution of that territory for which [A XXII] precisely this principle alone might hold.

There is, moreover (judging by analogy), a further ground for connecting the power of judgment with another ordering of our powers of representation, one that seems still more important than its kinship with the family of cognitive faculties. For all the faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three that cannot be further derived from a common ground: the *faculty of cognition*, the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, and the *faculty of desire*[1]. [178] For the faculty of cognition, the understanding alone legislates, if [A XXIII] that faculty (as must indeed be done when it is considered by itself, without admixture [A XXIV] of the faculty of desire) is referred, as a faculty of *theoretical cognition*, to nature. For only with regard to nature (as appearance) is it possible for us to give laws through concepts of nature *a priori*, which are properly pure concepts of the understanding.—For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty according to the concept of freedom, reason alone (in which alone this concept has a place) legislates *a priori*.—Now between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire stands the feeling of pleasure, just as the power of judgment stands between understanding and reason. It is therefore at least provisionally reasonable to suppose that the power of judgment likewise contains a principle *a priori* of its own; and since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily connected with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the lower faculty, it precedes that faculty's principle, or, as in the [A XXV] [179] higher, merely follows from its determination by the moral law), it will likewise effect a transition from the pure faculty of cognition—that is, from the domain of concepts of nature—to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.

Thus, although philosophy can be divided into only two principal parts, theoretical and practical; although everything we might have to say about the principles peculiar to the power of judgment would have to be counted in philosophy as belonging to its theoretical part, that is, to rational cognition according to concepts of nature: nevertheless the critique of pure reason, which must settle all this before that system is undertaken, for the sake of making it possible, consists of three parts: the critique of pure understanding, of pure power of judgment, and of pure reason. These faculties are called pure because they legislate *a priori*.

[1] For concepts used as empirical principles, when there is reason to suppose that they are related to the pure faculty of cognition *a priori*, it is useful, on account of this relation, to attempt a transcendental definition: namely through pure categories, insofar as these alone already indicate sufficiently the distinction between the concept in question and others. Here we follow the example of the mathematician, who leaves the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their relation in their pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic, thereby generalizing its solution.—A similar procedure of mine (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 16 [9] of the preface) has been made a reproach against me, and the definition of the faculty of desire as *the faculty of being, through one's representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations* has been criticized: for mere wishes, too, are desires, although everyone acknowledges that through these alone he cannot produce their object.—But this proves only that there are also desires in a human being through which he contradicts himself: through his representation alone he works toward producing the object, yet can expect no success from it, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call the nonpsychological ones), which would have to be determined by that representation in order to bring about the object (hence indirectly), are either insufficient or even directed toward something impossible—for example, undoing what has happened (*Oh, if only those past years, etc., were mine*) or, in impatient waiting, annihilating the interval before the longed-for moment.—Although in such

fantastic desires we are conscious of the insufficiency (or even the complete unfitness) of our representations to be the *cause* of their objects, their relation as cause, and thus the representation of their *causality*, is nevertheless contained in every *wish*, and is especially apparent when the wish is an emotion, namely *longing*. For by swelling and weakening the heart, and thus exhausting our powers, these desires show that the powers are repeatedly strained by representations, yet, in view of the impossibility, continually let the mind sink back into exhaustion. Even prayers for the averting of great and, as far as we can see, unavoidable evils, and many superstitious means of attaining ends naturally impossible, prove this causal relation of representations to their objects: even the consciousness of their insufficiency to produce the effect cannot deter them from striving toward it.—But why a propensity to consciously empty desires has been implanted in our nature is an anthropological-teleological question. It seems that if we were not determined to exert our powers until we had assured ourselves of their adequacy to produce an object, those powers would remain largely unused. For generally we first come to know our powers only by trying them. This deception in empty wishes is therefore only the consequence of a beneficent arrangement in our nature.

Introduction IV



IV. On the Power of Judgment as a Faculty That Legislates a priori.

The power of judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, [A XXVI] the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment that subsumes the particular under it is *determining* (even when, as transcendental power of judgment, it states *a priori* the conditions under which alone subsumption under that universal can occur). But if only the particular is given, for which it is to find the universal, then the power of judgment is merely *reflective*.

The determining power of judgment under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding merely subsumes; the law is prescribed for it *a priori*, and it therefore has no need to devise a law for itself in order to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal.—But there are so many diverse forms of nature, so many modifications, as it were, of the universal transcendental concepts of nature, left undetermined by those laws which the pure understanding gives *a priori*—since these concern only the possibility of a nature (as an object of the senses) in general—that for these forms there must [180] also be laws. As empirical laws, these may be contingent according to *our* understanding's insight; yet if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature also requires), they must be regarded as necessary on the basis of a principle of the unity of the manifold, even if that principle is unknown to us.—The reflective power of

judgment, whose task is to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, [A XXVII] therefore needs a principle it cannot borrow from experience, since that principle is precisely to ground the unity of all empirical principles under principles that are likewise empirical but higher, and thus the possibility of their systematic subordination to one another. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective power of judgment can only give itself as a law: it cannot take it from elsewhere (for then it would be determining judgment), nor prescribe it to nature, since reflection on the laws of nature conforms to nature, and nature does not conform to the conditions under which we strive to acquire a concept of it that is, in relation to those conditions, wholly contingent.

Now this principle can be none other than this: since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (though only according to the general concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, with regard to what those universal laws leave undetermined in them, must be considered in terms of a unity such as they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, to make a system of experience according to particular natural laws possible. This is not to say that such an understanding must actually be assumed (for it is only the reflective power of judgment for which this idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining); [A XXVIII] rather, this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, not to nature.

Now the concept of an object, insofar as it also contains the ground of that object's actuality, is called an end; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is possible only according to ends is called the *purposiveness* of its form. Hence the principle of the power of judgment concerning the form of things in nature under empirical laws in general is the *purposiveness of nature* in its manifoldness. That is, through this concept nature is represented [181] as though an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.

The purposiveness of nature is therefore a special concept *a priori* that has its origin solely in the reflective power of judgment. For we cannot attribute to natural products anything like a relation of nature in them to ends; we can use this concept only to reflect on them with regard to the connection of appearances in nature as given according to empirical laws. This concept is also entirely distinct from practical purposiveness (in human art or in morals), although it is thought by analogy with it.

Introduction V

V. [A XXIX] *The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature Is a Transcendental Principle of the Power of Judgment.*

A transcendental principle is one through which the universal condition *a priori* is represented under which alone things can become objects of our cognition in general. A principle, by contrast, is called metaphysical if it represents the condition *a priori* under which alone objects whose concept must be given empirically can be further determined *a priori*. Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental when it states that their alteration must have a cause; but it is metaphysical when it states that their alteration must have an *external* cause. For in the first case a body need be thought only through ontological predicates (pure concepts of the understanding), for example as substance, in order to cognize the proposition *a priori*; in the second, however, the empirical concept of a body (as a movable thing in space) must underlie the proposition, but then it can be understood wholly *a priori* that the latter predicate (motion only through an external cause) belongs to the body.—Likewise, as I shall show presently, the principle of nature's purposiveness (in the manifoldness of its empirical [A XXX] laws) is a transcendental principle. For the concept of objects, insofar as they are thought as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible experiential cognition [182] in general and contains nothing empirical. By contrast, the principle of practical purposiveness, which must be

thought in the idea of the *determination* of a free *will*, would be a metaphysical principle: for the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must nevertheless be given empirically (it does not belong among transcendental predicates). Yet neither principle is empirical; both are principles *a priori*, because no further experience is required to connect the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgments; rather, that connection can be understood entirely *a priori*.

That the concept of a purposiveness of nature belongs among transcendental principles is sufficiently evident from the maxims of the power of judgment that are laid *a priori* at the foundation of the investigation of nature. These concern nothing but the possibility of experience, hence of cognition of nature —not merely as nature in general, but as nature determined by a manifold of particular laws.—In the course of this science they occur often enough, though scattered, as sayings of metaphysical wisdom on the occasion of various rules whose necessity [A XXXI] cannot be demonstrated from concepts. "Nature takes the shortest path (*law of economy*); nevertheless it makes no leap, either in the succession of its changes or in the arrangement of specifically different forms (*law of continuity in nature*); its great manifoldness in empirical laws is nevertheless unity under a few principles (*principles must not be multiplied beyond necessity*)"; and the like.

But if one thinks to explain the origin of these principles by attempting a psychological approach, this runs wholly counter to their meaning. For they do not say what happens—that is, according to what rule our cognitive powers actually engage in their play, and how people judge—but how they ought to judge. And this logical objective necessity cannot emerge if the principles are merely empirical. Thus the purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use, which plainly shines through these principles, is a transcendental principle of judgments and therefore also requires a transcendental deduction, through which the ground for judging in this way must be sought in the sources of cognition *a priori*.

In the grounds of the possibility of an experience [183] we do indeed first find something necessary: the universal [A XXXII] laws without which nature in general (as an object of the senses) cannot be thought. These rest on the categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us, insofar as that intuition is likewise given *a priori*. Under these laws the power of judgment is determining, for it has nothing to do but subsume under given laws. For example, the understanding says: every alteration has its cause (a universal law of nature); transcendental judgment then has only to state *a priori* the condition of subsumption under the concept of the understanding presented to it: and this is the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing. For nature in general (as an object of possible experience), this law is cognized as absolutely necessary.—But beyond that formal condition of time, the objects of empirical cognition are also determined—or, as far as we can judge *a priori*, determinable—in many ways, so that specifically different natures, beyond what they have in common as belonging to nature in general, can be causes in infinitely manifold ways. Each of these ways must (according to the concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which is a law and hence carries necessity with it, although, given the constitution and limits of our cognitive faculties, we have no insight into this necessity. Thus [A XXXIII] with regard to nature's merely empirical laws we must think the possibility of infinitely manifold empirical laws that are nevertheless contingent for our insight (cannot be cognized *a priori*). With regard to these we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws, and the possibility of the unity of experience (as a system according to empirical laws), to be contingent. Yet such a unity must necessarily be presupposed and assumed; otherwise there would be no thoroughgoing connection of empirical cognitions into a whole of experience, since universal natural laws provide such a connection among things generically, as natural things in general, but not specifically, as such particular natural beings. Hence the power of judgment must assume as a principle *a priori* for its own use that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity, unfathomable for us but still [184] thinkable, in the connection of their manifold into an experience possible in

itself. Consequently, since lawful unity in a connection that we cognize as conforming to a necessary intention (a need of the understanding), yet at the same time as contingent in itself, is represented as the purposiveness of objects (here, of nature) [A XXXIV], the power of judgment, which is merely reflective with regard to things under possible empirical laws (still to be discovered), must think nature with regard to these laws according to a *principle of purposiveness* for our faculty of cognition. This is expressed in the maxims of judgment given above. Now this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, because it attributes nothing at all to the object (nature), but represents only the sole way in which we must proceed in reflecting on the objects of nature with a view to a thoroughly connected experience. It is therefore a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of judgment. This is also why, when we encounter such a systematic unity under merely empirical laws, we are delighted (properly speaking, relieved of a need), as though by a fortunate chance favoring our intention, although we had necessarily to assume that such a unity existed without being able to understand or prove it.

To convince oneself of the correctness of this deduction of the concept before us, and of the necessity of assuming it as a transcendental principle of cognition, one need only consider the magnitude of the task: to make, out of given perceptions of a nature containing a possibly infinite manifoldness of empirical laws, a connected [A XXXV] experience—a task that lies *a priori* in our understanding. The understanding does indeed possess *a priori* universal laws of nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; yet beyond these it also needs a certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can become known to it only empirically and which are contingent in relation to it. These rules, without which there would be no advance from the general analogy of a possible experience in general to particular experience, it must think as laws (that is, as necessary), since otherwise they would constitute no order of nature, although it does not cognize their necessity and could never gain insight into it. Thus although it can determine nothing *a priori* concerning them [185] (objects), in order to pursue these so-called empirical laws it

must nevertheless lay a principle *a priori* at the foundation of all reflection on nature: namely, that an order of nature cognizable according to them is possible. Such a principle is expressed by the following propositions: that in nature there is a subordination of genera and species comprehensible to us; that those genera in turn approach one another according to a common principle, so that a transition from one to another and thereby to a higher genus is possible; that although, given the specific diversity of natural effects, the need to assume as many different kinds of causality [A XXXVI] initially seems unavoidable to our understanding, these may nevertheless stand under a small number of principles, with whose discovery we must occupy ourselves; and so forth. This agreement of nature with our faculty of cognition is presupposed *a priori* by the power of judgment for the sake of its reflection on nature according to its empirical laws. The understanding at the same time recognizes it as objectively contingent, and only the power of judgment attributes it to nature as transcendental purposiveness (in relation to the subject's faculty of cognition). For without presupposing this, we would have no order of nature according to empirical laws, and hence no guiding thread for experience and the investigation of those laws in all their manifoldness.

For it is quite conceivable that, despite all the uniformity of natural things according to universal laws, without which the form of experiential cognition in general could not occur at all, the specific diversity of nature's empirical laws together with their effects might nevertheless be so great that it would be impossible for our understanding to discover a comprehensible order in it, to divide its products into genera and species so as to use the principles explaining and understanding one also to explain and comprehend another, and to make a connected experience out of material so confused for us [A XXXVII] (properly, only infinitely manifold and not commensurate with our power of comprehension).

The power of judgment therefore also contains within itself a principle *a priori* for the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective respect, through which it prescribes a law not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy) [186] for reflection on nature. This could be called the *law of the specification of*

nature with regard to its empirical laws. Judgment does not cognize this law in nature *a priori*, but assumes it for the sake of an order of nature cognizable by our understanding, in the division it makes of nature's universal laws when it seeks to subordinate a manifold of particular laws to them. Thus when we say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principle of purposiveness for our faculty of cognition—that is, in a manner commensurate with human understanding in its necessary task of finding the universal for the particular presented to it by perception, and, for what is diverse (though universal for each species), a connection in the unity of a principle—we thereby neither prescribe a law to nature nor learn one from it by observation (although that principle can be confirmed by observation). For it is not a principle of determining [A XXXVIII] but only of reflective judgment. We mean only that, however nature may be arranged according to its universal laws, we must pursue its empirical laws entirely according to that principle and the maxims grounded on it, because only insofar as that principle holds can we advance in the use of our understanding in experience and acquire cognition.

Introduction VI

VI. On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature.

The agreement of nature in the manifoldness of its particular laws with our need to find universal principles for them must, according to all our insight, be judged contingent, yet at the same time indispensable to the needs of our understanding, and hence a purposiveness through which nature agrees with our intention, though that intention is directed only toward cognition.—The universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are as necessary to nature (although they spring from spontaneity) as the laws of motion of matter; and their production presupposes no intention concerning our cognitive faculties, because only through them, concerning what cognition of things (of nature) is, do we first [A XXXIX] [187] acquire a concept, and they necessarily belong to nature as an object of our cognition in general. But that the order of nature according to its particular laws, despite all its at least possible manifoldness and diversity exceeding our power of comprehension, should nevertheless actually be commensurate with that power is, as far as we can see, contingent. Its discovery is a task of the understanding, pursued with a view to a necessary end of its own, namely to introduce unity of princi-

ples into nature. This end the power of judgment must then attribute to nature, because the understanding cannot prescribe a law to nature on this matter.

The attainment of every intention is connected with the feeling of pleasure; and if the condition of its attainment is a representation *a priori*, as here a principle for the reflective power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also determined by a ground *a priori* and valid for everyone. It is determined, indeed, solely through the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition, without the concept of purposiveness here having the least regard for the faculty of desire; it is thus wholly distinct from all practical purposiveness of nature.

In fact, while we find—and can find—not the slightest effect on the feeling of pleasure within us from the agreement of perceptions with laws according to universal concepts of nature (the categories), [A XL] because the understanding necessarily proceeds in this way, without intention, according to its nature, on the other hand the discovery that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be united under a principle embracing them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure, often even of admiration, and indeed of an admiration that does not cease even when we are sufficiently acquainted with its object. We no longer feel any noticeable pleasure in nature's comprehensibility and the unity of its division into genera and species, through which alone empirical concepts are possible by which we cognize nature according to its particular laws. But this pleasure certainly existed in its time; and only because the most ordinary experience would be impossible without it has it gradually become mingled with mere cognition and ceased to be noticed separately.—Something is therefore needed that, in judging nature, draws attention to its purposiveness for our understanding: a study aimed at bringing its heterogeneous laws, if possible, under higher, though still empirical, laws, [188] so that, when it succeeds, we may feel pleasure in their harmony with our faculty of cognition, which we regard as merely contingent. By contrast, a representation of nature would thoroughly displease us if it foretold that, with the slightest investigation [A XLI] beyond the most ordinary experience, we would

encounter a heterogeneity of its laws that made the union of its particular laws under universal empirical laws impossible for our understanding. For this conflicts with the principle of the subjectively purposive specification of nature into its genera and with our reflective power of judgment in its aim regarding them.

Nevertheless, this presupposition of the power of judgment is so indeterminate concerning how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for our faculty of cognition should extend that, if we are told that a deeper or more extensive knowledge of nature through observation must ultimately encounter a manifoldness of laws that no human understanding can reduce to a principle, we are content with that as well. Yet we would rather hear others give us hope that the more we came to know nature inwardly, or could compare it with external members as yet unknown to us, the simpler we would find it in its principles, and the more concordant despite the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws, as our experience advanced. For our power of judgment commands us to proceed according to the principle of nature's commensurateness with our faculty of cognition as far as that principle reaches, without (since it is not determining judgment that gives us this rule) deciding [A XLII] whether or not it has limits anywhere. For although we can determine limits with regard to the rational use of our cognitive faculties, no determination of limits is possible in the empirical field.

Introduction VII

VII. On the Aesthetic Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature.

What is merely subjective in the representation of an object—that is, what constitutes its relation to the subject, not to the object—is its aesthetic character; but what serves, or can be used, to determine [189] the object (for cognition) is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of the senses, both relations occur together. In the sensible representation of things outside me, the quality of space, in which we intuit them, is the merely subjective element of my representation of them (whereby what they may be as objects in themselves remains undecided); on account of this relation the object is also thought through it merely as appearance. Yet despite its merely subjective quality, space is nevertheless an element of the cognition of things as appearances. *Sensation* (here, outer sensation) likewise expresses the merely subjective element of our representations of things outside us, but properly [A XLIII] their material (real) element (through which something existing is given), just as space expresses the mere form *a priori* of the possibility of their intuition; and yet sensation too is used for the cognition of objects outside us.

But the subjective element in a representation *that cannot become an element of cognition at all* is the *pleasure* or *displeasure* connected with it. Through this I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may well be the effect of some cognition. Now the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is rep-

resented in perception, is likewise not a property of the object itself (for such a property cannot be perceived), although it can be inferred from a cognition of things. Thus the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an object, and is indeed immediately connected with its representation even without any intention of using that representation for cognition, is the subjective element in it that cannot become an element of cognition at all. The object is then called purposive only because its representation is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of purposiveness.—The only question is whether [A XLIV] there is any such representation of purposiveness at all.

If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the form of an object of intuition, without referring that form to a concept for a determinate cognition, then the representation is thereby referred not to the object but solely to the subject. The pleasure can express nothing but the object's commensurateness with the cognitive faculties that are at play in the reflective power of judgment [190], insofar as they are at play there, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object. For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never occur without reflective judgment, even unintentionally, at least comparing them with its capacity to relate intuitions to concepts. If, in this comparison, the imagination (as the faculty of intuitions *a priori*) is unintentionally brought into harmony with the understanding (as the faculty of concepts) by a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as purposive for reflective judgment. Such a judgment is an aesthetic judgment concerning the purposiveness of the object, grounded on no existing concept of the object and furnishing none. If an object's form (not the material element of its representation, as sensation), in mere [A XLV] reflection on it (without any intention of acquiring a concept of it), is judged to be the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, this pleasure is also judged to be necessarily connected with its representation, and thus not merely for the subject who apprehends this form, but for everyone who judges in general. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging through such a pleasure (and hence also

with universal validity) is called taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is placed solely in the form of the object for reflection in general, hence in no sensation of the object and also without reference to a concept containing any intention, it is solely the lawfulness in the empirical use of judgment in general (the unity of imagination with understanding) in the subject with which the representation of the object agrees in reflection, whose conditions hold universally *a priori*. And since this agreement of the object with the subject's faculties is contingent, it brings about the representation of its purposiveness with regard to the subject's cognitive faculties.

Here, then, is a pleasure which, like all pleasure or displeasure not produced through the concept of freedom (that is, through the prior determination of the higher faculty of desire by pure reason), can never [A XLVI] be understood from concepts as necessarily connected with the representation of an object. Rather, it must always be cognized only through [191] reflected perception as connected with that representation, and consequently, like all empirical judgments, can announce no objective necessity or lay claim to validity *a priori*. But the judgment of taste, like every other empirical judgment, also claims only to hold for everyone, which remains possible despite its inner contingency. What is strange and distinctive lies only in this: it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (hence no concept at all), that the judgment of taste nevertheless expects of everyone and would connect with the object's representation, just as though it were a predicate connected with cognition of the object.

A singular judgment of experience—for example, that of someone who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock crystal—rightly demands that everyone else must find it so as well, because he has made this judgment according to the universal conditions of determining judgment under the laws of a possible experience in general. Likewise, someone who feels pleasure in mere reflection on the form of an object, without regard to a concept, although this judgment is empirical and singular, rightly [A XLVII] claims everyone's assent. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments: namely, the purposive agreement of an object (whether a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the cognitive faculties

required for every empirical cognition (imagination and understanding). Thus in the judgment of taste pleasure does indeed depend on an empirical representation and cannot be connected *a priori* with any concept (we cannot determine *a priori* which object will or will not accord with taste; we must try it). Yet it is the determining ground of this judgment only because we are conscious that it rests solely on reflection and the universal, although merely subjective, conditions of reflection's agreement with the cognition of objects in general, for which the object's form is purposive.

This is why judgments of taste are also subject to a critique with regard to their possibility, since that possibility presupposes a principle *a priori*, although this principle is neither a principle of cognition [192] for the understanding nor a practical principle for the will, and hence is not determining *a priori* at all.

But receptivity to pleasure from reflection on the forms [A XLVIII] of things (in nature as well as art) indicates not only a purposiveness of objects in relation to the reflective power of judgment in the subject, according to the concept of nature; it also indicates, conversely, a purposiveness of the subject with regard to objects, in their form or even their formlessness, according to the concept of freedom. Hence aesthetic judgment is referred not only, as a judgment of taste, to the beautiful, but also, as springing from a feeling of spirit, to the *sublime*. Accordingly that critique of aesthetic judgment must fall into two principal parts corresponding to these.

Introduction VIII

VIII. On the Logical Representation of the Purposiveness of Nature.

Purposiveness can be represented in an object given in experience either on a merely subjective ground, as the agreement of its form, in its *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) prior to any concept, with the cognitive faculties, so as to unite intuition with concepts into a cognition in general; or on an objective ground, as the agreement of its form with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it that precedes [A XLIX] and contains the ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on immediate pleasure in the object's form in mere reflection on it. The representation of purposiveness of the second kind, therefore, since it refers the object's form not to the subject's cognitive faculties in apprehending it, but to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but with the understanding in judging them. If the concept of an object is given, then the task of the power of judgment in using it for cognition consists in *presentation* (*exhibitio*), that is, in placing beside the concept a corresponding intuition. This may be effected through our own imagination, as in art, [193] when we realize a previously conceived concept of an object that is an end for us; or through nature in its technique (as in organized bodies), when we place our concept of an end beneath nature for judging its product. In the latter case we represent not merely the *purposiveness*

of nature in the thing's form, but this product of nature as a *natural end*.—Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is no concept of the object at all, but only a [A L] principle of the power of judgment for acquiring concepts amid its overwhelming manifoldness (for being able to orient ourselves in it), we nevertheless thereby attribute to nature, as it were, a regard for our faculty of cognition by analogy with an end. Thus we can regard *natural beauty* as the *presentation* of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and *natural ends* as the presentation of the concept of real (objective) purposiveness. We judge the one through taste (aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure), the other through understanding and reason (logically, according to concepts).

On this rests the division of the critique of the power of judgment into the critique of *aesthetic* and of *teleological* judgment: the first means the faculty of judging formal purposiveness (otherwise also called subjective) through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure; the second, the faculty of judging the real (objective) purposiveness of nature through understanding and reason.

In a critique of the power of judgment, the part containing aesthetic judgment belongs essentially to it, because this alone contains a principle that judgment lays entirely *a priori* at the foundation of its reflection on nature: namely, the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature according to its particular (empirical) laws for our faculty of cognition, without which the understanding could not find its way in nature. By contrast, [A LI] no ground *a priori* can be given —nor does even the possibility of it become apparent from the concept of a nature as an object of experience, either in general or in particular—for the necessity of objective ends of nature, that is, things possible only as natural ends. Rather, only the power of judgment contains the rule for using the concept of ends for the sake of reason in cases that arise (of certain products), without containing within itself a principle for this *a priori*, after that transcendental [194] principle has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of an end (at least as regards form) to nature.

But the transcendental principle of representing a purposiveness of nature in the form of a thing, in subjective relation to our faculty of cognition, as a principle for judging nature, leaves it entirely undetermined where and in which cases I should judge a product according to a principle of purposiveness rather than merely according to universal laws of nature. It leaves to the *aesthetic* power of judgment, in taste, the decision concerning the product's (its form's) commensurateness with our cognitive faculties, insofar as aesthetic judgment decides not through agreement with concepts but through feeling. By contrast, the power of judgment used teleologically specifies the conditions [A LII] under which something (for example, an organized body) is to be judged according to the idea of an end of nature. Yet it can cite no principle from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorizing us to attribute to nature a relation to ends *a priori*, or even to assume such a relation indeterminately in advance of actual experience of such products. The reason is that many particular experiences must be made and considered under the unity of their principle in order to cognize an objective purposiveness in a certain object even empirically.—Aesthetic judgment is therefore a special faculty for judging things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. Teleological judgment is no special faculty, but only the reflective power of judgment in general, insofar as it proceeds, as everywhere in theoretical cognition, according to concepts, but concerning certain objects of nature according to special principles—namely those of a merely reflective, not an object-determining, power of judgment. Thus in its application it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy; and on account of its special principles, which are not determining as they must be in a doctrine, it must also constitute a special part of the critique. Aesthetic judgment, by contrast, contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects and must therefore be counted *only* as belonging to the critique of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, insofar as they [A LIII] are capable of principles *a priori*, whatever use (theoretical or practical) those principles may otherwise have. This critique is the propaedeutic of all philosophy.

Introduction IX



IX. [195] *On the Connection of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason through the Power of Judgment.*

The understanding legislates *a priori* for nature as an object of the senses, for a theoretical cognition of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates *a priori* for freedom and its own causality, as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditionally practical cognition. The domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are wholly separated, against any mutual influence they might of themselves have on one another (each according to its fundamental laws), by the great gulf dividing the supersensible from appearances. The concept of freedom determines nothing with regard to theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing with regard to the practical laws of freedom. To this extent it is impossible [A LIV] to throw a bridge from one domain to the other.—Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom (and the practical rule it contains) do not lie in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, the reverse is nevertheless possible—not with regard to cognition of nature, but with regard to the consequences of the former for the latter. This is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose *effect* is to occur in the world according to freedom's formal laws. When used of the supersensible, however, the word *cause* means only the *ground* for determining the causality of natural things to

an effect in conformity with their own natural laws, yet at the same time in harmony with the formal principle of the laws of reason. The possibility of this cannot indeed be understood, but the objection of an alleged contradiction within it can be sufficiently refuted[2].—The effect according to the concept of freedom is the [A LV] [196] final end that ought to exist (or whose appearance in the sensible world ought to exist), for which the condition of its possibility in nature (in the subject as a sensible being, namely a human being) is presupposed. What presupposes this *a priori* and without regard to the practical—the power of judgment—supplies the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, making possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness according to the former to the final end according to the latter, in the concept of a *purposiveness* of nature. For through this the possibility of the final end is cognized, which can become actual only in nature and in agreement with its laws.

Through the possibility of its laws *a priori* for nature, the understanding gives proof that we cognize nature only as appearance [A LVI], and thereby also points to a supersensible substratum of nature, but leaves this wholly *undetermined*. Through its principle *a priori* for judging nature according to its possible particular laws, the power of judgment provides nature's supersensible substratum (both within us and outside us) with *determinability through the intellectual faculty*. Reason, however, gives this same substratum *determination* through its practical law *a priori*. Thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.

With regard to the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are considered as higher faculties—that is, as containing an autonomy—it is the understanding that contains the *constitutive* principles *a priori* for the *faculty of cognition* (the theoretical cognition of nature); for the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, it is the power of judgment, independently of concepts and sensations that refer to the determination of the faculty of desire [197] and could thereby be immediately practical; for the *faculty of desire*, it is reason, which is practical without the mediation of any pleasure, whatever its source, and determines for

that faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which also carries with it pure intellectual satisfaction in the object.—The power of judgment's concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among concepts of nature [A LVII], but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although the aesthetic judgment concerning certain objects (of nature or art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, whose harmony contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept fit to mediate the connection of the domains of the concept of nature and the concept of freedom in their consequences, since it also promotes the mind's receptivity to moral feeling.—The following table may make it easier to survey all the higher faculties in their systematic unity[3].

All the faculties of the mind — Cognitive faculties — Principles a priori — Application to [A LVIII] [198]

Faculty of cognition — Understanding — Lawfulness — Nature

Feeling of pleasure and displeasure — Power of judgment — Purposiveness — Art

Faculty of desire — Reason — Final end — Freedom.

2 One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction of natural causality from causality through freedom is the reproach that, when I speak of *obstacles* that nature places in the way of causality according to laws of freedom (moral laws), or of its *promotion* by nature, I nevertheless concede an *influence* of the former on the latter. But if one is only willing to understand what has been said, the misinterpretation is very easily prevented. The resistance or promotion is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as appearance and the *effects* of the latter as appearances in the sensible world. Even the *causality* of freedom (of pure and practical reason) is the *causality* of a natural cause subordinate to freedom (of the subject considered as a human being, hence as appearance). The intelligible thought under free-

dom contains the ground of this cause's *determination*, in a manner otherwise inexplicable (just as is the very same thing that constitutes the supersensible substratum of nature).

3 It has been thought troubling that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always turn out to be threefold. But this lies in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made *a priori*, it will either be *analytic*, according to the principle of contradiction, and then it is always twofold (*every being is either A or not A*); or it is *synthetic*. If in the latter case it is to be carried out from *concepts a priori* (not, as in mathematics, from the intuition corresponding *a priori* to the concept), then, in accordance with what is required for synthetic unity in general—namely 1) a condition, 2) something conditioned, 3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition—the division must necessarily be a trichotomy.

Division of the Work



Division [A LIX] [199] *of the Entire Work.*
- *First Part.*
- *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.*
- *First Section.*
- Analytic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.
- *First Book.*
- Analytic of the Beautiful.
- *Second Book.*
- Analytic of the Sublime.
- *Second Section.*
- Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.
- *Second Part.* [A LX]
- *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.*
- *First Division.*
- Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
- *Second Division.*
- Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
- *Appendix.*
- Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgment.

Of the [201] *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

PART I

Analytic of the Beautiful



First Part. Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.
First Section. [203] *Analytic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.*
First Book. Analytic of the Beautiful.
First Moment of the Judgment of Taste[4]*, According to Quality.*

1 *The Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic.*

To distinguish whether something is beautiful or not, we refer the representation not through the understanding to the object for cognition, but through the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) [A 4] to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore no cognitive judgment, hence not logical but aesthetic, by which we understand a judgment whose determining ground can be *nothing other than subjective*. Any relation of representations, even of sensations, can be objective (and then it signifies the real element of an empirical representation); only the relation to [204] the feeling of pleasure and displeasure cannot, for through it nothing at all is designated in the object. Rather, in it the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

To comprehend a regular, purposive building with one's faculty of cognition (whether in a distinct or a confused mode of representation) is something quite different from being conscious of this representation with a sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is referred entirely to the subject, and indeed

to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This grounds a quite special faculty of distinguishing and judging that contributes nothing to cognition, but only holds the given representation in the subject [A 5] against the entire faculty of representations, of which the mind becomes conscious in feeling its state. Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (hence aesthetic); but the judgment made through them is logical if in that judgment they are referred only to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations were rational, but in a judgment were referred solely to the subject (its feeling), they are to that extent always aesthetic.

2 *The Satisfaction That Determines the Judgment of Taste Is Without Any Interest.*

Interest is the name given to the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object's existence. Such satisfaction therefore always also has a relation to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or as necessarily connected with that ground. But when the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know whether we or anyone else have, or could even have, any concern for the thing's existence; rather, we want to know how we judge it in mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). If someone asks whether I find the palace I see before me [A 6] beautiful, I may indeed say that I dislike things made merely to be gaped at; or, like that Iroquois *sachem*, that nothing in Paris pleases me more than the eating houses. I may even rail, in true *Rousseauian* fashion, against the vanity of the great who spend the people's sweat on such dispensable things. I can [205] finally quite easily convince myself that if I were on an uninhabited island, with no hope of ever returning to human society, and could conjure up such a splendid building by a mere wish, I would not even take that trouble if I already had a hut comfortable enough for me. All this may be conceded and approved; only it is not what is at issue now. We want to know only whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied in me by satisfaction, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object of this representation. It is easy to see that, to say it is *beautiful* and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I make of this rep-

resentation within myself, not how I depend on the object's existence. Everyone must admit that a judgment of beauty into which the slightest interest enters is very partial and no pure judgment of taste. To play the judge in matters of taste, one must not be in the least partial to the thing's existence, but entirely indifferent [A 7] in this respect.

We can best elucidate this proposition, which is of particular importance, by contrasting the pure, disinterested[5] satisfaction in a judgment of taste with satisfaction connected with interest—especially if at the same time we can be certain that there are no more kinds of interest than those about to be named.

3 *Satisfaction in the Agreeable Is Connected with Interest.*

Agreeable is what pleases the senses in sensation. Here at once an opportunity arises to point out and criticize a very common confusion between the two meanings the word sensation can have. All satisfaction, people say or think, is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently [206] everything that pleases is agreeable precisely in pleasing (and according to its [A 8] different degrees or its relations to other agreeable sensations, it is *charming, delightful, gratifying, joyful*, and so forth). But if this is conceded, then impressions of the senses that determine inclination, principles of reason that determine the will, and mere reflected forms of intuition that determine judgment are entirely alike as regards their effect on the feeling of pleasure. For this effect would be agreeableness in the sensation of one's state; and since all cultivation of our faculties must ultimately aim at the practical and unite in it as their goal, we could expect of them no other assessment of things and their worth than one consisting in the enjoyment they promise. How they attain this would in the end not matter at all; and since only the choice of means could make a difference here, people could certainly accuse one another of folly and lack of understanding, but never of baseness and malice. For all, each according to his way of seeing things, would be pursuing one goal, which for everyone is enjoyment.

When a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, this expression means something quite different from what it means when I call the representation of a thing (through the senses, as a receptivity belong-

ing to the faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the latter [A 9] case the representation is referred to the object, but in the former solely to the subject, and serves no cognition at all, not even that by which the subject *cognizes* itself.

In the definition above, however, by sensation we mean an objective representation of the senses; and to avoid the constant risk of being misunderstood, we shall call what must always remain merely subjective and can never constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of feeling. The green color of meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; its agreeableness, however, belongs to *subjective* sensation, through which no object is represented—that is, to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is no cognition of it).

That my judgment of an object by which I declare it [207] agreeable expresses an interest in it is already clear from the fact that, through sensation, it arouses a desire for objects of that kind. Hence the satisfaction presupposes not merely the judgment about the object, but the relation of its existence to my state insofar as that state is affected by such an object. Thus we say of the agreeable not merely that it *pleases*, but that it *gratifies*. It is not [A 10] mere approval that I give it; rather, inclination is produced through it. And what is agreeable in the liveliest way is so far from requiring any judgment about the character of the object that those who aim only at enjoyment (for this is the word that designates the inwardness of gratification) gladly spare themselves all judging.

4 *Satisfaction in the Good Is Connected with Interest.*

Good is what pleases through reason by means of the mere concept. We call some things *good for something* (the useful), which please only as means; others we call *good in themselves*, which please for their own sake. Both always contain the concept of an end, hence the relation of reason to willing (at least possible willing), and consequently a satisfaction in the *existence* of an object or an action—that is, some interest.

To find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, that is, have a concept of it. To find beauty in something, I do not need this. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly interwoven under the [A 11]

name of foliage, signify nothing, depend on no determinate concept, and yet please. Satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on reflection upon an object leading to some concept (undetermined which), and is thereby also distinguished from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

To be sure, the agreeable seems in many cases identical with the good. Thus people commonly say: all enjoyment (especially lasting enjoyment) is good in itself—which amounts roughly to saying that being lastingly agreeable and being good are the same. But one soon notices that this is only a mistaken substitution of words, since the concepts peculiar to these expressions can by no means [208] be exchanged for one another. The agreeable, which as such represents the object solely in relation to sense, must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end in order to be called good as an object of the will. But that this is an entirely different relation to satisfaction when I call what gratifies me *good* as well can be seen from this: with the good the question is always whether it is merely mediately good or immediately good (useful or good in itself); whereas with the agreeable this question cannot arise at all, since the word always means something that pleases immediately. (The same holds also for what [A 12] I call beautiful.)

Even in the most ordinary speech we distinguish the agreeable from the good. Of a dish whose flavor is heightened by spices and other additions, we say without hesitation that it is agreeable, while admitting that it is not good: for although it immediately *gratifies* the senses, it displeases when considered mediately, that is, through reason, which looks to the consequences. Even in judging health we can still observe this distinction. Health is immediately agreeable to everyone who possesses it (at least negatively, as the absence of all bodily pain). But to say that it is good, we must also direct it through reason toward ends: namely, that it is a state that makes us ready for all our occupations. Finally, with regard to happiness, everyone believes he can call the greatest sum (in both quantity and duration) of life's agreeable things a true good, indeed the highest good. But reason resists this as well. Agreeableness is enjoyment. If enjoyment alone were the aim, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it, whether it were attained passively through nature's generosity or

through our own activity and action. But reason will never be persuaded that the existence of a human being who lives merely (and [A 13] is ever so busy toward this end) *to enjoy* has a value in itself—even if, as a means to enjoyment, he were as helpful as possible to others, all of whom likewise aim only at enjoyment, precisely because through sympathy he shared in every enjoyment. Only through what he does without regard to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature could also provide him passively, does he give his existence as the existence of a person [209] an absolute worth; and happiness, with all its fullness of agreeableness, is far from being an unconditional good[6].

But despite all these differences between the agreeable and the good, both agree in always being connected with an interest in their object—not only the agreeable, § 3, and the mediately good (the useful), which pleases as a means to some agreeableness, but also what is good absolutely and in every respect, namely the morally good, which carries the highest interest with it. For the good is the object of the will (that is, [A 14] of a faculty of desire determined by reason). But to will something and to take satisfaction in its existence—that is, to take an interest in it—are identical.

5 *Comparison of the Three Specifically Different Kinds of Satisfaction.*

The agreeable and the good both have a relation to the faculty of desire and to that extent carry with them, the former a pathologically conditioned satisfaction (through incitements, stimuli), the latter a pure practical satisfaction. This satisfaction is determined not merely through the representation of the object, but also through the represented connection of the subject with its existence. Not merely the object, but its existence too, pleases. By contrast, the judgment of taste is merely *contemplative*: a judgment that, indifferent to the existence of an object, only compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is not directed toward concepts either; for the judgment of taste is no cognitive judgment (neither theoretical nor practical), and hence is neither *grounded* on concepts nor *aimed* at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in [A 15] [210] reference to which we distinguish objects or modes of representation from one another. Nor are the expressions appropriate to each, by which we designate satisfaction in them, the same. Someone calls *agreeable* what *gratifies* him; *beautiful*, what merely *pleases* him; *good*, what is *esteemed*, *approved*—that is, in which he places an objective worth. Agreeableness holds also for nonrational animals; beauty only for human beings, that is, animal yet rational beings, and not merely as rational beings (for example, spirits), but at the same time as animal beings; the good, however, holds for every rational being in general. This proposition can receive its full justification and explanation only later. We may say that among all these three kinds of satisfaction, that of taste in the beautiful alone is a disinterested and *free* satisfaction; for no interest, neither of sense nor of reason, compels approval. Thus we could say that satisfaction in the three cases mentioned relates to *inclination*, *favor*, or *respect*. For *favor* is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that a law of reason enjoins us to desire, leave us no freedom to make something into an object of pleasure for ourselves. Every interest presupposes a need or produces one [A 16]; and as a determining ground of approval, it no longer leaves the judgment about the object free.

As regards the interest of inclination in the agreeable, everyone says that hunger is the best cook, and people with a healthy appetite relish anything edible; hence such satisfaction proves no choice according to taste. Only when the need has been satisfied can one distinguish who among many has taste and who does not. Similarly there are manners (conduct) without virtue, politeness without goodwill, propriety without integrity, and so forth. For where the moral law speaks, there is objectively no longer any free choice concerning what is to be done; and to show taste in one's conduct (or in judging that of others) is something quite different from expressing one's moral way of thinking. The latter contains a command and produces a need, whereas moral taste merely plays with the objects of satisfaction without attaching itself to any one of them.

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the First Moment. [211]

Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a mode of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*. The object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful*.

Second Moment [A 17] *of the Judgment of Taste, Namely According to Its Quantity.*

6 *The Beautiful Is What, Without Concepts, Is Represented as the Object of a Universal Satisfaction.*

This definition of the beautiful can be derived from the preceding definition of it as an object of satisfaction without any interest. For what someone is conscious of taking satisfaction in without any interest he cannot judge otherwise than as having to contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. For since it is not grounded on any inclination of the subject (or on any other considered interest), but the person judging feels himself entirely *free* with regard to the satisfaction he accords the object, he can discover no private conditions as grounds of satisfaction to which his subject alone would be attached. He must therefore regard it as grounded in what he can also presuppose in everyone else; consequently, he must believe he has reason to expect a similar satisfaction from everyone. He will therefore speak of the beautiful as though beauty [A 18] were a property of the object and the judgment logical (constituting cognition of the object through concepts of it), although the judgment is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the object's representation to the subject. This is because it nevertheless resembles a logical judgment in allowing us to presuppose its validity for everyone. But this universality cannot spring from concepts either. For there is no passage from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws, which, however, carry an interest with them, such as is not connected with a pure judgment of taste [212]). Consequently a judgment of taste, with the consciousness that all interest has been set aside in it, must carry a claim to validity for everyone without a universality directed toward objects; that is, a claim to subjective universality must be connected with it.

7 *Comparison of the Beautiful with the Agreeable and the Good through the Above Characteristic.*

With regard to the *agreeable*, everyone acknowledges that his judgment, which he grounds on a private feeling and through which he says of an object that it pleases him, is also restricted to his own person alone. Thus he is quite content if, when he says that Canary wine [A 19] is agreeable, someone else corrects his expression and reminds him that he should say: it is agreeable *to me*. This holds not only for the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also for whatever may be agreeable to each person's eyes and ears. To one person violet is gentle and lovely, to another dead and lifeless. One loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of strings. To argue about this with the intention of condemning another's judgment, which differs from our own, as incorrect—as though it were logically opposed to ours—would be folly. With regard to the agreeable, therefore, the principle holds: *everyone has his own taste* (of the senses).

With the beautiful it is quite otherwise. It would, on the contrary, be ridiculous if someone who prided himself on his taste thought to justify himself by saying: this object (the building we see, the clothes that person wears, the concert we hear, the poem submitted for judgment) is beautiful *for me*. For he must not call it *beautiful* if it pleases only him. Many things may have charm and agreeableness for him; no one concerns himself with that. But when he declares something beautiful, he expects the very same satisfaction from others: he judges not merely for himself, but for [A 20] everyone, and then speaks of beauty as though it were a property of things. Thus he says: the *thing* is beautiful. He does not count on others agreeing with his judgment of satisfaction [213] because he has repeatedly found them in agreement with his own; rather, he *demands* it of them. He censures them if they judge otherwise, and denies them the taste he nevertheless requires them to have. To this extent we cannot say that everyone has his particular taste. That would amount to saying that there is no taste at all—that is, no aesthetic judgment that could rightfully claim everyone's assent.

Nevertheless, even with regard to the agreeable we find that people can be unanimous in judging it, and that in view of this unanimity some are denied taste and others granted it—not in the sense of an organic sense, but as a faculty of judging the agreeable in general. Thus we say that someone who knows how to entertain his guests with agreeable things (enjoyment through all the senses) in such a way that all are pleased has taste. But here universality is taken only comparatively; there are only *general* rules (as all empirical rules are), not *universal* rules, which the judgment of taste about the beautiful undertakes or claims to provide. It [A 21] is a judgment in relation to sociability, insofar as sociability rests on empirical rules. With regard to the good, judgments likewise rightly claim validity for everyone; but the good is represented as an object of universal satisfaction only *through a concept*, which is the case neither with the agreeable nor with the beautiful.

8 *The Universality of Satisfaction Is Represented in a Judgment of Taste Only as Subjective.*

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, found in a judgment of taste, is a remarkable feature—not indeed for the logician, but for the transcendental philosopher. It calls for no small effort on his part to discover its origin, but in return reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that would have remained unknown without this analysis.

First we must become fully convinced that through the [214] judgment of taste (about the beautiful) we expect *everyone* to take satisfaction in an object, yet without grounding ourselves on a concept (for then it would be the good); and that this claim to universal validity [A 22] belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare something *beautiful* that, without thinking such validity in it, no one would ever think of using this expression. Instead, everything that pleases without a concept would be counted among the agreeable, concerning which everyone is allowed his own opinion and no one expects another to agree with his judgment of taste—something that nevertheless always happens in judgments of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of sense, the second the taste of reflection: the former makes merely private judgments, the latter

supposedly generally valid (public) judgments; but both make aesthetic (not practical) judgments about an object merely with regard to the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now it is indeed strange that, whereas experience not only shows that the judgment of the taste of sense (of pleasure or displeasure in something) does not hold universally, but everyone is also of his own accord modest enough not to expect this agreement of others (although a very extensive unanimity is in fact often found even in these judgments), the taste of reflection, although experience teaches that it too is often enough rebuffed in its claim to the universal validity of its judgment (about the beautiful) for everyone, can nevertheless find it possible—as it [A 23] actually does—to represent judgments that could universally demand this agreement. It actually expects such agreement of everyone for each of its judgments of taste, without those judging disputing the possibility of such a claim, but merely failing to agree in particular cases about the correct application of this faculty.

Here we must first observe that a universality not resting on concepts of the object (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic: that is, it contains no objective quantity of the judgment, but only a subjective one. For this I also use the expression *common validity*, which designates the validity for every subject of the relation of a representation not to the faculty of cognition, but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (The same expression can also be used for the logical quantity of a judgment, [215] provided one adds *objective* universal validity, to distinguish it from merely subjective validity, which is always aesthetic.)

Now an *objectively universally valid* judgment is always subjectively valid as well: if the judgment holds for everything contained under a given concept, it also holds for everyone who represents an object through that concept. But from *subjective universal validity*—that is, aesthetic validity, which rests on no concept [A 24]—we cannot infer logical validity, because judgments of that kind do not concern the object at all. For precisely this reason, however, the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgment must also be of a special kind: it

does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the *object*, considered in its whole logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the whole sphere *of those who judge*.

With regard to logical quantity, all judgments of taste are *singular* judgments. For since I must compare the object immediately with my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and not through concepts, these judgments cannot have the quantity of objectively universally valid judgments. Yet if, according to the conditions determining the judgment of taste, the singular representation of its object is transformed through comparison into a concept, a logically universal judgment can arise from it. For example, through a judgment of taste I declare the rose I am looking at beautiful. By contrast, the judgment arising from the comparison of many singular judgments—roses in general are beautiful—is now stated not merely as an aesthetic judgment, but as a logical judgment grounded on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment that the rose is agreeable (in its scent) is also aesthetic and singular, but it is not a judgment of taste: it is a judgment of sense. It differs from the former in this: the judgment of taste carries with it an *aesthetic* [A 25] *quantity* of universality, that is, validity for everyone, which cannot be found in a judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good, although they too determine satisfaction in an object, have logical and not merely aesthetic universality; for they hold of the object as cognitions of it, and therefore for everyone.

If objects are judged merely according to concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule according to which someone should be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether [216] a garment, a house, or a flower is beautiful is not a judgment one allows reasons or principles to talk one into. One wants to submit the object to one's own eyes, as though one's satisfaction depended on sensation; and yet, when one then calls the object beautiful, one believes one has a universal voice on one's side and claims everyone's agreement, whereas every private sensation would decide only for the observer alone and his satisfaction.

Here, then, we see that in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated but such a *universal voice* concerning satisfaction without the mediation of concepts; hence the *possibility* of an [A 26] aesthetic judgment that can at the same time be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not *postulate* everyone's agreement (for only a logically universal judgment can do this, because it can adduce grounds); it only *expects* this agreement of everyone, as a case of the rule concerning which it awaits confirmation not from concepts but from the concurrence of others. The universal voice is therefore only an idea (what it rests on is not yet being investigated here). Whether someone who believes he is making a judgment of taste actually judges in accordance with this idea may be uncertain; but that he refers his judgment to it, and hence intends it to be a judgment of taste, he announces through the expression beauty. For himself, however, he can become certain of this through the mere consciousness of having separated everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains to him; and this is all for which he promises himself everyone's assent—a claim to which, under these conditions, he would also be entitled, if only he did not so often fail to meet them and thereby make an erroneous judgment of taste.

9 [A 27] *Investigation of the Question Whether, in a Judgment of Taste, the Feeling of Pleasure Precedes the Judging of the Object, or the Judging Precedes the Feeling.*

The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste and therefore deserves all our attention.

If pleasure in the given object came first, and only its [217] universal communicability were to be attributed in the judgment of taste to the representation of the object, such a procedure would contradict itself. For such pleasure would be nothing but mere agreeableness in the sensation of sense, and hence by its nature could have only private validity, since it would depend immediately on the representation through which the object *is given*.

Thus it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation that must, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, underlie that judgment and have pleasure in the object as its consequence. But

nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation insofar as it belongs to cognition. For only to this extent is the latter objective, and only thereby does it have a universal point of reference with which everyone's power of representation is compelled to agree [A 28]. Now if the determining ground of the judgment about this universal communicability of the representation is to be thought as merely subjective, namely without a concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind found in the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they refer a given representation to *cognition in general*.

The cognitive powers brought into play through this representation are here in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Thus the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation with a given representation for cognition in general. Now for a representation through which an object is given to become cognition at all, *imagination* is required to combine the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* for the unity of the concept that unites the representations. This state of a *free play* of the cognitive faculties in a representation through which an object is given must be universally communicable, because cognition, as a determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject) ought to agree [A 29], is the only mode of representation valid for everyone.

The subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgment of taste, since it is to occur without presupposing a determinate concept, can be nothing other than the state of mind in the [218] free play of imagination and understanding (insofar as they harmonize with each other as is required for *cognition in general*). For we are conscious that this subjective relation, suited to cognition in general, must be valid for everyone and hence universally communicable, just as every determinate cognition is, which nevertheless always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

This merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, now precedes the pleasure in it and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. But it is solely on that

universality of the subjective conditions of judging objects that this universal subjective validity of the satisfaction rests, which we connect with the representation of the object we call beautiful.

That being able to communicate one's state of mind, even only with regard to the cognitive faculties, carries pleasure with it could easily be demonstrated from the human being's natural propensity to sociability (empirically [A 30] and psychologically). But that is not enough for our purpose. In a judgment of taste we expect the pleasure we feel of everyone else as necessary, as though, when we call something beautiful, it were to be regarded as a property of the object determined in it according to concepts—although beauty, without relation to the subject's feeling, is nothing in itself. But we must reserve the discussion of this question until we answer the question whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible *a priori*.

For now we are still occupied with the lesser question: in what way do we become conscious in a judgment of taste of a reciprocal subjective agreement of the cognitive powers with one another—aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through consciousness of our intentional activity in setting them into play?

If the given representation occasioning the judgment of taste were a concept that united understanding and imagination in judging the object into a cognition of it, then consciousness of this relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism of judgment treated in the Critique). But then the judgment would not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure [219], and hence would not be a judgment of taste. Now, however, the judgment of taste [A 31] determines the object independently of concepts with regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. Thus that subjective unity of the relation can make itself known only through sensation. The enlivening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate, yet, through the occasion of the given representation, harmonious—namely the activity belonging to cognition in general—is the sensation whose universal communicability the judgment of taste postulates. An objective relation can indeed only be thought; yet insofar as it is subjective in its conditions, it can

nevertheless be sensed in its effect on the mind. And in a relation grounded on no concept (such as that of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition in general), no consciousness of it is possible other than through the sensation of its effect: the facilitated play of the two mental powers (imagination and understanding), enlivened through mutual harmony. A representation that, as singular and without comparison with others, nevertheless agrees with the conditions of universality, which constitutes the task of the understanding in general, brings the cognitive faculties into the proportionate attunement that we require for all cognition and therefore also regard as valid for everyone destined to judge through understanding and [A 32] senses in combination (for every human being).

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the Second Moment.

Beautiful is what pleases universally without a concept.

Third Moment of Judgments of Taste According to the Relation of the Ends Taken into Consideration in Them.

10 *On Purposiveness in General.*

If we wish to explain what an end is according to its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure [220]), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a *concept* with regard to its *object* is purposiveness (*final form*). Thus where not merely the cognition of an object, but the object itself (its form or existence), as an effect, is thought as possible only through a concept of that effect, we think an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause [A 33] and precedes it. Consciousness of a representation's causality with a view to the subject's state, so as *to maintain* the subject in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for determining the state of representations into its own opposite (for restraining or removing them).

The faculty of desire, insofar as it can be determined only through concepts—that is, to act in conformity with the representation of an end—would be the will. Yet an object, a state of mind, or an action is also called purposive even when its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, merely because its possibility can be explained and comprehended by us only insofar as we assume as its ground a causality according to ends: that is, a will that would have arranged it so according to the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can therefore be without an end insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, yet can make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always need to understand through reason the possibility of what we observe. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness as regards form, even without laying an end [A 34] beneath it (as the matter of the *connection of ends*), and discern it in objects, though only through reflection.

11 [221] *The Judgment of Taste Has Nothing but the Form of Purposiveness of an Object (or of Its Mode of Representation) as Its Ground.*

Every end, when regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always carries with it an interest as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of pleasure. Thus no subjective end can underlie a judgment of taste. But neither can any representation of an objective end—that is, of the possibility of the object itself according to principles of a connection of ends—and hence no concept of the good, determine the judgment of taste. For it is an aesthetic judgment and no cognitive judgment, and thus concerns no *concept* of the character and inner or outer possibility of the object through this or that cause, but merely the mutual relation of the powers of representation insofar as they are determined through a representation.

Now in determining an object [A 35] as beautiful, this relation is connected with the feeling of a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares valid for everyone. Consequently, neither an agreeableness accompanying the representation nor the representation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good can contain its determining ground. Thus nothing but

subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end (either objective or subjective)—hence the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is *given* to us, insofar as we are conscious of it—can constitute the satisfaction that we judge, without a concept, to be universally communicable, and hence the determining ground of the judgment of taste.

12 *The Judgment of Taste Rests on Grounds a priori.*

To establish *a priori* the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure, as an effect, with any representation (sensation or concept), as its cause, is absolutely impossible. For that would be a causal relation, which (among objects of experience) can always be cognized only [222] *a posteriori* and through experience itself [A 36]. In the Critique of Practical Reason, to be sure, we actually derived the feeling of respect (as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which does not quite coincide with either the pleasure or displeasure we receive from empirical objects) from universal moral concepts *a priori*. But there we could also pass beyond the limits of experience and call upon a causality resting on a supersensible constitution of the subject, namely that of freedom. Yet even there we did not, properly speaking, derive this *feeling* from the idea of morality as its cause; only the determination of the will was derived from it. But the state of mind of a will determined by anything is already in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it; it therefore does not follow from it as an effect. The latter would have to be assumed only if the concept of morality as a good preceded the determination of the will by the law; for then one would vainly seek to derive the pleasure connected with that concept from it as a mere cognition.

Now pleasure in aesthetic judgment is similar, except that here it is merely contemplative and produces no interest in the object, whereas in moral judgment it is practical. Consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers [A 37] in a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself. For it contains a determining ground of the subject's activity in enlivening its cognitive powers, hence an inner causality

(which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general, but without restriction to a determinate cognition—and thus a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetic judgment. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like pleasure arising from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor like pleasure arising from the intellectual ground of the represented good. Yet it does contain causality: namely, to *maintain* the state of the representation itself and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further intention. We *linger* over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. This is analogous to (but not identical with) the lingering in which a charm in the representation of an object repeatedly arouses attention, while the mind is passive.

13 [223] *The Pure Judgment of Taste Is Independent of Charm and Emotion.*

Every interest corrupts the judgment of taste and deprives it of impartiality, especially when it does not, like the interest of reason, [A 38] place purposiveness before the feeling of pleasure, but grounds purposiveness on that feeling. The latter always happens in an aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it gratifies or pains us. Thus judgments affected in this way can lay no claim to universally valid satisfaction, or so much less a claim the more sensations of the kind mentioned are found among the determining grounds of taste. Taste is always still barbarous where it needs an admixture of *charms* and *emotions* for its satisfaction, or even makes these the measure of its approval.

Yet charms are often not merely counted as contributing to beauty (which should properly concern only form) as a contribution to aesthetic universal satisfaction; they are even passed off in themselves as beauties, and thus the matter of satisfaction as its form. This misunderstanding, like many others that nevertheless always have some truth at their foundation, can be removed through careful determination of these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence (although they may be combined with satisfaction in the beautiful), and which therefore has solely the purposiveness of form as its determining ground, is a *pure judgment of taste*.

14 [A 39] *Elucidation through Examples.*

Aesthetic judgments, like theoretical (logical) judgments, can be divided into empirical and pure. The first are those that assert agreeableness or disagreeableness of an object or of its mode of representation; the second, those that assert beauty. The former are judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments); the latter alone, as formal judgments, are judgments of taste in the proper sense.

224 Thus a judgment of taste is pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mingled with its determining ground. But this always happens when charm or emotion has a share in the judgment by which something is to be declared beautiful.

Now various objections arise again, which ultimately present charm not merely as a necessary ingredient of beauty, but even as sufficient by itself to be called beautiful. A mere color, for example the green of a lawn, a mere tone (as distinct from sound and noise), such as that of a violin, is declared by most people to be beautiful in itself, although both seem to have as their ground merely the matter of representations, namely sensation alone, and therefore to deserve only to be called agreeable [A 40]. But we shall also observe that sensations of color as well as tone consider themselves entitled to count as beautiful only insofar as both are *pure*. This is a determination that already concerns form, and also the only thing about these representations that can be universally communicated with certainty. For the quality of sensations themselves can hardly be assumed to agree in all subjects, or the agreeableness of one color over another, or of the tone of one musical instrument over another, to be judged in the same way by everyone.

If, with *Euler*, we assume that colors are successive, evenly timed pulses (*pulsus*) of the ether, just as tones are of the air shaken in sound, and, most importantly, that the mind perceives not merely through sense their effect on the enlivening of the organ, but also through reflection the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations)—of which I

have no doubt—then color and tone would not be mere sensations, but already a formal determination of the unity of their manifold, and could then also be counted as beauties in themselves.

But the purity of a simple kind of sensation means that its uniformity is disturbed [A 41] and interrupted by no sensation of another kind, and belongs merely to form, because in this we can abstract from the quality of that kind of sensation (whether it represents a color, and which color, or a tone, and which tone). Thus all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are considered beautiful; mixed colors do not have this [225] advantage, precisely because, since they are not simple, we have no standard for judging whether to call them pure or impure.

But as for the beauty attributed to an object on account of its form, insofar as it is thought capable of being heightened by charm, this is a common error, very detrimental to genuine, unbribed, sound taste. Certainly charms may be added alongside beauty in order, beyond dry satisfaction, to interest the mind through the representation of the object, and thus serve to recommend taste and its cultivation, especially when it is still crude and unpracticed. But they actually impair the judgment of taste when they draw attention to themselves as grounds for judging beauty. For far from contributing to it, they must rather, as strangers, be admitted indulgently when taste is still weak and unpracticed, and only insofar as they do not disturb that beautiful form.

In painting, sculpture, indeed all the formative arts, in [A 42] architecture and the art of gardens insofar as they are fine arts, *design* is essential: in it, not what gratifies in sensation, but merely what pleases through its form, constitutes the ground of every arrangement for taste. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm; they can indeed enliven the object in itself for sensation, but cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful. Rather, they are for the most part greatly restricted by what beautiful form requires, and even where charm is admitted, are ennobled by that form alone.

All form in objects of the senses (of the outer senses and, indirectly, of inner sense as well) is either *shape* or *play*; in the latter case, either a play of shapes (in space: mime and dance) or a mere play of sensations (in time). The *charm* of

colors or agreeable instrumental tones may be added, but *design* in the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of a pure judgment of taste. That the purity of colors as well as tones, or their variety and contrast, seems to contribute to beauty does not mean that, because they are agreeable in themselves, they provide, as it were, an addition of the same kind to satisfaction in form [A 43]; rather, they merely make that form more precisely, determinately, and completely [226] intuitable, and also enliven the representation through their charm by arousing and sustaining attention to the object itself.

Even what are called *ornaments* (parerga)—what belongs to the whole representation of the object not inwardly as a constituent, but only outwardly as an addition, and increases the satisfaction of taste—do so only through their form: for example, the frames of paintings, draperies on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful form, and is attached, like a gold frame, merely to recommend the painting to approval through its charm, it is then called *finery* and detracts from genuine beauty.

Emotion, a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only through a momentary inhibition followed by a stronger outpouring of the vital force, does not belong to beauty at all. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is connected), however, requires a different standard of judgment from the one taste takes as its foundation. Thus a pure judgment of taste has neither charm nor emotion—in a word, no sensation as the matter of aesthetic judgment—as its determining ground.

15 [A 44] *The Judgment of Taste Is Entirely Independent of the Concept of Perfection.*

Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by referring the manifold to a determinate end, thus only through a concept. This alone already makes clear that the beautiful, whose judging has as its ground a merely formal purposiveness—that is, purposiveness without an end—is entirely independent of the representation of the good, since the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, that is, the relation of the object to a determinate end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, that is, the *utility*, or internal, that is, the *perfection*, of the object. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it beautiful cannot rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently evident from the two preceding main sections: for then it would not [227] be an immediate satisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But an objective internal purposiveness, that is, perfection, comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held identical with beauty by eminent philosophers, though with the qualification, *when it is thought confusedly* [A 45]. In a critique of taste it is of the utmost importance to decide whether beauty can actually be resolved into the concept of perfection.

To judge objective purposiveness we always need the concept of an end and (if that purposiveness is to be internal rather than external [utility]) the concept of an internal end containing the ground of the object's inner possibility. Now just as an end in general is that whose *concept* can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, so, in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing, the concept of that thing—*what sort of thing it is supposed to be*—will come first; and the agreement of the manifold in it with this concept (which gives the rule for its combination in the thing) is the *qualitative perfection* of a thing. Entirely distinct from this is *quantitative* perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its kind: a mere concept of magnitude (of totality), in which *what the thing is supposed to be* is already thought as determined in advance, and the only question is whether *everything* required for it is present. The formal element in the representation of a thing—that is, the agreement of the manifold into one (with what it is supposed to be left undetermined)—provides [A 46] in itself no cognition of objective purposiveness whatsoever. For since we abstract from this one thing *as an end* (what the thing is supposed to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representations in the mind of the one intuiting. This does indeed indicate a certain purposiveness of the state of representation in the subject, and in the subject a comfort in apprehending a given form in the imagination; but it indicates no perfection of any object, which here is thought through no concept of an end. For example,

if I come upon a grassy clearing in the woods around which trees stand in a circle, and do not represent an end to myself—say, that it is to serve for a country dance—not the slightest concept of [228] perfection is given through the mere form. But to represent a formal *objective* purposiveness without an end, that is, the mere form of a *perfection* (without any matter or *concept* of that with which there is agreement, even if it were only the idea of lawfulness in general), is a true contradiction.

Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, that is, one resting on subjective grounds, whose determining ground cannot be a concept, and hence cannot be the concept of a determinate end either. Thus beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, by no means involves thinking a perfection of the object as a supposedly [A 47] formal yet nevertheless objective purposiveness. And the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good—as though they differed only in logical form, the first being merely a confused and the second a distinct concept of perfection, but otherwise identical in content and origin—is null. For then there would be no *specific* difference between them, and a judgment of taste would be as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment declaring something good; just as, for instance, an ordinary person who says that fraud is wrong grounds his judgment on confused principles of reason, and the philosopher on distinct ones, but both fundamentally on the same principles. Yet I have already stated that an aesthetic judgment is unique in its kind and gives absolutely no cognition (not even a confused one) of the object. Such cognition occurs only through a logical judgment; the aesthetic judgment, by contrast, refers the representation through which an object is given solely to the subject, and makes discernible no property of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation occupied with it. The judgment is called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is no concept, but the feeling (of inner sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers, insofar as it can only be felt. By contrast, if we wished to call confused concepts and the objective [A 48] judgment grounded on them aesthetic, we would have an understanding that judges sensibly, or a sense that represents its objects through concepts, both of which are contradic-

tory. The faculty of concepts, whether confused or distinct, is the understanding; and although the judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment, also requires understanding (as do all judgments), it requires it [229] not as a faculty of cognizing an object, but as a faculty of determining the judgment and its representation (without a concept) according to their relation to the subject and its inner feeling, insofar as this judgment is possible according to a universal rule.

16 *A Judgment of Taste by Which an Object Is Declared Beautiful under the Condition of a Determinate Concept Is Not Pure.*

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*unattached beauty*), or merely adherent beauty (*attached beauty*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object is supposed to be; the second presupposes such a concept and the object's perfection according to it. The kinds of the first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the other, as adhering to a concept [A 49] (conditioned beauty), is attributed to objects standing under the concept of a particular end.

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be; and even he, who recognizes in it the plant's organ of fertilization, pays no regard to this natural end when judging it through taste. Thus no perfection of any kind, no inner purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold refers, is laid at the foundation of this judgment. Many birds (the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise), and a host of sea creatures in shells, are beauties in themselves, belonging to no object determined through concepts with regard to its end, but pleasing freely and for themselves. Thus designs *in the Greek manner*, foliage for borders or on wallpaper, and so forth, signify nothing in themselves: they represent nothing, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties. We can also count what are called fantasias (without a theme) in music, indeed all music without a text, as belonging to the same kind.

In judging a free beauty (according to mere form), the judgment of taste is pure. No concept is presupposed of any end that the manifold is to serve in the given object, and hence of what [230] the object is to represent; such a concept

would only restrict the freedom of the imagination [A 50], which, as it were, plays in observing the shape.

But the beauty of a human being (and within this kind, of a man, woman, or child), the beauty of a horse or a building (as a church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse), presupposes a concept of the end determining what the thing is supposed to be, and hence a concept of its perfection; it is therefore merely adherent beauty. Now just as the combination of the agreeable (in sensation) with beauty, which properly concerns only form, prevented the purity of the judgment of taste, so the combination of the good (namely, what the manifold is good for in the thing itself according to its end) with beauty impairs its purity.

Many things that please immediately in intuition could be added to a building, if only it were not to be a church; a figure could be embellished with all sorts of flourishes and light yet regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being; and this human being could have much finer features and a more pleasing, gentler facial outline, if only he were not to represent a man, or indeed a warrior.

Now satisfaction in the manifold in a thing [A 51] in relation to the internal end determining its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept; but satisfaction in beauty presupposes no concept and is immediately connected with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). If the judgment of taste concerning the latter is made dependent on the end in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

Taste does indeed gain from this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction in that it becomes fixed: although not universally, rules can nevertheless be prescribed to it with regard to certain objects determined according to ends. But these are then no rules of taste, only rules for reconciling taste with reason—that is, the beautiful with the good—through which the former becomes usable as an instrument of the intention regarding the latter. Thus the state of mind that maintains itself and has [231] subjective universal validity can be placed beneath the way of thinking that can be maintained only through

strenuous resolve, but is objectively universally valid. Properly speaking, however, neither perfection gains through beauty nor beauty through perfection [A 52]. Rather, because, when we compare through a concept the representation through which an object is given to us with the object (with regard to what it is supposed to be), we cannot avoid at the same time comparing it with the sensation in the subject, the *entire faculty* of representation gains when both states of mind agree.

A judgment of taste concerning an object with a determinate internal end would be pure only if the person judging either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But then, although he made a correct judgment of taste by judging the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be censured and accused of false taste by someone else who considered its beauty only as an adherent property (who looked to the object's end), although both judged correctly in their way: one according to what he had before his senses, the other according to what he had in thought. Through this distinction many a dispute among judges of taste about beauty can be settled, by showing that one is concerned with free and the other with adherent beauty, the former making a pure and the latter an applied judgment of taste.

17 [A 53] *On the Ideal of Beauty.*

There can be no objective rule of taste determining through concepts what is beautiful. For every judgment from this source is aesthetic: the subject's feeling, and no concept of an object, is its determining ground. To seek a principle of taste giving the universal criterion of the beautiful through determinate concepts is a fruitless effort, because what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal communicability of sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed a communicability occurring without a concept—the greatest possible unanimity of all ages and [232] peoples concerning this feeling in the representation of certain objects—is the empirical criterion, though a weak one scarcely sufficient for conjecture, that a taste thus confirmed by examples descends from the deeply hidden ground, common to all human beings, of unanimity in judging the forms under which objects are given to them.

Hence some products of taste are regarded as *exemplary*, not as though taste could be acquired by imitating others. For taste must be a faculty of one's own; someone who imitates a model shows skill insofar as he succeeds, [A 54] but taste only insofar as he can judge this model himself.[7] From this it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea that everyone must produce within himself, and according to which he must judge everything that is an object of taste or an example of judging through taste, and even everyone's taste itself. An *idea* properly means a concept of reason, and an *ideal* the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea. Thus that archetype of taste, which admittedly rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, yet can be represented not through concepts but only in an individual presentation, is better called the ideal of the beautiful. Although we are not in possession of such an ideal, we nevertheless strive to produce it within ourselves. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it rests not on concepts but on presentation; and the faculty [A 55] of presentation is the imagination.—How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? *A priori*, or empirically? And likewise, what kind of beautiful thing is capable of an ideal?

First we must observe that the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought must not be *unattached* beauty, but beauty *fixed* through a concept of objective purposiveness. It must therefore belong not to the object of a wholly pure judgment of taste, but to one of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste [233]. That is, wherever an ideal is to occur among grounds of judging, some idea of reason according to determinate concepts must underlie it, determining *a priori* the end on which the object's inner possibility rests. An ideal of beautiful flowers, beautiful furnishings, or a beautiful view cannot be thought. But neither can an ideal be represented of a beauty adhering to determinate ends, for example a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, and so forth—presumably because the ends are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, and hence the purposiveness is almost as free as in *unattached* beauty. Only what has the end of its existence within itself—the *human being*, who through reason can determine his own ends, or, where he must draw them from outer perception, can nevertheless compare them with essential and uni-

versal ends and then [A 56] judge their agreement with those ends aesthetically as well—only this *human being*, among all objects in the world, is therefore capable of an ideal of *beauty*, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, is capable of the ideal of *perfection*.

But two elements belong to this: *first*, the aesthetic *normal idea*, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) representing the standard for judging him as a thing belonging to a particular animal species; *second*, the *idea of reason*, which makes the ends of humanity, insofar as they cannot be represented sensibly, the principle for judging his shape, through which, as their effect in appearance, those ends reveal themselves. The normal idea must take from experience its elements for the shape of an animal of a particular kind; yet the greatest purposiveness in the construction of that shape, which would be fit to serve as the universal standard for aesthetically judging each individual of this species—the image that seems to have intentionally underlain nature's technique, to which only the species as a whole, but no separate individual, is adequate—lies solely in the idea of the person judging. But this idea, with its proportions, can as an aesthetic idea be presented fully *in a concrete instance* in a model image. To make it somewhat comprehensible how this happens [A 57] (for who can wholly draw nature's secret from it?), we shall attempt a psychological explanation.

It should be noted that, in a manner wholly incomprehensible to us, the [234] imagination knows not only how, on occasion, to recall signs for concepts even from long ago, but also how to reproduce the image and shape of an object from an unspeakable number of objects of different kinds, or of one and the same kind. Indeed, when the mind undertakes comparisons, it very probably actually knows how, though not sufficiently for consciousness, to let one image fall upon another, as it were, and through the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean serving as a common measure for them all. Someone has seen a thousand adult men. If he now wishes to judge the normal stature to be estimated comparatively, the imagination (in my opinion) lets a great number of the images—perhaps all thousand—fall upon one another. And if I may apply the analogy of optical presentation here, in the space where most of them

converge, and within the outline where the area is illuminated by the most heavily applied color, the *average stature* becomes discernible, equally distant in both height and breadth from the outermost limits of the largest and smallest figures; and this is the [A 58] stature for a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained mechanically by measuring all thousand, adding their heights together, and their widths (and thicknesses) separately, and dividing the sums by a thousand. But the imagination does precisely this through a dynamic effect arising from the manifold apprehension of such shapes upon the organ of inner sense.) If in a similar way the average head is sought for this average man, the average nose for that head, and so forth, this shape underlies the normal idea of a beautiful man in the country where the comparison is made. Thus under these empirical conditions a Black person must necessarily have a different normal idea of beauty of shape from a white person, a Chinese person a different one from a European. The same would hold for the *model* of a beautiful horse or dog (of a certain breed).—This *normal idea* is not derived from proportions taken from experience *as determinate rules*; rather, only in accordance with it do rules of judging first become possible. It is the image for the whole genus hovering among all the individual intuitions of individuals differing in many ways, which nature placed as an archetype beneath its productions of the same species, [235] yet seems not to have fully attained in any individual. It is by no means [A 59] the entire *archetype* of *beauty* in this genus, but only the form constituting the indispensable condition of all beauty, hence merely *correctness* in presenting the genus. It is, as *Polykleitos's* famous *Doryphoros* was called, the *rule* (*Myron's* cow could likewise have served this purpose within its genus). For precisely this reason it can contain nothing specifically characteristic; otherwise it would not be the *normal idea* for the genus. Its presentation also pleases not through beauty, but merely because it contradicts none of the conditions under which alone a thing of this genus can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.[8]

Still distinct from the *normal idea* of the beautiful is its *ideal*, which, for the reasons already given, we may expect only in the *human figure*. Here the ideal consists in the expression of the *moral*, without which the object [A 60] would

not please universally and also positively (not merely negatively in an academically correct presentation). The visible expression of moral ideas that inwardly govern a human being can indeed be taken only from experience. But to unite these with everything our reason connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—to make goodness, purity, strength, or serenity of soul, and so forth, as it were visible in bodily expression (as the effect of what is inward)—requires pure ideas of reason and great power of imagination united in someone who would merely judge them, and still more in someone who would present them. The correctness of such an ideal [236] of beauty proves itself in this: it allows no sensory charm to mingle with satisfaction in its object, yet permits a great interest to be taken in it. This then proves that judging by such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging according to an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of [A 61] taste.

Definition of the Beautiful Concluded from This Third Moment.

Beauty is the form of the *purposiveness* of an object insofar as it is perceived in it *without the representation of an end*.[9]

Fourth Moment [A 62] *of the Judgment of Taste According to the Modality of Satisfaction in the Object.*

18 *What the Modality of a Judgment of Taste Is.*

Of every representation I can say that it is at least *possible* for it (as cognition) to be connected with a pleasure. Of what I call *agreeable*, I say that it *actually* produces pleasure in me. But the *beautiful* is thought to have a necessary relation to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity through which one can cognize *a priori* [237] that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object I call beautiful; nor a practical necessity in which, through concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is the necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one ought unconditionally (without further intention) to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*: a necessity of the assent of *all* to a judgment regarded as an example of a universal [A 63] rule that cannot be stat-

ed. Since an aesthetic judgment is no objective cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (of a thoroughgoing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience scarcely provide enough evidence for this; no concept of the necessity of these judgments can be grounded on empirical judgments.

19 *The Subjective Necessity We Attribute to a Judgment of Taste Is Conditioned.*

The judgment of taste expects everyone's assent; and whoever declares something beautiful wants everyone to approve of the object before them and likewise to declare it beautiful, as they *ought*. Thus the *ought* in an aesthetic judgment is itself pronounced only conditionally, even after all the data required for judging have been supplied. We seek everyone else's assent because we have a ground for it common to all; and we could also count on such assent if only we were always certain that the case had been correctly subsumed under that ground as [A 64] the rule of approval.

20 *The Condition of the Necessity Claimed by a Judgment of Taste Is the Idea of a Common Sense.*

If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) had a determinate objective principle, someone making them according to that [238] principle would claim unconditional necessity for his judgment. If they were without any principle, like judgments of mere sensory taste, no necessity in them would ever enter one's thoughts. Thus they must have a subjective principle that determines what pleases or displeases only through feeling, not through concepts, yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could be regarded only as a *common sense*, essentially distinct from the common understanding, which is sometimes also called common sense (*shared sense*). For the latter judges not by feeling but always according to concepts, although usually only as principles obscurely represented.

Thus only on the presupposition that there is a common sense—by which we understand no outer sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers—only on the presupposition, [A 65] I say, of such a common sense can the judgment of taste be made.

21 *Whether We Can with Reason Presuppose a Common Sense.*

Cognitions and judgments, together with the conviction accompanying them, must be universally communicable; otherwise they would have no agreement with the object. They would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to be communicable, then the state of mind—that is, the attunement of the cognitive powers for cognition in general, and indeed the proportion appropriate to a representation (through which an object is given to us) in order to make cognition out of it—must also be universally communicable. For without this, as the subjective condition of cognizing, cognition could not arise as an effect. This also actually happens whenever a given object, through the senses, sets the imagination into activity to combine the manifold, and the imagination in turn sets the understanding into activity to unite it in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the difference of the objects given. Nevertheless there must be one [A 66] in which this inner relation for enlivening one power through the other is the most beneficial for both mental powers with a view to cognition (of given [239] objects) in general; and this attunement can be determined only through feeling (not according to concepts). Now since this attunement itself must be universally communicable, and hence also the feeling of it (in a given representation), while the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, this common sense can reasonably be assumed. We need not ground ourselves for this purpose on psychological observations, but may assume it as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in every logic and every principle of cognition that is not skeptical.

22 *The Necessity of Universal Assent Thought in a Judgment of Taste Is a Subjective Necessity Represented as Objective under the Presupposition of a Common Sense.*

In all judgments by which we declare something beautiful, we allow no one to be of another opinion, although we ground our judgment not on [A 67] concepts but only on our feeling—which we thus lay at its foundation not as a private feeling, but as a shared one. Now for this purpose this common sense cannot be grounded on experience; for it seeks to authorize judgments containing an ought. It does not say that everyone *will* agree with our judgment, but that everyone *ought* to agree with it. Thus common sense, of whose judgment I here give my judgment of taste as an example, and on account of which I attribute *exemplary* validity to it, is a mere ideal norm. Under its presupposition we could rightly make a judgment agreeing with it, and the satisfaction in an object expressed in that judgment, a rule for everyone. For although the principle is merely subjective, yet, assumed as subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone), it could, with regard to the unanimity of different people judging, demand universal assent like an objective principle—if only we were certain of having subsumed correctly under it.

We do actually presuppose this indeterminate norm of a common sense: our presumption in making judgments of taste proves it. [240] Whether there is in fact such a common sense as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a still higher principle of reason makes it merely a regulative principle for us, requiring us first to produce within ourselves a common sense [A 68] for higher ends; whether, therefore, taste is an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of an artificial faculty still to be acquired, so that a judgment of taste, with its expectation of universal assent, is in fact only a demand of reason to bring about such unanimity in our manner of sensing, and the ought—that is, the objective necessity that everyone's feeling should converge with each person's particular feeling—means only the possibility of becoming of one mind in this, while the judgment of taste merely supplies an example of the application of this principle: these are questions we neither wish nor are able to investigate here as yet. For now we have only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements and finally unite them in the idea of a common sense.

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the Fourth Moment.

Beautiful is what, without a concept, is cognized as the object of a *necessary* satisfaction.

General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic.

If we draw the result from the analyses above, we find that everything comes down to this concept of taste: that it is a faculty for judging an object in relation to the [A 69] *free lawfulness* of the imagination. Now if in a judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, it is assumed, first, not as reproductive, as subject to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the author of freely chosen forms of possible intuitions). And although in apprehending a given object of the senses it is bound to a determinate form of this object, and to that extent has no free play (as in poetic invention), we can nevertheless readily conceive that the object might offer it precisely such a form, containing a [241] combination of the manifold such as the imagination, if left freely to itself, would devise in harmony with the *lawfulness of the understanding* in general. But that the *imagination should be free* and yet *lawful of itself*—that is, should carry an autonomy within it—is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. If, however, the imagination is compelled to proceed according to a determinate law, then the form of its product is determined by concepts as to what it should be; but then, as shown above, the satisfaction is not in the beautiful but in the good (in perfection, perhaps merely formal perfection), and the judgment is no judgment through taste. Thus only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective agreement of the imagination with the understanding without an objective agreement—in which the representation is referred to a determinate concept of an object—can coexist with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness without an end) and with the distinctive character of a judgment of taste.

Now geometrically regular shapes—a circle, a [A 70] square, a cube, and so forth—are commonly cited by critics of taste as the simplest and most indubitable examples of beauty. Yet they are called regular precisely because we cannot represent them otherwise than as mere presentations of a determinate concept prescribing the rule for that shape (according to which alone it is possi-

ble). Thus one of the two must be mistaken: either the critics' judgment attributing beauty to these shapes, or ours, which finds purposiveness without a concept necessary for beauty.

Hardly anyone will think that a person of taste is needed to find more satisfaction in a circular shape than in a scribbled outline, or in a quadrilateral with equal sides and angles than in a slanting, unequal, as it were deformed one; for this requires only common understanding and no taste at all. Where an intention is perceived—for example, to judge the size of a space, or to make the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole comprehensible in a division—regular shapes, and indeed the simplest kinds, are necessary. Satisfaction rests not immediately on the sight of the shape, but on its usefulness [242] for all sorts of possible intentions. A room whose walls meet at oblique angles, a garden plot of that kind, indeed every violation of symmetry in the shape of animals (for example, being one-eyed), buildings, or flower beds, displeases because it is counterpurposive—not only practically, with regard to a determinate use of these things, but also for judging them with all sorts of possible intentions. This is not the case in a judgment of taste, which, when pure, immediately connects satisfaction [A 71] or dissatisfaction with the mere *contemplation* of the object, without regard to use or an end.

Regularity leading to the concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (*a condition without which it cannot be*) for grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end with regard to cognition; and in relation to cognition it is also always connected with satisfaction (which accompanies the realization of every intention, even a merely problematic one). But then it is merely the approval of a solution that satisfies a problem, not a free and indeterminately purposive occupation of the mental powers with what we call beautiful, in which the understanding serves the imagination, and not the imagination the understanding.

In a thing possible only through an intention—a building, even an animal—the regularity consisting in symmetry must express the unity of intuition accompanying the concept of the end, and belongs to cognition. But where

only a free play of the powers of representation is to be sustained (yet on condition that the understanding suffers no affront), in pleasure gardens, interior decoration, all kinds of tasteful furnishings, and the like, regularity, which announces itself as constraint, is avoided as far as possible. Thus the English taste in gardens and the Baroque taste in furniture readily push the freedom of the imagination almost to the grotesque, and locate precisely in this separation from every constraint of rule the case in which taste can show its [A 72] greatest perfection in the imagination's designs.

Everything stiffly regular (approaching mathematical regularity) has this about it that is contrary to taste: it affords no lasting occupation in its contemplation, but, unless it [243] expressly aims at cognition or a determinate practical end, causes boredom. By contrast, what the imagination can play with uncontrivedly and purposively is always new to us, and we do not tire of looking at it. *Marsden*, in his description of Sumatra, remarks that the free beauties of nature surround the spectator everywhere there, and thus have little attraction left for him; by contrast, a pepper garden, where the poles up which the plant climbs form avenues between them in parallel lines, had much charm for him when he encountered it in the middle of a forest. From this he concludes that wild, apparently unregulated beauty pleases only as a change for someone who has had his fill of looking at regular beauty. But he need only have tried spending a day in his pepper garden to realize that, once the understanding had been attuned by regularity to the order it needs everywhere, the object would no longer occupy him, but would instead impose a burdensome constraint on the imagination. By contrast, nature there, lavish to the point of luxuriance in its manifoldness and subject to no constraint of artificial rules, could provide lasting nourishment for his taste.—Even birdsong, which we cannot bring under any musical rule, seems to contain more freedom, and therefore more for taste, than even a human song performed according to all the rules of music, because [A 73] we tire much sooner of the latter when it is repeated often and for a long time. Yet here we probably confuse our sympathy with the merriment of a little

creature we love with the beauty of its song, which, when imitated quite precisely by a human being (as sometimes happens with the nightingale's song), seems wholly tasteless to our ear.

Beautiful objects must also be distinguished from beautiful views of objects (which often, because of their distance, can no longer be distinctly recognized). In the latter, taste seems to attach not so much to what the imagination *apprehends* in this field as to what it finds occasion to *invent* there—that is, to the actual fantasies with which the mind entertains itself while continually being aroused by the manifoldness the eye encounters. This is much as in watching the changing shapes of a hearth fire or a rippling brook, neither of which is a [244] beauty, yet both carry a charm for the imagination because they sustain its free play.

4 The definition of taste laid at the foundation here is that it is the faculty for judging the beautiful. But what is required in order to call an object beautiful must be discovered by analyzing judgments of taste. I have sought the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection by following the logical functions of judging (for a judgment of taste always still contains a relation to the understanding). I have considered those of quality first, because aesthetic judgment about the beautiful attends to these first.

5 A judgment about an object of satisfaction can be entirely *disinterested* and yet very *interesting*: that is, it is grounded on no interest, but produces an interest. All pure moral judgments are of this kind. But judgments of taste in themselves ground no interest at all. Only in society does it become *interesting* to have taste; the ground of this will be indicated later.

6 An obligation to enjoy is an obvious absurdity. Thus a supposed obligation to perform all actions whose goal is merely enjoyment must be the same, however spiritual that enjoyment may be conceived (or embellished) to be, even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly enjoyment.

7 Models of taste in the verbal arts must be composed in a dead and learned language: the first, so as not to have to endure the change that inevitably befalls living languages, in which noble expressions become commonplace, ordinary ones obsolete, and newly created ones enter a circulation that lasts only briefly; the second, so that the language has a grammar subject to no willful changes of fashion, but possessing its unchanging rule.

8 We shall find that a perfectly regular face, which a painter might ask to sit as his model, generally says nothing, because it contains nothing characteristic, and thus expresses the idea of the genus more than the specific character of a person. What is exaggerated in characteristic features of this kind—that is, what impairs the normal idea itself (the purposiveness of the genus)—is called *caricature*. Experience also shows that those wholly regular faces generally betray only an average human being within; presumably (if we may assume that nature expresses inward proportions in outward ones) because, when none of the mind's predispositions stands out beyond the proportion required to constitute a merely faultless human being, nothing of what is called *genius* can be expected, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the mental powers in favor of a single one.

9 An objection to this definition might cite things in which we see a purposive form without recognizing an end: for example, the stone implements often dug out of ancient burial mounds, furnished with a hole as if for a handle. Although their shape clearly reveals a purposiveness whose end is unknown, they are nevertheless not on that account declared beautiful. But the fact that we regard them as artifacts is already enough to require us to admit that we refer their shape to some intention and a determinate end. Hence there is also no immediate satisfaction in intuiting them. A flower, by contrast—for example, a tulip—is considered beautiful because a certain purposiveness is encountered in its perception which, as we judge it, is referred to no end at all.

PART I

Analytic of the Sublime

Second Book [A 74] *Analytic of the Sublime.*

23 *Transition from the Faculty for Judging the Beautiful to That for Judging the Sublime.*

The beautiful agrees with the sublime in that both please for their own sake. Further, both presuppose neither a judgment of sense nor a logically determining judgment, but a judgment of reflection. Consequently satisfaction depends neither on a sensation, as with the agreeable, nor on a determinate concept, as with satisfaction in the good, yet is nevertheless referred to concepts, although it remains undetermined which. Thus satisfaction is linked to the mere presentation or the faculty of presentation, whereby the faculty of presentation, or imagination, in a given intuition is regarded as harmonizing with the understanding's or reason's *faculty of concepts*, as promoting the latter. Hence both kinds of judgments are also *singular* judgments that nevertheless announce themselves as universally valid with regard to every subject, although they lay claim only to the feeling of pleasure and to no cognition of the object.

But notable differences between the two are also [A 75] evident. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by contrast, can also be found in a formless object, insofar as *boundlessness* is represented in it or occasioned by it, yet its totality is also thought. Thus the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of

the understanding, the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason. Hence satisfaction in the former is connected with the representation of *quality*, in the latter with that of *quantity*. The latter satisfaction also differs greatly in kind from the former: the former (the beautiful) directly carries with it a feeling of the furtherance of life, and is therefore compatible with charms and a [245] playful imagination; the latter (the feeling of the sublime), however, is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being produced through the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers followed at once by a still stronger outpouring of them. Thus, as emotion, it seems to be not play but seriousness in the imagination's activity. Hence it is also incompatible with charms; and since the mind is not merely attracted by the object but alternately repelled by it again and again, satisfaction in the sublime contains not so much positive pleasure as admiration [A 76] or respect—that is, it deserves to be called negative pleasure.

But the most important and inward distinction between the sublime and the beautiful is surely this: if, as is fitting here, we first consider only the sublime in natural objects (for the sublime in art is always restricted by the conditions of agreement with nature), natural beauty (self-subsisting beauty) carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems, as it were, predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus constitutes in itself an object of satisfaction. By contrast, what arouses the feeling of the sublime in us, without reasoning, merely in apprehension, may in its form appear counterpurposive for our power of judgment, incommensurate with our faculty of presentation, and as it were violent to the imagination, yet is judged all the more sublime for that very reason.

But from this we see at once that we express ourselves incorrectly when we call any *object of nature* sublime, although we can quite correctly call very many of them beautiful. For how can what is apprehended as counterpurposive in itself be designated by an expression of approval? We can say no more than that the object is suited to the presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind. For the sublime proper [A 77] can be contained in no sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason; although no presentation adequate to them is

possible, they are stirred and called into the mind precisely through this inadequacy, which can be presented sensibly. Thus the vast ocean stirred up by storms cannot be called sublime. Its sight is dreadful; and the mind must already have been filled with various ideas [246] if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself sublime, as the mind is incited to leave sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher purposiveness.

Self-subsisting natural beauty reveals to us a technique of nature that represents nature as a system according to laws whose principle we do not find in our entire faculty of understanding: namely, a purposiveness relative to the use of judgment with regard to appearances, so that these must be judged as belonging not merely to nature in its purposeless mechanism, but also to an analogy with art. Thus it actually extends, not indeed our cognition of natural objects, but our concept of nature as mere mechanism to the concept of that same nature as art, which invites profound investigations into the possibility of such a form. But in what we commonly call sublime in nature [A 78], there is so little that leads to particular objective principles and forms of nature conforming to them that nature instead arouses the ideas of the sublime most strongly in its chaos, or in its wildest, most unregulated disorder and devastation, provided only that magnitude and power are apparent. From this we see that the concept of the sublime in nature is far less important and rich in consequences than the concept of the beautiful in nature; and that it indicates nothing purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible *use* of its intuitions to make a purposiveness within ourselves, wholly independent of nature, felt. For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely within ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature. This is a very necessary preliminary remark, which wholly separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of *nature* and makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging of nature's purposiveness. For through it no particular form in nature is represented; rather, only a purposive use that the imagination makes of its representation is developed.

24 [A 79] [247] *On the Division of an Investigation of the Feeling of the Sublime.*

As regards the division of the moments of aesthetic judging of objects in relation to the feeling of the sublime, the analytic can proceed according to the same principle as in the analysis of judgments of taste. For as a judgment of aesthetic reflective judgment, satisfaction in the sublime, just as in the beautiful, must represent itself as universally valid in *quantity*, without interest in *quality*, subjective purposiveness in *relation*, and this latter as necessary in *modality*. In this respect, then, the method will not depart from that of the preceding section—unless one counts it as a difference that there, where the aesthetic judgment concerned the form of the object, we began by investigating quality, whereas here, given the formlessness that can belong to what we call sublime, we shall begin with quantity as the first moment of aesthetic judgment about the sublime. The ground for this can be seen from the preceding §.

But the analysis of the sublime needs a division not required by the analysis of the beautiful: namely, into the *mathematically* and the *dynamically sublime*.

For the feeling of the sublime carries as its characteristic a *movement* of the mind connected with judging the [A 80] object, whereas taste for the beautiful presupposes and maintains the mind in *calm* contemplation. But this movement is to be judged subjectively purposive (since the sublime pleases); thus it is referred through the imagination either to the *faculty of cognition* or to the *faculty of desire*. In both relations, however, the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only with regard to these *faculties* (without end or interest). The first is then attributed to the object as a *mathematical*, the second as a *dynamical* attunement of the imagination, and the object is consequently represented as sublime in this twofold manner.

A. [248] *On the Mathematically Sublime.*

25 *Nominal Definition of the Sublime.*

We call *sublime* what is *absolutely great*. But being great and being a magnitude are entirely different concepts (*greatness* and *quantity*). Likewise, *simply saying* that something is great is quite different from saying that it is *absolutely great* [A 81] (*great absolutely, not comparatively*). The latter is what is *great beyond*

all comparison.—But what does the expression that something is great, small, or middling mean? What it designates is no pure concept of the understanding, still less an intuition of sense, and just as little a concept of reason, since it carries no principle of cognition with it. It must therefore be a concept of the power of judgment, or descend from one, and have as its ground a subjective purposiveness of the representation in relation to judgment. That something is a magnitude (*a quantity*) can be cognized from the thing itself without any comparison with others: namely, when a multiplicity of homogeneous elements together constitutes one thing. But *how great* it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude, as its measure. Since, however, in judging magnitude what matters is not merely multiplicity (number), but also the magnitude of the unit (the measure), and the magnitude of the latter always in turn needs something else as a measure with which it can be compared, we see that all determination of the magnitude of appearances can supply absolutely no absolute concept of a magnitude, but always only a comparative concept.

Now when I simply say that something is great, it seems that I have no comparison in mind at all, at least with no [A 82] objective measure, since how great the object is remains entirely undetermined. But although the standard of comparison is merely subjective, the judgment nevertheless claims universal assent. The judgments "the man is beautiful" and "he is tall" are not restricted merely to the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgments, demand everyone's assent.

249 But since a judgment designating something simply as great is intended to say not merely that the object has a magnitude, but also to attribute that magnitude to it as a distinction over many others of the same kind, without determinately specifying this superiority, a standard is certainly laid at its foundation. We presuppose that we can assume this standard to be the same for everyone, yet it is usable not for any logical (mathematically determinate) judging of magnitude, but only for aesthetic judging, since it is a merely subjective standard underlying judgment as it reflects on magnitude. It may, moreover, be empirical, such as the average size of the human beings known to us, animals of a cer-

tain kind, trees, houses, mountains, and the like; or a standard given *a priori*, which, through deficiencies in the judging subject, is restricted to subjective conditions of presentation in a concrete instance—as, in the practical sphere, the greatness of a certain virtue, or of public freedom and justice in a country; [A 83] or, in the theoretical sphere, the degree of correctness or incorrectness of an observation or measurement, and the like.

Here it is remarkable that, even if we have no interest at all in the object—that is, its existence is indifferent to us—its mere magnitude, even when it is considered formless, can nevertheless carry a satisfaction with it that is universally communicable, and hence contains consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties. But this is not a satisfaction in the object, as with the beautiful (for it may be formless), where reflective judgment finds itself purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general; rather, it is satisfaction in the expansion of the imagination in itself.

When we say simply of an object (under the restriction mentioned above) that it is great, this is not a mathematically determining judgment but a mere reflective judgment upon its representation, which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in estimating magnitude. We then always connect a kind of respect with the representation, just as we connect contempt with what we call simply small. Moreover, judging things as great or small extends to everything, even to all their qualities; hence we call even beauty great or small. [250] The reason for this is that whatever we may present in intuition according to the prescription of the power of judgment [A 84] (and thus represent aesthetically) is, without exception, appearance, and therefore also a quantum.

But when we call something not merely great but absolutely great, great without qualification and in every respect (beyond all comparison), that is, sublime, we soon see that we permit no standard adequate to it to be sought outside it, but only within it. It is a magnitude equal to itself alone. It follows that the sublime is to be sought not in the things of nature but solely in our ideas; in which of these it lies must, however, be reserved for the deduction.

The explanation above may also be expressed as follows: *Sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small.* Here we readily see that nothing can be given in nature, however great we judge it, that could not, viewed in another relation, be diminished to the infinitely small; and conversely, nothing is so small that, compared with still smaller standards, it could not expand for our imagination to the magnitude of a world. Telescopes have furnished abundant material for the first observation, microscopes for the second. Nothing, therefore, that can be an object of the senses can, considered on this [A 85] footing, be called sublime. But precisely because our imagination contains a striving to advance to infinity, while our reason lays claim to absolute totality as a real idea, the very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of things in the sensible world to this idea awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty within us. And it is the use that the power of judgment naturally makes of certain objects on behalf of this latter feeling, not the object of the senses, that is absolutely great, while every other use is small in comparison. Thus it is the disposition of mind brought about by a certain representation occupying the reflective power of judgment, and not the object, that must be called sublime.

We can therefore add to the preceding formulas explaining the sublime this further one: *Sublime is that which, even to be able to think it, proves a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of the senses.*

26 [251] *On the estimation of the magnitude of natural things required for the idea of the sublime.*

The estimation of magnitude through numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical; that in mere intuition (by the eye) is aesthetic. Now we can obtain determinate concepts of [A 86] *how great* something is only through numbers (or at least approximations through numerical series continuing to infinity), whose unit is the measure; and to this extent every logical estimation of magnitude is mathematical. But since the magnitude of the measure must itself be assumed as known, if this in turn were to be estimated only through numbers whose unit would have to be another measure, and thus mathematically, we could never have a first or fundamental measure, and conse-

quently no determinate concept of a given magnitude. The estimation of the magnitude of the fundamental measure must therefore consist simply in our being able to grasp it immediately in an intuition and use it through the imagination to present numerical concepts: that is, every estimation of the magnitude of natural objects is ultimately aesthetic (that is, determined subjectively and not objectively).

Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is indeed no greatest magnitude (for the power of numbers extends to infinity); but for aesthetic estimation there certainly is a greatest. Of this I say that, when it is judged as an absolute measure beyond which none greater is subjectively possible (for the judging subject), it carries with it the idea of the sublime and produces an emotion that no mathematical estimation of magnitudes through numbers can bring about (except insofar [A 87] as that aesthetic fundamental measure is kept alive in the imagination). For the latter always presents only relative magnitude through comparison with others of the same kind, whereas the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in a single intuition.

To take a quantum intuitively into the imagination, so as to use it as a measure or unit for estimating magnitude through numbers, requires two acts of this faculty: *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) and *comprehension* (*comprehensio aesthetica*). Apprehension presents no difficulty, for it can proceed to [252] infinity; but comprehension grows more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for estimating magnitude. For when apprehension has advanced so far that the partial representations of sensible intuition first apprehended are already beginning to fade in the imagination while it advances to apprehend further ones, it loses on one side just as much as it gains on the other, and comprehension has a greatest limit beyond which it cannot go.

This explains what *Savary* observes in his accounts of Egypt: that one must come neither too close to the pyramids nor remain too far away to receive the full emotion [A 88] of their magnitude. For in the latter case the parts apprehended (their stones piled one above another) are represented only obscurely,

and their representation has no effect on the subject's aesthetic judgment. In the former case, however, the eye needs some time to complete its apprehension from base to summit; during this time the earlier apprehensions always partly fade before the imagination has taken in the later ones, and comprehension is never complete.—The same consideration may also suffice to explain the bewilderment, or sort of perplexity, said to overcome the spectator on first entering St. Peter's in Rome. Here there is a feeling of the inadequacy of one's imagination to present the idea of a whole; in this the imagination reaches its maximum and, in striving to extend it, sinks back into itself, yet is thereby brought into an affecting satisfaction.

I shall say nothing yet about the ground of this satisfaction, which is connected with a representation from which one would least expect it—one, namely, that makes us aware of the inadequacy, and thus the subjective contrapurposiveness, of the representation for the power of judgment in estimating magnitude. I observe only that, if the aesthetic judgment is to be *pure* (*unmixed with any teleological judgment* as a judgment of reason [A 89]), and an example is to be given that fully suits the critique of the *aesthetic* power of judgment, the sublime must be exhibited not in products of art (buildings, columns, and so on), where a human end determines both form and magnitude, nor in natural things *whose concept already carries a determinate end with* [253] *it* (animals whose natural vocation is known, for example), but in raw nature—and even here only insofar as it carries no charm of its own, or emotion arising from actual danger—simply insofar as it contains magnitude. For in this manner of representation nature contains nothing monstrous (nor anything magnificent or dreadful); the magnitude apprehended may have grown as great as one pleases, provided the imagination can still comprehend it in a whole. An object is *monstrous* when by its magnitude it destroys the end constituting its concept. But the mere presentation of a concept that is almost too great for any presentation (bordering on the relatively monstrous) is called *colossal*, because the end of presenting a concept is made difficult by the object's intuition being almost too great for our faculty of apprehension.—A pure judgment on the sublime,

however, must have no end of the object whatever as its determining ground if it is to be aesthetic [A 90] and not mingled with any judgment of understanding or reason.

Since everything that is to please the merely reflective power of judgment without interest must carry in its representation a subjective purposiveness, and one universally valid as such, yet here no purposiveness of the object's *form* (as in the beautiful) underlies the judging, the question arises: what is this subjective purposiveness? And through what is it prescribed as a norm, so as to supply a ground for universally valid satisfaction in the mere estimation of magnitude—and indeed in an estimation carried to the point where our faculty of imagination proves inadequate to present the concept of a magnitude?

In the composition required to represent magnitude, the imagination advances of itself to infinity without encountering any hindrance; but the understanding guides it through numerical concepts, for which the imagination must supply the schema. In this procedure, which belongs to the logical estimation of magnitude, there is indeed something objectively purposive according to the concept of an end (as every measurement is), but nothing purposive and pleasing for the aesthetic power of judgment. Nor is there anything in this intentional purposiveness that [A 91] [254] would require us to drive the magnitude of the measure, and thus the *comprehension* of the manifold in a single intuition, to the limit of the imagination's capacity, as far as it can possibly reach in its presentations. For in the understanding's estimation of magnitudes (arithmetic) we get just as far whether we carry the comprehension of units to the number 10 (in the decimal system) or only to 4 (in the quaternary system), and then generate further magnitude, in composition—or, if the quantum is given in intuition, in apprehension—merely progressively (not comprehensively), according to an adopted principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude, the understanding is equally well served and satisfied whether the imagination chooses as its unit a magnitude we can grasp at a glance, such as a foot or a rod, or a German mile, or even the earth's diameter, which the imagination can indeed apprehend but cannot comprehend in a sin-

gle intuition (not through *comprehensio aesthetica*, although certainly through *comprehensio logica* in a numerical concept). In either case the logical estimation of magnitude proceeds unhindered to infinity.

But now the mind listens within itself to the voice of reason, which demands totality for all given magnitudes, even those that can never be entirely apprehended but are nevertheless judged (in sensible representation) [A 92] as entirely given. It therefore demands comprehension in *one* intuition and a *presentation* for all those members of a progressively increasing numerical series; nor does it exempt even the infinite (space and elapsed time) from this demand, but rather makes it unavoidable to think of this (in the judgment of common reason) as *given whole* (in its totality).

The infinite, however, is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. Compared with it, everything else (among magnitudes of the same kind) is small. But most importantly, even being able to think it as *a whole* indicates a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of the senses. For this would require a comprehension supplying, as its unit, a standard that stood in a determinate, numerically expressible relation to the infinite—which is impossible. Yet *even to be able to think* the given infinite without contradiction requires in the human mind a faculty that is itself supersensible. For only through this faculty and [255] its idea of a noumenon—which itself admits of no intuition, but is nevertheless laid as a substrate beneath the intuition of the world as mere appearance—is the infinite of the sensible world comprehended *whole under* a concept in the purely intellectual estimation of magnitude, [A 93] although in mathematical estimation it can never be thought as a whole *through numerical concepts*. Even a faculty for being able to think the infinite of supersensible intuition as given (in its intelligible substrate) surpasses every standard of sensibility and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation; admittedly not in a theoretical respect, for the sake of the cognitive faculty, but still as an expansion of the mind, which feels itself capable of crossing the boundaries of sensibility in another respect (the practical).

Nature is therefore sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of its infinity. This can occur only through the inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in estimating an object's magnitude. Now in mathematical estimation the imagination is equal to any object, so as to supply a sufficient measure for it, because the understanding's numerical concepts can, through progression, make any measure adequate to any given magnitude. It must therefore be in the *aesthetic* estimation of magnitude that we feel the effort at comprehension, exceeding the imagination's capacity, to grasp progressive apprehension within a whole of intuition, and at the same time perceive the inadequacy of this [A 94] faculty, unlimited in its progression, to grasp and employ a fundamental measure suited to estimating magnitude with the least expenditure of understanding. Now nature's true, unchanging fundamental measure is its absolute whole, which, in nature as appearance, is infinity comprehended. But since this fundamental measure is a self-contradictory concept (because an absolute totality of a progression without end is impossible), that magnitude of a natural object upon which the imagination fruitlessly expends its entire capacity for comprehension must lead the concept of nature to a supersensible substrate (underlying both nature and our faculty of thought). This is great beyond every standard of the senses, and thus allows us to judge not so much [256] the object as the disposition of mind in estimating it as *sublime*.

Thus, just as in judging the beautiful the aesthetic power of judgment relates the imagination in its free play to the *understanding*, so as to accord with its *concepts* in general (without determining them), so in judging a thing as sublime it relates the same faculty to *reason*, so as to accord subjectively with its *ideas* (without determining which). That is, it brings about a disposition of mind conformable to and compatible with the disposition that [A 95] the influence of determinate (practical) ideas upon feeling would produce.

From this we also see that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, not in the natural object whose judging occasions this disposition. Who would call shapeless mountain masses, towering above one another in wild disorder with their pyramids of ice, or the gloomy, raging sea,

and so on, sublime? Yet the mind feels itself uplifted in judging them when, contemplating them without regard to their form, it surrenders itself to the imagination and to a reason connected with it without any determinate end, merely to enlarge it, and nevertheless finds the imagination's entire power inadequate to reason's ideas.

Examples of the mathematically sublime in nature, in mere intuition, are supplied by all those cases in which the imagination is given not so much a greater numerical concept as a great unit to serve as a measure (to shorten the numerical series). A tree that we estimate by a person's height may provide a standard for a mountain; and if the mountain were, say, a mile high, it could serve as the unit for the number expressing the earth's diameter, to make the latter intuitive; the earth's diameter could serve for the planetary system known to us, [A 96] this in turn for the Milky Way. And the immeasurable multitude of such Milky Way systems, known as nebulae, which presumably form yet another such system among themselves, leaves us expecting no limits here. Now in the aesthetic judging of so immeasurable a whole, the sublime lies not so much in the magnitude of the number as in our reaching ever greater units as we advance. The systematic division of the universe [257] contributes to this, continually representing everything great in nature as small in turn; more properly, it represents our imagination in all its boundlessness, and nature with it, as vanishing in comparison with reason's ideas when it is to provide a presentation adequate to them.

27 *On the quality of the satisfaction in judging the sublime.*

The feeling of our faculty's inadequacy to attain an idea *that is a law for us* is *respect*. Now the idea of comprehending every appearance that may be given to us in the intuition of a whole is one imposed upon us by a law of reason, which recognizes no other determinate, universally valid, and unchanging measure than the absolute whole. [A 97] But our imagination, even in its greatest effort to comprehend a given object in a whole of intuition, as demanded of it (and thus to present reason's idea), demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, yet at the same time its vocation to bring about adequacy to this idea as a law. The feeling

of the sublime in nature is therefore respect for our own vocation, which by a certain subreption we render to an object of nature (mistaking respect for the idea of humanity in our own subject for respect for the object). This makes, as it were, intuitively evident to us the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculties over the greatest faculty of sensibility.

The feeling of the sublime is therefore a feeling of displeasure arising from the inadequacy of the imagination, in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude, to estimation by reason, and at the same time a pleasure awakened by the agreement of this very judgment of the inadequacy of our greatest sensible faculty with ideas of reason, insofar as striving toward them is nevertheless a law for us. For it is a law (of reason) for us, and belongs to our vocation, to estimate everything that nature, as an object of the senses, contains that is great for us as small in comparison with ideas of reason; and whatever stirs within us the feeling of this supersensible [A 98] vocation accords with that law. [258] Now the imagination's greatest effort to present the unit for estimating magnitude is a relation to something *absolutely great*, and consequently also a relation to reason's law that this alone be adopted as the supreme measure of magnitudes. Thus the inner perception of the inadequacy of every sensible standard to reason's estimation of magnitude is an accord with reason's laws, and a displeasure that stirs in us the feeling of our supersensible vocation, according to which it is purposive, and therefore a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility inadequate to the ideas of reason.

In representing the sublime in nature, the mind feels itself *moved*, whereas in its aesthetic judgment upon nature's beauty it remains in *calm* contemplation. This movement may be compared (especially at its beginning) to a tremor, that is, to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to the very same object. What exceeds the imagination's capacity (to which it is driven in apprehending intuition) is, as it were, an abyss in which it fears losing itself; yet for reason's idea of the supersensible it is not excessive but lawful to produce such an effort of the imagination: [A 99] hence it is attractive again to precisely the degree that it was repellent to mere sensibility. Yet the judgment itself always remains merely aesthetic, because, without grounding itself on a determinate

concept of the object, it represents only the subjective play of the mental powers (imagination and reason) as harmonious even through their contrast. For just as imagination and *understanding* produce subjective purposiveness of the mental powers through their accord in judging the beautiful, so imagination and *reason* here produce it through their conflict: namely, a feeling that we possess pure, independent reason, or a faculty for estimating magnitude whose superiority can be made intuitive only through the insufficiency of the faculty that, in presenting magnitudes (of sensible objects), is itself unlimited.

Measuring a space (as apprehension) is at the same time describing it, and thus an objective movement in the imagination and a progression; comprehending the manifold in the unity not of thought but of intuition, and thus what has been successively apprehended in a single instant, is, by contrast, a regression that cancels the temporal condition in [259] the imagination's progression and makes *coexistence* intuitive. It is therefore (since temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of the [A 100] imagination by which it does violence to inner sense, a violence that must be all the more noticeable the greater the quantum that imagination comprehends in a single intuition. Thus the effort to take into a single intuition a measure of magnitudes whose apprehension requires an appreciable time is a manner of representation that, considered subjectively, is contrapurposive, but objectively is required for estimating magnitude and is therefore purposive. Yet the very same violence done to the subject through the imagination is judged purposive *for the mind's entire vocation*.

The *quality* of the feeling of the sublime is that it is a feeling of displeasure concerning the aesthetic faculty of judging an object, a displeasure nevertheless represented in that judgment as purposive. This is possible because our own incapacity discloses the consciousness of an unlimited capacity in the same subject, and the mind can judge the latter aesthetically only through the former.

In the logical estimation of magnitude, the impossibility of ever reaching absolute totality by advancing in the measurement of things in the sensible world, in time and space, was recognized as objective, that is, as an impossibility of *thinking* the infinite as given, and not as merely [A 101] subjective, that is, as an

inability to *grasp* it. For there no regard whatever is paid to the degree of comprehension in a single intuition as a measure; everything depends on a numerical concept. But in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude, the numerical concept must fall away or be altered, and the imagination's comprehension into the unity of a measure (thus avoiding concepts of a law for the successive generation of concepts of magnitude) is alone purposive for it.—Now when a magnitude almost reaches the utmost limit of our capacity to comprehend in a single intuition, yet the imagination is challenged by numerical magnitudes (for which we are conscious of our faculty as unlimited) to aesthetic comprehension in a still greater unit, we feel ourselves aesthetically confined within limits in our mind. Yet the displeasure, with regard to the necessary expansion of the imagination into adequacy with what is unlimited in our faculty of reason, namely the [260] idea of the absolute whole—and thus the contrapurposiveness of the imagination's faculty—is nevertheless represented as purposive for the ideas of reason and their awakening. Precisely thereby, however, the aesthetic judgment itself becomes subjectively purposive for reason as the source of ideas, that is, of an intellectual comprehension in comparison with which every aesthetic comprehension is small; and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure [A 102] possible only through a displeasure.

B. On the dynamically sublime in nature.

28 *On nature as a power.*

Power is a capacity superior to great obstacles. This same capacity is called *dominion* when it is superior even to the resistance of something that itself possesses power. Nature, considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us, is *dynamically sublime*.

If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as arousing fear (although, conversely, not every object that arouses fear is found sublime in our aesthetic judgment). For in aesthetic judging (without a concept), superiority over obstacles can be judged only by the magnitude of the resistance. Now what we strive to resist is an evil, and, if we find our capacity

unequal to it, an object of fear. Thus for the aesthetic power of judgment, nature can count as a power, and hence as dynamically sublime, only insofar as it is regarded as an object of fear. [A 103]

But we can regard an object as *fearful* without being *afraid* of it, namely when we judge it in such a way that we merely *think* of the case in which we might wish to resist it, and recognize that all resistance would then be utterly in vain. Thus the virtuous person fears God without being afraid of him, because wishing to resist him and his commandments is not a case *he* apprehends [261] for himself. Yet in every such case, which he thinks of as not intrinsically impossible, he recognizes God as fearful.

Someone who is afraid cannot judge the sublime in nature at all, any more than someone possessed by inclination and appetite can judge the beautiful. The former flees the sight of an object that inspires dread; and it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously felt. Hence the agreeableness arising when a trouble ceases is *relief*. But relief at deliverance from a danger is a relief accompanied by the resolve never to expose oneself to it again; indeed, one does not even like to think back upon that sensation, much less seek out the occasion for it.

Bold, overhanging, almost threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the [A 104] sky and advancing with lightning and crashing thunder, volcanoes in all their destructive force, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean in revolt, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, and the like reduce our capacity for resistance to an insignificant trifle beside their power. But their sight becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in safety; and we gladly call these objects sublime because they raise the soul's strength above its accustomed measure and disclose within us a capacity for resistance of an entirely different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against nature's seeming omnipotence.

For just as in nature's immeasurability and our inability to find a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its *domain* we found our own limitation, yet at the same time in our faculty of reason found another, nonsensible standard, which includes that infinity itself under itself as a

unit, and beside which everything in nature is small—thus finding in our mind a superiority over nature even in its immeasurability—so too the irresistibility of nature's power, while making us recognize our physical impotence as natural beings, [A 105] also discloses a capacity to judge ourselves independent of it, and a superiority over nature on which rests a self-preservation of an entirely different kind from that which nature outside us can assail and endanger. [262] In this, humanity in our person remains undiminished, although the human being would have to succumb to that dominion. In this way nature is judged sublime in our aesthetic judgment not insofar as it arouses fear, but because it summons our strength (which is not nature) within us to regard the things we care about (possessions, health, and life) as small, and consequently to regard its power—to which we are certainly subject in these matters—as nevertheless having no such dominion over us and our personality that we would have to bow before it when our highest principles and their maintenance or abandonment were at stake. Thus nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to present those cases in which the mind can make felt the sublimity of its own vocation even above nature.

This self-esteem loses nothing through our having to find ourselves safe in order to feel this inspiring satisfaction, and thus through the possibility that, because the danger is not serious, the sublimity of our mental faculty might likewise (as it could seem) not be serious. [A 106] For the satisfaction here concerns only the *vocation* of our faculty disclosed in such a case, just as the predisposition to it lies in our nature; its development and exercise, however, remain entrusted to us and incumbent upon us. And there is truth in this, however conscious a person may be of his present actual impotence when he extends his reflection so far.

This principle may indeed seem too far-fetched and overreasoned, and thus beyond the scope of an aesthetic judgment; but observation of humanity proves the contrary, and shows that it can underlie the most ordinary judgments, although we are not always conscious of it. For what is an object of the greatest admiration even to the savage? A person who is not terrified, who is not afraid, and thus does not yield to danger, yet at the same time sets vigor-

ously to work with full deliberation. Even in the most civilized condition this exceptional esteem for the warrior remains; only we further demand that he also display all the virtues of peace—gentleness, compassion, and even a fitting care for his own person—precisely because these reveal that danger cannot subdue his mind. Thus however much people may dispute, in comparing the statesman with the general, which deserves the higher [A 107] [263] esteem, aesthetic judgment decides for the latter. Even war, when conducted with order and sacred respect for civil rights, has something sublime about it, and makes the way of thinking of the people who conduct it in this manner all the more sublime, the more dangers they have faced and courageously withstood. A long peace, by contrast, tends to make the mere spirit of commerce dominant, and with it base self-interest, cowardice, and softness, thereby degrading the people's way of thinking.

Against this explanation of the concept of the sublime, insofar as sublimity is ascribed to power, there seems to stand our custom of representing God in thunderstorms, tempests, earthquakes, and the like as showing himself in his wrath, yet also in his sublimity; for imagining a superiority of our mind over the effects, and seemingly even over the intentions, of such a power would be both folly and sacrilege. Here it seems that not a feeling of the sublimity of our own nature, but rather submission, dejection, and a feeling of utter impotence would be the disposition of mind appropriate to the appearance of such an object, and ordinarily connected with its idea on the occasion of such natural events. In religion generally, prostration, [A 108] worship with bowed head, contrite and fearful gestures and voices, seems the only fitting conduct in the presence of the Deity; hence most peoples have adopted it and still observe it. Yet this disposition of mind is by no means intrinsically and necessarily connected with the idea of the *sublimity* of a religion and its object. A person who is genuinely afraid because he finds cause within himself—conscious that his reprehensible disposition sets him against a power whose will is irresistible and also just—is in no state of mind to admire divine greatness, which requires a disposition toward calm contemplation and an entirely free judgment. Only when he is conscious of his sincere disposition pleasing to God do those effects

of power serve to awaken in him the idea of this being's sublimity, insofar as he recognizes in himself a sublimity of disposition conforming to its will, and is thereby raised above fear of those effects of nature, which he does not regard as outbreaks [264] of its wrath. Even humility, as an unsparing judgment of one's faults—which, with the consciousness of good dispositions, might otherwise easily be cloaked under the frailty of human nature—is a sublime disposition of mind: voluntarily [A 109] to submit to the pain of self-reproach in order gradually to eradicate its cause. Only in this way does religion differ inwardly from superstition. The latter grounds in the mind not reverence for the sublime, but fear and dread before an overpowering being to whose will the terrified person sees himself subjected without nevertheless esteeming it. From this, of course, nothing can arise but the courting of favor and flattery in place of a religion of good conduct.

Thus sublimity is contained in no thing in nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and thereby also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us). Everything that arouses this feeling in us, including the power of nature that challenges our strength, is then called sublime (though improperly); and only by presupposing this idea within us and referring to it are we capable of reaching the idea of the sublimity of that being which inspires deep respect in us not merely through the power it displays in nature, but still more through the capacity placed within us to judge that power without fear and to think of our vocation as sublime above it.

29 [A 110] *On the modality of the judgment on the sublime in nature.*

There are countless things in beautiful nature concerning which we can directly demand that everyone's judgment agree with ours, and can also expect this without much risk of error; but we cannot so readily promise ourselves that our judgment on the sublime in nature will find acceptance with others. For it seems to require a far greater cultivation not only of the aesthetic power of judgment but also of the cognitive faculties underlying it, if one is to pass judgment upon this excellence of natural objects.

265 The mind's disposition toward the feeling of the sublime requires a receptivity to ideas. For it is precisely in nature's inadequacy to these—and thus only in presupposing them and straining the imagination to treat nature as a schema for them—that what repels sensibility, yet is at the same time attractive, consists: because this is a force reason exerts upon sensibility solely to enlarge it into conformity with reason's proper domain (the practical), and to let it look out toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss. Indeed, without the development of moral ideas, what we, prepared through cultivation, [A 111] call sublime will appear merely repellent to the uncultivated person. In the proofs of nature's force in its destructiveness, and the vast scale of its power beside which his own vanishes into nothing, he will see only the hardship, danger, and distress that would surround anyone confined there. Thus the good and otherwise sensible Savoyard peasant (as Mr. de Saussure relates) unhesitatingly called all lovers of the icy mountains fools. Who knows whether he would have been so entirely wrong, had that observer undertaken the dangers to which he exposed himself there merely from enthusiasm, as most travelers do, or to be able someday to give impassioned descriptions of them? But his intention was to instruct humanity; and the excellent man felt the soul-elevating sensation himself and gave it to the readers of his travels as a bonus.

Yet because judgment on the sublime in nature requires cultivation (more than judgment on the beautiful), it is not thereby first produced by cultivation, or introduced into society merely by convention. Rather, it has its foundation in human nature, and specifically in something that, together with sound understanding, we may demand and require of everyone: namely, the predisposition [A 112] to feeling for (practical) ideas, that is, to moral feeling.

On this rests the necessity that others' judgment of the sublime agree with ours, a necessity we include in our own judgment. For just as we charge someone who is indifferent in judging a natural object we find beautiful with a lack of *taste*, so we say that someone who remains unmoved by what we judge sublime has no *feeling*. Yet we demand both of every person and also presuppose them in anyone [266] who has some cultivation, with this difference alone: the former, because in it the power of judgment relates the imagination merely to the

understanding as the faculty of concepts, we demand outright of everyone; the second, because in it judgment relates the imagination to reason as the faculty of ideas, we demand only under a subjective presupposition (which we nevertheless believe ourselves entitled to require of everyone), namely that of moral feeling in the human being. In this way we also ascribe necessity to this aesthetic judgment.

In this modality of aesthetic judgments, namely the necessity they claim, lies a principal moment for the critique of the power of judgment. For precisely this makes an a priori principle recognizable in them and lifts them out of empirical psychology, where they would otherwise remain buried [A 113] among the feelings of pleasure and pain (with only the meaningless epithet of a *finer* feeling). It thus places them, and through them the power of judgment, among those that have *a priori* principles as their foundation, and as such draws them into transcendental philosophy.

General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments.

In relation to the feeling of pleasure, an object is to be counted either as *agreeable*, or *beautiful*, or *sublime*, or *good* (absolutely) (*iucundum*, *pulchrum*, *sublime*, *honestum*).

The *agreeable*, as an incentive of desires, is always of one and the same kind, whatever its source and however specifically different the representation (of sense and sensation, considered objectively) may be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, all that matters is the quantity of charms (simultaneous and successive), and as it were only the mass of agreeable sensation; it can therefore be made intelligible only through *quantity*. Nor does it cultivate, but belongs to mere enjoyment.—The *beautiful*, by contrast, requires the representation of a certain *quality* of the object, one that can also be made intelligible and brought under concepts (although in aesthetic judgment it is not brought under them); and it cultivates by teaching us at the same time to attend to purposiveness in the feeling of pleasure.—The *sublime* consists merely in the *relation* in which [A 114] [267] the sensible, in the representation of nature, is judged suitable for a possible supersensible use.—The *absolutely good*, judged subjectively according to the feeling it inspires (the object of moral feeling), as

the determinability of the subject's powers through the representation of an *absolutely necessitating* law, is distinguished chiefly by the *modality* of a necessity resting on *a priori* concepts, which contains not merely a *claim* to everyone's assent but a *command* for it. In itself it belongs not to the aesthetic but to the purely intellectual power of judgment; nor is it ascribed to nature, but to freedom, in a judgment that is determining, not merely reflective. But the *determinability of the subject* through this idea—and indeed of a subject capable of feeling within itself *obstacles* in sensibility, yet also superiority over sensibility through overcoming them, as a *modification of its state*—that is, moral feeling, is nevertheless so far akin to the aesthetic power of judgment and its *formal conditions* that it can serve to represent the lawfulness of action from duty as aesthetic at the same time, that is, as sublime or even as beautiful, without sacrificing its purity. This would not occur if one sought to bring it into a natural connection with the feeling of the agreeable.

If we draw the result from the preceding exposition of both kinds of aesthetic judgment, the following brief explanations emerge:

Beautiful is what pleases in mere judging (thus not through the sensation of sense according to a concept of the understanding). [A 115] It follows of itself that it must please without any interest.

Sublime is what pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the senses.

Both, as explanations of universally valid aesthetic judging, refer to subjective grounds: on the one hand, grounds of sensibility insofar as they are purposive on behalf of the contemplative understanding; on the other, insofar as they are purposive against sensibility, but for the ends of practical reason—both nevertheless united in the same subject in relation to moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it even against our (sensible) interest.

268 The sublime may be described in this way: it is an object (of nature) *whose representation determines the mind to think of nature as unable to attain an adequate presentation of ideas*.

Taken literally and considered logically, ideas cannot be presented. But when we expand our empirical faculty of representation (mathematically or dynamically) for the intuition of nature, reason inevitably enters as the faculty of the independence of absolute totality, and produces the mind's effort, though a vain one, to make the representation of the senses adequate to this totality. This effort, and the feeling that the idea is unattainable by the imagination, is itself a presentation of our mind's subjective purposiveness in employing the imagination for its supersensible vocation, and compels us subjectively to *think* nature itself in its totality as the presentation of something supersensible, [A 116] without being able to accomplish this presentation *objectively*.

For we soon become aware that nature in space and time wholly lacks the unconditioned, and thus also absolute magnitude, which even the most ordinary reason nevertheless demands. This also reminds us that we are dealing only with nature as appearance, and that this itself must still be regarded as the mere presentation of a nature in itself (which reason holds in the idea). But this idea of the supersensible—which we cannot further determine, and thus cannot *cognize* nature as its presentation but can only *think* it—is awakened in us by an object whose aesthetic judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion (mathematically) or of its power over the mind (dynamically). This judging rests on the feeling of a vocation of the mind that wholly exceeds the domain of the imagination (moral feeling), in regard to which the object's representation is judged subjectively purposive.

Indeed, a feeling for the sublime in nature can hardly be thought without connecting with it a disposition of mind similar to the disposition for moral feeling. And although immediate pleasure in the beautiful in nature likewise presupposes and cultivates a certain *liberality* of thought, that is, independence of satisfaction from mere sensory enjoyment, it nevertheless represents freedom more in *play* than in a lawful *occupation*. The latter is the [269] true character of human morality, where reason must do violence to sensibility; only in the aesthetic judgment on [A 117] the sublime this violence is represented as exercised by the imagination itself, as an instrument of reason.

Satisfaction in the sublime in nature is therefore only *negative* (whereas satisfaction in the beautiful is *positive*): namely, a feeling of the imagination's deprivation of its freedom by its own act, in being purposively determined according to a law other than that of empirical use. Through this it gains an expansion and power greater than what it sacrifices, but whose ground is hidden from it; instead it *feels* the sacrifice or deprivation and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected. The *astonishment* bordering on terror, the dread and sacred shudder that seize the spectator at the sight of mountain masses rising toward heaven, deep chasms with waters raging in them, deeply shadowed wildernesses inviting melancholy reflection, and so on, are, in the safety he knows himself to enjoy, not actual fear. They are only an attempt to engage with it through the imagination, in order to feel that same faculty's power to unite the movement of mind thereby aroused with its state of rest, and thus to be superior to nature within ourselves, and consequently also to nature outside us insofar as it can influence our feeling of well-being. For the imagination according to the law of association makes our state of contentment physically dependent; but the same imagination according to principles of the power of judgment's schematism (and thus insofar as it is subordinated to freedom) is an instrument of reason and its ideas, and as such a power to maintain our independence against natural influences, to diminish as small what by the former reckoning is great, and thus to place the [A 118] absolutely great only in its own (the subject's) vocation. This reflection of the aesthetic power of judgment, raising itself into adequacy with reason (yet without a determinate concept of reason), represents the object itself as nevertheless subjectively purposive through the objective inadequacy of the imagination, in its greatest expansion, to reason (as the faculty of ideas).

Here we must attend throughout to what was already noted above: in the transcendental aesthetic of the power of judgment, [270] only pure aesthetic judgments must be at issue. Consequently, examples must not be drawn from beautiful or sublime objects of nature that presuppose the concept of an end; for then the purposiveness would either be teleological or rest upon mere sensations of an object (pleasure or pain), and thus in the first case would not be aes-

thetic, and in the second would not be merely formal. Thus when we call the sight of the starry heavens *sublime*, we must not base our judging on concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, taking the bright points with which we see the space above us filled as their suns, moving in orbits most purposively arranged for them. We must take it simply as we see it, as a vast vault embracing everything; and only under this representation must we place the sublimity that a pure aesthetic judgment ascribes to this object. Likewise, we must be able to find the sight of the ocean sublime not as we *think* it when enriched with all manner of knowledge (which is not contained in immediate intuition)—say, as a vast realm of aquatic creatures, as the great reservoir for the vapors that [A 119] fill the air with clouds for the benefit of the land, or as an element that indeed separates continents but nevertheless makes the greatest intercourse among them possible, for these yield nothing but teleological judgments. Rather, we must take the ocean merely as poets do, according to what meets the eye: when contemplated at rest, perhaps, as a clear mirror of water bounded only by the sky; but when turbulent, as an abyss threatening to engulf everything, and yet find it sublime. The same must be said of the sublime and beautiful in the human figure, where we must not look back to concepts of the ends *for which* all its limbs exist as determining grounds of judgment, or allow agreement with them to *influence* our aesthetic judgment (which would then no longer be pure), although their not conflicting with those ends is certainly a necessary condition even of aesthetic satisfaction. Aesthetic purposiveness is the lawfulness of the power of judgment in its *freedom*. Satisfaction in the object depends on the relation in which we wish to place the imagination, provided only that it maintains the mind in free activity by itself. If, by contrast, something else, whether sensory sensation or a concept of understanding, [271] determines the judgment, it is indeed lawful, but not the judgment of a *free* power of judgment.

Thus when one speaks of intellectual beauty or sublimity, *first*, these expressions are not entirely correct, because these are aesthetic ways of representing that would not be found in us at all if we were merely pure intelligences (or even placed ourselves in thought in that condition). *Second*, although both, as

objects of an [A 120] intellectual (moral) satisfaction, are compatible with aesthetic satisfaction insofar as they *rest* upon no interest, they are nevertheless difficult to reconcile with it in another respect, because they are to *produce* an interest. If the presentation is to accord with satisfaction in aesthetic judging, this could never occur there except through an interest of the senses connected with it in the presentation; but this impairs and contaminates intellectual purposiveness.

The object of a pure and unconditional intellectual satisfaction is the moral law in the power it exercises within us over each and every incentive of the mind *preceding it*. And since this power really makes itself aesthetically recognizable only through sacrifices (which are a deprivation, although for the sake of inner freedom, yet disclose within us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty, with consequences extending beyond all reckoning), satisfaction is negative from the aesthetic side (in relation to sensibility), that is, opposed to this interest, but positive when considered from the intellectual side, and connected with an interest. It follows that the intellectual good, purposive in itself (the morally good), must, when judged aesthetically, be represented not so much as beautiful as sublime, so that it awakens the feeling of respect (which disdains charm) rather than love and familiar affection; because human nature accords with that good not so much of its own accord as through the violence reason does to sensibility. Conversely, what we call sublime in nature outside us, or even within us (certain affects, for example), is represented only as a [A 121] power of the mind to rise above *certain* obstacles of sensibility through moral principles, and becomes interesting in this way.

I shall dwell a little on this last point. The idea of the good accompanied by [272] affect is called *enthusiasm*. This state of mind seems sublime, so much so that people commonly assert that nothing great can be accomplished without it. But every affect[10] is blind, either in its choice of end or, even if reason has supplied the end, in its execution; for it is that movement of mind which renders it incapable of freely deliberating upon principles so as to determine itself by them. Thus it can in no way merit reason's satisfaction. Aesthetically, nevertheless, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is a straining of our powers through

ideas that give the mind an impetus far more powerful and lasting than the impulse of sensory representations. But (strange as this seems) even *freedom from affect* (*Apatheia, Phlegma in significatu bono*—apathy, phlegm in the good sense) in a mind vigorously [A 122] pursuing its unchanging principles is sublime, and indeed in a far more excellent way, because it also has the satisfaction of pure reason on its side. Such a disposition alone is called noble: an expression later applied also to things, such as buildings, clothing, literary style, bodily bearing, and the like, when these arouse not so much *astonishment* (affect at the representation of novelty exceeding expectation) as *admiration* (an astonishment that does not cease when novelty is lost). This occurs when ideas in their presentation accord unintentionally and artlessly with aesthetic satisfaction.

Every affect of the *vigorous kind* (that is, one that awakens the consciousness of our powers to overcome every resistance—*animi strenui*, of a courageous mind) is *aesthetically sublime*: anger, for example, and even despair (namely *indignant*, not *despondent*, despair). An affect of the *melting* kind, however (which makes the very effort to resist an object of displeasure—*animum languidum*, a languishing mind), has nothing *noble* [273] about it, but may be counted among the beauties of a disposition. Hence the *emotions* that can grow to the strength of affect are also very different. There are *courageous* emotions and *tender* ones. The latter, if they rise to affect, are good for nothing; the propensity toward them is called *sentimentality*. A sympathetic grief that will not be consoled, or one to which we deliberately surrender when it concerns fictitious evils, allowing fantasy to deceive us into treating them as real, reveals and produces a soft but also weak soul. Such a soul shows a beautiful side and may indeed be called fanciful, but not even enthusiastic. Novels, tearful plays, [A 123] insipid moral precepts that toy with so-called noble sentiments (though falsely so called), but in fact enervate the heart and make it insensible to the stern prescription of duty, incapable of any respect for the dignity of humanity in our person and for human rights (something quite different from human happiness), and incapable of any firm principles at all; even religious preaching that recommends groveling, base courting of favor and flattery, sur-

rendering all trust in our own capacity to resist the evil within us, instead of a vigorous resolve to try the powers that remain to us despite all our frailty in overcoming inclinations; the false humility that finds in self-contempt, in whining, feigned repentance, and in a merely passive state of mind the only way to please the supreme being—all these are incompatible even with what might be counted as beauty of disposition, and far less with what might be counted as its sublimity.

But even tempestuous movements of mind, whether connected under the name of edification with religious ideas, or, as belonging merely to cultivation, with ideas containing a social interest, can by no means claim the honor of a *sublime* presentation, however greatly they strain the imagination, unless they leave behind a disposition of mind that influences, even if only indirectly, the consciousness of its strength and resolve toward what carries purely intellectual purposiveness with it (the supersensible). Otherwise all these emotions belong only to the *exercise* we welcome for the sake of health. The agreeable exhaustion that [A 124] follows such a shaking through the play of affects is an enjoyment [274] of well-being arising from the restored balance of the various vital powers within us. In the end it amounts to the same thing as the enjoyment the sensualists of the Orient find so comfortable when they have their bodies kneaded, as it were, and all their muscles and joints gently pressed and bent; only in the former case the moving principle is largely within us, while in the latter it is entirely outside us. Thus many a person believes himself edified by a sermon although nothing has been built up within him (no system of good maxims), or improved by a tragedy although he is merely glad to have happily dispelled his boredom. The sublime must therefore always have a relation to the *way of thinking*, that is, to maxims securing supremacy for the intellectual and for ideas of reason over sensibility.

We need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such an abstract manner of presentation, which becomes wholly negative with regard to the sensible; for although the imagination finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can hold, it nevertheless feels itself unbounded precisely through this removal of its barriers. That separation is therefore a presentation

of the infinite, which for this very reason can never be anything but a merely negative presentation, yet still expands the soul. Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish book of law than the commandment: "You shall not make for yourself an image, nor any likeness of what is in heaven, or on the earth, or under the earth," and so on. This commandment alone can explain the enthusiasm the Jewish people felt for their religion in their civilized epoch when comparing themselves with other peoples, or the pride that Mohammedanism [A 125] inspires. The same holds for the representation of the moral law and the predisposition to morality within us. It is an entirely mistaken fear that, if we deprive this representation of everything that can commend it to the senses, it would then carry with it only cold, lifeless approval, and no moving power or emotion. The very reverse is true: for where the senses now see nothing before them, yet the unmistakable and indelible idea of morality remains, it would be more necessary to moderate the impetus of an unbounded imagination, lest it rise to enthusiasm, than to seek help for these ideas in images and childish trappings out of fear that they lack strength. Hence governments [275] have also gladly allowed religion to be richly furnished with such accessories, and have thus sought to deprive their subjects of the trouble, but also of the capacity, to extend their spiritual powers beyond the limits one arbitrarily wishes to set for them, and through which one can manage them more easily as merely passive beings.

This pure, soul-elevating, merely negative presentation of morality, by contrast, brings no danger of *fanaticism*, which is *a delusion of wishing to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility*, that is, to dream according to principles (to rave with reason), precisely because the presentation in the former case is merely negative. For *the inscrutability of the idea of freedom* completely bars the way to every positive presentation; the moral law, however, is in itself sufficiently and originally determining within us, so that it does not even permit us to look for a determining ground outside it. If [A 126] enthusiasm may be compared with *delirium*, fanaticism may be compared with *delusional insanity*, which of all things is least compatible with the sublime, because it is broodingly ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an affect, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as an

ingrained, brooding passion, it is without rules. The former is a passing accident that may sometimes befall the soundest understanding; the latter is a disease that deranges it.

Simplicity (artless purposiveness) is, as it were, nature's style in the sublime, and so too the style of morality, which is a second (supersensible) nature. Of this we know only the laws, without being able to reach through intuition the supersensible faculty within ourselves that contains the ground of this legislation.

It should further be noted that, although satisfaction in the beautiful, just as in the sublime, is distinguished from other aesthetic judgments not only by universal *communicability*, but also acquires through this property an interest in relation to society (in which it can be communicated), nevertheless *separation from all society* is also regarded as something sublime when it rests on ideas that look beyond every sensible interest. To be sufficient to oneself, and thus not to need society, yet without being unsociable, that is, fleeing it, is something approaching the sublime, as is every elevation above needs. By contrast, to flee people from *misanthropy*, because one bears them hostility, [276] or from *anthropophobia* (fear of people), because one fears them as enemies, is in part hateful and in part contemptible. Yet there is a misanthropy (very improperly so called), a predisposition toward which [A 127] often appears with age in the minds of many well-disposed people. It is philanthropic enough as regards *benevolence*, but long, sad experience has carried it far from *satisfaction* in human beings. Evidence of this is the inclination toward seclusion, the fanciful wish to spend one's life with a small family on a remote country estate, or even (among the young) the dreamed-of happiness of an island unknown to the rest of the world, which novelists and writers of Robinsonades know so well how to exploit. Falsehood, ingratitude, injustice, the childishness of the ends we ourselves consider important and great, in pursuit of which people inflict every conceivable evil upon one another, stand in such contradiction to the idea of what they could be if they wished, and so oppose the lively desire to see them better, that, in order not to hate them when one cannot love them, renouncing all social pleasures seems only a small sacrifice. This sadness—not over the evils fate inflicts on other people (of which sympathy is the cause), but over those

they inflict on themselves (which rests on antipathy in principles)—is sublime because it rests on ideas, whereas the former can likewise count only as beautiful.—*Saussure*, as insightful as he is thorough, says in his account of his Alpine travels concerning *Bonhomme*, one of the Savoyard mountains: "A certain *insipid sadness* reigns there." He therefore also knew an *interesting* sadness, inspired by the sight of a wilderness to which people might wish to withdraw in order to hear [A 128] and learn nothing more of the world, yet which must not be so entirely inhospitable that it offers human beings only a life of extreme hardship.—I make this remark solely to recall that even sorrow (not dejected sadness) may be counted among the *vigorous* affects when it has its ground in moral ideas; but when founded on sympathy, and lovable as such, it belongs only among the *melting* affects. My purpose is thereby to draw attention to the disposition of mind that is *sublime* only in the first case. [277]

We may now compare the transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments just completed with the physiological exposition developed by a *Burke* and many acute thinkers among us, to see where a merely empirical exposition of the sublime and beautiful leads. *Burke*[11], who deserves to be named the foremost author in this manner of treatment, arrives by this path (p. 223 of his work) at the conclusion "that the feeling of the sublime rests on the drive for self-preservation and on *fear*, that is, a pain which, because it does not go so far as actually to disrupt the bodily parts, produces movements capable of arousing agreeable sensations by clearing the finer or coarser vessels of dangerous and troublesome obstructions; not indeed pleasure, but a kind of pleasing shudder, a certain tranquility mingled with [A 129] terror." The beautiful, which he grounds on love (from which he nevertheless wishes desire to be separated), he traces (pp. 251–252) "to the relaxation, release, and slackening of the body's fibers, and thus a softening, dissolution, exhaustion, a sinking, dying away, and melting with pleasure." He then confirms this explanation not only through cases in which the imagination in connection with the understanding, but even through cases in which sensory sensation, can arouse in us the feeling both of the beautiful and of the sublime.—As psychological observations, these analyses of the phenomena of our mind are exceedingly fine and supply rich material

for the favorite inquiries of empirical anthropology. Nor can it be denied that all representations in us, whether objectively merely sensible or wholly intellectual, can nevertheless be connected subjectively with pleasure or pain, however imperceptible either may be (because they all affect the feeling of life, and none, insofar as it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent). We may even grant, as Epicurus maintained, that *pleasure* and *pain* are ultimately always bodily, whether they begin with the imagination or even with representations of the understanding: because life without the [278] feeling of the bodily organ would be merely consciousness of one's existence, but no feeling of well-being or ill-being, that is, of the furtherance or inhibition of vital powers; for the mind by itself is wholly life (the principle of life itself), and hindrances or furtherances must be sought outside it yet within the human being, and thus in its connection with the body.

But if satisfaction in an object is placed entirely [A 130] in its gratifying us through charm or emotion, then we must not require *anyone else* to assent to the aesthetic judgment *we* pass; for on that matter everyone rightly consults only his private sense. But then all censure of taste also ceases entirely, unless we made the example others give through the accidental agreement of their judgments into a *command* for our assent. We would presumably resist such a principle, appealing to the natural right to submit a judgment resting on the immediate feeling of our own well-being to our own sense, not that of others.

Thus if a judgment of taste must count not as *egoistic* but necessarily as *pluralistic* by its inner nature—that is, for its own sake, not for the sake of the examples others give of their taste—if we esteem it as a judgment entitled at the same time to demand everyone's assent, then some *a priori* principle (whether objective or subjective) must underlie it. This can never be reached by tracking down empirical laws of changes in the mind, because these reveal only how we judge, but do not command how we ought to judge, and indeed in such a way that the command is *unconditional*. Yet judgments of taste presuppose just this, in seeking to have satisfaction connected *immediately* with a representation. Thus an empirical exposition of aesthetic judgments may well make the beginning by supplying material for a higher investigation; a transcendental elucidation of

this faculty is nevertheless possible and belongs essentially to the critique of taste. [A 131] For unless taste had *a priori* principles, it could not possibly assess others' judgments and pronounce approval or rejection upon them with even some appearance of right.

What remains belonging to the analytic of the aesthetic power of judgment contains, first of all, the

[10] *Affects* are specifically distinct from *passions*. The former refer merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty of desire and are inclinations that make any determination of choice through principles difficult or impossible. The former are tempestuous and unintentional, the latter enduring and deliberate: thus indignation as anger is an affect, but as hatred (vengefulness) a passion. The latter can never, in any relation, be called sublime: because in affect the mind's freedom is indeed *hindered*, but in passion it is abolished.

[11] According to the German translation of his work: Philosophical Inquiries into the Origin of Our Concepts of the Beautiful and Sublime. Riga, Hartknoch, 1773.

PART I

Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments

Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments. [279]

30 *The deduction of aesthetic judgments concerning the objects of nature must be directed not to what we call sublime in nature, but only to the beautiful.*

An aesthetic judgment's claim to universal validity for every subject requires, as a judgment that must rest upon some *a priori* principle, a deduction (that is, a legitimation of its pretension) in addition to its exposition, when it concerns a satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the *form of the object*. Judgments of taste on the beautiful in nature are of this kind. For then purposiveness does have its ground in the object and its shape, even though it does not indicate the object's relation to other objects according to concepts (for a cognitive judgment), but concerns merely the apprehension of this form insofar as it shows itself suited in the mind to the *faculty* both [A 132] of concepts and of their presentation (which is one and the same as the faculty of apprehension) in general. Hence concerning the beautiful in nature we can also raise various questions about the cause of this purposiveness of its forms: for example, how one would explain why nature has so lavishly spread beauty everywhere, even on the ocean floor, where the human eye (for which alone it is nevertheless purposive) only rarely reaches, and so forth.

But the sublime in nature—when we pass a pure aesthetic judgment upon it, unmixed with concepts of perfection as objective purposiveness, in which case it would be a teleological judgment—can be regarded as entirely formless or shapeless and yet as an object of pure satisfaction, and can display subjective purposiveness in the given representation. The question now arises whether an aesthetic judgment of this kind can also require, beyond the exposition of what is thought in it, a deduction of its claim to some (subjective) *a priori* principle.

280 The answer is that the sublime in nature is so called only improperly, and must properly be ascribed solely to our way of thinking, or rather to its foundation in human nature. The apprehension of an [A 133] otherwise formless and contrapurposive object merely provides the occasion for becoming conscious of this foundation; the object is thus *used* in a subjectively purposive way, but is not judged as such *in itself* and for the sake of its form (a *species finalis accepta, non data*, as it were—a purposive form assumed, not given). Hence our exposition of judgments on the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduction. For when we analyzed the reflection of the power of judgment within them, we found a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties that must be laid *a priori* at the foundation of the faculty of ends (the will), and is therefore itself purposive *a priori*. This at once contains the deduction, that is, the justification of such a judgment's claim to universally necessary validity.

We shall therefore have to seek only the deduction of judgments of taste, that is, judgments on the beauty of natural things, and so satisfy the task for the entire aesthetic power of judgment as a whole.

31 *On the method of the deduction of judgments of taste.*

The obligation to provide a deduction, that is, a guarantee of legitimacy, for a kind of judgment arises only when the judgment lays claim to [A 134] necessity. This is also the case when it demands subjective universality, that is, everyone's assent, although it is not a cognitive judgment but only a judgment of pleasure or displeasure in a given object, that is, a claim to a subjective purposiveness valid throughout for everyone, which is to rest on no concepts of the thing, because it is a judgment of taste.

Since in the latter case we have before us no cognitive judgment—neither a theoretical one grounding itself on the concept of *nature* in general through the understanding, nor a (pure) practical one grounding itself on the idea of *freedom* as given *a priori* through reason—and thus have to justify in its *a priori* validity neither a judgment representing what a thing is nor one stating that I ought to do something to produce it, we need establish only the *universal validity* of a [281] *singular* judgment expressing the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation of an object's form for the power of judgment in general. This will explain how something can please merely in being judged (without sensory sensation or concept), and how, just as judging an object for the sake of *cognition* in general has universal rules, so also the [A 135] satisfaction of each person may be announced as a rule for every other.

Now if this universal validity is not to rest upon collecting votes and questioning others about their manner of feeling, but, as it were, on an autonomy of the subject judging the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), that is, on his own taste, yet is also not to be derived from concepts, then such a judgment —as a judgment of taste actually is—has a twofold and indeed logical peculiarity: *first*, universal validity a priori, yet not a logical universality according to concepts, but the universality of a singular judgment; *second*, a necessity (which must always rest on *a priori* grounds) that nevertheless depends on no *a priori* grounds of proof whose representation could compel the assent that the judgment of taste demands of everyone.

Resolving these logical peculiarities, by which a judgment of taste differs from all cognitive judgments—if we initially abstract here from its entire content, namely the feeling of pleasure, and compare only its aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments as prescribed by logic—will alone suffice for the deduction of this remarkable faculty. We shall therefore first present these characteristic properties of taste, illustrated by [A 136] examples.

32 *First peculiarity of the judgment of taste.*

The judgment of taste determines its object with regard to satisfaction (as beauty), claiming *everyone's* assent as though it were objective.

To say "This flower is beautiful" is tantamount merely to repeating the flower's own [282] claim to everyone's satisfaction. Through the agreeableness of its fragrance it has no claims at all. This fragrance delights one person and gives another a headache. What else should one infer from this but that beauty must be held to be a property of the flower itself, which does not adapt itself to the diversity of heads and so many senses, but to which these must adapt themselves if they wish to judge it? And yet this is not how matters stand. For precisely this constitutes the judgment of taste: it calls a thing beautiful only according to that quality in which it adapts itself to our manner of receiving it.

Moreover, every judgment that is to prove the subject's taste requires the subject to judge for himself, without needing [A 137] to grope about through experience among others' judgments and first learn from their satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the same object. Thus he is to pronounce his judgment not as an imitation, because a thing happens actually to please universally, but *a priori*. Yet one would think that an *a priori* judgment must contain a concept of the object for whose cognition it contains the principle; but a judgment of taste is not grounded on concepts at all, and is by no means cognition, but only an aesthetic judgment.

Hence a young poet cannot be dissuaded from his conviction that his poem is beautiful by the judgment of the public or even of his friends. If he listens to them, it is not because he now judges it differently, but because his desire for approval gives him reason to accommodate himself (even against his own judgment) to the common delusion, even if the whole public had false taste (at least in his view). Only later, when his power of judgment has been sharpened through practice, does he voluntarily abandon his earlier judgment, just as he does with judgments resting wholly on reason. Taste lays claim merely to autonomy. To make others' judgments the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy.

That the works of the ancients are rightly commended as models, and [A 138] their authors called classical, like a certain nobility among writers who give the people laws through their example, seems to indicate *a posteriori* sources of taste and to refute its autonomy in every subject. Yet one could just as well

[283] say that the ancient mathematicians, still regarded as indispensable models of the utmost thoroughness and elegance of the synthetic method, also prove that reason on our side is imitative, and incapable of producing strict proofs from itself with the greatest intuitive clarity through constructing concepts. There is no use of our powers, however free it may be—even of reason (which must draw all its judgments from the common *a priori* source)—that would not fall into faulty attempts if every subject always had to begin entirely from the raw predisposition of his nature, unless others had preceded him with their own attempts. They do so not to make their successors mere imitators, but through their procedure to set others on the path of seeking the principles within themselves and thus taking their own, often better, course. Even in religion, where everyone must certainly draw the rule of his conduct from himself, because he also remains responsible for it and cannot shift the blame for his transgressions [A 139] onto others as teachers or predecessors, universal precepts—whether received from priests or philosophers or drawn from oneself—will never accomplish as much as an example of virtue or holiness. Presented in history, such an example does not make dispensable the autonomy of virtue arising from one's own original idea of morality (*a priori*), or turn it into a mechanism of imitation. *Following*, which refers to a precedent, not imitation, is the proper expression for all the influence the products of an exemplary author can have upon others. It means only this: drawing from the same sources from which he himself drew, and learning from one's predecessor only how to proceed in doing so. But of all faculties and talents, taste is precisely the one that, because its judgment cannot be determined through concepts and precepts, most needs examples of what has longest retained approval as cultivation advances, lest it soon grow uncouth again and relapse into the crudity of its first attempts.

33 [A 140] [284] *Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste.*

The judgment of taste cannot be determined by grounds of proof at all, just as though it were merely *subjective*.

If someone does not find a building, a view, or a poem beautiful, then, *first*, a hundred voices all praising it highly cannot force their approval upon him inwardly. He may indeed pretend that it pleases him too, so as not to be considered tasteless; he may even begin to doubt whether he has sufficiently cultivated his taste by acquaintance with enough objects of a certain kind (as someone who believes he sees a forest in the distance where everyone else sees a town doubts the judgment of his own sight). Yet he clearly sees that others' approval supplies no valid proof for judging beauty; that others may indeed see and observe on his behalf, and that what many have seen in the same way can serve him, who believes he saw it differently, as sufficient proof for a theoretical and thus logical judgment, but that what has pleased others can never serve as the ground of an aesthetic judgment. The unfavorable judgment of others may indeed rightly make us doubtful about [A 141] our own, but can never convince us of its incorrectness. Thus there is no empirical *ground of proof* by which to compel a judgment of taste from anyone.

Second, still less can an *a priori* proof according to determinate rules determine a judgment on beauty. If someone reads me his poem, or takes me to a play that ultimately fails to suit my taste, he may cite *Batteux* or *Lessing*, or still older and more celebrated critics of taste, and all the rules they have established, to prove that his poem is beautiful; certain passages that displease me may even accord perfectly well with rules of beauty (as given there and universally acknowledged): I stop my ears, wish to hear no reasons or reasonings, and would sooner assume those critics' rules to be false, or at least that this is not a case for applying them, than allow my judgment to be determined through *a priori* grounds of proof, [285] since it is to be a judgment of taste and not of understanding or reason.

This seems to be one of the principal reasons why this aesthetic faculty of judging has been given precisely the name of taste. For someone may enumerate all the ingredients [A 142] of a dish and remark of each that I otherwise find it agreeable, and may rightly praise the wholesomeness of the food besides; yet I am deaf to all these reasons, try the dish on *my own* tongue and palate, and judge accordingly (not according to universal principles).

In fact, a judgment of taste is always made as a singular judgment of the object. By comparing the object in respect of what is pleasing with the judgment of others, the understanding can make a universal judgment—for example, all tulips are beautiful; but this is then not a judgment of taste but a logical judgment, which makes an object's relation to taste a predicate of things of a certain kind in general. Only the judgment through which I find a single given tulip beautiful, that is, my satisfaction in it universally valid, is a judgment of taste. Its peculiarity, however, consists in this: although it has merely subjective validity, it nevertheless lays claim to *all* subjects as fully as could ever occur if it were an objective judgment resting on grounds of cognition and capable of being compelled through a proof.

34 [A 143] *No objective principle of taste is possible.*

By a principle of taste one would understand a fundamental proposition under whose condition one could subsume the concept of an object and then conclude by inference that it is beautiful. But this is absolutely impossible. For I must feel pleasure immediately in its representation, and no grounds of proof can talk me into it. Thus although critics, as *Hume* says, can reason more plausibly than cooks, they nevertheless share the same fate. They can expect the determining ground of their judgment not from the force of proofs, but only from the [286] subject's reflection upon his own state (of pleasure or displeasure), rejecting all precepts and rules.

What critics nevertheless can and should reason about, so as to correct and enlarge our judgments of taste, is not the setting forth of the determining ground of this kind of aesthetic judgment in a universally usable formula, which is impossible, but the investigation of the cognitive faculties and their activities in these judgments, and the elucidation through examples of their reciprocal subjective purposiveness, [A 144] whose form in a given representation has been shown above to be the beauty of its object. Thus the critique of taste is itself only subjective with regard to the representation through which an object is given to us: namely, it is the art or science of bringing under rules the reciprocal relation of understanding and imagination in the given representa-

tion (without reference to a preceding sensation or concept), and thus their accord or discord, and of determining this relation with regard to its conditions. It is an *art* when it shows this only through examples; a *science* when it derives the possibility of such judging from the nature of these faculties as cognitive faculties in general. Here we are concerned throughout solely with the latter, as transcendental critique. It is to develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an *a priori* principle of the power of judgment. Critique as art seeks merely to apply the physiological (here psychological), and thus empirical, rules according to which taste actually proceeds (without reflecting on their possibility) to the judging of its objects, and criticizes the products of fine art, just as *the former* criticizes the very faculty of judging them.

35 [A 145] *The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.*

The judgment of taste differs from the logical judgment in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, whereas the former does not subsume it under a concept at all, since otherwise the necessary universal assent could be compelled through proofs. Nevertheless it resembles the latter in claiming a universality and [287] necessity, though not according to concepts of the object, and consequently a merely subjective one. Now since concepts in a judgment constitute its content (what belongs to cognition of the object), while a judgment of taste cannot be determined through concepts, it rests only upon the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty of judging itself, or the power of judgment. Employed with regard to a representation through which an object is given, this requires the accord of two powers of representation: imagination (for the intuition and the composition of its manifold) and understanding (for the concept of the representation of the unity of this composition). Since no concept of the object underlies the judgment here, it can consist only in subsuming the imagination [A 146] itself (in a representation through which an object is given) under the condition that the understanding in general proceeds from intuition to concepts. That is, since the imagination's freedom

consists precisely in schematizing without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of imagination in its *freedom* and understanding with its *lawfulness*, mutually animating one another; thus upon a feeling that allows the object to be judged according to the purposiveness of the representation (through which an object is given) for furthering the cognitive faculties in their free play. And taste, as subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, but not of intuitions under *concepts*: rather, of the *faculty* of intuitions or presentations (that is, imagination) under the faculty of concepts (that is, understanding), insofar as the former *in its freedom* accords with the latter *in its lawfulness*.

To discover this ground of legitimacy through a deduction of judgments of taste, only the formal peculiarities of this kind of judgment, and thus only insofar as their logical form is considered, can serve as our guide.

36 [A 147] *On the task of a deduction of judgments of taste.*

With the perception of an object, the concept of an object in general, of which that perception contains the empirical [288] predicates, can be immediately connected in a cognitive judgment, thereby producing a judgment of experience. Now underlying this are *a priori* concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition, so as to think it as the determination of an object; and these concepts (the categories) require a deduction, which was also given in the Critique of Pure Reason. Through this the solution to the problem could also be achieved: How are synthetic cognitive judgments *a priori* possible? This problem therefore concerned the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.

But a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a satisfaction can also be connected immediately with a perception, accompanying the representation of the object and serving it in place of a predicate; thus an aesthetic judgment arises that is not a cognitive judgment. Such a judgment, if it is not a mere judgment of sensation but a formal judgment of reflection demanding this satisfaction of everyone as necessary, must have something underlying it as an *a priori* principle, [A 148] which may indeed be merely subjective (if an objective one should

be impossible for this kind of judgment), but even as such requires a deduction, so that we may comprehend how an aesthetic judgment can lay claim to necessity. On this now rests the problem with which we are presently concerned: How are judgments of taste possible? This problem therefore concerns the *a priori* principles of the pure power of judgment in *aesthetic* judgments, that is, in judgments where it does not (as in theoretical ones) merely have to subsume under objective concepts of understanding and stand under a law, but where it is subjectively both object and law to itself.

This problem can also be presented as follows: How is a judgment possible that, merely from *one's own* feeling of pleasure in an object, independently of its concept, judges this pleasure *a priori*—that is, without having to await others' assent—as attached to the representation of the same object *in every other subject*?

That judgments of taste are synthetic is easy to see, because they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, adding as a predicate something that is not even cognition, namely the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). But that, although the predicate (of *one's own* pleasure connected with the representation) is empirical, [A 149] they are nevertheless *a priori* judgments, or wish to be taken as such, with regard to the assent demanded *of everyone*, [289] is likewise already contained in the expressions of their claim. Thus this problem of the critique of the power of judgment belongs under the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?

37 *What, precisely, is asserted a priori about an object in a judgment of taste?*

That the representation of an object is immediately connected with a pleasure can be perceived only inwardly, and if one wished to indicate nothing more than this, it would yield a merely empirical judgment. For I cannot connect a determinate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) *a priori* with any representation, except where an *a priori* principle determining the will underlies it in reason. There pleasure (in moral feeling) is its consequence, but for precisely that reason cannot be compared at all with pleasure in taste, because it requires a determinate concept of a law, whereas the latter is to be connected immediately

with mere judging, prior to any concept. Hence all judgments of taste are also singular judgments, [A 150] because they connect their predicate of satisfaction not with a concept but with a given singular empirical representation.

Thus it is not pleasure, but the *universal validity of this pleasure*, perceived as connected in the mind with the mere judging of an object, that is represented *a priori* in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for everyone. It is an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is an *a priori* judgment that I find it beautiful, that is, that I may demand that satisfaction of everyone as necessary.

38 *Deduction of judgments of taste.*

If it is granted that in a pure judgment of taste satisfaction in the object is connected with the mere judging of its form, then it is nothing other than the subjective purposiveness [290] of this form for the power of judgment that we feel connected in the mind with the object's representation. Now the power of judgment, with regard to the formal rules of judging and without any matter (neither sensory sensation nor concept), can be directed only to the subjective [A 151] conditions of employing the power of judgment in general (which is restricted neither to a particular manner of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding), and consequently to that subjective element we can presuppose in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognition in general). Thus the agreement of a representation with these conditions of the power of judgment must be capable of being assumed *a priori* as valid for everyone. That is, the pleasure, or subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in judging a sensible object in general, may rightly be demanded of everyone[12].

Remark. [A 152]

This deduction is so easy because it has no need to justify the objective reality of a concept; for beauty is not a concept of the object, and a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment. It asserts only that we are entitled to presuppose universally in every human being the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; and further, only that we have correctly

subsumed the given object under these conditions. Although the latter involves unavoidable difficulties not attaching to the logical power of judgment (because there one subsumes under concepts, but in aesthetic judgment under a [291] merely felt relation of imagination and understanding, mutually attuned to one another in the represented form of the object, where subsumption can easily deceive), this nevertheless detracts nothing from the legitimacy of the power of judgment's claim to count on universal assent. This claim amounts only to judging the correctness of the principle of judging from subjective grounds as valid for everyone. For the difficulty and doubt concerning the correctness of subsumption under that principle casts as little doubt upon the legitimacy of the claim to this validity of an aesthetic judgment in general, and thus upon the principle itself, as the likewise fallible subsumption of the logical power of judgment under its principle (though it errs less often and less readily) can cast doubt upon that principle, which is objective. But if the question were: How is it possible to assume nature *a priori* as a totality of objects of taste? then this problem would have a bearing on teleology, because the production of forms purposive for our power of judgment would have to be regarded as an end of nature [A 153] essentially belonging to its concept. Yet the correctness of this assumption remains very doubtful, while the actuality of natural beauties lies open to experience.

39 *On the communicability of a sensation.*

If sensation, as what is real in perception, is referred to cognition, it is called sensory sensation; and the specific character of its quality can be represented as communicable throughout in the same way only if we assume that everyone has a sense like ours. But this cannot by any means be presupposed of a sensory sensation. Thus this kind of sensation cannot be communicated to someone who lacks the sense of smell; and even if he does not lack it, we still cannot be certain whether he has precisely the same sensation from a flower as we have. But we must represent people as differing still more with regard to the *agreeableness* or *disagreeableness* in the sensation of the very same sensible object; and it is absolutely impossible to demand that pleasure in such objects be

acknowledged by everyone. We may call pleasure of this [292] kind the pleasure of *enjoyment*, because it enters the mind through sense, and we are therefore passive in it.

Satisfaction in an action on account of its moral character, [A 154] by contrast, is not a pleasure of enjoyment but of self-activity and its conformity with the idea of one's vocation. This feeling, called moral feeling, nevertheless requires concepts and presents not a free but a lawful purposiveness; thus it can be universally communicated only through reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind in everyone, through very determinate practical concepts of reason.

Pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of reasoning contemplation, does indeed also claim universal participation, but already presupposes another feeling, namely that of one's supersensible vocation, which, however obscure it may be, has a moral foundation. Yet I am not entitled simply to presuppose that other people will attend to this and find satisfaction in contemplating nature's rugged magnitude (a satisfaction that certainly cannot be ascribed to its appearance, which is rather repellent). Nevertheless, considering that those moral predispositions ought to be attended to on every suitable occasion, I can also demand that satisfaction of everyone, but only through the moral law, which in turn rests on concepts of reason.

Pleasure in the beautiful, by contrast, is a pleasure neither of enjoyment nor [A 155] of lawful activity, nor yet of reasoning contemplation according to ideas, but of mere reflection. Without having any end or fundamental principle as its guide, this pleasure accompanies the ordinary apprehension of an object by imagination, as the faculty of intuition, in relation to understanding, as the faculty of concepts, through a procedure of the power of judgment which it must also exercise for the sake of the most ordinary experience. Only in the latter case it is compelled to proceed in this way to obtain an empirical objective concept, while in the former (in aesthetic judging) it does so merely to perceive the representation's adequacy to the harmonious (subjectively purposive) activity of both cognitive faculties in their freedom, that is, to feel the representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must necessarily rest on the same conditions in everyone, because they are subjective conditions of the possibility of cogni-

tion in general, and the proportion of these [293] cognitive faculties required for taste is also required for ordinary sound understanding, which we may presuppose in everyone. Precisely for this reason someone judging with taste (provided only that he does not err in this consciousness and does not take matter for form, charm for beauty) may also demand subjective purposiveness, that is, [A 156] his satisfaction in the object, of everyone else, and assume his feeling to be universally communicable, indeed without the mediation of concepts.

40 *On taste as a kind of sensus communis.*

The power of judgment is often given the name of a sense when its reflection is less noticeable than merely its result; people speak of a sense of truth, a sense of propriety, justice, and so forth. Yet one knows, or at least ought to know, that these concepts cannot have their seat in a sense, still less that a sense has the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rules; rather, no representation of this kind concerning truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could ever enter our thoughts unless we could rise above the senses to higher cognitive faculties. *Common human understanding*, which as merely sound (not yet cultivated) understanding is considered the very least one can expect of anyone laying claim to the name of human being, therefore also has the mortifying honor of being designated common sense (*sensus communis*). And this is done in such a way that by the word *common* (not only in our language, which really contains an ambiguity here, [A 157] but in several others as well) one understands the *vulgar*, what is found everywhere, the possession of which is absolutely no merit or distinction.

By *sensus communis*, however, we must understand the idea of a *communal* sense, that is, a faculty of judging that in its reflection takes account in thought (*a priori*) of everyone else's way of representing, in order *as it were* to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole, and thereby escape the illusion that would injure judgment through subjective private conditions easily mistaken for objective ones. [294] This is accomplished by holding one's judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting oneself in everyone else's place, merely abstracting from the limitations

that happen to attach to our own judging. This in turn is effected by omitting as far as possible what is matter, that is, sensation, in the representational state, and attending solely to the formal peculiarities of one's representation or representational state. Now this operation of reflection may perhaps seem too artificial to ascribe to the faculty we call *common* sense; but it only looks that [A 158] way when expressed in abstract formulas. In itself nothing is more natural than to abstract from charm and emotion when seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule.

The following maxims of common human understanding do not belong here as parts of the critique of taste, but can nevertheless serve to elucidate its principles. They are: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the place of everyone else; 3. Always to think consistently with oneself. The first is the maxim of an *unprejudiced*, the second of an *enlarged*, the third of a *consistent* way of thinking. The first is the maxim of a reason that is never *passive*. The propensity toward passivity, and thus toward heteronomy of reason, is called *prejudice*; and the greatest of all prejudices is to represent nature as not subject to the rules that the understanding lays at its foundation through its own essential law: that is, *superstition*. Liberation from superstition is called *enlightenment*[13]. For although this name also belongs to liberation from prejudices in general, superstition preeminently (*in sensu* [A 159] *eminenti*) deserves to be called a prejudice, because the blindness into which superstition plunges us, indeed even demands as an obligation, [295] makes particularly evident the need to be guided by others, and thus the condition of a passive reason. As for the second maxim of thinking, we are otherwise accustomed to call someone limited (*narrow-minded*, the opposite of *enlarged*) whose talents do not suffice for any great use (especially an intensive one). But here the issue is not the faculty of cognition, but the *way of thinking* that makes a purposive use of it. However small the scope and degree to which a person's natural gift extends, this still marks someone of an *enlarged way of thinking* if he rises above the subjective private conditions of judgment within which so many others are, as it were, enclosed, and reflects upon his own judgment from a *universal standpoint* (which he can determine only by placing himself at the standpoint of others).

The third maxim, that of *consistent* [A 160] thinking, is the hardest to attain, and can be attained only through the union of the first two and after following them often enough for this to become a skill. We may say: the first of these is the maxim of understanding, the second of the power of judgment, the third of reason.—

I resume the thread abandoned in this digression, and say that taste may with greater right be called *sensus communis* than sound understanding, and that the aesthetic rather than the intellectual power of judgment may bear the name of a communal sense[14], if we are to use the word sense at all for an effect of mere reflection upon the mind; for then by sense we understand the feeling of pleasure. We might even define taste as the faculty of judging what makes our feeling in a given representation *universally communicable* without the mediation of a concept.

People's skill in communicating their thoughts also requires a relation of imagination and understanding, in order to associate intuitions with concepts and concepts in turn with intuitions, [A 161] which flow together into a cognition; but then the accord of both mental powers is *lawful*, under the constraint of determinate [296] concepts. Only where imagination in its freedom awakens understanding, and understanding without concepts sets imagination into a regular play, is the representation communicated not as a thought but as an inner feeling of a purposive state of mind.

Taste is therefore the faculty for judging *a priori* the communicability of feelings connected with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept).

If we could assume that the mere universal communicability of one's feeling must of itself already carry an interest for us (which, however, we are not entitled to infer from the character of a merely reflective power of judgment), we could explain why the feeling in a judgment of taste is demanded of everyone as though it were a duty.

41 *On the empirical interest in the beautiful.*

It has been sufficiently shown above that the judgment of taste by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest *as its determining ground*. But it does not follow that, once it has been given as a [A 162] pure aesthetic judgment, no interest can be connected with it. This connection, however, can always be only indirect: taste must first be represented as connected with something else, in order to join to satisfaction in mere reflection on an object a *pleasure in its existence* as well (in which all interest consists). For what is said of a cognitive judgment (concerning things in general) holds here of an aesthetic judgment: *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*—the inference from possibility to actuality is invalid. This other thing may be something empirical, namely an inclination proper to human nature; or something intellectual, as a property of the will by which it can be determined *a priori* through reason. Both contain a satisfaction in the existence of an object, and can thus ground an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without regard to any interest.

Empirically, the beautiful interests us only in *society*; and if we grant that the drive toward society is natural to human beings, and that the aptitude and propensity for it, that is, *sociability*, is requisite [297] for the human being as a creature destined for society, and thus a property belonging to *humanity*, then we cannot fail also to regard taste as a faculty of judging [A 163] everything through which we can communicate even our *feeling* to everyone else, and consequently as a means of furthering what everyone's natural inclination demands.

Alone, a person abandoned on a deserted island would adorn neither his hut nor himself, nor seek out flowers, still less plant them, to decorate himself. Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but a refined one in his own way (the beginning of civilization); for we judge as such someone inclined and skilled in communicating his pleasure to others, whom an object does not satisfy unless he can feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. Everyone also expects and demands from everyone else a regard for universal communication, as though arising from an original contract dictated by humanity itself. Thus, at first, mere charms—colors, for example, for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois), or

flowers, seashells, brightly colored feathers—but in time also beautiful forms (on canoes, clothes, and so forth), which carry no gratification, that is, satisfaction of enjoyment, become important in society and connected with great interest. Finally civilization, [A 164] having reached its highest point, makes this almost the principal occupation of refined inclination, and sensations are esteemed only insofar as they can be universally communicated. Then, although the pleasure each person has in such an object is only slight and of itself without appreciable interest, the idea of its universal communicability nevertheless increases its value almost infinitely.

But this empirical interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful through the inclination toward society, is of no importance to us here, since we have to consider only what may bear upon the judgment of taste *a priori*, even if only indirectly. For if an interest connected with it should also be discovered in this form, taste would disclose a transition of our faculty of judging from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling; and not only would this better guide us in employing taste purposively, [298] but a middle link in the chain of human *a priori* faculties, on which all legislation must depend, would also be presented as such. Of the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste itself, we may certainly say this much: since taste indulges inclination, however refined that inclination may be, it readily [A 165] blends with all the inclinations and passions that attain their greatest diversity and highest degree in society; and an interest in the beautiful, if founded on this, can supply only a very equivocal transition from the agreeable to the good. Yet we have reason to investigate whether this transition might nevertheless be furthered through taste when taken in its purity.

42 *On the intellectual interest in the beautiful.*

It was with kindly intentions that those who wished to direct all human occupations prompted by our inner natural predisposition toward humanity's final end, namely the morally good, considered an interest in the beautiful in general a sign of good moral character. But others, not without reason, contradicted them, appealing to experience: virtuosos of taste, not merely often but perhaps

usually vain, obstinate, and devoted to ruinous passions, might have even less claim than others to the distinction of adherence to moral principles. Thus it seems that the feeling for the beautiful is not only specifically distinct from moral feeling (as indeed it is), but also that the interest one can connect with it is difficult to reconcile with the moral interest, [A 166] and by no means reconcilable through an inner affinity.

Now I readily concede that interest in the *beautiful in art* (under which I also count the artificial use of natural beauties for adornment, and thus for vanity) supplies no proof of a way of thinking attached to the morally good, or even inclined toward it. But I maintain, by contrast, that taking an *immediate interest* in the beauty of *nature* (not merely having the taste to judge it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, [299] if this interest is habitual, it indicates at least a disposition of mind favorable to moral feeling, when it gladly joins itself with the *contemplation of nature*. But one must remember that I mean here specifically the beautiful *forms* of nature, while still setting aside the *charms* that nature so abundantly connects with them, because interest in these, although also immediate, is nevertheless empirical.

Someone who, alone (and without intending to communicate his observations to others), contemplates the beautiful shape of a wildflower, a bird, an insect, and so on, in order to admire and love it, and would be unwilling for it to be absent from nature altogether, even though it should cause him some harm, much less promise him any advantage, takes an immediate and indeed intellectual interest [A 167] in the beauty of nature. That is, not only does nature's product please him in its form, but its existence also pleases him, without sensory charm having any share in this or his connecting any end with it.

But here it is noteworthy that, if this lover of beauty had been secretly deceived, and artificial flowers (which can be made entirely like natural ones) had been planted in the ground, or artificially carved birds placed on the branches of trees, and he then discovered the deception, the immediate interest he previously took in them would vanish at once. Perhaps another interest would take its place, namely the interest of vanity in adorning his room with them for the eyes of visitors. That nature has produced this beauty: this thought must

accompany intuition and reflection, and on it alone rests the immediate interest we take in it. Otherwise there remains either a mere judgment of taste without any interest, or only one connected with an indirect interest, namely an interest relating to society; the latter gives no sure indication of a morally good way of thinking.

This privilege of natural over artistic beauty—that even if the latter surpassed the former in form, natural beauty alone [A 168] awakens an immediate interest—accords with the purified and thorough way of thinking of all people who have cultivated their moral feeling. If a man with taste enough to judge the products of fine art with the greatest correctness and delicacy [300] gladly leaves the room where those beauties that entertain vanity and perhaps social pleasures are to be found, and turns to the beautiful in nature, to find here, as it were, delight for his spirit in a train of thought he can never fully unfold to himself, we shall regard his very choice with esteem and presuppose in him a beautiful soul, to which no connoisseur or lover of art can lay claim merely on account of his interest in his objects.—What, then, accounts for this so different estimation of two kinds of object that, in the judgment of mere taste, would hardly contest precedence with one another?

We have a faculty of merely aesthetic judgment for judging forms without concepts and finding satisfaction in merely judging them, a satisfaction we at the same time make a rule for everyone, without this judgment resting upon an interest or producing one.—On the other hand, we also have a faculty of intellectual judgment for determining *a priori* a satisfaction in mere forms of practical maxims (insofar as they qualify of themselves for universal legislation), [A 169] which we make a law for everyone, without our judgment resting upon any interest, *but nevertheless producing one*. The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is called that of taste, in the second that of moral feeling.

But reason also has an interest in ideas (for which it produces an immediate interest in moral feeling) having objective reality: that is, in nature at least showing a trace, or giving a hint, that it contains some ground for assuming a lawful agreement of its products with our satisfaction independent of all interest (which we recognize *a priori* as a law for everyone, without being able to

ground it on proofs). Thus reason must take an interest in every manifestation by nature of an agreement resembling this. Consequently the mind cannot reflect upon the beauty of *nature* without finding itself interested at the same time. But this interest is moral by affinity; and someone who takes it in the beautiful in nature can do so only insofar as he has already firmly grounded his interest in the morally good. Thus in anyone whom the beauty of nature [301] immediately interests, we have reason to suspect at least a predisposition [A 170] toward a good moral disposition.

It will be said that interpreting aesthetic judgments as akin to moral feeling looks far too studied to be the true interpretation of the cipher in which nature speaks to us figuratively through its beautiful forms. But first, this immediate interest in the beautiful in nature is in fact not common, but belongs only to those whose way of thinking is either already developed toward the good or especially receptive to such development. And then the analogy between the pure judgment of taste—which, without depending on any interest, lets us feel a satisfaction and at the same time represents it *a priori* as befitting humanity in general—and the moral judgment, which does precisely the same through concepts, leads even without clear, subtle, and deliberate reflection to a similar immediate interest in the object of the former as in that of the latter. Only the former interest is free, while the latter is founded on objective laws. Added to this is admiration for nature, which in its beautiful products shows itself as art, not merely by chance but as though intentionally, according to lawful arrangement and as purposiveness without an end. Since we nowhere find this latter end externally, we naturally seek it within ourselves, and indeed in what [A 171] constitutes the final end of our existence, namely our moral vocation (but this inquiry into the ground of the possibility of such natural purposiveness will be discussed only in the teleology).

It is also easy to explain why satisfaction in fine art in a pure judgment of taste is not connected with an immediate interest in the same way as satisfaction in beautiful nature. For art is either an imitation of nature carried to the point of deception, in which case it acts as natural beauty (being taken for such); or it is art visibly and intentionally directed toward our satisfaction. In the latter case

satisfaction in this product would indeed occur immediately through taste, but would awaken only an indirect interest in the underlying cause, namely an art that can interest us only through its end, never in itself. Perhaps it will be said that the same holds when an object of nature interests us through its beauty only insofar [302] as a moral idea is associated with it; but it is not this association, but nature's own character in itself, its qualification for such an association, which thus belongs to it inwardly, that interests us immediately.

The charms in beautiful nature, which we so frequently find as though fused with beautiful form, belong either [A 172] to modifications of light (in coloring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations that permit not merely sensory feeling but also reflection upon the form of these modifications of the senses, and thus contain, as it were, a language nature addresses to us, which seems to have a higher meaning. Thus the white color of the lily seems to dispose the mind toward ideas of innocence, and the sequence of the seven colors from red to violet toward 1) the idea of sublimity, 2) of boldness, 3) of candor, 4) of friendliness, 5) of modesty, 6) of constancy, and 7) of tenderness. The singing of birds proclaims joy and contentment with their existence. At least this is how we interpret nature, whether such is its intention or not. But this interest we here take in beauty absolutely requires that it be the beauty of nature; it disappears entirely as soon as we notice that we have been deceived and that it is only art, so completely that taste can then no longer find anything beautiful in it, nor sight anything charming. What do poets praise more highly than the enchantingly beautiful song of the nightingale in solitary bushes on a quiet summer evening by the gentle light of the moon? Yet there are examples where, in the absence of such a singer, [A 173] some merry host has deceived the guests who came to enjoy the country air, to their greatest satisfaction, by hiding in a bush a mischievous boy who knew how to imitate this song (with a reed or tube in his mouth) exactly like nature. But as soon as one realizes it is a deception, no one will long endure listening to this song previously considered so charming; and the same holds for every other songbird. It must be nature, or be taken by us for nature, if we are to take an immediate *interest* in the beautiful as such; still more if we are entitled to require others to take such an inter-

est, as we in fact do [303] when we consider the way of thinking of those who have no *feeling* for beautiful nature (for so we call receptivity to an interest in contemplating it) coarse and ignoble, and find them clinging over their meal or bottle to the enjoyment of mere sensory sensations.

43 *On art in general.*

1) *Art* is distinguished from *nature* as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*); and the product or consequence of the former, as a *work* (*opus*), from that of the latter, as an effect (*effectus*). [A 174]

Strictly speaking, only production through freedom, that is, through a power of choice that grounds its actions on reason, should be called art. For although people like to call the product of bees (their regularly constructed honeycombs) a work of art, this is done only by analogy with art; as soon as we recall that they ground their labor on no rational deliberation of their own, we immediately say that it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and as art it is ascribed only to their creator.

If, in searching a bog, one finds a piece of hewn wood, as has sometimes happened, one does not say it is a product of nature, but of art; its producing cause conceived an end to which the wood owes its form. Otherwise one may also discern art in everything so constituted that a representation of it must have preceded its actuality in its cause (as even with bees), without the effect necessarily having been *thought* by that cause. But when something is called a work of art outright, to distinguish it from a natural effect, one always understands a work of human beings.

2) *Art*, as human skill, is also distinguished from [A 175] *science* (*being able* from *knowing*), as a practical from a theoretical faculty, as technique from theory (as surveying from geometry). Here, too, what one *can* do as soon as one merely *knows* what is to be done, and thus sufficiently knows the desired effect, is not properly called art. Only what one does not immediately have the skill to make, [304] even when one knows it most completely, belongs to art to that extent. *Camper* describes very precisely what the best shoe would have to be like, but he certainly could not make one[15].

3) *Art* is also distinguished from *craft*: the former is called *liberal*, while the latter may also be called *mercenary art*. The former is regarded as though it could turn out purposively (succeed) only as play, that is, an occupation agreeable in itself; the latter as labor, that is, an occupation disagreeable (burdensome) in itself and attractive only through its effect (for example, its wages), and thus capable of being imposed [A 176] by constraint. Whether watchmakers should rank as artists, but blacksmiths as craftsmen, in the hierarchy of guilds requires a standpoint of judgment different from the one we take here: namely, the proportion of talents that must underlie one occupation or the other. Whether among the so-called seven liberal arts some might have been listed that should be counted among the sciences, and others compared with crafts, I shall not discuss here. But it is advisable to recall that in all liberal arts something constraining, or, as it is called, a *mechanism*, is nevertheless required, without which the *spirit*, which must be *free* in art and alone animates the work, would have no body and evaporate entirely (in poetry, for example, correctness and richness of language, as well as prosody and meter). For some recent educators believe they best further a liberal art by removing all constraint from it and turning it from labor into mere play.

44 *On fine art.*

There is neither a science of the beautiful, but only a critique, nor a beautiful science, but only fine art. For as regards the former, [A 177] it would have to determine scientifically, that is, through grounds of proof, [305] whether something is to be considered beautiful or not; thus if judgment on beauty belonged to science, it would not be a judgment of taste. As for the second, a science that is to be beautiful as such is an absurdity. For if one asked for reasons and proofs in it as a science, one would be put off with tasteful sayings (bon mots).—What has occasioned the customary expression *beautiful sciences* is undoubtedly nothing other than the quite correct observation that fine art in its full perfection requires much science: for example, knowledge of ancient languages, wide reading in authors considered classical, history, knowledge of antiquities, and so forth. Thus these historical sciences, because they constitute the necessary

preparation and foundation for fine art, and partly also because knowledge of the products of fine art themselves (eloquence and poetry) was included among them, have through a confusion of words themselves been called beautiful sciences.

If art, in conformity with the *cognition* of a possible object, performs the actions required merely to make it actual, it is *mechanical*; but if its immediate aim is the feeling of pleasure, it is called *aesthetic* art. This is either [A 178] *agreeable* or *fine* art. It is the former when its end is that pleasure accompany representations as mere *sensations*; the latter when pleasure is to accompany them as *kinds of cognition*.

Agreeable arts are those directed merely toward enjoyment. Such are all the charms that can entertain company at table: telling amusing stories, drawing the company into frank and lively conversation, disposing it through jokes and laughter to a certain tone of merriment in which, as people say, much may be chattered into the gathering, and no one wishes to be held responsible for what he says, because the aim is only momentary entertainment, not lasting matter for reflection or repetition. (This also includes the manner in which the table is furnished for enjoyment, or even, at large banquets, table music: a curious thing, intended merely as an agreeable noise to maintain the minds' disposition toward gaiety and, without anyone paying the slightest attention to its composition, to favor the free conversation of one neighbor with another [306].) These arts also include all games that carry no interest beyond making time pass unnoticed.

Fine art, by contrast, is a manner of representation that is purposive in itself [A 179] and, although without an end, nevertheless furthers the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication.

The universal communicability of a pleasure already entails in its concept that this must be a pleasure not of enjoyment from mere sensation, but of reflection; and thus aesthetic art, as fine art, takes the reflective power of judgment, not sensory sensation, as its standard.

45 *Fine art is an art insofar as it also seems to be nature.*

In a product of fine art we must become conscious that it is art and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from every constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of nature alone. Upon this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties, which must nevertheless also be purposive, rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable without being grounded on concepts. Nature was beautiful when it also looked like art; and art can be called beautiful only when we are conscious that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature.

For we can say universally, whether concerning natural or artistic beauty: [A 180] *beautiful is what pleases in mere judging* (not in sensory sensation or through a concept). Now art always has a determinate intention to produce something. But if this were mere sensation (something merely subjective) that was to be accompanied by pleasure, then the product would please in being judged only through sensory feeling. If the intention were directed toward producing a determinate object, then, when art achieved it, the object would please only through concepts. In either case, however, the art would please not *in mere judging*, that is, not as fine but as mechanical art.

Thus purposiveness in the product of fine art, although [307] intentional, must nevertheless not seem intentional; that is, fine art must be *regarded* as nature, although we are conscious of it as art. But a product of art appears as nature when we find in it all *exactness* in agreement with the rules by which alone the product can become what it ought to be, yet without *painstakingness*, without the academic form showing through—that is, without betraying a trace that the rule hovered before the artist's eyes and fettered his mental powers.

46 [A 181] *Fine art is the art of genius.*

Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the artist's innate productive faculty, itself belongs to nature, we could also express this as follows: *genius* is the innate disposition of mind (*ingenium*) *through which* nature gives the rule to art.

Whatever may be the status of this definition, whether it is merely arbitrary or accords with the concept customarily associated with the word *genius*, or not (which will be discussed in the following §), we can nevertheless already prove that, according to the meaning of the word adopted here, the fine arts must necessarily be regarded as arts of *genius*.

For every art presupposes rules through whose grounding alone a product, if it is to be called artistic, is represented as possible. But the concept of fine art does not permit the judgment on the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule having a *concept* as its determining ground, and thus grounding itself on a concept of how the product is possible. Hence fine art cannot itself devise the rule according to which it is to bring its product [A 182] into being. Yet since without a preceding rule a product can never be called art, nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his faculties) must give the rule to art; that is, fine art is possible only as a product of genius.

From this we see that genius 1) is a *talent* for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for what can be learned according to some rule; [308] consequently *originality* must be its first property. 2) Since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, that is, *exemplary*; hence, although not themselves arising through imitation, they must nevertheless serve others for imitation, that is, as a standard or rule of judging. 3) It cannot itself describe or scientifically indicate how it brings its product into being, but gives the rule as *nature*. Hence the author of a product he owes to his genius does not himself know how the ideas for it come to him, nor does he have it in his power to devise such ideas at will or according to plan and communicate them to others in precepts enabling them to produce similar products. (Presumably, therefore, the word genius is derived from *genius*, the peculiar protective and guiding spirit given to a person at birth, [A 183] from whose inspiration those original ideas arose.) 4) Through genius nature prescribes the rule not to science but to art, and even this only insofar as the latter is to be fine art.

47 *Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of genius.*

Everyone agrees that genius must be set wholly against the *spirit of imitation*. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest aptitude, receptivity to learning (capacity) as such, cannot count as genius. But even if someone thinks or composes for himself and does not merely apprehend what others have thought, indeed even if he invents much for art and science, this still does not provide the proper ground for calling such a (often great) *mind* a *genius* (as opposed to someone called a *blockhead* because he can never do more than merely learn and imitate). For precisely this could also *have been learned*, and thus still lies on the natural path of inquiry and reflection according to rules, and is not specifically different from what diligence can acquire through imitation. Thus one can certainly learn everything that *Newton* set forth in his immortal work, the Principles of Natural Philosophy, however great a mind [A 184] was required to discover such things; but one cannot learn to compose inspired poetry, however exhaustively [309] all the precepts for poetry are given and however excellent its models. The reason is that Newton could make all the steps he had to take, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, fully intuitive and determinate for following, not only to himself but to everyone else. Yet no *Homer* or *Wieland* can indicate how his ideas, rich in imagination yet also in thought, arise and come together in his head, because he does not himself know and thus cannot teach anyone else. In science, therefore, the greatest discoverer differs from the most laborious imitator and apprentice only in degree, but differs specifically from someone nature has endowed for fine art. Yet this involves no belittling of those great men to whom the human race owes so much, in comparison with nature's favorites in respect of their talent for fine art. Precisely in the fact that their talent is made for the ever-advancing greater perfection of knowledge and all the benefit dependent upon it, as well as for instructing others in the same knowledge, lies their great advantage over those who deserve the honor of being called geniuses. For with these art comes [A 185] to a standstill somewhere, since a limit is set for it beyond which it cannot go, a limit presumably reached long ago and incapable of further extension; moreover, such skill cannot be communicated, but must be bestowed on each person directly by nature's hand, and thus dies with

him, until nature once again endows another in the same way, who needs nothing more than an example to let the talent of which he is conscious operate in a similar manner.

Since the natural gift must give art (as fine art) its rule, of what kind is this rule? It cannot be formulated to serve as a precept, for otherwise judgment on the beautiful could be determined through concepts. Rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed, that is, from the product, upon which others may test their own talent, allowing it to serve them as a model not for *copying* but for *imitation*. How this is possible is difficult to explain. The artist's ideas awaken similar ideas in his pupil, if nature has furnished him with a similar proportion of mental powers. The models of fine art are therefore [310] the only means of conveying it to posterity; this could not be accomplished through mere descriptions (especially in the verbal arts), and even in these only those models [A 186] in ancient, dead languages, now preserved only as learned languages, can become classical.

Although mechanical and fine art are very different from one another, the first as the mere art of diligence and learning, the second as the art of genius, there is nevertheless no fine art in which something mechanical, comprehensible and followable according to rules, and thus something *academic*, does not constitute an essential condition of the art. For something must be thought as an end in it, otherwise its product could not be ascribed to any art at all: it would be a mere product of chance. But carrying out an end requires determinate rules from which one may not exempt oneself. Now since originality of talent constitutes one essential element (but not the only one) in the character of genius, shallow minds believe they can best show themselves to be budding geniuses by renouncing the academic constraint of all rules; they believe one cuts a better figure on a horse running wild than on a trained one. Genius can supply only rich *material* for products of fine art; working it up and giving it *form* require a talent trained through schooling, to make a use of it that can withstand the power of judgment. But if someone speaks [A 187] and decides like a genius even in matters requiring the most careful rational investigation, it becomes altogether ridiculous. One hardly knows whether to laugh more at the conjurer

spreading so much mist around himself that nothing can be judged clearly but all the more can be imagined, or at the public, which naively imagines that its inability to recognize and grasp clearly this masterpiece of insight arises because new truths are being thrown at it in whole masses, while detail (through measured explanations and academically rigorous examination of principles) seems to it mere bungling.

48 [311] *On the relation of genius to taste.*

Judging beautiful objects as such requires *taste*; fine art itself, however, that is, *producing* such objects, requires *genius*.

If we regard genius as a talent for fine art (as the proper meaning of the word entails), and wish in this respect to analyze it into the faculties that must combine to constitute such a talent, we must first precisely determine the distinction between natural beauty, whose judging requires only taste, and artistic beauty, whose possibility (which must also be considered in judging [A 188] such an object) requires genius.

A natural beauty is a *beautiful thing*; artistic beauty is a *beautiful representation* of a thing.

To judge a natural beauty as such, I need not first have a concept of what sort of thing the object is supposed to be; that is, I need not know its material purposiveness (its end), but the mere form, without knowledge of the end, pleases of itself in being judged. But if the object is given as a product of art and is to be declared beautiful as such, then, because art always presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept of what the thing is supposed to be must first be laid at the foundation. And since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner determination of it as an end is the thing's perfection, the perfection of the thing must also be taken into account in judging artistic beauty, whereas in judging a natural beauty (as such) there is no question of this at all.—Indeed, in judging particularly animate objects of nature, such as a human being or a horse, objective purposiveness is also commonly taken into consideration in judging their beauty; [A 189] but then the judgment is no longer purely aesthetic, that is, a mere judgment of taste. Nature is no longer

judged as it appears as art, but insofar as it really *is* art (although superhuman); and the teleological judgment serves the aesthetic judgment as a [312] foundation and condition to which it must attend. In such a case, too, when one says, for example, "That is a beautiful woman," one actually thinks nothing other than: nature beautifully presents in her figure the ends of the female constitution. For one must look beyond mere form to a concept if the object is to be thought in this way through a logically conditioned aesthetic judgment.

Fine art shows its excellence precisely in describing beautifully things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, the devastations of war, and the like can, as harmful things, be very beautifully described and even represented in painting. Only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in conformity with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and thus artistic beauty: namely, that which arouses *disgust*. For in this peculiar sensation, resting on imagination alone, the object is represented as though pressing itself upon us for enjoyment, against which [A 190] we nevertheless struggle violently; thus in our sensation the artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished from the nature of that object itself, and the former cannot possibly then be considered beautiful. Sculpture, too, because in its products art is almost confused with nature, has excluded the immediate representation of ugly objects from its creations and permitted instead, for example, death (in a beautiful spirit) and martial courage (in Mars) to be represented through an allegory or attributes pleasing to the eye, thus only indirectly through an interpretation by reason, and not for merely aesthetic judgment.

So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept, through which the concept is universally communicated.—But to give this form to the product of fine art requires only taste. After exercising and correcting it through manifold examples of art or nature, the artist holds his work up to it, and after many often laborious attempts to satisfy it finds the form that meets its demands. Hence this is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of a free impetus of the mental powers, but of slow and even painstaking correction, to make it adequate to the thought [A 191] [313] yet not detrimental to freedom in the play of those powers.

Taste, however, is merely a judging, not a productive faculty; and what accords with it is not thereby a work of fine art. It may be a product belonging to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, according to determinate rules that can be learned and must be followed exactly. The pleasing form one gives it is only the vehicle of communication and, as it were, a manner of exposition, in respect of which one still remains to a certain degree free, although otherwise bound to a determinate end. Thus we demand that tableware, or even a moral treatise, even a sermon, possess this form of fine art without seeming *studied*; but we shall not for that reason call them works of fine art. A poem, a piece of music, a picture gallery, and the like, however, are counted as fine art; and in something intended as a work of fine art we can often perceive genius without taste, and in another taste without genius.

49 [A 192] *On the faculties of the mind that constitute genius.*

Of certain products expected to show themselves at least in part as fine art, we say that they are without *spirit*, although we find nothing in them to criticize as regards taste. A poem may be quite neat and elegant, yet without spirit. A history is accurate and orderly, yet without spirit. A ceremonial oration is thorough and at the same time graceful, yet without spirit. Much conversation is not without entertainment, yet is without spirit; even of a woman one may say: she is pretty, talkative, and agreeable, but without spirit. What, then, do we understand here by spirit?

Spirit, in an aesthetic sense, means the animating principle in the mind. But that through which this principle animates the soul, the material it employs for this purpose, is what sets the mental powers purposively in motion, that is, into a play that maintains itself and even strengthens those powers for it.

Now I maintain that this principle is nothing other than the faculty [314] of presenting *aesthetic ideas*; and by an aesthetic idea I understand a representation of the imagination that occasions much thought without any determinate thought, [A 193] that is, *concept*, being adequate to it, and which consequently

no language can fully attain and render intelligible.—We readily see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an *idea of reason*, which conversely is a concept to which no *intuition* (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.

For the imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it where experience seems too commonplace; we may even reshape experience, still indeed according to analogical laws, but also according to principles lying higher in reason (which are just as natural to us as those by which the understanding apprehends empirical nature). In this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical use of that faculty), according to which nature indeed lends us material, but we can work this up into something entirely different, namely something surpassing nature.

Such representations of the imagination may be called *ideas*: partly because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and thus seek to approach a presentation of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), which [A 194] gives them the appearance of an objective reality; but also, and chiefly, because no concept can be fully adequate to them as inner intuitions. The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation, and the like; or even to make sensible what does indeed find examples in experience—death, for example, envy and all vices, as well as love, fame, and the like—beyond the limits of experience, through an imagination emulating reason's precedent in attaining a maximum, with a completeness for which no example is found in nature. It is properly in poetry that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself to its full extent. But this faculty, considered by itself, is properly only a talent (of the imagination).

Now if a representation of the imagination [315] is placed beneath a concept, belonging to its presentation but occasioning of itself so much thought as can never be comprehended in a determinate concept, and thus aesthetically enlarging the concept itself without bounds, then the imagination is creative here and

sets the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) in motion: namely, to think more on the occasion of a representation (though this belongs to the concept of the object) than can be apprehended and made clear [A 195] in it.

Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself, but merely express, as subsidiary representations of the imagination, the consequences connected with it and its affinity with other concepts, are called the (aesthetic) *attributes* of an object whose concept, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented. Thus Jupiter's eagle with lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock of heaven's magnificent queen. Unlike *logical attributes*, they represent not what lies in our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but something else that gives the imagination occasion to spread over a multitude of related representations, which provoke more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. They supply an *aesthetic idea* that serves the rational idea in place of a logical presentation, but properly serves to animate the mind by opening before it the prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations. Fine art does this not only in painting or sculpture (where the name attributes is customary); poetry and eloquence, too, draw the spirit animating their works solely from the aesthetic attributes of objects, which accompany their logical attributes and give the imagination [A 196] an impetus to think more in connection with them, though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and thus in a determinate expression of language.—For brevity I must restrict myself to only a few examples.

When the great king expresses himself in one of his poems as follows: "Let us depart from life without murmuring and without regretting anything, while even then leaving the world heaped with benefits. Thus the sun, after completing its daily course, still spreads a gentle light across the sky; and the last rays [316] it sends into the air are its last sighs for the welfare of the world," he animates his rational idea of a cosmopolitan disposition even at life's end through an attribute that the imagination associates with that representation (in recalling all the pleasures of a completed beautiful summer day that a serene evening calls to mind), and that awakens a multitude of sensations and subsidiary repre-

sentations for which no expression can be found. Conversely, even an intellectual concept can serve as the attribute of a representation of the senses, and thus animate the latter through the idea of the supersensible; but only by employing for this purpose the aesthetic element subjectively attached to the consciousness of the latter. Thus, [A 197] for example, a certain poet says in describing a beautiful morning: "The sun welled forth, as peace wells forth from virtue." Consciousness of virtue, even if we place ourselves only in thought in the position of a virtuous person, spreads through the mind a multitude of sublime and soothing feelings, and a boundless prospect into a joyful future, which no expression adequate to a determinate concept fully attains.[16]

In a word, an aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination associated with a given concept, connected in the free use of the imagination with such a multiplicity of partial representations that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it. It thus lets us think much that is unnameable in addition to a concept, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and joins spirit to language as mere letter.

Thus the mental powers whose union (in a certain relation) [A 198] constitutes *genius* are imagination and understanding. Only, in employing imagination for cognition, imagination is under the constraint of understanding and subject to the restriction of being adequate to its concept; in an aesthetic respect, [317] however, imagination is free to supply, beyond that agreement with the concept, a wealth of undeveloped material for understanding, without seeking it, to which understanding paid no regard in its concept, but which it employs not so much objectively for cognition as subjectively to animate the cognitive powers, and thus indirectly for cognitions as well. Genius therefore consists properly in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no diligence learn, of discovering ideas for a given concept, and on the other hand of finding for them the *expression* through which the subjective disposition of mind thereby produced can be communicated to others as accompanying a concept. The latter talent is properly what is called spirit; for to express what is unnameable in the state of mind in a certain representation and make it universally communicable, whether the expression consists in language, painting, or sculp-

ture, requires a faculty for apprehending the rapidly passing play of imagination and uniting it in a concept (which for that very reason is original and [A 199] at the same time opens a new rule that could not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples) communicable without the constraint of rules.

If, after these analyses, we look back at the explanation given above of what is called *genius*, we find: *first*, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which clearly known rules must precede and determine its procedure; *second*, that as a talent for art it presupposes a determinate concept of the product as an end, and thus understanding, but also a representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, that is, the intuition, for presenting this concept, and thus a relation of imagination to understanding; *third*, that it shows itself not so much in carrying out the proposed end in presenting a determinate *concept*, as rather in the exposition or expression of *aesthetic ideas* containing rich material for that aim, and thus represents imagination in its freedom from all guidance by rules as nevertheless purposive for presenting the given concept; and finally, *fourth*, that the unstudied, unintentional subjective purposiveness [318] in the free agreement of imagination with the lawfulness [A 200] of understanding presupposes such a proportion and attunement of these faculties as no following of rules, whether of science or mechanical imitation, can effect, but only the nature of the subject can produce.

According to these presuppositions, genius is the exemplary originality of a subject's natural gift in the *free* use of his cognitive faculties. In this way the product of a genius (in respect of what in it is to be ascribed to genius, not to possible learning or schooling) is an example not for imitation (for then what is genius in it, constituting the spirit of the work, would be lost), but for another genius to follow. Through it he is awakened to the feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from the constraint of rules in art in such a way that art thereby acquires a new rule, through which the talent shows itself exemplary. But because genius is a favorite of nature, to be regarded as a rare phenomenon, his example produces a school for other good minds, that is, a methodical

instruction according to rules insofar as these could be drawn from those products of spirit and their peculiar character; and for these minds fine art is to that extent imitation, to which nature gave the rule through a genius.

But this imitation becomes *aping* when the pupil *copies* everything, [A 201] down to the deformities genius had to permit only because they could not readily be removed without weakening the idea. Such daring is meritorious in genius alone; a certain *boldness* of expression, and in general many a departure from the common rule, suit it well, but are by no means worthy of imitation. They always remain faults in themselves, which one must seek to remove, yet for which genius is, as it were, privileged, since anxious caution would impair the inimitable impetus of its spirit. *Mannerism* is another kind of aping, namely of mere *peculiarity* (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from imitators, yet without possessing the talent also to be *exemplary*.—There are indeed two ways (*modi*) in general of arranging one's thoughts for exposition, one called *manner* (*modus aestheticus*), the other *method* (*modus logicus*), which differ [319] in that the first has no standard other than the *feeling* of unity in presentation, while the other follows determinate *principles* in this; thus only the former holds for fine art. But a product of art is called *mannered* only when the exposition of its idea is *designed* for singularity, rather than made adequate [A 202] to the idea. The showy (precious), the contorted, and the affected, intended merely to distinguish themselves from the ordinary (but without spirit), resemble the conduct of someone said to love hearing himself speak, or who stands and walks as though on a stage to be gaped at: this always betrays a bungler.

50 *On the union of taste with genius in products of fine art.*

If the question is which matters more in things of fine art, whether genius or taste should show itself in them, this amounts to asking whether imagination or the power of judgment matters more. Now since an art deserves to be called *inspired* in respect of the former, but *fine* only in respect of the latter, the latter, at least as an indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*), is the foremost thing to consider in judging art as fine art. Richness and originality of ideas are

not so necessary for beauty as is the adequacy of imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of understanding. For all the former's richness, in its lawless freedom, [A 203] produces nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, by contrast, is the faculty for adapting it to understanding.

Taste, *like* the power of judgment in general, is the discipline (or training) of genius, severely clipping its wings and making it civilized or polished; at the same time it guides it as to where and how far it should extend if it is to remain purposive. And by bringing clarity and order into the wealth of thoughts, it makes the ideas lasting, capable of enduring and also universal approval, of being followed by others, and of an ever-advancing cultivation. Thus if, in the conflict between the two properties in a product, [320] something must be sacrificed, this should rather be on the side of genius; and the power of judgment, which pronounces from its own principles in matters of fine art, will sooner permit impairment of the freedom and richness of imagination than of understanding.

Fine art would thus require *imagination*, *understanding*, *spirit*, and *taste*[17].

51 [A 204] *On the division of the fine arts.*

We may call beauty in general (whether natural or artistic beauty) the *expression* of aesthetic ideas; only, in fine art this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object, while in beautiful nature mere reflection upon a given intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to be, suffices to awaken and communicate the idea of which that object is regarded as the *expression*.

Thus if we wish to divide the fine arts, we can choose, at least provisionally, no more convenient principle than the analogy of art with the kind of expression people employ in speaking to communicate themselves to one another as fully as possible, that is, not merely according to their concepts but also their sensations[18].—This consists in *word*, *gesture*, and *tone* (articulation, gesticulation, and modulation). Only the union of these [A 205] three kinds of expression constitutes the speaker's complete communication. For through them thought, intuition, and sensation are conveyed to the other person simultaneously and in union.

There are therefore only three kinds of fine arts: the *verbal*, the [321] *formative*, and the art *of the play of sensations* (as external sensory impressions). We could also arrange this division dichotomously, dividing fine art into the expression of thoughts or of intuitions, and the latter in turn merely according to their form or their matter (sensation). But then it would look too abstract and less suited to ordinary concepts.

1) The *verbal* arts are *eloquence* and *poetry*. *Eloquence* is the art of conducting a business of the understanding as a free play of imagination; *poetry*, of carrying out a free play of imagination as a business of the understanding.

Thus the *orator* announces a business and conducts it as though it were merely a *play* with ideas, to entertain his listeners. The *poet* announces merely an entertaining *play* with ideas, and yet as much results for the understanding as though he had intended only to conduct its business. The union and harmony of both [A 206] cognitive faculties, sensibility and understanding—which cannot do without one another, yet cannot readily be united without constraint and mutual impairment—must seem unintentional and as though it comes about of itself; otherwise it is not *fine* art. Hence everything studied and painstaking must be avoided in it; for fine art must be free art in a double sense: both in not being, as a paid occupation, a labor whose magnitude can be judged, compelled, or paid for according to a determinate standard, and in the mind's feeling itself occupied yet satisfied and enlivened, without looking toward another end (independently of payment).

The orator thus does give something he does not promise, namely an entertaining play of imagination; but he also falls short of what he promises, and what is nevertheless his announced business, namely to occupy the understanding purposively. The poet, by contrast, promises little and announces a mere play with ideas, but accomplishes something worthy of a business, namely to provide nourishment for the understanding through play and give life to its concepts through imagination: thus the former gives at bottom less, the latter more, than he promises.

2) The *formative* arts, or those that express ideas in [A 207] *sensory intuition* (not through representations of mere imagination [322] aroused by words), are either those of *sensory truth* or of *sensory semblance*. The first is called *plastic art*, the second *painting*. Both make shapes in space expressions of ideas: the former makes shapes recognizable to two senses, sight and touch (though not to the latter with regard to beauty), the latter only to the first. In both the aesthetic idea (archetype, original image) lies in the imagination as their foundation; but the shape constituting its expression (ectype, copy) is given either in its bodily extension (as the object itself exists) or according to the manner in which this depicts itself to the eye (according to its appearance on a surface). Or, amounting to the same thing, either relation to an actual end or merely its semblance is made a condition of reflection.

Plastic art, as the first kind of fine formative art, includes *sculpture* and *architecture*. The *first* presents concepts of things corporeally as they *could exist in nature* (yet as fine art with regard to aesthetic purposiveness); the *second* is the art of presenting concepts of things possible *only through art*, whose form has not nature but [A 208] an arbitrary end as its determining ground, for this purpose, yet at the same time in an aesthetically purposive way. In the latter a certain *use* of the artificial object is the principal thing, to which, as a condition, aesthetic ideas are restricted. In the former the mere *expression* of aesthetic ideas is the principal aim. Thus statues of human beings, gods, animals, and the like are of the former kind; but temples, magnificent buildings for public assemblies, or even dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected in honorable remembrance, belong to architecture. Indeed, all household furnishings (the work of the cabinetmaker and similar useful things) can be counted here, because the adequacy of the product to a certain use constitutes the essence of an *architectural work*. A mere *sculptural work*, by contrast, made solely for viewing and meant to please in itself, is, as a bodily presentation, mere imitation of nature, yet with regard to aesthetic ideas; here *sensory truth* must not go so far that it ceases to appear as art and a product of choice.

Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which artistically presents [323] *sensory semblance* connected with ideas, I would divide into the beautiful *depiction* of *nature* and the beautiful *arrangement* of its *products*. The first would be *painting* [A 209] *proper*, the second *landscape gardening*. For the first gives only the semblance of bodily extension; the second indeed gives this in truth, but only the semblance of employment and use for ends other than merely the play of imagination in contemplating its forms[19]. The latter is nothing other than adorning the ground with the same variety (grasses, flowers, shrubs, trees, even waters, hills, and valleys) with which nature presents it to intuition, only arranged differently and in conformity with certain ideas. But the beautiful arrangement of bodily things is [A 210] also given only for the eye, like painting; the sense of touch can supply no intuitive representation of such a form. Under painting in the broad sense I would also count the decoration of rooms through wallpaper, ornaments, and all beautiful furnishings serving merely for *viewing*; likewise the art of tasteful attire (rings, snuffboxes, and so on). For a bed of various flowers, a room with various ornaments (including even the ladies' finery) at a magnificent festival, constitute a kind of painting which, like paintings properly so called (which do not aim, for instance, to *teach* history or natural knowledge), exists merely to be viewed, in order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas and occupy the aesthetic power of judgment without a determinate end. The workmanship in all this adornment may be very different mechanically [324] and require entirely different artists; yet judgment of taste concerning what is beautiful in this art is to that extent determined in the same way: namely, to judge only the forms (without regard to an end), as they present themselves to the eye, singly or in combination, according to their effect on the imagination.—But the justification for counting formative art as gesture in a language (by analogy) [A 211] is that through these shapes the artist's spirit gives a bodily expression of what and how he has thought, and makes the thing itself speak, as it were, through mime: a very familiar play of our fantasy, which lays beneath lifeless things a spirit corresponding to their form that speaks out of them.

3) The art of the *beautiful play of sensations* (produced from outside, yet a play that must nevertheless be universally communicable) can concern nothing other than the proportion of the different degrees of attunement (tension) of the sense to which the sensation belongs, that is, its tone. In this broad meaning of the word, it can be divided into the artistic play of sensations of hearing and of sight, and thus into *music* and the *art of color*.—It is remarkable that these two senses, besides their receptivity to impressions insofar as required to obtain concepts of external objects through them, are also capable of a special sensation connected with these, concerning which we cannot quite determine whether sense or reflection lies at its foundation; and that this susceptibility can sometimes be absent, although the sense is otherwise not at all deficient in its use for cognizing objects, but perhaps even exceptionally fine. [A 212] That is, we cannot say with certainty whether a color or a tone (sound) is merely an agreeable sensation, or already in itself a beautiful play of sensations and as such carries with it a satisfaction in form in aesthetic judging. If we consider the rapidity of the vibrations of light, or, in the second case, of air, which probably far exceeds our entire capacity to judge directly in perception the proportion of time's division by them, we should believe that only the *effect* of these vibrations upon the elastic parts of our body is felt, while the *division of time* by them is not noticed or [325] taken into judgment, and thus only agreeableness, not beauty of their composition, is connected with colors and tones. But if, on the other hand, we consider *first* the mathematics that can be stated concerning the proportion of these vibrations in music and their judging, and judge the contrast of colors, as we should, by analogy with music; if *second* we consult the examples, though rare, of people who with the best eyesight in the world could not distinguish colors, or with the sharpest hearing could not distinguish tones, as well as, for those who can, the perception of an altered quality (not merely degree of sensation) at the different intensities on the scale of colors or tones, and likewise the fact that their number [A 213] is determinate for *comprehensible* differences: we might find ourselves compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sensory impressions, but as the effect of a judging of form in the play of many sensations. The difference between the two opinions in judg-

ing the basis of music, however, would alter its definition only so far as to explain it either, as we have done, as the *beautiful* play of sensations (through hearing), or as the play of *agreeable* sensations. Only according to the first explanation will music be represented wholly as a *fine* art; according to the second, as an *agreeable* art (at least in part).

52 *On the union of the fine arts in one and the same product.*

Eloquence can be united with a pictorial presentation both of its subjects and its objects in a *play*; poetry with music in *song*, and song in turn with pictorial (theatrical) presentation in an *opera*; the play of sensations in music with the play of shapes in *dance*, and so on. The presentation of the sublime, insofar as it belongs to fine art, can also unite with beauty in a *rhymed tragedy*, a *didactic poem*, or an *oratorio*; [A 214] and in these combinations fine art is still more artful. Whether it is also more beautiful (since so many different kinds of satisfaction intersect) may be doubted in some of these cases. Yet in all fine [326] art the essential thing consists in the form that is purposive for observation and judging, where pleasure is at the same time cultivation and disposes the spirit toward ideas, thus making it receptive to more such pleasure and entertainment; not in the matter of sensation (charm or emotion), where the aim is mere enjoyment, which leaves nothing behind in the idea, dulls the spirit, gradually makes the object repulsive, and, through consciousness of a disposition that reason judges contrapurposive, makes the mind dissatisfied with itself and ill-tempered.

Unless the fine arts are brought into a closer or more distant connection with moral ideas, which alone carry an independent satisfaction, the latter is their ultimate fate. They then serve merely as a diversion, of which one becomes increasingly needy the more one employs it to drive away the mind's dissatisfaction with itself, thereby making oneself still more useless and dissatisfied with oneself. In general, the beauties of nature are most conducive to the former aim, if one is accustomed early [A 215] to observing, judging, and admiring them.

53 *Comparison of the aesthetic worth of the fine arts with one another.*

Among them all, *poetry* (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius and is least willing to be guided by precept or example) holds the highest rank. It enlarges the mind by setting the imagination free and, within the bounds of a given concept, offering among the boundless variety of possible forms agreeing with it the one that joins its presentation to a wealth of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and thus rises aesthetically to ideas. It strengthens the mind by letting it feel its free, self-active faculty, independent of determination by nature, for contemplating and judging nature as appearance according to views it does not of itself offer either to sense or to understanding in experience, and thus for using it on behalf of, and as it were as a schema for, the supersensible. It plays with [327] the semblance it produces at will, yet without thereby deceiving; for it declares its own occupation to be mere play, which nevertheless [A 216] can be purposively employed by understanding for its business.—Eloquence, insofar as this means the art of persuasion, that is, of deceiving through beautiful semblance (as *ars oratoria*), and not mere excellence of speech (eloquence and style), is a dialectic that borrows from poetry only so much as is needed to win minds over to the orator's advantage before they judge, and deprive judgment of its freedom. Thus it can be recommended neither for the courtroom nor for the pulpit. For when civil laws, the rights of individuals, or lasting instruction and determination of minds toward correct knowledge and conscientious observance of their duty are at issue, it is beneath the dignity of so important a business to display even a trace of luxuriance of wit and imagination, still more of the art of persuading and predisposing people to anyone's advantage. For although this can sometimes be employed for intrinsically rightful and praiseworthy aims, it nevertheless becomes reprehensible because in this way maxims and dispositions are subjectively corrupted, even if the deed is objectively lawful: it is not enough to do what is right, but one must also do it solely because it is right. Moreover, the mere clear concept of these kinds of human affairs, joined with a [A 217] lively presentation through examples and without violating the rules of euphony in language or propriety in expressing rational ideas (which together constitute excellence of speech), already has sufficient influence of itself on human minds, without any

need also to deploy the machinery of persuasion. Since this machinery can equally be used to embellish or conceal vice and error, it cannot wholly eradicate a secret suspicion of artful deception. In poetry everything proceeds honestly and sincerely. It declares that it wishes to conduct a merely entertaining play with imagination, and indeed one agreeing in form with the laws of understanding; it does not seek to steal upon and ensnare understanding through sensible presentation.[20]

328 After poetry I would place, *if charm and the movement* [A 218] *of the mind are at issue*, that art which comes nearest to it among the verbal arts and can also be very naturally united with it, namely *music*. For although it speaks through nothing but sensations without concepts, and thus unlike poetry leaves nothing behind for reflection, it nevertheless moves the mind more diversely and, though only fleetingly, more intimately; but it is certainly more enjoyment than cultivation (the play of thought incidentally aroused by it is merely the effect of an almost mechanical association), and, judged by reason, has less worth than any other fine art. Hence, like every enjoyment, it demands frequent change and cannot endure repeated hearings without producing weariness. Its charm, which can be so universally communicated, seems [A 219] to rest on this: every expression in connected speech has a tone appropriate to its meaning; this tone more or less designates an affect in the speaker and reciprocally produces it in the listener, in whom it in turn also awakens the idea expressed in language with such a tone. And just as modulation is, as it were, a universal language of sensations intelligible to every human being, music practices this language by itself in its full force, namely as a language of affects, and thus universally communicates, according to the law of association, the aesthetic ideas naturally connected with it. But because those [329] aesthetic ideas are not concepts and determinate thoughts, the form of the composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) serves only in place of the form of a language, in order, through their proportionate attunement (which, because in tones it rests upon the ratio of the number of vibrations of air in the same time, insofar as tones are connected simultaneously or successively, can be brought mathematically

under certain rules), to express the aesthetic idea of a coherent whole of an unnameable wealth of thought, in conformity with a certain theme constituting the affect prevailing in the piece. Upon this mathematical form alone, although not represented through determinate [A 220] concepts, depends the satisfaction that mere reflection upon such a multitude of sensations accompanying or succeeding one another connects with their play as a universally valid condition of its beauty; and it is by this form alone that taste may claim a right to pronounce in advance upon everyone's judgment.

But mathematics certainly has not the slightest share in the charm and movement of mind that music produces; rather, it is only the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of that proportion of impressions in their combination as well as their alternation which makes it possible to comprehend them and prevent them from destroying one another, allowing them instead to accord in a continuous movement and animation of the mind through affects consonant with them, and thus in a comfortable enjoyment of oneself.

If, by contrast, we estimate the worth of the fine arts according to the cultivation they afford the mind, and take as our standard the enlargement of the faculties that must come together in the power of judgment for cognition, music holds the lowest place among the fine arts to this extent (just as among those also estimated by their agreeableness it perhaps holds the highest), because it plays merely with sensations. The formative arts therefore far surpass it in this [A 221] respect; for by setting the imagination into a free play that is nevertheless also adequate to understanding, they at the same time conduct a business, producing a product that serves the concepts of understanding as a lasting vehicle commending itself on its own account, to further their union with sensibility and thus, as it were, the urbanity of the higher cognitive powers. [330] The two kinds of art take entirely different courses: the former from sensations to indeterminate ideas, the latter from determinate ideas to sensations. The latter leave a *lasting*, the former only a *transitory* impression. Imagination can recall the lasting impressions and entertain itself agreeably with them; but the transitory ones either fade entirely or, if involuntarily repeated by imagination, are more troublesome than agreeable. Moreover, music is attended by a certain lack

of urbanity: chiefly according to the character of its instruments, it spreads its influence further than desired (into the neighborhood) and thus, as it were, imposes itself, impairing the freedom of others outside the musical company. Arts addressing the eyes do not do this, since one need only turn one's eyes away if one does not wish to admit their impression. It is almost as with [A 222] enjoyment from a widely spreading fragrance. Someone who draws his perfumed handkerchief from his pocket treats everyone around and beside him against their will, and compels them, if they wish to breathe, to enjoy it too; hence this has also gone out of fashion.[21]—Among the formative arts I would give preference to *painting*: partly because, as the art of drawing, it lies at the foundation of all the other formative arts; partly because it can penetrate far further into the region of ideas, and also expand the field of intuition in conformity with them more than the others are permitted to do.

54 *Remark.*

Between *what pleases merely in judging* and what *delights* (pleases in sensation), there is, as we have often shown, an essential difference. The latter is not something we can require of everyone as we can the former. Delight (even if its cause lies in ideas) seems always to consist in [331] a feeling that the whole of a person's life is being furthered, and thus bodily well-being as well, that is, health; [A 223] so that *Epicurus*, who declared all delight to be fundamentally bodily sensation, may perhaps not have been wrong to that extent, and only misunderstood himself when he counted intellectual and even practical satisfaction among delights. With this last distinction in view, we can explain how a delight can itself displease the person who feels it (as when a needy but right-minded man rejoices in the inheritance left by his loving but miserly father); or how a deep pain can nevertheless please the person who suffers it (a widow's sorrow at the death of her worthy husband); or how a delight can also please us (as does our delight in the sciences we pursue); or a pain (for example, hatred, envy, and the thirst for revenge) can also displease us. Here satisfaction or dissatisfaction

rests on reason and is identical with *approval* or *disapproval*; delight and pain, however, can rest only on the feeling or prospect of possible *well-being* or *ill-being*, whatever its ground may be.

Every changing, free play of sensations (those with no intention underlying them) delights us because it furthers the feeling of health, whether or not, in judging by reason, we take satisfaction in its object or even in this delight itself. And this delight can rise to the level of an affect, although we take no interest in the object itself, or at least none proportionate to the degree of the affect. We can divide these kinds of play into *games of chance*, *the play of tones*, and *the play of thought*. The *first* requires an *interest*, whether of vanity or self-interest, though this is far less than our interest in the way we seek to obtain it; [A 224] the *second* requires only the alternation of *sensations*, each of which bears a relation to affect, without reaching its degree, and awakens aesthetic ideas; the *third* springs merely from the alternation of representations in the power of judgment, which produces no thought carrying any interest, but nevertheless enlivens the mind.

How delightful games must be, without our having to suppose an interested intention beneath them, is shown by all our evening gatherings; for scarcely any can sustain themselves without a game. Yet the affects of hope, fear, joy, anger, and mockery [332] play their parts in them, changing roles at every moment, and are so lively that, as an inward exercise, they seem to further the entire business of life in the body. The cheerfulness of mind they produce bears witness to this, although nothing has been won or learned. But since a game of chance is not a beautiful play, we shall set it aside here. Music and material for laughter, on the other hand, are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or even with representations of the understanding, through which in the end nothing is thought, and which can delight us vividly merely through their alternation. They thereby make it fairly clear that in both cases the enlivening is merely bodily, although it is aroused by ideas of the mind, and that the feeling of health, through a movement of the viscera corresponding to that play, makes up the whole delight of a lively gathering, so highly praised for its refinement and wit. It is not the judging of harmony in tones or witty conceits, whose

beauty serves only as a necessary vehicle, but the furthered business of life in the body, the affect that moves the [A 225] viscera and the diaphragm—in a word, the feeling of health (which otherwise cannot be felt without such an occasion) —that makes up the delight we find in being able to reach the body through the soul as well, and to use the latter as the former's physician.

In music this play proceeds from bodily sensation to aesthetic ideas (the objects of affects), and then from these back again to the body, but with combined force. In joking (which, like music, deserves to be counted among the agreeable rather than the beautiful arts), the play begins with thoughts, all of which, insofar as they seek expression in the senses, also engage the body. And when the understanding suddenly relaxes in this presentation, in which it fails to find what it expected, we feel the effect of this relaxation in the body through the vibration of the organs, which furthers the restoration of their equilibrium and has a beneficial influence on health.

In everything meant to provoke lively, convulsive laughter, there must be something absurd (in which the understanding, in itself, can therefore find no satisfaction). *Laughter is an affect arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing*. This very transformation, which certainly gives the understanding no joy, nevertheless affords very lively joy indirectly for a moment. Its [333] cause must therefore lie in the influence of the representation on the body and the body's reciprocal influence on the mind; not, indeed, insofar as the representation is objectively an object of delight (for how can a disappointed expectation delight us?), but solely because, as [A 226] a mere play of representations, it brings about an equilibrium of the vital forces in the body.

If someone tells how an Indian, at an Englishman's table in Surat, saw a bottle of ale opened and all the beer, turned to foam, rush out, and expressed his great astonishment with many exclamations; and how, when the Englishman asked, "What is there here to be so astonished at?" he answered, "I am not astonished that it comes out, but at how you managed to get it in"—then we laugh, and it gives us hearty pleasure. This is not because we find ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man, or because of anything else in which the understanding might

discover something pleasing; rather, our expectation was strained and suddenly vanishes into nothing. Or suppose the heir of a rich relative wishes to arrange a suitably solemn funeral for him, but complains that he cannot quite manage it; "for," he says, "the more money I give my mourners to look sorrowful, the more cheerful they look." Then we laugh aloud, and the reason is that an expectation suddenly turns into nothing. We must note carefully that it must turn not into the positive opposite of an expected object—for that is always something and can often distress us—but into nothing. For if someone arouses great expectations in us by telling a story, and at its close we immediately recognize its untruth, this displeases us: for example, stories of people said to have grown gray-haired in a single night from great grief. But if, in reply to such a story, another wag relates at great length the grief of a merchant who, returning from India to Europe with his entire fortune [A 227] in goods, was forced in a violent storm to throw everything overboard, and grieved so deeply that his *wig* turned gray that very night, then we laugh, and it delights us. For we knock our own mistaken reach for an otherwise indifferent object—or rather, the idea we have been pursuing—back and forth for a while like a ball, when our only intention was to catch it and hold it fast. It is [334] not the rebuff to a liar or a fool that awakens the delight here; for even on its own, the latter story, told with an air of seriousness, would set a company laughing heartily, while such a rebuff would ordinarily not even be worth attention.

It is remarkable that in all such cases the joke must always contain something capable of deceiving us for a moment. Hence, when the illusion vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back to try it once again, and so is tossed back and forth and set oscillating by tension and relaxation following rapidly upon one another. Since the release from what had, as it were, drawn the string taut occurred suddenly, rather than through a gradual slackening, this oscillation must cause a movement of the mind and an inward bodily movement in harmony with it, which continues involuntarily and produces fatigue, but also exhilaration—the effects of exercise conducive to health.

For if we assume that some movement in the bodily organs is harmoniously connected with all our thoughts, we can fairly well understand how this sudden shifting of the mind, now to one standpoint, now to another, to consider its object [A 228], might be answered by an alternating tension and release of the elastic parts of our viscera, communicated to the diaphragm (like what ticklish people feel). In this process the lungs expel air in rapidly succeeding bursts, producing a movement beneficial to health, which alone—and not what takes place in the mind—is the true cause of delight in a thought that fundamentally represents nothing.—Voltaire said that heaven had given us two things to counterbalance life's many hardships: *hope* and *sleep*. He might have added *laughter*, if only the means of arousing it in reasonable people were so readily at hand, and the wit or originality of humor required for it were not as rare as the talent is common for composing things that *rack the brain*, like mystical brooders, *risk the neck*, like geniuses, or *break the heart*, like sentimental novelists (and moralists of that sort as well).

Thus, it seems to me, we may well concede to Epicurus that all delight, even when occasioned by concepts that [335] awaken aesthetic ideas, is *animal*, that is, bodily sensation, without thereby doing the least injury to the *spiritual* feeling of respect for moral ideas. This is not delight, but an esteem for oneself (for the humanity within us), which raises us above the need for delight; nor need we injure even the less noble feeling of *taste*.

Something compounded of both is found in *naivety*: the outbreak of the sincerity originally natural to humanity against the art of dissimulation that has become second nature. We [A 229] laugh at the simplicity that does not yet know how to dissemble; yet we also rejoice in the simplicity of nature, which here thwarts that art. We expected the customary manner of expression, artificial and carefully contrived for the sake of a fine appearance; and look! It is unspoiled, innocent nature, which we had not expected to encounter at all, and which the person who let it show had not intended to expose. The fine but false appearance that ordinarily counts for so much in our judgment is suddenly turned into nothing; the rogue within ourselves is, as it were, unmasked. This produces a movement of the mind in two opposite directions in succes-

sion, which at the same time gives the body a wholesome shaking. But that something infinitely better than all adopted manners—purity of thought (at least the predisposition to it)—has not quite died out in human nature mingles seriousness and high esteem with this play of the power of judgment. Since, however, it is only an appearance emerging for a short time, and the veil of dissimulation is soon drawn over it again, regret also mingles with it. This is a tender emotion that, as play, can readily be joined with such good-hearted laughter, and ordinarily is; it also tends to compensate the person who occasions it for the embarrassment of not yet having acquired worldly wisdom.—An art of being *naive* is therefore a contradiction; but to present naivety in a fictional character is certainly possible, and is a beautiful, though also rare, art. Naivety must not be confused with openhearted simplicity, which leaves nature unadorned only because it has no understanding [A 230] of the art of social intercourse.

Among things that cheer us, are closely related to the delight of laughter, and belong to originality of spirit, though not specifically to the talent for beautiful art, we may also count the *humorous* manner [336]. *Humor*, in the good sense, means the talent for voluntarily placing oneself in a certain disposition of mind in which all things are judged quite differently from usual (even in reverse), and yet in accordance with certain principles of reason appropriate to such a mood. Someone subject to such changes involuntarily is *moody*; someone able to assume them voluntarily and purposively (for a lively presentation by means of a contrast that provokes laughter) is called *humorous*, as is his manner of presentation. This manner, however, belongs more to agreeable than to beautiful art, since the object of the latter must always display a certain dignity, and therefore requires a certain seriousness in its presentation, as taste does in judging it.

Of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment [A 231] [337]

12 To be entitled to claim universal assent to a judgment of the aesthetic power of judgment resting merely on subjective grounds, it is enough to concede: 1) In all people the subjective conditions of this faculty are identical with respect to the relation of the cognitive powers set into activity within it to cognition in

general. This must be true, since otherwise people could not communicate their representations, or even cognition itself, to one another. 2) The judgment has taken account only of this relation (and thus of the *formal condition* of the power of judgment) and is pure, that is, mingled neither with concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining grounds. Even if an error has been made in this latter respect, it concerns only the incorrect application to a particular case of an entitlement a law gives us; this does not annul the entitlement in general.

13 We soon see that enlightenment, though easy in principle, is in practice a difficult thing, slow to accomplish. For not to be passive in the use of one's reason, but always to legislate for oneself, is indeed quite easy for a person who wishes only to be adequate to his essential end and does not demand knowledge of what surpasses his understanding. But since the striving for such knowledge can scarcely be prevented, and there will never be any lack of others who promise with great confidence to satisfy this curiosity, it must be very difficult to preserve or establish in a way of thinking (especially the public one) that merely negative element which constitutes enlightenment proper.

14 Taste might be designated by *sensus communis aestheticus*, common human understanding by *sensus communis logicus*.

15 In the region where I live, when an ordinary man is set a task like that of Columbus and his egg, he says: *that is no art; it is only knowledge*. That is, if one knows it, one *can* do it; and he says precisely the same of all the conjurer's supposed arts. But he will not hesitate at all to call the tightrope walker's skill an art.

16 Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, or a thought expressed more sublimely, than in that inscription above the temple of *Isis* (mother *Nature*): "I am all that is, all that was, and all that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil." *Segner* used this idea in an ingenious vignette prefixed to his natural philosophy, so as to fill his pupil, whom he was preparing to lead into this temple, with the sacred awe that should attune the mind to solemn attention.

17 The first three faculties receive their *union* only through the fourth. In his History, *Hume* gives the English to understand that although in their works they yield to no people in the world in evidence of the first three qualities, considered *separately*, in the quality that unites them they must nevertheless fall behind their neighbors, the French.

18 The reader will not judge this sketch of a possible division of the beautiful arts as an intended theory. It is only one of the many attempts that can and should still be made.

19 That ornamental gardening can be regarded as a kind of painting, although it presents its forms in bodily shape, may seem strange. But it actually takes its forms from nature (its trees, shrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field, at least originally), and to that extent is not an art like sculpture; nor does it make a concept of the object and its end (as architecture does, for example) the condition of their arrangement, but merely the free play of imagination in contemplation. To that extent, therefore, it agrees with merely aesthetic painting, which has no determinate theme (and pleasingly combines sky, land, and water through light and shadow).—In general, the reader will judge this only as an attempt to unite the beautiful arts under one principle, which on this occasion is to be the expression of aesthetic ideas (by analogy with a language), and will not regard it as a derivation of them held to be conclusive.

20 I must confess that a beautiful poem has always given me pure delight, whereas reading the best speech of a Roman popular orator, or a present-day parliamentary or pulpit speaker, has always been mingled with the unpleasant feeling of disapproval of an insidious art. It knows how to move people like machines, in important matters, toward a judgment that must lose all its weight with them in calm reflection. Eloquence and excellence of expression (together, rhetoric) belong to beautiful art; but oratory (*ars oratoria*), as the art of exploiting people's weaknesses for one's purposes (however well intended or even genuinely good these may be), is worthy of no *respect* at all. Indeed, both in Athens and in Rome it reached its highest point only at a time when the state was hastening

to ruin and a truly patriotic way of thinking had died out. Someone who, with clear insight into affairs, commands language in its richness and purity, and who, with an imagination fruitful and capable of presenting his ideas, takes a lively, heartfelt interest in the true good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*—the good man skilled in speaking—the orator without artifice but full of force, as *Cicero* would have him, though Cicero himself did not always remain faithful to this ideal.

21 Those who have recommended the singing of hymns as part of private devotions did not consider that through such *noisy* devotion (usually Pharisaical for that very reason) they impose a great burden on the public, by forcing their neighbors either to sing along or to lay aside their own train of thought.

PART I

Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment

Second Section. The Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.

55 A power of judgment that is to be dialectical must first be reasoning; that is, its judgments must lay claim to universality, and indeed a priori[22], for dialectic consists in the opposition of such judgments. Hence the incompatibility of aesthetic judgments of sense (concerning the agreeable and disagreeable) is not dialectical. Nor does the conflict of judgments of taste, insofar as each person appeals merely to his own taste, constitute a dialectic of taste, because [A 232] no one intends to make his judgment a universal rule. Thus no concept remains of a dialectic that could concern taste except a dialectic of the *critique* of taste (not of taste itself) with respect to its *principles*: namely, where conflicting concepts arise naturally and unavoidably concerning the ground of the possibility of judgments of taste in general. A transcendental critique of taste will therefore contain a part that can bear the name of a dialectic of the aesthetic power of judgment only if there is an antinomy of the principles of this faculty that casts doubt on its conformity to law, and hence also on its inner possibility.

56 [338] *Presentation of the Antinomy of Taste.*

The first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition with which everyone lacking taste thinks to defend himself against criticism: *everyone has his own taste*. This amounts to saying that the determining ground of this judgment is merely subjective (delight or pain), and the judgment has no right to the necessary assent of others.

Its second commonplace, used even by those who grant a judgment of taste the right to pronounce itself valid for everyone [A 233], is: *there is no disputing about taste*. This amounts to saying that the determining ground of a judgment of taste may indeed also be objective, but cannot be brought under determinate concepts; consequently nothing concerning the judgment itself can be *decided* by proofs, although we can quite properly and legitimately *argue* about it. For *arguing* and *disputing* agree in seeking to produce unanimity of judgments through their mutual opposition; but they differ in that the latter hopes to accomplish this according to determinate concepts as grounds of proof, and thus assumes *objective concepts* as grounds of the judgment. Where this is considered impracticable, disputing is likewise judged impracticable.

It is easy to see that between these two commonplaces a proposition is missing which, though not in proverbial circulation, is nevertheless present in everyone's mind: *we can argue about taste* (although not dispute about it). But this proposition contains the opposite of the first proposition. For where arguing is to be permissible, there must be hope of reaching agreement with one another; consequently we must be able to count on grounds of judgment that have more than private validity, and thus are not merely subjective. Yet the principle that *everyone has his own taste* stands directly opposed to this.

Thus the following [A 234] antinomy emerges concerning the principle of taste:

1) *Thesis.* The judgment of taste is not based on concepts; for otherwise we could dispute about it (decide it by proofs).

2) *Antithesis.* The judgment of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise, despite its diversity, we could not even [339] argue about it (claim the necessary agreement of others with this judgment).

57 *Resolution of the Antinomy of Taste.*

There is no way to remove the conflict between those principles underlying every judgment of taste (which are nothing other than the two peculiarities of the judgment of taste presented above in the Analytic) except by showing that the concept to which we refer the object in judgments of this kind is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the aesthetic power of judgment; that this twofold sense, or standpoint of judging, is necessary to our transcendental power of judgment; but also that the semblance arising from confusing one with the other is unavoidable as a natural illusion.

The judgment of taste must refer to some concept; for otherwise it could make no claim whatever to necessary validity for [A 235] everyone. Yet this does not mean that it must be demonstrable *from* a concept, since a concept can be either determinable or, in itself, indeterminate and also indeterminable. Of the first kind is the concept of the understanding, which can be determined through predicates of the sensible intuition that can correspond to it; of the second is the transcendental concept of reason concerning the supersensible that underlies all such intuition, and therefore cannot be further determined theoretically.

Now the judgment of taste concerns objects of the senses, but not in order to determine a *concept* of them for the understanding; for it is not a cognitive judgment. Hence, as an intuitive, singular representation related to the feeling of pleasure, it is only a private judgment; and to that extent its validity would be restricted to the judging individual alone: the object is an object of satisfaction *for me*; for others it may be otherwise—everyone has his own taste.

Nevertheless, the judgment of taste undoubtedly contains an extended reference of the representation of the object (and at the same time of the subject), on which we base an extension of judgments of this kind as necessary for everyone. This must therefore necessarily rest on some [340] concept; but a concept that cannot be determined at all through intuition [A 236], through which nothing can be cognized, and hence from which *no proof can be given* for the judgment of taste. Such a concept, however, is the mere pure concept of reason concerning the supersensible that underlies the object (and also the judging

subject) as an object of sense, and thus as appearance. For unless we assumed such a reference, the judgment of taste's claim to universal validity could not be saved. If the concept on which it rests were merely a confused concept of the understanding, of perfection, for example, to which we could attach a corresponding sensible intuition of the beautiful, then it would at least be possible in itself to base the judgment of taste on proofs, which contradicts the thesis.

But all contradiction disappears when I say: the judgment of taste is based on a concept (of a ground in general of nature's subjective purposiveness for the power of judgment), from which, however, nothing concerning the object can be cognized or proved, since it is in itself indeterminable and unfit for cognition. Yet through this very concept the judgment at the same time acquires validity for everyone (in each person, indeed, as a singular judgment immediately accompanying the intuition), because its determining ground perhaps lies in the concept of what can be regarded [A 237] as the supersensible substrate of humanity.

In resolving an antinomy, all that matters is the possibility that two apparently conflicting propositions do not in fact contradict one another but can coexist, even though explaining the possibility of their concept exceeds our cognitive faculty. From this we can also make comprehensible that this semblance is natural and unavoidable for human reason; likewise, why it is and remains so, although it no longer deceives after the apparent contradiction has been resolved.

For in both conflicting judgments we take the concept on which the universal validity of a judgment must rest in the same sense, and yet attribute two opposed predicates to it. Thus the thesis should read: the judgment of taste is not based on *determinate* concepts; the antithesis, however: the judgment of taste is nevertheless based on a concept, though an *indeterminate* [341] one (namely, of the supersensible substrate of appearances); and then there would be no conflict between them.

We can do no more than remove this conflict in taste's claims and counterclaims. To give a determinate objective principle of taste by which its judgments could be guided, [A 238] tested, and proved is utterly impossible; for

then it would no longer be a judgment of taste. The subjective principle, namely the indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us, can only be indicated as the sole key to the riddle of this faculty, whose sources are hidden even from ourselves; it cannot be made comprehensible through anything further.

The antinomy set forth and reconciled here rests on the correct concept of taste, namely as a merely reflective aesthetic power of judgment. The two apparently conflicting principles were reconciled because *both can be true*, which is also enough. If, on the other hand, we assume *agreeableness* as taste's determining ground, as some do (because of the singularity of the representation underlying a judgment of taste), or the principle of *perfection*, as others wish (because of its universal validity), and frame the definition of taste accordingly, then an antinomy arises that can be reconciled only by showing that *both propositions* opposed to one another (though not merely as contradictories) *are false*. This then proves that the concept on which each rests contradicts itself. Thus we see that [A 239] removing the antinomy of the aesthetic power of judgment follows a course similar to that followed by the Critique in resolving the antinomies of pure theoretical reason; and that here too, as in the Critique of Practical Reason, the antinomies compel us against our will to look beyond the sensible and seek in the supersensible the point of union of all our *a priori* faculties, because no other way remains to bring reason into agreement with itself.

Remark I.

Since in transcendental philosophy we so often have occasion to distinguish ideas from concepts of the understanding, it may be [342] useful to introduce technical expressions suited to their distinction. I believe there will be no objection if I propose a few.—Ideas, in the most general sense, are representations referred to an object according to a certain principle (subjective or objective), insofar as they can nevertheless never become cognition of it. They are either referred to an intuition according to a merely subjective principle of the agreement of the cognitive faculties with one another (imagination and understanding), and are then called *aesthetic*; or they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle, but can nevertheless never yield cognition of the object,

and are called ideas of reason. In the latter case the concept is a *transcendent* concept, distinguished from a concept of the understanding, to which an [A 240] adequately corresponding experience can always be supplied, and which is therefore called *immanent*.

An *aesthetic idea* cannot become cognition because it is an *intuition* (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found. An *idea of reason* can never become cognition because it contains a *concept* (of the supersensible) for which an adequate intuition can never be given.

Now I believe we may call an aesthetic idea an *inexponible* representation of the imagination, and an idea of reason an *indemonstrable* concept of reason. Of both it is assumed that they are not altogether groundless, but are produced (according to the explanation of an idea in general given above) in accordance with certain principles of the cognitive faculties to which they belong: the former with subjective principles, the latter with objective ones.

Concepts of the understanding, as such, must always be demonstrable (if by demonstrating we understand, as in anatomy, merely *presenting*); that is, the object corresponding to them must always be capable of being given in intuition, pure or empirical, for only through this can they become cognitions. The concept of *magnitude* can be given *a priori* in the intuition of space, for example in a straight line, and so on; the concept of *cause*, in the impenetrability and impact of bodies, and so on. Thus both can be supported by an empirical intuition, that is, the thought of them can be shown in an example (demonstrated, pointed out); and this must [343] be possible, otherwise we are not certain whether the thought is empty, that is, without any object at all.

In logic, the expressions demonstrable and [A 241] indemonstrable are commonly used only with regard to *propositions*. The former could better be designated as only mediately certain propositions, the latter as *immediately certain* ones; for pure philosophy, too, has propositions of both kinds, if by these we understand true propositions capable and incapable of proof. But although, as philosophy, it can prove from *a priori* grounds, it cannot demonstrate—unless we abandon entirely the meaning of the word, according to which demonstrating (*ostendere*, *exhibere*: showing, exhibiting) means presenting one's concept in

intuition at the same time, whether in proving or merely in defining. If this is an *a priori* intuition, it is called constructing the concept; but even if the intuition is empirical, it still remains an exhibiting of the object, through which the concept's objective reality is secured. Thus we say that an anatomist demonstrates the human eye when, by dissecting this organ, he makes intuitive the concept he has previously expounded discursively.

Accordingly, reason's concept of the supersensible substrate of all appearances in general, or of what must underlie our power of choice in relation to moral laws, namely transcendental freedom, is already by its kind an indemonstrable concept and an idea of reason; virtue, however, is so by its degree. For in the former case nothing corresponding to it in quality can in itself be given in experience, whereas in the latter no product in experience of that causality attains the degree prescribed as a rule by the idea of reason.

Just as, in an idea of reason, the *imagination* with its [A 242] intuitions falls short of the given concept, so, in an aesthetic idea, the *understanding* through its concepts never attains the whole inner intuition of the imagination that it connects with a given representation. Now since bringing a representation of the imagination under concepts means *expounding* it, an aesthetic idea can be called an *inexponible* representation of the imagination (in its free play). Later I shall have occasion to develop something further about ideas of this kind; here I note only that both kinds [344] of ideas, ideas of reason as well as aesthetic ideas, must have their principles, and both in reason: the former in the objective, the latter in the subjective principles of its use.

Accordingly, *genius* can also be explained as the faculty of *aesthetic ideas*. This also indicates the reason why in products of genius nature (in the subject), rather than a deliberate end of art (the production of the beautiful), gives the rule. For since the beautiful must be judged not by concepts, but by the purposive attunement of imagination to agreement with the faculty of concepts in general, neither rule nor prescription can serve as the subjective standard for that aesthetic yet unconditional purposiveness in beautiful art which is to make a legitimate [A 243] claim that it must please everyone. Only what is mere nature in the subject, but cannot be brought under rules or concepts—that is,

the supersensible substrate of all its faculties (which no concept of the understanding can reach)—can serve as this standard; consequently, that in relation to which bringing all our cognitive faculties into accord is the ultimate end given through the intelligible element of our nature. Only in this way, too, is it possible for this purposiveness, to which no objective principle can be prescribed, to rest on a subjective and yet universally valid *a priori* principle.

Remark II.

The following important observation presents itself here: there are *three kinds of antinomy* of pure reason, but they all agree in forcing reason to abandon the otherwise very natural presupposition that objects of the senses are things in themselves, to regard them instead merely as appearances, and to place beneath them an intelligible substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is only an idea and admits no cognition proper). Without such an antinomy, reason could never resolve to accept a principle that so greatly narrows the field of its speculation, or to make sacrifices in which so many otherwise glittering hopes must wholly vanish. For even now, when a correspondingly greater use in a practical respect opens up to compensate it for this loss, reason seems [345] unable to part from those hopes and free itself from its old attachment without pain.

That there are three kinds of antinomy is grounded in the existence of three cognitive faculties: understanding, power of judgment, and reason, each of which (as a higher cognitive faculty) must have its *a priori* principles. Now reason, insofar as it judges these principles themselves and their use, relentlessly demands, with respect to them all, the unconditioned for the given [A 244] conditioned. Yet this can never be found if we regard the sensible as belonging to things in themselves, rather than placing beneath it, as mere appearance, something supersensible (the intelligible substrate of nature outside us and within us) as the thing in itself. Thus there are: 1) an antinomy of reason concerning the theoretical use of the understanding, ascending to the unconditioned, *for the cognitive faculty*; 2) an antinomy of reason concerning the aesthetic use of the power of judgment *for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure*; 3) an antinomy concerning the practical use of reason, which legislates in itself,

for the faculty of desire: insofar as all these faculties have their higher *a priori* principles and, in accordance with an inescapable demand of reason, must also be able to judge and determine their object *unconditionally* according to these principles.

Concerning two antinomies of those higher cognitive faculties, that of their theoretical and that of their practical use, we have already shown elsewhere both their *inevitability* if such judgments do not look back to a supersensible substrate of the given objects as appearances, and their *resolvability* as soon as they do. As for the antinomy in the use of the power of judgment in accordance with reason's demand, and its resolution given here, there is no other means of avoiding it than *either* to deny that any *a priori* principle underlies the aesthetic judgment of taste, so that every claim to the necessity of universal assent is a groundless, empty delusion, and a judgment of taste deserves to be held correct [A 245] only because *it happens* that many agree about it—and even this not properly because we *suspect* an *a priori* principle behind their agreement, but because (as in the taste of the palate) the subjects happen by chance to be similarly [346] organized; *or* we would have to assume that a judgment of taste is really a concealed judgment of reason concerning the perfection discovered in a thing and in the relation of the manifold within it to an end, and is thus called aesthetic only because of the confusion attaching to this reflection of ours, although fundamentally it is teleological. In that case we could declare the resolution of the antinomy through transcendental ideas unnecessary and void, and so reconcile those laws of taste with objects of the senses not merely as appearances, but also as things in themselves. Yet how little either escape achieves has been shown at several points in the exposition of judgments of taste.

But if we concede to our deduction at least that it proceeds along the right path, although it has not yet been made sufficiently clear in every respect, then three ideas emerge: *first*, of the supersensible in general, without further determination, as the substrate of nature; *second*, of this same supersensible as the principle of nature's subjective purposiveness for our cognitive faculty; *third*, of this same supersensible as the principle of the ends of freedom and of their agreement with nature in the moral sphere.

58 [A 246] *On the Idealism of the Purposiveness of Both Nature and Art, as the Sole Principle of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.*

To begin with, we can place the principle of taste either in its always judging according to empirical determining grounds, and thus grounds given only *a posteriori* through the senses, or we can concede that it judges from an *a priori* ground. The former would be the *empiricism* of the critique of taste, the latter its *rationalism*. According to the *first*, the object of our satisfaction would not be distinguished from the *agreeable*; according to the second, if the judgment rested on determinate concepts, it would not be distinguished from the *good*. Thus all *beauty* would be denied out of the world, leaving in its place only a special name, perhaps for a certain mixture of the two kinds of satisfaction just mentioned. But [347] we have shown that there are also *a priori* grounds of satisfaction, which can therefore coexist with the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be grasped in *determinate concepts*.

The rationalism of the principle of taste, in turn, is either that of the *realism* of purposiveness or of its *idealism*. Now since a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, and beauty [A 247] is not a property of the object considered in itself, the rationalism of the principle of taste can never consist in thinking the purposiveness in this judgment as objective: that is, in the judgment's referring theoretically, and thus also logically (even if only in a confused judging), to the perfection of the object. It can refer only *aesthetically* to the agreement, in the subject, of the object's representation in imagination with the essential principles of the power of judgment in general. Consequently, even according to the principle of rationalism, the judgment of taste and the distinction between its realism and idealism can consist only in this: in the first case that subjective purposiveness is assumed as an actual (intentional) *end* of nature (or of art) to agree with our power of judgment; in the second, it is assumed only as a purposive agreement with the needs of the power of judgment concerning nature and its forms produced according to particular laws, an agreement arising of itself and by chance, without an end.

The [A 248] beautiful formations in the realm of organized nature speak strongly in favor of the realism of nature's aesthetic purposiveness: namely, the assumption that the production of the beautiful rests on an idea of it in the producing cause, as an *end* favoring our imagination. Flowers, blossoms, even the shapes of entire plants; the elegance in the forms of animals of every kind, unnecessary for their own use but seemingly chosen for our taste; above all, the variety and harmonious combination of colors so pleasing and charming to our eyes (in the pheasant, in shellfish, insects, down to the commonest flowers)—these seem entirely directed toward outward contemplation, since they concern merely the surface, and even there not the shape of the creatures, which might still be required for their inner ends. They lend [348] great weight to an explanation that assumes actual ends of nature for our aesthetic power of judgment.

Against this assumption stands not only reason, with its maxims of avoiding everywhere, as far as possible, any unnecessary multiplication of principles; nature itself also shows everywhere, in its free formations, so much of a mechanical tendency to produce forms seemingly made for the aesthetic use of our power of judgment, without offering the slightest ground for supposing that anything beyond its mechanism, merely as nature, is needed. In accordance with this mechanism, they can be purposive for our judging even without any idea underlying them. By a *free formation* of nature [A 249], however, I understand *one* in which, from a *fluid at rest*, through the evaporation or separation of a part of it (sometimes merely the matter of heat), the remainder assumes, as it solidifies, a determinate shape or fabric (figure or texture), differing with the specific differences of the materials but precisely the same in the same material. This presupposes what is always understood by a true fluid: that the matter in it is completely dissolved, that is, is not to be regarded as a mere mixture of solid parts merely suspended within it.

The formation then takes place through *setting*, that is, through a sudden solidification, not a gradual transition from the fluid to the solid state, but, as it were, a leap—a transition also called *crystallization*. The commonest example of this kind of formation is freezing water, in which straight rays of ice first develop and join at angles of 60 degrees, while others similarly attach them-

selves at every point, until everything has become ice. During this time the water between the rays of ice does not gradually grow more viscous, but is as completely fluid as it would be at a much greater warmth, and yet has the full coldness of ice. The separating matter, which suddenly escapes at the moment [A 250] of solidification, is a considerable quantity of caloric; since it was required only for fluidity, its departure leaves this newly formed ice not the least colder than the water that was fluid within it just before.

Many salts, as well as stones with a crystalline figure, are similarly produced from an earthy substance dissolved in water by who knows what agency [349]. Likewise, the clustered configurations of many minerals, of cubic galena, ruby silver ore, and the like, are in all probability also formed in water and through the setting of their parts, when some cause forces them to leave this vehicle and unite with one another in determinate outward shapes.

But even internally, all materials made fluid merely by heat and solidified by cooling reveal a determinate texture when fractured. From this we may judge that, had their own weight or contact with air not prevented it, they would also have displayed outwardly the shape peculiar to their kind. Something like this has been observed in certain metals that had hardened outwardly after melting but remained fluid within: the inner, still fluid part was drained off, and what remained inside was then allowed to set undisturbed. Many of those mineral [A 251] crystallizations, such as clusters of spar, kidney ore, and iron flowers, often yield forms as exceedingly beautiful as art could ever devise; and the splendor in the cave of Antiparos is merely the product of water seeping through beds of gypsum.

To all appearances, the fluid is generally older than the solid, and both plants and animal bodies are formed from fluid nutritive matter as it takes shape at rest. In this nutritive matter, admittedly, the formation proceeds first according to a certain original predisposition directed toward ends (which, as will be shown in the second part, must be judged not aesthetically but teleologically, according to the principle of realism); yet perhaps it also happens incidentally through setting and free formation according to the universal law of the affinity of materials. Now just as aqueous fluids dissolved in an atmosphere that is a

mixture of different kinds of air produce snow figures when, through the loss of heat, these fluids separate from the atmosphere—figures often seemingly very artful and exceedingly beautiful, according to the differences in the current mixture of air—so we can well conceive, without detracting at all from the teleological principle for judging organization, that the beauty of flowers, birds' feathers, and shells, in both shape and color, can [A 252] be ascribed to nature and its capacity, in its freedom and without particular ends directed toward this, to form itself in an aesthetically purposive way as well, according to chemical laws, through the deposition of the matter required for [350] organization.

But what directly proves the principle of the *ideality* of purposiveness in natural beauty—as the principle we always lay at the basis of aesthetic judgment itself, and which permits us to use no realism of an end of nature for our faculty of representation as a ground of explanation—is this: in judging beauty in general, we seek its standard *a priori* within ourselves, and the aesthetic power of judgment itself legislates in judging whether something is beautiful or not. This cannot take place if we assume the realism of nature's purposiveness, since then we would have to learn from nature what we should find beautiful, and the judgment of taste would be subject to empirical principles. For in such judging, what matters is not what nature is, or even what it is for us as an end, but how we receive it. If nature had fashioned its forms for our satisfaction, this would always be an objective purposiveness of nature, not a subjective purposiveness resting on the play of imagination in its freedom [A 253], where it is with favor that we receive nature, not favor that nature shows us. Nature's property of affording us an opportunity, in judging certain of its products, to perceive the inner purposiveness in the relation of our mental powers—and indeed a purposiveness that is to be declared necessary and universally valid from a supersensible ground—cannot be an end of nature, or rather cannot be judged by us as such. Otherwise the judgment determined by it would be heteronomous, and not, as befits a judgment of taste, free and grounded in autonomy.

In beautiful art the principle of the idealism of purposiveness can be recognized still more clearly. For that we cannot here assume an aesthetic realism of purposiveness through sensations (in which case it would be merely agreeable rather than beautiful art) is something it shares with beautiful nature. But that satisfaction through aesthetic ideas must not depend on the attainment of determinate ends (as mechanically intentional art), and consequently that even the rationalism of the principle rests on the ideality of ends, not their reality, is already evident from this: beautiful art as such must be regarded not as a [351] product of understanding and science, but of genius, and thus receives its rule through *aesthetic* ideas, which differ essentially from ideas of reason concerning determinate ends. [A 254]

Just as the *ideality* of objects of the senses as appearances is the only way to explain the possibility of determining their forms *a priori*, so too the *idealism* of purposiveness in judging the beauty of nature and art is the sole presupposition under which the critique can explain the possibility of a judgment of taste that demands *a priori* validity for everyone (without, however, grounding the purposiveness represented in the object on concepts).

59 *On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality.*

To establish the reality of our concepts, intuitions are always required. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called *examples*. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called *schemata*. If one goes so far as to demand that the objective reality of concepts of reason, that is, of ideas, be established for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, one asks the impossible, since absolutely no adequate intuition can be given for them.

All *hypotyposis* (presentation, *subiectio sub adspectum*, placing before the eyes), as a rendering sensible [A 255], is twofold: either *schematic*, where the intuition corresponding to a concept grasped by the understanding is given *a priori*; or *symbolic*, where a concept that only reason can think, and for which no sensible intuition can be adequate, is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of the power of judgment with it is merely analogous to the procedure it

follows in schematizing. That is, the two agree merely in the rule of this procedure, not in the intuition itself, and thus merely in the form of reflection, not in its content.

It is an incorrect use of the word *symbolic*, though accepted by modern logicians, and one that distorts its meaning, to oppose it to the *intuitive* manner of representation; for the symbolic is only a kind of the intuitive. The latter (the intuitive) can, namely, be divided into the *schematic* and the *symbolic* manner of representation. [352] Both are hypotyposes, that is, presentations (*exhibitiones*), not mere *characterizations*: designations of concepts through accompanying sensible signs that contain nothing belonging to the intuition of the object, but serve only as a means of reproducing those concepts according to the imagination's law of association, and thus for a subjective purpose. Such signs are either words or visible signs (algebraic, [A 256] even mimetic), as mere *expressions* for concepts[23].

All intuitions supplied to *a priori* concepts are thus either *schemata* or *symbols*, the former containing direct, the latter indirect presentations of the concept. The former do this demonstratively, the latter by means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are also used), in which the power of judgment performs a double task: first applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented by an animate body if it is governed according to the people's internal laws, but by a mere machine (a hand mill, for example) if it is governed by a single absolute will; in both cases, however, it is represented only *symbolically*. For although there is no resemblance between a despotic state and a hand mill, there is one between the rules for reflecting on the two and on their causality. This activity has so far been little analyzed, much as [A 257] it deserves deeper investigation; but this is not the place to dwell on it. Our language is full of such indirect presentations by analogy, in which the expression contains not the proper schema for the concept but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words *ground* (support, base), *depend* (be held from above), *flow from* (instead of follow), *substance* (as Locke puts it: the bearer of accidents),

and countless others are not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes, and expressions for concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only by analogy with it: that is, by transferring reflection on [353] an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond. If we may call a mere manner of representation cognition at all (which is permissible if it is a principle not for theoretically determining the object as it is in itself, but for practically determining what the idea of it is to become for us and for its purposive use), then all our cognition of God is merely symbolic. Whoever takes it as schematic, with the properties of understanding, will, and so on, which prove their objective reality only in beings within the world, falls into anthropomorphism; just as, if he leaves out everything intuitive, he falls into [A 258] deism, through which nothing whatever is cognized, not even in a practical respect.

Now I say: the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; and only in this respect (a relation natural to everyone, and which everyone also requires of others as a duty) does it please with a claim to everyone else's assent. In this the mind is at the same time conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere receptivity to pleasure through impressions of sense, and estimates the worth of others according to a similar maxim of their power of judgment. This is the *intelligible* toward which, as the preceding section indicated, taste looks: that with which even our higher cognitive faculties agree, and without which nothing but contradictions would arise between their nature and the claims taste makes. In this faculty the power of judgment does not, as it otherwise does in empirical judging, see itself subjected to a heteronomy of laws of experience. With regard to the objects of so pure a satisfaction, it gives itself the law, just as reason does with regard to the faculty of desire; and both because of this inner possibility in the subject and because of the outward possibility of a nature agreeing with it, it sees itself referred to something within the subject itself and outside it [A 259] that is neither nature nor freedom, yet is linked with the ground of the latter, namely the supersensible, in which the theoreti-

cal faculty is joined in unity with the practical in a shared and unknown way. We shall mention some points of this analogy, while also noting their differences.

1) The beautiful pleases *immediately* (but only in reflective [354] intuition, not, like morality, in a concept). 2) It pleases *without any interest* (the morally good is necessarily connected with an interest, but not one that precedes the judgment of satisfaction; rather, one first produced by it). 3) The *freedom* of imagination (and thus of the sensibility of our faculty) is represented, in judging the beautiful, as agreeing with the lawfulness of the understanding (in moral judgment the freedom of the will is thought as the will's agreement with itself according to universal laws of reason). 4) The subjective principle for judging the beautiful is represented as *universal*, that is, valid for everyone, yet not recognizable through any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is likewise declared universal, that is, valid for all subjects and also for all actions of the same subject, while recognizable through a universal concept). Hence [A 260] moral judgment is not merely capable of determinate constitutive principles, but is possible *only* through grounding maxims on these principles and their universality.

Attention to this analogy is also customary for common understanding; and we often give beautiful objects of nature or art names that seem to rest on moral judging. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or fields smiling and cheerful; even colors are called innocent, modest, tender, because they arouse sensations containing something analogous to consciousness of a state of mind brought about by moral judgments. Taste makes possible, as it were, the transition from sensory charm to habitual moral interest without too violent a leap, by representing imagination even in its freedom as determinable purposively for the understanding, and by teaching us to find a free satisfaction even in objects of the senses without sensory charm.

60 [A 261] *Appendix. On the Doctrine of Method for Taste.*

The division of a critique into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method, preceding the science, cannot be applied to the critique of taste [355], because there is and can be no science of the beautiful, and the judgment of taste cannot be determined by principles. For the scientific element in every art, which concerns *truth* in the presentation of its object, is indeed the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of beautiful art, but not beautiful art itself. Thus for beautiful art there is only a *manner* (*modus*), not a *method of instruction* (*methodus*). The master must demonstrate what the pupil is to accomplish and how; and the general rules under which he ultimately brings his procedure can serve rather to recall its chief features on occasion than to prescribe them to him. Yet attention must be paid here to a certain ideal that art must keep before its eyes, though it never fully attains it in practice. Only by awakening the pupil's imagination to adequacy to a given concept, by pointing out the inadequacy of [A 262] expression to the idea that the concept itself does not reach because it is aesthetic, and by exacting criticism, can we prevent him from immediately taking the examples set before him as archetypes and models for imitation, subject perhaps to no still higher norm or judgment of his own. Otherwise genius would be stifled, and with it the freedom of imagination itself in its lawfulness, without which no beautiful art is possible, nor even a correct taste of one's own for judging it.

The preparatory training for all beautiful art, insofar as its highest degree of perfection is intended, seems to lie not in precepts but in the cultivation of the mental powers through the preliminary studies called the *humanities*. This is presumably because *humanity* means, on the one hand, the universal *feeling of sympathy*, and on the other, the capacity to *communicate* intimately and universally. Together these qualities constitute the sociability appropriate to humanity, by which it differs from animal limitation. In ages and among peoples where the lively drive toward *law-governed* sociability, through which a people forms a lasting commonwealth, struggled with the great difficulties surrounding the hard task of uniting freedom (and thus equality) with [A 263] constraint (more of respect and submission from duty than of fear), such an age and such a people had [356] first to discover the art of reciprocal communi-

cation of ideas between the most cultivated part and the less refined; of attuning the breadth and refinement of the former to the natural simplicity and originality of the latter; and in this way of finding the mean between higher culture and self-sufficient nature that also constitutes the correct standard for taste as a universal human sense—a standard that cannot be stated through general rules. A later age will scarcely make those models dispensable, since it will stand ever farther from nature and may ultimately, without enduring examples of it, hardly be able to form a concept of the happy union, in one and the same people, of the lawful constraint of the highest culture with the strength and soundness of free nature conscious of its own worth.

But since taste is fundamentally a faculty for judging the rendering of moral ideas in sensible form (through a certain analogy of reflection on the two), and since from this, and from the greater receptivity to the feeling arising from those ideas (called moral feeling) that is to be grounded on it, there also derives the pleasure that taste declares valid for humanity in general, not merely for each person's private feeling [A 264], it is evident that the true preparatory training for establishing taste is the development of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought into agreement with this feeling can genuine taste assume a determinate, unchanging form.

Of the [A 265] [357] Critique of the Power of Judgment

22 Any judgment that announces itself as universal can be called a reasoning judgment (*iudicium ratiocinans*), for to that extent it can serve as the major premise in an inference of reason. A judgment of reason (*iudicium ratiocinatum*), on the other hand, can only be one that is thought as the conclusion of an inference of reason, and hence as grounded *a priori*.

23 The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive (not to the symbolic). The former is either *schematic* through *demonstration*, or *symbolic* as representation according to a mere *analogy*.

PART II

Introduction to Teleological Judgment

Second Part. Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.

61 [A 267] [359] *On the Objective Purposiveness of Nature.*

According to transcendental principles, we have good reason to assume a subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws for their comprehensibility by the human power of judgment, and for the possibility of connecting particular experiences into a system. Among nature's many products, we may then also expect as possible some containing specific forms suited to this power of judgment, as though expressly designed for it. Through their manifoldness and unity, these forms serve, as it were, to strengthen and sustain the mental powers (which are at play in the use of this faculty), and are therefore given the name of *beautiful* forms.

But that things in nature serve one another as means to ends, and that their possibility itself can be sufficiently understood only through this kind of causality, has no ground at all in the general idea of nature as the sum of the objects of the senses. For in the case above [A 268], the representation of things, being something within us, could quite well be thought *a priori* as suited and adapted to the inwardly purposive attunement of our cognitive faculties. But how ends that are not ours, and do not belong to nature either

(which we do not assume to be an intelligent being), can or should nevertheless constitute a special kind of causality, or at least an entirely peculiar lawfulness of it, cannot be presumed *a priori* on any ground whatever. What is more, even experience cannot prove their actuality to us, unless a piece of specious reasoning has preceded it, merely slipping the concept of an end into [360] the nature of things rather than drawing it from objects and our experiential cognition of them. Thus it uses that concept more to make nature comprehensible by analogy with a subjective ground for connecting representations within us than to cognize nature from objective grounds.

Moreover, objective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of things in nature, is so far from being *necessarily* connected with the concept of them that it is, rather, precisely what people chiefly appeal to in order to prove from it the contingency of nature and its form. For if, for example, we cite the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its bones, the position of its wings [A 269] for movement and its tail for steering, and so on, we say that all this is contingent in the highest degree according to the mere *nexus effectivus*, or connection of efficient causes, in nature, unless we enlist another special kind of causality, namely that of ends (*nexus finalis*, or connection of final causes). That is, nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have formed itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting upon precisely this unity according to such a principle. We may therefore hope to find even the slightest *a priori* ground for it only outside the concept of nature, not within it.

Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly brought into the investigation of nature, at least problematically; but only to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry by *analogy* with causality according to ends, without presuming to *explain* it thereby. It thus belongs to the reflective, not the determining power of judgment. The concept of connections and forms in nature according to ends is at least *one more principle* for bringing its appearances under rules where the laws of causality according to nature's mere mechanism do not suffice. For we adduce a teleological ground when we attribute causality with respect to an object to a concept of that object, as though the concept were in nature (not in us); or rather, when we represent the possibility of the

object to ourselves by analogy with such a causality [A 270] (as we find within ourselves), and thus think nature as *technical* through a capacity of its own. By contrast, if we do not attribute such a way of acting to it, its causality would have to be represented as blind mechanism. But if we were to place causes acting *intentionally* beneath nature, and thus ground [361] teleology not merely on a *regulative* principle for the mere *judging* of appearances, to which nature according to its particular laws could be thought subject, but also on a *constitutive* principle for *deriving* its products from their causes, then the concept of a natural end would no longer belong to the reflective but to the determining power of judgment. In that case, however, it would not in fact belong distinctively to the power of judgment at all (as does the concept of beauty as formal subjective purposiveness), but, as a concept of reason, would introduce into natural science a new causality, which we nevertheless borrow only from ourselves and attribute to other beings without wishing to assume that they are of the same kind as we are.

PART II

Analytic of Teleological Judgment

First Division. [A 271] [362] *Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.*

62 *On Objective Purposiveness That Is Merely Formal, as Distinguished from Material Purposiveness.*

All geometrical figures drawn according to a principle exhibit a manifold and often admired objective purposiveness: their fitness for solving many problems according to a single principle, and sometimes each of them in infinitely different ways. Here the purposiveness is plainly objective and intellectual, not merely subjective and aesthetic. For it expresses the figure's adequacy for producing many intended shapes, and is cognized by reason. Yet this purposiveness does not make the concept of the object itself possible; that is, the object is not regarded as possible solely with reference to this use.

A figure as simple as the circle contains the ground for [A 272] solving a multitude of problems, each of which by itself would require various preparations; the solution emerges, as it were, of itself as one of the infinitely many excellent properties of this figure. If, for example, the task is to construct a triangle from a given base and the angle opposite it, the problem is indeterminate: that is, it can be solved in infinitely many ways. Yet the circle embraces them all together, as the geometrical locus of all triangles meeting this condition. Or suppose two

lines are to intersect so that the rectangle formed from the two parts of one equals the rectangle formed from the two parts of the other: the solution seems to present many difficulties. But all lines intersecting within a circle whose [363] circumference bounds each of them divide themselves in this proportion. Other curved lines in turn furnish other purposive solutions that were not thought of at all in the rule constituting their construction. All conic sections, both by themselves and in comparison with one another, are fruitful in principles for solving a multitude of possible problems, however simple the explanation determining their concept.—It is a true joy to behold the zeal with which the ancient geometers investigated these properties of lines of this [A 273] kind, undeterred by the narrow-minded question of what use such knowledge might have. They studied, for example, the parabola without knowing the law of gravity on earth, which would have given them its application to the trajectory of heavy bodies (for which the direction of gravity during their motion can be regarded as parallel); or the ellipse, without suspecting that gravity was also to be found in heavenly bodies, and without knowing its law at different distances from the point of attraction, which makes them trace this line in free motion. While thus working unknowingly for posterity, they delighted in a purposiveness in the essence of things that they could nevertheless present wholly *a priori* in its necessity. Plato, himself a master of this science, was so inspired by this original constitution of things, which we need no experience to discover, and by the mind's capacity to draw the harmony of beings from their supersensible principle (to which we may add the properties of numbers, with which the mind plays in music), that he rose above experiential concepts to ideas that seemed to him explicable only through an intellectual communion with the origin of all beings. No wonder he excluded those ignorant of geometry from his school, since [A 274] he thought to derive from the pure intuition dwelling within the human mind what Anaxagoras inferred from objects of experience and their connection through ends. For the very ground of our great admiration of nature—not so much outside us as within our own reason—lies in the necessity of what is purposive and constituted as though intentionally arranged

for our use, yet seems originally to belong to the essence of things without regard to our use. It is surely [364] pardonable if, through misunderstanding, this admiration gradually rose even to enthusiasm run wild.

But although this intellectual purposiveness is objective (not subjective, like aesthetic purposiveness), its possibility can nevertheless be quite well understood, though only in general, as merely formal (not real): that is, as purposiveness without the need to place an end beneath it, and thus without any need of teleology. The figure of the circle is an intuition determined by the understanding according to a principle. The unity of this principle, which I freely assume and lay down as a concept, applied to a form of intuition (space) that is likewise found within me merely as a representation, and indeed *a priori*, makes comprehensible the unity of many rules arising from the construction of that concept and purposive for many possible [A 275] intentions, without any need to place an *end* or any other ground beneath this purposiveness. This is not like finding order and regularity among trees, flower beds, paths, and so forth in a collection of *things* outside me enclosed within certain boundaries, for example a garden. I cannot hope to infer these *a priori* from my delimitation of a space according to an arbitrary rule, because these are existing things, which must be given empirically if they are to be cognized, not a mere representation within me determined according to an *a priori* principle. Hence the latter, empirical purposiveness, as *real*, depends on the concept of an end.

But we can also understand very well, and recognize as legitimate, the ground for admiring a purposiveness perceived even in the essence of things (insofar as their concepts can be constructed). The manifold rules whose unity (from one principle) arouses this admiration are all synthetic, and do not follow from a *concept* of the object—for example, of the circle—but require that this object be given in intuition. This, however, gives the unity the appearance of having empirically an external ground of the rules distinct from our faculty of representation, so [A 276] that the object's agreement with the need for rules proper to the understanding appears contingent in itself, and thus possible only through an end expressly directed toward it. Now this very harmony [365], since despite all this purposiveness it is cognized not empirically but *a priori*,

should lead us of itself to see that space, through whose determination (by imagination in accordance with a concept) alone the object was possible, is not a property of things outside me but a mere manner of representation within me. Thus I *introduce purposiveness* into the figure I draw *in accordance with a concept*—that is, into my own manner of representing what is given to me externally, whatever it may be in itself—and am not empirically instructed about that purposiveness by the object; consequently I need no special end outside me in the object to account for it. But since this reflection already requires a critical use of reason, and therefore cannot immediately be contained in judging the object according to its properties, such judging directly furnishes me with nothing but the union of heterogeneous rules (even in what is dissimilar in them) in one principle. Without requiring a special ground for this outside my concept and my *a priori* representation in general, [A 277] I nevertheless cognize it *a priori* as true. Now *astonishment* is the mind's being struck by the incompatibility of a representation and the rule given through it with the principles already underlying the mind, and thus produces doubt whether one has seen or judged correctly; *admiration*, however, is astonishment that continually returns despite the disappearance of this doubt. The latter is therefore an entirely natural effect of that observed purposiveness in the essence of things (as appearances), and to that extent cannot be faulted. For not only is the agreement of that form of sensible intuition called space with the faculty of concepts, the understanding, inexplicable to us as to why it is precisely this and no other; it also enlarges the mind to have, as it were, an intimation of something lying beyond those sensible representations, in which, though unknown to us, the ultimate ground of that agreement may be found. We do not need to know this ground when we are concerned only with the formal purposiveness of our *a priori* representations; yet even having to look in that direction inspires admiration for the object that compels us to do so.

It is customary to call the properties mentioned, both of geometrical [366] figures and also of numbers, *beauty*, because of a certain *a priori* purposiveness for all kinds of cognitive use that is unexpected from the [A 278] simplicity of their construction. Thus we speak, for example, of this or that *beautiful* property of

the circle discovered in this or that way. Yet it is not through an aesthetic judgment that we find them purposive; not a judgment without a concept, bringing to notice a merely *subjective* purposiveness in the free play of our cognitive faculties, but an intellectual judgment according to concepts, which makes clearly cognizable an objective purposiveness: fitness for all kinds of ends, infinitely manifold. We should call it a *relative perfection* rather than a beauty of the mathematical figure. The designation *intellectual beauty* cannot properly be allowed at all, since otherwise either the word beauty would lose all determinate meaning, or intellectual satisfaction would lose all precedence over sensible satisfaction. We might sooner call a *demonstration* of such properties beautiful, since through it the understanding as the faculty of concepts and the imagination as the faculty of their *a priori* presentation feel strengthened (which, together with the precision reason introduces, is called its elegance). For here at least the satisfaction, though its ground lies in concepts, is subjective, whereas perfection carries with it an objective [A 279] satisfaction.

63 *On the Relative Purposiveness of Nature, as Distinguished from Its Inner Purposiveness.*

Experience leads our power of judgment to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness, that is, to the concept of an end of nature, only when we have to judge a relation of cause to effect[24] whose lawfulness we find ourselves able to comprehend only by [367] placing the idea of the effect beneath the causality of its cause, as the condition of the former's possibility underlying that causality itself. But this can happen in two ways: either by regarding the effect immediately as a product of art, or only as material for the art of other possible natural beings; hence either as an end or as a means for the purposive use of other causes. The latter purposiveness is called utility (for human beings), or also beneficialness (for every other [A 280] creature), and is merely relative, whereas the former is an inner purposiveness of the natural being.

Rivers, for example, carry along all kinds of earth useful for the growth of plants, depositing it sometimes inland, and often at their mouths. At some coasts the flood tide carries this silt over the land or deposits it along the shore;

and if human beings in particular help prevent the ebb tide from washing it away again, the fertile land increases and the plant kingdom gains a place where fish and shellfish had previously dwelt. Nature itself has probably accomplished most extensions of land of this kind, and still continues to do so, though slowly. —Now the question is whether this should be judged an end of nature because it has a utility for human beings. For its utility for the plant kingdom itself cannot be taken into account, since just as much is taken from sea creatures as accrues to the land's advantage.

Or, to give an example of the beneficialness of certain natural things as means for other creatures (if we presuppose these as ends): no soil is more favorable to pines than sandy soil. Now the ancient sea, before withdrawing from the land, left so many stretches of sand in our northern regions that extensive pine forests could [A 281] spring up on this soil, otherwise so useless for cultivation; and we often reproach our ancestors for recklessly destroying them. Here we may ask whether that ancient deposition of layers of sand was an end of nature for the sake of the pine forests possible upon them. This much is clear: if we assume these forests as an end of nature, we must also concede the sand to be one, but only a relative end, for which the ancient seashore and its withdrawal were in turn the means. For in the series of members subordinated to one another in a connection of ends, every intermediate member must be regarded as an [368] end (though not precisely as a final end), for which its immediate cause is the means. Likewise, if cattle, sheep, horses, and so on were to exist in the world, grass had to grow on earth; but salt plants also had to grow in sandy deserts if camels were to thrive, or these and other herbivorous species had to be found in abundance if there were to be wolves, tigers, and lions. Thus objective purposiveness grounded on beneficialness is not an objective purposiveness of things in themselves, as though sand could not in itself be understood as an effect of its cause, the sea, without placing an end beneath the latter and regarding the effect, namely the sand, as a work of art. It is a merely relative purposiveness, merely contingent for the thing itself to which it is attributed; [A 282] and although among the examples cited the grasses must in themselves be

judged as organized products of nature, and thus as artfully formed, in relation to the animals that feed on them they are nevertheless regarded as mere raw material.

But when a human being, through the freedom of his causality, finds natural things useful for his often foolish intentions (colorful bird feathers to adorn his clothing, colored earths or plant juices as makeup), or sometimes for a rational intention, as with the horse for riding, the ox—and in Minorca even the donkey and pig—for plowing, we cannot here assume even a relative natural end directed toward this use. For his reason knows how to make things agree with his arbitrary fancies, for which he himself was not even predestined by nature. Only *if* we assume that human beings were meant to live on earth must at least the means without which they could not subsist as animals, and even as rational animals (however low their degree), not be lacking; but then the natural things indispensable for this purpose would also have to be regarded as natural ends.

From this it is easy to see that external purposiveness (the beneficialness of a thing for others) can be regarded as an external natural end only on condition that the [A 283] existence of that to which it is immediately or remotely beneficial is itself an end of nature. But since this can never be established by mere contemplation of nature, it follows that relative purposiveness, [369] although hypothetically indicating natural ends, nevertheless warrants no absolute teleological judgment.

Snow protects crops in cold countries from frost; it facilitates communication among people (by sleds); the Laplander finds animals there that make this communication possible (reindeer), which find sufficient nourishment in a dry moss they must scrape out for themselves beneath the snow, yet are easily tamed and willingly allow themselves to be deprived of the freedom in which they could very well maintain themselves. For other peoples in the same frozen zone, the sea holds a rich supply of animals which, besides providing food and clothing, also supply fuel for warming their huts, while the sea as it were floats them the timber for their dwellings. Here, then, is an admirable convergence of so many relations of nature toward one end; and this is the Greenlander, the

Lapp, the Samoyed, the Yakut, and so on. But we do not see why human beings must live there at all. Thus to say that *for this reason* vapors fall from the air in the form of snow [A 284], that the sea has currents that wash timber grown in warmer lands toward those regions, and that large sea animals filled with oil are there, *because* the cause providing all these natural products is grounded on the idea of an advantage for certain pitiable creatures, would be a very bold and arbitrary judgment. For even if all this usefulness of nature were absent, we would find nothing lacking in the adequacy of natural causes to this constitution of things. Rather, even to demand such an arrangement and to impute such an end to nature would seem to us presumptuous and unconsidered, especially since only the greatest discord among human beings could have scattered them into such inhospitable regions in the first place.

64 *On the Distinctive Character of Things as Natural Ends.*

To see that a thing is possible only as an end—that is, that we must seek the causality of its origin not in the mechanism of nature but in a cause whose capacity to act is determined by concepts [370]—requires that its form be impossible according to mere laws of nature: laws, that is, which we can cognize through the understanding alone applied to objects of the senses. Instead, even empirical cognition of it in its cause and effect [A 285] must presuppose concepts of reason. This *contingency* of its form in relation to reason under all empirical laws of nature is itself a ground for assuming its causality as though it were possible only through reason. For reason, which must cognize the necessity of every form of a natural product if it is to comprehend even the conditions connected with its production, nevertheless cannot assume this necessity in the given form. Reason is then the faculty of acting according to ends (a will); and the object represented as possible only through such a faculty would be represented as possible only as an end.

If someone in a land that seemed uninhabited were to perceive a geometrical figure drawn in the sand, perhaps a regular hexagon, his reflection, in working toward a concept of it, would become aware through reason, however obscurely, of the unity of the principle of its production. Accordingly, he would judge

that neither the sand, the neighboring sea, the winds, nor animals with the footprints familiar to him, nor any other nonrational cause was a ground of the possibility of such a shape. For the contingency of its coinciding with such a concept, possible only in reason [A 286], would seem to him so infinitely great that it would be as good as if there were no natural law for it at all; consequently no cause in nature acting merely mechanically could contain the causality for such an effect. Only the concept of such an object, as a concept that reason alone can give and with which it can compare the object, could contain that causality. Hence the effect could be regarded altogether as an end, but not a natural end: that is, as a product of *art* (*vestigium hominis video*: I see a human footprint).

But to judge something cognized as a natural product nevertheless also as an end, and thus as a *natural end*, requires more—unless indeed this contains an outright contradiction. Provisionally I would say: a thing exists as a natural end *if it is cause and effect of itself* (though in a twofold sense); [371] for this involves a causality that cannot be connected with the mere concept of nature without placing an end beneath it, and even then can indeed be thought without contradiction, but cannot be comprehended. Before fully analyzing this idea of a natural end, we shall first elucidate its determination through an example.

First, a tree produces another tree according to a known natural law. But the tree it produces is of the same kind; [A 287] and thus it produces itself as a *kind*, in which, on the one hand as effect and on the other as cause, continually produced by itself and likewise often producing itself, it constantly preserves itself as a kind.

Second, a tree also produces itself as an *individual*. We admittedly call this kind of effect only growth; but this must be understood in a sense entirely different from any other increase in size according to mechanical laws, and must be regarded as equivalent to generation, though under another name. The plant first processes the matter it adds to itself into a quality peculiar to its kind, which the mechanism of nature outside it cannot supply, and further develops itself by means of a substance that, in its composition, is its own product. For

although, with regard to the components it receives from nature outside it, it must be regarded only as an educt, in the separation and recombination of this raw material there is such originality in the separating and formative faculty of this kind of natural being that all art remains infinitely far from it when it attempts to reproduce those products of the plant kingdom from the elements obtained by analyzing them, or even from the material nature supplies for their nourishment.

Third, a part of this creature also produces itself in such a way that [A 288] the preservation of one part depends reciprocally on the preservation of the others. A bud from a tree's leaf, grafted onto the branch of another, produces on an alien stock a growth of its own kind; so too does a graft on another trunk. Hence we can also regard every branch or leaf on the same tree as merely grafted or budded onto it, and thus as a tree existing in its own right, which merely attaches itself to another and feeds parasitically [372]. At the same time, although the leaves are products of the tree, they also preserve it in return; for repeated defoliation would kill it, and its growth depends on their effect upon the trunk. I shall mention only in passing nature's self-help in these creatures when they are injured, where the loss of a part needed to preserve neighboring parts is made good by the others; and the malformations or misshapen growths in which certain parts, because of defects or obstacles, form themselves in an entirely new way to preserve what exists and produce an anomalous creature—although these are among the most wonderful properties of organized creatures.

65 [A 289] *Things as Natural Ends Are Organized Beings.*

According to the character described in the preceding §, a thing that, as a natural product, is nevertheless to be cognized as possible only as a natural end must stand toward itself reciprocally as cause and effect. This is a somewhat improper and indeterminate expression, requiring derivation from a determinate concept.

A causal connection, insofar as it is thought merely through the understanding, is a linkage forming a series (of causes and effects) that always proceeds downward; and the things themselves that, as effects, presuppose others as their causes cannot at the same time be causes of these in return. This causal connection is called that of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). But we can also think a causal connection according to a concept of reason (of ends) which, considered as a series, would involve dependence both downward and upward: in it, the thing once designated as an effect nevertheless deserves, in the upward direction, the name of a cause of the very thing of which it is the effect. In the practical sphere (namely art), such a linkage is readily found: for example, although a house is the cause of the money received [A 290] as rent, conversely the representation of this possible income was the cause of the house's construction. Such a causal linkage is called that of final causes (*nexus finalis*). We might perhaps more aptly call the former the connection of [373] real causes, the latter that of ideal causes, since this designation also makes comprehensible that there can be no more than these two kinds of causality.

Now for a thing to be a natural end it is required, *first*, that its parts (in their existence and form) be possible only through their relation to the whole. For the thing itself is an end, and is therefore comprehended under a concept or idea that must determine *a priori* everything it is to contain. But insofar as a thing is thought possible only in this way, it is merely a work of art: the product of a rational cause distinct from its matter (its parts), whose causality (in procuring and combining the parts) is determined by its idea of a whole possible through them, and thus not by nature outside it.

But if a thing as a natural product is nevertheless to contain, within itself and its inner possibility, a relation to ends—that is, to be possible only as a natural end and without the causality of concepts belonging to rational beings outside it—then it is required, *second*, that its parts [A 291] combine into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of one another's form. For only in this way is it possible that, conversely and reciprocally, the idea of the whole should in turn determine the form and connection of all the parts: not as cause

—for then it would be a product of art—but, for the person judging it, as the ground of cognition of the systematic unity of the form and connection of all the manifold contained in the given matter.

Thus for a body to be judged, in itself and according to its inner possibility, as a natural end, it is required that its parts all reciprocally produce one another, both in their form and in their connection, and thus produce a whole through their own causality. The concept of this whole could in turn, conversely (in a being possessing the causality according to concepts appropriate to such a product), be the cause of it according to a principle; consequently the connection of *efficient causes* could at the same time be judged as an *effect through final causes*.

In such a product of nature, each part is thought as existing not only *through* all the others, but also *for the sake of the others* and of the whole—that is, as an instrument (organ). Yet this [374] is not enough (for it could also be an instrument of art and [A 292] thus be represented as possible only as an end in general). Rather, it must be thought as an organ *producing* the other parts (consequently each reciprocally producing the others), which no instrument of art can be, but only an instrument of nature, which supplies all the material for instruments, even those of art. Only then and for that reason can such a product, as an *organized* and *self-organizing* being, be called a *natural end*.

In a watch, one part is the instrument for moving the others, but one wheel is not the efficient cause of producing another; one part exists for the sake of another, but not through it. Hence the productive cause of the watch and its form is contained not in nature (in this matter), but outside it, in a being that can act according to ideas of a whole possible through its causality. Hence, too, one wheel in a watch does not produce another, still less does one watch produce other watches by using other matter for this purpose (organizing it). Thus it also does not replace parts removed from it by itself, compensate for a defect in its initial formation through the intervention of the remaining parts, or repair itself when it has fallen into disorder—all of which, by contrast, we can expect from organized nature.—An organized being is therefore not a mere machine, for that has only *motive* force; rather, it possesses [A 293] within itself

a *formative* force, and one that it communicates to materials that lack it (organizing them): thus a self-propagating formative force, which cannot be explained by the capacity for motion alone (mechanism).

We say far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products when we call this an *analogue* of *art*, for then we think of the artist (a rational being) as outside nature. Rather, nature organizes itself, and in every species of its organized products, according to one and the same model on the whole, yet also with suitable deviations required by self-preservation under the circumstances. We perhaps come closer to this inscrutable property by calling it an *analogue of life*. But then we must either endow matter as mere matter with a property (hylozoism) that conflicts with its essence, or associate with it an alien principle (a soul) *in communion with it* [375]. If such a product is to be a natural product, however, we must then either already presuppose organized matter as the instrument of that soul, thus making it no more comprehensible, or make the soul the artist of this structure and so remove the product from bodily nature. Strictly speaking, therefore, the [A 294] organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality we know[25]. The beauty of nature, since it is attributed to objects only in relation to reflection on their *outward* intuition, and thus only on account of the form of their surface, can rightly be called an analogue of art. But *inner natural perfection*, such as is possessed by things possible only as *natural ends* and therefore called organized beings, cannot be thought or explained by analogy with any physical—that is, natural—capacity known to us; indeed, since we ourselves belong to nature in the widest sense, not even through an exactly adequate analogy with human art.

The concept of a thing as in itself a natural end is therefore no constitutive concept of understanding or reason, but can nevertheless be a regulative concept for the reflective power of judgment: guiding inquiry into objects of this kind through a [A 295] remote analogy with our causality according to ends in general, and prompting reflection on their highest ground. The latter is not for the sake of knowledge of nature, or of that primordial ground of nature, but rather for the sake of that very practical faculty of reason within us with which we considered the cause of that purposiveness by analogy.

Organized beings are thus the only beings in nature that, even considered in themselves and without relation to other things, must nevertheless be thought possible only as ends of nature. They [376] therefore first give objective reality to the concept of an *end* that is not a practical end but an end *of nature*, and thereby furnish natural science with the basis for a teleology: a way of judging its objects according to a special principle, which we would otherwise have no right whatever to introduce into it, since we cannot comprehend *a priori* the possibility of such a kind of causality.

66 *On the Principle for Judging Inner Purposiveness in Organized Beings.*

This principle, which is also their definition, reads: *An organized product of nature is one in which everything is* [A 296] *an end and reciprocally also a means.* Nothing in it is in vain, without an end, or attributable to a blind mechanism of nature.

In its occasion, this principle is indeed to be derived from experience, namely experience conducted methodically and called observation. But because of the universality and necessity it asserts of such purposiveness, it cannot rest merely on experiential grounds; it must have some *a priori* principle at its basis, even if this were merely regulative and those ends lay solely in the idea of the judging person and nowhere in an efficient cause. We may therefore call the principle just stated a *maxim* for judging the inner purposiveness of organized beings.

It is well known that those who dissect plants and animals in order to investigate their structure and comprehend the reasons why and to what end such parts, such a position and connection of the parts, and precisely this inner form have been given to them, assume as indispensably necessary the maxim that nothing in such a creature is *in vain*. They uphold it just as they do the principle of general natural science that *nothing happens by chance*. Indeed, they can no more renounce this teleological principle than the general physical one, since just as abandoning the latter would leave no experience at all, [A 297] abandoning the former would leave no guiding thread for observing a kind of natural thing that we have once thought teleologically under the concept of natural ends.

377 For this concept leads reason into an entirely different order of things from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which no longer satisfies us here. An idea is to underlie the possibility of the natural product. But since this idea is an absolute unity of representation, whereas matter is a plurality of things that by itself can furnish no determinate unity of composition, the end of nature must extend to *everything* contained in its product if that unity of the idea is even to serve as the *a priori* determining ground of a natural law governing the causality of such a form of the composite. For once we refer an effect of this kind *as a whole* to a supersensible determining ground beyond nature's blind mechanism, we must also judge it entirely according to this principle. There is no ground for assuming the form of such a thing still to depend partly on the latter; for with such a mixture of heterogeneous principles, no secure rule of judging would remain.

It may well be that, for example, in an animal body certain [A 298] parts could be understood as concretions according to merely mechanical laws (such as skins, bones, and hair). Yet the cause that procures the suitable matter, modifies and forms it in this way, and deposits it in its proper places must always be judged teleologically, so that everything in the body must be regarded as organized, and everything is also, in a certain relation to the thing itself, in turn an organ.

67 *On the Principle of Teleological Judging of Nature in General as a System of Ends.*

We said above of the *external* purposiveness of natural things that it gives us no sufficient warrant to use them, as ends of nature, as grounds for explaining their existence, and to use their contingently purposive effects, in the idea of them, as grounds of their existence according to the principle of final causes. Thus we cannot immediately regard *rivers* as natural ends because they promote communication among peoples inland; *mountains*, because they contain the sources of these rivers and the stores of snow that sustain them in rainless seasons; or likewise the *slope* of the land, which drains these waters and allows the land [378] to become dry. For although [A 299] this shape of the earth's

surface was very necessary for the rise and preservation of the plant and animal kingdoms, it contains nothing whose possibility would force us to assume a causality according to ends. The same holds of plants that human beings use for their needs or enjoyment, and of animals—the camel, ox, horse, dog, and so on—which they can use in so many ways, partly for nourishment and partly for service, and can for the most part scarcely do without. Of things none of which we have reason to regard as an end in itself, the external relation can be judged purposive only hypothetically.

To judge a thing as a natural end because of its inner form is entirely different from holding the existence of that thing to be an end of nature. For the latter assertion we need not merely the concept of a possible end, but cognition of nature's final end (*scopus*), which requires a relation of nature to something supersensible far exceeding all our teleological cognition of nature; for the end of the existence of nature itself must be sought beyond nature. The inner form of a mere blade of grass can sufficiently prove, for our human faculty of judging, that its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But if we turn away from this and look only at the use other natural beings make of it, [A 300] abandoning the consideration of inner organization and looking only at external purposive relations—how grass is necessary for cattle, and cattle for human beings as a means of existence—while not seeing why human beings need to exist at all (which, if we think perhaps of the New Hollanders or Fuegians, may not be so easy to answer), we reach no categorical end. Rather, all this purposive relation rests on a condition that must continually be pushed farther back, and which, as unconditioned—the existence of a thing as final end—lies wholly outside the physical-teleological contemplation of the world. But then such a thing is also not a natural end, for it (or its entire kind) is not to be regarded as a natural product.

Thus only matter insofar as it is organized necessarily carries with it the concept of itself as a natural end, because this specific form of it is at the same time a product of nature. But this concept [379] now necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system according to the rule of ends, to which idea all mechanism of nature must now be subordinated according to principles of rea-

son (at least to test natural appearances by it). The principle of reason belongs to it only subjectively, that is, as a maxim: everything in the world is good for something; nothing in it is in vain. And we are [A 301] entitled, indeed called upon, by the example nature gives in its organic products, to expect from nature and its laws nothing but what is purposive in the whole.

It goes without saying that this is a principle not for the determining but only for the reflective power of judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive, and that through it we gain only a guiding thread for considering natural things in relation to an already given determining ground, according to a new lawful order, and for extending the study of nature according to another principle, namely that of final causes, yet without prejudice to the mechanism of its causality. Moreover, this by no means establishes whether anything we judge according to this principle is *intentionally* an end of nature: whether grasses exist for the ox or sheep, and whether these and the other natural things exist for human beings. It is good to consider from this side even things unpleasant to us and counterpurposive in particular relations. Thus we might say, for example, that the vermin plaguing people in their clothing, hair, or beds are, by a wise arrangement of nature, an incentive to cleanliness, which in itself is already an important means of preserving health. Or that mosquitoes and other biting insects, which make the wildernesses of America [A 302] so troublesome for its savages, are so many spurs to activity for these developing human beings, to drain the marshes and thin the dense forests that block the airflow, thereby, and also through cultivating the soil, making their dwelling places healthier. Even what seems unnatural in a human being's inner organization, if treated in this way, affords an entertaining and sometimes instructive prospect into a teleological order of things, to which purely physical consideration alone would not lead us without such a principle. Just as some judge the tapeworm to have been given to the human being or animal it inhabits as a kind of compensation for a certain deficiency in the vital organs [380], so I would ask whether dreams (without which there is never sleep, though we only rarely remember them) might not be a purposive arrangement of nature. When all the bodily motive forces relax, dreams serve, through imagination and its great activity (which in

this state usually rises to affect), to move the vital organs inwardly; just as imagination generally plays all the more vividly in nighttime sleep when the stomach is overfull, when this movement is all the more necessary. Consequently, without this inwardly moving force and wearying unrest for which we reproach dreams (though [A 303] they may in fact be remedies), sleep even in a healthy state might perhaps be a complete extinction of life.

The beauty of nature too—that is, its accord with the free play of our cognitive faculties in apprehending and judging its appearance—can in this way be regarded as objective purposiveness of nature in its entirety, as a system of which the human being is a member: once the teleological judging of nature, through the natural ends furnished by organized beings, has entitled us to the idea of a great system of nature's ends. We can regard it as a favor[26] nature has shown us that, beyond what is useful, it has distributed beauty and charms so abundantly; and we can love it for this, just as we regard it with respect for its immeasurability and feel ourselves ennobled [A 304] in contemplating it—just as though nature had erected and adorned its magnificent stage expressly for this purpose.

In this § we mean to say only that, once we have discovered in nature a capacity to bring forth products that we can think only according to the concept of final causes, we may go further and judge even those products which (or whose relations, though purposive [381]) do not actually make it necessary to seek another principle of their possibility beyond the mechanism of blindly acting causes as nevertheless belonging to a system of ends. For the first idea already leads us, as regards its ground, beyond the world of sense; and then the unity of the supersensible principle must be regarded as valid in the same way not merely for certain species of natural beings, but for nature as a whole as a system.

68 *On the Principle of Teleology as an Internal Principle of Natural Science.*

The principles of a science are either internal to it and called indigenous (*principia domestica*), or founded on concepts that can have a place only outside it, and are *foreign* principles (*peregrina*). Sciences containing the latter [A 305]

base their doctrines on borrowed propositions (*lemmata*): that is, they borrow some concept, and with it a ground for their ordering, from another science.

Every science is in itself a system; and it is not enough to build within it according to principles, and thus proceed technically. We must also proceed architectonically with it as a self-standing structure, treating it not as an addition and part of another building, but as a whole in its own right, even though afterward a passage may be established from this one into that one, or reciprocally.

Thus if we bring the concept of God into natural science and its context in order to explain purposiveness in nature, and then use this purposiveness in turn to prove that there is a God, neither science has any internal stability. A deceptive circular argument renders each uncertain by allowing their boundaries to run into one another.

The expression "an end of nature" already sufficiently prevents this confusion, keeping natural science and the occasion it gives for *teleological* judging of its objects from being mingled with the contemplation of God and thus with a *theological* derivation. We must not regard it as insignificant whether we confuse that expression [A 306] [382] with a divine end in the arrangement of nature, or even declare the latter more fitting and more suited to a devout soul, since in the end it must supposedly come to deriving those purposive forms in nature from a wise author of the world. Rather, we must carefully and modestly restrict ourselves to the expression that says precisely as much as we know: an end of nature. For before we even ask about the cause of nature itself, we find in nature and in the course of its generation products of this sort, generated within it according to known experiential laws. Natural science must judge its objects according to these laws, and must therefore also seek their causality according to the rule of ends within nature itself. Hence it must not overstep its boundary by drawing in as an indigenous principle something for whose concept no experience can be adequate, and which we are entitled to venture upon only after natural science is complete.

Properties of nature that can be demonstrated *a priori*, and whose possibility can thus be understood from general principles without any contribution from experience, cannot, although they involve a technical purposiveness, be

counted as belonging to the teleology of nature as a method within physics for solving its questions, because they are absolutely necessary. Arithmetical and [A 307] geometrical analogies, as well as universal mechanical laws, however surprising and admirable we may find their uniting in one principle various rules seemingly quite independent of one another, have no claim on that account to be teleological grounds of explanation in physics. And although they deserve consideration within the general theory of the purposiveness of things in nature as such, this theory would belong elsewhere, namely to metaphysics, and would constitute no internal principle of natural science. By contrast, with the empirical laws of natural ends in organized beings, it is not only permissible but unavoidable to use the teleological *manner of judging* as a principle of natural science with respect to a particular class of its objects.

Now for physics to remain precisely within its boundaries, it abstracts entirely from the question whether natural ends are such *intentionally* or *unintentionally*, for this would be interference in a foreign business [383], namely that of metaphysics. It is enough that these are objects *explicable* solely according to natural laws that we can think only under the idea of ends as a principle, and *cognizable* in their inner form [A 308], indeed even inwardly at all, only in this way. Thus, to avoid even the slightest suspicion of presuming to mingle with our grounds of cognition something that does not belong to physics at all, namely a supernatural cause, in teleology we speak of nature as though its purposiveness were intentional, yet at the same time attribute this intention to nature itself, that is, to matter. Since there can be no misunderstanding here—no one will of himself attribute intention in the proper sense to lifeless matter—we thereby mean to indicate that this word signifies here only a principle of the reflective, not the determining power of judgment. It is therefore not to introduce a special ground of causality, but merely to add, for reason's use, a mode of inquiry different from that according to mechanical laws, supplementing the inadequacy of the latter even for the empirical search for all the particular laws of nature. Hence in teleology, insofar as it is brought into physics, we speak quite rightly of nature's wisdom, economy, foresight, and beneficence, without thereby making it an intelligent being (which would be absurd), but

also without daring to place another intelligent being above it as its artificer, since this would be presumptuous[27] [A 309]. Rather, this is intended only to designate a kind of causality of nature by analogy with our own in the technical use of reason, so that we may keep before our eyes the rule according to which certain products of nature must be investigated.

But why does teleology usually constitute no separate part of theoretical natural science, being instead assigned to theology as a preparation or transition? This is done to keep the

384 study of nature according to its mechanism firmly attached to what we can subject to our observation or experiments in such a way that we could ourselves produce it like nature, at least with respect to similarity of laws; for we fully comprehend only what we can ourselves make and bring about according to concepts. But organization as an inner end of nature infinitely surpasses every capacity for a similar presentation through art; and as for external arrangements of nature held [A 310] to be purposive (winds, rain, and the like), physics does indeed consider their mechanism, but cannot at all present their relation to ends insofar as this is supposed to be a condition necessarily belonging to the cause. For this necessity of connection concerns entirely the connection of our concepts and not the constitution of things.

24 Since pure mathematics cannot concern the existence but only the possibility of things, namely an intuition corresponding to their concept, and thus cannot concern cause and effect at all, all purposiveness noted there must consequently be regarded as merely formal, never as a natural end.

25 Conversely, a certain connection, though found more in the idea than in actuality, can be illuminated through an analogy with the immediate natural ends mentioned. Thus, in a recently undertaken complete transformation of a great people into a state, the word *organization* has frequently and very aptly been used for the establishment of the magistracies and so forth, and even of the whole body politic. For in such a whole each member should indeed be not

merely a means but also an end, and, while contributing to the possibility of the whole, should in turn have its place and function determined by the idea of the whole.

26 In the aesthetic part it was said that *we regard beautiful nature with favor*, since we take an entirely free (disinterested) satisfaction in its form. For in this mere judgment of taste no account at all is taken of the end for which these natural beauties exist: whether to awaken pleasure in us, or without any relation to us as ends. In a teleological judgment, however, we also attend to this relation; and there we can *regard it as a favor of nature* that, by displaying so many beautiful forms, it has wished to further our cultivation.

27 The German word *vermessen*—presumptuous—is a good and meaningful word. A judgment in which one forgets to measure the reach of one's powers (of understanding) may sometimes sound very humble, yet makes great claims and is very presumptuous. Of this kind are most judgments through which people profess to exalt divine wisdom by attributing to it intentions in the works of creation and preservation that are really meant to honor the reasoner's own wisdom.

PART II

Dialectic of Teleological Judgment

Second Division. [A 311] [385] *Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.*

69 *What an Antinomy of the Power of Judgment Is.*

The *determining* power of judgment has in itself no principles that ground *concepts of objects*. It is not autonomous, for it only *subsumes* under given laws or concepts as principles. For that very reason it is also exposed to no danger of an antinomy of its own and no conflict of its principles. Thus the transcendental power of judgment, which contained the conditions for subsuming under categories, was not in itself *legislative*; it merely specified the conditions of sensible intuition under which reality (application) can be given to a given concept as a law of the understanding. In this it could never fall into disagreement with itself, at least as regards principles.

But the *reflective* power of judgment is to subsume under a law [A 312] that is not yet given, and is thus in fact only a principle of reflection on objects for which, objectively, we entirely lack a law, or a concept of the object sufficient as a principle for the cases that arise. Now since no use of the cognitive faculties may be allowed without principles, the reflective power of judgment must in such cases serve as its own principle. Because this principle is not objective and cannot supply a ground of cognition of the object sufficient for the purpose, it

is to serve as a merely subjective principle for the purposive use of the cognitive faculties, namely for reflecting on a kind of object. Thus in relation to such cases the reflective power of judgment has its maxims, and indeed necessary ones, for the cognition of natural laws [386] in experience, so as to arrive through them at concepts, even if these should be concepts of reason, if it absolutely needs such concepts merely to become acquainted with nature according to its empirical laws.—Between these necessary maxims of the reflective power of judgment there can now be a conflict, and thus an antinomy, grounding a dialectic. If each of two conflicting maxims is grounded in the nature of the cognitive faculties, this can be called a natural dialectic and an [A 313] unavoidable semblance, which must be exposed and resolved in the critique so that it does not deceive.

70 *Presentation of This Antinomy.*

Insofar as reason deals with nature as the sum of the objects of the outer senses, it can base itself on laws that the understanding partly prescribes to nature itself *a priori*, and partly can extend indefinitely through the empirical determinations occurring in experience. For applying laws of the first kind, namely the *universal* laws of material nature in general, the power of judgment needs no special principle of reflection; for here it is determining, because an objective principle is given to it by the understanding. But as regards particular laws, which can become known to us only through experience, there may be such great variety and heterogeneity among them that the power of judgment must serve as its own principle even to search for and discern a law in nature's appearances. It needs such a principle as a guiding thread if it is even to hope for a connected experiential cognition according to a thoroughgoing lawfulness of nature, a unity of nature according to empirical laws. With this contingent unity of particular laws, it may now happen that [A 314] the power of judgment proceeds in its reflection from two maxims, one furnished *a priori* by the understanding alone, the other occasioned by particular experiences that bring reason into play in order to judge corporeal nature and its laws according to a

special principle. It then happens that these two kinds of maxim seem unable to coexist [387], and thus a dialectic emerges that confuses the power of judgment in the principle of its reflection.

Its first maxim is the *thesis*: all production of material things and their forms must be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Its second maxim is the *antithesis*: some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes).

If we were now to transform these regulative principles for inquiry into constitutive principles of the possibility of the objects themselves, they would read:

Thesis: all production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Antithesis: some production of them is not possible according to merely mechanical [A 315] laws.

In this latter capacity, as objective principles for the determining power of judgment, they would contradict one another, and thus one of the two propositions would necessarily be false. But although this would then be an antinomy, it would not be one of the power of judgment, but a conflict in reason's legislation. Reason, however, can prove neither of these principles, because we can have no determining *a priori* principle concerning the possibility of things according to merely empirical laws of nature.

By contrast, the maxim of a reflective power of judgment presented first contains in fact no contradiction at all. For when I say that I must *judge* all events in material nature, and thus also all forms as its products, with regard to their possibility according to merely mechanical laws, I do not thereby say that they *are possible according to these alone*, to the exclusion of every other kind of causality. Rather, this means only that I *should* always *reflect* on them *according to the principle* of the mere mechanism of nature, and thus investigate this as far as I can, since without laying it at the basis of inquiry there can be no cognition of nature proper at all. Now this does not hinder the second maxim, when occasion arises, from seeking out a principle for certain natural forms (and [A 316], on their occasion, even for nature as a whole) and [388] reflecting on

them according to it—a principle entirely different from explanation according to nature's mechanism, namely that of final causes. For reflection according to the first maxim is not thereby annulled; rather, we are commanded to pursue it as far as we can. Nor does this say that those forms would be impossible according to nature's mechanism. It asserts only that *human reason*, in following that maxim and proceeding in this way, will never be able to discover the slightest ground of what constitutes the specific character of a natural end, though it can discover other cognitions of natural laws. It remains undecided whether, in the inner ground of nature itself unknown to us, physical-mechanical connection and connection through ends in the same things might not be linked in one principle. Only, our reason is not capable of uniting them in such a principle, and the power of judgment, therefore, as *reflective* (from a subjective ground), not as determining (according to an objective principle of the possibility of things in themselves), is compelled to think, as the ground of the possibility of certain forms in nature, a principle other than that of nature's mechanism.

71 [A 317] *Preparation for Resolving the Above Antinomy.*

We can in no way prove the impossibility of producing organized natural products through the mere mechanism of nature. For we cannot comprehend the infinite variety of particular natural laws, which are contingent for us because they are cognized only empirically, according to their first inner ground; and thus we can never reach the inner, thoroughly sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature, which lies in the supersensible. Whether, then, nature's productive capacity is not as sufficient for what we judge formed or connected according to the idea of ends as for what we believe requires merely a machinery of nature; and whether things as genuine natural ends (as we must necessarily judge them) actually rest on an entirely different kind of original causality that cannot be contained in material nature or its intelligible substrate, namely an architectonic understanding [389]—on this our reason, very narrowly limited with regard to the concept of causality when it is to be specified *a priori*, can give no information whatever.—But it is equally and indubitably certain

that, relative to our cognitive faculty, the mere mechanism of nature can furnish no ground for explaining the production [A 318] of organized beings. *For the reflective power of judgment*, therefore, this is an entirely correct principle: for the so manifest connection of things according to final causes, we must think a causality distinct from mechanism, namely that of an (intelligent) cause of the world acting according to ends—however rash and unprovable this principle would be *for the determining power of judgment*. In the former case it is a mere maxim of the power of judgment, in which the concept of that causality is a mere idea to which we in no way undertake to concede reality, but which we use only as a guiding thread for reflection. This reflection always remains open to all mechanical grounds of explanation and does not lose itself beyond the world of sense. In the second case the principle would be an objective one prescribed by reason, to which the power of judgment would have to submit determinatively; but in doing so it loses itself beyond the world of sense in the transcendent, and is perhaps led astray.

Thus every appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of the properly physical (mechanical) and the teleological (technical) modes of explanation rests on confusing a principle of the reflective power of judgment with one of the determining power, and the *autonomy* of the former (which holds merely subjectively for our use of reason with regard to particular [A 319] experiential laws) with the *heteronomy* of the latter, which must conform to the laws, universal or particular, given by the understanding.

72 *On the Various Systems Concerning the Purposiveness of Nature.*

No one has yet doubted the correctness of the principle that certain things in nature (organized beings) and their possibility must be judged according to the concept of final causes, even if we require only a *guiding thread* for learning their constitution through observation, without venturing as far as an investigation of their first origin [390]. The question can therefore only be whether this principle is merely subjectively valid—that is, merely a maxim of our power of judgment—or an objective principle of nature, according to which nature

possesses, beyond its mechanism (according to mere laws of motion), another kind of causality, namely that of final causes, under which the former causes (the motive forces) would stand only as intermediate causes.

Now we could leave this question or problem entirely undecided and unresolved for speculation, because, if we content ourselves in speculation with the bounds of mere cognition of nature, those maxims suffice for studying nature as far as human [A 320] powers reach and tracing its most hidden secrets. It is therefore perhaps a certain intimation of our reason, or a hint nature has as it were given us, that through this concept of final causes we might even reach beyond nature and connect nature itself to the highest point in the series of causes, if we abandoned the investigation of nature (although we have not yet advanced far in it), or at least suspended it for a time, and first tried to discover where that stranger in natural science, the concept of natural ends, leads.

Here, admittedly, that undisputed maxim would have to pass into a problem opening a wide field of controversy: whether the connection of ends in nature *proves* a special kind of causality for nature; or whether, considered in itself and according to objective principles, this connection is not rather identical with nature's mechanism, or rests on one and the same ground. Only, since this ground is often hidden too deeply for our inquiry in certain natural products, we try a subjective principle, namely that of art, that is, causality according to ideas, to place beneath nature by analogy. This expedient succeeds in many cases, and seems to fail in some; but in no case does it entitle us to introduce into natural science a special mode of action distinct from [A 321] causality according to merely mechanical laws of nature itself. Calling nature's procedure (its causality) a technique because of the resemblance to ends we find in its products, we shall divide this into *intentional* (*technica intentionalis*) and *unintentional* (*technica naturalis*). The first is to mean that nature's productive [391] capacity according to final causes must be held to be a special kind of causality; the second, that it is fundamentally quite identical with nature's mechanism, and that its accidental coincidence with our concepts of art and their rules, as merely subjective conditions for judging it, is falsely interpreted as a special kind of natural production.

When we now speak of systems for explaining nature with regard to final causes, we must note carefully that they all dispute dogmatically with one another, that is, about objective principles of the possibility of things, whether through intentionally acting causes or through wholly unintentionally acting ones, not about the subjective maxim for merely judging the cause of such purposive products. In the latter case *disparate* principles could still be reconciled, whereas in the former *contradictorily opposed* principles cancel one another [A 322] and cannot coexist.

The systems concerning nature's technique, that is, its productive force according to the rule of ends, are twofold: the *idealism* or the *realism* of natural ends. The former asserts that all purposiveness of nature is *unintentional*; the latter, that some of it (in organized beings) is *intentional*. From this we could also draw the hypothetical consequence that nature's technique, even concerning all its other products in relation to nature as a whole, is intentional, that is, an end.

1) The *idealism* of purposiveness (by which I always mean objective purposiveness here) is either that of the *chance* or that of the *fatality* of nature's determination in the purposive form of its products. The former principle concerns the relation of matter to the physical ground of its form, namely the laws of motion; the latter concerns its *hyperphysical* ground and that of nature as a whole. Taken literally, the system of *chance*, attributed to Epicurus or Democritus, is so plainly absurd that it need not detain us. The system of fatality, however (of which Spinoza is made the author, although to all appearances it is much older), appeals to something supersensible, beyond the reach of our insight [A 323], and is not so easily refuted, because its concept of the original being cannot be understood at all. This much, however, is clear: the connection of ends in the world must in this system be assumed as unintentional [392], since it is derived from an original being, but not from its understanding, and thus from no intention of that being, but from the necessity of its nature and the unity of the world stemming from it. Hence the fatalism of purposiveness is at the same time an idealism of it.

2) The *realism* of nature's purposiveness is likewise either physical or hyperphysical. The *first* grounds ends in nature on an analogue of a capacity acting intentionally: the *life of matter* (within it, or through an animating inner principle, a world soul), and is called *hylozoism*. The *second* derives them from the original ground of the universe as an intelligent being producing intentionally (originally living), and is *theism*.[28]

73 [A 324] *None of the Above Systems Accomplishes What It Claims.*

What do all these systems intend? They intend to explain our teleological judgments about nature, and proceed in such a way that one side denies their truth, thus declaring them an idealism of nature (represented as art); the other recognizes them as true and promises to establish the possibility of a nature according to the idea of final causes.

1) The systems arguing for the idealism of final causes in nature do, on the one hand, admit in their principle a causality according to laws of motion (through which natural things exist purposively); but they deny its *intentionality*: [393] that it is intentionally determined to this purposive production, or, in other words, that an end is the cause. This is Epicurus's mode of explanation, which entirely denies the distinction between a technique of nature and mere mechanics, and assumes blind chance as the ground of explanation not only for the agreement of the products generated with our concepts of an [A 325] end, and thus for the technique, but even for the determination of the causes of this generation according to laws of motion, and thus for their mechanics. Consequently it explains nothing, not even the semblance in our teleological judgment, and thus by no means establishes the alleged idealism in it.

On the other hand, *Spinoza* seeks to spare us all inquiry into the ground of the possibility of natural ends, and to deprive this idea of all reality, by treating them not as products at all but as accidents inhering in an original being. To this being, as the substrate of those natural things, he attributes not causality with regard to them, but mere subsistence. And because of its unconditional necessity, together with all natural things as accidents inhering in it, he does indeed secure for natural forms the unity of ground required for all purposive-

ness; but at the same time he takes away their contingency, without which no *unity of ends* can be thought, and with it everything *intentional*, just as he takes all understanding away from the primordial ground of natural things.

But Spinozism does not accomplish what it intends. It intends to provide a ground for explaining the connection of ends (which it does not deny) among things in nature, and merely names the unity of the subject in which they all inhere. But even if we grant him this manner of existence for beings in the world [A 326], that ontological unity is not thereby immediately a *unity of ends*, and by no means makes the latter comprehensible. For the latter is an entirely special kind of unity, which does not follow at all from the connection of things (beings in the world) in one subject (the original being), but necessarily involves relation to a *cause* possessing understanding. Even if we united all these things in a simple subject, this would never present a relation of ends unless we thought them, first, as internal *effects* of the substance as a *cause*, and second, of that same substance as a cause *through its understanding*. Without these formal conditions, all unity is mere natural necessity, and if nevertheless attributed to things we [394] represent as external to one another, blind necessity. But if one wishes to call what the schools call the transcendental perfection of things (in relation to their own essence)—according to which all things have in themselves everything required to be such a thing and no other—the purposiveness of nature, this is a childish game with words instead of concepts. For if all things must be thought as ends, so that being a thing and being an end are identical, then fundamentally there is nothing that deserves to be represented particularly as an end.

From this we can readily see that Spinoza, by tracing our concepts [A 327] of the purposive in nature back to our consciousness of ourselves in an all-encompassing (yet at the same time simple) being, and seeking that form merely in the unity of this being, must have intended to assert not the realism but merely the idealism of nature's purposiveness. Yet even this he could not accomplish, since the mere representation of the unity of the substrate cannot produce even the idea of a purposiveness that is only unintentional.

2) Those who not merely assert the *realism* of natural ends but also think they can explain it believe themselves able to comprehend a special kind of causality, namely that of intentionally acting causes, at least in its possibility; otherwise they could not undertake to explain it. For even to be entitled to the boldest hypothesis, at least the *possibility* of what one assumes as a ground must be *certain*, and one must be able to secure the objective reality of its concept.

But the possibility of living matter (a concept containing a contradiction, since lifelessness, *inertia*, constitutes matter's essential character) cannot even be thought. The possibility of animated matter, and of nature as a whole as an animal, can be used only meagerly [A 328] for a hypothesis of purposiveness in nature at large, insofar as it is revealed to us in experience in nature's organization on a small scale; it can by no means be comprehended *a priori* in its possibility. Thus one must reason in a circle in explaining if one wishes to derive nature's purposiveness in organized beings from the life of matter, yet in turn knows this life only in organized beings, and so without [395] such experience can form no concept of its possibility. Hylozoism therefore does not accomplish what it promises.

Finally, *theism* can no more establish dogmatically the possibility of natural ends as a key to teleology, although it has this advantage over all other grounds of explanation: through an understanding that it attributes to the original being, it best rescues nature's purposiveness from idealism and introduces an intentional causality for its production.

For we would first have to prove, sufficiently for the determining power of judgment, the impossibility of a unity of ends in matter through its mere mechanism, in order to be entitled to place its ground beyond nature in a determinate way. But we can establish no more than this: given the constitution and limits of our cognitive faculties (since we do not comprehend the first, inner ground even of this mechanism), we [A 329] must in no way seek a principle of determinate relations of ends in matter; rather, for us no way of judging the production of its products as natural ends remains except through a supreme

understanding as cause of the world. But this is only a ground for the reflective, not for the determining power of judgment, and can warrant no objective assertion whatever.

74 *The Cause of the Impossibility of Treating the Concept of a Technique of Nature Dogmatically Is the Inexplicability of a Natural End.*

We proceed dogmatically with a concept (even if it should be empirically conditioned) when we regard it as contained under another concept of the object constituting a principle of reason, and determine it accordingly. But we proceed with it merely critically when we consider it only in relation to our cognitive faculty, and thus to the subjective conditions for thinking it, without undertaking to decide anything about its object. Thus the dogmatic procedure with a concept is the one lawful for the determining power of judgment, the critical procedure the one lawful merely for the reflective power.

396 Now the concept of a thing as a natural end is a concept [A 330] that subsumes nature under a causality thinkable only through reason, in order to judge according to this principle what is given of the object in experience. But to use it dogmatically for the determining power of judgment, we would first have to be assured of the objective reality of this concept, since otherwise we could subsume no natural thing under it. The concept of a thing as a natural end is indeed empirically conditioned—that is, possible only under certain conditions given in experience—but it cannot be abstracted from experience; rather, it is possible only according to a principle of reason in judging the object. Hence, as such a principle, it cannot at all be comprehended in its objective reality (that is, that an object is possible in accordance with it) or dogmatically established; and we do not know whether it is merely a reasoning and objectively empty concept (*conceptus ratiocinans*), or a concept of reason grounding cognition and confirmed by reason (*conceptus ratiocinatus*). Thus it cannot be treated dogmatically for the determining power of judgment: that is, not only can it not be established whether things in nature, considered as natural ends, require for their production a causality of an entirely special kind (according to intentions), or not; the question cannot even be asked, because the concept of a [A

331] natural end is not provable by reason in its objective reality at all (that is, it is not constitutive for the determining power of judgment, but merely regulative for the reflective).

That it is not constitutive is clear because, as the concept of a *natural product*, it embraces natural necessity and yet at the same time a contingency of the object's form (in relation to mere laws of nature) in one and the same thing as an end. Consequently, if this is to contain no contradiction, it must contain a ground for the possibility of the thing in nature, yet also a ground for the possibility of this nature itself and its relation to something that is not empirically cognizable nature (something supersensible), and thus not cognizable by us at all, if the thing is to be judged according to a kind of causality other than nature's mechanism when we seek to establish its possibility. Since, therefore, the concept of a thing as a natural end is transcendent *for the determining power of judgment* when the object is considered through reason (although it may be immanent for the reflective power of judgment with regard to [397] objects of experience), and consequently cannot be furnished with objective reality for determining judgments, we can understand how all the systems one might devise for the dogmatic treatment of the concept of natural ends, and of nature as [A 332] a whole connected through final causes, can decide nothing either objectively affirmatively or objectively negatively. For when things are subsumed under a concept that is merely problematic, its synthetic predicates (here, for example, whether the end of nature that we think for the production of things is intentional or unintentional) must yield equally problematic judgments about the object, whether affirmative or negative, since we do not know whether we are judging about something or nothing. The concept of causality through ends (of art) certainly has objective reality, and so does the concept of causality according to nature's mechanism. But the concept of a causality of nature according to the rule of ends, and still more that of a being that cannot be given to us in experience at all, namely such a being as the primordial ground of nature, can indeed be thought without contradiction, yet cannot serve for dogmatic determinations: since it can neither be drawn from experience nor is required for the possibility of experience, its objective reality can be

secured through nothing. But even if this were done, how could I still count things explicitly declared products of divine art among the products of nature, whose inability to bring forth such things according to its [A 333] laws was precisely what made the appeal to a cause distinct from it necessary?

75 *The Concept of an Objective Purposiveness of Nature Is a Critical Principle of Reason for the Reflective Power of Judgment.*

It is quite a different thing whether I say: the production of certain things in nature, or even of nature as a whole, is possible only through a cause that determines itself to act according to intentions; or: *given the distinctive constitution of my cognitive faculties*, I cannot judge the possibility of those things and their [398] production otherwise than by thinking for it a cause acting according to intentions, and thus a being productive by analogy with the causality of an understanding. In the first case I mean to establish something about the object and am obliged to demonstrate the objective reality of an assumed concept; in the second, reason determines only the use of my cognitive faculties in accordance with their distinctive character and the essential conditions both of their scope and of their limits. Thus the first principle is an *objective* principle for the determining power of judgment; the second a subjective principle merely for the reflective power, and hence a maxim [A 334] that reason imposes on it.

For we indispensably need to place the concept of an intention beneath nature if we wish to investigate it through continued observation even only in its organized products; and this concept is therefore already an absolutely necessary maxim for the experiential use of our reason. Clearly, once such a guiding thread for studying nature has been adopted and found reliable, we must at least also try this maxim of the power of judgment on nature as a whole, because according to it we might discover further laws of nature that would otherwise remain hidden from us because of the limits of our insight into the inner workings of its mechanism. But with regard to this latter use, that maxim of the power of judgment is indeed useful, though not indispensable, because nature as a whole is not given to us as organized (in the strictest sense of the word stated above). By contrast, with regard to those products of nature that

must be judged as intentionally formed in this way and no other, if we are even to gain experiential cognition of their inner constitution, that maxim of the reflective power of judgment is essentially necessary. For even the thought of them as organized things is impossible without connecting with it the thought of production with [A 335] intention.

Now the concept of a thing whose existence or form we represent as possible under the condition of an end is inseparably connected with the concept of its contingency (according to natural laws). Hence natural things that we find possible only as ends constitute the foremost proof of the contingency of the world as a whole, and are the only ground of proof valid for common understanding [399] as well as for the philosopher of its dependence upon, and origin from, a being existing outside the world and indeed, on account of that purposive form, an intelligent being. Thus teleology finds no complete conclusion to the explanation sought in its inquiries except in a theology.

But what, in the end, does even the most complete teleology prove? Does it perhaps prove that such an intelligent being exists? No; nothing more than that, given the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and thus in connecting experience with the highest principles of reason, we can form absolutely no concept of the possibility of such a world except by thinking a supreme cause of it that *acts intentionally*. Objectively, therefore, we cannot establish the proposition that there is an intelligent original being; we can establish it only subjectively for the use of our power of judgment in its reflection on the ends [A 336] in nature, which cannot be thought according to any principle other than that of an intentional causality of a highest cause.

If we wished to establish the above proposition dogmatically, on teleological grounds, we would be caught in difficulties from which we could not disentangle ourselves. For these inferences would have to rest on the proposition that organized beings in the world are possible only through an intentionally acting cause. But we would then unavoidably have to assert that, because we can trace these things in their causal connection and cognize this connection in its lawfulness only under the idea of ends, we are also entitled to presuppose this same condition as necessary for every thinking and cognizing being, and thus as

attaching to the object and not merely to our subject. Yet we cannot sustain such an assertion. For we do not actually *observe* ends in nature as intentional, but only *think* this concept into our reflection on its products as a guiding thread for the power of judgment; thus they are not given to us through the object. Indeed, *a priori* it is impossible even for us to justify such a concept as admissible in its objective reality. The proposition therefore remains one resting solely on subjective conditions [A 337], namely the power of judgment reflecting in a manner suited to our cognitive faculties. If expressed as objectively and dogmatically valid, it would read: there is a God. But for [400] us human beings it now permits only the restricted formula: we cannot think or make comprehensible the purposiveness that must underlie even our cognition of the inner possibility of many natural things otherwise than by representing it, and the world in general, as a product of an intelligent cause (a God).

Now if this proposition, founded on an inescapably necessary maxim of our power of judgment, fully satisfies every speculative as well as practical use of our reason for every *human* purpose, I should like to know what we lose by being unable to prove it valid also for higher beings, namely from purely objective grounds (which, unfortunately, surpass our capacity). For it is entirely certain that we cannot even become sufficiently acquainted with organized beings and their inner possibility according to merely mechanical principles of nature, much less explain them; indeed, so certain that we can boldly say: it is absurd for human beings even to conceive such a plan, or to [A 338] hope that perhaps another Newton might someday arise who would make comprehensible even the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws ordered by no intention. Rather, we must absolutely deny human beings this insight. But to judge that in nature itself, if we could penetrate to its principle in the specification of its universal laws known to us, there *could* not possibly lie hidden a sufficient ground of the possibility of organized beings without placing an intention beneath their production (and thus in nature's mere mechanism), would in turn be presumptuous of us; for how could we know this? Probabilities have no place at all here, where judgments of pure reason are at issue.—Thus we cannot judge objectively at all, either affirmatively or negatively, whether a

being acting according to intentions as cause of the world (and hence as its author) underlies what we rightly call natural ends. Only this much is certain: if we are nevertheless to judge at least according to what our own nature permits us to comprehend (according to the conditions and limits of our reason), we can place nothing other than an intelligent being at the basis of the possibility of those natural ends. This alone accords with the maxim of our reflective power of judgment, and thus with a subjective [A 339] [401] ground that nevertheless clings inescapably to the human species.

76 *Remark.*

This consideration, which very much deserves detailed development in transcendental philosophy, may enter here only as an aside for elucidation, not as a proof of what has been presented here.

Reason is a faculty of principles, and in its utmost demand seeks the unconditioned; understanding, by contrast, serves it always only under a certain condition that must be given. But without concepts of the understanding, to which objective reality must be given, reason cannot judge objectively (synthetically) at all, and as theoretical reason contains in itself absolutely no constitutive, but merely regulative principles. We soon become aware that where understanding cannot follow, reason becomes transcendent and manifests itself in ideas that are indeed well grounded (as regulative principles), but not in objectively valid concepts. Understanding, however, which cannot keep pace with reason yet would be necessary for validity with regard to objects, restricts the validity of those ideas of reason to the subject, though universally for all subjects of this kind. That is, it restricts them to the condition that, according to the nature of our (human) cognitive faculty, or indeed according to the concept *we can form* of the faculty of a finite rational being in general, we can and must think in this way and no other—without, however, asserting that the ground of such a judgment [A 340] lies in the object. We shall give examples that are admittedly too important and too difficult to press upon the reader here at once as proven propositions, but can give him material for reflection and serve to elucidate our particular business here.

It is inescapably necessary for human understanding to distinguish the possibility of things from their actuality. The ground of this lies in the subject and the nature of its cognitive faculties. For if their exercise did not require two entirely heterogeneous elements—understanding for concepts, and sensible intuition for objects corresponding to them—there would be no such distinction [402] between the possible and the actual. If, namely, our understanding were intuitive, it would have no objects but the actual. Concepts (which concern merely the possibility of an object) and sensible intuitions (which give us something without thereby letting us cognize it as an object) would both disappear. But our entire distinction of the merely possible from the actual rests on this: the former signifies only the positing of the representation of a thing relative to our concept and our capacity to think in general; the latter, however, the positing of the thing in itself, outside this concept. Thus the distinction of possible things from actual ones is a distinction valid merely subjectively for human understanding: we can still have something in thought although it does not exist, or represent something as given although we do not yet have a concept of it. The propositions that things can be possible without being actual, and that consequently actuality cannot be inferred at all from mere possibility, therefore hold entirely correctly for human [A 341] reason, without thereby proving that this distinction lies in the things themselves. For that this cannot be inferred from them, and consequently that these propositions do indeed hold also of objects insofar as our cognitive faculty, as sensibly conditioned, deals with objects of the senses, but not of things in general, is clear from reason's unceasing demand to assume something (the primordial ground) as existing with unconditional necessity, in which possibility and actuality are no longer to be distinguished at all. For this idea our understanding has absolutely no concept: that is, it can discover no way to represent such a thing and its manner of existence. For if it *thinks* it (however it may think it), the thing is represented merely as possible. If understanding is conscious of it as given in intuition, it is actual, without any thought here of possibility. Thus the concept of an absolutely necessary being is indeed an indispensable idea of reason, but a problematic concept unattainable by human understanding. Yet it holds for the use of

our cognitive faculties according to their distinctive constitution, and thus not of the object and thereby for every cognizing being; for I cannot presuppose in every such being thought and intuition as two different conditions of the exercise of its cognitive faculties, and hence of the possibility and actuality of things [403]. For an understanding in which this distinction did not occur, the proposition would read: all objects I cognize *are* (exist); and the possibility of some that nevertheless did not exist—that is, their contingency if they do exist, and thus also necessity as distinct from this—could not enter the representation of such a being at all [A 342]. What makes it so difficult for our understanding to match reason here with its concepts is merely that, for it as human understanding, what reason nevertheless makes a principle as belonging to the object is transcendent—that is, impossible under the subjective conditions of its cognition.—Here, then, the maxim always holds that wherever cognition of objects surpasses the understanding's capacity, we think all such objects according to the subjective conditions necessarily attaching to our (that is, human) nature in the exercise of its faculties. And if judgments made in this way cannot be constitutive principles determining the object as it is constituted—as indeed cannot be otherwise with transcendent concepts—they will nevertheless remain regulative principles, immanent and secure in their exercise, and suited to human purposes.

Just as reason, in its theoretical consideration of nature, must assume the idea of an unconditional necessity of nature's primordial ground, so in its practical consideration it also presupposes its own causality as unconditioned with regard to nature, that is, freedom, insofar as it is conscious of its moral command. But here the objective necessity of an action as duty is opposed to the necessity it would have as an event if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom (that is, in reason's causality); and the morally absolutely necessary action is regarded physically as entirely contingent (that is, what necessarily *ought* to happen often nevertheless does not happen). Thus it is clear that only the subjective constitution of our practical faculty accounts for moral laws having to be represented as commands (and actions conforming to them [A 343] as duties), and for reason's expressing this necessity not through a *being* (happen-

ing), but through an ought-to-be. This would not occur if reason were considered without sensibility (as the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature) with regard to its causality, and thus as cause in an intelligible [404] world agreeing throughout with the moral law. There would be no distinction there between ought and deed, between a practical law of what is possible through us and a theoretical law of what is actual through us. Now although an intelligible world, in which everything would be actual merely because it is possible (as something good), and even freedom as its formal condition, is for us a transcendent concept unfit to serve as a constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality, freedom nevertheless serves, according to the constitution of our partly sensible nature and faculty, as a universal *regulative* principle for us and for all rational beings connected with the world of sense, insofar as we can represent them according to the constitution of our reason. This principle does not objectively determine the constitution of freedom as a form of causality, but makes the rule of actions according to that idea into commands for everyone, with no less validity than if it did.

Likewise, in the case before us, we can concede that we would find no distinction between nature's mechanism and its technique, that is, its connection of ends, if our understanding were not of a kind that must proceed from the universal to the particular, so that the power of judgment can cognize no [A 344] purposiveness in the particular, and thus make no determining judgments, without having a universal law under which to subsume it. But the particular as such contains something contingent in relation to the universal, while reason nevertheless also requires unity, and thus lawfulness, in the connection of particular natural laws (this lawfulness of the contingent is called purposiveness); and deriving particular laws from universal ones, with regard to what they contain contingently, is impossible *a priori* through determining the concept of the object. Hence the concept of nature's purposiveness in its products will be a concept necessary for the human power of judgment with regard to nature, but not concerning the determination of objects themselves; thus a subjective prin-

ciple of reason for the power of judgment, which, as regulative (not constitutive), holds for our *human power of judgment* just as necessarily as if it were an objective principle.

77 [405] *On the Distinctive Character of Human Understanding Through Which the Concept of a Natural End Becomes Possible for Us.*

In the remark we cited peculiarities of our cognitive faculty, even the higher faculty, which we are easily led to transfer to the things themselves as objective predicates. But these concerned ideas for which no adequate object can be given in experience [A 345], and which could therefore serve only as regulative principles in pursuing experience. With the concept of a natural end the same indeed holds as regards the cause of the possibility of such a predicate, which can lie only in the idea; but the consequence corresponding to it (the product itself) is nevertheless given in nature, and the concept of nature's causality as a being acting according to ends seems to make the idea of a natural end into a constitutive principle of the product. In this it has something distinguishing it from all other ideas.

But this distinction consists in the fact that the idea in question is a principle of reason not for the understanding but for the power of judgment, and thus concerns solely the application of an understanding in general to possible objects of experience: specifically where the judgment can be not determining but merely reflective, and consequently where the object is indeed given in experience, but no *determinate judgment* about it in accordance with the idea (much less a fully adequate one) can be made at all; we can only reflect upon it.

Thus it concerns a peculiarity of *our* (human) understanding with regard to the power of judgment in its reflection on things in nature. If this is so, however, the idea of another possible understanding than the human must underlie it [A 346] (just as in the Critique of Pure Reason we had to have another possible intuition in mind if ours was to be regarded as a particular kind, namely one for which objects count only as appearances). We can then say: given the particular constitution of our understanding, certain natural products *must be regarded by us*, with regard to their possibility, as produced intentionally and as ends,

without thereby demanding that there actually be a special [406] cause whose determining ground is the representation of an end; hence without denying that another (higher) understanding than the human might find the ground of the possibility of such natural products even in nature's mechanism—that is, in a causal connection for which an understanding is not exclusively assumed as cause.

What matters here, then, is the relation of *our* understanding to the power of judgment: we seek in this relation a certain contingency in the constitution of our understanding, so as to mark its peculiarity in distinction from other possible understandings.

This contingency is found quite naturally in the *particular* that the power of judgment is to bring under the *universal* of concepts of the understanding. For the particular is not determined through the universal of *our* (human) understanding; and it is contingent in how many [A 347] ways different things, nevertheless agreeing in a common characteristic, can occur to our perception. Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, that is, a discursive understanding, for which it must indeed be contingent what kind, and how very different, the particular may be that can be given to it in nature and brought under its concepts. But since intuition also belongs to cognition, and a faculty of *complete spontaneity of intuition* would be a cognitive faculty distinct from sensibility and entirely independent of it, and thus understanding in the most general sense, we can also think an *intuitive* understanding (negatively, namely merely as not discursive). It does not proceed from the universal to the particular and so to the singular through concepts, and for it there is no such contingency of nature's agreement, in its products according to *particular* laws, with the understanding—a contingency that makes it so difficult for ours to bring nature's manifold into the unity of cognition. Our understanding can accomplish this task only through a very contingent agreement of natural characteristics with our faculty of concepts, which an intuitive understanding does not require.

Thus our understanding has this distinctive character for the power of judgment: in [A 348] cognition through it, the particular is not determined by the universal, and therefore cannot be derived from the universal alone; yet this particular in nature's manifoldness [407] must agree with the universal (through concepts and laws) in order to be subsumed under it. Under such circumstances this agreement must be very contingent and without a determinate principle for the power of judgment.

Now, in order nevertheless to be able at least to think the possibility of such an agreement of natural things with the power of judgment (which we represent as contingent, and thus as possible only through an end directed toward it), we must at the same time think another understanding. In relation to this understanding, and indeed prior to any end attributed to it, we can represent as *necessary* that agreement of natural laws with our power of judgment which, for our understanding, is thinkable only through the connecting means of ends.

Our understanding has the property that in its cognition—for example, of the cause of a product—it must proceed from the *analytically universal* (from concepts) to the particular (the given empirical intuition). In doing so it determines nothing with regard to the manifoldness of the latter, but must await this determination for the power of judgment [A 349] from the subsumption of empirical intuition (if the object is a natural product) under the concept. But we can also think an understanding that, because it is not discursive like ours but intuitive, proceeds from the *synthetically universal* (the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, that is, from the whole to the parts. Such an understanding, and its representation of the whole, therefore does not contain the *contingency* of the connection of the parts in making a determinate form of the whole possible—a contingency required by our understanding, which must proceed from parts as universally thought grounds to various possible forms to be subsumed under them as consequences. According to the constitution of our understanding, by contrast, a real whole of nature is to be regarded only as an effect of the jointly acting motive forces of the parts. If, therefore, we wish to represent not the possibility of the whole as dependent on the parts, as accords with our discursive understanding, but, after the model of the intuitive (ar-

chetypal) understanding, the possibility of the parts (in their constitution and connection) as dependent on the whole, this, given that same peculiarity of our understanding, cannot be done by making the whole contain the ground of the possibility of the connection of the parts (which would be a contradiction in the discursive mode of cognition), but only by making the [408] *representation* of a whole contain the ground of the possibility of its form [A 350] and of the connection of the parts belonging to it. But since the whole would then be an effect, a *product*, whose *representation* is regarded as the *cause* of its possibility, and the product of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of its effect is called an end, it follows that our representing natural products as possible according to a different kind of causality from that of the natural laws of matter—namely only according to the causality of ends and final causes—is merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding. This principle concerns not the possibility of such things themselves (even considered as phenomena) according to this mode of production, but only the judging of them possible for our understanding. At the same time we see why, in natural science, we are far from satisfied with an explanation of natural products through causality according to ends: in such an explanation we ask for natural production to be judged in a way adequate merely to our faculty of judging it, that is, the reflective power of judgment, and not to the things themselves for the determining power of judgment. Nor is it at all necessary here to prove that such an *intellectus archetypus*, an archetypal understanding, is possible; only that, in contrasting our discursive understanding, which requires images (*intellectus ectypus*), and the [A 351] contingency of such a constitution, we are led to that idea of an *intellectus archetypus*, and that this idea contains no contradiction.

Now if we consider a material whole in its form as a product of the parts and of their forces and capacities to combine of themselves (adding in thought other materials that they supply to one another), we represent to ourselves a mechanical mode of its production. But in this way no concept emerges of a whole as an end, whose inner possibility necessarily presupposes the idea of a whole on which even the constitution and manner of action of the parts depend, as we

must nevertheless represent an organized body. Yet, as has just been shown, it does not follow that the mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for this would amount to saying that it is impossible (that is, contradictory) *for every understanding* to represent such a unity in the connection of the manifold without the idea of this unity being at the same time its productive cause —that is, without intentional production. Nevertheless, this [409] would indeed follow if we were entitled to regard material beings as things in themselves. For then the unity constituting the ground of the possibility of natural formations would be solely the unity of space, which, however, is no real ground of productions, but [A 352] only their formal condition. It does bear some resemblance to the real ground we seek, in that no part in it can be determined except in relation to the whole, the representation of which thus underlies the possibility of the parts. But since it is at least possible to regard the material world as mere appearance and to think something as a thing in itself (which is not appearance) as its substrate, and to place beneath this a corresponding intellectual intuition (even if it is not ours), there would be a supersensible real ground of nature, though unknowable to us. We ourselves belong to this nature, and thus in it we would consider what is necessary in it as an object of the senses according to mechanical laws, but at the same time consider the agreement and unity of the particular laws and the forms according to them —which we must judge contingent in relation to those mechanical laws—in nature as an object of reason (indeed, the whole of nature as a system) according to teleological laws. We would judge nature according to two kinds of principle, without the mechanical mode of explanation being excluded by the teleological as though they contradicted one another.

From this we can also comprehend what could otherwise readily be conjectured but scarcely asserted and proved with certainty [A 353]: although the principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive natural products could coexist with the teleological principle, it could by no means make the latter dispensable. That is, in a thing we must judge as a natural end (an organized being), we may indeed try all the known laws of mechanical production and those still to be discovered, and may hope to make good progress with them; but we can

never be spared the appeal, for the possibility of such a product, to a ground of production entirely different from them, namely causality through ends. And absolutely no human reason (nor any finite reason qualitatively similar to ours, however greatly it might surpass it in degree) can hope to understand the production even of a little blade of grass from merely mechanical causes. For if the teleological connection of causes and [410] effects is wholly indispensable to the power of judgment for the possibility of such an object, even merely to study it by the guiding thread of experience; and if for external objects as appearances a sufficient ground referring to ends cannot be found at all, but this ground, which also lies in nature, must nevertheless be sought only in its supersensible substrate, from which every possible insight is barred to us, then it is utterly impossible for us to draw grounds of explanation for [A 354] connections of ends from nature itself. Given the constitution of the human cognitive faculty, it is necessary to seek their highest ground in an original understanding as cause of the world.

78 *On the Union of the Principle of the Universal Mechanism of Matter with the Teleological Principle in the Technique of Nature.*

It matters infinitely to reason not to abandon nature's mechanism in its productions, or pass over it in explaining them, because without it no insight into the nature of things can be attained. Even if we are granted that a supreme architect immediately created the forms of nature as they have always existed, or predetermined those that continually form themselves in nature's course according to the same pattern, our cognition of nature is not advanced in the least thereby. For we do not know that being's manner of acting at all, or its ideas, which are supposed to contain the principles of the possibility of natural beings, and cannot explain nature from that being as from above downward (*a priori*). But if, starting from the forms of objects of experience, and thus from below upward (*a posteriori*), we appeal to a cause acting according to ends [A 355] to explain the purposiveness we believe we find in them, our explanation would be wholly tautological, deceiving reason with words. This is without even mentioning that where we lose ourselves through this mode of explana-

tion in the transcendent, where cognition of nature cannot follow us, reason is led to indulge in fanciful enthusiasm—the prevention of which is precisely its foremost vocation.

411 On the other hand, it is an equally necessary maxim of reason not to overlook the principle of ends in nature's products. For even if it makes their manner of originating no more comprehensible to us, it is still a heuristic principle for investigating nature's particular laws—even supposing we did not wish to use it to explain nature itself accordingly, since we continue to call these products merely natural ends, however visibly they display an intentional unity of purpose, that is, without seeking the ground of their possibility beyond nature. Yet since the question of this possibility must ultimately arise, reason must just as necessarily conceive a distinct kind of causality, not found in nature, as the mechanism of natural causes has its own kind. For to the receptivity for more and different forms than matter is capable of under the latter, there must be added the spontaneity of a [A 356] cause—which therefore cannot be matter—without which no ground for those forms can be given. Before taking this step, reason must indeed proceed cautiously. It must not seek to explain every technique of nature teleologically, that is, every productive capacity displaying a purposiveness of shape for our mere apprehension, as with regular solids, but must continue to regard it as possible through mechanism alone. Yet to exclude the teleological principle altogether on this account, and to insist on following mere mechanism even where purposiveness, in reason's investigation of the possibility of natural forms through their causes, undeniably reveals a relation to another kind of causality, must make reason just as fanciful, wandering among imagined natural powers that cannot be conceived at all, as a merely teleological mode of explanation, paying no heed to natural mechanism, would make it extravagant.

In one and the same natural thing, the two principles cannot be joined as principles for explaining—deducing—one from the other; that is, they cannot be united as dogmatic and constitutive principles of insight into nature for determining judgment. If, for example, I assume that a maggot is to be regarded as a

product of the mere mechanism of matter—of the new formation that matter accomplishes by itself [A 357] when its elements are freed by putrefaction—I cannot then derive precisely the same product from that same matter as a causality [412] acting according to ends. Conversely, if I assume the same product to be a natural end, I cannot count on its being generated mechanically, take this as a constitutive principle for judging its possibility, and thus unite both principles. For one mode of explanation excludes the other, even supposing that, objectively, both grounds of the possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, but that we took no account of it. The principle that is to make the two compatible in judging nature according to them must be placed in what lies outside both—and therefore also outside any possible empirical representation of nature—yet contains nature's ground: that is, in the supersensible; and each mode of explanation must be referred to it. Now we can have nothing of this but the indeterminate concept of a ground that makes it possible to judge nature according to empirical laws, without being able to determine it more closely through any predicate. It follows that the union of the two principles cannot rest on a ground for *explaining* (explication) the possibility of a product according to given laws for *determining* [A 358] judgment, but only on a ground for *elucidating* (exposition) it for reflective judgment.—For to explain is to derive from a principle, which one must therefore be able to know distinctly and specify. Now the principle of nature's mechanism and that of its causality according to ends must indeed converge, in one and the same natural product, in a single higher principle and flow jointly from it; otherwise they could not coexist in the study of nature. But if this objectively common principle—which therefore also warrants the conjunction of the maxims of natural inquiry dependent on it—is of such a kind that it can indeed be indicated but never determinately known or distinctly specified for use in particular cases, then no explanation, that is, no distinct and determinate derivation of the possibility of a natural product possible according to those two heterogeneous principles, can be drawn from it. Yet the common principle of mechanical derivation on the one hand and teleological derivation on the other is the *supersensible*, which we must place beneath nature as appearance. Of this, however, we

cannot form the least positively determinate concept for theoretical purposes. How, then, according [413] to this principle, nature in its particular laws constitutes for us a system that can be known as possible both through the principle of generation [A 359] by physical causes and through that of final causes cannot in any way be explained. We can only presuppose that, when natural objects occur whose possibility we cannot conceive according to the principle of mechanism—which always has a claim on a natural being—without relying on teleological principles, we may confidently investigate natural laws in accordance with both, according as the possibility of their product is cognizable to our understanding through one principle or the other. We need not be troubled by the apparent conflict that emerges between the principles for judging it, since at least the possibility that both might also be objectively united in one principle is secured, as they concern appearances that presuppose a supersensible ground.

Thus, although both mechanism and nature's teleological, intentional technique may, with regard to the very same product and its possibility, stand under a common higher principle of nature according to particular laws, we cannot, given the limits of our understanding, unite both principles *in explaining* the very same natural generation when the inner possibility of this product is itself *intelligible* only through a causality according to ends—as is the case with organized [A 360] matter—because that principle is *transcendent*. The foregoing principle of teleology therefore remains: given the character of the human understanding, no cause other than one acting intentionally can be assumed for the possibility of organic beings in nature, and nature's mere mechanism can in no way suffice to explain these products of it. Yet this is not to decide, through that principle, anything about the possibility of such things themselves.

For this is only a maxim of reflective, not determining judgment, and therefore holds only subjectively for us, not objectively for the possibility of things of this kind themselves, where both modes of generation might well converge in one and the same ground. Moreover, without adding to the concept of a teleologically conceived mode of generation that of a natural mechanism also present

within it, such generation could not be judged a natural product [414] at all. The foregoing maxim therefore also brings with it the necessity of uniting both principles in judging things as natural ends, but not of substituting one for the other, either wholly or in certain parts. For no mechanism can be substituted for what we, at least, can conceive as possible only through intention; nor can what is recognized as necessary according to mechanism be replaced by a contingency requiring an end as its determining ground [A 361]. Rather, the one —mechanism—can only be subordinated to the other—intentional technique —and this is entirely permissible according to the transcendental principle of nature's purposiveness.

For where ends are conceived as grounds of the possibility of certain things, means must also be assumed whose law of operation *in itself* requires nothing that presupposes an end, and which may therefore be mechanical while still serving as a subordinate cause of intentional effects. Hence even in nature's organic products—and still more if, prompted by their infinite multitude, we also assume intention in the conjunction of natural causes according to particular laws, at least as a permissible hypothesis, as the *universal principle* of reflective judgment for nature as a whole, the world—we can conceive an extensive and even universal conjunction of mechanical and teleological laws in nature's generations without confusing the principles for judging them or substituting one for the other. For in a teleological judgment, even if the form assumed by matter is judged possible only through intention, matter may nevertheless, by its nature and in accordance with mechanical laws, be subordinated as a means to that represented end. Yet [A 362] because the ground of this compatibility lies in what is neither the one nor the other—neither mechanism nor a combination of ends—but the supersensible substrate of nature, of which we know nothing, the two ways of representing the possibility of such objects cannot be fused for our human reason. We can judge them only as grounded, through the connection of final causes, in a supreme understanding; and thus nothing is taken away from the teleological mode of explanation.

But how much nature's mechanism contributes as a means to [415] each final intention within it is wholly undetermined, and forever indeterminable for our reason. Moreover, in view of the intelligible principle mentioned above, which makes a nature in general possible, we may even assume that nature is possible throughout according to both kinds of universally harmonious laws—physical laws and those of final causes—although we cannot at all understand how this happens. Thus we also do not know how far the mechanical mode of explanation possible for us extends. We know with certainty only this: however far we may advance in it, it must always remain insufficient for things we have once recognized as natural ends; and so, given the character of our understanding, we must subordinate all those grounds to a teleological [A 363] principle.

On this rests our right—and, because of the importance that studying nature according to the principle of mechanism has for our theoretical use of reason, also our calling—to explain all nature's products and events, even the most purposive, mechanically as far as our capacity allows, a capacity whose limits we cannot specify within this mode of inquiry. Yet we must never lose sight of this: those products that we can so much as present to reason for investigation only under the concept of an end must, in keeping with the essential character of our reason, ultimately be subordinated to causality according to ends, notwithstanding those mechanical causes.

28 We see from this that, in most speculative matters of pure reason, philosophical schools have generally tried every possible solution to a given question, so far as dogmatic assertions are concerned. Thus, to account for nature's purposiveness, people have tried either *lifeless matter* or a *lifeless God*, at other times *living matter* or a *living God*. Nothing remains for us but, if necessary, to abandon all these *objective assertions* and consider our judgment *critically*, solely in relation to our cognitive faculties, so as to secure for its principle the validity of a maxim: if not dogmatic validity, then one sufficient for the safe use of reason.

PART II

Methodology of Teleological Judgment

Appendix. [A 364] [416] *Methodology of Teleological Judgment.*

79 *Whether Teleology Must Be Treated as Belonging to the Study of Nature.*

Every science must have its determinate place in the encyclopedia of all sciences. If it is a philosophical science, its place must be assigned within philosophy's theoretical or practical part; and if within the former, either in the study of nature, insofar as this considers what can be an object of experience—and thus in the study of bodies, of the soul, or of the world in general—or in theology, the study of the original ground of the world as the sum of all objects of experience.

The question now is: What place belongs to teleology? Does it belong to natural science, properly so called, or to theology? It must be one or the other; for no science can belong to the transition from one to the other, since this signifies only the articulation or organization of the system, not a place within it.

That teleology does not belong to theology as one of its parts, although [A 365] theology can make the most important use of it, is clear in itself. For its objects are natural products and their cause; and although it points beyond nature to this cause as a ground situated outside and above nature—a divine author—it

does so not for determining judgment but only for reflective judgment in the study of nature, so that this idea may guide our judging of things in the world, as a regulative principle suited to the human understanding.

417 Yet it seems to belong no more to natural science, which requires determining and not merely reflective principles in order to state objective grounds of natural effects. Indeed, nothing is gained for the theory of nature, or the mechanical explanation of its phenomena through their efficient causes, by considering them according to the relation of ends to one another. Setting out nature's ends in its products, insofar as they form a system according to teleological concepts, properly belongs only to a description of nature composed under a particular guiding thread. Here reason carries out a splendidly instructive task, practically purposive in many respects, yet gives no [A 366] insight into the origin and inner possibility of these forms, which is precisely what theoretical natural science is concerned with.

Teleology as a science therefore belongs to no doctrine, but only to critique, and specifically to the critique of a particular cognitive faculty: the power of judgment. But insofar as it contains *a priori* principles, it can and must specify the method by which nature is to be judged according to the principle of final causes. Its methodology thus has at least a negative influence on the procedure of theoretical natural science, and also on the relation that this science, within metaphysics, can have to theology as a preparation for it.

80 *On the Necessary Subordination of the Principle of Mechanism to the Teleological Principle in Explaining a Thing as a Natural End.*

The *right to pursue* a merely mechanical explanation of all natural products is in itself wholly unrestricted. But the *capacity to suffice* with this alone is, given the character of our understanding insofar as it deals with things as natural ends, not only very restricted but also distinctly bounded: [A 367] according to a principle of judgment, the former procedure alone can accomplish nothing toward explaining the latter. Hence our judging of such products must always also be subordinated to a teleological principle.

418 It is therefore reasonable, indeed meritorious, to pursue natural mechanism in explaining nature's products as far as this can be done with probability, and not to abandon the attempt on the ground that meeting with nature's purposiveness along this path is impossible *in itself*, but only because it is impossible *for us* as human beings. For it would require an intuition other than sensible intuition, and a determinate cognition of nature's intelligible substrate, from which a ground could be given even for the mechanism of appearances according to particular laws. All this wholly exceeds our capacity.

If the natural investigator is not to labor in vain, then, in judging things whose concept as natural ends is indubitably grounded—organized beings—he must always take some original organization as his basis. This organization employs that very mechanism to produce other organized forms or to develop its own into new shapes, which nevertheless always arise from that end and in accordance [A 368] with it.

It is commendable to survey, through comparative anatomy, the great creation of organized natures, to see whether something resembling a system may be found in them, specifically in their principle of generation. We need not stop at the mere principle for judging them—which gives no insight into their generation—and faintheartedly renounce every claim to *insight into nature* in this field. The agreement of so many animal genera in a certain common scheme, which seems to underlie not only their skeletal structure but also the arrangement of their other parts, allows a ray of hope, however faint, to enter the mind: here the admirable simplicity of the basic plan has been able to produce so great a diversity of species by shortening some parts and lengthening others, enfolding these and unfolding those. Something might therefore be accomplished here through the principle of nature's mechanism, without which there can be no natural science at all. This analogy of forms, insofar as despite all their diversity they seem to have been generated according to a common original model, strengthens the conjecture of an actual kinship among them in their generation from a common original mother. This is suggested by the gradual approximation of one animal genus [A 369] [419] to another, from the one in which the principle of ends seems most fully established, namely the human

being, down to the polyp; from this even to mosses and lichens; and finally to the lowest level of nature perceptible to us, raw matter. From this matter and its powers, according to mechanical laws like those by which it acts in producing crystals, the whole technique of nature seems to descend—a technique so incomprehensible to us in organized beings that we believe ourselves compelled to conceive another principle to account for it.

Here the *archaeologist* of nature is free to derive that great family of creatures—for so we would have to represent them if the thoroughgoing kinship just described is to have a ground—from the surviving traces of nature's earliest revolutions, according to whatever mechanism of nature he knows or conjectures. He may have the womb of the earth, just emerging from its chaotic condition, give birth, like a great animal, first to creatures of less purposive form, and these in turn to others that developed more suitably to their place of generation and their relations to one another; until this womb itself stiffened and ossified, limiting its offspring to determinate species that would no longer depart from their kind, so that their diversity [A 370] remained as it had emerged at the end of that fertile formative power's operation.—Yet for this purpose he must still ascribe to this universal mother an organization purposively arranged for all these creatures; otherwise the purposive form of the products of the animal and plant kingdoms cannot even be conceived as possible.[29] But then [420] he has only deferred the ground of explanation and cannot claim to have made the generation of those two kingdoms independent of the condition of [A 371] final causes.

Even the change to which certain individuals of organized genera are contingently subject, if we find that their altered character is hereditary and incorporated into their reproductive power, can hardly be judged otherwise than as the occasional development of a purposive predisposition originally present in the species for the preservation of its kind. For, given the thoroughgoing inner purposiveness of an organized being, the generation of its like is very closely bound to the condition that nothing be incorporated into its reproductive power unless it also belongs, within such a system of ends, to one of the undeveloped original predispositions. If we depart from this principle, we cannot know with

certainty whether several parts of the form now found in a species might not likewise be of contingent, purposeless origin. The principle of teleology—that nothing preserved in an organized being's propagation is to be judged unpurposive—would thereby become very unreliable in application and valid solely for the original stock, which we no longer know.

Hume objects to those who find it necessary, for all such natural ends, [A 372] to assume a teleological principle of judgment, that is, an architectonic understanding: one could with equal right ask how such an understanding is possible: how the manifold capacities and properties that make possible an understanding possessing executive power as well could have come together so purposively in one being. But this objection is empty. For the entire difficulty surrounding the question of the first generation of a thing that contains ends within itself and is comprehensible through them alone rests on the demand for unity in the ground connecting the manifold elements *external to one another* within this product. If this ground is placed in [421] the understanding of a productive cause as a simple substance, then the question, insofar as it is teleological, is sufficiently answered. But if the cause is sought merely in matter, as an aggregate of many substances external to one another, unity of principle for the internally purposive form of their formation is wholly lacking. The *autocracy* of matter in productions that our understanding can comprehend only as ends is a phrase without meaning.

This explains why those who seek a supreme ground of the possibility of matter's objectively purposive forms [A 373] without granting it an understanding nevertheless like to make the whole world into one all-embracing substance—pantheism—or, what is merely a more determinate explanation of the former, into a sum of many determinations inhering in one *simple substance*—Spinozism. Their sole aim is to obtain that condition of all purposiveness, the *unity* of its ground. Through the merely ontological concept of a simple substance, they do indeed satisfy *one* condition of the problem, namely unity in the relation to ends. But they provide nothing for the *other* condition, namely the relation of that substance to its consequence as an *end*, by which the ontological ground is to be more closely determined for the question at hand; and thus

they by no means answer the *whole* question. It also remains absolutely unanswerable for our reason unless we represent that original ground of things as a simple *substance*; its property, in relation to the specific character of the natural forms grounded upon it, namely their unity of purpose, as the property of an intelligent substance; and its relation to those forms as one of *causality*, because of the contingency we find in everything we can conceive as possible only as an end.

81 [A 374] *On Joining Mechanism to the Teleological Principle in Explaining a Natural End as a Natural Product.*

Just as nature's mechanism, according to the preceding section, cannot alone suffice for conceiving the possibility of an organized [422] being, but must originally be subordinated to a cause acting intentionally, at least given the character of our cognitive faculty, so too the mere teleological ground of such a being does not suffice for considering and judging it also as a product of nature unless nature's mechanism is joined to that ground. It serves, as it were, as the instrument of a cause acting intentionally, to whose ends nature, in its mechanical laws, is nevertheless subordinated. Our reason does not comprehend the possibility of such a union of two wholly different kinds of causality: nature in its universal lawfulness, and an idea that restricts it to a particular form for which nature in itself contains no ground. This possibility lies in nature's supersensible substrate, of which we can determine nothing affirmatively except that it is the being in itself of which we know only the appearance. Nevertheless, the principle that everything we assume to belong to this nature (*phenomenon*) [A 375] and to be its product must also be conceived as connected with it according to mechanical laws remains fully in force. For without this kind of causality, organized beings, as natural ends, would still not be natural products.

If, then, the teleological principle of the generation of these beings is assumed —as it must be—one can take as one's basis either the *occasionalism* or the *prestabilism* of the cause of their internally purposive form. According to the former, on the occasion of every mating, the supreme cause of the world would

directly give organic formation, in accordance with its idea, to the matter mingling in it. According to the latter, it would have placed in the initial products of its wisdom only the predisposition by means of which an organic being produces its like and the species continually preserves itself, while the loss of individuals through their nature, which also works toward their destruction, is continuously replaced. If one assumes occasionalism in the production of organized beings, all nature is entirely lost here, and with it every use of reason in judging the possibility of such products. We may therefore presume that no one with any concern for philosophy will adopt this system.

Prestabilism, in turn, can proceed in two ways. [A 376] It regards every organic [423] being generated by its like either as the *educt* or as the *product* of the former. The system of generation as mere eduction is called *individual preformation*, or also the *theory of evolution*; that of generation as production is called the system of *epigenesis*. The latter can also be called the system of *generic preformation*, since the productive capacity of the progenitors, and thus the specific form, was nevertheless virtually preformed according to the inner purposive predispositions allotted to their stock. Accordingly, the opposing theory of individual preformation might better be called the *theory of involution*, or of encasement.

The defenders of the *theory of evolution*, who exempt every individual from nature's formative power in order to have it come directly from the Creator's hand, nevertheless did not venture to let this happen according to the hypothesis of occasionalism. On that hypothesis, mating would be a mere formality under which a supreme intelligent cause of the world had resolved each time to form an offspring directly, leaving its mother only to unfold and nourish it. They declared themselves for preformation, [A 377] as though it were not all the same whether such forms arose supernaturally at the beginning of the world or during its course. Indeed, occasional creation would spare a great many supernatural arrangements otherwise required to preserve an embryo formed at the beginning of the world, unharmed by nature's destructive powers throughout the long period before its development. It would likewise render unnecessary and purposeless an immeasurably greater number of such pre-

formed beings than were ever to develop, and with them as many acts of creation. Yet they wished to leave at least something here to nature, so as not to lapse into a complete hyperphysics that could dispense with every natural explanation. They still clung to their hyperphysics even when they found an admirable purposiveness in monstrosities—which cannot possibly be regarded as natural ends—even if its sole aim were that an anatomist should one day take offense at it as a purposeless purposiveness and feel a disheartening wonder. But they could not possibly fit the generation of hybrids into the system of preformation. [424] They therefore had to grant to the seed of male creatures, to which they had otherwise conceded only the mechanical property of serving as the embryo's first nourishment, a purposively formative [A 378] power as well —the very power that, with regard to the entire product generated by two creatures of the same kind, they wished to allow neither.

By contrast, even if we did not know the great advantage that the defender of *epigenesis* possesses over the former in the experiential grounds supporting his theory, reason would already be especially favorable to his explanation. For, with respect to things that can originally be represented as possible only through the causality of ends, it nevertheless regards nature, at least in propagation, as itself productive, not merely as unfolding. With the least possible expenditure of the supernatural, it thus leaves to nature everything that follows from the first beginning, without, however, determining anything about that first beginning itself, at which physics altogether founders, whatever chain of causes it may attempt.

With regard to this theory of epigenesis, no one has contributed more both to its proof and to establishing the genuine principles of its application, in part by restricting an overbold use of it, than Court Councilor *Blumenbach*. He begins every physical explanation of these formations [A 379] with organized matter. He rightly declares it contrary to reason that raw matter should originally have formed itself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from the nature of the lifeless, and that matter should spontaneously have arranged itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness. Yet at the same time, under this *principle* of an original *organization*, which is inscrutable to us, he

allows natural mechanism an indeterminable yet unmistakable share. To this end he calls matter's capacity in an organized body a *formative drive*, as distinct from the merely mechanical *formative power* generally inherent in matter: a drive standing, as it were, under the higher direction and instruction of that organization.

82 [425] *On the Teleological System in the External Relations of Organized Beings.*
By external purposiveness I understand that in which one natural thing serves another as a means to an end. Now things that have no inner purposiveness, nor presuppose any for their possibility—earth, air, water, and so on—can nevertheless be highly purposive externally, that is, in relation to other beings. But these must [A 380] always be organized beings, that is, natural ends; otherwise the former could not be judged means either. Thus water, air, and earth cannot be regarded as means to the piling up of mountains, since mountains contain nothing in themselves that would require a ground of their possibility according to ends. In relation to them, therefore, their cause can never be represented under the predicate of a means useful to that end.

External purposiveness is an entirely different concept from inner purposiveness, which is bound up with the possibility of an object, regardless of whether its very actuality is an end or not. Of an organized being we can still ask: What is it there for? But we cannot readily ask this of things in which we recognize merely the effect of nature's mechanism. For in the former we already represent a causality according to ends for their inner possibility, a creative understanding, and relate this active capacity to its determining ground, intention. There is only one external purposiveness connected with the inner purposiveness of organization that nevertheless serves, in the external relation, as a means to an end, without our having to ask for what end this organized being itself had to exist. This is the organization of the two sexes [A 381] in relation to one another for the propagation of their kind. For here we can still ask, just as with an individual: Why did such a pair have to exist? The answer is: Only this pair constitutes an *organizing* whole, though not one organized within a single body.

If we now ask what a thing is there for, the answer is either that its existence and generation bear no relation at all to a cause acting intentionally—in which case we always [426] understand its origin to lie in nature's mechanism—or that there is some intentional ground of its existence as a contingent natural being. We can hardly separate this latter thought from the concept of an organized thing. For once we must place beneath its inner possibility a causality of final causes and an idea underlying that causality, we can conceive the existence of this product only as an end. For a represented effect, whose representation is at the same time the determining ground of the intelligent efficient cause for producing it, is called an *end*. In this case, then, we can either say that the end of such a natural being's existence lies within itself, that is, that it is not merely an end but also a *final end*; or that this end lies outside it in other natural beings, that is, that it exists purposively not as a final end but necessarily also [A 382] as a means.

Yet if we survey the whole of nature, we find in it, as nature, no being that could claim the distinction of being the final end of creation. Indeed, we can prove *a priori* that whatever might still be an *ultimate end* for nature could never, as a natural thing, be a *final end*, no matter what conceivable determinations and properties we might equip it with.

When we consider the plant kingdom, the immeasurable fertility by which it spreads over almost every soil might at first lead us to regard it as a mere product of nature's mechanism, such as nature displays in the formations of the mineral kingdom. But a closer knowledge of its indescribably wise organization prevents us from resting in this thought and prompts the question: What are these creatures there for? If we answer: For the animal kingdom, which they nourish so that it could spread across the earth in such diverse genera, the question returns: What, then, are these plant-eating animals there for? The answer might be: For the beasts of prey, which can feed only on what has life [A 383]. Finally comes the question: What are these, together with the preceding natural kingdoms, good for? For the human being, for the manifold use that his understanding teaches him to make of all those creatures. And he is the ultimate end

of creation here on earth, because he is the only being on [427] it who can form a concept of ends and, through his reason, make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things.

One could also take the apparently opposite path with the Knight Linnaeus and say: Plant-eating animals exist to moderate the luxuriant growth of the plant kingdom, which would otherwise choke out many of its species; beasts of prey exist to set limits to their voracity; and finally the human being exists so that, by pursuing and reducing these, he may establish a certain balance between nature's productive and destructive powers. Thus the human being, however highly he might be valued as an end in one respect, would in another hold only the rank of a means.

If one makes objective purposiveness in the diversity of the genera of earthly creatures and in their external relations to one another, as purposively constructed beings, one's principle, then it accords with reason to conceive in this relation a certain [A 384] organization in turn, and a system of all nature's kingdoms according to final causes. Yet here experience seems loudly to contradict reason's maxim, especially regarding an ultimate end of nature, which is nevertheless required for the possibility of such a system and which we can place nowhere but in the human being. For with regard to him, as one among the many animal genera, nature has made not the slightest exception, in either its destructive or its generative powers, to subjecting everything to its mechanism without an end.

The first thing that would have to be intentionally arranged in an ordering of earthly natural beings into a purposive whole would presumably be their dwelling place: the ground and the element on and in which they were to thrive. Yet closer knowledge of the character of this foundation of all organic generation indicates none but wholly unintentional causes, indeed causes more destructive than favorable to generation, order, and ends. Land and sea contain not only monuments of ancient, mighty devastations that befell them and all the creatures on and in them; their entire structure, the strata of the one and the boundaries of the other, bears wholly the appearance of a product of wild, all-powerful forces of a nature working in a chaotic condition. [428] However

purposively the shape, structure, and slope of [A 385] the lands may now seem arranged to receive water from the air, to supply veins of springs between varied strata of earth for manifold products, and to direct the course of rivers, closer investigation nevertheless proves that they arose merely as the effect of eruptions partly of fire, partly of water, or of upheavals of the ocean. This holds both for the first production of this shape and, especially, for its later transformation together with the destruction of its first organic products.[30] If, then, the dwelling place, the maternal soil of the land and the maternal womb of the sea, for all these creatures indicates nothing but a wholly unintentional mechanism of its generation, how and [A 386] with what right can we demand and assert a different origin for these latter products? Even if the human being was not caught up in these revolutions, as the most exact examination of the remains of those natural devastations seems, in Camper's judgment, to prove, he is still so dependent on the earth's other creatures that, if a mechanism of nature universally ruling over the others is admitted, he must be regarded as included under it, even though his understanding has been able, at least in large part, to save him amid their devastation.

But this argument seems to prove more than the intention for which it was proposed: not merely that the human being can be no ultimate end of nature, and for the same reason that the aggregate of organized natural things on earth cannot be a system of ends, but even that the natural products previously regarded as natural ends have no other origin than nature's mechanism.

429 Yet in the foregoing resolution of the antinomy between the principles of the mechanical and teleological generation of organic natural beings, we saw that, regarding nature as formative according to its particular laws, for whose systematic connection we lack the key, these are merely principles of reflective judgment [A 387]. They do not determine the origin of these beings in itself, but say only that, given the character of our understanding and our reason, we can conceive their origin only according to final causes. We saw that the greatest possible effort, indeed boldness, in attempts to explain them mechanically is not only permitted but commanded by reason, although we know that this can

never suffice, for subjective reasons arising from the particular kind and limitation of our understanding, not because a mechanism of generation would in itself contradict an origin according to ends. Finally, we saw that the supersensible principle of nature, both outside us and within us, may well contain the compatibility of both ways of representing nature's possibility. For representation according to final causes is only a subjective condition of our use of reason when reason wishes objects to be judged not merely as appearances, but requires these appearances themselves, together with their principles, to be referred to the supersensible substrate, in order to find possible certain laws of their unity that it can represent only through ends—including ends of reason that are themselves supersensible.

83 [A 388] *On the Ultimate End of Nature as a Teleological System.*

We have shown above that we have sufficient reason, according to principles of reason, to judge the human being not merely as a natural end, like all organized beings, but also as the *ultimate* end of nature here on earth, in relation to whom all other natural things constitute a system of ends. This holds, if not for determining judgment, then for reflective judgment. Now if what is to be advanced as an end through his connection with nature must be found in the human being himself, then either the end [430] must be such that nature itself, in its beneficence, can satisfy it, or it must be his aptitude and skill for all sorts of ends for which he might use nature, externally and internally. Nature's first end would be human *happiness*, its second human *culture*.

The concept of happiness is not one the human being abstracts from his instincts and thus draws from the animality within himself. It is a mere *idea* of a state to which he wishes to make that animality adequate under merely empirical conditions—which is impossible. [A 389] He devises this idea for himself, and in such varied ways through his understanding, entangled with imagination and the senses; indeed, he changes it so often that nature, even if wholly subject to his choice, could adopt absolutely no determinate, universal, and fixed law to agree with this wavering concept, and thus with the end each arbitrarily sets himself. But even if we either reduced this concept to genuine

natural need, in which our species is in thorough agreement with itself, or, on the other hand, raised the skill for attaining imagined ends as high as we pleased, what the human being understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own ultimate natural end, not an end of freedom, would still never be attained by him. For his nature is not such as to come to rest and find satisfaction anywhere in possession and enjoyment. On the other hand, far from having adopted him as its special favorite and favored him above all animals with its beneficence, nature spares him no more than any other animal in its destructive effects: plague, famine, floods, frost, attacks by other animals, large and small, and the like. Still worse, the contradictory character of the *natural predispositions* within him exposes him to torments of his own devising, and to others inflicted by his own species through the oppression of [A 390] domination, the barbarity of wars, and so on. He himself works, as far as he can, toward the destruction of his own species. Thus, even with the most beneficent nature outside us, nature's end, if directed toward the happiness of our species, would not be attained in a system of nature on earth, because the nature within us is not receptive to it. He is therefore always only a link in the chain of natural ends: a principle, indeed, with respect to many an [431] end for which nature seems to have destined him in its predispositions, since he makes himself such; yet also a means for preserving purposiveness in the mechanism of the remaining links. As the only being on earth who has understanding, and thus a capacity to set himself ends of his own choice, he is indeed titular lord of nature and, if nature is regarded as a teleological system, is by his vocation its ultimate end. But this is always conditional: he must understand how, and have the will, to give nature and himself a relation to ends that, independently of nature, can be self-sufficient and thus be a final end. This final end, however, must not be sought in nature at all.

But to discover where in the human being we must place at least that *ultimate* end of nature, we must seek out what [A 391] nature can accomplish to prepare him for what he himself must do in order to be a final end, and separate it from all those ends whose possibility rests on conditions that may be expected from nature alone. Of the latter kind is happiness on earth, by which is under-

stood the sum of all his ends possible through nature outside and within him. This is the matter of all his ends on earth; if he makes it his entire end, it renders him incapable of setting a final end to his own existence and bringing himself into harmony with it. Thus, of all his ends in nature, only the formal, subjective condition remains: his aptitude for setting himself ends in general and, independently of nature in determining them, using nature as a means in conformity with the maxims of his free ends in general. This is what nature can accomplish with a view to the final end lying outside it, and what can therefore be regarded as its ultimate end. Producing a rational being's aptitude for any ends whatsoever, and consequently in his freedom, is *culture*. Thus culture alone can be the ultimate end that we have reason to ascribe to nature with respect to the human species—not his own happiness on earth, or even merely his being the foremost instrument for establishing order [A 392] and concord in the nonrational nature outside him.

But not every culture suffices for this ultimate end of nature. The culture of *skill* is indeed the foremost subjective condition of aptitude for advancing ends in general, yet [432] it does not suffice to advance the *will* in determining and choosing its ends, which nevertheless belongs essentially to the full scope of an aptitude for ends. This latter condition of aptitude, which might be called the culture of training, or discipline, is negative. It consists in freeing the will from the despotism of desires, by which we are fastened to certain natural things and rendered incapable of choosing for ourselves. For we let ourselves be fettered by the impulses that nature gave us merely as guiding threads, so that we should not neglect or even violate the vocation of animality within us, although we are free enough to tighten or loosen, lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require.

Skill can hardly be developed in the human species except through inequality among people. The greater number provide life's necessities almost mechanically, without requiring any special art, for the comfort and leisure of others who cultivate the less necessary elements of culture, science [A 393] and art. By these others they are kept in a condition of oppression, bitter labor, and little enjoyment, although something of the culture of the higher classes gradually

spreads to this class as well. But as culture advances—its height being called luxury when the propensity toward the dispensable begins to encroach upon the indispensable—afflictions grow equally powerful on both sides: on the one through violence from others, on the other through inner discontent. Yet this glittering misery is bound up with the development of natural predispositions in the human species, and nature's own end, even if it is not our end, is nevertheless attained in the process. The formal condition under which alone nature can attain this final intention is that constitution of human relations in which lawful power within a whole called *civil society* opposes the encroachments of freedoms in mutual conflict. For only within it can the greatest development of natural predispositions occur. Yet even if people were clever enough to discover it and wise enough to submit willingly to its constraint, this would still require a *cosmopolitan* whole, that is, a system of all states liable to act harmfully upon one another. In its absence, and given the obstacle [433] that ambition, lust for power, and greed—especially among those [A 394] holding power—place in the way of even the possibility of such a design, *war* is unavoidable. In war, states either split and dissolve into smaller ones, or one state unites other, smaller states with itself and strives to form a greater whole. Although war is an unintentional human endeavor, stirred by unbridled passions, it is also a deeply hidden and perhaps intentional endeavor of supreme wisdom, if not to establish, then at least to prepare, lawfulness together with the freedom of states, and thereby the unity of a morally grounded system of them. Despite the most terrible hardships it imposes on the human race, and the perhaps still greater ones with which constant readiness for it weighs upon peace, war is nevertheless one more incentive to develop to the highest degree all talents serving culture, even as the hope of a settled condition of popular happiness recedes ever further.

As for disciplining the inclinations, whose natural predisposition is entirely purposive with regard to our vocation as an animal species, but which greatly impede the development of humanity, here too, with respect to this second requirement for culture, nature displays a purposive striving toward a cultivation that makes us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can provide. The preponderance of evils that refinement of taste, even to its [A 395] idealization,

and luxury even in the sciences, as nourishment for vanity, pour upon us through the insatiable multitude of inclinations they generate cannot be denied. Yet neither can nature's end be mistaken: increasingly to overcome the coarseness and vehemence of those inclinations that belong more to our animality and most oppose our cultivation for our higher vocation—the inclinations toward enjoyment—and to make room for the development of humanity. Fine art and the sciences, which through universally communicable pleasure and through polish and refinement for society make human beings, if not morally better, at least civilized, win much ground from the tyranny of sensual propensity. They thereby prepare the human being for a dominion in which reason alone is to hold power. Meanwhile the evils with which nature in part, and the unsociable selfishness of human beings in part, afflict us call forth, heighten, and temper the powers of the soul [434] so that we do not succumb to them, and thus let us feel an aptitude for higher ends hidden within us.[31]

84 [A 396] *On the Final End of the Existence of a World, That Is, of Creation Itself.*
A *final end* is an end that requires no other as the condition of its possibility.
If nature's mere mechanism is assumed as the ground for explaining its purposiveness, we cannot ask what the things in the world are there for. For on such an idealistic system the question concerns only the physical possibility of things, and to conceive them as ends would be mere reasoning without an object. Whether we interpret this form of things as chance or as blind necessity, in either case [A 397] that question would be empty. But if we assume that the connection of ends in the world is real, and assume for it a particular kind of causality, namely that of a cause *acting intentionally*, then we cannot stop at asking why things in the world—organized beings—have this or that form, or are placed by nature in this or that relation to others. Rather, once an understanding is conceived that must be regarded as the cause of the possibility of such forms as are actually found in things, we must also ask after the [435] objective ground within that same understanding that could have determined this productive understanding to an effect of this kind. This is then the final end for which such things exist.

I said above that the final end is not an end that nature could suffice to effect and produce in accordance with its idea, because it is unconditioned. For there is nothing in nature, as a sensible being, for which the determining ground lying within nature itself would not always be conditioned in turn. This holds not only for nature outside us, material nature, but also for nature within us, thinking nature—understanding clearly that I consider within myself only what is nature. But a thing that, because of its objective character, is necessarily to exist as the final end of an intelligent cause must be such that, in the order of ends, it depends on no further condition [A 398] beyond its idea alone.

Now we have only a single kind of being in the world whose causality is teleological, that is, directed toward ends, and yet is also so constituted that the law according to which these beings are to determine their ends is represented by them as unconditioned and independent of natural conditions, but necessary in itself. The being of this kind is the human being, considered, however, as noumenon: the only natural being in whom we can nevertheless recognize, from his own constitution, a supersensible capacity—*freedom*—and even the law of its causality together with its object, which he can set before himself as the highest end: the highest good in the world.

Of the human being, then—and thus of every rational being in the world—as a moral being, we can no longer ask for what end (*quem in finem*) he exists. His existence contains within itself the highest end, to which he can subject the whole of nature as far as he is able, or at least contrary to which he may not regard himself as subject to any influence of nature.—If, then, things in the world, as beings dependent in their existence, require a supreme cause acting according to ends, the human being is creation's final end. For without him the chain of mutually subordinated ends would lack a complete foundation; and only in the human being, and even in him only as a subject of morality, [A 399] is unconditional legislation with regard to ends to be found. This [436] alone makes him capable of being a final end to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated.[32]

85 [A 400] *On Physicotheology.*

Physicotheology is reason's attempt to infer the supreme cause of nature and its properties from the *ends* of nature, which can be known only empirically. A *moral theology*—ethicotheology—would be the attempt to infer that cause and its properties from the moral end of rational beings in nature, which can be known *a priori*.

The former naturally precedes the latter. For if we wish to infer a world-cause *teleologically* from things in the world, natural ends must first be given, for which [437] we must then seek a final end, and for this in turn the principle of the causality of that supreme cause.

Many investigations of nature can and must be conducted according to the teleological principle without our having reason to ask after the ground of the possibility of acting purposively that we find in various products [A 401] of nature. But if we also wish to have a concept of this ground, we possess absolutely no further insight than the mere maxim of reflective judgment: even if only a single organic product of nature were given to us, the character of our cognitive faculty would allow us to conceive no ground for it other than a cause of nature itself—whether of all nature or merely of this part—which contains through understanding the causality for that product. This principle of judgment brings us no further in explaining natural things and their origin, yet it opens a prospect beyond nature, so that we might perhaps determine more closely the otherwise so barren concept of an original being.

Now I say that physicotheology, however far it may be pursued, can disclose nothing to us about a *final end* of creation; for it does not even reach the question of such an end. It can therefore justify the concept of an intelligent world-cause as the only concept subjectively suited to the character of our cognitive faculty for the possibility of things that we can make intelligible to ourselves according to ends. But it can determine this concept no further, either theoretically or practically; and its attempt fails in its [A 402] intention of founding a theology. It always remains only a physical teleology, because within it the relation to ends is, and must always be, regarded as conditioned within nature. It therefore cannot even raise the question of the end for which nature itself

exists, whose ground must be sought outside nature. Yet on the determinate idea of this end depends the determinate concept of that higher intelligent world-cause, and thus the possibility of a theology.

What things in the world are useful to one another for; what the manifold within a thing is good for in relation to that thing itself; how we even have reason to assume that nothing in the world is in vain, but everything is good for something *in nature*, on condition that certain things are to exist as ends; and how, therefore, our reason has at its disposal for judgment [438] no other principle for the possibility of the object of its unavoidable teleological judging than to subordinate nature's mechanism to the architectonic of an intelligent author of the world—all this the teleological contemplation of the world accomplishes splendidly and to our utmost admiration. But the data, and thus the principles, for *determining* that concept of an intelligent world-cause as the highest artist are merely empirical. They therefore permit no inference to properties beyond those that experience reveals in its effects. Since experience can never encompass all of nature as a system, [A 403] it must often encounter grounds of proof apparently conflicting with that concept and with one another. Yet even if we could survey empirically the whole system insofar as it concerns mere nature, experience could never raise us above nature to the end of its very existence, and thereby to the determinate concept of that higher intelligence.

If we diminish the problem that physicotheology seeks to solve, its solution seems easy. Suppose we lavish the concept of a *deity* on any intelligent being we conceive, whether there be one or several, possessing many very great properties, though not all those required to found a nature in general agreeing with the greatest possible end. Or suppose we think nothing of supplementing through arbitrary additions what a theory's proofs fail to provide, and where we have reason to assume *much* perfection—and what is much for us?—consider ourselves entitled to presuppose *all possible* perfection. Physical teleology then makes considerable claims to the glory of founding a theology. But if we are required to show what impels us, and moreover entitles us, to make these additions, we will seek in vain for a ground of justification in the principles of the theoretical use of reason. For this use invariably demands that, in explaining

an [A 404] object of experience, we ascribe to it no more properties than empirical data can be found to establish as possible. On closer examination we would see that an idea of a highest being actually underlies our thinking *a priori*, resting on an entirely different use of reason, the practical. This idea impels us to complete physical teleology's deficient representation of the original ground of ends in nature, extending it to the [439] concept of a deity. We would then not falsely imagine that we had produced this idea, and with it a theology, through the theoretical use of reason in physical knowledge of the world, much less that we had proved its reality.

We cannot greatly blame the ancients for conceiving their gods as differing widely both in their powers and in their intentions and volitions, yet all, not excepting their chief, as limited in human fashion. For when they considered the arrangement and course of things in nature, they indeed found sufficient reason to assume something more than mechanical as their cause, and to suspect behind the machinery of this world the intentions of certain higher causes that they could conceive only as superhuman. But since they [A 405] found good and evil, the purposive and the counterpurposive, very mixed together in the world, at least for our insight, and could not permit themselves to assume secretly underlying wise and beneficent ends, for which they saw no proof, in support of an arbitrary idea of a supremely perfect author, their judgment of the supreme world-cause could hardly turn out otherwise, insofar as they proceeded consistently according to maxims of the merely theoretical use of reason. Others, who wished to be theologians as well as physicists, thought reason would find satisfaction if they provided for the absolute unity of the principle of natural things that reason demands through the idea of a being in which, as the sole substance, all those things would be merely inherent determinations. This substance would not be the cause of the world through understanding, yet as subject it would contain all the understanding of the beings in the world. It would thus be a being that produced nothing according to ends, but in which all things, because of the unity of the subject of which they are merely determinations, would necessarily relate purposively to one another even without end or intention. They thus introduced the idealism of final causes: instead

of the causal dependence *on one substance*, they established the elusive unity of a multitude of purposively connected substances through their inherence *in one substance*. [A 406] This system, subsequently called *pantheism* when considered from the side of the inhering beings of the world, and later *Spinozism* from the side of the solely subsisting subject as original being, did not so much [440] solve the question of the first ground of nature's purposiveness as declare it void. For the latter concept, stripped of all its reality, was made into a mere misinterpretation of a universal ontological concept of a thing in general.

Thus, on merely theoretical principles of the use of reason, on which alone physicotheology rests, we can never arrive at a concept of a deity sufficient for our teleological judging of nature. For either we declare all teleology a mere deception of judgment in judging the causal connection of things, and take refuge in the sole principle of nature's mere mechanism: nature would merely seem to contain a universal relation to ends because of the unity of the substance of which it is nothing but the manifold of determinations. Or, if instead of this idealism of final causes we wish to hold to the principle of the realism of this particular kind of causality, we may place beneath natural ends many intelligent original beings or only one. But as soon as we have at hand, for grounding the concept of such a being, nothing but principles of experience drawn from the actual connection of ends [A 407] in the world, we can, on the one hand, find no remedy against the discord that nature presents in many examples with respect to unity of purpose, and, on the other, never derive from this the concept of a single intelligent cause, as justified by mere experience, with sufficient determination for any theology usable in any way, theoretically or practically.

Physical teleology does indeed impel us to seek a theology, but it cannot produce one, however far we may trace nature through experience and assist the connection of ends discovered within it through ideas of reason—which, for physical problems, must be theoretical. What use is it, one may rightly complain, to place beneath all these arrangements a great understanding, immeasurable for us, and have it order this world according to intentions, if nature tells us nothing, and can never tell us anything, of the final intention? Without this

we can form no common point of reference for all these natural ends, no sufficient teleological principle either for knowing all the ends within a system or for forming a [441] concept of the supreme understanding as cause of such a nature that, for our judgment reflecting teleologically upon it, [A 408] could serve as a standard. I would then indeed have an *artistic understanding* for scattered ends, but no *wisdom* for a final end, which must properly contain the determining ground of that understanding. But in the absence of a final end, which only pure reason can supply *a priori*—since all ends in the world are empirically conditioned and can contain only what is good for this or that contingent intention, not what is good absolutely—and which alone would teach me what properties, what degree, and what relation of nature's supreme cause I must conceive in order to judge nature as a teleological system, how and with what right may I enlarge at will my very limited concept of that original understanding, grounded in my scant knowledge of the world, of this original being's power to make its ideas actual, of its will to do so, and so forth, and complete it into the idea of an all-wise infinite being? If this were to be done theoretically, it would presuppose omniscience in myself, so that I could comprehend nature's ends in their entire connection and, moreover, conceive all other possible plans, in comparison with which the present one would have to be judged, with grounds, the best. For without this complete knowledge of the effect, I cannot infer a determinate concept of the supreme cause, which can be found only in that of an intelligence infinite in every [A 409] respect, that is, in the concept of a deity, and establish a foundation for theology.

Thus, however far physical teleology may be extended, according to the principle stated above we may indeed say that, given the character and principles of our cognitive faculty, we can conceive nature, in the purposive arrangements that have become known to us, only as the product of an understanding to which it is subject. But whether this understanding may also have had a final intention in the whole of nature and its production—an intention that would then not lie in the nature of the sensible world—the theoretical investigation of nature can never disclose. With all our knowledge of nature, it remains undecided whether that supreme cause is its original ground according to a final end

at all, rather than through an understanding determined by the mere necessity of its nature to produce certain forms [442]—by analogy with what we call artistic instinct in animals—without our having to ascribe to it even wisdom on that account, much less supreme wisdom united with all the other properties required for the perfection of its product.

Physicotheology is therefore a misunderstood physical teleology, [A 410] usable only as a preparation, a propaedeutic, for theology, and sufficient for this intention only through the addition of another principle on which it can rest, not in itself, as its name would suggest.

86 *On Ethicotheology.*

There is a judgment from which even the commonest understanding cannot free itself when it reflects on the existence of things in the world and on the existence of the world itself: all the manifold creatures, however great their artful arrangement and however diverse their purposively interrelated connections, indeed the whole of their many systems, which we incorrectly call worlds, would exist for nothing if there were no human beings—rational beings in general—in them. That is, without the human being the whole of creation would be a mere wilderness, in vain and without a final end. Yet neither is it his cognitive faculty, theoretical reason, in relation to which the existence of everything else in the world first acquires its worth, as though merely someone needed to be there who could *contemplate* the world. For if this contemplation of the world still represented to him nothing but things without a final end, [A 411] the world's existence could acquire no worth from being known. One must already presuppose a final end for it, in relation to which contemplating the world itself would have worth. Nor is it the feeling of pleasure and its sum in relation to which we conceive a final end of creation as given: it is not well-being, enjoyment, whether bodily or spiritual—in a word, happiness—by which we estimate that absolute worth. For the fact that, if the human being exists, he makes happiness his own final intention gives no concept of why he exists at all, or what worth he himself has, that his existence should be made agreeable to him. [443] He must therefore already be presupposed as the final

end of creation if we are to have a rational ground for why nature must harmonize with his happiness when it is considered as an absolute whole according to principles of ends.—Thus it is only the faculty of desire; but not that which makes him dependent on nature through sensible impulses, not that in respect of which the worth of his existence rests on what he receives and enjoys. Rather, it is the worth that he alone can give himself, consisting in what he does, how and according to what principles he acts, not as a member of nature but in the *freedom* of his faculty of desire. That is, a [A 412] good will alone can give his existence an absolute worth, and in relation to it the existence of the world can have a *final end*.

With this the commonest judgment of sound human reason also agrees completely: the human being can be a final end of creation only as a moral being, if only we direct judgment toward this question and prompt it to attempt an answer. What use is it, one will say, that this person has so much talent, that he is even very active with it and thereby exercises a useful influence on the commonwealth, and thus has great worth in relation both to his fortunate circumstances and to the benefit of others, if he possesses no good will? Considered inwardly, he is a contemptible object. And if creation is not to be altogether without a final end, then he, who as a human being also belongs to it, must nevertheless, as an evil human being in a world under moral laws, forfeit his subjective end, happiness, in accordance with these laws, as the sole condition under which his existence can coexist with the final end.

If, then, we encounter purposive arrangements in the world and, as reason unavoidably demands, subordinate the merely conditioned ends to an unconditioned highest end, that is, a final end, we first see readily that the question is no longer one of an end of nature within [A 413] itself insofar as it exists, but of the end of its existence with all its arrangements, and hence of the ultimate *end of creation*. And in this we are properly concerned with the supreme condition under which alone a final end—that is, the determining ground of a highest understanding for producing the beings of the world—can have a place.

444 Now since we recognize the human being only as a moral being as the end of creation, we have, first, a ground, or at least the principal condition, for regarding the world as a whole connected according to ends and as a system of final causes. Above all, however, for the reference of natural ends to an intelligent world-cause that the character of our reason makes necessary for us, we have *a principle* for conceiving the nature and properties of this first cause as the supreme ground in the kingdom of ends, and thus for determining its concept. Physical teleology could not accomplish this: it could occasion only indeterminate concepts of that cause, and for that very reason concepts unfit for either theoretical or practical use.

From this thus-determined principle of the original being's causality, we must conceive it not merely as an intelligence legislating for nature, but also as the legislative sovereign in a moral kingdom of ends. In relation to the *highest good* possible only under its rule, [A 414] namely the existence of rational beings under moral laws, we must conceive this original being as *omniscient*, so that even the innermost dispositions—which constitute the true moral worth of the actions of rational beings in the world—are not hidden from it; as *omnipotent*, so that it can make all nature conform to this highest end; as *all-good* and at the same time *just*, because these two properties, united as *wisdom*, constitute the conditions of the causality of a supreme cause of the world as the highest good under moral laws. We must likewise conceive in it all the remaining transcendental properties, such as *eternity*, *omnipresence*, and so on, that are presupposed in relation to such a final end—for goodness and justice are moral properties.—In this way *moral* teleology supplies the deficiency of *physical* teleology and first grounds a *theology*. The latter, if it did not borrow unnoticed from the former but proceeded consistently, could by itself ground nothing but a *demonology*, incapable of any determinate concept.

But the principle of referring the world, because of the moral determination of the ends of certain beings within it, to a supreme cause [A 415] as deity does this not merely by supplementing the physicoteleological ground of proof and thus necessarily taking it as a foundation. It is also sufficient *by itself* for this purpose and directs our attention [445] to natural ends and our investigation

to the inconceivably great art hidden behind their forms, so as to give the ideas supplied by pure practical reason incidental confirmation in natural ends. For the concept of beings in the world under moral laws is an *a priori* principle according to which the human being must necessarily judge himself. Furthermore, if there is any world-cause acting intentionally and directed toward an end, that moral relation must be just as necessarily a condition of the possibility of creation as the relation according to physical laws—provided that intelligent cause also has a final end. Reason likewise regards this *a priori* as a principle necessary for its teleological judging of the existence of things. The question now is only whether we have any ground sufficient for reason, speculative or practical, to ascribe a *final end* to the supreme cause acting according to ends. For that this final end, given the subjective character of our reason, and however we might conceive the reason of other beings, can be none other than *the* [A 416] *human being under moral laws*, may count for us as certain *a priori*. By contrast, the ends of nature in the physical order cannot be known *a priori* at all; above all, we cannot in any way see that a nature could not exist without them.

Remark.

Consider a human being in moments when his mind is attuned to moral feeling. If, surrounded by beautiful nature, he enjoys his existence in calm cheerfulness, he feels within himself a need to be grateful to someone for it. Or suppose that on another occasion, in the same frame of mind, he finds himself pressed by duties that he can and will fulfill only through voluntary sacrifice; then he feels a need to have thereby also performed something commanded and obeyed a sovereign. Or perhaps he has thoughtlessly transgressed his duty without thereby becoming accountable to other people; his stern self-reproaches will nevertheless speak within him as though they were the voice of a judge to whom he had [446] to render an account. In a word, he needs a moral intelligence so that, for the end for which he exists, there may be a being that is, in conformity with that end, the cause of him and of the world. It is vain to contrive incentives behind these feelings, for they are immediately connected with the purest moral disposition. *Gratitude*, *obedience*, and *humiliation*—submis-

sion to [A 417] deserved chastisement—are particular states of mind directed toward duty; and the mind inclined to expand its moral disposition here freely conceives an object not in the world, so as, if possible, to demonstrate its duty toward such an object as well. It is therefore at least possible, and its ground also lies in a moral way of thinking, to represent a purely moral need for the existence of a being under whom our morality acquires either greater strength or, at least in our representation, greater scope, namely a new object for its exercise. That is, it is possible to assume a morally legislative being outside the world, without any regard to theoretical proof, still less to selfish interest, on a purely moral ground free from every alien influence, though admittedly only subjective, at the mere recommendation of pure practical reason, which legislates in its own right. Even if such a state of mind occurred rarely or did not last long, but passed fleetingly without lasting effect, or without any reflection on the object represented in such a shadowy image and without any effort to bring it under distinct concepts, its ground—the moral predisposition within us—is nevertheless unmistakable. It is a subjective principle for not resting content, in contemplating the world, with its purposiveness through natural causes, but placing beneath it a supreme cause governing nature according to moral principles.—Added to this is that the moral law impels us to strive toward a universal highest end, while we feel ourselves and all nature powerless to attain it; and that only insofar as we strive toward it may we judge ourselves in conformity with the final end of an intelligent world-cause, if [A 418] there were one. Thus there is a purely moral ground of practical reason for assuming this cause, since this can be done without contradiction, if for no other reason than to avoid the danger of regarding that striving as wholly vain in its effects and thereby letting it weaken.

447 All this is intended here to say only that, although *fear* could first produce *gods* —demons—*reason*, through its moral principles, could first produce the concept of *God*. This holds even if people were, as commonly happens, very ignorant of nature's teleology, or very doubtful because of the difficulty of reconciling its conflicting appearances through a sufficiently established principle. The

inner *moral* determination of the end of human existence supplied what knowledge of nature lacked. For it instructed us, with regard to the final end of the existence of all things—a principle satisfying reason only when *ethical*—to conceive the supreme cause with properties enabling it to subordinate all nature to that single intention, for which nature is merely an instrument: that is, as a *deity*.

87 *On the Moral Proof of the Existence of God.*

There is a *physical teleology* that supplies a ground of proof sufficient for our theoretically reflective judgment to assume the existence of an intelligent world-cause. But we [A 419] also find in ourselves, and still more in the concept of a rational being endowed with freedom in its causality in general, a *moral teleology*. Since the relation to ends within ourselves can be determined *a priori* together with its law, and thus known as necessary, this teleology requires no intelligent cause outside us to account for this inner lawfulness. Nor, when we find purposiveness in the geometrical properties of figures for all kinds of possible artistic practice, may we look beyond them to a supreme understanding imparting it. Yet this moral teleology concerns us as beings in the world, and thus as beings connected with other things in the world. Those same moral laws prescribe that we direct our judgment to these other things either as ends or as objects in relation to which we ourselves are the final end. From this moral teleology—which concerns the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to a final end that we must intend in the world, as well as the reciprocal relation of the world to that moral end and the [448] external possibility of accomplishing it, for which no physical teleology can guide us—there now arises the necessary question whether it compels our rational judgment to go beyond the world [A 420] and seek an intelligent supreme principle for that relation of nature to the moral within us, so that we may represent nature as purposive also in relation to inner moral legislation and its possible realization. Consequently, there certainly is a moral teleology; and it is necessarily connected with the *nomothetic* of freedom on the one hand and that of nature on the other, just as civil legislation is connected with the question of where execu-

tive power is to be sought, and as there is connection generally wherever reason is to supply a principle for the actuality of a certain lawful order of things possible only according to ideas.—We will first present reason's advance from that moral teleology, and its relation to physical teleology, to *theology*, and afterward consider the possibility and cogency of this mode of inference.

If one assumes the existence of certain things, or even only certain forms of things, to be contingent, and thus possible only through something else as cause, one can seek the supreme ground for this causality, and thus the unconditioned ground for the conditioned, either in the physical or in the teleological order, according to the *nexus of efficient causes* or that *of final causes*. That is, one can ask: What is the supreme productive cause? Or: What is its supreme, absolutely unconditioned end, [A 421] that is, the final end of its producing these products, or all its products in general? Here, of course, it is presupposed that this cause is capable of representing ends and is therefore an intelligent being, or at least must be conceived by us as acting according to the laws of such a being.

Now if we follow the latter order, there is a *principle* to which even the commonest human reason is compelled to assent immediately: if there is to be any *final end* that reason must specify *a priori*, it can be none other than *the human being*—every rational being in the world—*under moral laws*.[33] For everyone judges thus: if the world consisted [A 422] [449] entirely of lifeless beings, or partly of living but nonrational beings, the existence of such a world would have no worth at all, since no being would exist within it that had the least concept of worth. If, on the other hand, there were also rational beings, but their reason could place the worth of the existence of things only in nature's relation to them and their well-being, and were unable originally [A 423] to procure such worth for itself through freedom, then there would indeed be relative ends in the world, but no absolute final end, since the existence of such rational beings would still always be purposeless. Moral laws, however, have the distinctive character of prescribing something to reason as an end without condition, and thus precisely as the concept of a final end requires. The existence of a reason that can itself be the supreme law in the relation to ends—in other words,

the existence of rational beings under moral laws—can therefore alone be conceived as the final end [450] of a world's existence. If this is not the case, then either no end at all in its cause underlies that existence, or ends without a final end underlie it.

The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, obligates us by itself alone, without depending on any end as a material condition. Yet it also determines for us, and does so *a priori*, a final end that it makes us bound to pursue: the *highest good in the world* possible through freedom.

The subjective condition under which the human being—and, according to all our concepts, every finite rational being as well—can set himself a final end under the foregoing law is happiness. Consequently, [A 424] the highest physical good possible in the world, which we are to advance as far as we can as a final end, is *happiness*, under the objective condition of the human being's agreement with the law of *morality*, as his worthiness to be happy.

But according to all our rational capacities, we cannot possibly represent these two requirements of the final end assigned to us by the moral law as *united* through mere natural causes and in conformity with the idea of that final end. Thus the concept of the *practical necessity* of such an end through the application of our powers does not agree with the theoretical concept of the *physical possibility* of bringing it about, if we connect our freedom with no causality of a means other than that of nature.

Consequently, we must assume a moral world-cause, an author of the world, in order to set ourselves a final end in conformity with the moral law. And insofar as the latter is necessary, so far—that is, to the same degree and on the same ground—is it necessary to assume the former: namely, that there is a God.[34]

This proof, which can readily be given the form of logical precision, [A 425] does not mean that assuming the existence of God [451] is just as necessary as recognizing the validity of the moral law, and hence that someone unable to convince himself of the former could judge himself released from obligations under the latter. No! Only the *intention* to realize in the world the final end to be brought about through obedience to that law—the happiness of rational beings harmoniously coinciding with obedience to moral laws, as the highest

good of the world—would then have to be abandoned. Every rational person would still have to recognize himself as strictly bound by morality's precept; for its laws are formal and command unconditionally, without regard to ends as the matter of willing. But one requirement of the final end, as practical reason prescribes it to beings in the world, is an irresistible end implanted in them by their nature as [A 426] finite beings. Reason wishes only that this end be subjected to the moral law *as* an inviolable *condition*, or also made universal in accordance with it, and thus makes the advancement of happiness in agreement with morality the final end. The moral law commands us to advance this as far as lies within our power, so far as those former ends are concerned, whatever the outcome of the effort may be. Fulfillment of duty consists in the form of an earnest will, not in the intervening causes of success.

Suppose, then, that a person, moved partly by the weakness of all the much-praised speculative arguments and partly by various irregularities he encounters in nature and the moral world, persuaded himself of the proposition that there is no God. He would nevertheless be worthless in his own eyes if he therefore wished to regard the laws of duty as merely imagined, invalid, and nonbinding, and resolved to transgress them without scruple. Such a person, with that cast of mind, would remain worthless even if he could subsequently become convinced of what he had initially doubted, although he fulfilled his duty out of fear or desire for reward, without a [452] disposition of reverence for duty, as punctiliously in its effects as could ever [A 427] be demanded. Conversely, if, as a believer, he follows those laws sincerely and unselfishly to his own consciousness, yet whenever he supposes for the sake of experiment that he might one day be convinced there is no God, immediately believes himself free of every moral obligation, then his inner moral disposition must be in a poor state indeed.

We can therefore suppose an upright man, such as Spinoza, who holds himself firmly persuaded that there is no God and, since the consequence is the same regarding the object of morality, no future life either. How will he judge his own inner determination of ends through the moral law, which he actively reveres? He desires no advantage for himself from following it, either in this

world or another; rather, he wishes unselfishly only to establish the good toward which that holy law directs all his powers. But his endeavor is limited. From nature he may indeed expect occasional contingent assistance, but never a lawful agreement, occurring according to constant rules, as his maxims inwardly are and must be, with the end he nevertheless feels bound and impelled to bring about. Deceit, violence, and envy will always flourish around him, though [A 428] he himself is honest, peaceable, and benevolent. And the other upright people he encounters, despite all their worthiness to be happy, will nevertheless be subjected by nature, which takes no account of this, to all the evils of want, disease, and untimely death, like the earth's other animals. They will remain so until a vast grave swallows them all, honest or dishonest—it makes no difference here—and casts them, who could believe themselves the final end of creation, back into the abyss of matter's purposeless chaos from which they were drawn.—Thus this well-disposed man would indeed have to abandon as impossible the end that he had, and ought to have had, before his eyes in following moral laws. Or, if he wishes to remain faithful here too to the call of his inner moral vocation, and not weaken the respect that the moral law immediately inspires in him for obedience by the nullity of the sole ideal final end adequate to its lofty demand—which cannot happen without injury to his moral disposition—[453] he must—and can very well do so, since it is at least not contradictory in itself—assume for practical purposes, that is, so as at least to form a concept of the possibility of the final end morally prescribed to him, the existence of a *moral* author of the world, that is, [A 429] God.

88 *Limitation of the Validity of the Moral Proof.*

Pure reason as a practical faculty—that is, as the capacity to determine the free use of our causality through ideas, pure concepts of reason—not only contains in the moral law a regulative principle of our actions, but thereby also supplies a subjectively constitutive principle in the concept of an object that reason alone can conceive and that is to be made actual in the world through our actions according to that law. The idea of a final end in the use of freedom according to moral laws therefore has subjective-*practical* reality. Reason deter-

mines us *a priori* to advance with all our powers the greatest good of the world, which consists in uniting the greatest well-being of rational beings in the world with the supreme condition of goodness in them: universal happiness with morality most fully conforming to law. In this final end, the possibility of one part, happiness, is empirically conditioned, that is, dependent on the character of nature—whether it agrees with this end or not—and theoretically [A 430] problematic. The other part, morality, with respect to which we are independent of nature's cooperation, is established *a priori* as possible and is dogmatically certain. Thus the objective theoretical reality of the concept of the final end of rational beings in the world requires not only that we have a final end set before us *a priori*, but also that creation, that is, the world itself, have a final end in its existence. If this could be proved *a priori*, it would add objective reality to the subjective reality of the final end. For if creation has a final end at all, we can conceive it only as necessarily agreeing with the moral end, which alone makes the concept of an end possible. [454] Now we do indeed find ends in the world, and physical teleology displays them so abundantly that, if we judge in accordance with reason, we ultimately have grounds to assume, as a principle for investigating nature, that nothing in nature is without an end. But we seek nature's final end within nature itself in vain. Hence, just as its idea lies only in reason, this end can and must be sought, even as regards its objective possibility, only in rational beings. Their practical reason, however, not only supplies this final end but also determines its concept with respect to the conditions under which alone a final end of creation can [A 431] be conceived by us.

The question now is whether the objective reality of the concept of a final end of creation can also be demonstrated sufficiently for the theoretical demands of pure reason: if not apodictically for determining judgment, then sufficiently for the maxims of theoretically reflective judgment. This is the least one can ask of speculative philosophy, which undertakes to connect the moral end with natural ends through the idea of a single end. Yet even this little is far more than it can ever accomplish.

According to the principle of theoretically reflective judgment, we would say: If we have grounds to assume, for nature's purposive products, a supreme cause of nature whose causality in respect of nature's actuality—creation—must be conceived as different in kind from that required for nature's mechanism, namely as the causality of an understanding, then we will also have sufficient grounds to conceive in this original being not merely ends everywhere in nature but also a final end. This would not demonstrate the existence of such a being, but would at least, as occurred in physical teleology, convince us that we can make the possibility [A 432] of such a world comprehensible to ourselves not merely according to ends, but only by placing a final end beneath its existence as well.

But a final end is solely a concept of our practical reason and can neither be inferred from any data of experience for the theoretical judging of nature nor be referred to knowledge of nature. No use of this concept is possible except solely for practical [455] reason according to moral laws. The final end of creation is that constitution of the world which agrees with what alone we can determinately specify according to laws, namely the final end of our pure practical reason, insofar, indeed, as it is to be practical.—Now through the moral law, which imposes this latter end upon us, we have a ground for practical purposes, namely for applying our powers to realizing it, to assume its possibility and practicability, and hence also a nature of things agreeing with it. For without nature's cooperation in a condition of that end which is not in our power, its realization would be impossible. Thus we have a moral ground for conceiving in a world also a final end of creation.

This is not yet the inference from moral teleology [A 433] to a theology, that is, to the existence of a moral author of the world, but only to a final end of creation determined in this way. That for this creation—that is, for the existence of things in conformity with a *final end*—we must assume as author of the world, first, an intelligent being, but, second, not merely an intelligent being, as required for the possibility of natural things we were compelled to judge as *ends*, but one that is also *moral*, and thus a *God*: this is a second inference. Its character makes clear that it is drawn solely for judgment according to concepts

of practical reason and, as such, for reflective, not determining judgment. For we cannot claim to see that, although morally practical reason in us differs essentially in its principles from technically practical reason, this must also be so in the supreme world-cause, if assumed as an intelligence, and that a particular and distinct kind of its causality is required for a final end, as against mere natural ends. Hence we cannot claim to see that in our final end we have not merely a *moral ground* for assuming a final end of creation as effect, but also for assuming a *moral being* as creation's original ground. We can, however, say that *given the character of our rational faculty*, [A 434] we cannot at all make comprehensible to ourselves the possibility of such purposiveness *related to the moral law* and its object as is contained in this final end, without an author and ruler of the world who is also a moral legislator.

456 The actuality of a highest morally legislative author is therefore sufficiently demonstrated solely *for the practical use* of our reason, without determining anything theoretically regarding its existence. For the possibility of its end—which is already assigned to us in any case through its own legislation—reason requires an idea that removes, sufficiently for reflective judgment, the obstacle arising from our inability to pursue that end on the merely natural concept of the world. This idea thereby acquires practical reality, even though speculative cognition wholly lacks every means of giving it such reality for theoretical purposes in explaining nature and determining the supreme cause. For theoretically reflective judgment, physical teleology sufficiently proved an intelligent world-cause from natural ends; for practical judgment, moral teleology accomplishes this through the concept of a final end that it is compelled, for practical purposes, to ascribe to creation. The [A 435] objective reality of the idea of God as moral author of the world cannot indeed be demonstrated through physical ends *alone*. Yet when knowledge of these ends is united with knowledge of the moral end, the former are of great importance, by virtue of pure reason's maxim of pursuing unity of principles as far as possible, in assisting the practical reality of that idea through the reality it already has for judgment in theoretical respects.

To prevent a readily arising misunderstanding, it is most necessary here to note, first, that we can *conceive* these properties of the highest being only by analogy. For how could we investigate its nature, to which experience can show us nothing similar? Second, through analogy we can only conceive it, not *cognize* it accordingly and ascribe these properties to it theoretically. For that would be for determining judgment in our reason's speculative intention, in order to understand what the supreme world-cause is *in itself*. Here, however, the sole concern is what concept we must form of it, given the character of our cognitive faculties, and whether we must assume its existence in order to give likewise only practical reality to an end that pure practical reason, without any such presupposition, imposes upon us *a priori* to realize with all our powers: [A 436] that is, merely to be able to conceive an intended effect as possible. That concept may well be transcendent [457] for speculative reason; the properties we ascribe to the being conceived through it may also conceal an anthropomorphism if used objectively. Yet their use is not intended to determine its nature, which is inaccessible to us, but to determine ourselves and our will accordingly. We name a cause according to the concept we have of its effect, but only in respect of its relation to that effect, without thereby wishing to determine its inner constitution through properties that alone are known to us in such causes and must be given through experience. Thus, for example, we ascribe to the soul, among other things, a *power of locomotion*, because movements of the body actually arise whose cause lies in its representations, without wishing thereby to ascribe to it the only way we know moving forces: through attraction, pressure, impact, and thus motion, which always presupposes an extended being.—In just this way we must assume *something* containing the ground of the possibility and practical reality, that is, the practicability, of a necessary moral final end. According to the character of the effect expected from it, we can conceive this as a wise being governing the world according to moral [A 437] laws; and, in conformity with the character of our cognitive faculties, we must conceive it as a cause of things distinct from nature, merely to express the *relation* of this being, which surpasses all our cognitive faculties, to the object of *our* practical reason. We do not thereby wish to ascribe to it theo-

retically the only causality of this kind known to us, namely understanding and will, nor even objectively to distinguish the causality conceived in it with respect to what is a final end *for us* from its causality with respect to nature and its determinations of ends generally. We can assume this distinction only as subjectively necessary given the character of our cognitive faculty, and valid for reflective, not objectively determining judgment. But where practice is concerned, such a *regulative* principle for prudence or wisdom—to act in conformity with what, given our cognitive faculties, we can conceive as possible only in a certain way, as an end—is also *constitutive*, that is, practically determining. Yet this very same principle, as a principle for judging the objective possibility of things, is by no means theoretically determining, as though [458] the object itself possessed only the kind of possibility that belongs to our [A 438] capacity for thinking it; it is a merely *regulative* principle for reflective judgment.

Remark.

This moral proof is not a newly invented ground of proof, but at most only a newly elucidated one. For it already lay within the human rational faculty before its earliest germination and is only developed further as that faculty's cultivation proceeds. As soon as human beings began to reflect on right and wrong, at a time when they still passed indifferently over nature's purposiveness and used nature without thinking of anything but its customary course, the judgment inevitably had to arise that in the outcome it could never be all the same whether a person had behaved honestly or falsely, justly or violently, even if to the end of his life he had encountered, at least visibly, no good fortune for his virtues or punishment for his crimes. It is as if they perceived within themselves a voice saying that things must turn out differently. Thus there must also have lain hidden a representation, however obscure, of something toward which they felt bound to strive and with which such an outcome could not be reconciled; or, if they regarded the course of the world as the sole order of things, they could not reconcile with it that inner determination of their mind's ends. They might represent the way in which such an irregularity—an irregularity far more revolting to the human mind than the blind chance one

might wish to place beneath the judging of nature as a principle—could be balanced out in any number of crude [A 439] ways. Yet they could never devise any other principle for the possibility of uniting nature with their inner moral law than a supreme cause governing the world according to moral laws. For a final end assigned within them as duty, and a nature outside them without any final end, in which that end is nevertheless to become actual, stand in contradiction. They might brood over much nonsense concerning the inner constitution of that world-cause; yet that moral relation in the government of the world always remained the same, universally comprehensible to even the least cultivated reason insofar as it considers itself practical, whereas speculative reason [459] cannot nearly keep pace with it.—In all probability, this moral interest also first awakened attention to nature's beauty and ends. These then served excellently to strengthen that idea, yet could neither ground it nor, still less, dispense with that interest. For even the investigation of natural ends acquires only in relation to the final end that immediate interest which manifests itself so strongly in admiration for them without regard to any advantage to be drawn from them.

89 *On the Usefulness of the Moral Argument.*

Restricting reason, with respect to all our ideas of the supersensible, to the conditions of its practical use has, regarding [A 440] the idea of God, this unmistakable benefit: it prevents *theology* from soaring into *theosophy*, into transcendent concepts that bewilder reason, or sinking into *demonology*, an anthropomorphic representation of the highest being; and it prevents *religion* from lapsing into *theurgy*, the extravagant delusion that we can feel other supersensible beings and in turn influence them, or into *idolatry*, the superstitious delusion that we can make ourselves pleasing to the highest being through means other than a moral disposition.[35]

For if we allow the vanity or presumption of reasoning to determine even the least thing theoretically, and thus to expand knowledge, about what lies beyond the sensible world; if we permit it to make a great show of insights into the existence and constitution of the [A 441] divine nature, into its understanding and

will, the laws of both, and the properties flowing from them into the world, then I would like to know where and at what point we are to limit [460] reason's pretensions. For from the very source from which those insights were drawn, still more may surely be expected, if only, as one supposes, we exert our reflection. Such claims would have to be limited according to some principle, not merely because we find that all attempts with them have hitherto failed, since this proves nothing against the possibility of a better outcome. But here no principle is possible except either to assume that absolutely nothing concerning the supersensible can be determined theoretically, save in a merely negative way, or to assume that our reason contains a still unused mine of who knows how vast an expansion of knowledge, held in reserve for us and our descendants.—As for religion, however, that is, morality in relation to God as legislator, if theoretical knowledge of him had to precede it, morality would have to conform to theology. Not only would the external, arbitrary legislation of a supreme being be introduced in place of reason's internal, necessary legislation, but everything deficient in our insight into [A 442] that being's nature would also extend to the moral precept, thus making religion immoral and perverting it.

Regarding the hope of a future life, suppose that, instead of taking as our guide for reason's judgment of our vocation the final end that we ourselves must fulfill according to the moral law's precept—a judgment therefore regarded as necessary or worthy of acceptance only in a practical relation—we consult our theoretical cognitive faculty. In this regard, the study of the soul, like theology above, supplies nothing more than a negative concept of our thinking being: none of its actions or the appearances of inner sense can be explained materialistically. Thus, through our entire theoretical cognitive faculty, no judgment expanding or determining knowledge of its separate nature, or of the continuance or noncontinuance of its personality after death, is possible for us on speculative grounds. Since everything here is therefore left to the teleological judging of our existence in a practically necessary respect, and to assuming our continued existence as the condition required for the final end that reason unconditionally assigns to us, a benefit becomes apparent, though at first it seems a

loss. Just as theology can never become theosophy [A 443] [461] for us, rational *psychology* can never become *pneumatology* as a science expanding knowledge, while on the other hand it is also secured against falling into *materialism*. Rather, it is merely an anthropology of inner sense, that is, knowledge of our thinking self in *life*, and as theoretical knowledge remains merely empirical. Rational psychology, by contrast, as regards the question of our eternal existence, is no theoretical science at all, but rests on a single inference of moral teleology, just as its entire use is necessary solely for the sake of the latter as our practical vocation.

90 *On the Kind of Assent in a Teleological Proof of the Existence of God.*

First, every proof—whether conducted through direct empirical presentation of what is to be proved, as in proof through observation of the object or experiment, or through reason *a priori* from principles—requires that it not *persuade* but *convince*, or at least work toward conviction. That is, the ground of proof or inference must not be merely a subjective [A 444] aesthetic determining ground of assent, mere semblance, but must be objectively valid and a logical ground of knowledge; otherwise the understanding is beguiled, not convinced. Of the former kind of apparent proof is one conducted in natural theology perhaps with good intentions, yet with deliberate concealment of its weakness: one invokes the great multitude of evidences for an origin of natural things according to the principle of ends, and exploits a merely subjective ground of human reason. This is reason's characteristic propensity, wherever it can do so without contradiction, to substitute a single principle for many; and where only some or even many requirements for determining a concept are found in this principle, to add the rest in thought, so as to complete the concept of the thing through arbitrary supplementation. For indeed, if we encounter so many products in nature indicating to us an intelligent cause, why should we not prefer to conceive one cause instead of many, and in it not merely great understanding, [462] power, and so on, but rather all-wisdom and omnipotence—in a word, conceive it as containing the sufficient ground of such properties for all possible things? And why not ascribe to this single all-powerful original being not mere-

ly, for natural laws and products, [A 445] understanding, but also, as a moral world-cause, supreme moral practical reason, since this completion of the concept supplies a principle sufficient both for insight into nature and for moral wisdom, and no even somewhat well-grounded objection can be raised against the possibility of such an idea? If at the same time the mind's moral incentives are set in motion and a lively interest in them is added with rhetorical force, of which they are indeed worthy, there arises a persuasion of the proof's objective sufficiency and an illusion—salutary in most instances of its use—that dispenses entirely with any examination of its logical rigor and even feels abhorrence and aversion toward such examination, as though it rested on impious doubt.—There may be nothing to object to here insofar as popular usefulness is the proper concern. Yet dividing the argument into its two heterogeneous parts, what belongs to physical and what to moral teleology, cannot and must not be prevented. Fusing them conceals where the proof's true strength lies, and in which part and how it would have to be worked upon to sustain its validity before the strictest scrutiny, [A 446] even if we should be compelled to acknowledge the weakness of our rational insight in one part. Thus it is the philosopher's duty—even supposing he made nothing of the demand for sincerity—to expose the illusion, however salutary, that such a mingling can produce, and to separate what belongs merely to persuasion from what leads to conviction. These are determinations of assent differing not merely in degree but in kind. In this way he can openly present the mind's attitude in this proof in all its purity and submit it candidly to the strictest examination.

But a proof aimed at conviction can in turn be of two kinds. It may seek to establish what the object is *in itself*, or what it is *for us*, for human beings in general, according to the [463] rational principles necessary for our judging of it: a proof κατ' αληθειαν or κατ' ανθρωπον, the latter word taken in its general meaning for humanity as such. In the former case it rests on sufficient principles for determining judgment; in the second, merely for reflective judgment. In the latter case, if it rests on merely theoretical principles, it can never work toward conviction. But if [A 447] it takes a practical principle of reason as its basis, which thus holds universally and necessarily, it may well claim conviction

sufficient for a purely practical purpose, that is, moral conviction. A proof *works toward conviction* without yet convincing when it is merely conducted on the path toward it: that is, it contains only objective grounds for conviction which, though not yet sufficient for certainty, are nevertheless of a kind that does not merely serve persuasion as subjective grounds of judgment.

Now all theoretical grounds of proof suffice either: 1) for proof through logically rigorous *inferences of reason*; or, failing this, 2) for an *inference by analogy*; or, if this too is unavailable, still 3) for *probable opinion*; or finally, at the very least, 4) for assuming a merely possible explanatory ground as a *hypothesis*.—Now I say that no grounds of proof whatsoever working toward theoretical conviction can produce assent of this kind, from its highest to its lowest degree, if what is to be proved is the proposition that an original being exists as a God in the meaning adequate to the whole content of this concept: namely, as a *moral* author of the world, and thus in such a way that through him the final end of creation is also specified. [A 448]

1) As for the *logically correct* proof proceeding from the universal to the particular, the Critique has sufficiently shown the following. Since no intuition possible for us corresponds to the concept of a being to be sought beyond nature, and this concept itself, insofar as it is to be determined theoretically through synthetic predicates, therefore always remains problematic for us, absolutely no cognition of this being is possible that would expand the scope of our theoretical knowledge in the least. Nor can the particular concept of a supersensible being be subsumed under the universal principles of the nature of things so that we might infer [464] the former from the latter, because those principles hold solely for nature as an object of the senses.

2) With two things differing in kind, one can indeed *conceive* one of them, precisely at the point of their difference, according to an *analogy*[36] with the other. But one cannot, from that in which they differ, [A 449] *infer* from one to the other by analogy, that is, transfer to the other this mark [A 450] of specific difference. Thus, by analogy with the law of equality of action and reaction in the mutual attraction and repulsion of [465] bodies, I can also conceive the community of members of a commonwealth according to rules of right. But I can-

not transfer those specific determinations—material attraction or repulsion—to this community and ascribe them to its citizens in order to constitute a system called a state.—Likewise we may conceive the causality of the original being with respect to things in the world as natural ends by analogy with an understanding as the ground of the forms of certain products we call works of art. For this is done only for the theoretical or practical use that, according to a certain principle, our cognitive faculty must make of this concept regarding natural things in the world. But from the fact that among [A 451] beings in the world understanding must be ascribed to the cause of an effect judged artificial, we can by no means infer by analogy that a being wholly distinct from nature possesses, with respect to nature itself, the very same causality that we perceive in the human being. For this concerns precisely the point of difference conceived, in its very concept, between a cause sensibly conditioned with regard to its effects and the supersensible original being; it therefore cannot be transferred to the latter.—The very requirement that I conceive divine causality only by analogy with an understanding—a faculty we know in no being other than the sensibly conditioned human being—contains the prohibition against ascribing understanding to it in the literal sense.[37]

3) *Opinion* has no place at all in *a priori* judgments; through them one either knows something as wholly certain or knows nothing at all. But even if the given grounds of proof from which we begin are empirical, as here with the ends in the world, we still cannot [A 452] form any opinion by their means beyond the sensible world or grant such venturesome judgments the slightest claim to probability. For probability is a part of a certainty possible in a given series of grounds: its grounds are compared with the sufficient ground as parts with a whole. The insufficient [466] ground must be capable of being supplemented to reach this certainty. But since, as determining grounds of the certainty of one and the same judgment, they must be homogeneous—otherwise they would not together make up a magnitude such as certainty—one part cannot lie within the limits of possible experience and another outside all possible experience. Hence, since merely empirical grounds of proof lead to nothing supersensible, and the deficiency in their series cannot be supplied by anything,

there is not the slightest approach to the supersensible in attempting to attain it and knowledge of it through them. Consequently, neither is there any probability in a judgment concerning the supersensible through arguments drawn from experience.

4) Whatever is to serve as a *hypothesis* for explaining the possibility of a given appearance must at least be wholly certain in its possibility. It is enough that, with a hypothesis, I renounce knowledge of actuality, which is still asserted in an opinion represented as probable. [A 453] I cannot surrender more. The possibility of what I place at the basis of an explanation must at least be beyond doubt; otherwise empty imaginings would have no end. But to assume the possibility of a supersensible being determined according to certain concepts, when none of the required conditions of cognition, insofar as it rests on intuition, is given, and thus only the principle of contradiction remains as a criterion of this possibility—a principle that can prove only the possibility of thinking, not of the object thought—would be a wholly groundless presupposition.

The result is that absolutely no proof for theoretical purposes of the existence of the original being as a deity, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, is possible for human reason that could produce even the slightest degree of assent. The reason is entirely comprehensible: we have no material at all for determining ideas of the supersensible, since we would have to take that material from things in the sensible world, whereas such material is absolutely unsuited to that object. Thus, without any determination of these ideas, nothing remains but the concept of a nonsensible something containing the ultimate ground of the sensible world, [A 454] which does not yet constitute cognition, as an expansion of the concept, of its inner constitution.

91 [467] *On the Kind of Assent through a Practical Faith.*

If we consider only the way in which something can be an object of knowledge *for us*, according to the subjective character of our powers of representation—a *knowable thing*—then concepts are compared not with objects, but merely with our cognitive faculties and the use these can make of the given representa-

tion for theoretical or practical purposes. The question whether something is a knowable being or not concerns not the possibility of things themselves, but that of our knowledge of them.

Knowable things are of three kinds: *matters of opinion* (*opinabile*), *matters of fact* (*scibile*), and *matters of faith* (*mere credibile*).

1) Objects of mere ideas of reason, which cannot be presented for theoretical cognition in any possible experience, are to that extent not *knowable* things at all; hence we cannot even hold an *opinion* concerning them. Indeed, to hold an opinion *a priori* [A 455] is already absurd in itself and is the direct path to sheer imaginings. Thus either our *a priori* proposition is certain or it contains nothing at all to which we can assent. *Matters of opinion* are therefore always objects of a cognition through experience that is at least possible in itself—objects of the sensible world—but impossible *for us* merely because of the degree of this capacity that we possess. Thus the ether of modern physicists, an elastic fluid permeating all other matter and intimately mixed with it, is a mere matter of opinion; yet it is still of such a kind that, if the external senses were sharpened to the highest degree, it could be perceived, though it can never be presented in any observation or experiment. To assume rational inhabitants of other planets is a matter of opinion. For if we could approach those planets, which is possible in itself, we would determine through experience whether such inhabitants exist or not; but we shall never approach them so closely, and so it remains opinion. Yet to hold the opinion that there are pure spirits thinking without bodies in the material universe—if we rightly reject certain actual appearances offered as evidence—is to invent fictions and is [468] no matter of opinion at all. It is a mere idea remaining when we remove everything material from a thinking being yet leave it its thinking. But whether the latter, which [A 456] we know only in the human being, that is, in connection with a body, would then remain, we cannot determine. Such a thing is a *being fabricated by reasoning* (*ens rationis ratiocinantis*), not a *being of reason* (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*). Of the latter it is nevertheless possible sufficiently to demonstrate the objective

reality of its concept, at least for the practical use of reason, because this use, which has its own distinctive and apodictically certain *a priori* principles, even requires—postulates—it.

2) Objects for concepts whose objective reality can be proved—whether through pure reason or experience, and in the former case from theoretical or practical data of reason, but in every case by means of a corresponding intuition—are *matters of fact* (*res facti*).[38] Such are the mathematical properties of magnitudes in geometry, because they are capable of an *a priori presentation* for the theoretical use of reason. Furthermore, [A 457] things or their properties that can be demonstrated through experience, our own or that of others through testimony, are likewise matters of fact.—But, remarkably, even an idea of reason is found among matters of fact, though in itself it is incapable of presentation in intuition and hence of any theoretical proof of its possibility. This is the idea of *freedom*, whose reality as a particular kind of causality—a concept that would be transcendent in theoretical respects—can be demonstrated through practical laws of pure reason and, in conformity with them, in actual actions, and thus in experience.—It is the only one among all the ideas of pure reason whose object is a matter of fact and must be counted among the *scibilia*.

469 3) Objects that must be conceived *a priori* in relation to the dutiful use of pure practical reason, whether as consequences or as grounds, but are transcendent for its theoretical use, are mere *matters of faith*. Such is the *highest good* in the world to be brought about through freedom. Its concept cannot be sufficiently proved in its objective reality in any experience possible for us, and thus for the theoretical use of reason; yet its use for realizing that end as well as possible is commanded by pure practical reason, and it must therefore [A 458] be assumed possible. This commanded effect, *together with the only conditions of its possibility conceivable for us*, namely the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are *matters of faith* (*res fidei*), indeed the only objects among all objects that can be so called.[39] For although we must believe what we can learn only from the experience of others through *testimony*, it is not therefore in itself a matter of faith. For *one* of those witnesses it was still his own experience and a

matter of fact, or is presupposed as such. Moreover, it must be possible to attain knowledge by this path of historical belief. The objects of history and geography, like everything in general that it is at least possible to know given the character of our cognitive faculties, belong not to matters of faith but to matters of fact. Only objects of pure reason can possibly be matters of faith, [A 459] but not as objects of merely pure speculative reason; for as such they cannot even be counted with certainty among things, that is, objects of knowledge possible for us. They are ideas, concepts whose objective reality cannot be secured theoretically. By contrast, the highest final end to be realized by us, that through which alone we can become worthy of being ourselves the final end of a creation, is an idea having objective reality for us in practical respects, and is a thing. But because we cannot give this concept [470] that reality for theoretical purposes, it is a mere matter of faith of pure reason, and with it so too are God and immortality, as the conditions under which alone, given the character of our human reason, we can conceive the possibility of that effect of the lawful use of our freedom. Assent in matters of faith, however, is assent for purely practical purposes: a moral faith that proves nothing for theoretical knowledge, but only for pure rational knowledge that is practical and directed toward following one's duties. It expands neither speculation nor practical rules of prudence according to the principle of self-love. If the supreme principle of all moral laws is a postulate, then the possibility of their highest object, and hence also the condition [A 460] under which we can conceive that possibility, is thereby postulated along with it. Knowledge of this condition becomes neither knowing nor opinion concerning the existence and constitution of these conditions as theoretical modes of cognition, but merely an assumption in a practical, and indeed commanded, relation for the moral use of our reason.

Even if we could apparently ground a *determinate* concept of an intelligent world-cause on the natural ends that physical teleology presents to us in such abundance, the existence of this being would still not be a matter of faith. For since it is assumed not for fulfilling my duty but merely for explaining nature, it would be only the opinion and hypothesis best suited to our reason. Now that teleology by no means leads to a determinate concept of God. Such a concept is

found only in that of a moral author of the world, because this alone specifies the final end to which we can count ourselves as belonging only insofar as we act in conformity with what the moral law imposes on us as a final end and thus obligates us to pursue. Consequently, only through its relation to the object of our duty, as a condition of the possibility of attaining duty's final end, does the concept of God acquire the privilege of counting in our assent as a matter of faith. Yet that very same [A 461] concept cannot establish its object as a matter of fact. For although the necessity of duty is quite clear to practical reason, attaining its final end, insofar as this is not wholly in our power, is assumed only for the practical use of [471] reason and is therefore not practically necessary in the way duty itself is.[40]

Faith, as a settled disposition (*habitus*) rather than an act (*actus*), is reason's moral way of thinking [A 462] in assenting to what is inaccessible to theoretical cognition. It is therefore the mind's abiding principle of accepting as true, because of our obligation to that end, what must necessarily be presupposed as a condition for the possibility of the highest moral final end,[41] although we can comprehend neither its possibility [472] nor, equally, its impossibility. [A 463] Faith, so called without qualification, is trust in attaining an intention whose advancement is duty, but whose practicability we cannot *comprehend*, and consequently neither can we comprehend that of the only conditions conceivable for us. Thus faith relating to particular objects that are not objects of possible knowledge or opinion—in which latter case, especially the historical, it would have to be called credulity rather than faith—is entirely moral. It is a free assent, not to that for which dogmatic proofs can be found for theoretically determining judgment, nor to that to which we regard ourselves as bound, but to what we assume for the sake of an intention according to laws of freedom. Yet it is not, like an opinion, without sufficient ground, but is grounded in reason, though only with respect to its practical use, [A 464] *sufficiently for reason's intention*. For without it the moral way of thinking has no firm constancy when confronted with theoretical reason's demand for proof of the possibility of morality's object, but wavers between practical commands and theoretical doubts. To be *incredulous* is to adhere to the maxim of not believing testimony

in general; but an *unbeliever* is one who denies those ideas of reason all validity because they lack a *theoretical* grounding of their reality. He therefore judges dogmatically. But dogmatic *unbelief* cannot coexist with a moral maxim governing one's way of thinking, for reason cannot command us to pursue an end recognized as nothing but a figment. A *doubting faith*, however, can: the absence of conviction through grounds of speculative reason is merely an obstacle for it. A critical insight into the limits of speculative reason can deprive that obstacle of its influence on conduct and [473] offer in its place an overriding practical assent.

If we wish to introduce another principle in place of certain failed attempts in philosophy and secure influence for it, it is a great satisfaction to understand how and why those [A 465] attempts had to fail.

God, *freedom*, and *immortality of the soul* are the problems toward whose solution all the preparations of metaphysics are directed, as its ultimate and sole end. Now it was believed that the doctrine of freedom was necessary only as a negative condition for practical philosophy, whereas the doctrine of God and of the soul's constitution belonged to theoretical philosophy and had to be demonstrated separately and by itself. Both were then to be connected with what the moral law—which is possible only under the condition of freedom—commands, and a religion thus brought about. But we can readily see that these attempts had to fail. For from mere ontological concepts of things in general, or of the existence of a necessary being, we can form absolutely no concept of an original being determined by predicates that can be given in experience and thus could serve cognition. And the concept grounded on experience of nature's physical purposiveness could in turn supply no proof sufficient for morality, and thus for knowledge of a God. Nor could knowledge of the soul through experience, which we acquire only in this life, furnish a concept of its spiritual, immortal nature, and thus one sufficient for morality. *Theology* and *pneumatology*, as [A 466] problems for the sciences of speculative reason, cannot be brought about through any empirical data or predicates, because their concept transcends all our cognitive faculties.—Both concepts, that of God and that of the soul with regard to its immortality, can be determined only through

predicates which, although themselves possible only from a supersensible ground, must nevertheless prove their reality in experience. For only thus can they make cognition of wholly supersensible beings possible.—Such is the unique concept found in human reason [474] of human freedom under moral laws, together with the final end that reason prescribes through those laws. The former are suited to ascribe to the author of nature, and the latter to the human being, those properties containing the necessary condition for the possibility of both. Thus from this very idea we can infer the existence and constitution of those beings otherwise wholly hidden from us.

Thus the reason why the intention of proving God and immortality fails on the merely theoretical path is that no cognition of the supersensible is possible by this path of natural concepts. Its success, by contrast, on the moral path of the concept of freedom [A 467] rests on this: here the supersensible lying at the foundation—freedom—not only supplies material for knowledge of the other supersensible objects, the moral final end and the conditions of its practicability, through a determinate law of causality arising from it, but also demonstrates its reality as a matter of fact in actions. Yet for that very reason it can provide no ground of proof valid except for practical purposes, which are also the only purposes religion requires.

It always remains highly remarkable here that among the three pure ideas of reason—*God*, *freedom*, and *immortality*—the idea of freedom is the sole concept of the supersensible that proves its objective reality, by means of the causality conceived in it, in nature through its effect possible there. Precisely thereby it makes possible the connection of the other two with nature, and of all three with one another into a religion. Thus we have within ourselves a principle capable of determining the idea of the supersensible within us, and thereby also that of the supersensible outside us, into cognition, although possible only for practical purposes—a task at which merely speculative philosophy, which could give only a negative concept even of freedom, had to despair. Hence the concept of freedom, as the fundamental concept [A 468] of all unconditionally practical laws, can expand reason beyond those limits within which every theoretical concept of nature would have to remain confined without hope.

29 A hypothesis of this kind may be called a daring adventure of reason; and there may be few even among the most acute natural investigators to whom it has not sometimes occurred. For it is not actually absurd, like *equivocal generation*, by which is understood the production of an organized being through the mechanics of raw, unorganized matter. It would still be *univocal generation* in the most general meaning of the word, insofar as something organic were generated from something else organic, though specifically distinct from it among beings of this kind: for example, if certain aquatic animals gradually developed into marsh animals, and these, after several generations, into land animals. *A priori*, in the judgment of reason alone, this is not self-contradictory. But experience shows no example of it. According to experience, rather, all generation known to us is *homonymous generation*, not merely *univocal* as opposed to generation from unorganized material, but also producing something homogeneous in its very organization with its progenitor. *Heteronymous generation* is nowhere encountered as far as our experiential knowledge of nature extends.

30 If the already adopted name *natural history* is to remain in use for the description of nature, then what the former literally indicates—a representation of the earth's former, *ancient* condition, about which we venture conjectures with good reason even though we cannot hope for certainty—may be called the *archaeology of nature*, in contrast to that of art. Petrifactions would belong to the former, as engraved stones and so on belong to the latter. For since work on such an inquiry, under the name of a theory of the earth, is in fact continually carried on, though slowly, as is proper, this name would not be given to a merely imagined investigation of nature, but to one to which nature itself invites and summons us.

31 What worth life has for us, if assessed merely according to *what we enjoy*—the natural end of the sum of all inclinations, happiness—is easy to decide. It sinks below zero. For who would wish to begin life anew under the same conditions, or even according to a new, self-devised plan, though one conforming to nature's course, that likewise aimed merely at enjoyment? What worth life has according to what it contains when led in accordance with nature's end for us,

consisting in *what we do*, not merely enjoy, though we are still always only means to an undetermined final end, has been shown above. Thus nothing seems to remain but the worth that we ourselves give our life through what we not only do, but do purposively in such independence from nature that even nature's existence can be an end only under this condition.

32 It would be possible for the happiness of rational beings in the world to be an end of nature, and then it would also be its *ultimate* end. At least we cannot comprehend *a priori* why nature should not be so arranged, since this effect might well be possible through its mechanism, at least as far as we can see. But morality, and a causality according to ends subordinated to it, are absolutely impossible through natural causes. For the principle determining them to action is supersensible; it is therefore the only thing possible in the order of ends that is absolutely unconditioned with respect to nature, and thereby alone qualifies its subject as the *final end* of creation, to which all nature is subordinated.—*Happiness*, by contrast, as shown in the preceding section on the testimony of experience, is not even an *end of nature* with respect to human beings in preference to other creatures, far less a *final end of creation*. Human beings may certainly make it their ultimate subjective end. But when I ask after the final end of creation—Why did human beings have to exist?—the question concerns an objective highest end, such as supreme reason would require for its creation. If we answer: So that beings may exist to whom that supreme cause can do good, we contradict the condition to which human reason itself subjects its most heartfelt wish for happiness, namely agreement with its own inner moral legislation. This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned end, and thus that the human being can be creation's final end only as a moral being. As for his condition, happiness is connected with it only as a consequence proportionate to his agreement with that end as the end of his existence.

33 I deliberately say: *under* moral laws. It is not the human being *according to* moral laws, that is, one who behaves in conformity with them, who is creation's final end. For by the latter expression we would say more than we know: name-

ly, that an author of the world has the power to make the human being behave at all times in conformity with moral laws. This presupposes a concept of freedom and of nature—of the latter alone can we conceive an external author—that would have to contain an insight into nature's supersensible substrate and its identity with what makes causality through freedom possible in the world, an insight far beyond our rational comprehension. Only of the *human being under moral laws* can we say, without exceeding the limits of our insight, that his existence constitutes the world's final end. This also agrees completely with the judgment of human reason reflecting morally on the world's course. We believe we perceive traces of a wise relation to ends even in evil, if only we see that the impious villain does not die before suffering the well-deserved punishment of his misdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, good or evil conduct rests with us; but we place the highest wisdom in the world's government in this: that the occasion for the former, and the outcome for both, is ordained according to moral laws. In the latter properly consists the glory of God, which theologians therefore not inappropriately call the ultimate end of creation.—It must further be noted that when we use the word creation, we understand nothing but what has been said here, namely the cause of the *existence of a world*, or of the things in it, its substances, as the proper concept of the word also implies: *the actualization of substance is creation*. Thus it does not already carry with it the presupposition of a freely acting, and consequently intelligent cause, whose existence we are only now seeking to prove.

34 This moral argument is not intended to supply an *objectively* valid proof of God's existence, or to prove to the doubting believer that there is a God, but to show that, if he wishes to think consistently in moral matters, he *must incorporate* the acceptance of this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason.—Nor is this meant to say that assuming the happiness of all rational beings in the world in accordance with their morality is necessary *for morality*, but that it is necessary *through morality*. It is therefore a *subjectively* sufficient argument for moral beings.

35 Idolatry in a practical sense is still any religion that conceives the highest being with properties according to which something other than morality could be the condition, adequate in itself, for conforming to his will in what the human being can do. For however purely and free of sensible images that concept may have been framed theoretically, it is then nevertheless represented in practice as an *idol*, that is, anthropomorphically with respect to the character of its will.

36 *Analogy*, in a qualitative sense, is identity of the relation between grounds and consequences, causes and effects, insofar as it obtains despite the specific difference of the things or of those properties in themselves that contain the ground of similar consequences, that is, considered apart from this relation. Thus, comparing animals' artful actions with those of human beings, we conceive the ground of these effects in animals, which we do not know, as an analogue of reason by comparison with the ground of similar human effects—reason—which we do know. We thereby also mean to indicate that the ground of the animal's artistic capacity, called instinct, is in fact specifically different from reason, yet bears a similar relation to its effect, comparing the beaver's building with human building.—But from the fact that the human being needs *reason* for building I cannot infer that the beaver must have it too and call this an *inference* by analogy. Yet from the similar mode of action of animals, whose ground we cannot immediately perceive, compared with that of human beings, of which we are immediately conscious, we can quite correctly infer *by analogy* that animals too act according to *representations* and are not machines, as Descartes holds; and that despite their specific difference they are nevertheless generically identical with human beings as living beings. The principle authorizing such an inference lies in the identity of the ground for counting animals, with regard to the determination in question, within the same genus as the human being as human, insofar as we compare them externally through their actions. The rationale is equal. Likewise, in comparing the purposive products of the supreme world-cause in the world with human works of art, I can conceive its causality by analogy with an understanding, but cannot infer these properties in it by analogy. For here precisely the principle making such an

inference possible is lacking: namely the *equality of rationale* for counting the highest being and the human being within one and the same genus with respect to their respective causalities. The causality of beings in the world, which is always sensibly conditioned, as is causality through understanding, cannot be transferred to a being sharing with them no generic concept beyond that of a thing in general.

37 Nothing whatever is thereby lacking in the representation of this being's relations to the world, with regard to either the theoretical or practical consequences of this concept. To wish to investigate what it is in itself is a curiosity as purposeless as it is vain.

38 Here I extend the concept of a matter of fact beyond the word's customary meaning, rightly, as it seems to me. For when the relation of things to our cognitive faculties is at issue, it is not necessary, indeed not even feasible, to restrict this expression merely to actual experience, since a merely possible experience already suffices for speaking of them simply as objects of a determinate kind of cognition.

39 But matters of faith are not therefore *articles of faith*, if by the latter we understand matters of faith to whose *profession*, inward or outward, one can be obligated. Natural theology therefore contains none of this kind. For since, as matters of faith, they cannot be grounded on theoretical proofs as matters of fact can, assent to them is free and compatible with the subject's morality only as such.

40 The final end that the moral law imposes on us to advance is not the ground of duty; for this lies in the moral law, which as a formal practical principle guides categorically, regardless of objects of the faculty of desire—the matter of willing—and thus regardless of any end. This formal character of my actions, their subordination to the principle of universal validity, in which alone their inner moral worth consists, is wholly within our power. I can very well abstract from the possibility or impracticability of the ends I am bound to advance according to that law, since only the external worth of my actions consists in them, as

from something never wholly in my power, and attend only to what is my doing. Yet the intention to advance the final end of all rational beings—happiness insofar as it is possible in harmony with duty—is imposed by that very law of duty. But speculative reason has no insight into its practicability, either through our own physical capacity or through nature's cooperation. Rather, as far as we can reasonably judge, it must regard the expectation of such a result of our good conduct from such causes, from nature alone within and outside us, without assuming God and immortality, as groundless and vain, however well intended. And if it could have complete certainty of this judgment, it would have to regard the moral law itself, in practical respects, as a mere deception of our reason. But since speculative reason is fully convinced that the latter can never happen, while those ideas whose object lies beyond nature can be conceived without contradiction, it must, for the sake of its own practical law and the task thereby imposed, thus in moral respects, recognize those ideas as real, so as not to contradict itself.

41 It is trust in the promise of the moral law, not, however, a promise contained within that law, but one I place in it, and indeed on a morally sufficient ground. For no law of reason can command a final end without reason's also promising its attainability, though uncertain, and thereby authorizing assent to the sole conditions under which our reason can conceive it. The word faith already expresses this. It may seem questionable only how this expression and this particular idea enter moral philosophy, since they were first introduced with Christianity, and their adoption might perhaps appear merely a flattering imitation of its language. But this is not the only instance in which this wondrous religion, in the greatest simplicity of its presentation, has enriched philosophy with far more determinate and purer concepts of morality than philosophy had hitherto been able to supply. Once they exist, however, reason *freely* approves and accepts them as concepts it could and should have reached and introduced on its own.

General Remark on Teleology

General Remark on Teleology. [475]

If the question is what rank the moral argument—which proves the existence of God only as a matter of faith for pure practical reason—holds among philosophy's other arguments, philosophy's entire possession can readily be surveyed. It then becomes clear that there is no choice here, but that before an impartial critique its theoretical capacity must of itself surrender all its claims.

It must first ground all assent on a matter of fact if assent is not to be wholly groundless. Thus the sole possible distinction in proving is whether assent to the consequence drawn from this matter of fact can be grounded as *knowledge* for theoretical cognition or merely as *faith* for practical cognition. All matters of fact belong either to the *concept of nature*, which proves its reality in objects of the senses given, or capable of being given, before all concepts of nature; or to the *concept of freedom*, which sufficiently demonstrates its reality through reason's causality with respect to certain effects possible through it in the sensible world, effects that reason irrefutably postulates in the moral law. Now the concept of nature, belonging solely to theoretical cognition, is either metaphysical and wholly *a priori*, or physical, that is, *a posteriori* and necessarily [A 469] conceivable only through determinate experience. The metaphysical concept of nature, which presupposes no determinate experience, is therefore ontological.

The ontological proof of God's existence from the concept of an original being is either one that infers absolutely necessary existence from ontological predicates through which alone that being can be conceived as thoroughly determined, or one that infers the predicates of the original being from the absolute necessity of the existence of some thing, whatever it may be. For the concept of an original being, if it is not to be derivative, includes the unconditional necessity of its existence and, in order to represent this, thoroughgoing determination through its concept. Now both requirements were believed to be found in the concept of the ontological idea of a *most real being*, and thus two metaphysical proofs arose.

The proof based on a merely metaphysical concept of nature, called ontological in the proper sense, inferred from the concept of the most real [476] being its absolutely necessary existence; for, it is said, if it did not exist, it would lack a reality, namely existence.—The other, also called the metaphysical-*cosmological* proof, inferred from the necessity of the existence of some thing—a necessity that must certainly be admitted, since an existence is given to me in self-consciousness—its thoroughgoing determination as the most real being. For everything existing is thoroughly determined, but what is absolutely necessary, namely what we are to know as such and thus *a priori*, must be thoroughly determined *through its concept*; and this could be found only in the concept of a most real thing. There is no need here to expose the sophistry in both inferences, which has already been done elsewhere, [A 470] but only to note that such proofs, even if they could be defended through all manner of dialectical subtlety, could never pass beyond the school into the public sphere or have the slightest influence on mere sound understanding.

The proof based on a concept of nature that can only be empirical, yet is supposed to lead beyond nature's limits as the sum of the objects of the senses, can be none other than the proof from natural *ends*. Their concept cannot be given *a priori*, but only through experience; yet it promises a concept of nature's original ground that alone, among all those we can conceive, is suited to the supersensible: that of a highest understanding as world-cause. This it indeed accomplishes fully according to principles of reflective judgment, that is, according to

the character of our human cognitive faculty.—But whether from the same data it can also supply this concept of a *supreme*, that is, independent intelligent being as a God, an author of a world under moral laws, and thus sufficiently determined for the idea of a final end of the world's existence, is the question on which everything depends, whether we demand a theoretically sufficient concept of the original being for all knowledge of nature, or a practical one for religion.

This argument drawn from physical teleology is worthy of respect. It works equally toward conviction in the common understanding and in the subtlest thinker; and *Reimarus*, in his [A 471] still unsurpassed work, in which he develops this ground of proof at length with his [477] characteristic thoroughness and clarity, has thereby earned an immortal merit.—But how does this proof gain so powerful an influence on the mind, especially when judged by cool reason, producing a calm assent that yields itself wholly to it? For the mind's emotion and elevation through the wonders of nature might be counted as persuasion. It is not the physical ends, all pointing to an unfathomable understanding in the world-cause; these are insufficient, because they do not satisfy inquiring reason's need. For what, reason asks, are all those artfully formed natural things there for? What is the human being himself there for, with whom we must stop as the ultimate natural end conceivable for us? What is this entire nature there for, and what is the final end of so great and manifold an art? That the world and the human being himself should have been created for enjoyment, or for intuiting, contemplating, and admiring—which, if it stops there, is likewise nothing but enjoyment of a particular kind—as their ultimate final end cannot satisfy reason. For reason presupposes a personal worth that the human being alone can give himself, as the condition under which alone he and his existence can be a final end. In the absence of this worth, which alone admits of a determinate concept, natural ends do not satisfy reason's inquiry, especially because they can supply no *determinate concept* of the highest being as an all-sufficient being, and for that very reason the single *highest* being properly so called, nor of the laws according to which its understanding is cause of the world.

Thus, that the physicoteleological proof convinces as though it were also [A 472] a theological proof does not arise from using ideas of natural ends as so many empirical grounds of proof for a *highest* understanding. Rather, the moral ground of proof dwelling in every human being and moving him so intimately slips unnoticed into the inference. According to it, one also ascribes a final end, and thus wisdom, to the being revealed with such inconceivable art in natural ends, although perception of those ends does not authorize this, and so arbitrarily supplies the deficiency still attaching to that argument. In fact, therefore, only the moral ground of proof produces conviction, and this only in moral respects, to which everyone feels his most inward assent. [478] The physicoteleological proof has only the merit of leading the mind, in contemplating the world, onto the path of ends and thereby to an *intelligent* author of the world. Then the moral relation to ends and the idea of a legislator and author of the world of that kind, as a theological concept, seem to develop of themselves from that ground of proof, although they are a pure addition.

The customary *presentation* may continue to leave matters at this. For the common, sound understanding generally finds it difficult to separate as heterogeneous the different principles it mingles, from only one of which it actually and correctly infers, when distinguishing them requires much reflection. But the moral ground of proof for God's existence does not properly merely *supplement* the physicoteleological proof into a complete proof. It is a distinct proof that *replaces* the lack of conviction [A 473] from the latter. For the latter can in fact accomplish nothing but this: in judging the ground of nature and its contingent yet admirable order, known to us only through experience, it directs reason toward the causality of a cause containing that ground according to ends —a cause we must conceive as intelligent given the character of our cognitive faculties—and makes reason attentive and thus more receptive to the moral proof. For what is required for the latter concept is so essentially different from anything concepts of nature can contain and teach that a distinct ground of proof and proof, wholly independent of the previous one, is needed to supply the concept of the original being sufficiently for a theology and to infer its existence.—The moral proof—which admittedly proves God's existence only in a

practical yet also indispensable respect of reason—would therefore retain its force even if we encountered no material at all in the world for physical teleology, or only ambiguous material. We can conceive rational beings finding themselves surrounded by a nature showing no clear trace of organization, but only effects of a mere mechanism of raw matter. In view of this, and of the variability of certain merely contingently purposive forms and relations, there would seem no ground for inferring an intelligent author. There would then be no occasion for a [479] physical teleology. Yet reason, receiving no guidance here through concepts of nature, would find in the concept of freedom and the moral ideas grounded upon it a practically sufficient ground to postulate the concept of the original being in conformity with these ideas, [A 474] that is, as a deity, and nature, even our own existence, as a final end conforming to them and their laws, with regard to the indispensable command of practical reason. —But that in the actual world there is abundant material for physical teleology for the rational beings within it—which need not necessarily have been so—serves as welcome confirmation of the moral argument, insofar as nature can exhibit something analogous to reason's moral ideas. For the concept of a supreme cause possessing understanding—which is far from sufficient for a theology—thereby acquires reality sufficient for reflective judgment. But this is not required as a foundation for the moral proof; nor does the moral proof serve to complete the former, which by itself does not point to morality at all, into *one* proof through a continued inference according to a single principle. Two such heterogeneous principles as nature and freedom can yield only two different kinds of proof; and the attempt to conduct the proof from the former is found inadequate for what is to be proved.

If the physicoteleological ground of proof sufficed for the proof sought, it would be very satisfying to speculative reason, for it would offer hope of producing a theosophy. This is what we would have to call theoretical knowledge of the divine nature and its existence sufficient to explain the world's constitution and also to determine moral laws. Likewise, if psychology sufficed to attain knowledge of the immortality of the soul, it would make possible a pneumatology equally welcome to speculative [A 475] reason. But neither, however pleas-

ing to the conceit of curiosity, fulfills reason's wish regarding theory, which would have to be grounded in knowledge of the nature of things. Whether the former as theology and the latter as anthropology, both grounded on the moral principle, that is, the principle of freedom, and thus suited to the practical use of reason, might better fulfill their objective final intention is another question, which we need not pursue further here.

480 The physicoteleological ground of proof is insufficient for theology because it does not, and cannot, give a concept of the original being sufficiently determined for this purpose. Rather, this concept must be taken entirely from elsewhere, or its absence remedied by what amounts to an arbitrary addition. From the great purposiveness of natural forms and their relations you infer an intelligent world-cause; but to what degree of understanding? You surely cannot claim to infer the highest possible understanding. That would require you to see that no greater understanding than the one whose evidences you perceive in the world is conceivable—which would mean ascribing omniscience to yourselves. Likewise, from the world's magnitude you infer a very great power in its author; but you will acknowledge that this has meaning only comparatively, for your power of comprehension, and that since you do not know everything possible in order to compare it with the magnitude of the world as far as you know it, you cannot infer the author's omnipotence by so small a standard, and so on. Thus you arrive at no determinate concept of an original being suited to a theology. Such a concept can be found only in that of the totality of perfections compatible with [A 476] an understanding, which merely *empirical* data cannot help you attain. Yet without such a determinate concept you also cannot infer a *single* intelligent original being, but can only assume one, for whatever purpose.—Now it may quite readily be conceded that, since reason has nothing well-grounded to say against it, you may arbitrarily add: Where so much perfection is found, one may well assume all perfection united in a single world-cause, because reason fares better theoretically and practically with so determinate a principle. But you still cannot commend this concept of the original being as one you have proved, since you have assumed it only for a better use of reason.

All lamentation or impotent anger over the supposed outrage of questioning the cogency of your chain of inference is therefore vain bluster. It would like people to take the doubt freely expressed against your argument as doubt of a sacred truth, merely to let the argument's shallowness slip through under this cover.

Moral teleology, on the other hand, which is no less firmly grounded [481] than physical teleology, and indeed deserves preference because it rests *a priori* on principles inseparable from our reason, leads to what the possibility of a theology requires: a determinate *concept* of the supreme cause as a world-cause according to moral laws, and hence of a cause satisfying our moral final end. This requires nothing less than omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and so on as natural properties belonging to it, which [A 477] must be conceived as united with, and thus adequate to, the moral final end, which is infinite. Moral teleology alone can thus supply the concept of a *single* author of the world suited to a theology.

In this way a theology also leads directly to *religion*, that is, the *recognition of our duties as divine commands*. For knowledge of our duty and of the final end imposed upon us within it by reason could first produce the determinate concept of God, which is thus inseparable, even in its origin, from obligation toward this being. By contrast, even if a determinate concept of the original being could be found on the merely theoretical path, namely as the mere cause of nature, it would afterward be very difficult, perhaps impossible without arbitrary interpolation, to ascribe to this being, through well-grounded proofs, a causality according to moral laws. Without this, however, that allegedly theological concept can form no foundation for religion. Even if a religion could be founded on this theoretical path, it would actually differ, in respect of disposition, in which its essence consists, from one in which the concept of God and the practical conviction of his existence spring from fundamental ideas of morality. For if we had to presuppose the all-power, omniscience, and so on of an author of the world as concepts given to us from elsewhere, merely to apply afterward our concepts of duty to our relation to him, these would have to bear a strong coloring of coercion and forced submission. Instead, when respect for

the moral law, quite freely according to the precept of our own [A 478] reason, presents the final end of our vocation to us, we include in our moral prospects a cause agreeing with this end and its realization, with the truest reverence, entirely distinct from pathological fear, [482] and willingly submit ourselves to it.[42]

If we ask why it matters to us to have a theology at all, it is plainly evident that we need it subjectively not to expand or correct our knowledge of nature, or any theory whatsoever, but solely for religion, that is, the practical, specifically moral use of reason. If it now turns out that the sole argument leading to a determinate concept of theology's object is itself moral, then it will not merely cease to be surprising: we will also find nothing lacking in the accessibility of assent from this ground of proof for its final intention, when it is admitted that such an argument sufficiently demonstrates God's existence only for our moral vocation, that is, for practical purposes, and that speculation by no means proves its strength in it or thereby expands the scope [A 479] of its domain. The surprise, or supposed contradiction, between the possibility of a theology asserted here and what the critique of speculative reason said about the categories will also disappear: namely, that these can produce cognition only when applied to objects of the senses, and by no means when applied to the supersensible. It disappears when we see them used here for knowledge of God, not for theoretical purposes, concerning what his nature, inscrutable to us, is in itself, but solely for practical purposes.—To put an end on this occasion to the misinterpretation of that very necessary doctrine of the Critique, which also, to the annoyance of the blind dogmatist, recalls reason to its limits, I append the following elucidation.

If I ascribe *moving force* to a body, and thus [483] conceive it through the category of *causality*, I thereby also *cognize* it: that is, I determine its concept as an object in general through what belongs to it in itself as an object of the senses, as a condition of the possibility of that relation. For if the moving force I ascribe to it is repulsive, then even if I do not yet place beside it another body against which it exercises that force, it possesses a place in space; further, extension, that is, space within itself; moreover, the filling of this space through the

repulsive forces of its parts; and finally the law of this filling: the ground of the repulsion of those parts must diminish in the same proportion as the body's extension grows and the space that it fills through this force with the same parts increases.—By contrast, if I conceive a supersensible being as the *first mover*, and thus through the category of causality with regard to the same determination of the world, the motion of matter, [A 480] I must not conceive it as in any place in space, nor as extended; indeed, I may not even conceive it as existing in time and simultaneously with other things. Thus I have no determinations at all that could make intelligible to me the condition of the possibility of motion through this being as its ground. Consequently, through the predicate of cause as first mover, I do not in the least cognize this being in itself. I have only the representation of a something containing the ground of motions in the world; and its relation to these as their cause, since it otherwise supplies nothing belonging to the constitution of the thing that is cause, leaves the concept of that cause entirely empty. The reason is that with predicates finding their object only in the sensible world I can indeed advance to the existence of something that must contain the ground of that world, but not to determining its concept as a supersensible being, which excludes all those predicates. Thus through the category of causality, when I determine it by the concept of a *first mover*, I do not in the least cognize what God is. But perhaps I shall succeed better if I take the order of the world as an occasion not merely to *conceive* his causality as that of a supreme *understanding*, but also to *cognize* him through this determination of the concept in question, since the troublesome condition of space and extension then falls away.—Certainly the great purposiveness in the world compels us to *conceive* a supreme cause for it and its causality as through an understanding; [484] but this by no means authorizes us to *ascribe* understanding to it. Similarly, we may conceive God's eternity as existence at all times, because otherwise we can form no concept of mere existence as a magnitude, that is, as duration; or divine omnipresence as existence [A 481] in all places, to make immediate presence to things external to one another comprehensible to ourselves, without nevertheless being entitled to ascribe either of these determinations to God as something cognized in him. If I determine

human causality regarding certain products explicable only through intentional purposiveness by conceiving it as the human being's understanding, I need not stop there. I can ascribe this predicate to him as a well-known property and thereby cognize him. For I know that intuitions are given to human senses and brought by understanding under a concept and thereby under a rule; that this concept contains only the common characteristic, omitting the particular, and is therefore discursive; that understanding gives the rules for bringing given representations under one consciousness in general even before those intuitions; and so on. Thus I ascribe this property to the human being as one through which I *cognize* him. But if I wish to *conceive* a supersensible being, God, as intelligence, this is not merely permitted but unavoidable in a certain respect of my use of reason. Yet to flatter myself that I can ascribe understanding to it and thereby *cognize* it through a property of its own is by no means permitted. For I must then omit all those conditions under which alone I know an understanding; hence the predicate serving only to determine the human being cannot be referred to a supersensible object at all, and what God is cannot be cognized through a causality so determined. And so it is with all categories, which can have no significance for cognition in theoretical respects unless applied to objects [A 482] of possible experience.—But by analogy with an understanding I can, indeed in a certain other respect must, conceive even a supersensible being without wishing thereby to cognize it theoretically: namely, if this determination of its causality concerns an effect in the world containing a morally necessary intention that sensible beings cannot accomplish. Then a knowledge of God and his existence, theology, is possible through properties and determinations of his causality conceived in him merely by [485] analogy. In practical relation, but also *only with regard to this relation* as moral, such knowledge has all the reality required.—Thus an ethicotheology is indeed possible. For although morality can subsist without theology as regards its rule, it cannot do so as regards the final intention that this very rule imposes, without leaving reason exposed concerning that intention. But a theological ethics of pure reason is impossible: laws that reason does not originally give itself, and whose observance it does not itself also effect as a pure practical faculty, cannot be moral.

Likewise a theological physics would be an absurdity, because it would present not natural laws but arrangements of a highest will. By contrast, a physical, properly physicoteleological, theology can at least serve as a preparation for theology proper. Through contemplating natural ends, for which it offers abundant material, it occasions the idea of a final end that nature cannot supply. It can thus make us feel the need for a theology sufficiently determining the concept of God for reason's highest practical use, but cannot produce that theology or ground it adequately on its own proofs.

42 Both admiration of beauty and the emotion aroused by nature's so manifold ends, which a reflective mind can feel even before having a clear representation of a rational author of the world, contain something akin to a *religious* feeling. They therefore seem first to act upon the moral feeling—of gratitude and reverence toward the cause unknown to us—through a way of judging them analogous to moral judgment, and thus to act on the mind by awakening moral ideas, when they inspire that admiration bound up with far greater interest than mere theoretical contemplation can produce.