

The Phenomenology of Spirit

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

Plain English Translation

MOUSEIA

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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German, paragraph by paragraph, in shorter sentences and everyday words.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

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GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Paragraph numbers follow the Miller/Findlay 1977 scheme, with its documented split of one source paragraph and merge of another; the 1807 chapter and page numbers are kept in place. Machine-assisted translations with recorded source-language review, not human scholarly certification.

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Preface



1 A preface usually opens a book with an explanation of the author's purpose, the circumstances that led to the work, and its relation, in the author's view, to earlier or contemporary treatments of the same subject. In a philosophical work, such an explanation seems not just unnecessary but, given the nature of the subject, inappropriate and counterproductive. Whatever it might be proper to say about philosophy in a preface—a historical *account* of its direction and standpoint, its general content and results, or a string of assertions and [1807 II] assurances about truth, going this way and that—cannot count as the way to present philosophical truth. Philosophy also works essentially in the element of universality, which includes the particular within it. This makes it seem, more than in other sciences, that the purpose or final results express the subject itself, even its complete essence, while working it out is really inessential. By contrast, with a general idea of anatomy, for example—as knowledge of the parts of the body considered in their lifeless existence—we are convinced that we do not yet possess the subject itself, the content of this science. We must also take the trouble to learn the particulars. Moreover, in such a collection of information, which does not rightly deserve the name of science, conversation about purposes and similar general matters is no different from the historical, con-

ceptless way in which the content itself—these nerves, muscles, and so on—is discussed. Philosophy, however, would involve an inconsistency: it would use a method [1807 III] that it itself shows to be incapable of grasping truth.

2 Defining a philosophical work's supposed relation to other attempts on the same subject likewise introduces an alien interest and obscures what matters in knowing truth. The more firmly opinion sets up an opposition between true and false, the more it expects either agreement with or opposition to an existing philosophical system. It sees any statement about such a system as only one or the other. It does not understand the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive development of truth. Instead, it sees only contradiction in their diversity. The bud disappears when the flower breaks out, and we might say that the flower refutes it. In the same way, the fruit declares the flower to be a false existence of the plant and replaces it as the plant's truth. These forms do not just differ. They also displace one another as incompatible. Yet their fluid nature also makes them moments [1807 IV] of an organic unity. In that unity they not only do not conflict, but each is as necessary as the other. This equal necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But opposition to a philosophical system usually does not understand itself in this way. Nor does the consciousness that takes in this opposition usually know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or keep it free, and recognize mutually necessary moments in what seems to conflict and contradict itself.

3 Demanding explanations of this kind, and supplying them, may seem to deal with what is essential. Where could the inner content of a philosophical work be expressed more fully than in its purposes and results? And how could these be known more precisely than by their difference from what else the age produces in the same field? But if this activity is supposed to be more than the beginning of knowledge—if it is supposed to count as actual knowledge—it is in fact one of the devices for avoiding the subject itself. It combines the appearance of taking it seriously and working at it [1807 V] with actually sparing oneself that effort. For the subject is not exhausted by its *purpose*, but by its *execution*. Nor is the *result* the *actual* whole: it is the result together with its becom-

ing. The purpose by itself is a lifeless universal, just as a tendency is merely a drive that still lacks actuality. The bare result is the corpse that has left that actuality behind. Likewise, *difference* is really the subject's *limit*. It is where the subject stops, or what the subject is not. So such efforts with purposes and results, and with distinguishing and judging one or the other, are easier work than they may seem. Instead of engaging with the subject, this activity is always beyond it. Instead of staying with it and forgetting itself in it, this kind of knowing always reaches for something else. It stays with itself rather than being with the subject and giving itself over to it. The easiest thing is to judge what has substance and solidity. Grasping it is harder. Hardest of all is producing its presentation, which combines the two.
[1807 VI]

4 Cultivation, and the work of emerging from the immediacy of substantial life, must always begin by acquiring knowledge of general principles and points of view. We must first work our way up to thinking about the subject in general. We must also learn to support or refute it with reasons, grasp its concrete and rich fullness in its specific features, and give an orderly account and a serious judgment of it. But this beginning of cultivation will first give way to the seriousness of a fulfilled life, which leads into experience of the subject itself. And when the seriousness of the concept also descends into its depths, knowledge and judgment of that preliminary kind will retain their proper place in conversation.

5 The true form in which truth exists can only be its scientific system. My aim has been to help bring philosophy closer to the form of science—to the goal where it can put aside its name, *love* of *knowing*, and be *actual knowing*. The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in its nature, [1807 VII] and only the presentation of philosophy itself can explain this satisfactorily. But the external necessity, understood generally and apart from the accidents of a person's character and individual circumstances, is the same as the inner necessity, in the form in which time presents the existence of its moments. Showing that

the time has come to raise philosophy to science would therefore be the only true justification of attempts with this purpose. It would demonstrate the necessity of that purpose and, indeed, carry it out at the same time.

6 In placing the true form of truth in its scientific character—or, what amounts to the same thing, in claiming that truth has the element of its existence only in the *concept*—I know that I seem to contradict a view, and its consequences, that is as widespread in the convictions of the age as it is presumptuous. An explanation of this contradiction therefore does not seem unnecessary, even if here it can only be an assurance, just like what it opposes. Suppose that truth exists only in [1807 VIII] what, or rather only as what, is variously called intuition, immediate knowledge of the absolute, religion, or being—not being at the center of divine love, but the being of that center itself. From this standpoint, the presentation of philosophy is required to take the very opposite of the form of the concept. The absolute is not to be comprehended, but felt and intuited. Its feeling and intuition, not its concept, are to speak and find expression.

7 Consider this demand in its wider context and look at the level self-conscious spirit has now reached. Spirit has gone beyond the substantial life it once led in the element of thought—beyond the immediacy of its faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty consciousness had of its reconciliation with essence and of essence's universal presence, both inward and outward. Spirit has not only passed beyond this into the opposite extreme, its insubstantial reflection into itself. It has gone beyond that too. It has not only lost its essential life; [1807 IX] it is also conscious of this loss and of the finitude that constitutes its content. Turning away from the husks, admitting and denouncing its fallen condition, it now asks philosophy not so much for *knowledge* of what it *is* as for a way to regain that substantiality and solidity of being. To meet this need, philosophy is therefore asked not so much to unlock substance's closed interior and raise it to self-consciousness, nor to bring its chaotic consciousness back to an order thought through and to the simplicity of the concept. Instead, it is asked to jumble together the distinctions of thought, suppress the distinguishing concept, and restore the feeling of essence: to offer *edi-*

fication rather than *insight*. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love are the bait required to awaken the urge to bite. Not the concept but ecstasy, not the subject's coolly advancing necessity but fermenting enthusiasm, is supposed to sustain and progressively spread out the riches of substance. [1807 X]

8 This demand is met by the strenuous, almost zealously irritated effort to drag people out of their absorption in sensory, commonplace, and individual things and make them look up at the stars. It is as though they had utterly forgotten the divine and were on the point of finding satisfaction, like worms, in dirt and water. People once furnished a heaven with a vast wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of everything that exists lay in the thread of light that linked it to heaven. Instead of staying in *this* present, the eye traveled along that thread beyond it, up to divine essence—to a present on the other side, so to speak. The eye of spirit had to be forced to look at earthly things and held there. It took a long time to bring the clarity that only the otherworldly possessed into the dullness and confusion in which the meaning of this world lay. It took a long time to make attention to the present as such—what was called *experience*—interesting and respected. Now the opposite need seems to have arisen. The mind seems so deeply rooted in earthly things [1807 XI] that an equal force is needed to raise it above them. Spirit shows itself to be so poor that, like a traveler in a sandy desert longing for a simple drink of water, it seems to want only the meager feeling of the divine in general to refresh it. What spirit finds enough lets us measure how much it has lost.

9 Yet this readiness to receive so little, or to give so sparingly, does not suit science. Anyone who seeks only edification, who wants to wrap the earthly variety of existence and thought in mist and longs for the vague enjoyment of this vague divinity, may look for it wherever it can be found. Such a person will easily find the means to dream something up and puff himself up with it. But philosophy must guard against wanting to be edifying.

10 Still less should this willingness to do without science claim that such enthusiasm and obscurity are higher than science. This prophetic talk imagines that it stays right at the center and in the depths. It looks down on [1807 XII] determinacy—the *horos*—and deliberately keeps away from the concept and necessity, treating them as reflection, which lives only in the finite. But there is an empty depth as well as an empty breadth. There is an extension of substance that pours into finite variety without the strength to hold it together. Equally, this is an intensity without content: claiming to be sheer force without any spread, it is the same as superficiality. The strength of spirit is only as great as its expression. Its depth is only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in unfolding itself. At the same time, when this substantial knowing without concepts claims to have sunk the self's particularity into essence and to philosophize truly and holily, it hides something from itself. By rejecting measure and definite form, it does not surrender to God. Instead, it gives free rein either to the accidental content within itself or to its own arbitrary will within that content. Those who abandon themselves to the unchecked ferment of substance think that by shrouding self-consciousness and giving up understanding they become God's *own*, to whom he gives wisdom in sleep. [1807 XIII] What they actually receive and bring forth in their sleep are therefore also dreams.

11 In any case, it is not hard to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period. Spirit has broken with the world in which it has lived and formed its ideas until now. It is about to sink that world into the past and is working to transform itself. Certainly, spirit is never at rest but always moving forward. Yet after a long period of quiet nourishment, a child's first breath interrupts the gradual process of merely quantitative growth—a qualitative leap—and now the child is born. In the same way, spirit as it takes shape matures slowly and quietly toward its new form. It dissolves one small piece after another of the structure of its previous *world*. Only scattered symptoms signal that this world is tottering. The frivolity and boredom spreading through the established order, and the vague sense of something unknown, announce that something

else is approaching. This gradual crumbling, which did not change the face of the whole, is interrupted by the dawn that, like [1807 XIV] lightning, sets the shape of the new world before us all at once.

12 But this new world has no more complete actuality than a newborn child. It is essential not to overlook this. Its first appearance is only its immediacy, or its concept. A building is not finished when its foundation has been laid. No more is the concept of the whole, once reached, the whole itself. If we want to see an oak in the strength of its trunk, the spread of its branches, and the mass of its foliage, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. In the same way, science, the crown of a world of spirit, is not complete at its beginning. The beginning of the new spirit is the product of a sweeping upheaval of many forms of cultivation. It is the reward for a path with many twists and turns and for equally varied efforts and struggles. It is the whole that has returned into itself from both its succession and its extension: the whole's *simple concept*, now come into being. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in those forms, now reduced to moments, developing anew and taking shape in their [1807 XV] new element, with the meaning that has come into being.

13 On one side, then, the new world's first appearance is only the whole veiled in its *simplicity*, or its universal foundation. On the other side, consciousness still has the riches of its previous existence present in memory. It misses the spread and differentiation of content in the newly appearing form. Still more, it misses the developed form through which differences are securely defined and put in their fixed relations. Without this development, science lacks general *intelligibility* and looks like the esoteric possession of a few individuals. It is an esoteric possession because only its concept, or its inner nature, is present as yet. It belongs to a few individuals because its appearance, not yet spread out, makes its existence something individual. Only what is completely determined is also open to everyone, comprehensible, capable of being learned and becoming everyone's possession. Science's form in terms of understanding is the road to it that is offered to everyone and made the same for everyone. To reach rational knowing through understanding is the [1807 XVI] rightful demand of con-

sciousness as it approaches science. For understanding is thinking, the pure I in general. What is understandable is already familiar and is shared by science and unscientific consciousness. Through it, the latter can enter the former directly.

14 Science that is only beginning has not yet achieved either completeness of detail or perfection of form, and is open to criticism on that account. But if the criticism is meant to strike at its essence, it would be as unjust as refusing to recognize the demand for that development is unacceptable. This opposition seems to be the main knot at which scientific cultivation is now wearing itself out, without yet properly understanding the issue. One side insists on rich material and intelligibility. The other at least scorns intelligibility and insists on immediate rationality and divinity. Even if the first side has been silenced, whether by the force of truth alone or also by the other's vehemence, and feels itself overcome [1807 XVII] as regards the subject's foundation, its demands are still not satisfied. They are justified, but unfulfilled. Its silence is only half due to defeat. The other half comes from the boredom and indifference that usually follow when expectations are constantly aroused and promises go unfulfilled.

15 As for content, the other side sometimes makes it easy enough for itself to cover a wide field. It draws a mass of material onto its own ground—material already known and arranged. By concentrating especially on oddities and curiosities, it seems all the more to possess the rest, which knowledge has already dealt with in its own way. It also seems to master what has not yet been brought to order, and so to subject everything to the absolute idea. This idea then seems to have been recognized in everything and developed into a comprehensive science. But look more closely at this expansion. It has not come about through one and the same thing giving itself different forms. Instead, it is a formless repetition of one and the same thing, merely applied externally [1807 XVIII] to different material and acquiring a tedious appearance of diversity. The idea may well be true in itself. In fact, though, it always remains at its beginning if its development consists only in repeating the same formula. The knowing subject carries one unmoving form around over what is there; the material is dipped from outside into this motionless element. This fulfills the demand no more than arbi-

trary notions about the content do. What is required is a richness that springs from itself and differences of form that determine themselves. Instead, this is a formalism of one color. It reaches differences in the material only because that material has already been prepared and is already known.

16 Yet this formalism declares its monotony and abstract universality to be the absolute. It assures us that dissatisfaction with it shows an inability to take up the absolute standpoint and hold on to it. Formerly, the bare possibility of imagining something differently was enough to refute an idea, and this same bare possibility, the general thought, also had the entire positive [1807 XIX] value of actual knowledge. Here, similarly, we see all value assigned to the universal idea in this form of nonactuality. Dissolving what is distinct and determinate—or rather throwing it down into the abyss of emptiness without further development or any justification in itself—passes for speculative thinking. Here, to consider some existence as it is in the *absolute* means nothing more than saying that although we have just spoken of it as something, in the absolute, in A = A, there is nothing of the kind: everything there is one. To set this single piece of knowledge, that in the absolute everything is alike, against knowledge that distinguishes and is fulfilled, or seeks and demands fulfillment —to pass off one's *absolute* as the night in which, as people say, all cows are black—is the naivety of a mind empty of knowledge. Modern philosophy has accused and reviled formalism, only to reproduce it within itself. Even when its inadequacy is known and felt, it will not disappear from science until knowledge of absolute actuality [1807 XX] has become completely clear about its own nature. A general idea placed before an attempt to work it out makes that attempt easier to grasp. It is therefore useful to give an approximate indication of it here, while also taking the opportunity to remove certain habitual forms that obstruct philosophical knowledge.

17 In my view—a view that must justify itself through the presentation of the system itself—everything depends on grasping and expressing truth not as *substance* alone, but just as much as *subject*. We should also note that substantiality includes both the universal, or the *immediacy of knowing*, and the immediacy

that is *being*, or immediacy *for knowing*. Conceiving God as the one substance outraged the age in which this definition was stated. One reason was the instinct that self-consciousness was only submerged in it, not preserved. But the opposite position, which holds fast to thinking as thinking, to *universality*, is the same simplicity, or [1807 XXI] undifferentiated, unmoving substantiality. Third, if thinking unites the being of substance as such with itself and grasps immediacy or intuition as thinking, the question still remains whether this intellectual intuition falls back into inert simplicity and presents actuality itself in a nonactual way.

18 Further, living substance is being that is truly *subject*, or, what means the same, is truly actual, only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or of mediating its becoming-other with itself. As subject, it is pure, *simple negativity*. By that very fact it is the splitting of the simple, or its doubling into opposites, which in turn negates this indifferent diversity and its opposition. Only this *self-restoring* sameness, or reflection into itself in otherness—not an *original* unity as such, or an *immediate* unity as such—is truth. Truth is the becoming of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its purpose and has that end as its beginning. It is actual only through being carried out and through its end. [1807 XXII]

19 So the life of God and divine knowing may indeed be described as love playing with itself. But this idea sinks into edification, even blandness, if it leaves out the seriousness, pain, patience, and labor of the negative. *In itself*, that life may well be undisturbed sameness and unity with itself, taking neither otherness and alienation nor the overcoming of alienation seriously. But this *in itself* is abstract universality. It leaves out that life's nature of *being for itself*, and thus the self-movement of form in general. If form is said to be equal to essence, then precisely for this reason it is a misunderstanding to think that knowing can be content with the in-itself or essence and dispense with form. It is a misunderstanding to think that an absolute first principle makes working it out unnecessary, or that absolute intuition makes its development unnecessary. Precisely because form is as essential to essence as essence is to itself, essence

must not be grasped and expressed merely as essence—as immediate substance, or as the divine's pure intuition of itself. It must equally be grasped as *form*, [1807 XXIII] in the full richness of developed form. Only then is it grasped and expressed as actual.

20 Truth is the whole. But the whole is only essence completing itself through its development. Of the absolute we must say that it is essentially a *result*: only at the *end* is it what it truly is. This is precisely its nature: to be actual, subject, or the becoming of itself. It may seem contradictory that the absolute should essentially be understood as a result. A little thought, however, clears up this apparent contradiction. The beginning, the principle, or the absolute as it is first and immediately stated, is only the universal. If I say "*all* animals," those words cannot count as a zoology. Equally, it is obvious that words such as "divine," "absolute," "eternal," and so on do not express what they contain. And in fact only such words express intuition as the immediate. Anything more than such a word—even the transition to a sentence—is a *becoming-other* that must be taken back: it is a mediation. But mediation is regarded with horror, [1807 XXIV] as though absolute knowledge had been abandoned if we made anything more of mediation than that it is nothing absolute and is not in the absolute at all.

21 In fact, this horror comes from ignorance of the nature of mediation and of absolute knowing itself. For mediation is nothing but self-sameness in motion. It is reflection into itself, the moment of the I that is for itself, pure negativity, or *simple becoming*. The I, or becoming in general, this mediating, is precisely immediacy coming to be, and the immediate itself, because of its simplicity. So excluding reflection from truth and failing to grasp it as a positive moment of the absolute misunderstands reason. Reflection makes truth a result, but it also sublates this opposition to its becoming. For this becoming is equally simple, and therefore does not differ from truth's form of showing itself as *simple* in the result. Rather, it is precisely this having-returned into simplicity. An embryo is certainly human *in itself*, but not *for itself*. It is human for itself only [1807 XXV] as cultivated reason, which has *made* itself what it is *in itself*. Only

this is its actuality. But this result is itself simple immediacy. It is self-conscious freedom, resting in itself, which has not put the opposition aside and left it lying there, but is reconciled with it.

22 We can also express what has been said by saying that reason is *purposive activity*. Exalting supposedly given nature over misunderstood thinking, and especially banishing external purposiveness, has discredited the form of *purpose* in general. Yet Aristotle, too, defines nature as purposive activity. Purpose is the immediate, the resting thing that itself moves, or is subject. Its abstract power to move is *being-for-itself*, or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning only because the beginning is purpose. Or, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or pure actuality, within itself. The purpose carried out, or the actual that exists, is movement and unfolded [1807 XXVI] becoming. But this very unrest is the self. It is therefore equal to the beginning's immediacy and simplicity because it is the result, what has returned into itself. What has returned into itself is precisely the self, and the self is sameness and simplicity relating to itself.

23 The need to represent the absolute as *subject* made use of propositions such as "*God* is the eternal," or "the moral world order," or "love," and so on. In these propositions, truth is simply posited as subject, but is not presented as the movement of reflecting itself into itself. A proposition of this kind begins with the word "*God*." By itself, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name. Only the predicate says *what he is*, filling the name and giving it meaning. Only in this ending does the empty beginning become actual knowledge. In that respect, it is hard to see why one should not speak only of the eternal, the moral world order, and so on—or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, being, the one, and so on—of what carries the meaning, without adding the meaningless sound. But the word indicates precisely that what is posited is not a being, an essence, [1807 XXVII] or a universal in general, but something reflected into itself, a subject. Yet this is only anticipated. The subject is assumed as a fixed point to which predicates are attached as their support. The movement that attaches them belongs to the person knowing it and is not regarded as belonging to the

point itself. Yet only through this movement would the content be presented as subject. As this movement is constituted, it cannot belong to the subject. But once that fixed point is presupposed, the movement cannot be constituted differently: it can only be external. So this anticipation that the absolute is subject not only fails to be the actuality of this concept; it even makes that actuality impossible. For the anticipation posits the concept as a resting point, whereas its actuality is self-movement.

24 Among the various consequences of what has been said, we can single out this one: knowing is actual, and can be presented, only as science or as a *system*. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or principle of philosophy, even if true, is also false simply because it is a fundamental proposition or principle. It is therefore easy to refute it. The [1807 XXVIII] refutation consists in showing its deficiency. It is deficient because it is only the universal or principle, the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is drawn from and developed out of the principle itself, not achieved through opposing assurances and notions brought in from outside. Properly speaking, then, it would be the principle's development and thus the remedy for its deficiency—unless it misunderstood itself by attending only to its *negative* side, without also becoming conscious of its advance and result on their *positive* side. Conversely, the properly *positive* working-out of the beginning is at the same time a negative stance toward it: toward its one-sided form of being only *immediate*, or only *purpose*. It can therefore equally be taken as a refutation of what forms the system's *foundation*. Better, though, it is a demonstration that the system's *foundation* or principle is in fact only its *beginning*.

25 That truth is actual only as a system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the idea that declares the absolute to be *spirit*. This is the highest concept, and it belongs to the modern age and its [1807 XXIX] religion. Only the spiritual is *actual*. It is essence, or what is *in itself*; it is what *relates*, or is determinate, *otherness* and *being-for-itself*; and in this determinacy, or its being outside itself, it remains within itself. In other words, it is *in and for itself*. But at first it is this being-in-and-for-itself only for us, or *in itself*: it is spiritual *sub-*

stance. It must also be this *for itself*. It must be knowledge of the spiritual and knowledge of itself as spirit. That means it must be an *object* to itself, but just as immediately a *mediated* object—that is, an object sublated and reflected into itself. It is *for itself* only for us insofar as it has produced its spiritual content itself. But insofar as it is for itself also for its own self, this self-production, the pure concept, is also for it the objective element in which it exists. In this way, in its existence it is for itself an object reflected into itself. Spirit that knows itself as spirit in this way is *science*. Science is its actuality and the realm it builds for itself in its own element.

26 *Pure* self-knowledge in absolute otherness, this ether *as such*, is the ground [1807 XXX] and soil of science, or *knowing in general*. The beginning of philosophy presupposes, or demands, that consciousness be in this element. But this element itself is complete and transparent only through the movement of its becoming. It is pure spirituality, or the universal in the mode of simple immediacy. Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because substance in general is spirit, it is *transfigured essentiality*: reflection that is itself simple, or immediacy; being that is reflection into itself. Science, for its part, demands that self-consciousness should have risen into this ether in order to be able to live, and actually live, with and in science. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science at least provide the ladder to this standpoint. This right rests on the individual's absolute independence, which it knows it possesses in every form of its knowing. In every form, whether science recognizes it or not, and whatever its content, the individual is also the absolute form, or has *immediate certainty* of itself—and, if we prefer this expression, [1807 XXXI] thereby has unconditional *being*. Consciousness's standpoint is to know objective things as opposed to itself and itself as opposed to them. If science regards this standpoint as its *other*, and regards the place where consciousness is at home with itself as instead the loss of spirit, then consciousness in turn regards the element of science as a distant beyond in which it no longer possesses itself. Each side seems to the other to be the reverse of truth. For natural consciousness to entrust itself directly to science is an attempt, prompted by an attraction it does

not understand, to try walking on its head for once. The compulsion to adopt this unfamiliar position and move about in it seems an unprepared and unnecessary act of violence it is asked to inflict on itself. Whatever science may be in itself, in relation to immediate self-consciousness it presents itself as something inverted. Or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, science has the form of nonactuality while that consciousness exists for itself outside science. Science must therefore unite that element with itself, [1807 XXXII] or rather show that and how it belongs to science itself. Lacking actuality, science is only the *in-itself*, the *purpose*, still only something *inward*, not spirit but as yet only spiritual substance. It must express itself and become for itself. This means nothing other than that it must posit self-consciousness as one with itself.

27 This becoming of *science in general*, or of *knowing*, is what this *Phenomenology* of spirit presents as the first part of its system. Knowing as it first is, or *immediate spirit*, is what lacks spirit: *sensory consciousness*. To become genuine knowing, or to produce the element of science that is its pure concept, spirit must work through a long road. As presented in its content and in the forms that appear within it, this becoming looks different from a guide leading unscientific consciousness to science. It also looks different from a grounding of science—and certainly different from the enthusiasm that begins immediately with absolute knowing, as though fired from a pistol, and has already disposed [1807 XXXIII] of other standpoints by declaring that it takes no notice of them.

28 But the task of leading the individual from its uncultivated standpoint to knowing had to be grasped in its general sense. It was necessary to consider the universal individual, world spirit, in its cultivation. As to the relation between the two, in the universal individual each moment shows itself as it acquires concrete form and a shape of its own. The particular individual, however, is incomplete spirit: a concrete shape whose entire existence falls under one specific determination and in which the others are present only as blurred traces. In a spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has sunk to

an inconspicuous moment. What was previously the subject itself is now only a trace. Its shape is wrapped up and has become a simple shading. The individual whose substance is the higher spirit goes through this past in the way someone taking up a higher science reviews preparatory knowledge long since mastered, to bring its content to mind. He recalls it without [1807 XXXIV] dwelling on it or making it his main interest. In the same way, each individual goes through the stages of cultivation of universal spirit, but as forms spirit has already left behind, as stages on a road already worked out and leveled. We see knowledge that occupied the mature minds of men in earlier ages reduced to the lessons, exercises, and even games of childhood. In educational progress we will recognize the history of the world's cultivation retraced in outline. This past existence is already an acquired possession of universal spirit, which forms the individual's substance, or its inorganic nature. From the individual's side, its cultivation in this respect consists in acquiring what is already there, consuming its inorganic nature into itself and taking possession of it for itself. But this is equally nothing other than universal spirit, or substance, giving itself its self-consciousness: its becoming and reflection into itself.

29 Science presents this formative movement both in its detail and necessity, and presents in its shape what has already sunk to a [1807 XXXV] moment and possession of spirit. The goal is spirit's insight into what knowing is. Impatience demands the impossible: reaching the goal without the means. On the one hand, we must endure the *length* of this road, for every moment is necessary. On the other hand, we must *stay* at each moment, for each is itself an individual, complete shape. It is considered absolutely only insofar as its determinacy is considered as a whole or something concrete, or the whole is considered in the distinctive character of this determination. The individual's substance, world spirit, had the patience to pass through these forms over the long stretch of time and to undertake the immense labor of world history. Since it could not reach consciousness of itself with any less labor, the individual certainly cannot comprehend its substance with less. Still, the individual's trouble is also reduced, because *in itself* this has been accomplished already. The con-

tent is already actuality erased down to possibility, immediacy brought under control. Already something *thought*, it is the possession of individuality. What must be converted is no longer *existence* into *being-in-itself*, [1807 XXXVI] but only the *in-itself* into the form of *being-for-itself*. We must define more closely how this happens.

30 What the individual is spared in this movement is the sublation of *existence*. What still remains is the *representation* of the forms and *familiarity* with them. Existence taken back into substance has, through that first negation, only been placed *immediately* in the element of the self. It therefore still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy or unmoving indifference as existence itself. In other words, it has only passed into *representation*. At the same time, it has thereby become something *familiar*, something spirit has finished with, in which its activity and therefore its interest no longer lie. The activity that finishes with existence is immediate mediation, mediation that exists, and hence the movement only of particular spirit that does not comprehend itself. Knowing, in contrast, is directed against the representation produced by this activity, against this familiarity. It is the activity of the universal self and the interest of thinking.

31 What is familiar is not known simply because it is *familiar*. It is the [1807 XXXVII] most common way of deceiving oneself and others to presuppose something as familiar in knowing, and to accept it on that basis. For all its talk back and forth, such knowing never moves from the spot, without knowing what is happening to it. Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, and so on, are taken without examination as familiar and valid foundations. They form fixed points both of departure and return. The movement goes back and forth between them while they remain unmoved, and so proceeds only on their surface. Grasping and testing likewise consist in seeing whether everyone also finds what is said about them in their own representation—whether or not it seems that way and is familiar to them.

32 *Analyzing* a representation, as it used to be practiced, was already nothing other than sublating the form of its familiarity. Breaking a representation into its original elements is a return to its moments. At least these no longer have the form of the representation as we found it, but constitute the self's immediate possession. Admittedly, this analysis reaches only *thoughts* that are themselves familiar, fixed, and [1807 XXXVIII] resting determinations. But this *separated*, nonactual element is itself an essential moment. For the concrete moves itself only because it divides itself and makes itself nonactual. The activity of separation is the power and labor of *understanding*, the most astonishing and greatest power—or rather, absolute power. The circle that rests closed within itself and holds its moments as substance is an immediate and therefore unsurprising relation. But an accident, separated from what encompasses it, gains an existence of its own and a separate freedom. What is bound, and actual only in its connection with something else, gains this freedom as such. That is the immense power of the negative: the energy of thinking, of the pure I. Death, if that is what we want to call this nonactuality, is the most terrible thing. Holding fast to what is dead requires the greatest strength. Powerless beauty hates understanding because understanding asks of it what it cannot do. But spirit's life is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation. It is the life that endures death and preserves itself in it. Spirit wins its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. [1807 XXXIX] It is not this power as something positive that looks away from the negative, as when we say of something, "This is nothing," or "This is false," and, finished with it, turn away to something else. Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and staying with it. This staying is the magic power that turns the negative into being. It is the same thing that was called subject above. By giving determinacy existence in its own element, subject sublates abstract immediacy—immediacy that merely *is* in general. It is thereby true substance: being, or immediacy, that does not have mediation outside it but is itself this mediation.

33 Making what is represented into the possession of pure self-consciousness, this raising into universality in general, is only one side. It is not yet completed cultivation. Ancient study differed from modern study in this: it thoroughly cultivated natural consciousness itself. Testing itself in each part of its existence and philosophizing about everything it encountered, natural consciousness produced itself as a universality active through and through. In [1807 XL] modern times, by contrast, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made. The effort to grasp it and make it one's own is more an unmediated forcing-out of what is within, a cut-short production of the universal, than the universal's emergence from the concrete and from the variety of existence. So the work now consists less in purifying the individual of the immediate sensory mode and making it into a substance that thinks and is thought. Rather, it consists in the opposite: making the universal actual and giving it spirit by sublating fixed, determinate thoughts. But making fixed thoughts fluid is much harder than making sensory existence fluid. The reason is the one given earlier. Those determinations have the I, the power of the negative or pure actuality, as their substance and the element of their existence. Sensory determinations, by contrast, have only powerless abstract immediacy, or being as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inward *immediacy*, recognizes itself as a moment, or when pure certainty of itself abstracts from itself. It does not leave itself out or set itself aside. Instead, it gives up the *fixity* [1807 XLI] of its self-positing: both the fixity of the pure concrete that the I itself is, as opposed to differentiated content, and the fixity of differentiated terms that, posited in the element of pure thinking, share in the I's unconditional character. Through this movement, pure thoughts become *concepts*. Only then are they what they truly are: self-movements, circles, what their substance is—spiritual essences.

34 This movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific procedure in general. Considered as the connectedness of its content, it is that content's necessity and expansion into an organic whole. Through it, the road by which the concept of knowing is reached likewise becomes a necessary and complete becoming. This preparation thus ceases to be an accidental philosophizing that

attaches itself, as chance dictates, to this or that object, relation, or thought of imperfect consciousness. Nor does it try to ground truth by reasoning back and forth, drawing conclusions and inferences from determinate thoughts. Instead, through the concept's movement, this road will embrace the complete [1807 XLII] worldly existence of consciousness in its necessity.

35 Further, such a presentation forms the *first* part of science because spirit's existence, as what comes first, is nothing other than the immediate, or the beginning. But the beginning is not yet spirit's return into itself. The *element of immediate existence* is therefore the specific feature that distinguishes this part of science from the others. Stating this difference leads us to discuss some fixed thoughts that usually occur here.

36 Spirit's immediate existence, *consciousness*, has two moments: knowing and objectivity that is negative to knowing. As spirit develops in this element and unfolds its moments, this opposition belongs to them, and they all appear as forms of consciousness. The science of this road is the science of the *experience* consciousness undergoes. Substance is considered as it and its movement are consciousness's object. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what is in its experience. For what is in experience is only spiritual substance, and specifically as the *object* of its self. [1807 XLIII] But spirit becomes an object because it is this movement: becoming *another* to *itself*, that is, the *object of its own self*, and sublating this otherness. Experience is precisely the name for the movement in which the immediate, the unexperienced—that is, the abstract, whether of sensory being or of a simplicity merely thought—alienates itself, then returns to itself from this alienation. Only then is it presented in its actuality and truth and also possessed by consciousness.

37 The inequality in consciousness between the I and substance, which is its object, is their difference, the *negative* in general. It can be regarded as the *deficiency* of both. But it is their soul, or what moves them. That is why some ancient thinkers understood the *void* as what moves: they grasped what moves as the *negative*, but did not yet grasp the negative as the self. Now, although

this negative appears at first as the I's inequality with the object, it is just as much substance's inequality with itself. What seems to happen outside substance, to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing. Substance shows itself [1807 XLIV] to be essentially subject. Once it has shown this completely, spirit has made its existence equal to its essence. It is an object to itself as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy and of the separation between knowing and truth has been overcome. Being is absolutely mediated: it is substantial content that is just as immediately the I's possession, selflike, or the concept. With this, the Phenomenology of spirit comes to its close. What spirit prepares for itself in it is the element of knowing. Within this element, spirit's moments now spread out in the *form of simplicity*, which knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowing. Instead, they remain in the simplicity of knowing. They are truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is only diversity of content. Their movement, which organizes itself into the whole in this element, is *logic*, or *speculative philosophy*.

38 Now, that system of spirit's experience includes only spirit's *appearance*. So the advance from it to the science of *truth* in the *shape* of *truth* seems merely negative. We might [1807 XLV] want to be spared the negative as *false* and demand to be led straight to truth. Why deal with falsehood? The demand to begin at once with science has already been discussed above. Here we must answer it in terms of what the negative as *false* is in general. Ideas about this are the chief obstacles to entering into truth. This will give us occasion to discuss mathematical knowing. Unphilosophical knowing regards it as the ideal philosophy ought to strive to reach, but has so far striven in vain to attain.

39 The *true* and the *false* belong to the determinate thoughts that are treated as unmoving essences of their own. One stands fixed and isolated on that side, the other on this side, without any connection. Against this we must insist that truth is not a minted coin that can be handed over ready-made and pocketed just as it is. Nor *is there* a falsehood, any more than there is an evil. Admittedly, evil and falsehood are not as bad as the devil, since in the devil they are even made into a particular *subject*. As falsehood and [1807 XLVI] evil, they are only

universals, but they still have their own essential character in opposition to each other. Falsehood—since it alone concerns us here—would be the other, the negative of substance, which as the content of knowing is truth. But substance is itself essentially the negative: partly as the distinguishing and determining of content, partly as a *simple* distinguishing, that is, as self and knowing in general. We can certainly know falsely. To say that something is known falsely means that knowing is unequal to its substance. But this very inequality is distinguishing in general, which is an essential moment. Their equality does indeed emerge from this distinguishing, and this equality that has come to be is truth. But it is not truth as though the inequality had been thrown away like slag from pure metal, or even as though the tool were left apart from the finished vessel. Rather, inequality, as the negative, as the self, is itself still immediately present in truth as such. Yet this does not mean that *falsehood* constitutes a moment, let alone a component, of truth. To say that there is something true in every falsehood treats the two [1807 XLVII] like oil and water, which do not mix and are combined only externally. Precisely because their expressions signify the moment of *complete otherness*, those expressions must no longer be used where that otherness has been sublated. Speaking of the *unity* of subject and object, finite and infinite, being and thinking, and so on, has this awkward feature: "object" and "subject," and so on, mean what they are *outside their unity*. In the unity, then, they are not meant as what their expressions say. In the same way, falsehood is no longer a moment of truth as falsehood.

40 *Dogmatism* in the way of thinking in knowledge and the study of philosophy is nothing other than the opinion that truth consists in a proposition that is a fixed result, or is immediately known. Questions such as when Caesar was born, or how many toises a stadium measured, and which stadium, and so on, should receive a *precise* answer. It is likewise definitely true that the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the two other sides of a right-angled triangle. But the nature of such a so-called truth is [1807 XLVIII] different from the nature of philosophical truths.

41 To mention *historical* truths briefly: insofar as we consider what is purely historical in them, it is readily admitted that they concern individual existence, content on its accidental and arbitrary side, and determinations of it that are not necessary. But even bare truths like the example just given are not without the movement of self-consciousness. To know one of them, we must make many comparisons, consult books, or investigate in some other way. Even where intuition is immediate, only knowledge of it together with its grounds is held to have true value, although supposedly it is only the bare result that really matters.

42 As for *mathematical* truths, someone who knew Euclid's theorems *by heart* without their proofs—without knowing them *from within*, as we might say by contrast—would be even less likely to count as a geometer. Likewise, knowledge acquired by measuring many [1807 XLIX] right-angled triangles and finding that their sides have the familiar relation would be considered unsatisfactory. Yet even in mathematical knowing, the proof's *essential character* does not mean that it is a moment of the result itself. Instead, in the result the proof is over and has disappeared. As a result, the theorem is certainly *recognized as true*. But this added circumstance does not affect its content, only its relation to the subject. The movement of mathematical proof does not belong to what is the object. It is an activity *external* to the subject matter. Thus the nature of a right-angled triangle does not divide itself up in the way presented in the construction needed to prove the proposition expressing its relation. The whole production of the result is a route and a means of knowing. In philosophical knowing too, the becoming of *existence* as existence differs from the becoming of the *essence* or inner nature of the subject. But first, philosophical knowing contains both, whereas mathematical knowing presents only the becoming of *existence*: that is, the *being* of the subject's nature in *knowing* as [1807 L] such. Second, philosophical knowing also unites these two particular movements. The inward arising, or the becoming of substance, is inseparably a passage into the outward, into existence, being for another. Conversely, the becoming of existence is a taking of itself back into essence. Thus the movement is the dou-

ble process and becoming of the whole. Each at the same time posits the other, and each therefore also has both in it as two aspects. Together they make up the whole by dissolving themselves and making themselves its moments.

43 In mathematical knowing, insight is an activity external to the subject. It follows that the true subject is changed by it. The means—construction and proof—therefore certainly contain true propositions. But it must equally be said that the content is false. In the example above, the triangle is torn apart and its parts are added to other figures that the construction brings into being on it. Only at the end is the triangle restored. It is what really concerns us, but it was lost from view during the process and appeared only in pieces belonging to other wholes. Here, then, we also see [1807 LI] negativity entering the content. We would have to call this a falsity of the content just as much as the disappearance of thoughts held to be fixed in the movement of the concept.

44 But the real deficiency of this knowing concerns both knowing itself and its material in general. As to knowing, first, we do not see the necessity of the construction. It does not emerge from the concept of the theorem but is prescribed. We must blindly obey the instruction to draw these particular lines, when infinitely many others could be drawn. We know nothing further; we have only the good faith that this will serve to conduct the proof. Afterwards, this usefulness does indeed appear. It is therefore only external, because it appears only afterwards, in the proof. Likewise, the proof follows a path beginning somewhere whose relation to the intended result is not yet known. Its advance takes up *these* determinations and relations and leaves others aside, without our immediately seeing what necessity guides it. An external purpose governs this movement.
[1807 LII]

45 The *self-evidence* of this deficient knowing, in which mathematics takes pride and with which it boasts against philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its *purpose* and the deficiency of its *material*. It is therefore of a kind philosophy must reject. Its *purpose*, or concept, is *magnitude*. This is precisely the inessen-

tial relation without a concept. So knowing moves along the surface. It does not touch the subject itself, its essence or concept, and therefore is not comprehension. The *material* about which mathematics provides its welcome treasure of truths is *space* and the *one*. Space is the existence in which the concept inscribes its differences as in an empty, dead element, where they are likewise unmoving and lifeless. The *actual* is not something spatial in the way mathematics considers it. Neither concrete sensory intuition nor philosophy deals with nonactual things of the kind found in mathematics. In such a nonactual element there is also only nonactual truth: fixed, dead propositions. We can stop at any one of them. The next begins afresh [1807 LIII] on its own, without the first moving itself on to the next and without a necessary connection arising in this way from the nature of the subject itself. Because of this principle and element—and this is the formal character of mathematical self-evidence—knowing also advances along the line of *equality*. For what is dead does not move itself. It therefore does not reach differences of essence, essential opposition or inequality, and so does not reach the passage of one opposite into the other, qualitative, immanent movement, or self-movement. For magnitude, the inessential difference, is all mathematics considers. It abstracts from the fact that the concept divides space into its dimensions and determines their connections and the connections within them. For example, it does not consider the relation of line to surface. And where it compares a circle's diameter with its circumference, it comes up against their incommensurability: a relation of the concept, an infinite that escapes mathematical determination.

46 Immanent, so-called pure mathematics also does not set *time* as time against [1807 LIV] space as the second material of its investigation. Applied mathematics does deal with time, as with motion and other actual things. But it takes from experience the synthetic propositions—that is, propositions about their relations determined by their concept—and merely applies its formulas to these presuppositions. It often gives so-called proofs of propositions such as those about the equilibrium of a lever or the relation of space and time in falling motion, and so on. That these are offered and accepted as proofs proves only

how great knowing's need for proof is: where it has nothing more, it values even the empty appearance of proof and finds satisfaction in it. A critique of those proofs would be as remarkable as it would be instructive. It would partly clear mathematics of this false ornament, partly show its limit and, from that, the necessity of another kind of knowing. As for *time*, which one might expect to form, as the counterpart of space, the material of the other part of pure mathematics: it is the concept itself in existence. The principle of [1807 LV] *magnitude*, of difference without a concept, and the principle of *equality*, of abstract, lifeless unity, cannot deal with that pure restlessness of life and absolute differentiation. So this negativity becomes the second material of this knowing only when paralyzed, namely as the *one*. This knowing, an external activity, degrades what moves itself into material, in order to have in it an indifferent, external, lifeless content.

47 Philosophy, by contrast, considers determination not as *inessential* but insofar as it is essential. Its element and content are not the abstract or nonactual, but the *actual*: what posits itself and lives within itself, existence in its concept. This is the process that produces and passes through its own moments. This entire movement constitutes the positive and its truth. Truth therefore also includes the negative—what would be called falsehood if it could be regarded as something to abstract from. What disappears must instead itself be considered essential. It must not be defined as something fixed, cut off from truth [1807 LVI] and left lying outside it somewhere unknown. Nor should truth be treated as a dead positive resting on the other side. Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality and movement of the life of truth. Truth is thus the Bacchic frenzy in which not one member is sober. And because each member, as it separates itself, also immediately dissolves, the frenzy is equally transparent and simple repose. In the judgment of that movement, the individual forms of spirit, like determinate thoughts, do not stand. But they are as much positive and necessary moments as they are negative and disappearing. In the *whole* of

the movement, grasped as repose, what distinguishes itself within it and gives itself a particular existence is preserved as something that *recollects itself*. Its existence is knowledge of itself, just as this knowledge is also immediately existence.

48 It might seem necessary to say more in advance about the *method* of this movement, or of science. But its concept already lies in what has been said. Its proper [1807 LVII] presentation belongs to logic, or rather is logic itself. For method is nothing other than the structure of the whole set out in its pure essentiality. But we must be conscious that the system of ideas about what philosophical method is, too, belongs to a vanished cultivation. If this should sound boastful or revolutionary—a tone I know to be far from my own—we should remember that the scientific apparatus borrowed from mathematics is already, even in common opinion, at least *outdated*: definitions, divisions, axioms, series of theorems and their proofs, fundamental propositions, and inferences and conclusions drawn from them. Even if its unfitness is not clearly understood, little or no use is now made of it. Even if it is not disapproved of in itself, it is not liked. And we must have this prejudice in favor of what is excellent: that it establishes itself in use and wins favor. It is not hard to see, however, that setting up a proposition, giving reasons for it, and likewise [1807 LVIII] refuting the opposite proposition with reasons is not the form in which truth can appear. Truth is its own movement within itself. That method, by contrast, is knowing external to its material. It therefore belongs to mathematics and must be left to mathematics, whose principle, as noted, is the conceptless relation of magnitude, and whose material is dead space and the equally dead one. In a freer manner—that is, mixed more with arbitrariness and chance—it may also remain in ordinary life, conversation, or historical instruction meant more to satisfy curiosity than to provide knowledge, as a preface roughly is too. In ordinary life, consciousness has as its content information, experiences, concrete sensory things, thoughts, and principles: in general, things regarded as already there, or as fixed, resting being or essence. Consciousness partly runs along this content, partly interrupts its connection by exercising free choice over it. It acts

as an external determining and handling of that content. It traces it back to something certain, even if only the feeling of the moment. Conviction is [1807 LIX] satisfied when it has reached a resting point familiar to it.

49 The necessity of the concept rules out both the loose progress of argumentative conversation and the stiffer progress of scientific display. But, as noted above, their place is not to be taken by the absence of method in presentiment and enthusiasm, or by arbitrary prophetic talk that despises not merely that kind of scientific procedure but scientific procedure altogether.

50 Likewise, Kant's *threefold form*—still dead and uncomprehended, rediscovered only by instinct—has been raised to its absolute significance. The true form has thereby been established together with its true content, and the concept of science has emerged. But this does not make scientific the use of this form that reduces it to a lifeless schema, an actual phantom, and reduces scientific organization to a table. This formalism, discussed above in general, should now be described more closely. It thinks it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a [1807 LX] form when it has stated a determination from its schema as a predicate of that form: subjectivity or objectivity, magnetism, electricity, and so on, contraction or expansion, east or west, and the like. This can be multiplied without limit. In this approach, any determination or form can be used again for another as a form or moment of the schema, and each can gratefully perform the same service for the other. This is a circle of reciprocity through which we learn nothing of the subject itself—what either the one or the other is. In part, sensory determinations are taken from ordinary intuition, though they are supposed to *mean* something other than what they say. In part, what has meaning in itself—the pure determinations of thought, such as subject, object, substance, cause, the universal, and so on—is used just as unexamined and uncritically as in ordinary life, and just like strength and weakness, expansion and contraction. So this metaphysics is as unscientific as those sensory representations.
[1807 LXI]

51 Instead of the inward life and self-movement of its existence, intuition—here meaning sensory knowing—states some such simple determination according to a superficial analogy. This empty, external application of a formula is called *construction*. Such formalism is like every other kind. How dull would a head have to be if it could not learn in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases, with as many plans of treatment—or could not be turned in that short time from a routine practitioner into a theoretical physician, since until quite recently such instruction was enough for this? Suppose the formalism of natural philosophy teaches that understanding is electricity, or that the animal is nitrogen, or is *equal* to south or north, and so on, or represents it—whether stated as baldly as here or brewed up with more terminology. The inexperienced may fall into admiring amazement at this power to bring together things that seem far apart, and at the violence done to the resting sensory thing by this connection. The connection gives it the appearance of a concept while sparing the [1807 LXII] main task: stating the concept itself, or the meaning of the sensory representation. They may revere a profound genius in it. They may also enjoy the cheerfulness of such determinations, since they replace the abstract concept with something intuitive and make it more pleasing, and congratulate themselves on their sensed kinship with such splendid activity. The trick of this wisdom is as quickly learned as it is easy to perform. Once known, its repetition becomes as unbearable as repeating a conjuring trick one has seen through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no harder to handle than a painter's palette containing only two colors, say red and green: one to color a surface when a historical picture is wanted, the other when a landscape is wanted. It would be hard to decide which is greater: the complacency with which everything in heaven, on earth, and under the earth is daubed with this colored wash, or the conceit about the excellence of this [1807 LXIII] universal remedy. Each supports the other. This method sticks the few determinations of its general schema onto everything heavenly and earthly, every natural and spiritual form, and files everything away in this manner. What it produces is nothing less than a clear-as-day account of the universe's organism: a table resembling a skeleton

with little labels stuck to it, or the rows of sealed jars with attached labels in a grocer's shop. The table is as clear as either of these. Just as flesh and blood have been removed from the bones, and the contents of the jars—likewise not alive—are hidden, so the living essence of the subject has been omitted or hidden. It was already noted above that this manner perfects itself into absolute painting in one color. Ashamed even of the schema's differences, it sinks them into the emptiness of the absolute as belonging to reflection, so as to restore pure identity, the formless white. The sameness of color in that schema and its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the passage from one to [1807 LXIV] the other are each as much dead understanding as the others, and equally external knowing.

52 What is excellent cannot escape this fate: being stripped of life and spirit, flayed in this way, and seeing its skin worn by lifeless knowing and its vanity. Yet even in this fate we can recognize its power over people's hearts, if not their spirits. We can also recognize its development into the universality and determinacy of form in which its completion consists. Only that development makes it possible to use this universality for superficiality.

53 Science may organize itself only through the concept's own life. In science, the determinacy that a schema would stick onto existence from outside is the self-moving soul of fulfilled content. The movement of what is consists, on one side, in becoming other to itself and thus becoming its immanent content. On the other side, it takes this unfolding, or this existence of its own, back into itself. That is, it makes itself a *moment* and simplifies itself into determinacy. In the first movement, *negativity* is distinguishing and positing *existence*. In [1807 LXV] this return into itself, it is the becoming of *determinate simplicity*. In this way the content shows that its determinacy is not received from and attached by another. It gives itself this determinacy and, from itself, arranges itself into a moment and a place in the whole. Tabulating understanding keeps to itself the content's necessity and concept—what makes up the concrete character, actuality, and living movement of the subject it arranges. Or rather, it does not keep this to itself: it does not know it. For if it had this insight, it would surely show

it. It does not even know the need for such insight. Otherwise it would stop its schematizing, or at least know that it had nothing more than a table of contents. It gives only the table of contents; it does not supply the content itself. Even if the determination is one like magnetism, something concrete or actual in itself, it has still sunk into something dead when it is merely predicated of another existence. It is not known as that existence's immanent life, or in the way it has its native and distinctive self-production and presentation within it. Formal understanding leaves others to add this [1807 LXVI] main thing. Instead of entering the subject's immanent content, it always surveys the whole and stands above the individual existence it discusses. That means it does not see it at all. Scientific knowing, by contrast, requires giving oneself over to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, having its inner necessity before oneself and expressing it. Immersed in its object in this way, knowing forgets that overview, which is only knowing's reflection out of the content and into itself. But sunk in the material and advancing with its movement, knowing returns into itself—though only when the fullness or content takes itself back into itself, simplifies itself into determinacy, reduces itself to one side of an existence, and passes into its higher truth. Through this, the simple whole that surveys itself emerges on its own from the riches in which its reflection seemed lost.

54 Because substance, as expressed above, is subject within itself, all content is its own reflection into itself. The subsistence, or substance, of an [1807 LXVII] existence is self-sameness, for its inequality with itself would be its dissolution. But self-sameness is pure abstraction, and this is *thinking*. When I say *quality*, I say simple determinacy. Through quality, an existence is distinguished from another, or is an existence. It is for itself, or subsists, through this simplicity with itself. But thereby it is essentially *thought*. In this lies the comprehension that being is thinking. Here lies the insight usually missing from ordinary conceptless talk about the identity of thinking and being. Now, because the subsistence of existence is self-sameness or pure abstraction, it is abstraction from itself, or is itself its inequality with itself and its dissolution—its own inward-

ness and taking-itself-back into itself, its becoming. Because of this nature of what is, and insofar as what is has this nature for knowing, knowing is not an activity that handles the content as something alien, nor a reflection into itself out of the content. Science is not that idealism which replaced *assertive* dogmatism with *assuring [1807 LXVIII] dogmatism*, or the *dogmatism of self-certainty*. Rather, as knowing sees the content return into its own inwardness, its activity is both immersed in the content, since it is the content's immanent self, and returned into itself, since it is pure self-sameness in otherness. It is thus the cunning that seems to refrain from activity and watches as determinacy and its concrete life, precisely while thinking it pursues its own preservation and particular interest, does the opposite: dissolves itself and makes itself a moment of the whole.

55 Above, the meaning of *understanding* was given from the side of substance's self-consciousness. What has now been said makes clear its meaning in terms of substance as something that is. Existence is quality, self-identical determinacy or determinate simplicity, determinate thought. This is the understanding of existence. Through this it is *nous*, which Anaxagoras first recognized as essence. Those who followed him grasped the nature of existence more precisely as *eidos* or *idea*: that is, *determinate universality, kind*. The word *kind* may seem too ordinary [1807 LXIX] and too little for the ideas, the beautiful, holy, and eternal that are now so prevalent. But in fact "idea" expresses neither more nor less than "kind." Yet now we often see an expression that precisely designates a concept rejected in favor of another that wraps the concept in mist, if only because it belongs to a foreign language, and thus sounds more edifying. Precisely in being determined as kind, existence is simple thought. *Nous*, simplicity, is substance. Because of its simplicity or self-sameness it appears fixed and enduring. But this self-sameness is equally negativity, through which that fixed existence passes into its dissolution. At first, determinacy seems to be determinate only by relating to *another*, and its movement seems to be inflicted on it by an alien force. But that it has its otherness within itself and is self-movement is con-

tained precisely in that *simplicity* of thinking itself. For this is thought moving and distinguishing itself, its own inwardness, the pure *concept*. Thus *understanding* is a becoming, and as this becoming it is *reason*.
[1807 LXX]

56 *Logical necessity* consists in this nature of what is: that in its being it is its concept. It alone is the rational and the rhythm of the organic whole. It is as much *knowledge* of the content as the content is concept and essence. Or, it alone is the *speculative*. The concrete form, moving itself, makes itself into simple determinacy. It thereby raises itself to logical form and is in its essentiality. Its concrete existence is only this movement and is immediately logical existence. So there is no need to impose formalism externally on the concrete content. This content is in itself the passage into formalism. But the latter ceases to be external formalism, because form is the concrete content's own native becoming.

57 Scientific method is inseparable from its content and determines its rhythm through itself. As already noted, this nature of method has its proper presentation in speculative philosophy. What has been said here certainly expresses the concept, but can count as no more than an assurance given in advance. Its truth does not lie in this partly narrative [1807 LXXI] exposition. So it is just as little refuted by an opposing assurance that things are not so, but are this way or that; by recalling and recounting habitual ideas as settled and familiar truths; or by serving up and assuring us of something new from the shrine of inward divine intuition. Knowing commonly reacts in this way when it first encounters something previously unknown. It does so to save its freedom and its own insight, its own authority against an alien authority—for that is how what it first encounters appears. It also wants to remove the appearance and supposed disgrace of having learned something. When the unfamiliar is accepted with applause, the same kind of reaction consists in what, in another sphere, was ultrarevolutionary speech and action.

58 So what matters in the *study* of *science* is taking on the effort of the concept. This requires attention to the concept as such, to simple determinations such as *being-in-itself*, *being-for-itself*, *self-sameness*, and so on. These are pure [1807 LXXII] self-movements that might be called souls, if their concept did not designate something higher than souls. The concept interrupts the habitual running along representations. This is as tiresome to that habit as it is to formal thinking that argues back and forth in nonactual thoughts. That habit can be called material thinking: an accidental consciousness merely immersed in the material, which therefore finds it hard at the same time to lift its self purely out of the material and be with itself. The other kind, argumentative reasoning, is by contrast freedom from the content and vanity toward it. It is asked to make the effort of giving up this freedom. Instead of being the principle that arbitrarily moves the content, it must sink this freedom into the content, let the content move itself through its own nature—that is, through the self as its own self—and observe this movement. Giving up one's own intrusions into the immanent rhythm of concepts, not interfering with it through arbitrary choice or wisdom acquired elsewhere: this restraint is itself an essential moment of attention to the concept.
[1807 LXXIII]

59 We should bring out more clearly the two sides of argumentative reasoning to which comprehending thought is opposed. On one side, reasoning takes a negative stance toward the content it has grasped, knowing how to refute and destroy it. The insight that this is not so is merely the *negative*. It is the final thing, which does not itself go beyond itself to a new content. To have content again, something *else* must be taken up from somewhere. This is reflection into the empty I, the vanity of its knowing. But this vanity expresses not only that this content is empty, but also that this insight itself is empty. For it is the negative that does not see the positive within itself. Because this reflection does not gain its own negativity as content, it is never in the subject at all, but always beyond it. It therefore imagines that asserting emptiness always takes it further than an insight rich in content. By contrast, as shown earlier, in comprehend-

ing thought the negative belongs to the content itself. Both as the content's *immanent* movement and determination, and as their *whole*, it is the [1807 LXXIV] *positive*. Grasped as a result, it is what comes out of this movement, the *determinate* negative, and thus equally a positive content.

60 But insofar as such thinking has a content—whether representations, thoughts, or a mixture of both—it has another side that makes comprehension difficult for it. This side's remarkable nature is closely linked to the essence of the idea described above. Or rather, it expresses that essence as it appears in the movement that is thinking apprehension. In its negative attitude, just discussed, argumentative thinking is itself the self into which the content returns. In its positive knowing, by contrast, the self is a represented *subject* to which the content relates as accident and predicate. This subject is the basis to which the content is attached and on which the movement runs back and forth. Comprehending thought is different. The concept is the object's own self, which presents itself as *its becoming*. So it is not a resting subject that carries accidents without moving. It is the concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back [1807 LXXV] into itself. In this movement, that resting subject itself perishes. It enters into the differences and content. Instead of remaining opposite them, it constitutes the determinacy—that is, the differentiated content—as well as its movement. So the firm ground that reasoning has in the resting subject begins to shake, and only this movement itself becomes the object. The subject that fills its content ceases to go beyond that content and cannot have still other predicates or accidents. Conversely, the content's dispersed elements are thereby bound under the self. The content is not a universal that, free of the subject, could belong to several subjects. Thus the content is in fact no longer the subject's predicate. It is the substance, the essence and concept of what is being discussed. Representational thinking by nature runs along accidents or predicates and rightly goes beyond them, because they are no more than predicates and accidents. But when what has the form of a predicate in the proposition is substance itself, this running-along is checked. It suffers, so to speak, a counterthrust. [1807 LXXVI] Starting from the subject as though it

would remain the underlying basis, thought finds instead that the predicate is substance, that the subject has passed into the predicate and is thereby sublated. What seems to be a predicate has become the entire independent mass, so thought cannot wander freely but is held back by this weight. Usually the subject is first laid down as the fixed, *objective* self. From here the necessary movement advances to the variety of determinations or predicates. Here the knowing I itself replaces that subject and becomes both the linking of predicates and the subject holding them. But when that first subject enters the determinations themselves and is their soul, the second subject, the knowing one, still finds the first in the predicate. It had wanted to be done with the first subject and go beyond it to return into itself. Instead of being the agent moving the predicate, reasoning about whether this or that predicate should be assigned to the first subject, it still has to deal with the self of the content. It is not to be for itself but together with this self.
[1807 LXXVII]

61 Formally, this can be expressed by saying that the speculative proposition destroys the nature of judgment or the proposition in general, which includes the difference between subject and predicate. The proposition of identity into which the former turns contains the counterthrust against that relation. This conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the unity of the concept that destroys it resembles the conflict in rhythm between meter and accent. Rhythm results from the hovering middle and union of the two. Likewise, in the philosophical proposition, the identity of subject and predicate should not destroy the difference expressed by the proposition's form. Instead, their unity should emerge as a harmony. The proposition's form is the appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent that distinguishes its fulfillment. But the predicate's expressing substance, and the subject's itself falling into the universal, is the *unity* in which that accent dies away.

62 To illustrate this with examples: in the proposition "*God is being*," the predicate is *being*. It has a substantial meaning in which the subject dissolves. Being is [1807 LXXVIII] meant here not as a predicate but as essence. God therefore

seems to cease to be what the proposition's arrangement makes him: the fixed subject. Instead of advancing in the passage from subject to predicate, thought feels checked because the subject is lost. Missing it, thought is thrown back to the thought of the subject. Or, because the predicate is itself expressed as a subject, as *being*, as the *essence* that exhausts the subject's nature, thought immediately finds the subject in the predicate too. So instead of entering itself in the predicate and gaining the free position of argumentative reasoning, it remains immersed in the content—or at least is required to remain immersed in it. Likewise, when we say "The *actual* is the *universal*," the actual as subject passes away in its predicate. The universal is not supposed to mean merely a predicate, as though the proposition said that the actual is universal. Instead, the universal is supposed to express the essence of the actual. So thought loses the fixed objective ground it had in the subject, while being thrown back to that ground in the predicate. [1807 LXXIX] In the predicate it returns not into itself but into the subject of the content.

63 This unfamiliar checking accounts for much of the complaint that philosophical writings are unintelligible—provided the individual otherwise has the cultivation needed to understand them. What has been said shows the reason for a quite specific charge often made against them: that much must be read repeatedly before it can be understood. This charge is supposed to be something outrageous and final, allowing no reply if it is justified. The above makes clear how matters stand. Because the philosophical proposition is a proposition, it suggests the ordinary relation of subject and predicate and the habitual way knowing behaves. Its philosophical content destroys this behavior and the opinion supporting it. Opinion learns that something different is meant from what it thought. Correcting its opinion in this way forces knowing to return to the proposition and now grasp it differently.

64 One difficulty that should be avoided is mixing the speculative [1807 LXXX] and argumentative ways of proceeding: sometimes what is said of the subject means its concept, while at other times it means only its predicate or accident.

One way disrupts the other. Only a philosophical exposition that rigorously excluded the ordinary relation between the parts of a proposition would succeed in giving its subject a fully formed shape.

65 In fact, nonspeculative thinking also has a right that is valid but is not respected in the speculative proposition. The form of the proposition must not be sublated only *immediately*, merely through its content. This opposing movement must be expressed. It must not remain only that inward checking: this return of the concept into itself must be *presented*. This movement, which does what proof was otherwise supposed to do, is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. It alone is the *actual* speculative, and only expressing it is speculative presentation. As a proposition, the speculative is only the *inward* checking and the return of essence into itself that *does not exist outwardly*. Philosophical [1807 LXXXI] expositions thus often refer us to this *inward* intuition, sparing themselves the presentation of the proposition's dialectical movement that we demanded. The *proposition* is supposed to express *what* truth is. But truth is essentially subject. As subject it is only the dialectical movement, this course that produces itself, carries itself forward, and returns into itself. In other kinds of knowing, proof supplies this aspect of expressed inwardness. But once dialectic was separated from proof, the concept of philosophical proof was in fact lost.

66 One may point out that dialectical movement likewise has propositions as its parts or elements. So the difficulty just shown seems to recur continually and to be a difficulty in the subject itself. This resembles what happens in ordinary proof: the grounds it uses themselves need grounding, and so on to infinity. But this form of grounding and conditioning belongs to the kind of proof from which dialectical movement differs, and thus to external knowing. As for dialectical movement itself, its element is the [1807 LXXXII] pure concept. It therefore has a content that is subject within itself through and through. So no content occurs that behaves as an underlying subject whose meaning would belong to it as a predicate. The proposition is immediately only an empty form. Apart from the self as sensuously intuited or represented, it is chiefly the name

as name that designates the pure subject, the empty one without a concept. For this reason it may be useful, for example, to avoid the name *God*. This word is not immediately also a concept, but a proper name, the fixed repose of the underlying subject. By contrast, "being," for example, or "the one," "singularity," "the subject," and so on, themselves immediately indicate concepts. Even if speculative truths are said of that subject, their content still lacks the immanent concept because the subject is present only as a resting subject. This circumstance easily gives them the form of mere edification. From this side too, then, philosophical [1807 LXXXIII] exposition itself can be responsible for increasing or reducing the obstacle created by the habit of grasping the speculative predicate according to the proposition's form, rather than as concept and essence. Faithful to insight into the nature of the speculative, the presentation must retain dialectical form and admit nothing except insofar as it is comprehended and is the concept.

67 Just as obstructive to the study of philosophy as argumentative reasoning is an unreasoning conceit about settled truths. Their possessor thinks there is no need to return to them, but takes them as a foundation and believes he can state them and use them to judge and condemn. From this side, it is especially necessary to make philosophizing a serious business again. For every science, art, skill, and craft, people are convinced that possessing it requires a varied effort of learning and practice. Yet with philosophy the prejudice now seems to prevail that although having eyes and fingers, and being given leather and tools, does not enable everyone to make shoes, everyone immediately knows how to philosophize and judge philosophy [1807 LXXXIV] because natural reason gives him the standard for it—as though he did not also have the standard for a shoe in his foot. Possessing philosophy seems to be located precisely in the absence of knowledge and study, and philosophy seems to stop where these begin. It is often taken to be a formal knowledge empty of content. There is a great lack of insight that what is true, even in its content, in any knowledge or

science can deserve that name only when produced by philosophy. The other sciences may try reasoning without philosophy as much as they like, but without it they cannot have life, spirit, or truth within them.

68 In place of genuine philosophy, immediate revelation of the divine and sound common sense regard themselves as a perfect equivalent and an adequate substitute for the long road of cultivation, for the movement, as rich as it is deep, through which spirit reaches knowledge. This common sense has not worked at or cultivated itself in other knowledge or in genuine philosophizing. It is as good a substitute as chicory [1807 LXXXV] is praised for being for coffee. It is not pleasant to see ignorance, and a crudity lacking both form and taste, unable to hold its thinking to an abstract proposition, still less to the connection between several, declare itself now freedom and tolerance of thought, now genius. As genius now runs rampant in philosophy, it once notoriously did in poetry. But instead of poetry, its productions, when they made sense, yielded trivial prose; when they went beyond that, they yielded deranged talk. Likewise today, a natural philosophizing that thinks itself too good for the concept, and takes its lack of concepts for intuitive and poetic thinking, brings to market arbitrary combinations of an imagination merely disorganized by thought. These creations are neither fish nor flesh, neither poetry nor philosophy.

69 Flowing instead in the calmer bed of sound common sense, natural philosophizing serves up a rhetoric of trivial truths. If confronted with their insignificance, it assures us that their meaning and [1807 LXXXVI] fullness are present in its heart and must likewise be present in others' hearts. By invoking innocence of heart, purity of conscience, and the like, it thinks it has said final things against which no objection can be made and beyond which nothing more can be demanded. But the point was that the best should not remain inside, but be brought to daylight from that mineshaft. The trouble of offering final truths of this sort could have been spared long ago, since they have long been found in the catechism, popular proverbs, and so on. It is not hard to catch such truths in their vagueness or distortion, and often to show this consciousness, within itself, the exact opposite of them. Trying to escape the con-

fusion created in it, it will fall into fresh confusions and may burst out that things are admittedly *this way* and *that way*, but that the other things are *sophistries*. This is common sense's catchword against cultivated reason, just as ignorance of philosophy has learned once and for all to call it *daydreaming*. By appealing to [1807 LXXXVII] feeling, its inward oracle, common sense has finished with anyone who disagrees. It must declare that it has nothing further to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same within himself. In other words, it tramples on the root of humanity. For humanity's nature is to press toward agreement with others, and it exists only in an achieved community of consciousnesses. What is inhuman, what is animal, consists in staying at the level of feeling and being able to communicate only through feeling.

70 If someone asked for a royal road to science, none more convenient could be given than relying on sound common sense and, to keep up with the times and philosophy as well, reading reviews of philosophical works—or even their prefaces and opening paragraphs. These give the general principles on which everything depends; the reviews add to historical information a judgment that, precisely because it is judgment, is even beyond what it judges. This ordinary road is traveled in a dressing gown. But in [1807 LXXXVIII] high-priestly robes strides the exalted feeling of the eternal, holy, infinite. Its road is rather already immediate being at the center itself, the genius of deep original ideas and lofty flashes of thought. Yet just as such depth does not yet reveal the source of essence, these rockets are not yet the highest heaven. True thoughts and scientific insight can be won only through the labor of the concept. It alone can produce the universality of knowing that is neither the ordinary vagueness and poverty of common sense, but cultivated and complete knowledge; nor the extraordinary universality of reason's capacity corrupted by laziness and the conceit of genius, but truth that has reached its native form and can become the possession of all self-conscious reason.

71 I place that through which science exists in the self-movement of the concept. The views mentioned, and other outward aspects of our age's ideas about truth's nature and shape, differ from this, indeed [1807 LXXXIX] directly

oppose it. This seems to promise no favorable reception for an attempt to present the system of science in that character. Still, I can reflect that although, for example, the excellence of Plato's philosophy is sometimes located in his scientifically worthless myths, there have also been times—even called times of enthusiasm—when Aristotle's philosophy was valued for its speculative depth. Plato's Parmenides, perhaps the greatest work of art of ancient *dialectic*, was regarded as the true unveiling and *positive expression of divine life*. Even amid much obscurity in what *ecstasy* produced, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing other than *the pure concept*. Further, what is excellent in the philosophy of our own time itself places its value in scientific character. Even if others take a different view, it actually establishes itself only through that character. So I may also hope that this attempt to vindicate science for the concept and present it in this, its distinctive element, will gain entry through the inner truth of the subject. We [1807 XC] must be convinced that truth has the nature of breaking through when its time has come, that it appears only when that time has come, and therefore never appears too early or finds an unready public. We must also be convinced that the individual needs this effect to test by it what is still his solitary concern, and to experience the conviction that so far belongs only to the particular as something universal. Here, however, we must often distinguish the public from those who act as its representatives and spokespeople. In some respects the public behaves differently from them, even oppositely. When a philosophical work does not appeal to it, the public is more kindly inclined to take the blame itself. Those others, certain of their competence, put all the blame on the writer. The effect in the public is quieter than the activity of these dead people burying their dead. General insight is now more cultivated overall, its curiosity more alert, and its judgment more quickly settled, so that the feet of those who will carry you out are already at the door. Yet we must often distinguish from this the slower effect that corrects [1807 XCI] both the attention forced by impressive assurances and the dismissive criticism. Only after some time does it give one group a contemporary world, while another after that time has no posterity left.

72 Besides, this is an age in which spirit's universality has grown so strong and individuality has, as it should, become correspondingly less important. Universality holds to and demands its full scope and cultivated richness. So the share of the individual's activity in spirit's total work can only be small. The individual must therefore forget himself all the more, as the nature of science already requires. He must become and do what he can, but less must also be demanded of him, just as he himself may expect less of himself and claim less for himself.

Introduction

Part One. Science of the Experience of Consciousness.

73 It is natural to think that before philosophy tackles the subject itself—actually knowing what truly is—we must first come to an understanding about knowing. Knowing is regarded as the tool by which we take possession of the absolute, or the medium through which we see it. There seem to be good grounds for concern. There may be different kinds of knowledge, one better suited than another to reaching this final purpose, so we might choose wrongly. Also, knowing is a capacity of a specific kind and scope. Unless its nature and limits are defined more precisely, we might grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This concern may even turn into the conviction that the whole undertaking of acquiring what is in itself for consciousness through knowing is contradictory in its very concept, and that a boundary falls between knowing and the absolute, separating them completely. For if knowing is the tool for taking possession of absolute essence, it is immediately clear that applying a tool to a thing does not leave it [1807 4] as it is for itself, but shapes and changes it. Or suppose knowing is not a tool of our activity but, in a sense, a passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us. Then too we receive truth not as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we use a means that immediately produces the opposite of its purpose. Or rather, the absurdity lies in our using a means at all. It may seem possible to remedy this difficulty by

knowing how the *tool* works. This would let us subtract from the result the part contributed by the tool to our representation of the absolute, and so obtain truth pure. But this correction would in fact only bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a shaped thing what the tool has done to it, the thing—here the absolute—is once again just as much for us as it was before this thus unnecessary effort. If the tool were only to bring the absolute closer to us without changing it, like a bird caught with a limed twig, then unless the absolute were already with us in and for itself, and wanted to be with us, it would surely mock this trick. For knowing would in [1807 5] that case be a trick: its many efforts give it the appearance of doing something quite different from merely producing the immediate and therefore effortless relation. Or suppose examining knowing, conceived as a *medium*, teaches us its law of refraction. Subtracting that refraction from the result is equally useless. For knowing is not the bending of the ray, but the ray itself through which truth touches us. Subtract that, and we would be shown only the pure direction, or the empty place.

74 Meanwhile, fear of falling into error breeds distrust of science, which goes to work and actually knows without such scruples. But why should we not instead distrust this distrust and worry that this fear of error is already the error itself? In fact, it presupposes something—indeed, quite a lot—as true, and bases its scruples and conclusions on what must itself first be tested for truth. It presupposes *ideas* of *knowing* as a *tool* and *medium*, and a *difference between ourselves and this knowing*. Above all, it presupposes that the absolute stands *on one side*, and *knowing on the other*, for itself and separate from the absolute, yet still something real. In other words, it presupposes that [1807 6] knowing, which in being outside the absolute is surely also outside truth, is nevertheless genuine. Through this assumption, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself instead as fear of truth.

75 This consequence follows because the absolute alone is true, or truth alone absolute. It can be rejected by making a distinction: knowing that does not know the absolute, as science intends to do, may nevertheless be true; knowing

in general, though unable to grasp the absolute, may still be capable of other truth. But we gradually see that this talk back and forth amounts to a cloudy distinction between an absolute truth and some other truth. "The absolute," "knowing," and so on are words that presuppose a meaning we must first work to obtain.

76 Instead of troubling ourselves with these useless ideas and phrases about knowing as a tool for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we see truth, and so on—relations to which all these ideas of knowing separated from the absolute, and an absolute separated from knowing, probably amount —we could simply reject them as accidental and arbitrary ideas. We could do the same with the excuses that inability to do science draws from the [1807 7] presupposition of these relations, both to escape the labor of science and to gain the appearance of serious and eager effort; and we could spare ourselves the trouble of answering all this. We might even regard the associated use of words such as "the absolute," "knowing," "the objective," "the subjective," and countless others whose meaning is assumed to be generally familiar, as deception. For claiming both that their meaning is generally familiar and that one possesses their concept seems intended only to spare the main task: giving this concept. With more right, however, we could spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice at all of ideas and phrases meant to ward off science itself. They form only an empty appearance of knowing that immediately vanishes before science as it comes on the scene. But in coming on the scene, science is itself an appearance. Its appearance is not yet science worked out and spread out in its truth. It makes no difference here whether we imagine that *science* is the appearance because it appears *alongside something else*, or call that other, untrue knowing science's appearing. Science must [1807 8] free itself from this seeming, and it can do so only by turning against it. It cannot merely reject knowing that is not genuine as an ordinary view of things and assure us that it is an entirely different kind of knowledge and that the other knowing counts for nothing with it. Nor can it appeal to an intimation of something better within that other knowing itself. With the first *assurance*, science would declare its

being to be its power. But untrue knowing likewise appeals to the fact that *it is* and *assures* us that science counts for nothing with it. *One* dry assurance is worth exactly as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation present in nongenuine knowing as a pointer to science within it. First, science would again be appealing to a being. Second, it would appeal to itself as it is in nongenuine knowing—that is, to an inferior mode of its being, to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason, a presentation of knowing as it appears is to be undertaken here.

77 Since this presentation has only appearing knowing as its object, it seems not to be free science moving in its own distinctive shape. From this standpoint it can instead be taken as the road of natural consciousness pressing toward true [1807 9] knowing; or as the road of the soul, traveling through the series of its shapes as stations set out for it by its nature. Through the complete experience of itself, the soul reaches knowledge of what it is in itself and so purifies itself into spirit.

78 Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the concept of knowing, or knowing that is not real. But since it immediately takes itself instead to be real knowing, this road has a negative meaning for it. What is the realization of the concept counts for it instead as the loss of itself, since on this road it loses its truth. The road can therefore be regarded as the road of *doubt*, or more properly as the road of despair. For what happens on it is not what is usually understood by doubting: shaking this or that supposed truth, then duly letting the doubt disappear and returning to that truth, so that in the end things are taken just as before. Instead, it is conscious insight into the untruth of appearing knowing. What that knowing regards as most real is in truth only the unrealized concept. This skepticism accomplishing itself is therefore not what serious zeal for truth and science imagines has prepared [1807 10] and equipped it for them: the *resolution* not to submit in science to others' thoughts on authority, but to test everything oneself and follow only one's own conviction—or, better still, to produce everything oneself and regard only one's own deed as true. Rather, the series of forms consciousness passes through on this road is the

detailed history of consciousness's own *cultivation* into science. That resolution pictures cultivation, in the simple form of a resolution, as immediately settled and accomplished. Against this untruth, this road is the actual carrying-out. Following one's own conviction is certainly more than submitting to authority. But changing from holding an opinion on authority to holding it from one's own conviction does not necessarily change its content or replace error with truth. Being caught in a system of opinion and prejudice on others' authority or from one's own conviction differs only through the vanity that accompanies the latter way. By contrast, skepticism directed at the entire scope of appearing consciousness first makes spirit capable of testing what is true. It brings about despair concerning so-called natural representations, thoughts, and opinions. [1807 11] Whether we call these one's own or someone else's makes no difference. Consciousness that sets *straight* to testing is still filled and burdened with them, and is therefore in fact incapable of what it wants to undertake.

79 The *completeness* of the forms of nonreal consciousness will emerge from the necessity of their advance and connection itself. To make this understandable, we can note in general beforehand that presenting nongenuine consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* movement. Natural consciousness generally has this one-sided view of it. Knowing that makes this one-sidedness its essence is one of the forms of incomplete consciousness that falls within the course of the road itself and will appear there. It is the skepticism that always sees only *pure nothing* in the result and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is specifically the nothing *of what it results from*. But only when taken as the nothing of what it comes from is nothing in fact the genuine result. It is thereby itself *determinate* and has a *content*. Skepticism that ends with the abstraction of nothing, or emptiness, cannot go further from there. It must wait to see whether, and what, new thing may present itself, in order to throw it into the same empty abyss. [1807 12] By contrast, when the result is grasped

as it truly is, as *determinate* negation, a new form has immediately arisen with it. In the negation, the transition is made through which the advance through the complete series of forms happens of itself.

80 But the *goal* is set for knowing just as necessarily as the series of its advance. It is where knowing no longer needs to go beyond itself, where it finds itself and the concept corresponds to the object, the object to the concept. Advance toward this goal is therefore unstoppable too, and satisfaction can be found at no earlier station. What is confined to a natural life cannot go beyond its immediate existence by itself. It is driven beyond it by another, and this being torn beyond itself is its death. But consciousness is for itself its *concept*. It is therefore immediately a going-beyond the limited and, because this limited belongs to it, a going-beyond itself. Together with the individual thing, a beyond is posited for consciousness, even if only *beside* the limited, as in spatial intuition. Thus consciousness suffers from itself this violence of spoiling its limited satisfaction. Feeling this violence, anxiety about truth may well retreat and strive to preserve [1807 13] what it is threatened with losing. But it can find no rest. If it wants to remain in thoughtless inertia, thought stunts its thoughtlessness and its restlessness disturbs the inertia. Or if it entrenches itself as sentimentality, assuring us that everything is *good of its kind*, this assurance likewise suffers violence from reason, which finds something not good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of truth may hide from itself and others behind the appearance that its burning zeal for truth itself makes it so hard, even impossible, to find any truth except the single truth of vanity: always being cleverer than any thoughts one has from oneself or others. This vanity knows how to nullify every truth, return from it into itself, and feast on its own understanding, which always knows how to dissolve all thoughts and find only the dry I instead of any content. It is a satisfaction that must be left to itself, for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-itself.

81 These are preliminary, general remarks about the way the advance happens and its necessity. It may also be useful to say something about the *method of carrying it out*. If this presentation is conceived as a *relation* of *science* to *appearing*

knowing, and as an *investigation* [1807 14] and *test of the reality of knowing*, it seems impossible without some presupposition laid down as a *standard*. For testing consists in applying an accepted standard. The resulting equality or inequality between what is tested and the standard decides whether it is correct or incorrect. The standard in general—and science too, if science were the standard—is thereby assumed as *essence*, or as *what is in itself*. But here, where science is only coming on the scene, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as essence or as what is in itself. Without something of this kind, no testing seems possible.

82 This contradiction and its removal will emerge more precisely if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowing and truth as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness *distinguishes* something from itself while at the same time *relating* to it. Or, as this is expressed, something is *for consciousness*. The determinate side of this *relating*, or of something's *being for a consciousness*, is *knowing*. But from this being for another we distinguish *being-in-itself*. What is related to knowing is also distinguished from knowing and posited as *being* outside this relation as well. This side of the in-itself is called *truth*. What these [1807 15] determinations really involve need not concern us further here. Since appearing knowing is our object, its determinations too are initially taken up as they immediately present themselves. And they do present themselves in the way we have grasped them.

83 Now, if we investigate the truth of knowing, it seems we investigate what it is *in itself*. But in this investigation knowing is *our* object: it is *for us*. So the *in-itself* that emerged would instead be its being *for us*. What we claimed as its essence would be not its truth but only our knowledge of it. The essence, or standard, would fall within us. What was to be compared with it, and judged through that comparison, would not necessarily have to recognize that standard.

84 But the nature of the object we investigate frees us from this separation, or this appearance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness supplies its standard within itself. The investigation will therefore be a comparison of con-

sciousness with itself, since the distinction just made falls within consciousness. In it, one thing is *for another*: it has within it the determination of the moment of knowing in general. At the same time, this other is for consciousness not only *for it*, but also outside this relation, or *in itself*: [1807 16] the moment of truth. Thus, in what consciousness declares within itself to be the *in-itself*, or the *true*, we have the standard consciousness itself sets up to measure its knowing. If we call *knowing* the *concept*, and essence or *truth* what is, or the *object*, then testing consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call the object's *essence*, or its in-itself, the *concept*, and understand by the *object* the object *as object*, namely as it is *for another*, then testing consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. Clearly, both are the same. What matters is to hold firmly throughout the investigation that these two moments—*concept and object*, being *for another* and being *in itself*—fall within the knowing we are investigating. We therefore do not need to bring standards with us or apply *our* notions and thoughts in the investigation. By leaving these out, we manage to consider the subject as it is *in and for itself*.

85 An addition from us is unnecessary not only because concept and object, the standard and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself. We are also spared the trouble of comparing the two and performing the actual *test*. Since [1807 17] consciousness tests itself, all that remains for us on this side too is simply to watch. For consciousness is, on one side, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what is true for it, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are *for it*, consciousness is itself their comparison. Whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not becomes something *for it*. Admittedly, the object seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it. Consciousness seems unable to get behind this, as it were, to see how the object is *not for it*, but *in itself*, and thus unable to test its knowing against the object. But precisely in consciousness's knowing an object at all, the distinction is already present: something is *for it* the *in-itself*, while another moment is knowing, or the object's being *for consciousness*. Testing rests on this distinction, which is

present. If the two do not correspond in this comparison, consciousness seems to have to change its knowing to make it fit the object. But as its knowing changes, the object itself in fact changes for consciousness too. For the existing knowing was essentially knowledge of the object. Along with knowing, the object also becomes another, because it essentially belonged to this knowing. Consciousness thus comes to see that what [1807 18] was previously the *in-itself* for it is not in itself, or was *in itself only for consciousness*. So when consciousness finds at its object that its knowing does not correspond to it, the object itself does not stand up either. Or, the standard of testing changes when what it was supposed to measure fails the test. The testing is therefore not only a testing of knowing, but also of its standard.

86 This *dialectical* movement that consciousness carries out on itself, both on its knowing and on its object, *insofar as the new true object arises for it from that movement*, is properly what is called *experience*. In the course just mentioned, one moment needs to be brought out more closely. This will shed new light on the scientific side of the following presentation. Consciousness knows *something*. This object is essence, or the *in-itself*. But it is also the *in-itself for consciousness*. This introduces an ambiguity into this truth. We see that consciousness now has two objects: the first *in-itself*, and, second, *the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*. The latter at first seems to be only consciousness's reflection into itself, a representation not of an object but only of its knowledge of that first object. But as shown earlier, in this process the first [1807 19] object changes for consciousness. It ceases to be the in-itself and becomes an object that is the *in-itself only for consciousness*. But then this—*the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*—is the true; that is, it is *essence*, or consciousness's *object*. This new object contains the first object's nullity. It is the experience made of that first object.

87 This account of the course of experience contains a moment that seems not to agree with what is usually understood by experience. The transition from the first object and knowledge of it to the other object, *with which*, people say, experience has been gained, was described as follows: knowledge of the first

object, or the first in-itself's being *for* consciousness, is to become the second object itself. Usually, by contrast, it seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept *with another* object that we happen to find externally. Only the pure *apprehension* of what is in and for itself would then fall within us. In the view given here, however, the new object shows itself as having become through a *reversal of consciousness* itself. This way of considering the matter is our addition. Through it, the series of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific course. It is not present for the consciousness we are considering. But [1807 20] this is in fact the same circumstance mentioned above in discussing this presentation's relation to skepticism: each result yielded by nongenuine knowing must not collapse into an empty nothing. It must necessarily be grasped as the nothing *of that of which it is the result*: a result containing what was true in the preceding knowing. Here this appears as follows. What first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to a knowledge of it, and the *in-itself* becomes the *being-for-consciousness of the in-itself*. This is the new object, with which a new form of consciousness also appears. For this new form, something different is essence from what was essence for the preceding form. This circumstance guides the entire succession of consciousness's forms in their necessity. Only this necessity itself, or the *arising* of the new object that presents itself to consciousness without its knowing how this happens, is what takes place for us, as it were, behind its back. A moment of *being-in-itself*, or *being-for-us*, thereby enters its movement. This moment does not present itself to the consciousness caught up in the experience. But the *content* of what arises for us is *for consciousness*. We comprehend only its formal aspect, or its pure arising. *For consciousness*, [1807 21] what has arisen is only an object; *for us*, it is at the same time movement and becoming.

88 Through this necessity, this road to science is itself already *science*, and in its content is therefore the science of the *experience of consciousness*.

89 By its concept, the experience consciousness undergoes concerning itself can include nothing less than its entire system, or the whole realm of spirit's truth. The moments of this truth present themselves with this distinctive determina-

tion: they are not abstract, pure moments, but are as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them. Through this, the moments of the whole are *forms of consciousness*. As consciousness drives itself forward to its true existence, it will reach a point where it casts off the appearance of being burdened with something alien that is only for it and is an other. Here appearance becomes equal to essence. Its presentation thus coincides at this very point with the genuine science of spirit. Finally, as consciousness itself grasps this essence of its own, it will indicate the nature of absolute knowing itself.

I. Sense-certainty

[1807 22]

I. Sensory certainty; or *the This* and *What We Mean*.

90 The knowing that is our object first, or immediately, can only be knowing that is itself immediate: *knowledge* of the *immediate*, or of *what is*. We must behave just as *immediately*, or *receptively*. So we must change nothing in it as it presents itself, and keep comprehension out of our apprehension.

91 The concrete content of *sensory certainty* makes it appear immediately as the *richest* knowledge, indeed as knowledge of infinite richness. No limit can be found either when we go *outward* in the space and time in which it spreads, or when we take a piece of this fullness and *enter into it* by dividing it. It also appears as the *truest* knowledge, because it has not yet left anything out of the object but has the object before it in its entire completeness. Yet this *certainty* in fact declares itself to be the [1807 23] most abstract and poorest *truth*. Of what it knows it says only this: it *is*. Its truth contains only the *being* of the thing. Consciousness, for its part, is present in this certainty only as pure *I*. Or, *I* am in it only as a pure *this*, and the object likewise only as a pure *this*. I, *this person*, am not *certain* of *this* thing because *I*, as consciousness, have developed myself in doing so and moved thought in many ways. Nor am I certain because *the thing* of which I am certain, with its many different properties, is a rich relation within itself or has varied relations to other things. Neither concerns the truth

of sensory certainty. Neither I nor the thing has in it the meaning of a manifold mediation. I do not mean a manifold representing or thinking, nor does the thing mean manifold properties. Rather, the thing *is*, and it *is* only because it *is*. It *is*: this is essential to sensory knowing, and this pure *being*, or simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. Likewise, certainty as a *relation* is an *immediate*, pure relation. Consciousness is *I*, nothing more, a pure *this*. The *individual* knows a pure this, or *the individual thing*.

92 But if we look, much else plays a part alongside the *pure being* that constitutes the essence of this certainty and that it states as its truth. [1807 24] An actual sensory certainty is not just this pure immediacy but an *example* of it. Among the countless differences that occur here, we everywhere find the main difference: out of pure being there immediately fall the two *thises* already mentioned, a *this* as *I* and a *this as object*. If *we* reflect on this difference, it emerges that neither the one nor the other is only *immediate* in sensory certainty. Each is also *mediated*. I have certainty *through* another, namely the thing; and the thing is likewise in certainty *through* another, namely through I.

93 It is not only we who make this distinction between essence and example, immediacy and mediation. We find it in sensory certainty itself, and must take it up in the form it has there, not as we have just defined it. In sensory certainty, one term is posited as simple and immediately existing, or as essence: *the object*. The other is posited as inessential and mediated, something that is in it not *in itself* but through another: I, *a knowing*, which knows the object only because *the object* is, and which may be or may also not be. But the object *is*: it is truth and essence. It *is*, regardless of whether it is known or not. It remains even if it is not known, whereas [1807 25] knowing does not exist if the object does not exist.

94 We must therefore consider whether the object is in fact, within sensory certainty itself, the essence that sensory certainty claims it to be. Does its concept of being essence correspond to the way it is present in sensory certainty? For

this purpose we need not reflect on it and think about what it might truly be. We need only consider it as sensory certainty has it within itself.

95 So *sensory certainty itself* must be asked: *What is the this?* If we take it in the double shape of its being, as *now* and as *here*, its dialectic will take a form as understandable as the this itself. To the question "*What is the now?*" we answer, for example, "*The now is night*." A simple experiment is enough to test the truth of this sensory certainty. We write this truth down. A truth cannot lose anything by being written down, nor by being preserved. If we look again at the written truth *now, this midday*, we will have to say that it has gone stale.

96 The now that is night is *preserved*. That is, it is treated as what it is claimed to be: something *that is*. But it proves instead to be something that is not. The *now* [1807 26] itself certainly holds on, but as something that is not night. Likewise, against the day that it now is, it holds on as something that is also not day: as something *negative* in general. This self-preserving now is therefore not immediate but mediated. For it is determined as enduring and preserving itself *through* another—namely day and night—not being. At the same time, it is still just as simple as before: *now*. In this simplicity it is indifferent to whatever else plays alongside it. Just as neither night nor day is its being, it is equally both day and night. It is not affected at all by this otherness of its own. We call a simple thing of this kind, which is through negation—neither this nor that, a *not-this*—and is equally indifferent to being this or that, a *universal*. So the universal is in fact the truth of sensory certainty.

97 We also *express* the sensory as a universal. What we say is: "*this*," meaning the *universal this*, or "*it is*," meaning *being in general*. Admittedly, we do not *picture* the universal this or being in general when doing so. But we *express* the universal. In other words, we simply do not speak as we *mean* in this sensory certainty. Yet language, as we see, is the truer thing. In it we ourselves immediately refute what we *mean*. Since the universal is the truth of sensory certainty and [1807 27] language expresses only this truth, it is quite impossible for us ever to say a sensory being that we *mean*.

98 The same will happen with the other form of the this, with *here*. *Here* is, for example, the *tree*. I turn around, and this truth has disappeared and turned into its opposite: *here is not a tree*, but rather *a house*. The *here* itself does not disappear. Instead, *it is* enduring in the disappearance of the house, tree, and so on, and is indifferent to being house or tree. So the *this* again shows itself as *mediated simplicity*, or as *universality*.

99 Thus *pure being* remains the essence of this sensory certainty, as sensory certainty itself proves the universal to be the truth of its object. But it is not immediate being. It is a being to which negation and mediation are essential. So it is not what we *mean by being*, but *being* with the *determination* that it is abstraction, or the pure universal. Only *what we mean*, for which the truth of sensory certainty is not the universal, still remains opposite this empty or indifferent now and here.

100 Compare the relation in which *knowing* and the *object* first appeared with their relation in this [1807 28] result, and we find it reversed. The object, which was supposed to be essential, is now the inessential element of sensory certainty. For the universal it has become is no longer the kind of object that was supposed to be essential for sensory certainty. Instead, sensory certainty is now present in the opposite term, in knowing, which was previously inessential. Its truth is in the object as *my* object, or in *meaning*. The object is because *I* know of it. Sensory certainty has thus indeed been driven out of the object, but it has not yet been sublated. It has only been pushed back into the I. We must see what experience shows us about this reality of sensory certainty.

101 So the force of its truth now lies in the *I*, in the immediacy of my *seeing, hearing*, and so on. The disappearance of the individual now and here that we mean is prevented because *I* hold them fast. *Now is day* because I see it; *here is a tree* for the same reason. But in this relation sensory certainty experiences the same dialectic within itself as in the previous relation. *I, this person*, see the tree and *assert the tree as the here*. But *another I* sees the house and asserts that here is not

a tree but a house. Both truths have the same warrant: the immediacy of seeing, and both people's certainty and assurance [1807 29] about their knowing. But one vanishes in the other.

102 What does not vanish here is *I* as *universal*. Its seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but a simple seeing. Mediated by the negation of this house, and so on, it remains just as simple and indifferent to what else plays alongside it—to the house, the tree. I is only universal, like *now, here, or this* in general. I certainly mean an *individual I*. But just as I cannot say what I mean by now and here, so I cannot say what I mean by I. When I say *this here, now*, or an *individual*, I say *all these, all heres, nows, individuals*. Likewise, when I say *I, this individual I*, I say in general *all* I's. Everyone is what I say: *I, this individual I*. Science is sometimes presented with the demand to deduce, construct, find a priori, or however one puts it, a so-called *this thing* or *this person*. This demand is offered as the touchstone on which science supposedly cannot possibly stand. It is only fair that the demand should *say* which *this* thing or which *this* I it means. But saying this is impossible.

103 So sensory certainty experiences that its essence is neither in the object nor in the I, and that immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other. In both, what I mean is instead [1807 30] inessential. The object and I are universals in which the particular now, here, and I that I mean do not endure, or *exist*. This brings us to posit the *whole* of sensory certainty itself as its *essence*, no longer just one of its moments. That is what happened in the two cases where first the object opposed to the I, then the I, was supposed to be its reality. So only the *whole* of sensory certainty itself holds fast to itself as *immediacy*, thereby excluding from itself all the opposition found previously.

104 This pure immediacy is therefore no longer concerned with the otherness of here as tree passing into a here that is not-tree, with the otherness of now as day passing into a now that is night, or with another I for whom something else is the object. Its truth holds on as a relation remaining equal to itself. It makes no distinction of essential and inessential between the I and the object, so no dif-

ference at all can enter it. I, this person, therefore assert the here as tree and do not turn around, so that the here would become not-tree for me. Nor do I take notice that another I sees the here as not-tree, or that I myself at another time take the here as not-tree and the now as not-day. Instead, I am pure [1807 31] intuition. For myself I stick to this: now is day; or to this: here is tree. Nor do I compare here and now themselves with one another. I hold fast to *one* immediate relation: now is day.

105 Since this certainty will no longer come forward when we draw its attention to a now that is night, or an I for whom it is night, we approach it and have it point out the now it asserts. We must have it *pointed out* to us, because the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of *this* I, who limits himself to a *now* or a *here*. If we took up this truth *afterwards*, or stood *at a distance* from it, it would have no meaning at all, since we would sublate the immediacy essential to it. So we must enter the same point of time or space, let it be pointed out to us—that is, let ourselves be made into that same this I who knows with certainty. Let us see, then, what the immediate that is pointed out to us is like.

106 The *now* is pointed out: *this now. Now*—it has already ceased to be as it is pointed out. The *now* that *is* is different from the one pointed out. We see that the now is precisely this: in being, already no longer to be. The now as it is pointed out to us is something *that has been*, and this is its truth. It does not have the truth of being. So it is nevertheless true that it has been. [1807 32] But what *has been* is in fact *not an essence: it is not*, and being was what concerned us.

107 In this pointing-out, then, we see only a movement with the following course. 1) I point out the now; it is asserted as true. But I point it out as having been, or as sublated, and sublate the first truth. 2) Now I assert as the second truth that it *has been*, that it is sublated. 3) But what has been is not. I sublate its having-been or being-sublated, the second truth. I thereby negate the negation of the now and return to the first assertion: that *now* is. Thus neither the now nor the

pointing-out of the now is something immediate and simple. Each is a movement with different moments in it. *This* is posited, but instead *another* is posited, or the this is sublated. This *otherness*, or sublation of the first, is itself *sublated again*, and so there is a return to the first. But this first, reflected into itself, is not exactly what it was at first, namely something *immediate*. It is precisely something *reflected into itself*, or *simple*: an otherness that remains what it is, a now that is absolutely many nows. This is the genuine now: the now as a simple day that has many nows within it, hours. Such a now, an hour, is likewise many minutes; and these nows [1807 33] are likewise many nows, and so on. *Pointing-out* is thus itself the movement that expresses what the now truly is: a result, or a multiplicity of nows gathered together. Pointing-out is the experience that now is *universal*.

108 The *here pointed out* that I hold fast is likewise a *this* here that is in fact *not this* here, but a front and back, an above and below, a right and left. The above is itself likewise this manifold otherness in above, below, and so on. The here that was to be pointed out disappears in other heres, but these disappear too. What is pointed out, held fast, and enduring is a *negative this*. It *is* only insofar as the *heres* are taken as they are supposed to be, but sublate themselves in being so taken. It is a simple combination of many heres. The here that is meant would be the point. But the point *is* not. Instead, when it is pointed out as being, pointing-out shows itself to be not immediate knowing but a movement from the intended here, through many heres, into the universal here. Just as day is a simple multiplicity of nows, this is a simple multiplicity of heres.

109 It is clear that the dialectic of sensory certainty is nothing other than the simple history of its movement, or its experience, and that sensory certainty itself is nothing other than this history. Natural consciousness therefore always advances [1807 34] on its own to this result, to what is true in sensory certainty, and experiences it. But it also always forgets it again and begins the movement afresh. So it is surprising when, against this experience, people put forward as universal experience, as a philosophical claim, and even as a result of skepticism, the assertion that the reality or being of external things as *these*, or sensory

things, has absolute truth for consciousness. Such a claim does not at the same time know what it is saying. It does not know that it says the opposite of what it wants to say. The truth for consciousness of the sensory *this* is supposed to be universal experience. Yet the opposite is universal experience. Every consciousness itself again sublates a truth such as "*Here is a tree*" or "*Now is midday*" and states the opposite: here is *not* a tree *but* a house. What, in this assertion that sublates the first, is again just such an assertion of a sensory this, consciousness likewise goes on to sublate. In all sensory certainty, what is truly experienced is only what we have seen: the *this* as a *universal*, the opposite of what that claim assures us is universal experience. In this appeal to universal experience, we may be permitted to anticipate the practical [1807 35] standpoint. From this standpoint, those who assert that truth and certainty of the reality of sensory objects can be told to go back to the lowest school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and first learn the secret of eating bread and drinking wine. For anyone initiated into these mysteries reaches not merely doubt about the being of sensory things, but despair about it. Partly he himself carries out their nullity in them, partly he sees it carried out. Animals are not excluded from this wisdom either. Instead, they prove to be most deeply initiated into it. They do not stop before sensory things as things existing in themselves. Despairing of this reality and completely certain of their nullity, they reach out without further ado and eat them up. Like them, all nature celebrates these open mysteries, which teach the truth of sensory things.

110 But those who put forward that claim also immediately say, as the preceding remarks show, the opposite of what they mean. This phenomenon may be especially capable of prompting reflection on the nature of sensory certainty. They speak of the existence of *external* objects, which may be defined still more precisely as *actual*, absolutely *individual, wholly personal*, [1807 36] *singular* things, each without another absolutely like it. This existence, they say, has absolute certainty and truth. They mean *this* piece of paper on which I write *this*, or rather have written it. But they do not say what they mean. If they actually wanted to *say* this piece of paper that they mean—and wanted to *say* it—

that is impossible. For the sensory this that is meant is *unreachable* by language, which belongs to consciousness, to what is universal in itself. In the course of an actual attempt to say it, the paper would therefore rot away. Those who had begun describing it could not finish, but would have to leave it to others, who would finally themselves admit that they were speaking of a thing that *is* not. So they do indeed mean *this* piece of paper, which here is quite different from the one above. But they say actual *things*, *external* or *sensory objects*, absolutely *individual* beings, and so on. That is, they say only the *universal* about them. Hence what is called the inexpressible is nothing other than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant. If nothing more is said of something than that it is *an actual thing*, an *external object*, it is expressed only as the most universal thing of all. This expresses its *sameness* with everything rather than its difference. If I say *an individual thing*, I likewise say it as wholly *universal*, for all [1807 37] are an individual thing. And *this* thing is equally anything one likes. More precisely designated as *this piece of paper*, *all* and *every* paper is *a this* piece of paper, and I have only ever said the universal. Speech has the divine nature of immediately reversing what is meant, making it into something else, and so not letting it *get a word in* at all. If I try to help speech by *pointing out* this piece of paper, I experience what the truth of sensory certainty actually is. I point it out as a *here* that is a here of other heres, or is in itself a *simple togetherness* of many *heres*: a universal. In this way I apprehend it as it truly is, and instead of knowing something immediate, *I perceive*.

II. Perception



[1807 38]

II. Perception; or the *Thing* and *Deception*.

111 Immediate certainty does not take hold of truth, for its truth is the universal, while it wants to take the *this*. Perception, by contrast, takes what is for it as a universal. Universality is its principle in general, and its moments, which immediately distinguish themselves within it, are also universal: I am a universal, and the object is a universal. This principle has *arisen* for us. Our taking up perception is therefore no longer an appearing apprehension, as with sensory certainty, but a necessary one. In the arising of the principle, the two moments that merely *fall out* in its appearance have also come to be. One is the movement of pointing-out; the other is the same movement, but as something simple. The first is *perceiving*, the second the *object*. In essence, the object is the same as the movement. The movement unfolds and distinguishes the moments; the object is their being gathered together. For us, or [1807 39] in itself, the universal as principle is the *essence* of perception. Against this abstraction, the two distinguished terms, the perceiving and the perceived, are *inessential*. But in fact, because both are themselves the universal or essence, both are essential. Yet because they relate to one another as opposites, only one can be essential in the relation. The difference between essential and inessential must be distributed

between them. The one determined as simple, the object, is essence, indifferent to whether it is perceived or not. Perceiving, as movement, is the unstable term that may be or may not be, the inessential.

112 We must now define this object more closely and briefly develop its determination from the result we have reached. A fuller development does not belong here. Its principle, the universal, is something *mediated* in its simplicity. The object must therefore express this within itself as its nature. It thereby shows itself as *the thing with many properties*. The richness of sensory knowing belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, where it only played alongside. For only perception has *negation*, difference or multiplicity, within its essence.

113 Thus the this is posited as *not-this*, or as *sublated*. It is thereby not nothing, but [1807 40] a determinate nothing, or *a nothing with a content*, namely *the this*. The sensory is thus still present, but not as it was supposed to be in immediate certainty, as the individual thing meant. It is present as universal, or as what will be determined as a *property*. *Sublation* displays its true double meaning, which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a *negating* and a *preserving*. Nothing, as *the nothing of the this*, preserves immediacy and is itself sensory, but a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a universal through having mediation, or the negative, within it. In *expressing* this in its immediacy, it is a *differentiated, determinate* property. At the same time, *many* such properties are thereby posited, each the negative of another. Expressed in the *simplicity* of the universal, these *determinations*—which become properties properly speaking only through a further determination—*relate to themselves*. They are *indifferent* to one another, each for itself, free of the other. But simple, self-identical universality itself is in turn distinct from these determinations of its own and free. It is pure self-relation, or the *medium* in which all these determinations are. In it, as a *simple* unity, they thus *interpenetrate* without *touching* one another. For precisely [1807 41] by sharing in this universality, they are indifferent for themselves. This abstract universal medium, which can be called *thinghood* in general or *pure essence*, is nothing other than the *here* and *now* as they have proved

to be: a *simple togetherness* of many. But the many are themselves, *in their determinacy*, *simple universals*. This salt is a simple here and at the same time manifold. It is white, and *also* sharp-tasting, *also* cubic in shape, *also* of a specific weight, and so on. All these many properties are in one simple *here*, in which they therefore interpenetrate. None has a different here from another: each is everywhere in the same here in which the other is. At the same time, though not separated by different heres, they do not affect one another in this interpenetration. The white does not affect or change the cubic; neither affects the sharp taste, and so on. Since each is itself simple *self-relation*, it leaves the others alone and relates to them only through the indifferent *also*. This *also* is therefore the pure universal itself, or the medium, the *thinghood* that gathers them together in this way.

114 In the relation that has emerged, only the character of positive universality has so far been observed and developed. But another side presents itself that must also be included. If the many determinate properties were wholly indifferent [1807 42] and related only to themselves, they would not be *determinate*. For they are determinate only insofar as they *differ* and *relate to others* as opposites. But in this opposition they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is as essential to them as negation. Their differentiation, insofar as it is not indifferent but excludes and negates another, therefore falls outside this simple medium. The medium is consequently not merely an *also*, an indifferent unity, but also *one, an excluding unity*. The one is the *moment of negation* as it relates to itself in a simple way and excludes another. Through it, *thinghood* is determined as a *thing*. In the property, negation is *determinacy* immediately one with the immediacy of being, which through this unity with negation is universality. But as *one*, negation is freed from this unity with its opposite and is in and for itself.

115 In these moments together, the thing as the truth of perception is complete, as far as it needs to be developed here. It is *α*) indifferent, passive universality, the *also* of the many properties, or rather *matters*; *β*) negation, likewise as simple, or the *one*, the exclusion of opposite properties; and *γ*) the many *properties* them-

selves, the [1807 43] relation of the first two moments: negation as it relates to the indifferent element and spreads within it as a multitude of differences, the point of individuality radiating into multiplicity in the medium of subsistence. Insofar as these differences belong to the indifferent medium, they are themselves universal, relate only to themselves, and do not affect one another. But insofar as they belong to the negative unity, they are at the same time excluding. Yet they necessarily have this opposed relation to properties removed from *their also*. Sensory universality, or the *immediate* unity of being and the negative, becomes a *property* only when the one and pure universality have been developed out of it and distinguished from one another, and it joins them together. Only this relation of the property to the pure essential moments completes the *thing*.

116 This, then, is how the thing of perception is constituted. Consciousness is determined as perceiving insofar as this thing is its object. Consciousness has *only to take* the object and behave as pure apprehension. What results for it is truth. If it itself did anything in taking the object, such addition or omission would change the truth. The object is the true and universal, equal to itself; consciousness takes itself to be the [1807 44] changeable and inessential. So consciousness may apprehend the object incorrectly and be deceived. Perceiving consciousness is aware of the possibility of deception. For in universality, which is the principle, *otherness* itself is immediately present for it, but as *null*, sublated. Its criterion of truth is therefore *self-sameness*, and its behavior is to apprehend the object as equal to itself. Since difference is also present for consciousness, consciousness relates the different moments of its apprehension to one another. But if an inequality comes out in this comparison, this is not an untruth of the object, since the object is equal to itself. It is an untruth of perceiving.

117 Let us now see what experience consciousness undergoes in its actual perceiving. *For us*, this experience is already contained in the development just given of the object and consciousness's relation to it. It will only be the development of the contradictions present there. The object I apprehend presents itself as

purely one. I also become aware of a property in it that is *universal* and thus goes beyond individuality. The objective essence's first being as a one was therefore not its true being. Since *the object* is truth, the untruth falls within me, and the apprehension was incorrect. Because of the property's *universality*, [1807 45] I must instead take the objective essence as a *community* in general. I now further perceive the property as *determinate*, *opposed* to and excluding another. So I did not in fact apprehend the objective essence correctly when I defined it as a *community* with others, or as continuity. Because of the property's *determinacy*, I must instead divide the continuity and posit the essence as an excluding one. In the separated one, I find many such properties that do not affect one another but are mutually indifferent. So I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as *excluding*. Rather, just as it was previously only continuity in general, it is now a universal *common medium* in which many properties, as sensory *universals*, are each for themselves and, as *determinate*, exclude the others. But the simple and true that I perceive is thereby also not a universal medium. It is the *individual property* for itself. Yet in this way the property is neither a property nor a determinate being. For it is now neither in a one nor related to others. But it is a property only in the one, and determinate only in relation to others. As this pure self-relation, it remains only *sensory being* in general, since it no longer has the character of negativity within it. Consciousness [1807 46] for which there is now a sensory being is only a *meaning*: it has stepped entirely out of perceiving and returned into itself. But sensory being and meaning themselves pass into perception. I am thrown back to the beginning and swept again into the same circuit, which sublates itself at every moment and as a whole.

118 Thus consciousness necessarily goes through this circuit again, but not in the same way as the first time. For it has experienced that the result and truth of perceiving is perceiving's dissolution, or reflection into itself out of truth. Consciousness has thereby come to see how its perceiving is essentially constituted: not as a simple, pure apprehension, but as something *reflected out of truth into itself in its apprehension*. This return of consciousness into itself

immediately *mixes itself into* pure apprehension, since it has proved essential to perceiving, and changes truth. At the same time, consciousness recognizes this side as its own and takes responsibility for it. In this way, it will keep the true object pure. So now, as happened with sensory certainty, perception has the side where consciousness is pushed back into itself. But initially this is not in [1807 47] the same sense as before—as though the *truth* of perception fell within consciousness. Instead, consciousness recognizes that the *untruth* occurring in perception falls within it. But through this recognition it is also capable of sublating that untruth. It distinguishes its apprehension of truth from the untruth of its perceiving and corrects the latter. Insofar as consciousness itself carries out this correction, truth does indeed fall *within it as the truth of perceiving*. The behavior of consciousness that we must now consider is therefore such that it no longer merely perceives. It is also conscious of its reflection into itself and separates this reflection from simple apprehension itself.

119 Thus I first become aware of the thing as *one* and must hold it fast in this true determination. If anything contradicting it occurs in the movement of perceiving, I must recognize this as my reflection. Now, different properties also occur in perception and seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is one, and we are conscious that this diversity, through which it would cease to be one, falls within us. So this thing is in fact white only when brought before *our* eye; *also* sharp-tasting when brought to *our* tongue; *also* cubic to *our* touch; and so on. We take the complete diversity of these sides not from [1807 48] the thing but from ourselves. They fall apart in this way for us in our eye, which is wholly different from our tongue, and so on. We are thus the *universal medium* in which such moments separate and are for themselves. By considering the determination of being a universal medium as our reflection, we therefore preserve the thing's self-sameness and its truth of being one.

120 Yet these *different sides* that consciousness takes upon itself are *determinate*, whether considered each for itself or as located in the universal medium. White is only in opposition to black, and so on, and the thing is one precisely by opposing itself to others. But it does not exclude others from itself insofar as it

is one. For being one is universal self-relation, and through being one it is instead equal to all others. It excludes them through *determinacy*. So the things themselves are *determinate in and for themselves*: they have properties through which they differ from others. Since the *property* is the thing's *own* property, a determinacy within it, the thing has *several* properties. For, first, the thing is truth: it is *in itself*. What is in it is in it as its own essence, not for the sake of others. So, second, the determinate properties are not only for the sake of other [1807 49] things and for other things, but in the thing itself. Yet they are determinate properties *in it* only insofar as they are several properties distinguished from one another. And third, insofar as they are thus in thinghood, they are in and for themselves and indifferent to one another. So in truth it is the thing itself that is white and *also* cubic, *also* sharp-tasting, and so on. Or the thing is the *also*, the *universal medium* in which the many properties subsist outside one another without touching or sublating one another. Taken in this way, it is taken as truth.

121 Now, in this perceiving, consciousness is at the same time aware that it *also* reflects into itself, and that a moment opposed to the *also* occurs in perceiving. But this moment is the thing's *unity* with itself, which excludes difference from itself. This unity, then, is what consciousness must take upon itself. For the thing itself is the *subsistence of the many different and independent properties*. So it is said of the thing: *it is* white, *also* cubic, and also sharp-tasting, and so on. But *insofar as* it is white it is not cubic, and *insofar as* it is cubic and also white it is not sharp-tasting, and so on. *Putting these properties into one* belongs only to consciousness, which must therefore not let them fall into one in the thing. To this end it introduces the *insofar as*, through which it keeps them [1807 50] apart and preserves the thing as the also. Strictly speaking, consciousness takes *being-one* upon itself only by representing what was called a property as *free matter*. The thing is thus raised to a genuine *also*, becoming a collection of matters and, instead of being one, a merely enclosing surface.

122 Look back at what consciousness took upon itself before and takes upon itself now, and at what it attributed to the thing before and attributes to it now. We find that alternately it makes both itself and the thing into both: a pure *one* without multiplicity, and an *also* dissolved into independent matters. Through this comparison, consciousness therefore finds that not only does *its* taking of truth contain the *difference between apprehension and returning into itself*, but truth itself, the thing, shows itself in this double way. The experience is thus present that the thing *presents itself for apprehending consciousness* in a determinate way, but is *at the same time reflected out of* the way it offers itself and *into itself*, or has an opposite truth within itself.

123 So consciousness has itself also emerged from this second way of behaving in perception: taking the thing as the true, self-identical term, [1807 51] and itself as the unequal term that returns into itself out of equality. Its object is now this whole movement, which was previously divided between the object and consciousness. The thing is *one*, reflected into itself; it is *for itself*. But it is also *for another*, and specifically it is *different* for itself *from what it is* for another. The thing therefore is for itself and *also* for another: a *double*, different being. But it is *also one*, and being-one contradicts this diversity of its own. Consciousness would therefore again have to take this putting-into-one upon itself and keep it away from the thing. It would have to say that the thing, *insofar as* it is for itself, is not for another. But being-one belongs to the thing itself too, as consciousness has experienced. The thing is essentially reflected into itself. Thus the *also*, or indifferent difference, falls within the thing just as much as *being-one* does. But since the two differ, they fall not in the same thing but in *different* things. The contradiction in objective essence in general is distributed between two objects. The thing is therefore indeed equal to itself in and for itself, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the thing's unity is preserved, while otherness is at the same time outside it, as well as outside consciousness.
[1807 52]

124 Although the contradiction of objective essence is thus distributed among different things, difference will nevertheless come into the separate individual thing itself. The *different things* are therefore posited *for themselves*, and their conflict falls reciprocally between them, so that each differs not from itself but only from the other. But each is thereby *itself determined as something differentiated*, and has the essential difference from the others *within it*. Yet this is not supposed to be an opposition within the thing itself. Rather, for itself it is *simple determinacy*, forming its *essential* character that distinguishes it from others. In fact, since diversity is within it, diversity is necessarily present within it as an *actual* difference of manifold constitution. But because determinacy forms the thing's *essence*, through which it differs from others and is for itself, this other manifold constitution is *inessential*. Thus the thing does indeed have within its unity the *double insofar as*, but with *unequal value*. As a result, this opposition does not become an actual opposition of the thing itself. Instead, insofar as the thing enters into opposition through its *absolute difference*, it has this opposition against another thing outside it. The other multiplicity is also necessarily in the thing, so it cannot be [1807 53] absent from it, but it is *inessential* to the thing.

125 The determinacy that forms the thing's essential character and distinguishes it from all others is now defined so that the thing stands through it in opposition to others, but is supposed to preserve itself for itself in that opposition. Yet it is a thing, or a one existing for itself, only insofar as it does not stand in this relation to others. For in this relation, connection with another is instead posited, and connection with another is the ending of being-for-itself. Precisely through its *absolute character* and its opposition, it *relates to others* and is essentially only this relation. But the relation negates its independence, and the thing instead perishes through its essential property.

126 Consciousness necessarily experiences that the thing perishes precisely through the determinacy that forms its essence and its being-for-itself. In terms of the simple concept, we can briefly consider this necessity as follows. The thing is

posited as *being-for-itself*, or as absolute negation of all otherness: therefore as absolute negation relating only to itself. But self-relating negation is sublation of *itself*, or having its essence in another.

127 In fact, the determination of the object as it has emerged contains nothing else. The object [1807 54] is supposed to have an essential property that constitutes its simple being-for-itself. But along with this simplicity, it is also supposed to have diversity within itself, a diversity that is indeed *necessary* but supposedly does not constitute its *essential* determinacy. Yet this is a distinction that now lies only in words. The *inessential* that is nevertheless also supposed to be *necessary* sublates itself, or is what was just called the negation of itself.

128 The last *insofar as*, which separated being-for-itself from being-for-another, thereby falls away. Instead, the object is *in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: for itself insofar as it is for another*, and *for another insofar as it is for itself*. It is *for itself*, reflected into itself, one. But this being *for itself*, reflected into itself, one, is in a unity with its opposite, *being-for-another*, and is therefore posited only as sublated. Or, this *being-for-itself* is just as *inessential* as what alone was supposed to be inessential, namely its relation to another.

129 Thus the object is sublated in its pure determinations, or in the determinations that were supposed to constitute its essence, just as it became something sublated in its sensory being. From sensory being it becomes a universal. But because this universal *comes from the sensory*, it is essentially [1807 55] *conditioned* by it. It is therefore not truly self-identical universality at all, but universality *affected by an opposition*. It consequently divides into the extremes of individuality and universality, the one of properties and the also of free matters. These pure determinations seem to express *essence* itself, but they are only a *being-for-itself* burdened with *being-for-another*. Yet because both are essentially *in one unity*, unconditioned absolute universality is now present, and only here does consciousness truly enter the realm of understanding.

130 Sensory individuality does indeed disappear in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and become universality, but only *sensory universality*. Meaning has disappeared, and perceiving takes the object as *it is in itself*, or as universal in general. Individuality therefore emerges in the object as true individuality, as the *being-in-itself* of the *one*, or as *being-reflected into itself*. But this is still a *conditioned* being-for-itself. *Beside it* there occurs another being-for-itself: universality, opposed to individuality and conditioned by it. But these two contradictory extremes are not merely *beside one another*. They are in one unity. Or, what amounts to the same thing, what they share, *being-for-itself*, is burdened with opposition in general. That is, it is at the same time not a *being-for-itself*. The [1807 56] sophistry of perceiving tries to save these moments from their contradiction. It tries to hold them fast by distinguishing *respects*, by the *also* and *insofar as*, and finally to grasp truth by distinguishing the *inessential* from an *essence* opposed to it. But instead of keeping deception out of apprehension, these expedients themselves prove null. The truth that this logic of perceiving is supposed to win shows itself to be the opposite in one and the same respect. It thereby has as its essence universality without distinctions or determinations.

131 These empty abstractions—*individuality* and the *universality* opposed to it, *essence* linked to something inessential, and an *inessential* that is nevertheless also necessary—are the powers whose plaything perceiving understanding, often called sound common sense, is. Taking itself to be solid, real consciousness, it is in perception only the play of *these abstractions*. In general, it is always poorest where it thinks itself richest. Driven about by these null essences and thrown from one into the arms of another, it uses its sophistry to try to hold fast and assert first one, then its exact opposite. In resisting truth [1807 57] in this way, it thinks philosophy deals only with *things of thought*. Philosophy does in fact deal with them and recognizes them as pure essences, as absolute elements and powers. But at the same time it recognizes them *in their determinacy* and is therefore master over them. Perceiving understanding, by contrast, takes them as truth and is sent by them from one error to another. It does not itself

become conscious that such simple essences govern it. Instead, it always thinks it is dealing with thoroughly solid material and content, just as sensory certainty does not know that the empty abstraction of pure being is its essence. Yet in fact it is along these abstractions that it runs back and forth through all material and content. They hold that material together and govern it. They alone are what the sensory is *as essence* for consciousness, what determines consciousness's relations to it, and what the movement of perceiving and its truth runs its course through. This course, a constantly alternating determination of truth and sublation of that determination, is really the daily and constant life and activity of consciousness that perceives and thinks it moves in truth. In it, consciousness advances unstoppably to the result of equally sublating all these essential essences or determinations. [1807 58] But at each individual moment, it is conscious only of *this one determinacy* as truth, and then again of its opposite. It does sense their lack of essence. To save them from the danger threatening them, it turns to the sophistry of now asserting as true what it itself just asserted as untrue. The nature of these untrue essences really wants to drive this understanding to *bring together the thoughts* of those nonentities: that *universality* and *individuality*, the *also* and *one*, that *essentiality necessarily* linked with *inessentiality*, and an *inessential* that is nevertheless necessary—and thereby to sublate them. Understanding resists this with the supports of the *insofar as* and the different *respects*, or by taking one thought upon itself so as to keep the other separate and preserve it as truth. But the nature of these abstractions brings them together in and for themselves. Sound common sense is their prey, driven about in their whirling circle. It tries to give them truth, sometimes by taking their untruth upon itself, sometimes by calling deception an appearance of unreliable things. It separates the essential from something necessary to things that is nevertheless supposed to be inessential, and holds the former fast as their truth against the latter. In doing so, it does not preserve their truth, but gives itself untruth.

III. Force and understanding

[1807 59]

III. Force and Understanding, Appearance and the Supersensible World.

132 In the dialectic of sensory certainty, consciousness has lost its hearing and seeing, and so on. As perception, it has reached thoughts, but only in the unconditionally universal does it bring them together. If this unconditioned were taken as a resting, simple essence, it would itself again be only the *extreme* of *being-for-itself* stepping to one side. For nonessence would then stand opposite it. Related to nonessence, it would itself be inessential, and consciousness would not have escaped perception's deception. But the unconditioned has emerged as something that has returned into itself from just such a conditioned being-for-itself. This unconditioned universal, now the true object of consciousness, is still consciousness's *object*. Consciousness has not yet grasped its *concept* as *concept*. The two must be carefully distinguished. For consciousness, the object has returned [1807 60] into itself from its relation to another and has thereby become concept *in itself*. But consciousness is not yet the concept for its own self, and therefore does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us*, this object has come to be through consciousness's movement in such a way that consciousness is woven into the object's becoming, and the reflection on both sides is the same, or only one. But in this movement consciousness had only objective essence as its content, not consciousness as such. So for consciousness

the result must be posited with an objective meaning. Consciousness still withdraws from what has come to be, so that this is essence for it as something objective.

133 Understanding has thereby sublated both its own untruth and the object's untruth. What has come to be for it through this is the concept of truth, as truth existing *in itself*, not yet concept, or lacking consciousness's *being-for-itself*. Understanding lets this truth go its way without knowing itself within it. This truth carries on its essential activity for itself. Consciousness takes no part in its free realization, but merely watches and purely apprehends it. So for the time being *we* must still take its place and be the concept that develops what the result contains. Only at this developed object, which presents itself to [1807 61] consciousness as something that is, does consciousness become comprehending consciousness for itself.

134 The result was the unconditionally universal, initially in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided concepts and abstracted from them, that is, gave them up. But in itself the result has the positive meaning that in it the unity of *being-for-itself* and *being-for-another*, or the absolute opposition, is immediately posited as the same essence. At first this seems to concern only the form of the moments in relation to one another. But being-for-itself and being-for-another are equally the *content* itself. For the opposition in its truth can have no nature other than what has emerged in the result: the content held true in perception in fact belongs only to form and dissolves into its unity. This content is also universal. There can be no other content whose particular constitution exempts it from returning into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would be some determinate way of being for itself and relating to another. But *being for itself* and *relating to another in general* constitute its *nature* and *essence*, whose truth is to be unconditionally universal. The result is universal without qualification.
[1807 62]

135 But because this unconditionally universal is an object for consciousness, the difference between form and content emerges in it. In the shape of content, the moments look as they first appeared: on one side, a universal medium of many subsisting matters; on the other, a one reflected into itself, in which their independence is extinguished. The former is the dissolution of the thing's independence, or passivity, which is a being-for-another; the latter is being-for-itself. We must see how these moments present themselves in the unconditioned universality that is their essence. It is immediately clear that, because they are only within this universality, they no longer lie apart at all. Instead, they are essentially sides that sublate themselves within themselves. Only their passage into one another is posited.

136 So one moment appears as essence stepped to one side, as universal medium, or as the subsistence of independent matters. But the *independence* of these matters is nothing other than this medium. Or, this *universal* is altogether the *multiplicity* of such different universals. To say that the universal is within itself in undivided unity with this multiplicity means that each of these matters is where the other is. They interpenetrate, but without touching, because conversely the many differentiated matters are equally independent. Their pure [1807 63] porosity, or their being-sublated, is thereby also posited. This being-sublated, in turn, or the reduction of this diversity to *pure being-for-itself*, is nothing other than the medium itself, and this is the *independence* of the differences. Or, the differences posited as independent pass immediately into their unity, their unity immediately into unfolding, and this again back into reduction. But this movement is what is called *force*. One of its moments, force as the spread of independent matters in their being, is its *expression*. Force as their having-disappeared is force *driven back into itself* out of its expression, or *force proper*. But first, force driven back into itself *must* express itself. Second, in its expression it is just as much force *being within itself* as, in this being-within-itself, it is expression. If we thus hold both moments in their immediate unity, understanding, to which the concept of force belongs, is properly *the concept* that carries the differentiated moments as differentiated. For *within force itself*

they are supposed not to be differentiated. So the difference is only in thought. Or, what has been posited above is only the concept of force, not its reality. But in fact force is the unconditionally universal, which is within itself just what it is *for another*, or which has difference within itself—for difference is nothing other than [1807 64] *being-for-another*. So for force to be in its truth, it must be released entirely from thought and posited as the substance of these differences. That means, *first*, force as this whole force must remain essentially *in and for itself*, and *then* its *differences* must be posited as *substantial*, or as moments subsisting for themselves. Thus force as such, or as driven back into itself, is for itself as an *excluding* one, for which the unfolding of matters is *another subsisting essence*. Two different, independent sides are thus posited. But force is also the whole, or remains what it is according to its concept. These *differences*, then, remain pure forms, superficial *disappearing moments*. The *differences* between force proper, *driven back into itself*, and the *unfolding* of independent matters would not exist at all unless they had a *subsistence*. Or force would not be unless it *existed* in this opposed way. But saying that it exists in this opposed way means nothing other than that both moments are themselves also *independent*. We must therefore consider this movement in which the two moments constantly make themselves independent and sublate themselves again. In general, it is clear that this movement is nothing other than the movement of perceiving. In that movement, both sides, the perceiving and the perceived, [1807 65] are at one time one and undifferentiated as the *apprehension* of truth, yet each side is also *reflected* into itself, or for itself. Here these two sides are moments of force. They are in a unity, but this unity, which appears as the middle against the extremes existing for themselves, constantly breaks apart into these very extremes, which exist only through this. The movement that previously appeared as the self-destruction of contradictory concepts thus has *objective* form here. It is the movement of force, from which the unconditionally universal emerges as its result, as something *nonobjective*, or as the *inner* being of things.

137 Force, as defined, when represented as *such* or as *reflected into itself*, is one side of its concept, but as an extreme made substantial, specifically the extreme posited under the determination of the one. The *subsistence* of unfolded matters is thereby excluded from force and is something *other* than it. Since it is necessary that *force itself* be this *subsistence*, or *express itself*, its expression appears in this way: *that other approaches* force and solicits it. But in fact, since force *necessarily* expresses itself, it has within itself what was posited as another essence. We must take back the positing of force as *a one* and its essence, expressing itself, as something other that approaches it from outside. Instead, force is itself this universal [1807 66] medium of the subsistence of moments as matters. Or, *it has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be the other, soliciting term is instead force itself. Thus it now exists as the medium of unfolded matters. But just as essentially, it has the form of the subsisting matters' being-sublated, or is essentially *one*. *Now*, therefore, when *force* is posited as the medium of matters, this *being-one* is *something other than force*, and force has this essence of its own outside itself. But since force must necessarily be what it is *not yet* posited as, *this other approaches* and solicits it to reflect into itself, or sublates its expression. In fact, however, *force itself* is this being-reflected into itself, or this being-sublated of expression. Being-one disappears *as* it appeared, namely as *another*. *Force itself is it*: force is driven back into itself.

138 What appears as another and solicits force both to expression and to return into itself is, as immediately follows, *itself force*. For the other shows itself equally as universal medium and as one, and each of these forms appears only as a disappearing moment. So by having another for it and being for another, force has not yet stepped outside its concept at all. But at the same time two forces are present. The concept of both is indeed the same, but it has passed out of its unity into duality. Instead of [1807 67] opposition remaining essentially only a moment throughout, it seems, through splitting into wholly *independent forces*, to have escaped the rule of unity. We must look more closely at this independence. First, the second force confronts the force determined as solicited as the soliciting force, specifically, in its content, as universal medium.

But since the second force is essentially the alternation of these two moments and is itself force, it is in fact likewise *a universal medium only when solicited to be so*. It is also negative unity, or what solicits force to return into itself, only *through being solicited*. Thus this difference between the two—that one was supposed to be *soliciting*, the other *solicited*—also changes into the same interchange of determinations.

139 The play of the two forces therefore consists in both being determined in these opposed ways, in their being for one another in this determination, and in the absolute, immediate interchange of determinations. Only through this transition do the determinations exist in which the forces seem to appear *independently*. For example, the soliciting force is posited as universal medium, and the solicited force, by contrast, as driven back into itself. But the former is itself a universal medium only because the other is force driven back into itself. [1807 68] Or rather, the latter is what solicits the former and first makes it a medium. The former has its determinacy only through the other, and is soliciting only insofar as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting. It just as immediately loses this determinacy given to it, for this passes to the other, or rather has already passed to it. The alien term soliciting force appears as universal medium, but only because force has solicited it to do so. But this means that *force posits* it in this way and *is essentially universal medium itself*. Force posits the soliciting term in this way because this other determination is essential to *force*—that is, because *force is instead this determination itself*.

140 To complete our insight into the concept of this movement, we can also note that the differences themselves appear in a double distinction. *First*, they appear as differences *of content*: one extreme is force reflected into itself, the other the medium of matters. *Second*, they appear as differences *of form*: one is soliciting, the other solicited, the former active, the latter passive. By the difference of content, they *are* different in general, or different for us. By the difference of form, however, they are independent, separating themselves from one another in their relation and standing opposed. In perceiving the movement of force, consciousness comes to see that in [1807 69] both respects the extremes are noth-

ing *in themselves*. These sides, in which their distinct essence was supposed to consist, are only disappearing moments, each immediately passing into its opposite. But for us, as noted above, there was also this: in themselves, the differences vanished as *differences of content and form*. On the side of form, what was *active, soliciting*, or *being-for-itself* was essentially the same as what appeared on the side of content as force driven back into itself. The passive, *solicited*, or being-for-another on the side of form was the same as what appeared on the side of content as the universal medium of many matters.

141 From this it follows that the concept of force becomes *actual* by doubling into two forces, and we see how this happens. These two forces exist as essences that are for themselves. But their existence is such a movement toward one another that their *being* is instead a pure *being-posited through another*. That is, their being has instead the pure meaning of *disappearing*. They are not extremes that retain something fixed for themselves and send only an external property into the middle, into their contact with one another. Rather, what they are, they are only in this middle and contact. Here are immediately both force's being-driven-back-into-itself, or *being-for-itself*, and [1807 70] its expression, both soliciting and being-solicited. These moments are therefore not divided between two independent extremes that merely offer opposite tips to one another. Instead, their essence is simply this: each is only through the other, and what each is through the other it immediately no longer is in being it. Thus they in fact have no substances of their own that would carry and preserve them. Instead, the *concept* of force preserves itself as *essence* in force's *actuality* itself. *Actual force* is simply only in its *expression*, which is itself nothing other than a self-sublation. Represented as free of its expression and existing for itself, this *actual* force is force driven back into itself. But as we have found, this determinacy is in fact itself only a moment of *expression*. So only the *thought* of force remains as its truth. Without any support, the moments of its actuality, its substances and its movement, collapse into an undifferentiated unity. This is not force driven back into itself, since that is itself only one such moment. Rather, this unity is *its concept as concept*. The realization of force is therefore at the

same time a loss of reality. In this realization, force has instead become something quite different: this *universality* that understanding initially or immediately recognizes as force's essence, and that also proves to be its essence in [1807 71] its supposed reality, in the actual substances.

142 If we consider *the first* universal as the *concept* of understanding, in which force is not yet for itself, then the second is now force's *essence* as it presents itself *in and for itself*. Or conversely, if we consider the first universal as the *immediate* that was supposed to be an *actual* object for consciousness, then this second is determined as the *negative* of sensuously objective force. It is force as, in its true essence, it is only an *object of understanding*. The first would be force driven back into itself, or force as substance. The second, however, is the *inner* being of things as *inner*, which is the same as the concept as concept.

143 This true essence of things has now been determined as not immediately present for consciousness. Instead, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner and, as understanding, *looks through this middle of the play of forces into the true background of things*. The middle joining the two extremes, understanding and the inner, is force's developed *being*, which for understanding itself is now a *disappearing*. It is therefore called *appearance*. For we call a *being* that immediately within itself is a *nonbeing* a seeming. But this is not merely a seeming; it is appearance, a *whole* of seeming. This *whole* as whole, or as *universal*, is what constitutes the [1807 72] *inner*: the *play of forces* as its *reflection* into itself. In it, the essences of perception are objectively *posited* for consciousness as they are in themselves: as moments immediately turning into their opposite without rest or being. The one turns immediately into the universal, the essential immediately into the inessential, and conversely. This play of forces is therefore the developed negative. But its truth is the positive, namely the *universal*, the object that is *in itself*. Its *being for consciousness* is mediated by the movement of *appearance*. In this movement, the *being of perception*, and sensory objectivity in general, has only negative meaning. Consciousness thus reflects out of it into itself as into truth. But as consciousness, it again makes this truth into an objective *inner* and distinguishes this reflection of things from its own

reflection into itself. The mediating movement likewise remains an objective movement for it. So this inner is an extreme standing over against consciousness. Yet it is truth for consciousness because in it, as in the *in-itself*, consciousness also has certainty of itself, or the moment of its being-for-itself. But it is not yet conscious of this ground. For the *being-for-itself* that the inner was supposed to have within itself would be nothing other than negative movement. But for consciousness this is still [1807 73] *objective*, disappearing appearance, not yet its *own* being-for-itself. The inner is therefore indeed concept for consciousness, but consciousness does not yet know the nature of the concept.

144 In this *inner truth*, as the *absolutely universal* purified of the *opposition* of universal and individual and having come to be *for understanding*, a *supersensible* world as the *true* world now first opens above the *sensory* world as the *appearing* world. Above the disappearing *here-and-now* opens the enduring *beyond*: an in-itself that is the first and therefore itself imperfect appearance of reason, or only the pure element in which truth has its *essence*.

145 Thus *our object* is now the syllogism whose extremes are the inner being of things and understanding, and whose middle is appearance. The movement of this syllogism gives the further determination of what understanding sees in the inner through the middle, and the experience understanding undergoes concerning this relation of being joined together.

146 The inner is still a *pure beyond* for consciousness, since consciousness does not yet find itself in it. It is *empty*, for it is only the nothing of appearance and, positively, the simple universal. This way of being of the inner immediately agrees with those who say that the inner being of things cannot be known. But the ground would have to be understood differently. There is certainly no knowledge of this inner [1807 74] as it immediately is here. But this is not because reason is too shortsighted or limited, or whatever else we might call it. Nothing is yet known about that, since we have not penetrated so deeply. It is because of the simple nature of the subject itself: nothing is known in the *empty*. Or, expressed from the other side, it is because the inner is defined precisely as the

beyond of consciousness. The result is certainly the same if a blind person is placed amid the riches of the supersensible world—if it has any, whether as its own distinctive content or as consciousness itself as this content—and if a sighted person is placed in pure darkness, or, if we like, in pure light, provided it is only this. The sighted person sees as little in his pure light as in his pure darkness, and exactly as much as the blind person amid the fullness of the riches that would lie before him. If there were nothing more to the inner and to being joined to it through appearance, nothing would remain but to stick to appearance: to take as true something we know is not true. Or, so that there might still be something in this emptiness—which has admittedly first come to be as emptiness of objective things, but *as emptiness in itself* must also be taken as the emptiness of all spiritual relations and of the distinctions of consciousness as [1807 75] consciousness—we would fill this *complete emptiness*, also called *the holy*, with daydreams, *appearances* consciousness produces for itself. It would have to put up with being treated so badly, for it would deserve no better, since even daydreams are better than its emptiness.

147 But the inner, or the supersensible beyond, has *arisen*. It *comes* from appearance, and appearance is its mediation. Or, *appearance is its essence* and in fact its fulfillment. The supersensible is the sensory and perceived posited as they are in *truth*. But the *truth* of the *sensory* and perceived is to be *appearance*. Thus the supersensible is *appearance as appearance*. If this is taken to mean that the supersensible is *therefore* the sensory world, or the world as it is *for immediate sensory certainty and perception*, this is a mistaken understanding. For appearance is *not* the world of sensory knowing and perceiving as existing, but that world posited *as sublated*, or in truth *as inner*. People commonly say that the supersensible is *not* appearance. But by appearance they then mean not appearance, but rather the *sensory* world as itself real actuality.
[1807 76]

148 Understanding, which is our object, stands at precisely this point: the inner has come to be for it only as the universal *in-itself*, still unfilled. The play of forces has only this negative meaning, not to be in itself, and only this positive mean-

ing, to be what *mediates*, but to be outside the inner. Yet understanding's relation to the inner through mediation is its movement, through which the inner will fill itself for understanding. What is *immediately* for understanding is the play of forces. But *truth* for it is the simple inner. The movement of force is therefore likewise true only as something *simple* in general. But we have seen that this play of forces is constituted as follows. The force *solicited* by another force is equally what *solicits* this other, which becomes soliciting only through this. Here too there is only immediate change, or the absolute interchange of the *determinacy* that forms the sole *content* of what appears: being either universal medium or negative unity. In its determinate appearance, it itself immediately ceases to be what it appears as. Through its determinate appearance it solicits the other side, which thereby *expresses itself*. That is, the other side is now immediately what the first was supposed to be. Each of these two sides—the *relation* of soliciting and the *relation* of determinate, opposed content—is *for itself* absolute [1807 77] reversal and interchange. But these two relations are themselves again the same. The difference of *form*, being solicited and being soliciting, is the same as the difference of *content*: the solicited as such is the passive medium; the soliciting, by contrast, is the active, the negative unity or the one. Through this, every mutual difference between *particular forces* that were supposed to be present in this movement disappears altogether. For they rested only on those differences. The difference of forces, together with those other two differences, likewise collapses into just one. Thus neither force, nor soliciting and being solicited, nor the determinacy of being a subsisting medium and a unity reflected into itself is individually something for itself. Nor are they different oppositions. What exists in this absolute interchange is only *difference as universal*, or difference into which the many oppositions have been reduced. This *difference as universal* is therefore *the simple element in the play of force itself*, and its truth. It is the *law of force*.

149 Absolutely changing appearance becomes *simple difference* through its relation to the simplicity of the inner, or of understanding. The inner is initially only the universal in itself. But this *universal*, simple in itself, is essentially just as

absolutely *universal difference*. For it is [1807 78] the result of change itself, or change is its essence. Yet change, posited in the inner as it truly is, is thereby taken into the inner as equally absolutely universal difference, at rest and remaining equal to itself. Or, negation is an essential moment of the universal. Negation, or mediation, in the universal is therefore *universal difference*. This is expressed in the *law* as the *enduring* image of unstable appearance. The *supersensible* world is thus a *quiet realm of laws*: beyond the perceived world, since the latter presents law only through constant change, yet equally *present* in that world and its immediate, still image.

150 This realm of laws is indeed understanding's truth, with its *content* in the difference within the law. But it is also only understanding's *first truth* and does not fill out appearance. Law is present in appearance, but is not its whole presence. Under continually different circumstances, it has a continually different actuality. Appearance thus retains a side *for itself* that is not in the inner. Or, appearance is not yet truly posited as *appearance*, as *sublated* being-for-itself. This deficiency of law must likewise reveal itself in law itself. What seems to be lacking is that law indeed has difference within itself, but as universal, indeterminate difference. [1807 79] Yet insofar as it is not *law* in general but *a* law, it has determinacy within it, and there are therefore indefinitely *many* laws. But this multiplicity is itself instead a deficiency. It contradicts the principle of understanding, for which, as consciousness of the simple inner, *unity* universal in itself is truth. So understanding must instead let the many laws collapse into *one* law. For example, the law by which a stone falls and the law by which the heavenly spheres move have been comprehended as *one* law. But in this collapse into one another, the laws lose their determinacy. The law becomes ever more superficial. In fact, what has been found is not the unity of *these determinate* laws but a law that leaves out their determinacy. Thus the one law uniting within itself the laws of falling bodies on earth and of heavenly motion in fact expresses neither. The union of all laws in *universal attraction* expresses no further content than the *mere concept of law itself*, posited there as *being*. Universal attraction says only that *everything has an enduring difference from another*.

Understanding thinks it has found a universal law expressing universal actuality *as such*. But in fact it has found only the *concept* of [1807 80] *law itself*, though in such a way that it also says this: *all* actuality is *within itself* governed by law. Expressing *universal attraction* is therefore very important insofar as it opposes thoughtless *representation*, for which everything appears in the shape of accident and determinacy has the form of sensory independence.

151 Thus universal attraction, or the pure concept of law, stands opposite determinate laws. Insofar as this pure concept is considered essence, or the true inner, the *determinacy* of the determinate law itself still belongs to appearance, or rather to sensory being. But the pure *concept* of law goes beyond not only the law that, itself *determinate*, stands opposite *other determinate* laws. It also goes *beyond law* as such. The determinacy discussed was itself really only a disappearing moment that can no longer appear here as essentiality. For only law is present as truth. But the *concept* of law is turned against *law* itself. In law, difference itself is grasped *immediately* and taken into the universal. This also means a *subsistence* of the moments whose relation law expresses, as indifferent essences existing in themselves. Yet these parts of [1807 81] the difference in law are themselves determinate sides. In its true meaning, the pure concept of law as universal attraction must be grasped as follows: in it, as absolutely *simple*, the *differences* present in law *as such* themselves *return into the inner as simple unity*. This unity is the law's inner *necessity*.

152 Law is thereby present in a double way. At one time it is law in which differences are expressed as independent moments. At the other it is in the form of *simple* having-returned-into-itself, which can again be called *force*. But this is not force driven back into itself. It is force in general, or the concept of force: an abstraction that draws into itself the differences of what attracts and what is attracted. Thus, for example, *simple* electricity is *force*, while the expression of difference falls within *law*. This difference is positive and negative electricity. In falling motion, *force* is the simple term, *gravity*, which has the *law* that the magnitudes of the different moments of motion, elapsed *time* and traversed *space*, relate as root and square. Electricity itself is not difference in itself, or in its

essence the double essence of positive and negative [1807 82] electricity. So people commonly say that it *has* the law of *being* in this way, or that it *has the property* of expressing itself in this way. This property is indeed the essential and sole property of this force, or is *necessary* to it. But necessity here is an empty word. Force simply *must* double itself in this way *because* it *must*. If *positive* electricity is posited, then *negative* electricity is of course also necessary *in itself*. For the *positive* is only as relation to a *negative*, or the positive is *within itself* difference from itself, as is the negative. But electricity as such dividing in this way is not what is necessary in itself. As *simple force*, electricity is indifferent to its law of *being* positive and negative. If we call the former its concept and the latter its being, its concept is indifferent to its being. It merely *has* this property. That means precisely that the property is not necessary to it *in itself*. This indifference takes another shape when we say that being positive and negative belongs to electricity's *definition*, or that this is simply *its concept and essence*. Then its being would mean *its existence* in general. But that definition does not contain *the necessity of its existence*. Electricity either is because we *find* it—that is, it is not necessary at all—or its existence is through other forces, meaning that its necessity is external. But by placing [1807 83] necessity in the determination of *being through another*, we fall back into the *multiplicity* of determinate laws that we just left behind to consider *law* as law. Only with law as law must its *concept* as concept, or its necessity, be compared. Yet in all these forms necessity has so far shown itself only as an empty word.

153 The indifference of law and force, or of concept and being, is present in another way besides the one indicated. In the law of motion, for example, it is necessary that motion *divide* itself into time and space, or again into distance and velocity. Since motion is only the relation of those moments, motion, the universal, is here indeed divided *within itself*. But these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not express in themselves this origin from one. They are indifferent to one another. Space is represented as capable of being without time, time without space, and at least distance without velocity. Their magnitudes are likewise indifferent to one another, since they do not relate *as positive*

and negative, and therefore do not relate to one another through *their essence*. So the necessity of the *division* is indeed present here, but not the necessity of the *parts* as such for one another. For this reason, however, that first necessity is itself only an illusory, false [1807 84] necessity. For motion is not itself represented as *simple*, or as pure essence, but *already* as divided. Time and space are its *independent* parts, or *essences in themselves*. Or distance and velocity are ways of being or representing, one of which can certainly be without the other. Motion is therefore only their *superficial* relation, not their essence. Represented as simple essence or as force, motion is indeed *gravity*, but gravity does not contain these differences within it at all.

154 Thus in both cases difference is no *difference within itself*. Either the universal, force, is indifferent to the division in law, or the differences, the parts of law, are indifferent to one another. But understanding *has* the concept of *this difference in itself*, precisely because law is on one side the inner existing *in itself*, while also *differentiated within itself*. That this difference is an *inner* difference is present in law's being *simple* force, or its own *concept*: thus a *difference of the concept*. But this inner difference still falls only *within understanding*. It is not yet *posited in the subject matter itself*. So understanding expresses only its *own* necessity. It makes a difference only in such a way as also to express that the difference is not a *difference of the subject matter itself*. This necessity, [1807 85] which lies only in the word, is therefore a recounting of the moments making up its circle. They are indeed distinguished, but their difference is also expressed as not being a difference of the subject matter itself, and is therefore itself immediately sublated again. This movement is called *explanation*. Thus a *law* is stated. From it, its universal in-itself, or ground, is distinguished as *force*. But this difference is said not to be a difference: instead, the ground is constituted exactly as the law is. For example, the individual event of lightning is grasped as universal, and this universal is expressed as the *law* of electricity. Explanation then gathers *law* into *force* as law's essence. This force is then *so constituted* that when it expresses itself, opposite electricities emerge and disappear into one another again. That is, *force is constituted exactly as law is*: the two are said not

to differ at all. The differences are pure universal expression, or law, and pure force. But both have *the same* content, *the same* constitution. So the difference as a difference of content, that is, of the *subject matter*, is taken back again as well.

155 In this tautological movement, as we find, understanding persists in the quiet unity of its object. The movement falls only [1807 86] within understanding itself, not within the object. It is an explanation that not only explains nothing but is so clear that, while preparing to say something different from what has already been said, it instead says nothing, merely repeating the same thing. This movement produces nothing new in the subject matter itself, but comes into consideration as a movement of understanding. Yet in it we now recognize precisely what was missing in law: absolute change itself. For if we consider this *movement* more closely, it is immediately its own opposite. It posits *a difference* that is not only *no difference* for us, but that it itself sublates as difference. This is the same change that appeared as the play of forces. In that play there was the difference of soliciting and solicited, of force expressing itself and force driven back into itself. But these were differences that were in truth no differences, and so immediately sublated themselves again. What is present is not merely unity, as though *no difference were posited*. It is this *movement*: *a difference is indeed made, but*, because it is no difference, *is sublated again*. With explanation, then, alteration and change, which previously were outside the inner only in appearance, have penetrated the supersensible itself. But our consciousness has passed from the inner as object [1807 87] to the other side, into *understanding*, and has change within it.

156 Thus this change is not yet a change of the subject matter itself. Rather, it shows itself as *pure change* precisely because the *content* of the changing moments stays the same. But since the *concept*, as understanding's concept, is the same as the *inner* being of things, *this change becomes for understanding the law of the inner*. Understanding therefore *experiences* that it is the *law of appearance itself* that differences arise which are no differences, or that *like repels itself from itself*. Equally, the differences are only differences that in truth

are none and sublate themselves, or *unlike attracts itself*. This is a *second law*, whose content is opposed to what was previously called law, the difference that constantly remains equal to itself. For the new law instead expresses *like becoming unlike* and *unlike becoming like*. The concept requires thoughtlessness to bring the two laws together and become conscious of their opposition. The second is certainly law too, or an inner being equal to itself. But it is instead a self-sameness of inequality, a constancy of inconstancy. In the play of forces, this law emerged as precisely this absolute passing-over and pure change. The *like*, force, [1807 88] *splits* into an opposition that initially appears as an independent difference, but in fact proves *not to be one*. For it is the *like* that repels itself from itself, and what is repelled therefore essentially attracts itself, since it is *the same*. So the difference made, since it is no difference, sublates itself again. It thereby presents itself as a difference *of the subject matter itself*, or as absolute difference. This difference of the *subject matter* is therefore nothing other than the like that has repelled itself from itself and thus posits only an opposition that is none.

157 Through this principle, the first supersensible world, the quiet realm of laws, the immediate image of the perceived world, is reversed into its opposite. Law in general was what *remained equal to itself*, as were its differences. But now it is posited that both are instead their own opposite. What is *equal to itself* instead repels itself from itself, and what is unequal to itself instead posits itself as equal to itself. In fact, only with this determination is difference *inner*, or difference *within itself*, since the like is unlike itself and the unlike is like itself. In this way, *this second supersensible world* is the *inverted* world. Since one side is already present in the first supersensible world, it is specifically the *inversion of this first world*. The inner is thereby completed as appearance. For the first supersensible world was only the *immediate* [1807 89] raising of the perceived world into the universal element. It had its necessary counterpart in the perceived world, which still kept *for itself the principle of change and alteration*. The first realm of laws lacked this principle, but receives it as the inverted world.

158 According to the law of this inverted world, then, the *like* of the first world is *unlike* itself, and that world's *unlike* is equally *unlike itself*, or becomes *like* itself. In determinate moments this will appear as follows: what is sweet in the first world's law is sour in this inverted in-itself; what is black there is white here. What, in the first world's law, is the north pole of a magnet is, in its other supersensible in-itself—namely in the earth—the south pole. What is south pole there is north pole here. Likewise, what in the first law of electricity is the oxygen pole becomes the hydrogen pole in its other supersensible essence. Conversely, what is the hydrogen pole there becomes the oxygen pole here. In another sphere, according to *immediate law*, revenge on an enemy is the highest satisfaction of injured individuality. But *this law*—to show myself as essence against someone who does not treat me as a selflike essence, and instead to sublate him as essence—is *reversed into its opposite* through the principle of the other world. Restoring myself as essence by sublating the alien essence [1807 90] turns into self-destruction. Now, if this inversion, presented in the *punishment* of crime, is made into *law*, it too is again only the law of one world. Opposite it stands an *inverted* supersensible world, in which what is despised in the first world is honored, and what is honored there is despised. Punishment, which according to *the first world's law* dishonors and destroys the person, changes in its *inverted world* into the pardon that preserves his essence and brings him honor.

159 Viewed superficially, this inverted world is the opposite of the first in such a way that it has the first outside itself and repels it as an inverted *actuality*. *One* would be *appearance*, the *other* the *in-itself*; *one* would be the world as it is *for another*, the *other* as it is *for itself*. To use the earlier examples, what tastes sweet would *really*, or *inwardly* in the thing, be sour. What is north pole in the actual magnet of appearance would be south pole *in its inner or essential being*. What appears as oxygen pole in appearing electricity would be hydrogen pole in non-appearing electricity. Or an action that is a crime *in appearance* could supposedly be really good *inwardly*—a bad action could have a good intention. Punishment would be punishment only *in appearance*, but *in itself*, or in [1807

91] another world, a benefit for the criminal. But such oppositions of inner and outer, appearance and supersensible, as two kinds of actuality, are no longer present here. The repelled differences are not distributed anew between two substances that would carry them and give them a separate subsistence. That would make understanding fall out of the inner and back to its previous position. One side or substance would again be the world of perception, in which one of the two laws carried on its activity. Opposite it would be an inner world, *just such a sensory world* as the first, but in *representation*. It could not be pointed out as a sensory world, or seen, heard, or tasted, yet it would be represented as such a sensory world. But in fact, if *the one posited* is something perceived and its *in-itself*, as its inversion, is likewise something *sensuously represented*, then the sour that would be the sweet thing's in-itself is as actual a thing as the sweet thing: a *sour thing*. The black that would be the white's in-itself is actual black. The north pole that is the south pole's in-itself is the north pole *present in the same magnet*. The oxygen pole that is the hydrogen pole's in-itself is the oxygen pole *present* in the same battery. But *actual* crime has *its inversion* and *its in-itself* as *possibility* in *intention* as [1807 92] such, not in a good intention. For the truth of intention is only the deed itself. Crime in its content, however, has its reflection into itself, or its inversion, in *actual* punishment. Punishment is the reconciliation of law with the actuality opposed to it in crime. Finally, *actual* punishment has its *inverted* actuality within it in this way: it is an actualization of law through which law's activity as punishment *sublates itself*. From being active, law becomes once again *quiet* and valid law, and both individuality's movement against law and law's movement against individuality are extinguished.

160 Thus we must remove from the idea of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensible world, the sensory idea of differences fixed in a different element of subsistence. We must purely present and grasp this absolute concept of difference as inner difference: the repulsion of like as like from itself, and the likeness of unlike as unlike. Pure change, or *opposition within itself, contradiction, must be thought*. For in difference that is inner, the opposed

is not merely *one of two*. Otherwise it would be something *that is*, not something opposed. Instead, it is the opposite of an [1807 93] opposite, or the other is itself immediately present within it. I may place the opposite *here* and the other, whose opposite it is, *there*: thus the *opposite* on one side, in and for itself without the other. But precisely because I have *the opposite in and for itself* here, it is its own opposite, or in fact has the other immediately within itself. Thus the supersensible world that is inverted has at the same time reached over the other world and has it within itself. It is for itself the inverted world: that is, the inversion of itself. It is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only in this way is it difference as *inner*, or difference *within itself*, or is it as *infinity*.

161 Through infinity, we see law completed into necessity within itself, and all moments of appearance taken into the inner. To say that law's simple element is infinity means, according to what has emerged: α) It is something *equal to itself* that is, however, *difference* in itself. Or it is like that repels itself from itself, or splits itself in two. What was called *simple* force *doubles* itself and through its infinity is law. β) What has split, and constitutes the parts represented in *law*, presents itself as subsisting. Considered without the concept of inner difference, these parts—space and [1807 94] time, or distance and velocity, appearing as moments of gravity—are indifferent and without necessity both for one another and for gravity itself. Simple gravity is likewise indifferent to them, as simple electricity is to positive and negative. γ) Through the concept of inner difference, however, this unlike and indifferent content—space and time, and so on—is a *difference* that is no *difference*, or only a difference of *like*, whose essence is unity. They are animated toward one another as positive and negative. Their being is instead this: to posit themselves as nonbeing and sublate themselves in unity. Both differentiated terms subsist; they are *in themselves*. They are *in themselves as opposed*: that is, the opposite of themselves. They have their other within them and are only one unity.

162 This simple infinity, or the absolute concept, should be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood. Present everywhere, it is neither clouded nor interrupted by any difference. Instead, it is itself all differ-

ences as well as their being-sublated. So it pulses within itself without moving, trembles within itself without being restless. It is *equal to itself*, for the differences are tautological: differences that are none. This self-identical essence therefore relates only to itself. *To itself*: then this is another to which the relation goes, and [1807 95] *relating to itself* is instead *splitting in two*. Or that very self-sameness is inner difference. These *divided terms* are thus *in and for themselves*, each an opposite. If we say the opposite *of another*, the *other* is already expressed together with it. Or if it is not the opposite *of another* but only *pure opposition*, it is within itself its own opposite. Or suppose it is not an opposite at all, but purely for itself, a pure, self-identical essence without any difference within it. Then we need not ask—still less take tormenting oneself with the question as philosophy, or even regard philosophy as unable to answer—*how* difference or otherness comes from this pure essence, how it comes *out of* it. For the splitting has already happened: difference has been excluded from what is equal to itself and placed beside it. What was supposed to be *equal to itself* is therefore already one of the divided terms rather than absolute essence. To say that *what is equal to itself splits in two* therefore means just as much that it sublates itself as already divided, sublates itself as otherness. The *unity* out of which difference is commonly said to be unable to emerge is in fact itself only one moment of the division. It is the abstraction of simplicity standing opposite difference. But insofar as it is [1807 96] abstraction, only one of the opposites, it has already been said that it is the splitting. For if unity is something *negative*, something *opposed*, then it is posited precisely as what has opposition within it. The differences of *splitting in two* and *becoming equal to itself* are therefore likewise only *this movement of self-sublation*. What is equal to itself, which is supposed first to split or become its opposite, is an abstraction, or *already itself* something divided. So its splitting is a sublation of what it is, and thus a sublation of its being-divided. *Becoming equal to itself* is likewise a splitting. What becomes *equal to itself* thereby stands opposite division. That is, it thereby places itself *on one side*, or rather *becomes something divided*.

163 Infinity, or this absolute restlessness of pure self-movement, means that what is determined in any way—for example, as being—is instead the opposite of this determinacy. It has indeed already been the soul of everything so far, but only in the *inner* has it itself emerged freely. Appearance, or the play of forces, already presents it, but it first emerges freely as *explanation*. Finally, when it is an object for consciousness *as what it is*, consciousness is *self-consciousness*. Understanding's *explanation* initially gives only the description of what [1807 97] self-consciousness is. Understanding sublates the differences present in law, already purified but still indifferent, and posits them in one unity, force. But this becoming-equal is just as immediately a splitting. For understanding sublates the differences, and thereby posits the one of force, only by making a new difference between law and force, which is nevertheless also no difference. And understanding itself advances to this difference's also being no difference by sublating it again, letting force be constituted in just the same way as law. But this movement or necessity is still necessity and movement of understanding. It *as such* is *not understanding's object*. Instead, in this movement understanding has as its objects positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, attractive force, and a thousand other things that constitute the content of the movement's moments. Explanation contains so much self-satisfaction precisely because in it consciousness, so to speak, is in immediate conversation with itself and enjoys only itself. It seems to be doing something else, but in fact only busies itself with itself.

164 In the opposed law as the inversion of the first law, or in inner difference, infinity itself does indeed become understanding's *object*. But understanding again misses infinity as [1807 98] such, by once again distributing difference in itself —the self-repulsion of like, and the unlike terms that attract one another— between two worlds, or two substantial elements. *Movement* as it is in experience is here an event for understanding. Like and unlike are *predicates* whose essence is an existing substrate. What is an object for understanding in a sensory covering is for us an object in its essential shape, as pure concept. This grasping of difference as it is *in truth*, or grasping of *infinity* as such, is *for us*, or *in itself*.

The exposition of its concept belongs to science. But consciousness, as it has the concept *immediately*, again appears as a form of its own, a new shape of consciousness. It does not recognize its essence in what preceded, but regards that as something entirely different. Since this concept of infinity is its object, consciousness is therefore consciousness of difference as something just as *immediately* sublated. It is *for itself*; it is *distinguishing the undistinguished*, or *self-consciousness*. I *distinguish myself from myself*, and *in this it is immediately present for me that what is distinguished is not distinguished*. I, the like, repel myself from myself. But this distinguished term, posited as unlike, is immediately, in being distinguished, no difference for me. Consciousness of another, of an object [1807 99] in general, is itself necessarily *self-consciousness*: being reflected into itself, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The *necessary advance* from the previous forms of consciousness, for which their truth was a thing, something other than themselves, expresses precisely this. Not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but self-consciousness alone is the truth of those forms. Yet this truth is present only for us, not yet for consciousness. Self-consciousness has, however, come to be only *for itself*, not yet *as unity* with consciousness in general.

165 We see that in the inner being of appearance, understanding in truth experiences nothing other than appearance itself. But it experiences appearance not as the play of forces, but in its absolutely universal moments and their movement —and in fact experiences only *itself*. Raised above perception, consciousness presents itself as joined with the supersensible through the middle of appearance, through which it looks into this background. The two extremes—the one of the pure inner, the other of the inner looking into this pure inner—have now coincided. Just as they have disappeared as extremes, so the middle has disappeared as something other than them. This curtain has therefore been drawn away from the inner. What is present is the inner looking into the inner: the looking of *undifferentiated* like, [1807 100] which repels itself, posits itself as a *differentiated* inner, but *for which* the *lack of difference* between both is just as immediate—*self-consciousness*. It turns out that behind the so-called curtain

meant to conceal the inner, there is nothing to see unless *we* go behind it ourselves, both so that there may be seeing and so that there may be something behind it to be seen. But it also turns out that we cannot go straight behind it without any further work. For this knowing, which is the truth of *the representation* of appearance and its inner, is itself only the result of a detailed movement through which the modes of consciousness—meaning, perceiving, and understanding—disappear. It will likewise turn out that knowing *what consciousness knows when it knows itself* requires further work, which the following account will unfold.

IV. Self-consciousness

[1807 101]

IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty.

166 In the modes of certainty considered so far, truth is for consciousness something other than itself. But the concept of this truth disappears in the experience of it. The object as it was immediately *in itself*—the being of sensory certainty, the concrete thing of perception, the force of understanding—proves instead not to be in truth. This *in-itself* emerges as a way in which the object is only for another. The concept of it sublates itself at the actual object, or the first immediate representation sublates itself in experience, and certainty was lost in truth. But now something has arisen that did not come about in those earlier relations: a certainty equal to its truth. For certainty is its own object, and consciousness is truth for itself. There is indeed otherness here too: consciousness distinguishes, but distinguishes something that for it [1807 102] is at the same time not distinguished. If we call the movement of knowing the *concept*, and knowing as a quiet unity, or as I, the *object*, we see that the object corresponds to the concept not just for us but for knowing itself. Or, put the other way, if we call what the object is *in itself* the *concept*, and what it is as *object*, or *for another*, the object, then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-another are the same. For the *in-itself* is consciousness. But consciousness is equally that *for which* another—the *in-itself*—is. And it is present for consciousness that the

object's in-itself and its being for another are the same. I is the content of the relation and the relating itself. It is itself against another and at the same time reaches over this other, which for it is equally only itself.

167 With self-consciousness, then, we have now entered truth's native realm. We must see how the form of self-consciousness first appears. Consider this new form of knowing, knowing oneself, in relation to what preceded, knowing another. The latter has indeed disappeared, but its moments have equally been preserved. The loss consists in their now being present as they are in themselves. The *being* of meaning, the *individuality* and the [1807 103] opposed *universality* of perception, as well as understanding's *empty inner*, are no longer essences. They are moments of self-consciousness: abstractions or differences that *for* consciousness itself are at the same time null, or no differences, and purely disappearing essences. So only the main moment itself seems to have been lost: *simple, independent subsistence* for consciousness. But in fact self-consciousness is reflection out of the being of the sensory and perceived world, and essentially the return from *otherness*. As self-consciousness, it is movement. But insofar as it distinguishes *only itself as itself* from itself, difference as otherness is *immediately sublated* for it. Difference *is* not, and *self-consciousness* is only the motionless tautology "I am I." Insofar as difference does not also have the form of *being* for it, it is not self-consciousness. Thus otherness is for it *as a being*, or as a *distinguished moment*. But the unity of itself with this difference is also for it as a *second distinguished* moment. With the first moment, self-consciousness as *consciousness* is preserved, and for it the whole spread of the sensory world is preserved. But this world is at the same time only related to the second moment, self-consciousness's unity with itself. It is therefore for self-consciousness a subsistence that is only *appearance*, or [1807 104] difference that *in itself* has no being. Yet this opposition between its appearance and its truth has only truth, the unity of self-consciousness with itself, as its essence. This unity must become essential for self-consciousness. That means it is *desire* in general. As self-consciousness, consciousness now has a double object. One is the immediate object, the object of sensory certainty and perceiving, but *for consciousness*

marked with the *character of the negative*. The second is *itself*, which is the true *essence* and is initially present only in opposition to the first. Here self-consciousness presents itself as the movement in which this opposition is sublated and its equality with itself comes to be for it.

168 But the object that is negative for self-consciousness has, for its own part, *for us* or *in itself*, returned into itself just as much as consciousness has on the other side. Through this reflection into itself it has become *life*. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself *as being* has, insofar as it is posited as being, not merely the mode of sensory certainty and perception. It is being reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is something *living*. For the *in-itself*, or the *universal* result of understanding's relation to the [1807 105] inner being of things, is the distinguishing of what cannot be distinguished, or the unity of what is distinguished. But as we have seen, this unity is equally its repulsion from itself. This concept *splits* into the opposition of self-consciousness and life. Self-consciousness is the unity *for which* the infinite unity of differences is. Life, however, *is* only this unity itself, so that the unity is not at the same time *for itself*. Thus, as independent as consciousness is, its object is equally independent *in itself*. Self-consciousness, which is simply *for itself* and immediately marks its object with the character of the negative, or is initially *desire*, will therefore instead experience the object's independence.

169 The determination of life emerging from the concept, or from the universal result with which we enter this sphere, is enough to characterize life without developing its nature further from it. Its circle closes in the following moments. *Essence* is infinity as the *being-sublated* of all differences: pure rotation on its axis, its own repose as absolutely restless infinity; *independence* itself, in which the differences of movement are dissolved; the simple essence of time that, in this self-sameness, has the solid shape of space. Yet the [1807 106] *differences* are just as much present in this *simple universal* medium *as differences*. For this universal fluidity has its negative nature only insofar as it is a *sublation of them*. But it cannot sublate the differentiated terms unless they have a subsistence. This very fluidity, as self-identical independence, is itself their *subsistence*, or

substance, in which they thus are as differentiated members and parts *existing for themselves*. *Being* no longer means the *abstraction of being*, nor does their pure essentiality mean the *abstraction of universality*. Instead, their being is precisely that simple, fluid substance of pure movement within itself. The *difference* of these members *from one another*, however, *as* difference, consists in no *determinacy* other than that of the moments of infinity, or of pure movement itself.

170 The independent members are *for themselves*. But this *being-for-itself* is instead just as *immediately* their reflection into unity as this unity is the splitting into independent forms. Unity is divided because it is absolutely negative or infinite unity. And because *it* is *subsistence*, difference too has independence only *within it*. This independence of the form appears as something *determinate, for another*, since it is something divided. To that extent, the *sublation* of division happens through another. [1807 107] But it is equally within the form itself. For that very fluidity is the substance of the independent forms, and this substance is infinite. So in its subsistence itself, the form is the splitting, or the sublation of its being-for-itself.

171 If we distinguish the moments contained here more closely, we see that the *first* moment is the *subsistence of independent* forms, or the suppression of what distinguishing is in itself: not to be in itself and to have no subsistence. The *second* moment is the *subjection* of that subsistence to the infinity of difference. In the first moment is the subsisting form. As *existing for itself*, or as infinite substance in its determinacy, it confronts *universal* substance, denies this fluidity and its continuity with it, and asserts itself as not dissolved in this universal. Instead, it preserves itself by separating from this, its inorganic nature, and consuming it. Life in the universal fluid medium, a *quiet* laying-out of forms, thereby becomes the movement of those forms, or life as *process*. Simple universal fluidity is the *in-itself*, and the difference of forms is the *other*. But through this difference, fluidity itself becomes *the other*. For it is now *for difference*, which is in and for itself and is therefore [1807 108] the infinite movement that consumes that quiet medium: life as *living*. But this *inversion* is therefore again *inversion*

within itself. What is consumed is essence. Individuality, preserving itself at the cost of the universal and giving itself the feeling of its unity with itself, thereby sublates precisely *its opposition to the other, through which it is for itself*. The *unity* with itself that it gives itself is precisely the *fluidity* of differences, or *universal dissolution*. Conversely, however, sublating individual subsistence equally produces it. For since the *essence* of the individual form is universal life, and what is for itself is in itself simple substance, in positing *the other* within itself it sublates this *simplicity* of its own, or its essence. That is, it divides it, and this dividing of undifferentiated fluidity is precisely the positing of individuality. So the simple substance of life is its splitting into forms and at the same time the dissolution of these subsisting differences. The dissolution of division is equally a dividing, or an articulation into members. The two sides of the whole movement that were distinguished thereby fall into one another: the shaping quietly laid out in the universal medium of independence, and the process of life. The latter is just as much shaping as it is sublation of form. [1807 109] And the first, shaping, is just as much a sublating as it is articulation. The fluid element is itself only the *abstraction* of essence, or is *actual* only as form. Its articulation is again a dividing of what has been articulated, or its dissolution. This whole circuit constitutes life. Life is neither what was first stated, the immediate continuity and solidity of its essence, nor the subsisting form and the discrete existing for itself, nor their pure process, nor even a simple gathering of these moments. It is the whole that develops itself, dissolves its development, and in this movement preserves itself as simple.

172 We started from the first immediate unity and, through the moments of shaping and process, returned to the unity of these two moments and thus back to the first simple substance. This *reflected unity* is therefore different from the first. Against that *immediate* unity, expressed as a *being*, this second unity is the *universal*, which has all these moments within it as sublated. It is the *simple genus*, which does not *exist for itself as* this *simple* in the movement of life itself. Instead, in this *result*, life points to something other than itself: consciousness, for which life is as this unity, or as genus.

[1807 110]

173 But this other life, for which *genus* exists as such and which is genus for itself—self-consciousness—is initially for itself only as this simple essence, and has itself as *pure I* for its object. In its experience, which we must now consider, this abstract object will grow richer for it and receive the unfolding that we have seen in life.

174 The simple I is this genus, or the simple universal for which differences are none, only by being the *negative essence* of the shaped, independent moments. Self-consciousness is therefore certain of itself only by sublating this other that presents itself as independent life. It is *desire*. Certain of this other's nullity, it posits that nullity *for itself* as its truth, destroys the independent object, and thereby gives itself self-certainty as *true* certainty: a certainty that has come to be for it itself in an *objective way*.

175 But in this satisfaction it experiences the independence of its object. Desire and the self-certainty reached in its satisfaction are conditioned by the object, for that certainty comes through sublating this other. For this sublation to be, this other must be. So self-consciousness cannot sublate the object through its negative relation to it. Instead, it therefore produces the object again, as well as desire. In [1807 111] fact, something other than self-consciousness is the essence of desire, and through this experience this truth has come to be for self-consciousness itself. Yet at the same time self-consciousness is equally absolutely for itself, and is so only by sublating the object. Its satisfaction must come to be for it, for it is truth. Because of the object's independence, self-consciousness can therefore reach satisfaction only when the object itself carries out negation within itself. The object must carry out this self-negation within itself because it is *in itself* the negative and must be for the other what it is. In being negation within itself and at the same time independent in this, it is consciousness. In life, which is the object of desire, *negation* is either *in another*, namely in desire; or it is *determinacy* against another indifferent form; or it is

life's *inorganic universal nature*. But this universal independent nature, in which negation is absolute, is genus as such, or as *self-consciousness. Self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness*.

176 Only in these three moments is the concept of self-consciousness complete. a) Pure, undifferentiated I is its first immediate object. b) But this immediacy is itself absolute mediation. It is only as sublation of the independent object, or it is desire. The [1807 112] satisfaction of desire is indeed self-consciousness's reflection into itself, or certainty become truth. c) But the truth of this certainty is instead doubled reflection, the doubling of self-consciousness. There is an object for consciousness that within itself posits its otherness, or difference, as null and is independent in doing so. The differentiated, merely *living* form certainly also sublates its independence in the process of life itself. But together with its difference, it ceases to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself. It is thereby genus for itself, universal fluidity in the particularity of its separation. It is living self-consciousness.

177 There is a *self-consciousness for a self-consciousness*. Only through this is self-consciousness in fact, for only here does its unity with itself in its otherness come to be for it. *I*, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not an *object*. But the object of desire is only *independent*, for it is universal, indestructible substance, the fluid, self-identical essence. When a self-consciousness is the object, it is just as much I as object. With this, the concept of *spirit* is already present for us. What comes to be further for consciousness is the experience of what [1807 113] spirit is: this absolute substance that is the unity of its opposites in their complete freedom and independence—namely, different self-consciousnesses existing for themselves. It is *I* that is *we*, and *we* that is *I*. Only in self-consciousness as the concept of spirit does consciousness reach its turning point. Here it steps from the colorful seeming of the sensory here-and-now, and from the empty night of the supersensible beyond, into the spiritual daylight of the present.
[1807 114]

A. Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness; Mastery and Servitude.

178 Self-consciousness is *in and for itself* when, and by the fact that, it is in and for itself for another. That is, it is only as something recognized. The concept of this unity in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is an interweaving with many sides and meanings. Its moments must therefore partly be kept strictly apart, and partly, in this distinction, also be taken and known as not distinguished, or always in their opposite meaning. The ambiguity of what is distinguished lies in self-consciousness's essence: being infinite, or immediately the opposite of the determinacy in which it is posited. Unfolding the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of *recognition*.

179 For self-consciousness there is another self-consciousness. It has come *outside itself*. [1807 115] This has a double meaning. *First*, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as *another* essence. *Second*, it has thereby sublated the other, for it does not see the other as essence either, but sees *itself* in the other.

180 It must sublate *this otherness of its own*. This sublates the first ambiguity and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. *First*, it must set out to sublate *the other* independent essence, in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as essence. *Second*, it thereby sets out to sublate *itself*, for this other is itself.

181 This ambiguous sublation of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return *into itself*. For *first*, through the sublation it gets itself back: it becomes equal to itself again by sublating *its* otherness. *Second*, it equally gives the other self-consciousness back to itself. For self-consciousness was itself in the other; it sublates this *being of its own* in the other and thus releases the other again.

182 Yet this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has been presented in this way as *the action of one*. But this action of one itself has the double meaning of being both *its action* and *the other's action*. For the other is equally independent, closed within itself, and there is nothing in it

that is not through itself. The first [1807 116] does not have before it an object of the kind that initially exists only for desire. Its object is independent, existing for itself. So the first can do nothing to it on its own unless the object does within itself what the first does to it. Thus the movement is simply the doubled movement of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees *the other* do the same as *it* does. Each itself does what it demands of the other. It therefore also does what it does *only* insofar as the other does the same. One-sided action would be useless, because what is to happen can come about only through both.

183 So the action is ambiguous not only because it is action both *against itself* and *against the other*, but also because it is inseparably both *the action of one* and *of the other*.

184 In this movement we see the process that appeared as the play of forces repeated, but now in consciousness. What was for us in that process is here for the extremes themselves. The middle is self-consciousness, which breaks apart into the extremes. Each extreme is this exchange of its determinacy and absolute passage into the opposite. As consciousness, it does indeed come *outside itself*. Yet in being outside itself it is also held back within itself, *for itself*, and its being-outside-itself is *for it*. It is present for it that it immediately *is* and [1807 117] *is not* another consciousness. Equally, this other is for itself only by sublating itself as existing for itself, and is for itself only in the other's being-for-itself. Each is for the other the middle through which each mediates and joins itself with itself. And each is, for itself and the other, an immediate essence existing for itself, which is at the same time for itself in this way only through this mediation. They *recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another*.

185 We must now consider this pure concept of recognition, the doubling of self-consciousness in its unity, as its process appears for self-consciousness. It will first present the side of the *inequality* of the two, or the middle's emergence into extremes. As extremes, they are opposed: one is only recognized, the other only recognizing.

186 Self-consciousness is initially simple being-for-itself, equal to itself through excluding everything *else from itself*. Its essence and absolute object is for it *I*. In this *immediacy*, or this *being* of its being-for-itself, it is *individual*. Whatever else is for it exists as an inessential object marked with the character of the negative. But the other is also a self-consciousness. An individual appears opposite an individual. Appearing so *immediately*, they are for one another in the manner of ordinary objects: *independent* forms, consciousnesses immersed in the *being* [1807 118] of *life*—for the existing object has here been determined as life. They have not yet accomplished *for one another* the movement of absolute abstraction, of eradicating all immediate being and being only the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness. Or they have not yet presented themselves to one another as pure *being-for-itself*, that is, as *self*-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of itself, but not of the other. Its own certainty of itself therefore has no truth yet. For its truth would consist only in its own being-for-itself presenting itself to it as an independent object—or, what is the same, in the object presenting itself as this pure self-certainty. But according to the concept of recognition, this is possible only when, as the other does for it, so it does for the other: each accomplishes this pure abstraction of being-for-itself within itself through its own action, and again through the other's action.

187 But *presenting* itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as pure negation of its objective mode, or showing that it is tied to no determinate *existence*, not to the universal individuality of existence in general, not to life. This presentation is the *double* action: action of the other and action through oneself. Insofar as it is action *of the other*, each therefore aims at [1807 119] the other's death. But the second action, *action through oneself*, is also present in this, since the first involves staking one's own life. Thus the relation of the two self-consciousnesses is determined in such a way that they *prove* themselves to themselves and one another through a struggle of life and death. They must enter this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of themselves, of *being for themselves*, to truth in the other and in themselves. Only by staking life is freedom proved. Only in this way is it proved that self-

consciousness's essence is not *being*, not the *immediate* manner in which it appears, not its immersion in the spread of life; that nothing is present in it that would not be a disappearing moment for it; that it is only pure *being-for-itself*. The individual who has not risked life may indeed be recognized as a *person*, but has not reached the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Just as each stakes its life, each must likewise aim at the other's death. For the other counts for no more with it than it itself does. Its essence presents itself as another; it is outside itself and must sublate its being-outside-itself. The other is consciousness entangled in many ways and existing. Self-consciousness must intuit its otherness as pure being-for-itself, or as absolute negation.
[1807 120]

188 But this proving through death equally sublates the truth that was supposed to emerge from it, and thereby also self-certainty in general. For just as life is consciousness's *natural* positing, independence without absolute negativity, death is its *natural* negation, negation without independence, which therefore remains without the required meaning of recognition. Through death, certainty has indeed come to be that both risked their lives and held life in contempt in themselves and in the other—but not for those who underwent this struggle. They sublate their consciousness posited in this alien essentiality, natural existence. Or they sublate themselves and are sublated as *extremes* wanting to be for themselves. But with this, the essential moment disappears from the play of exchange: splitting into extremes of opposed determinacies. The middle collapses into a dead unity, divided into dead extremes that merely are and are not opposed. The two do not mutually give themselves back to one another and receive themselves from one another through consciousness. They merely release one another indifferently, as things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness that *sublates* in such a way as to *preserve* and *maintain* what is sublated, and thus survives its own being-sublated.
[1807 121]

189 In this experience self-consciousness comes to see that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness, the simple I is the absolute object. But for us, or in itself, this object is absolute mediation and has subsisting independence as an essential moment. Dissolving that simple unity is the result of the first experience. Through it, a pure self-consciousness is posited, along with a consciousness that is not purely for itself but for another: that is, as *existing* consciousness, or consciousness in the form of *thinghood*. Both moments are essential. Since initially they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into unity has not yet emerged, they exist as two opposed forms of consciousness. One is independent, taking being-for-itself as its essence. The other is dependent, taking life or being-for-another as its essence. The former is the *master*, the latter the *servant*.

190 The master is consciousness existing *for itself*, but no longer merely its concept. He is consciousness existing for itself and mediated with itself through *another* consciousness, one whose essence includes being joined with independent *being*, or thinghood in general. The master relates to these two moments: a *thing* as such, [1807 122] the object of desire, and the consciousness for which thinghood is essential. As a) the concept of self-consciousness, he is immediate relation of *being-for-itself*. But b) he is now also mediation, or a being-for-itself that is for itself only through another. He therefore relates a) immediately to both, and b) mediately to each through the other. The master relates *to the servant mediately through independent being*. For this is precisely what holds the servant. It is his chain, from which he could not abstract in the struggle. He therefore proved dependent, having his independence in thinghood. But the master is power over this being, for he proved in the struggle that it counts for him only as something negative. Since he is power over this being, and this being is power over the other, in this syllogism he has the other under him. Likewise, the master relates *mediately through the servant to the thing*. As self-consciousness in general, the servant also relates negatively to the thing and sublates it. But at the same time the thing is independent for him, so in negating it he cannot be done with it to the point of destroying it. He only *works on*

it. For the master, by contrast, through this mediation there *comes to be* the *immediate* relation as pure negation of the thing, or *enjoyment*. What desire failed to do, he succeeds in doing: being done with the thing and satisfying himself [1807 123] in enjoyment. Desire failed because of the thing's independence. But the master, having inserted the servant between the thing and himself, thereby joins himself only to the thing's dependence and enjoys it purely. He leaves the side of independence to the servant who works on it.

191 In these two moments, the master's being-recognized through another consciousness comes to be for him. For that consciousness posits itself in them as inessential: once in working on the thing, the other time in dependence on a determinate existence. In neither can it master being and reach absolute negation. Thus this moment of recognition is present here: the other consciousness sublates itself as being-for-itself and thereby itself does what the first does against it. The other moment is likewise present: this action of the second is the first's own action. For what the servant does is really the master's action. For the master, only being-for-itself is essence. He is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and therefore the purely essential action in this relation. The servant, however, is not pure but inessential action. Yet genuine recognition lacks this moment: that the master should also do against himself what he does against the other, and that the servant should also do against the other what he does against himself. A [1807 124] one-sided and unequal recognition has thereby arisen.

192 In this relation, inessential consciousness is for the master the object that constitutes the *truth* of his self-certainty. But clearly this object does not correspond to its concept. Instead, in what the master has accomplished himself in, something entirely different from an independent consciousness has come to be for him. What is for him is not an independent consciousness but a dependent one. He is therefore not certain of *being-for-itself* as truth. Instead, his truth is inessential consciousness and its inessential action.

193 The *truth* of independent consciousness is therefore *servile consciousness*. This admittedly appears at first *outside* itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as mastery showed that its essence is the reverse of what it wants to be, so servitude too, in its accomplishment, will instead become the opposite of what it immediately is. As consciousness *driven back into itself*, it will enter itself and turn into true independence.

194 We have seen only what servitude is in relation to mastery. But it is self-consciousness, and we must now consider what it accordingly is in and for itself. Initially, for [1807 125] servitude the master is essence. Thus *independent consciousness existing for itself* is its *truth*, but *for it* this truth is not yet *within itself*. Yet it *does in fact have within itself* this truth of pure negativity and *being-for-itself*, for it has *experienced* this essence within itself. This consciousness was anxious not about this or that, nor for this or that moment, but about its whole essence. For it felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that fear it was inwardly dissolved, trembled through and through within itself, and everything fixed in it shook. But this pure universal movement, this absolute liquefying of all subsistence, is the simple essence of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure being-for-itself*, which is therefore *within* this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-itself is also *for it*, since in the master it is its *object*. Further, consciousness is not merely this universal dissolution *in general*. In serving, it carries out the dissolution *actually*. In every *individual* moment, it sublates its attachment to natural existence and works that existence away.

195 But the feeling of absolute power, both in general and in the particulars of service, is only dissolution *in itself*. Although fear of the master is the beginning of wisdom, consciousness is not in this, *for itself*, *being-for-itself*. Through work, however, it comes to itself. In the moment [1807 126] corresponding to desire in the master's consciousness, serving consciousness did seem to receive the side of the inessential relation to the thing, since the thing keeps its independence in this relation. Desire reserved to itself the pure negation of the object and thereby the unmixed feeling of self. But this satisfaction is itself only a disappearing, because it lacks the *objective* side, or *subsistence*. Work, by contrast, is

restrained desire, *delayed* disappearance: it *forms*. The negative relation to the object becomes the object's *form*, something *enduring*, precisely because the object has independence for the worker. This *negative* middle, or *formative action*, is at the same time consciousness's *individuality*, or pure being-for-itself, which now, in work, steps outside consciousness into the element of endurance. Working consciousness thereby comes to intuit independent being *as itself*.

196 But forming has not only this positive meaning: that in it serving consciousness becomes for itself something *that is*, as pure *being-for-itself*. It also has a negative meaning against its first moment, fear. For in shaping the thing, its own negativity, its being-for-itself, becomes an object for it only by its sublating the opposed, existing *form*. But this objective *negative* is precisely the alien essence before which it [1807 127] trembled. Now, however, it destroys this alien negative and posits *itself* as such a negative in the element of endurance. It thereby becomes *for its own self* something *existing for itself*. In the master, being-for-itself is for it *another*, or only *for it*. In fear, being-for-itself is *within it*. In forming, being-for-itself becomes for it *its own*, and it becomes conscious that it itself is in and for itself. Being *set outside* does not make form something other than consciousness, for form is precisely its pure being-for-itself, which therein becomes truth for it. By finding itself again through itself, it therefore gains *a mind of its own*, precisely in the work in which it seemed to be only *someone else's mind*. Both moments—fear and service in general, as well as forming—are necessary for this reflection, and both in a universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains formal and does not spread over the conscious actuality of existence. Without forming, fear stays inward and mute, and consciousness does not become for itself. If consciousness forms without that first absolute fear, it is only a vain mind of its own. For its form, or negativity, is not negativity *in itself*, and its forming therefore cannot give it consciousness of itself as essence. If it has endured not absolute fear but only some anxiety, negative essence has remained [1807 128] external to it, and has not infected its substance through and through. Since not all the contents of its

natural consciousness have been shaken, it still belongs *in itself* to determinate being. The mind of its own is *stubbornness*: a freedom that still remains within servitude. Just as little as pure form can become its essence, so, considered as spread over the particular, it is not universal forming, not absolute concept, but a skill that masters only some things, not universal power and the whole objective essence.

[1807 129]

B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness; Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness.

197 For independent self-consciousness, on one side only the pure abstraction *of the I* is its essence. On the other, as this abstraction develops and gives itself differences, this distinguishing does not become for self-consciousness an objective essence *existing in itself*. So this self-consciousness does not become an I that truly distinguishes itself in its simplicity, or remains equal to itself in this absolute distinction. Consciousness driven back into itself, by contrast, becomes an object for itself in forming, as the form of the shaped things. In the master it also intuits being-for-itself as consciousness. But for serving consciousness as such, these two moments fall apart: *itself* as independent object, and this object as a consciousness and thus as its own essence. Yet *for us*, or *in itself*, *form* and *being-for-itself* are the same. And in the [1807 130] concept of independent consciousness, *being-in-itself* is consciousness. So the side of *being-in-itself*, or *thinghood*, that form received in work is no other substance than consciousness. A new form of self-consciousness has come to be for us: a consciousness that takes itself, as infinity or the pure movement of consciousness, as essence; a consciousness that *thinks*, or is free self-consciousness. For being an object to oneself not as *abstract I* but as I that also has the meaning of *being-in-itself*, or relating to objective essence so that it has the meaning of the *being-for-itself* of the consciousness for which it is, means *thinking*. For *thinking*, the object moves not in representations or shapes but in *concepts*: in a differentiated being-in-itself that immediately is no different from consciousness for consciousness. What is *represented, shaped, existing*, as such, has the form of

being something other than consciousness. But a concept is also something *that is*—and this difference, insofar as it is within the concept itself, is its determinate content. Yet because this content is at the same time comprehended, consciousness remains *immediately* aware of its unity with this determinate and differentiated being. It is not like representation, in which consciousness must still remind itself expressly that this is *its* representation. Instead, the concept is immediately *my* [1807 131] concept. In thinking *I am free*, because I am not in another but remain simply with myself. The object that is essence for me is, in undivided unity, my being-for-myself. My movement in concepts is a movement within myself. But in this determination of this form of self-consciousness, it is essential to hold firmly that it is *thinking* consciousness *in general*, or that its object is the *immediate* unity of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*. Self-identical consciousness, repelling itself from itself, becomes for itself an *element existing in itself*. But so far it is this element for itself only as universal essence in general, not as this objective essence in the development and movement of its manifold being.

198 This freedom of self-consciousness, when it appeared in the history of spirit as an appearance conscious of itself, was, as is well known, called *Stoicism*. Its principle is that consciousness is a thinking essence, and that something has essentiality for it, or is true and good for it, only insofar as consciousness behaves in it as a thinking essence.

199 Life's manifold spread, differentiation, isolation, and entanglement is the object on which desire and work act. This manifold activity has now drawn together into the simple distinction [1807 132] within the pure movement of thinking. Essentiality no longer belongs to the difference that presents itself as a *determinate thing*, or as *consciousness of a determinate natural existence*, as a feeling, or as *desire* and a *purpose for desire*—whether posited by one's *own* or by *an alien consciousness*. Essentiality belongs only to the difference that is *thought*, or immediately not distinguished from me. This consciousness therefore takes a negative stance toward the relation of mastery and servitude. Its action is to have its truth neither in the servant when it is master, nor in the master's will

and its service when it is servant. Instead, whether on the throne or in chains, in all the dependence of its individual existence, it is to be free and to preserve the lifelessness that constantly *withdraws* from the movement of existence, from acting as from suffering, *into the simple essentiality of thought*. Stubbornness is freedom attached to an individuality and standing *within* servitude. Stoicism, however, is freedom that always comes immediately out of servitude and returns into the *pure universality* of thought. As a universal form of world spirit, it could appear only in a time of universal fear and servitude, but also of universal cultivation, which had raised forming to the level of thinking.
[1807 133]

200 For this self-consciousness, essence is neither something other than itself nor the pure abstraction of the I. Instead, it is I that has otherness within it, but as a thought difference, so that in its otherness it has immediately returned into itself. Yet this essence of its own is at the same time only an *abstract* essence. The freedom of self-consciousness is *indifferent* to natural existence and has therefore *equally released it freely*. The *reflection* is *doubled*. Freedom in thought has only *pure thought* as its truth, without the fullness of life. So it is also only the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself. For so far only *thinking* in general is its essence: form as such, which has returned into itself away from the independence of things. But individuality is supposed either to present itself as living in action or, as thinking, to grasp the living world as a system of thought. In *thought itself*, therefore, there would have to be a *content*: of what is good for the former expansion, and of what is true for the latter. Then *throughout what is for consciousness* there would be no other ingredient than the concept, which is essence. But as it separates itself here as an *abstraction* from the multiplicity of things, it has *no content within itself*, but *a given content*. Consciousness does indeed eradicate the content as an alien *being* by thinking it. But the [1807 134] concept is a *determinate* concept, and this *determinacy* of its own is the alien element within it. Stoicism was therefore embarrassed when asked, as the expression went, for the *criterion* of truth in general—that is, really, for a *content of thought itself*. Asked *what* is good and true, it answered

again with *contentless* thinking itself: truth and goodness were supposed to consist in rationality. But this self-sameness of thinking is again only pure form in which nothing is determined. The general words about truth and goodness, wisdom and virtue, at which Stoicism must stop, may therefore be uplifting in general. But because they cannot in fact reach any expansion of content, they soon begin to bore.

201 Thus this thinking consciousness, as it has determined itself as abstract freedom, is only the incomplete negation of otherness. Merely *withdrawn* into itself from existence, it has not accomplished itself within itself as the absolute negation of existence. For it, content counts only as thought, but at the same time as *determinate* thought, and determinacy as such also counts.

202 *Skepticism* is the realization of what Stoicism is only the concept of, and the actual experience of what freedom of thought [1807 135] is. This freedom is *in itself* the negative and must present itself as such. With self-consciousness's reflection into the simple thought of itself, independent existence or enduring determinacy has in fact fallen out of infinity and stands opposite that reflection. In skepticism, the complete inessentiality and dependence of this other now comes to be *for consciousness*. Thought becomes complete thinking that destroys the being of the *multiply determined* world. The negativity of free self-consciousness becomes for itself real negativity in this manifold shaping of life. Clearly, just as Stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of *independent* consciousness that appeared as the relation of mastery and servitude, skepticism corresponds to its *realization* as the negative direction toward otherness, desire and work. But whereas desire and work could not carry out negation for self-consciousness, this polemical direction against the manifold independence of things will succeed. For it turns against them as free self-consciousness already completed within itself. More precisely, it has *thinking*, or infinity, within itself, and in this the independent things, in their difference, are for it only disappearing magnitudes. The differences that in pure thinking of itself are only the [1807 136] abstraction of differences here become *all* differences. All differentiated being becomes a difference of self-consciousness.

203 The *action* of *skepticism* in general and its *manner* are thereby determined. It points out the *dialectical movement* that sensory certainty, perception, and understanding are. It likewise points out the inessentiality of what counts as *determinate* in the relation of ruling and serving and for abstract thinking itself. That relation also includes a *determinate manner* in which ethical laws are present as commands of mastery. The determinations in abstract thinking, however, are concepts of science. Contentless thinking expands into these, attaches the concept in what is in fact only an external way to the being that is independent for it and forms its content, and takes only *determinate* concepts as valid, even if they are pure abstractions.

204 The *dialectical*, as negative movement in the way it immediately *is*, initially appears to consciousness as something to which it is surrendered and that is not through consciousness itself. As *skepticism*, however, it is a moment of self-consciousness. Here it does not simply *happen* to self-consciousness that its truth and reality disappear without its knowing how. Instead, certain of its freedom, self-consciousness itself makes this other that claims to be real [1807 137] disappear. It makes disappear not only the objective as such, but its own behavior toward it, in which it counts and is asserted as objective. Thus it also makes disappear its *perceiving*, its *fixing* of what it is in danger of losing—*sophistry*—and its *truth determined and established from itself*. Through this self-conscious negation, consciousness acquires *for itself the certainty of its freedom*, produces the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to *truth*. What disappears is the determinate, or difference that sets itself up as fixed and unchangeable, in whatever manner and from whatever source. It has nothing enduring within it and *must* disappear before thinking. For what is differentiated is precisely this: not to be *within itself*, but to have its essentiality only in another. Thinking, however, is insight into this nature of what is differentiated. It is negative essence as simple.

205 Thus, amid the change of everything that wants to establish itself firmly for it, skeptical self-consciousness experiences its own freedom as given and preserved through itself. It is for itself this calm of thinking itself, the unchangeable and

genuine certainty of itself. This certainty does not emerge from an alien thing whose manifold development collapsed into itself, as a result that would have its becoming behind it. Instead, consciousness itself is *absolute dialectical restlessness*: [1807 138] this mixture of sensory and thought representations whose differences collapse and whose *equality* equally dissolves again, since equality is itself *determinacy* against the *unequal*. But precisely in this, instead of being self-identical consciousness, this consciousness is in fact only a wholly accidental confusion, the dizziness of a disorder constantly producing itself. *It is this for itself*, since it itself maintains and produces this moving confusion. It therefore also admits this: it admits being an entirely *accidental, individual* consciousness—an *empirical* consciousness that follows what has no reality for it, obeys what is no essence for it, and does and actualizes what has no truth for it. But just as in this way it counts for itself as *individual, accidental*, and in fact animal life, and as *lost* self-consciousness, it conversely makes itself once more into the *universal, self-identical* consciousness. For it is the negativity of all individuality and all difference. From this self-sameness—or rather within it—it falls back into that accident and confusion. For this very moving negativity deals only with individual things and busies itself with the accidental. This consciousness is therefore this unconscious rambling, going back and forth from one extreme, self-identical self-consciousness, to the other, [1807 139] accidental, confused, and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. At *one time* it recognizes its freedom as elevation above all confusion and all the accident of existence; at *another* it equally admits itself to be a relapse into *inessentiality* and a wandering about within it. It makes inessential content disappear in its thinking, but in doing so it is consciousness of something inessential. It declares absolute *disappearance*, but the *declaring is*, and this consciousness is the disappearance declared. It declares the nullity of seeing, hearing, and so on, and *it itself sees, hears*, and so on. It declares the nullity of ethical essences and itself makes them the powers of its action. Its action and its words always contradict one another. Likewise, it itself has the double, contradictory consciousness of unchangeability and self-sameness, and of complete accident and inequality with itself. But it keeps this self-

contradiction apart, behaving here as it does in its purely negative movement generally. If *equality* is pointed out to it, it points out *inequality*. And when this inequality, which it has just expressed, is now held up to it, it moves on to pointing out *equality*. Its talk is in fact the bickering of stubborn [1807 140] boys: one says A when the other says B, and B again when the other says A. By contradicting *themselves*, they buy the pleasure of remaining in contradiction *with one another*.

206 In skepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as a consciousness that contradicts itself. This experience produces a *new shape* that brings together the two thoughts skepticism keeps apart. Skepticism's thoughtlessness about itself must disappear, because it is actually *one* consciousness that contains both these ways of being. The new shape is therefore a consciousness that is *for itself* the doubled consciousness of itself: of itself as freeing itself, unchanging, and self-identical, and of itself as utterly confusing and reversing itself. It is also consciousness of this contradiction. In stoicism, self-consciousness is its own simple freedom. In skepticism, this freedom becomes real and destroys the other side, determinate existence. But instead it doubles *itself* and now finds itself twofold. The doubling previously divided between two individuals, lord and servant, has thus returned into one. Self-consciousness's doubling within itself, which is essential to the concept of spirit, is now present, but its unity is not yet present. *Unhappy consciousness* is consciousness [1807 141] of itself as a doubled being that only contradicts itself.

207 Because the contradiction in its being is *one* consciousness, this *unhappy consciousness, divided within itself*, must always contain the other consciousness within either one. Just when it thinks it has won and reached the peace of unity, it must immediately be driven out of each again. Its true return into itself, or reconciliation with itself, will present the concept of spirit that has come alive and entered existence. For it already has this feature: as one undivided consciousness, it is doubled. It *is* itself one self-consciousness looking into another. It *is* itself both, and it also takes their unity as its essence. But *for itself* it is not yet this essence itself, not yet their unity.

208 At first it is only the *immediate unity* of the two. For it, however, they are not the same but opposed. So it regards one, the simple and unchanging, as *essential*, and the other, the varied and changing, as *inessential*. *For it*, the two are beings alien to each other. Since it is consciousness of this contradiction, it places itself on the side of changing consciousness and regards itself as inessential. Yet as consciousness of the unchanging, or simple essence, it must also seek [1807 142] to free itself from the inessential—that is, from itself. For although *for itself* it is only the changing consciousness, and the unchanging is something alien to it, *it is itself* simple and therefore unchanging consciousness. It is thus conscious of this as *its* essence, yet in such a way that *it itself*, for itself, is again not this essence. The position it gives the two therefore cannot be one of indifference toward each other: it cannot itself be indifferent to the unchanging. Instead, it immediately is both itself. For it, *their relationship* is the relationship of essence to what lacks essence, so that the latter must be sublated. Yet since both are equally essential to it and contradictory, it is only the contradictory movement in which an opposite does not find rest in its opposite, but only produces itself anew there as an opposite.

209 This is a struggle against an enemy in which victory is instead defeat, and attaining one thing instead means losing it in its opposite. Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only pain over this existence and activity. In them it is conscious only of its opposite as the essence, and of its own nothingness. It passes from this to rising toward the unchanging. But this rising is itself this consciousness. It is therefore immediately [1807 143] consciousness of the opposite, namely of itself as an individual. The unchanging that enters consciousness is thereby also touched by individuality and present only along with it. Instead of being erased in consciousness of the unchanging, individuality keeps emerging within it.

210 In this movement, however, it experiences precisely this *emergence of individuality in the unchanging* and *of the unchanging in individuality*. *For it*, individuality *in general comes to be in* the unchanging essence, and at the same time its *own* individuality comes to be there. For the truth of this movement is precisely

the *oneness* of this doubled consciousness. *This unity comes to be for it*, but *at first* as a unity *in which the difference* between the two still dominates. It therefore has three ways in which individuality is linked with the unchanging. *First*, it again emerges for itself as opposed to the unchanging essence. It is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which remains the element of the whole relationship. *Second*, the *unchanging* itself has *individuality in it* for consciousness, so that individuality is a shape of the unchanging. The whole manner of existence thus passes over to the unchanging. *Third*, consciousness finds *itself* as this individual in the unchanging. The *first* unchanging is for it only the *alien* essence that condemns individuality. [1807 144] Since the *second* is a *shape of individuality* like itself, it becomes, *third*, spirit. It has the joy of finding itself in it and becomes conscious that its individuality is reconciled with the universal.

211 What appears here as the way the unchanging is and relates has emerged as the *experience* divided self-consciousness undergoes in its unhappiness. This experience is not, admittedly, *its one-sided* movement. It is itself unchanging consciousness, which is therefore also individual consciousness. The movement is just as much the movement of unchanging consciousness, which appears in it as much as the other does. For the movement runs through these moments: first, the unchanging is opposed to the individual in general; then, itself individual, it is opposed to the other individual; finally, it is one with it. But this consideration, insofar as it belongs to us, is premature here. So far, what has emerged for us is only unchangeability as the unchangeability of consciousness. This is therefore not true unchangeability but still burdened with an opposition. The unchanging *in and for itself* has not emerged. We therefore do not know how it will behave. All that has emerged here is that these indicated determinations of the unchanging appear to the consciousness that is our object here.
[1807 145]

212 For this reason, unchanging *consciousness*, even in taking shape, retains the character and basis of division and of being for itself over against individual consciousness. For the latter, the unchanging's receiving the shape of individuality is therefore something that simply *happens*. Likewise, it only *finds* itself opposed to the unchanging, and so has this relationship *by nature*. Its finally *finding itself* in the unchanging does appear to it partly as something it has brought about itself, or as occurring because it is itself individual. But part of this unity belongs to the unchanging, both in its coming about and in its being. The opposition remains within this unity itself. In fact, the unchanging's *taking shape* has not merely preserved its character as a beyond, but strengthened it. On one side, the shape of individual actuality seems to have brought it nearer. On the other, it now confronts consciousness as an opaque, sensory *one*, with all the unyielding resistance of something *actual*. The hope of becoming one with it must remain hope—that is, without fulfillment and presence. For between hope and fulfillment stands precisely the absolute contingency or immovable indifference inherent in the taking of shape that grounds this hope. Because of the nature of the *existing one*, because of the actuality it has [1807 146] taken on, it necessarily has disappeared in time and has been distant in space, and remains absolutely distant.

213 At first, the mere concept of divided consciousness was determined as seeking to sublate itself as an individual and become unchanging consciousness. Its striving is now determined differently. It must instead sublate its relationship to the pure, *unshaped* unchanging and relate itself only to *the unchanging that has taken shape*. For the *oneness* of the individual with the unchanging is now its *essence* and *object*, just as, in the concept, the essential object was only the shapeless, abstract unchanging. The relationship of absolute division belonging to that concept is now what it must turn away from. But it must raise its initially external relationship to the unchanging that has taken shape, as an alien actuality, into absolute oneness.

214 The movement in which inessential consciousness strives to reach this oneness is itself *threefold*. It follows the threefold relationship it will have to its beyond that has taken shape: first as *pure consciousness*; second as an *individual being* relating to *actuality* through desire and work; and third as *consciousness of its being-for-itself*. We must now see how these three ways of being are present and determined within that general [1807 147] relationship.

215 First, consider it as *pure consciousness*. Since the unchanging that has taken shape exists for pure consciousness, it seems to be posited as it is in and for itself. But as already noted, what it is in and for itself has not yet emerged. Its being in consciousness as it is in and for itself would have to come from it rather than from consciousness. Here, however, its presence exists only one-sidedly through consciousness. For that very reason it is not complete and true, but remains burdened with incompleteness or an opposition.

216 Although unhappy consciousness does not possess this presence, it has also gone beyond pure thinking in the forms of stoicism's abstract thinking, which *looks away from individuality* altogether, and skepticism's merely *restless* thinking—which is really only individuality as an unconscious contradiction and its ceaseless movement. It has gone beyond both. It brings pure thinking and individuality together and keeps them together. But it has not yet risen to the thinking *for which* the individuality of consciousness is reconciled with pure thinking itself. Instead, it stands at the midpoint where abstract thinking touches the individuality of consciousness [1807 148] as individuality. It itself *is* this contact. It is the unity of pure thinking and individuality. *For it*, too, it is this thinking individuality, or pure thinking, and the unchanging itself is essentially individuality. But it does not see *for itself* that this object of its own—the unchanging, which for it essentially has the shape of individuality—is *itself*: itself as the individuality of consciousness.

217 In this first way, then, in which we consider it as *pure consciousness*, it does not *relate to its object* through thinking. Admittedly, it is *in itself* pure thinking individuality, and its object is the same. But their *relationship to each other is not*

itself pure thinking. So it only approaches thinking, so to speak, and is *devotion*. Its thinking as such remains the shapeless sound of ringing bells, or a warm, misty fullness: a musical thinking that does not reach the concept, which would be the only immanent way of being objective. Its object does come to this infinite, pure, inward feeling. But it enters as something not grasped conceptually and therefore alien. What is present, then, is the inward movement of the *pure* heart, which *feels* itself, but painfully, as division. It is the movement of infinite *longing*, certain that its essence is such a pure heart, pure *thinking* [1807 149] that *thinks itself as an individual*. It is certain that this object knows and recognizes it, precisely because the object thinks itself as an individual. At the same time, however, this essence is the unreachable *beyond*, which escapes as it is grasped, or rather has already escaped. It has already escaped because, on one side, it is the unchanging that thinks itself as an individual. Consciousness therefore immediately reaches itself in it: *itself*, but as *what is opposed to the unchanging*. Instead of grasping the essence, it only *feels* and has fallen back into itself. As it reaches, it cannot prevent itself from being this opposite. So instead of grasping the essence, it has grasped only inessentiality. Thus, on one side, while striving to reach *itself in the essence*, it grasps only its own separate actuality. On the other side, it cannot grasp the other *as an individual*, or as something *actual*. Wherever it is sought, it cannot be found. For it is meant to be precisely *a beyond*, something that cannot be found. Sought as an individual, it is not a *universal individuality* in thought, not a concept, but an *individual* as object, or something *actual*: an object of immediate sense-certainty, and for that very reason only something that has vanished. Thus only the *grave* of its life can become present to consciousness. But the grave is itself an *actuality*, and it is contrary [1807 150] to actuality's nature to grant lasting possession. So even this presence of the grave is only the struggle of an effort that must be lost. Yet consciousness has now experienced that *the grave* of its *actual*, unchanging essence has *no actuality*, and that *vanished individuality*, as vanished, is not true individuality. It will therefore give up searching for

unchanging individuality as *actual*, or holding onto it as vanished. Only through this does it become capable of finding individuality as true, or as universal.

218 At first, however, the *heart's return into itself* must be taken to mean that it has actuality for itself as an *individual*. It is the *pure heart* that *for us*, or *in itself*, has found itself and is satisfied within itself. Although *for it* the essence separates itself from it in its feeling, this feeling is in itself *self*-feeling. It has felt the object of its pure feeling, and this object is itself. It thus emerges as self-feeling, or as something actual that exists for itself. In this return into itself, its *second relationship* has come about for us: desire and work. By sublating and enjoying the alien essence—namely, that essence in the form of independent things—these confirm for consciousness the inner certainty of itself that it has attained for us. But unhappy consciousness only *finds* itself as *[1807 151] desiring* and *working*. It does not see that this finding itself rests on its inner certainty of itself, or that its feeling of the essence is this self-feeling. Since it does not possess that certainty *for itself*, its inner life instead remains a fractured certainty of itself. The confirmation it would gain through work and enjoyment is therefore equally *fractured*. Or rather, it must itself destroy this confirmation for itself. It does find confirmation there, but only of what it is for itself: its division.

219 For this consciousness, the actuality toward which desire and work turn is no longer something *inherently nothing*, which it need only sublate and consume. Instead, like consciousness itself, it is an *actuality broken in two*. Only on one side is it inherently nothing; on the other it is also a sanctified world. It is a shape of the unchanging, for the unchanging has acquired individuality within itself. And because as the unchanging it is universal, its individuality has the meaning of all actuality in general.

220 If consciousness were independent consciousness for itself, and actuality were nothing in and for itself, consciousness would reach the feeling of its independence through work and enjoyment. For it would itself be what [1807 152] sublated actuality. But since actuality is for it a shape of the unchanging, it can-

not sublate actuality by itself. Rather, although it does destroy and enjoy actuality, for it this happens essentially because the unchanging itself *surrenders* its shape and *hands it over* for enjoyment. Consciousness, on its side, *likewise* appears here as actual, but also as inwardly broken. In its work and enjoyment, this division shows itself as a split into a *relationship to actuality*, or *being-for-itself*, and a *being-in-itself*. The relationship to actuality is *changing* or *doing*, the being-for-itself that belongs to *individual* consciousness as such. But within this it also is *in itself*. This side belongs to the unchanging beyond. It consists of capacities and powers, an alien gift that the unchanging likewise hands over to consciousness to use.

221 In its activity, then, consciousness is initially in a relationship between two extremes. On one side it stands as the active here-and-now, facing passive actuality. Both relate to each other, but both have also withdrawn into the unchanging and hold fast within themselves. From either side, therefore, only a surface breaks loose toward the other and enters into the play of movement against it. The extreme of actuality is sublated by the active extreme. Yet on its [1807 153] side, actuality can be sublated only because its unchanging essence itself sublates it, repels it from itself, and surrenders what has been repelled to activity. Active force appears as *the power* in which actuality dissolves. But for this consciousness, to which the *in-itself*, or essence, is something other than itself, this power—which it manifests in its activity—is beyond itself. Instead of returning into itself from its activity and having confirmed itself for itself, it reflects this movement of activity back into the other extreme. That extreme is thereby presented as purely universal, as the absolute power from which the movement has proceeded in every direction. It is the essence both of the dissolving extremes as they first appeared, and of the exchange itself.

222 Unchanging consciousness *renounces* its shape and *surrenders* it. Individual consciousness, in turn, *gives thanks*: it *denies itself* the satisfaction of being conscious of its *independence* and assigns the essence of its activity to the beyond rather than to itself. Through these two moments of both sides *mutually giving themselves up*, consciousness does acquire its *unity* with the unchanging. Yet

this unity is also affected by separation and broken again within itself. The opposition of universal and individual reappears from it. For [1807 154] consciousness renounces the satisfaction of its self-feeling only *in appearance*. It gains *actual* satisfaction of that feeling, since *it has* desired, worked, and enjoyed. As consciousness, *it has willed, acted*, and *enjoyed*. Its *thanks*, too, in which it recognizes the other extreme as the essence and sublates itself, is *its own* activity. This balances the activity of the other extreme and sets an *equal* activity against the benefit that surrenders itself. If the other yields its *surface* to consciousness, consciousness *also* gives thanks. In doing so, it gives up its activity itself—that is, its *essence*—and actually does more than the other, which merely casts off a surface. The whole movement thus reflects itself into the *extreme of individuality*, not only in actual desire, work, and enjoyment, but even in giving thanks, where the opposite seems to happen. Consciousness feels itself there as this individual. It is not deceived by the appearance of its renunciation, for the truth is that it has not given itself up. What has come about is only the doubled reflection into the two extremes. The result is a renewed split into the opposed consciousness of the *unchanging* and the consciousness of the *opposing* willing, accomplishing, enjoying, and self-renunciation itself—in short, of *individuality that is for itself*.
[1807 155]

223 This brings us to the *third relationship* in this consciousness's movement. It emerges from the second as a consciousness that has truly proved itself independent through its willing and accomplishing. In the first relationship it was only the *concept* of actual consciousness, or the *inward heart*, not yet actual in activity and enjoyment. The *second* is this actualization as outward activity and enjoyment. Having returned from this, it has *experienced* itself as actual and active consciousness. It is *true* for it that it exists *in and for itself*. But now the enemy has been discovered in its most characteristic shape. In the heart's struggle, individual consciousness is only a musical, abstract moment. In work and enjoyment, as the realization of this being without essence, it can immediately

forget *itself*. Consciousness of its *own distinctness* within this actuality is beaten down by thankful recognition. But this beating down is truly a return of consciousness into itself, specifically into itself as what it regards as true actuality.

224 This third relationship, in which this true actuality is one extreme, is the *relationship* of that actuality, as something null, to the universal essence. We must still examine the movement of this relationship.
[1807 156]

225 First consider consciousness's oppositional relationship, in which its *reality is immediately nothing* for it. Its actual activity thus becomes an activity of nothing, and its enjoyment becomes the feeling of its unhappiness. Activity and enjoyment thereby lose all *universal content and meaning*, since these would give them being in and for themselves. Both withdraw into individuality, which consciousness aims to sublate. Consciousness is aware of itself as *this actual individual* in its animal functions. These functions should be performed without self-conscious concern, as something inherently nothing that can acquire no importance or essential significance for spirit. Instead, because the enemy shows itself in its characteristic shape in them, they become the object of serious effort, and indeed the most important thing. But this enemy produces itself in its defeat. By fixing on it, consciousness always dwells on it instead of freeing itself, and always sees itself as defiled. Moreover, the content of its striving is the lowest rather than something essential, the most particular rather than something universal. So we see only a personality confined to itself and its little activity, brooding over itself, as unhappy as it is impoverished.

226 But both the feeling of its unhappiness and the poverty of its activity are also connected [1807 157] with consciousness of its unity with the unchanging. For its attempted immediate destruction of its actual being is *mediated* by the thought of the unchanging and occurs in this *relationship*. The *mediated* relationship forms the essence of the negative movement in which it turns against its individuality. Yet as a *relationship in itself*, this is also positive and will produce this *unity* for consciousness itself.

227 This mediated relationship is thus a syllogism. Individuality, which initially fixes itself as opposed to the *in-itself*, is joined to this other extreme only through a third term. Through this middle term, the extreme of unchanging consciousness exists for inessential consciousness. This also involves inessential consciousness existing for unchanging consciousness only through this middle term. The middle thus presents the two extremes to each other and serves each in dealing with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious being, since it is an activity that mediates consciousness as such. The content of this activity is the destruction consciousness carries out upon its individuality.

228 In this, then, consciousness frees itself from activity and enjoyment as *its own*. As the extreme that *is for itself*, it casts off the essence of its *will*. It puts onto the middle term, or servant, the [1807 158] ownership and freedom of decision, and with them the *guilt* for its activity. This mediator, directly related to the unchanging essence, serves it with *advice* about what is right. Since the action follows another's decision, it ceases to be its own on the side of activity or *will*. But its *objective* side still belongs to inessential consciousness: the *fruit* of its work and its *enjoyment*. So it casts this off as well. Just as it renounces its will, it renounces the *actuality* acquired in work and enjoyment. It renounces this *partly* as the attained truth of its self-conscious *independence*, by occupying itself with imagining and saying something wholly alien and meaningless to it; partly as *external property*, by giving away some of the possessions earned through work; and partly as the *enjoyment* it has had, by completely denying itself enjoyment again through fasting and mortification.

229 Through these moments—giving up its own decision, then its property and enjoyment, and finally the positive moment of pursuing a task it does not understand—it truly and completely deprives itself of consciousness of inward and outward freedom, of actuality as its *being-for-itself*. It is certain that it has truly alienated its *I* and made its immediate self-consciousness into a *[1807 159] thing*, an objective being. Only through this *actual* sacrifice could it confirm its self-renunciation. For only here does the *deception* disappear that lies in the *inward* recognition expressed by giving thanks in heart, attitude, and

speech. Such recognition does shift all the power of being-for-itself away from itself and attribute it to a gift from above. Yet in this very shifting it retains its *outward* distinctness in the possessions it does not give up, and its *inward* distinctness in consciousness of the decision it has itself made. It also retains consciousness of the content it has itself determined, which it has not exchanged for an alien content that fills it without meaning.

230 But in the sacrifice actually carried out, its *unhappiness* has also left it *in itself*, just as consciousness has sublated *activity* as its own. That this release has happened *in itself*, however, is an activity of the syllogism's other extreme, which is the essence that *is in itself*. Yet the sacrifice of the inessential extreme was not one-sided activity either. It contained the activity of the other. For giving up one's own will is negative only on one side. *In its concept*, or *in itself*, it is also positive: it posits will as the will of *another*, and specifically as a will that is not individual but universal. For this [1807 160] consciousness, this positive meaning of the negated individual will is the will of the other extreme. Precisely because that extreme is other for it, this will comes to it not through itself but through the third term, the mediator, as advice. Thus *for it*, its will does become universal will, will that *is in itself*. But *it itself does not* regard itself as this *in-itself*. Giving up its will as *individual* is not, for it, conceptually the positive character of universal will. Likewise, giving up possession and enjoyment has only the same negative meaning. The universal that thereby comes to be for it is not its *own activity* for it. This *unity* of objective being and being-for-itself lies in the *concept* of activity, and therefore becomes essence and *object* for consciousness. Yet just as consciousness does not grasp it as the concept of its activity, neither does it see that this unity becomes an object *for it* immediately and through itself. Instead, it has the mediating servant pronounce this still fractured certainty: only *in itself* is its unhappiness the reverse of what it seems—activity that satisfies itself in its own activity, or blessed enjoyment. Likewise, its impoverished activity is *in itself* its reverse, namely absolute activity. According to the concept, activity is activity at all only as an individual's activity. But *for consciousness itself*, activity, including its actual activity, remains impoverished,

and its enjoyment remains pain. Their sublated condition [1807 161], in its positive meaning, remains a *beyond*. Yet in this object, in which its activity and being as this *individual* consciousness are being and activity *in themselves*, the representation of *reason* has arisen for it: consciousness's certainty that in its individuality it is absolutely *in itself*, or is all reality.

V. Reason

[1807 162]

V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason.

231 In grasping the thought that *individual* consciousness is *in itself* absolute essence, consciousness returns into itself. For unhappy consciousness, *being-in-itself* is the *beyond* of itself. But its movement has accomplished this: it has posited individuality in its full development—individuality that is *actual consciousness*—as its own *negative*, namely as the *objective* extreme. It has wrested its being-for-itself out of itself and made it into being. In this, its *unity* with this universal has also come about for it. For us this unity no longer falls outside it, since the sublated individual is the universal. And since consciousness preserves itself in this negativity of its own, this unity is its essence within consciousness as such. Its truth is what appears as the middle term in the syllogism whose extremes appeared absolutely separated. This middle term tells unchanging consciousness that [1807 163] the individual has renounced itself, and tells the individual that the unchanging is no longer an extreme for it but is reconciled with it. This middle is the unity that immediately knows both and relates them. It is consciousness of their unity, which it declares to consciousness and thereby to *itself*: the certainty of being all truth.

232 Since self-consciousness is reason, its previously negative relationship to otherness turns into a positive one. Until now, its concern has been only its independence and freedom: saving and preserving itself for itself at the expense of the *world* or its own actuality. Both appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as reason, assured of itself, it has gained peace toward them and can tolerate them. For it is certain of itself as reality, or certain that all actuality is nothing other than itself. Its thinking is immediately actuality itself. It therefore relates to actuality as idealism. In grasping itself this way, it feels as though the world has only now come into being for it. Previously it does not understand the world. It desires and works on it, withdraws from it into itself, and destroys it for itself. It also destroys itself as consciousness: as consciousness of the world as essence, and as consciousness of its nothingness. Only now, after the grave of its truth has been lost, the destruction of its actuality itself [1807 164] destroyed, and the individuality of consciousness has become absolute essence in itself for it, does it discover the world as *its* new actual world. The world's persistence now interests it, just as previously only its disappearance did. For the world's *continuance* becomes its own *truth* and *presence*. It is certain of experiencing only itself in it.

233 Reason is consciousness's certainty of being all reality. This is how idealism states its concept. Just as consciousness *appearing* as reason *immediately* has this certainty within it, *idealism* also states it *immediately*: I am I. Here the I that is my object is not, as in self-consciousness in general, merely an *empty* object in general. Nor is it, as in free self-consciousness, merely an object withdrawing from others that still count *alongside* it. Instead it is an object accompanied by consciousness of the *nonbeing* of anything else: the sole object, all reality and presence. But self-consciousness is all reality not only *for itself* but also *in itself* only by *becoming* this reality—or rather, by *proving itself* to be so. It proves this along the *path* on which otherness disappears *for consciousness itself*: first, otherness as *being-in-itself*, in the dialectical movement of meaning, perceiving, and understanding; then otherness insofar as it is only *for consciousness*, through the independence of consciousness in lordship and servitude, the

thought of freedom, skeptical [1807 165] liberation, and the struggle for absolute liberation by consciousness divided within itself. Two sides appeared in succession. On one side, essence or truth had the determination of *being* for consciousness; on the other, it had the determination of being only *for consciousness*. But both reduced themselves to one truth: what *is*, or the *in-itself*, is only insofar as it is *for* consciousness, and what is *for consciousness* also is *in itself*. When consciousness, which is this truth, appears *immediately* as reason, it has this path behind it and has forgotten it. Or, this reason appearing immediately appears only as the *certainty* of that truth. It therefore merely *asserts* that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this. For the forgotten path is the conceptual comprehension of this immediately stated claim. Likewise, anyone who has not traveled that path finds the claim incomprehensible on hearing it in this pure form, although in a concrete shape they may indeed make it themselves.

234 Idealism that does not present this path but begins with this claim is therefore also a mere *assertion*. It neither comprehends itself nor can make itself comprehensible to others. It states an *immediate certainty* opposed by other immediate certainties, which have been lost only along that path. Thus the *assertions* of those other certainties stand with equal right *alongside* the *[1807 166] assertion* of this one. Reason appeals to the *self*-consciousness of every consciousness: *I am I*; my object and essence is *I*. No consciousness will deny it this truth. But by grounding the truth in this appeal, reason sanctions the truth of the other certainty: *there is something other for me*. Something other than *I* is my object and essence. Or, insofar as *I* am my object and essence, I am so only by withdrawing from the other in general and taking my place as an actuality *alongside* it. Only when reason appears as *reflection* out of this opposed certainty does its claim about itself appear not merely as certainty and assertion but as *truth*: not *alongside* others, but as the *only* truth. Its *immediate appearance* is an abstraction from its *being present*, whose *essence* and *being-in-itself* is the absolute concept—that is, the *movement of its having become*. Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness, or its object, differently according to the stage it

occupies in world spirit's becoming conscious of itself. How spirit *immediately* finds and determines itself and its object each time, or how it is *for itself*, depends on what it has already *become*, or what it already is *in itself*.
[1807 167]

235 Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*. But this *in-itself*, or this *reality*, is still entirely universal: the pure *abstraction* of reality. It is the first *positivity* that self-consciousness is *within itself, for itself*. The I is therefore only the *pure essentiality* of what exists, or the simple *category*. Previously the *category* meant the essentiality of what exists—*indeterminately*, of what exists in general, or of what exists over against consciousness. Now it is the *essentiality*, or simple *unity*, of what exists only as thinking actuality. Or it means that self-consciousness and being are *the same* essence: *the same* not by comparison but in and for themselves. Only one-sided, bad idealism lets this unity step back onto one side as consciousness, with an *in-itself* facing it. Now this category, or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being, contains *difference* within itself. For its essence is precisely to be immediately self-identical in *otherness*, or absolute difference. Difference therefore *is*, but is completely transparent, and is a difference that is also no difference. It appears as a *multiplicity* of categories. Idealism declares the *simple unity* of self-consciousness to be all reality and *immediately* makes it the essence, without comprehending it as absolutely negative essence—only such an essence contains negation, determinacy, or difference [1807 168] within itself. So its second claim, that the category contains *differences* or *kinds*, is even more incomprehensible than its first. This assertion in general, like the assertion of any *definite number* of its kinds, is a new assertion. Yet it implies that we must no longer accept it merely as an assertion. For when *difference* begins in the pure I, in pure understanding itself, this means that *immediacy*, *asserting*, and *finding* must be abandoned here and *conceptual comprehension* must begin. To take up the multiplicity of categories again as something found in some way—for example, from judgments—and simply accept them like this must indeed be considered a disgrace to science. Where could understanding still demonstrate necessity if it cannot do so in itself, which is pure necessity?

236 Since both the pure essentiality of things and their difference thus belong to reason, strictly speaking we could no longer speak of *things* at all: of something that would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself. For saying that the many categories are *kinds* of the pure category means that *it* is still their *genus* or *essence*, not opposed to them. But they are already ambiguous: in their *multiplicity* they also contain otherness [1807 169] *over against* the pure category. Through this multiplicity they actually contradict it. Pure unity must sublate them within itself, thereby constituting itself as the *negative unity* of differences. But as *negative* unity it excludes both the *differences* as such and that first *immediate* pure unity as such. It is *individuality*: a new category that is excluding consciousness, meaning that *something other* exists for it. Individuality is the category's transition from its concept to an *external* reality. It is the pure *schema*, which is both consciousness and, because it is individuality and an excluding one, a pointing toward something other. But this category's *other* consists only of the *other, first categories*, namely *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*. Within individuality—that is, precisely in the positing of the other, or in this other itself—consciousness is equally itself. Each of these distinct moments refers to another, but in them no otherness comes about either. The pure category refers to the *kinds*, which pass into the negative category, or individuality. Individuality, however, points back to them. It is itself pure consciousness, which in each category remains this clear unity with itself. Yet this unity is equally referred to another, which has vanished as soon as it is, and is produced again as soon as it has vanished.
[1807 170]

237 Here we see pure consciousness posited in two ways. First, as a restless *back-and-forth movement* running through all its moments, with otherness hovering before it in them, only to be sublated when grasped. Second, as the *resting unity* certain of its truth. For this unity, that movement is the *other*; for the movement, the resting unity is the other. Consciousness and object alternate in these reciprocal determinations. Thus at one time consciousness regards itself as the searching that moves back and forth, and its object as the *pure in-itself*

and essence. At another, consciousness regards itself as the simple category and its object as the movement of differences. But consciousness as essence is this entire course itself: passing from itself as simple category into individuality and the object; intuiting this course in the object; sublating it as something distinct; *appropriating* it; and declaring itself to be this certainty of being all reality, both itself and its object.

238 Its first declaration is only the abstract, empty statement that everything is *its own*. For the certainty of being all reality is at first only the pure category. Empty idealism expresses reason in this first recognition of itself in the object. It grasps reason only as reason initially is for itself. [1807 171] By showing this pure *mine* of consciousness in all being and describing things as sensations or representations, it imagines it has demonstrated this mine as complete reality. It must therefore also be absolute empiricism. For to *fill* the empty *mine*—to supply its differences and all its development and shaping—its reason needs an alien stimulus, in which alone the *variety* of sensation or representation would lie. This idealism therefore becomes the same self-contradictory ambiguity as skepticism. The only difference is that skepticism expresses itself negatively, idealism positively. Idealism no more brings its contradictory thoughts together: pure consciousness as all reality, and the alien stimulus, or sensory sensation and representation, as equally real. Instead it throws itself back and forth between them and has fallen into bad infinity, namely sensory infinity. Since reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract *mine*, while the *other* is something *indifferently alien* to it, precisely that knowledge of another is posited in reason which appeared as *meaning*, *perception*, and the *understanding* that grasps what is meant and perceived. The concept [1807 172] of this idealism itself also declares such knowledge untrue: only the unity of apperception is the truth of knowledge. Thus, to reach this *other* that is *essential* to it—that is, the *in-itself*—but which it does not have within itself, the pure reason of this idealism sends itself back to knowledge that is not knowledge of truth. It knowingly and willingly condemns itself to untrue knowledge. It cannot let go of meaning and perception, which for it itself have no truth. It is caught in the immediate

contradiction of asserting two absolutely opposed things as essence: the *unity of apperception* and equally the *thing*. Whether called an *alien stimulus*, an *empirical* essence, *sensibility*, or *the thing in itself*, this thing remains in its concept the same thing alien to that unity.

239 This idealism is caught in this contradiction because it asserts the *abstract concept* of reason as truth. Thus reality immediately arises for it just as much as something that is not reason's reality, although reason is supposed to be all reality. Reason remains a restless search that declares, in the searching itself, that the satisfaction of finding is absolutely impossible. But [1807 173] actual reason is not so inconsistent. Being at first only the *certainty* of being all reality, it is conscious in this *concept* that, as *certainty*, as *I*, it is not yet reality in truth. It is driven to raise its certainty to truth and fill the *empty* mine.
[1807 174]
A. Observing Reason.

240 We now see this consciousness, for which *being* means *its own*, enter meaning and perceiving again. But it does not enter them as certainty of something merely *other*. It is certain of being this other itself. Previously it merely *happened* to perceive and *experience* various things about an object. Here it conducts observations and experience itself. Meaning and perceiving, which previously sublated themselves for us, are now sublated by consciousness for itself. Reason aims to *know* the truth: to find as a concept what is a thing for meaning and perceiving—that is, to have in thinghood only consciousness of itself. Reason therefore now has a universal *interest* in the world, because it is certain of having its presence in it, or that the present is rational. It seeks its other, knowing that in it it possesses nothing but itself. It seeks only its own infinity.
[1807 175]

241 At first it only dimly senses itself in actuality, or knows actuality only as *its own* in general. In this sense it proceeds to take universal possession of the property assured to it, planting the sign of its sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this superficial mine is not its final interest. In the joy of this univer-

sal taking of possession, it still finds in its property the alien other that abstract reason does not have within itself. Reason senses itself as a deeper essence than the pure I *is*. It must demand that difference, *manifold being*, become its own for it: that it intuit itself as *actuality* and find itself present as shape and thing. But even if reason rummages through all the entrails of things and opens all their veins so that it might spring out of them toward itself, it will not reach this happiness. It must first have completed itself within itself, to be able then to experience its completion.

242 Consciousness *observes*: reason wants to find and have itself as an existing object, in an *actual, sensibly present* form. The consciousness engaged in this observation certainly thinks and says that it wants to experience *not itself* but, on the contrary, *the essence of things as things*. This *consciousness* thinks and says so because it *is* reason, but reason [1807 176] is not yet its object as reason. If it knew *reason* as the same essence of things and itself, and knew that reason can be present in its characteristic shape only in consciousness, it would descend into its own depths and seek reason there rather than in things. Had it found reason in those depths, reason would be directed out again toward actuality, to intuit its sensory expression there, but immediately take this expression essentially as *concept*. Reason, as it appears *immediately* as consciousness's certainty of being all reality, takes its reality in the sense of the *immediacy of being*. Likewise, it takes the unity of the I with this objective essence as an *immediate unity*, within which it has not yet separated and reunited the moments of being and I—a unity it has not yet recognized. As observing consciousness, it therefore approaches things thinking it truly takes them as sensory things opposed to the I. But its actual activity contradicts this view. For it *knows* things. It transforms their sensory character *into concepts*: into a being that is also I. It thus transforms thinking into an existing thinking, or being into a thought being. In fact, it asserts that things have truth only as concepts. In this, observing consciousness discovers only what *things* [1807 177] are; we discover what *it itself* is. But the result of its movement will be that it becomes for itself what it is in itself.

243 We must consider *the activity* of observing reason in the moments of its movement: how it takes up nature, spirit, and finally their relationship as sensory being, and searches for itself as existing actuality.

a. Observation of Nature.

244 When thoughtless consciousness declares observation and experience the source of truth, its words may sound as though tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing, and seeing were all that mattered. In its eagerness to recommend tasting, smelling, and so forth, it forgets to say that it has in fact already determined the object of this sensation for itself, and that this determination matters to it at least as much as sensation does. It will also immediately admit that it is not concerned merely with perception in general. For example, it will not count perceiving that this penknife lies beside this snuffbox as an observation. What is perceived must at least have the meaning of a *universal*, not a *sensory this*. [1807 178]

245 At first this universal is only *what remains self-identical*. Its movement is only the uniform repetition of the same activity. Consciousness, which so far finds only *universality*, or the *abstract mine*, in the object, must take the object's actual movement onto *itself*. Since it is not yet the object's understanding, it must at least be its memory, expressing universally what is present in actuality only individually. This superficial lifting out of individuality, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sensory is merely taken without becoming universal in itself—this *description* of things—does not yet contain movement in the object itself. The movement lies only in describing. Once described, therefore, the object has lost its interest. Once one object is described, another must be taken up and continually sought so that describing does not run out. When new *whole* things are no longer easy to find, one must return to those already found, divide them further, take them apart, and track down new sides of their thinghood. This restless, unquiet instinct can never lack material. Only the fortunate may discover a new distinctive genus, or even a new planet, which, though an individual, still has the nature of a [1807 179] universal. But the boundaries of what is *distinctive*, like the elephant, oak, and

gold—what is a *genus* and *species*—pass through many stages into the infinite *particularization* of chaotic animals and plants, kinds of rock, or metals, earths, and so on that must first be produced by force and art. In this realm of the universal's indeterminacy, particularization approaches *singularity* again and here and there sinks completely back into it. An inexhaustible supply is opened up for observing and describing. But here, where an immense field opens before it, at the boundary of the universal, observation may have found only the limit of nature and its own activity rather than immeasurable wealth. It can no longer know whether what seems to be in itself is not a contingency. Anything bearing the stamp of a confused or immature, weak formation, barely developing out of elemental indeterminacy, cannot claim even to be described.

246 Though this searching and describing seems concerned only with things, we see that it does not actually follow *sensory perception*. What enables things to be *recognized* matters more to it than the remaining range of sensory properties. The [1807 180] thing itself may be unable to do without these, but consciousness dispenses with them. Through this distinction between the *essential* and *inessential*, the concept rises from sensory dispersion. Knowing thereby declares that it is at least as essentially concerned *with itself* as with things. With this double essentiality it begins to waver: is what is essential and necessary for *knowing* also essential and necessary in *things*? On one side, *distinguishing marks* are merely to serve knowing in telling things apart. On the other, what is to be known is not the inessential in things, but that through which they themselves *break away* from the universal continuity of being in general, *separate* themselves from others, and are *for themselves*. Distinguishing marks are to relate essentially not only to knowing. They must also be the essential determinations of things. The artificial system must conform to nature's own system and express only that. This follows necessarily from the concept of reason. Reason's instinct—for in this observing it acts only as instinct—has also reached this unity in its systems where its objects themselves are constituted so as to have essentiality, or *being-for-itself*, within them, rather than being mere accidents of this *moment* or this *here*. The distinguishing marks [1807 181] of

animals, for example, are taken from claws and teeth. For not only does knowing *distinguish* one animal from another by these; the animal itself *separates* itself by them. Through these weapons it maintains itself *for itself* and apart from the universal. The plant, by contrast, does not reach *being-for-itself* but only touches the boundary of individuality. It has therefore been taken up and distinguished at this boundary, where it displays the appearance of *division* into sexes. What stands lower still can no longer distinguish itself from others, but is lost on entering opposition. *Being at rest* and *being in relationship* conflict: in the latter the thing is something different from what it is in the former. The individual, by contrast, is precisely what preserves itself in relation to others. But what cannot do this, and becomes *chemically* something other than what it is *empirically*, confuses knowing and draws it into the same conflict over which side to follow. The thing itself is nothing self-constant, and these sides fall apart within it.

247 In such systems of the universal that remains self-identical, this universal thus means what remains self-identical both in knowing and in things themselves. But this spread of *constant determinations*, each [1807 182] calmly tracing the series of its progression and receiving room to operate for itself, also essentially passes into its opposite: the confusion of these determinations. For the distinguishing mark, the universal determination, is the unity of opposites: the determinate and what is universal in itself. It must therefore divide into this opposition. On one side, determinacy defeats the universal in which it has its essence. On the other, however, the universal equally maintains its rule over determinacy, drives it to its limit, and there mixes its differences and essential features together. Observation had kept these neatly apart and thought it had something fixed in them. Now it sees other principles encroach on a given principle, transitions and confusions develop, what it first took as absolutely separate become joined, and what it grouped together become separated. Thus this attachment to quiet, self-identical being must find itself tormented, precisely in its most universal determinations—for example, the essential distinguishing

marks of animal and plant—by instances that rob it of every determination. These silence the universality to which it had risen and throw it back into thoughtless observation and description.

248 This observation, which confines itself to the simple, or limits sensory dispersion through the universal, [1807 183] thus finds in its object the *confusion of its principle*. For the determinate must, by its nature, lose itself in its opposite. Reason must therefore advance from the *inert* determinacy that seemed permanent to observing determinacy as it truly is: *relating itself to its opposite*. What are called essential distinguishing marks are *resting* determinations. As expressed and grasped as *simple*, they do not present what constitutes their nature: being vanishing *moments* of the movement that takes itself back into itself. The instinct of reason now comes to seek determinacy according to its nature: essentially not being for itself, but passing into its opposite. It therefore seeks the *law* and its *concept*. Admittedly, it seeks these too as *existing* actuality. But this actuality will in fact disappear for it, and the sides of the law become pure moments, or abstractions. The law thus emerges in the nature of the concept, which has destroyed within itself the indifferent subsistence of sensory actuality.

249 For observing consciousness, the *truth of the law* lies in *experience*, in the way *sensory being exists for it*, not in and for itself. Yet if the law does not have its truth in the concept, it is something contingent, [1807 184] not a necessity, or in fact not a law. But its being essentially a concept does not conflict with its being available to observation. Rather, for that very reason it has necessary *existence* and is for observation. What is universal *in the sense of reason's universality* is also universal in observation's sense: it presents itself *for consciousness* as present and actual, or the concept presents itself in the form of thinghood and sensory being. Yet it does so without losing its nature and falling into inert subsistence or indifferent succession. What has universal validity also holds universally. What *ought to be is* in fact also, and what only *ought* to be without *being* has no truth. Reason's instinct rightly holds firmly to this. It does not let itself be confused by thought-entities that only *ought* to be and are supposed to have

truth as *oughts*, though never encountered in experience: neither by hypotheses nor by any other invisible things belonging to an everlasting ought. For reason is precisely this certainty of having reality. What does not exist for consciousness as an essence in its own right—that is, what does not appear—is nothing at all for it.

250 For this consciousness that remains with observation, the truth of the law being essentially *reality* becomes, again, an *opposition* [1807 185] to the concept and to what is universal in itself. Something like its law is not, for it, an essence of reason. It thinks it is obtaining something *alien* in it. But its activity refutes this view. In practice it does not take universality to mean that *all individual* sensory things must have shown it the law's appearance before it can assert its truth. To establish that stones lifted from the earth and released fall, it does not demand that the experiment be performed with every stone. It may say the test must at least have been made with very many, allowing an inference about the rest with the greatest probability, or with full justification *by analogy*. But analogy not only gives no full justification. By its nature it so often refutes itself that, to infer by analogy itself, analogy rather permits no inference. The *probability* to which its result would reduce loses all distinction between greater and lesser probability when measured against *truth*. However great it may be, it is nothing compared with truth. Yet reason's instinct actually accepts such laws as *truth*. Only in relation to their necessity, which it does not recognize, does it fall into this [1807 186] distinction and reduce the truth of the matter itself to probability. It does this to indicate the imperfect way truth is present for consciousness that has not yet attained insight into the pure concept. For universality is present only as *simple, immediate* universality. But it is also because of this universality that the law has truth for consciousness. That the stone falls is true for it because the stone is *heavy*: because in gravity it has *in and for itself* the essential relationship *to the earth* expressed as falling. Thus in experience consciousness has the *being* of the law, but equally has it as *concept*. The law is true for it only because of *both circumstances together*. It counts as law because it presents itself in appearance and is also concept in itself.

251 Because the law is also *concept in itself*, this consciousness's instinct of reason necessarily aims to *purify* the law and its moments *into the concept*, without knowing that this is what it wants. It performs experiments on the law. At first the law appears impure, wrapped in individual sensory being, with the concept that constitutes its nature submerged in empirical material. In its experiments, reason's instinct aims to find what happens under these or those circumstances. This seems [1807 187] to plunge the law still further into sensory being. But sensory being is instead lost in this. The inner meaning of this investigation is to find the law's *pure conditions*. This means nothing other than raising the law wholly into the form of the concept and *erasing* every bond of *its moments* to *determinate being*, even if consciousness using this expression thinks it means something else. Negative electricity, for example, may first present itself as *resin* electricity and positive electricity as *glass* electricity. Through experiments these entirely lose that meaning and become purely *positive* and *negative* electricity. Neither belongs any longer to a particular kind of thing. One can no longer say that some bodies are positively electric and others negatively electric. Likewise, the relationship of acid and base and their movement toward each other form a law in which these opposites appear as bodies. But these separate things have no actuality. The force that tears them apart cannot keep them from immediately entering a process again, for they are only this relationship. They cannot remain for themselves and be pointed out like a tooth or claw. Their essence is to pass immediately into a neutral product. This makes their *being* something sublated in itself, or something [1807 188] universal. Acid and base have truth only as *universals*. Just as glass and resin can be either positively or negatively electric, acidity and basicity are not properties bound to this or that *actuality*. Instead, each thing is acidic or basic only *relatively*. What seems a definite base or acid acquires the opposite meaning in relation to another in so-called synsomaties. The result of experiments thus sublates the moments, or animating qualities, as properties of determinate things and frees predicates from their subjects. These predicates are found as they truly are: only as universals.

Because of this independence they receive the name *matters*, which are neither bodies nor properties. One is careful not to call oxygen and so forth, positive and negative electricity, heat, and so on, bodies.

252 *Matter*, however, is not an *existing thing*. It is being as *universal*, or in the form of the concept. Reason, still instinct, makes this correct distinction without being conscious that, in testing the law on all sensory being, it thereby sublates the law's merely sensory being. Nor is it conscious that, by grasping its moments as *matters*, their essentiality has become universal for it. In this expression, essentiality is stated as a nonsensory sensory something: a bodiless yet objective being.
[1807 189]

253 We must now see what turn its result takes for this instinct, and what new shape of its observation emerges with it. As the truth of this experimenting consciousness, we see the pure law freed from sensory being. We see it as *concept*, present in sensory being but moving independently and unbound within it; submerged in it yet free of it, and *simple* concept. What is truly the *result* and *essence* now appears for this consciousness itself, but as *object*. Since for it the object is not a *result* and has no relationship to the preceding movement, it appears as a *particular kind* of object, and consciousness's relationship to it as another kind of observation.

254 The object that contains the process within the *simplicity* of the concept is the *organic*. It is this absolute fluidity in which the determinacy that would make it only *for another* is dissolved. An inorganic thing has determinacy as its essence. It therefore forms the complete set of moments of the concept only together with another thing, and is lost when it enters movement. In the organic being, by contrast, all determinations through which it is open to another are bound under organic simple unity. None appears as essential that would relate freely [1807 190] to another. The organic therefore preserves itself in its relationship itself.

255 As follows from this determination, the *sides* of the *law* that reason's instinct here aims to observe are initially *organic* and *inorganic* nature in their relationship to each other. For organic nature, inorganic nature is precisely the freedom of *unbound* determinations opposed to its *simple concept*. In these determinations individual nature is *at once dissolved*, while *at the same time* it separates itself from their continuity and is *for itself*. Air, water, earth, zones, and climate are such universal elements. They make up the indeterminate, simple essence of individualities, which are also reflected into themselves within these elements. Neither individuality nor the elemental is absolutely in and for itself. Rather, in the independent freedom in which they confront each other for observation, they also behave as *essential relationships*. Yet their independence and indifference toward each other dominate, and pass only partly into abstraction. Here, then, law is present as the relationship of an element to the formation of the organic. The organic at one time has elemental being facing it, and at another presents it within its organic reflection. But such *laws*—that animals belonging to air have the constitution of birds, those [1807 191] belonging to water that of fish, northern animals have thick, hairy coats, and so forth—immediately show a poverty that does not match organic variety. Besides organic freedom's ability to withdraw its forms from these determinations, necessarily offering exceptions everywhere to such laws or rules, the determination remains so superficial even in things that fall under it that its necessity can be expressed no better. It never gets beyond *great influence*, leaving us ignorant of what actually belongs to this influence and what does not. Such relationships of the organic to the elemental therefore cannot really be called *laws*. As noted, the content of such a relationship does not remotely exhaust the scope of the organic. Moreover, the moments of the relationship themselves remain indifferent to each other and express no necessity. The *concept* of base lies in the concept of acid, just as negative electricity lies in the concept of positive electricity. But however often thick hair and the north, the structure of fish and water, or the structure of birds and air may be *found* together, the concept of thick hair does not lie in the concept of the north, nor the structure of fish in that of the sea, [1807 192] nor the structure of birds in that of air. Because the two sides are

free toward each other, there *are* also land animals with the essential characteristics of a bird or fish, and so on. Since necessity cannot be grasped as internal to the essence, it also ceases to have sensory existence and can no longer be observed in actuality. It has *stepped outside* actuality. Not being found in the real essence itself, it is what is called a teleological relationship: a relationship *external* to what is related, and therefore rather the opposite of a law. It is thought completely freed from necessary nature, leaving nature behind and moving for itself above it.

256 Although the relationship just discussed between the organic and elemental nature does not express the organic's essence, that essence is contained in the *concept of purpose*. For this observing consciousness, admittedly, the concept of purpose is not the organic's own *essence*. It falls outside it and is then only that external, *teleological* relationship. But as the organic was determined earlier, it is in fact real purpose itself. For by *preserving itself* in relation to another, it is precisely the natural being in which nature reflects itself into the concept. The moments spread apart in necessity—cause [1807 193] and effect, something active and something passive—are brought together into one. Thus something appears here not merely as a *result* of necessity. Because it has returned into itself, the last, or result, is equally the *first* that begins the movement, and is for itself the *purpose* it actualizes. The organic does not produce something; it only *preserves itself*. Or, what is produced is already present just as much as it is produced.

257 We must discuss this determination more closely, both as it is in itself and as it is for reason's instinct. This will show how the instinct finds itself in it but does not recognize itself in what it finds. The concept of purpose to which observing reason rises, while being reason's *conscious concept*, is just as much present as something *actual*. It is not merely actuality's *external relationship*, but its *essence*. Saying that this actuality, itself a purpose, relates purposefully to another means that their relationship is contingent *according to what both immediately are*. Immediately, both are independent and indifferent to each other. But the essence of their relationship differs from what they thus seem to

be, and their activity has a meaning different from what it *immediately* has for sense-perception. Necessity is hidden in what happens and shows itself only *at the end*, but in such a way that this very end shows it was also the first. [1807 194] The end shows its own priority because the change made by the activity produces nothing other than what was already there. Or, if we start from the first, then at its end, or in the result of its activity, it only returns to itself. This proves it to be something that has *itself* as its end, and so as first has already returned into itself, or is *in and for itself*. What it reaches through the movement of its activity is thus *itself*. Its reaching only itself is its *self-feeling*. There is therefore a difference between *what it is* and *what it seeks*, but this is only the *appearance of a difference*. In this way it is concept within itself.

258 *Self-consciousness* is likewise constituted so as to distinguish itself from itself in a way that produces no difference. In observing organic nature it therefore finds nothing but this essence. It finds itself as a thing, *as a life*, yet still makes a distinction between what it itself is and what it has found—a distinction that is none. Just as the animal's instinct seeks and consumes food but thereby produces nothing other than itself, reason's instinct in its search finds only reason itself. The animal ends with self-feeling. Reason's instinct, by contrast, is [1807 195] also self-consciousness. But because it is only instinct, it is placed on one side over against consciousness and has its opposite in consciousness. Its satisfaction is therefore split by this. It does find itself, namely *purpose*, and equally this purpose as *thing*. But first, purpose falls *outside the thing* that presents itself as purpose. Second, this purpose as purpose is also *objective*. So for the instinct, purpose does not fall within itself as consciousness either, but into another understanding.

259 Considered more closely, this determination lies equally in the concept of the thing as *purpose within itself*. It preserves *itself*. This also means that its nature is to conceal necessity and present it in the form of a *contingent* relationship. For its freedom, or *being-for-itself*, is precisely its indifferent attitude toward what is necessary to it. It thus presents itself as something whose concept falls outside its being. Likewise, reason must intuit its own concept as falling outside itself,

and hence as a *thing*: something toward which reason is *indifferent*, and which is therefore in turn indifferent toward reason and its own concept. As instinct, reason also stops within this *being*, or *indifference*. The thing expressing the concept remains for it something other than this concept, and the concept something [1807 196] other than the thing. Thus the organic thing is *purpose* within itself for reason only in this sense: the necessity that presents itself as hidden in its activity falls outside the organic itself, since the agent behaves in this activity as something indifferent, existing for itself. But because the organic, as purpose within itself, can behave only in this way, its being purpose within itself also appears and is sensibly present. It is observed as such. The organic shows itself as *preserving itself*, *returning into itself*, and *having returned into itself*. But observing consciousness does not recognize the concept of purpose in this being. It does not recognize that the concept of purpose exists not somewhere else in an understanding but precisely here, as a thing. It makes a distinction between the concept of purpose and being-for-itself and self-preservation—a distinction that is none. Consciousness does not see that it is none. Instead, it sees an activity that appears contingent and indifferent toward what it brings about. The unity that nevertheless joins the two—this activity and this purpose—falls apart for it.

260 On this view, what belongs to the organic itself is the activity lying between its first and last, insofar as that activity has the character of individuality. Activity with the character of universality, [1807 197] where the agent is equated with what it produces—purposeful activity as such—would not belong to the organic. That individual activity, which is only a means, falls through its individuality under a wholly individual or contingent necessity. What the organic does to preserve itself as individual or as genus is therefore, in this immediate content, entirely lawless, since the universal and concept fall outside it. Its activity would thus be empty operation with no content of its own. It would not even be a machine's operation, since a machine has a purpose, giving its operation a determinate content. Abandoned by the universal in this way, it would be the activity merely of something existing *as existing*, not also reflected into

itself—like the activity of an acid or base. Such operation could neither detach itself from its immediate existence nor give up that existence, which is lost in relation to its opposite, while preserving itself. But the being whose operation is considered here is posited as a thing that *preserves itself* in relation to its opposite. *Activity* as such is only the pure, essenceless form of its being-for-itself. Its substance, which is not merely determinate being but the universal—its *purpose*—does not fall outside it. It is activity returning into itself by its own nature, not [1807 198] directed back into itself by something alien.

261 This unity of universality and activity does not exist for *observing* consciousness because it is essentially the organic's inner movement and can be grasped only as concept. Observation, however, seeks the moments in the form of *being* and *permanence*. Since the organic whole essentially does not contain its moments in this way or allow them to be found in it this way, consciousness transforms the opposition in its view into one that suits that view.

262 In this way organic being arises for it as a relationship between two *existing*, *fixed* moments: an opposition whose two sides seem, on one hand, to be given to it in observation, while on the other their content expresses the opposition between the organic *concept of purpose* and *actuality*. But because the concept as such has been erased in them, they express this darkly and superficially, with thought sunk into representation. Thus we see the first meant roughly by the *inner* and the other by the *outer*. Their relationship produces the law *that the outer is the expression of the inner*.

263 A closer look at this inner, its opposite, and their relationship shows [1807 199] first that the law's two sides no longer have the form they had in earlier laws, where they appeared as independent *things*, each a separate body. Nor, second, is the universal supposed to exist somewhere else, *outside what exists*. Instead, undivided organic being in general is laid down as the content of inner and outer, the same for both. The opposition is therefore now purely formal. Its real sides have the same *in-itself* as their essence. Yet because inner and outer are also opposed realities and different *beings* for observation, each seems to

observation to have its own content. But since this particular content is the same substance, or organic unity, it can in fact only be a different form of that unity. Observing consciousness indicates this by saying that the outer is only the *expression* of the inner. We saw these same determinations of the relationship in the concept of purpose: the indifferent independence of the distinct sides, and within this their unity, in which they disappear.

264 We must now see what *shape* inner and outer have in their being. The inner as such must have an outward being and shape just as much as the outer as such does. For it [1807 200] is posited as object, or as itself existing and available to observation.

265 As *inner*, organic substance is the *simple* soul, the pure *concept of purpose*, or the *universal* that remains equally universal fluidity in its division. In its *being*, it therefore appears as the *activity* or *movement* of *vanishing* actuality. By contrast, the *outer*, opposed to this existing inner, consists in the organic's *resting being*. The law as the relationship of this inner to this outer thus expresses its content once by presenting universal *moments* or *simple essentialities*, and again by presenting actualized essentiality, or *shape*. Those first simple organic *properties*, to call them that, are *sensibility, irritability*, and *reproduction*. These properties, at least the first two, admittedly seem to refer not to the organism in general but only to the animal organism. The plant organism does in fact express only the simple concept of the organism, which *does not develop* its moments. In considering these moments insofar as they are to exist for observation, we must therefore stick to the organism that presents their developed existence.

266 As for these properties themselves, they follow immediately from the concept of being a purpose to oneself. *Sensibility* expresses in general the simple [1807 201] concept of organic reflection into itself, or its universal fluidity. *Irritability* expresses organic elasticity: behaving *reactively* within reflection, and the actualization opposed to that first, quiet *being-within-itself*. In this actualization, that abstract being-for-itself is a being *for another*. *Reproduction*, however, is the action of this *whole* organism reflected into itself, its activity as

purpose in itself or as *genus*. In it, the individual repels itself from itself and repeats itself by producing either its organic parts or the whole individual. Taken as *self-preservation in general*, reproduction expresses the formal concept of the organic, or sensibility. But properly it is the real organic concept, or the *whole* that returns into itself either as individual by producing its particular parts, or as genus by producing individuals.

267 The *other meaning* of these organic elements, namely as the *outer*, is their *shaped* form. In this form they are present as *actual* yet also *universal* parts, or organic *systems*: sensibility, perhaps, as nervous system; irritability as muscular system; reproduction as the internal organs that preserve the individual and genus.
[1807 202]

268 Specific organic laws would therefore concern a relationship between organic moments in their double meaning: once as a *part* of organic *structure*, and again as a *universal, fluid* determinacy passing through all those systems. In such a law, for example, a determinate *sensibility* as a moment of the *whole* organism would find expression in a definitely formed nervous system. Or it would be linked with a determinate *reproduction* of the individual's organic parts, or propagation of the whole, and so on. Both sides of such a law can be *observed*. In its concept, the *outer* is *being for another*. Sensibility, for example, has its immediately actualized form in the sensitive *system*. As a *universal property*, it is likewise objective in its *manifestations*. The side called the *inner* has *its own outward* side, distinct from what is called the *outer* in the whole.

269 The two sides of an organic law could therefore indeed be observed, but not laws of their relationship. Observation is not inadequate because, *as observation*, it is too shortsighted, so that we should abandon empirical procedure and start from the idea. For if such laws were something real, they would indeed have to be actually present and hence [1807 203] observable. Rather, observation is inadequate because the thought of laws of this kind proves to have no truth.

270 The relationship that emerged for a law was that the universal organic *property* would have made itself into a thing in an organic *system*, finding its shaped imprint there. Both would thus be the same essence, present once as universal moment, and again as thing. But the inner side is also itself a relationship between several sides. The thought of a law therefore first presents itself as a relationship of universal organic activities or properties to each other. Whether such a law is possible must be decided from the nature of such a property. As universal fluidity, it is not something confined like a thing and remaining within the distinction of an existence that would constitute its shape. Instead, sensibility passes beyond the nervous system and through all the organism's other systems. Moreover, it is a universal *moment*, essentially undivided and inseparable from reaction, or irritability, and reproduction. For as reflection into itself, it absolutely contains reaction. Merely being reflected into itself is passivity or dead being, not sensibility, just as action—which is the same as reaction—without reflection into itself is not irritability. Reflection in action or [1807 204] reaction, and action or reaction in reflection, are precisely what form the organic in their unity. This unity means the same as organic reproduction. Thus in every form of actuality there must be the same *magnitude* of sensibility as of irritability, considering first their relationship to each other. An organic appearance can be grasped and determined—or explained, if one wishes—equally in terms of either. What one person takes as high sensibility, another can just as well regard as high irritability, irritability *of the same degree*. If they are called *factors*, and this is not to be a meaningless word, this says precisely that they are *moments* of the concept. The real object whose essence is this concept therefore contains them equally. If it is determined one way as very sensitive, it must equally be described the other way as just as irritable.

271 If they are distinguished, as they necessarily must be, they are distinguished according to the concept, and their opposition is *qualitative*. But if, beyond this true difference, they are also posited as existing and as different for representation, so that they could be sides of a law, they appear in *quantitative* difference. Their characteristic qualitative [1807 205] opposition thus passes into

magnitude. Laws arise stating, for example, that sensibility and irritability stand in inverse proportion in magnitude, so that as one increases the other decreases. Or, better, taking magnitude itself as content straightaway: something's magnitude increases as its smallness decreases. If this law is given determinate content —for instance, that a hole's size *increases* the more what fills it *decreases*—this inverse proportion can equally be converted into a direct one: the hole's size *increases* directly with the amount removed. Whether expressed as direct or inverse proportion, this is a *tautological* statement. In its proper expression it means only that a magnitude increases as this magnitude increases. The hole and what fills it and is removed are qualitatively opposed. But their reality and its determinate magnitude are one and the same in both. Likewise, increasing magnitude and decreasing smallness are the same, and their meaningless opposition ends in tautology. So too the organic moments are equally inseparable in their reality and magnitude, which is the magnitude of that same reality. One decreases only with the other and increases only with it, for one has meaning absolutely only insofar as the [1807 206] other is present. Or rather, it is indifferent whether an organic appearance is considered as irritability or sensibility, both in general and when discussing its magnitude. It is equally indifferent whether one describes a hole's increase as an increase of its emptiness or of the fullness removed. Or a number, for example *three*, stays equally large whether taken positively or negatively. If I increase three to four, the positive and negative have both become four. Similarly, a magnet's south pole is exactly as strong as its north pole, or positive electricity or an acid exactly as strong as its negative electricity or the base on which it acts. Organic *existence* is such a magnitude, like that three, or a magnet, and so forth. It is what is increased and decreased. When it increases, *both* its factors increase, just as *both* poles of a magnet, or both electricities, increase when a magnet and so forth is strengthened. The same concept of empty opposition applies to distinguishing them by *intensity* and *extension*: one cannot decrease in extension while increasing in intensity, as the other supposedly reduces its intensity but increases its extension. Real intensity is likewise [1807 207] absolutely as great as extension, and conversely.

272 Clearly, then, this lawmaking actually proceeds as follows. First, irritability and sensibility constitute the determinate organic opposition. But this content is lost, and the opposition runs out into the formal opposition of increasing and decreasing magnitude, or different intensity and extension. This opposition no longer concerns or expresses the nature of sensibility and irritability. Such an empty game of lawmaking is therefore not tied to organic moments. It can be played everywhere with anything, and rests in general on ignorance of the logical nature of these oppositions.

273 Finally, if reproduction is related to either sensibility or irritability instead of relating those two, even the occasion for this lawmaking disappears. Reproduction is not opposed to those moments as they are to each other. Since this lawmaking rests on that opposition, even the appearance of its taking place disappears here.

274 The lawmaking just considered contains the organism's differences as moments of its *concept*, and was properly supposed to be a priori lawmaking. Yet it [1807 208] essentially contains the thought that they have the meaning of *things present*. Merely observing consciousness must in any case stick to their existence. Organic actuality necessarily contains an opposition of the kind expressed by its concept, which can be determined as irritability and sensibility, while both in turn appear distinct from reproduction. The *externality* in which the moments of the organic concept are considered here is the inner's *own immediate* externality. It is not the *outer* that is outer in the whole and is *shape*, with which the inner is subsequently to be considered in relationship.

275 But when the opposition of the moments is grasped as it exists, sensibility, irritability, and reproduction sink into ordinary *properties*. These are universalities as indifferent to each other as specific gravity, color, hardness, and so on. In this sense one can certainly observe that one organic being is more sensitive, more irritable, or has greater reproductive power than another. One can also observe that the sensibility and so forth of one differs in *kind* from another's, that one responds differently to particular stimuli—for instance, a horse differently to

oats than to hay, and a dog differently again to both, and so on—just as one can observe that one body is harder than [1807 209] another. But these sensory properties—hardness, color, and so on—like the appearances of responsiveness to oats, irritability to loads, or the number of young born and the manner of giving birth, essentially resist lawfulness when related and compared with each other. For the determinacy of their *sensory being* consists precisely in existing completely indifferently to each other. They display nature's freedom released from the concept rather than the unity of a relationship: its irrational play back and forth on the scale of contingent magnitude between the concept's moments, rather than those moments themselves.

276 The *other* side, on which the simple moments of the organic concept are compared with the moments of *structure*, would first provide the proper law expressing the true *outer* as an imprint of the *inner*. Since those simple moments are penetrating, fluid properties, they do not have in the organic thing the kind of separate, real expression found in what is called an individual structural system. Or, if the abstract idea of the organism is truly expressed in those three moments only because they are nothing fixed, but only moments of the concept and movement, then as structure the organism is not contained in three determinate systems [1807 210] of the kind anatomy separates out. Insofar as such systems are to be found in actuality and justified by this finding, we must also recall that anatomy shows not just three such systems, but many more. Apart from this, the sensitive *system* must mean something altogether different from what is called the *nervous system*; likewise, the irritable *system* differs from the *muscular system*, and the reproductive *system* from the reproductive *organs*. In systems of *structure* as such, the organism is grasped from the abstract side of dead existence. Taken this way, its moments belong to anatomy and the corpse, not to knowledge and the living organism. As such parts, they have rather ceased *to be*, since they cease to be processes. Since the organism's *being* is essentially universality or reflection into itself, the *being* of its whole and its moments cannot consist in an anatomical system. Rather, their actual expression and externality are present only as a movement running through the

different structural parts. In this movement, what is torn out and fixed as an individual system presents itself essentially as a fluid moment. Thus the actuality anatomy finds cannot count as their reality. Only actuality [1807 211] as process can do so, and only within that process do the anatomical parts themselves have meaning.

277 It follows that the moments of the organic *inner*, taken by themselves, cannot supply the sides of a law of being. For in such a law, stated of an existence, they would have to be distinguished from each other, and one could not be named just as well in place of another. Nor can they be placed on one side and have their realization on the other in a fixed system. For such a system has neither organic truth in general nor the status of expressing those inner moments. Since the organic is in itself the universal, its essential character is instead to have its moments equally universal in actuality: as processes running through it, not as an image of the universal in an isolated thing.

278 In this way the *representation* of a *law* in general is lost in the organic. Law seeks to grasp and express opposition as resting sides, and the determinacy in them that is their relationship to each other. The *inner*, to which appearing universality belongs, and the *outer*, to which the parts of resting structure belong, were supposed to form the corresponding sides of the law. But held apart this way, they lose their organic meaning. The representation of law takes precisely this as [1807 212] its basis: that its two sides have an indifferent subsistence for themselves, and that the relationship is divided between them as a doubled, corresponding determinacy. Instead, each side of the organic is in itself simple universality, in which all determinations are dissolved, and the movement of this dissolution.

279 Understanding the difference between this lawmaking and earlier forms will fully clarify its nature. Look back at the movement of perception and of the understanding that reflects into itself within perception and thereby determines its object. Understanding does not there confront, in its object, the *relationship* of these abstract determinations: universal and individual, essential and

external. Instead, it is itself the transition, without this transition becoming objective for it. Here, by contrast, organic unity—that is, precisely the relationship of those opposites, a relationship that is pure transition—is itself the *object*. In its simplicity this transition is immediately *universality*. As universality enters the difference whose relationship the law is to express, its moments *as universals* are objects of this consciousness. The law states that the *outer* is the expression of the *inner*. Here understanding has grasped *the thought* of law itself. Previously [1807 213] it only sought laws in general, with their moments before it as a determinate content, not as their thoughts. As regards content, then, the laws sought here are not merely a quiet gathering of differences that simply *exist* into the form of universality. They are laws that immediately contain within these differences the concept's unrest, and with it the necessity of the sides' relationship. But the object, organic unity, immediately unites infinite sublation, or absolute negation of being, with resting being. Its moments are essentially *pure transition*. Thus no *existing* sides of the kind required for a law result.

280 To obtain such sides, understanding must hold to the other moment of the organic relationship: organic existence's *being reflected* into itself. But this being is so completely reflected into itself that no determinacy over against another remains. *Immediate* sensory being is immediately one with determinacy as such and therefore expresses a qualitative difference within itself: blue against red, acid against alkaline, and so forth. But organic being that has returned into itself is completely indifferent toward another. Its existence is simple universality and denies [1807 214] observation lasting sensory differences. Or, what is the same, it shows its essential determinacy only as the *change of existing* determinations. When difference is expressed as existing, it is precisely an *indifferent* difference—that is, *magnitude*. But here the concept is erased and necessity has disappeared. The content filling this indifferent being —the change of sensory determinations, gathered into the simplicity of an

organic determination—also expresses precisely that it lacks that determinacy of an immediate property. The qualitative falls solely into magnitude, as we saw above.

281 Thus the objective something grasped as organic determinacy does contain the concept within itself. It thereby differs from the object of an understanding that behaves as merely perceiving when grasping the content of its laws. Yet this grasping falls entirely back into the principle and manner of merely perceiving understanding, because what is grasped is used as the moments of a *law*. It thereby acquires the character of a fixed determinacy, the form of an immediate property or resting appearance. It is then taken into the determination of magnitude, and the nature of the concept is suppressed. Exchanging something merely perceived for [1807 215] something reflected into itself, a merely sensory determinacy for an organic one, thus loses its value again, precisely because understanding has not yet sublated lawmaking.

282 To compare this exchange through a few examples: what perception sees as an animal with strong muscles is determined as an animal organism with high irritability. What perception sees as a state of great weakness is determined as a state of high sensibility, or, if preferred, an abnormal affection, specifically an intensification of it. These expressions translate the sensory into German-Latin instead of into the concept. Understanding can also express the animal's having strong muscles by saying that it possesses great *muscular force*, just as great weakness can be expressed as slight *force*. Determination through irritability has an advantage over determination as *force*: force expresses indeterminate reflection into itself, irritability determinate reflection. For the muscle's *specific* force is precisely irritability. It also has an advantage over determination as *strong muscles*, since, as already in force, reflection into itself is also included. Likewise, weakness or slight force, *organic passivity*, is determinately expressed through *sensibility*. But when sensibility is taken and fixed by itself, then also joined to [1807 216] *magnitude*, and opposed as greater or lesser sensibility to greater or lesser irritability, each has been reduced entirely to the sensory element and the ordinary form of a property. Their relationship is not the concept but, on the

contrary, magnitude, into which the opposition now falls and becomes a thoughtless difference. Although the indeterminacy of the expressions *force*, *strength*, and *weakness* has been removed, we now get an equally empty and indeterminate wandering among the oppositions of higher and lower sensibility and irritability, rising and falling in themselves and against each other. Greater or lesser sensibility and irritability are sensory appearances grasped and expressed thoughtlessly, no less than strength and weakness are wholly sensory, thoughtless determinations. The concept has not replaced those nonconceptual expressions. Instead, strength and weakness have been filled with a determination that, taken alone, rests on the concept and has it as its content, but entirely loses this origin and character. Thus through the form of simplicity and immediacy in which this content is made one side of a law, and through magnitude as the element differentiating such determinations, the essence originally existing and posited as concept retains [1807 217] the manner of sensory perception. It remains as far from knowledge as when determined through strength and weakness of force, or immediate sensory properties.

283 We still have to consider *by itself* what constitutes the organic's *outer*, and how the opposition of *its* inner and outer is determined there, just as we first considered the *inner* of the whole in relation to its *own* outer.

284 Considered by itself, the *outer* is *structure* in general: the system of life articulating itself in the *element* of *being*. It is also essentially organic being's being *for another*: objective essence in its *being-for-itself*. This *other* first appears as its external inorganic nature. Considering these two in relation to a law, we saw above that inorganic nature cannot form one side of a law facing organic being. For the organic is also absolutely for itself and has a universal, free relationship to inorganic nature.

285 Determining the relationship of these two sides more closely within organic structure itself: on one side it is turned toward inorganic nature, while on the other it is *for itself* and reflected into itself. *Actual* organic being is the middle term joining life's *being-for-itself* with the *outer* in general, or *being-in-itself*.

[1807 218] The extreme of being-for-itself, however, is the inner as infinite one. It takes the moments of structure back into itself from their subsistence and connection with the outer. It is contentless, giving itself content in the structure and appearing in it as its process. In this extreme, as simple negativity or *pure individuality*, the organic has its absolute freedom. Through this it is indifferent and secure toward being for another and toward the determinacy of the structural moments. This freedom is also the freedom of the moments themselves. It is their possibility of appearing and being grasped as *existent*. In it they are freed and indifferent toward each other as well as toward the external, since the *simplicity* of this freedom is *being*, or their simple substance. This concept, or pure freedom, is one and the same life, however varied the play in which structure or being for another may wander. This stream of life is indifferent to what kinds of mills it drives. First, we must note that the concept here is not to be grasped in the form of *process*, or the development of its moments, as it was earlier when considering the inner properly so called. It is to be grasped as *simple inner*, constituting the purely universal side facing the *actual* living being, or as the *element* in which the existing members of the [1807 219] structure *subsist*. For it is structure that we consider here, and in it life's essence is the simplicity of subsistence. Next, *being for another*, or the determinacy of actual structure, taken into this simple universality that is its essence, is an equally simple, universal, nonsensory determinacy. It can only be the determinacy expressed as *number*. Number is the middle term of structure, joining indeterminate life with actual life: simple like the former and determinate like the latter. What would exist as number in the former, the *inner*, the outer would have to express in its own way as many-shaped actuality, manner of life, color, and so forth—in general, as the whole range of differences developing in appearance.

286 Compare the two sides of the organic whole—one the *inner*, the other the *outer*, each in turn having an inner and outer of its own—according to their respective inner. The first side's inner was the concept as the unrest of *abstraction*. The second has as its inner resting universality, and within it also resting determinacy: number. The first therefore deceptively promised laws through

the appearance of necessity in the relationship, because the concept develops its moments within it. The second immediately renounces this promise, since number proves to be the determination of one side of its laws. [1807 220] For number is precisely wholly resting, dead, indifferent determinacy. All movement and relationship are extinguished in it. It has broken the bridge to the living character of drives, manner of life, and other sensory existence.

287 But considering organic *structure* as such, and the inner as an inner merely of structure, is in fact no longer considering the organic. The two sides meant to be related are posited only as indifferent to each other. Reflection into itself, which constitutes the organic's essence, is thereby sublated. Instead, the attempted comparison of inner and outer is transferred here to inorganic nature. The infinite concept is here only the *essence*, hidden inside or falling outside into self-consciousness. It no longer has objective presence as it does in the organic. This relationship of inner and outer must therefore still be considered in its proper sphere.

288 First, this inner of structure, as the simple individuality of an inorganic thing, is *specific gravity*. As simple being it can be observed, as can the numerical determinacy of which alone it is capable—or properly, found by comparing observations. It thus seems to provide one side of the law. [1807 221] Shape, color, hardness, toughness, and countless other properties would together make up the *outer* side and would have to express the inner's determinacy, number, so that one had its counterpart in the other.

289 Since negativity is grasped here not as the movement of process but as *quieted* unity, or *simple being-for-itself*, it appears instead as what enables the thing to resist process and preserve itself within itself, indifferent to process. But because this simple being-for-itself is a quiet indifference toward another, specific gravity appears as a *property alongside* others. This ends every necessary relationship between it and this multiplicity, and all lawfulness. Specific gravity, as this simple inner, has no difference *within itself*, or has only inessential difference. For precisely its *pure simplicity* sublates every essential distinction. This inessential

difference, *magnitude*, would therefore have to find its counterpart or *other* on the other side, the multiplicity of properties. Only through this is it difference at all. If this multiplicity is itself gathered into the simplicity of an opposition and determined, say, as *cohesion*—cohesion being *being-for-itself in otherness*, while specific gravity is *pure being-for-itself*—then this [1807 222] cohesion is first this pure determinacy posited in the concept over against the other determinacy. The manner of lawmaking would be the one considered above in the relationship of sensibility to irritability. Further, as the *concept* of being-for-itself in otherness, cohesion is only the *abstraction* of the side facing specific gravity and has no existence as such. For being-for-itself in otherness is the process in which the inorganic would have to express its being-for-itself as *self-preservation*, keeping it from emerging from the process as a moment of a product. But this is precisely contrary to its nature, which does not contain purpose or universality within itself. Its process is instead only the determinate behavior through which its being-for-itself, its specific gravity, *sublates itself*. This determinate behavior itself, in which cohesion in its true concept would consist, and the determinate magnitude of specific gravity are wholly indifferent concepts toward each other. If the manner of behavior were entirely ignored and restricted to the representation of magnitude, one might think that greater specific weight, as a higher being-within-itself, would resist entering the process more than lesser weight. But conversely, the freedom of being-for-itself proves itself only in the ease of engaging with everything and preserving itself in [1807 223] this variety. That intensity without extension of relationships is an empty abstraction, since extension constitutes intensity's *existence*. Yet, as noted, self-preservation of the inorganic within its relationship falls outside its nature. It does not contain the principle of movement within itself, or its being is not absolute negativity and concept.

290 If, instead, this other side of the inorganic is considered not as process but as resting being, it is ordinary cohesion: a *simple* sensory property placed on one side against the released moment of *otherness*, which lies dispersed in many indifferent properties. Cohesion itself joins these properties, as specific gravity

does. Their collection then makes up the other side facing it. But in cohesion, as in the others, *number* is the only determinacy. Number not only fails to express a relationship and transition between these properties. Its essential character is precisely to have no necessary relationship, and instead to present the destruction of all lawfulness, since it expresses determinacy as *inessential*. Thus a series of bodies expressing difference as the numerical difference of their specific gravities runs in no way parallel to a series of differences in the other [1807 224] properties, even if only one or a few are selected to simplify matters. In fact, only the whole bundle of properties could constitute the other side of this parallel. To order this bundle within itself and unite it into a whole, observation has on one hand the magnitudes of these various properties. On the other, their differences enter as qualitative. What in this heap would have to be designated positive or negative and mutually cancel out—in general, the internal formation and exposition of the very complex formula—would belong to the concept. But the concept is precisely excluded by the way the properties are supposed to lie there and be taken up as *existing*. In this being, no property shows the character of a negative against another. One *is* just as much as another, and none otherwise indicates its place in the arrangement of the whole. In a series with parallel differences—whether the relationship is imagined as increasing on both sides together, or increasing on one and decreasing on the other—what matters is only the *final* simple expression of this gathered whole, which would form one side of the law over against specific gravity. But this side as an *existing result* is nothing other than what has already been [1807 225] mentioned: an individual property, such as ordinary cohesion, alongside which the others, including specific gravity, exist indifferently. Any other property can be chosen with equal right—that is, equal wrong—as representative of the whole other side. Each would merely represent the essence, put plainly, *stand for it*, rather than be the thing itself. The attempt to find series of bodies running along the simple parallel of two sides and expressing the essential nature of bodies according to a law of these sides must therefore be regarded as a thought ignorant of its task and the means of carrying it out.

291 Earlier, the relationship of outer and inner in the structure supposed to present itself to observation was immediately transferred into the inorganic sphere. We can now specify more closely the determination that draws it here. Another form and relationship of this relation also results. In the organic, what seems to offer the possibility of such comparison between inner and outer in the inorganic disappears altogether. The inorganic inner is a simple inner presenting itself to perception as an *existing* property. Its determinacy is [1807 226] therefore essentially magnitude. As an existing property it appears indifferent to the outer, or the many other sensory properties. But the being-for-itself of organic life does not take its place on one side against its outer. It contains the principle of *otherness* within itself. If we determine being-for-itself as a *simple, self-preserving relationship to itself*, its otherness is simple *negativity*. Organic unity is the unity of self-identical self-relation and pure negativity. As unity, this unity is the organic's inner. Through it, the organic is universal in itself, or is *genus*. But the freedom of the genus toward its actuality differs from the freedom of specific *gravity* toward structure. The latter is an *existing* freedom: specific gravity takes its place on one side as a particular property. But because it is *existing* freedom, it is also only *one determinacy* that *essentially* belongs to this structure, or through which this structure is determinate *as essence*. The genus's freedom, however, is universal and indifferent to this structure or its actuality. The *determinacy* belonging to the *being-for-itself* of the inorganic *as such* therefore falls in the organic *under its* being-for-itself, whereas in the inorganic it falls only under its *being*. Although in the inorganic it is also only a *property*, [1807 227] it still has the dignity of *essence*, because as the simple negative it confronts existence as being for another. In its final individual determinacy this simple negative is a number. But the organic is an individuality that is itself pure negativity, and so destroys within itself number's fixed determinacy, which belongs to *indifferent being*. Insofar as it contains the moment of indifferent being and therefore number, number can be taken only as a play within it, not as the essence of its life.

292 Pure negativity, the principle of process, does not fall outside the organic. The organic therefore does not contain it as a determinacy in its *essence*; rather, individuality itself is universal in itself. Nevertheless, this pure individuality is not developed and actual in the organic through moments that are themselves *abstract* or *universal*. Instead, this expression falls outside that universality, which retreats into *inwardness*. Between actuality or structure—that is, self-developing individuality—and the organic universal, or genus, stands the *determinate* universal, the *species*. The existence reached by the negativity of the universal or genus is only the developed movement of a process running through the *parts of the existing structure*. If the genus, [1807 228] as resting simplicity, contained the differentiated parts within itself, and its *simple negativity* as such were also movement running through equally simple parts immediately universal in themselves—parts actually existing here as such moments—then the organic genus would be consciousness. Instead, *simple determinacy* as the determinacy of species is present in it in a spiritless way. Actuality begins from this determinacy. What enters actuality is not genus as such, and thus not thought at all. As actual organic being, genus is represented only by a representative. This representative is number, which seems to mark the transition from genus to individual structure and to give observation both sides of necessity: once as simple determinacy, and again as determinacy developed into a structure born out into multiplicity. But number instead marks the mutual indifference and freedom of universal and individual. The individual is surrendered by the genus to the inessential difference of magnitude, yet as living also proves free of this difference. True universality, as determined earlier, is here only *inner essence*. As *determinacy of species*, it is formal universality. Facing this, that true universality takes the side of individuality, which is thereby alive and through its *inner rises above its [1807 229] determinacy as species*. But this individuality is not also universal individual, in which universality would equally have external actuality. That falls outside organic life. Yet this *universal* individual, as *immediately* the individual of natural structures, is not consciousness itself. To be consciousness, its existence as *a single organic living individual* would have to fall within, not outside, it.

293 We therefore see a syllogism whose one extreme is *universal life as universal*, or as genus, and whose other extreme is *the same life as individual*, or as universal individual. The middle term is composed of both. The first seems to enter it as *determinate* universality, or *species*; the other as *proper*, or individual, *individuality*. Since this syllogism belongs in general to the side of *structure*, it also includes what is distinguished as inorganic nature.

294 Universal life, as *the simple essence of genus*, must on its side develop the concept's differences and present them as a series of simple determinations. This is a system of differences posited indifferently, or *a numerical series*. Earlier, the organic in the form of individuality was opposed to this inessential difference, which neither expresses nor contains its [1807 230] living nature. The same must be said of the inorganic in its whole existence developed in its many properties. Now it is the universal individual that must be considered not only free from every articulation of genus but also as the power over it. The genus divides into species according to the *universal determinacy* of number, or may use particular determinations of its existence—shape, color, and so forth—as its basis of division. In this quiet business, it suffers violence from the universal individual, *the earth*. As universal negativity, the earth asserts against the genus's systematizing the differences as it contains them itself. Because of the substance to which they belong, their nature differs from that of those other differences. The genus's activity becomes a wholly restricted business, which it may pursue only within those powerful elements. Their unrestrained force interrupts it everywhere, leaving it incomplete and stunted.

295 It follows that in structured existence, reason can become available to observation only *as life in general*. But in differentiating itself, this life has no actual rational series and articulation within itself, and is not a system of shapes grounded in itself. If, [1807 231] in the syllogism of organic structure, the middle term—containing species and its actuality as single individuality—contained within itself the extremes of inner universality and universal individuality, then in *the movement* of its actuality this middle would express and have the nature of universality. It would be development that systematizes itself. Thus

consciousness has as its middle, between universal spirit and its individuality or sensory consciousness, the system of shapes of consciousness: a life of spirit ordering itself into a whole. This is the system considered here, whose objective existence is world history. But organic nature has no history. It falls immediately from its universal, life, into the individuality of existence. The moments of simple determinacy and individual vitality united in this actuality produce becoming only as contingent movement, in which each is active in its own part and the whole is preserved. But *for itself* this activity is confined to its own point, because the whole is not present in it. The whole is not present because it is not here *for itself* as a whole.

296 Thus, beyond intuiting itself in organic nature only as universal life in general, [1807 232] observing reason intuits life's development and realization only according to systems distinguished quite generally. The essence of their determination lies not in the organic as such but in the universal individual; and *within* these differences of the earth, reason intuits the series attempted by the genus.

297 Since in its actuality the *universality of organic life* lets itself fall immediately into the extreme of *individuality*, without true mediation that is for itself, observing consciousness confronts only *meaning* as a thing. If reason can take an idle interest in observing this meaning, it is limited to describing and recounting nature's opinions and fancies. This spiritless freedom of meaning will indeed offer everywhere beginnings of laws, traces of necessity, hints of order and sequence, ingenious and plausible relationships. But in the organic's relationship to the existing differences of the inorganic—elements, zones, and climates—observation gets no further regarding law and necessity than *great influence*. On the other side, individuality means not the earth but the *one immanent* in organic life. In immediate unity with the universal, this one does constitute the genus. [1807 233] But precisely for that reason the genus's simple unity is determined only as number and therefore leaves qualitative appearance free. Here observation can get no further than *clever remarks, interesting relationships, friendly gestures toward the concept*. But clever *remarks* are not

knowledge of necessity. *Interesting* relationships stop at *interest*, and interest is still only an opinion about reason. The individual thing's *friendliness* in alluding to a concept is a child's friendliness, which becomes childish if it claims, or is expected, to count for something in and for itself.
[1807 234]
b. Observation of Self-Consciousness in Its Purity and in Its Relationship to External Actuality; Logical and Psychological Laws.

298 Observation of nature finds the concept realized in inorganic nature: laws whose moments are things that also behave as abstractions. But this concept is not a simplicity reflected into itself. By contrast, the life of organic nature is only this simplicity reflected into itself. Its opposition to itself as universal and individual does not divide within the essence of this life itself. The essence is not the genus that would separate and move within its undifferentiated element while also being undifferentiated for itself in its opposition. Observation finds this free concept, whose universality equally contains developed individuality absolutely within itself, only in the concept itself existing as concept, or in self-consciousness.
[1807 235]

299 Turning into itself and directing itself toward the concept actual as free concept, observation first finds the *laws of thinking*. This individuality, which thinking is within itself, is the abstract movement of the negative, taken entirely back into simplicity. The laws stand outside reality. Having no *reality* means nothing other than having no truth. Admittedly, they are supposed to be not *whole* truth but *formal* truth. Yet the purely formal without reality is a thought-entity, or empty abstraction without the division within it that would be nothing other than content. On the other hand, they are laws of pure thinking, and pure thinking is what is universal in itself: a knowledge immediately containing being and therefore all reality. These laws are thus absolute concepts, inseparably the essentialities of form and of things. Universality moving within itself is the *divided* simple concept. In this way it has *content* within itself, a content that is all content, though not sensory being. This content nei-

ther contradicts form nor is separated from it at all. Instead, it is essentially form itself, since form is nothing but the universal separating itself into its pure moments.

300 But as this form or content exists *for observation* as observation, it acquires the [1807 236] determination of a *found*, given—that is, *merely existing*—content. It becomes a *resting being* of relationships, a collection of separate necessities supposed to have truth as a *fixed* content in and for themselves, *in their determinacy*. They are thus in fact withdrawn from form. But this absolute truth of fixed determinations, or many different laws, contradicts the unity of self-consciousness, or of thinking and form in general. What is stated as a fixed law remaining in itself can only be a moment of unity reflecting into itself, and appear only as a vanishing magnitude. When consideration tears them from this connected movement and sets them up individually, what they lack is not content—they have determinate content—but form, which is their essence. These laws are not the truth of thinking, not because they are supposed to be merely formal and without content, but precisely for the opposite reason: in their determinacy, or *as a content* deprived of form, they are supposed to count as absolute. In their truth, as moments vanishing within the unity of thinking, they would have to be taken as knowledge, or thinking movement, not as *laws* of knowledge. But observation is not knowledge itself and does not know it. Instead, it reverses knowledge's nature into the [1807 237] shape of *being*: it grasps its negativity only as its *laws*. It is enough here to have demonstrated the invalidity of the so-called laws of thinking from the general nature of the matter. Their fuller development belongs to speculative philosophy. There they show themselves as what they truly are: individual vanishing moments whose truth is only the whole of thinking movement, knowledge itself.

301 This negative unity of thinking is for itself, or rather it is *being-for-itself*: the principle of individuality, and in its reality, *active consciousness*. By the nature of the matter, observing consciousness is therefore carried forward to active consciousness as the reality of those laws. Since it does not see this connection, it thinks thinking remains on one side in its laws, while on the other it obtains a

different being in its present object: active consciousness. This consciousness is for itself in such a way that it sublates otherness and has its actuality in this intuition of itself as the negative.

302 Thus a *new field* opens for *observation* in *consciousness's acting actuality*. Psychology contains the collection of laws according to which spirit relates differently to the various ways of its actuality as an *[1807 238] otherness found before it*. In part, it receives this otherness into itself and *conforms* to the habits, customs, and way of thinking it finds, in which it is its own object as actuality. In part, it knows itself as acting on its own against them, selecting only particular things from them through inclination and passion and *making the objective conform to itself*. In the first case it relates negatively to itself as individuality; in the second, to itself as universal being. On the first side, independence gives what is found only the *form* of conscious individuality in general, while remaining, as regards content, within the universal actuality it finds. On the other side, it at least gives this actuality a distinctive modification that does not contradict its essential content. Or it modifies it so that the individual, as particular actuality and distinctive content, sets itself against it. The individual then becomes criminal by sublating actuality in a merely individual way, or, by doing this universally and thus for everyone, brings another world, another right, law, and customs into the place of those that exist.

303 Observing psychology first reports its perceptions of the *general ways* it encounters in active consciousness. It finds all sorts of faculties, inclinations, and passions. As it [1807 239] recounts this collection, it cannot suppress the memory of self-consciousness's unity. It must at least advance to amazement that so many varied and heterogeneous things, contingent to each other, can be together in spirit as in a sack—especially since they show themselves not as dead, resting things but as restless movements.

304 In recounting these different faculties, observation occupies the universal side. The unity of these manifold capacities is the opposite side: *actual* individuality. But to grasp and recount distinct actual individualities by saying that one per-

son has more inclination toward this, another toward that, one more understanding than another, is far less interesting than even listing species of insects, mosses, and so forth. These give observation the right to take them individually and without a concept, since they essentially belong to the element of contingent singularity. By contrast, taking conscious individuality spiritlessly as an *individually* existing appearance is contradictory, since its essence is the universal of spirit. But when apprehension also brings individuality into the form of universality, it finds *its law* and now seems to have a rational purpose and pursue a necessary task.
[1807 240]

305 The moments making up the law's content are, on one side, individuality itself, and on the other, its universal inorganic nature: the circumstances, situation, habits, customs, religion, and so forth that it finds. From these, determinate individuality is to be comprehended. They contain the determinate as well as the universal. They are also *things present*, offering themselves to observation and expressing themselves on the other side in the form of individuality.

306 The law of this relationship between the two sides would have to state what effect and influence these determinate circumstances exercise on individuality. But individuality is precisely *both* the *universal*, and hence calmly and immediately merges with the *present* universal—customs, habits, and so forth—and conforms to them, *and* opposes them and instead reverses them. It can also remain completely indifferent toward them in its individuality, neither letting them affect it nor acting against them. *What* is to influence individuality and *what kind* of influence it is to have—which really mean the same thing—therefore depend only on individuality itself. Saying that *through this*, this individuality *became this determinate individuality* means nothing other than that *it already was this*. Circumstances, situation, customs, and so forth, shown on one side [1807 241] as *present* and on the other *within this determinate individuality*, express only its indeterminate essence, which is not the issue. If these circumstances, way of thinking, customs, and general state of the world had not existed, the individual would indeed not have become what it is. For everyone

situated in this state of the world is this universal substance. But to explain how that state particularized itself in *this* individual—and this is what must be comprehended—it would have had to particularize itself in and for itself, and act on an individual in the determinacy it gave itself. Only so would it have made the individual the determinate individual it is. If the external had in and for itself the constitution it displays in individuality, individuality would be comprehended from it. We would have a double gallery of pictures, one the reflection of the other: one gallery showing the complete determination and delimitation of external circumstances, the other translating these into the way they exist in the conscious being; the former the sphere's surface, the latter its center, which represents that surface within itself.

307 But the sphere's surface, the individual's world, immediately has an ambiguous meaning. It is a *world and situation existing in and for itself*, and the *individual's world either* because the individual merely merged with it, let it enter itself just as it [1807 242] is, and behaved toward it only as formal consciousness; *or* it is the individual's world as what is present has been *reversed* by the individual. Because this freedom makes actuality capable of this double meaning, the individual's world can be comprehended only from the individual itself. Through the individual, the *influence* of actuality represented as *existing* in and for itself receives the absolutely opposed meaning that the individual either *lets* the inflowing stream of actuality take its course within it, or interrupts and reverses it. But this makes *psychological necessity* so empty a phrase that whatever is supposed to have had this influence has the absolute possibility of not having had it.

308 Thus the *being* that would exist *in and for itself* and form one side—the universal side—of a law falls away. Individuality is what *its* world is as *its own*. Individuality itself is the circle of its activity, in which it has displayed itself as actuality. It is absolutely only the unity of *being found present* and *being made*. The sides of this unity do not fall apart, as in the representation of psychologi-

cal law, into a world present *in itself* and an individuality existing *for itself*. Or if each is considered separately this way, there is no necessity or law of their relationship to each other.

[1807 243]

c. Observation of Self-Consciousness's Relationship to Its Immediate Actuality; Physiognomy and the Study of the Skull.

309 Psychological observation finds no law governing self-consciousness's relationship to actuality, or to the world opposed to it. Their mutual indifference drives it back to the *distinctive determinacy* of real individuality. This individuality is *in and for itself*, or contains the opposition of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself* erased in their absolute mediation. It is the object observation has now acquired, or toward which it passes.

310 The individual is in and for itself. It is *for itself*, or free activity; but it is also *in itself*. It itself has an *original*, determinate *being*: a determinacy conceptually the same as what psychology wanted to find outside it. The opposition thus emerges *within the individual itself*: it is this doubled thing, the movement of [1807 244] consciousness and the fixed being of an appearing actuality—an actuality immediately *its own* within itself. This *being*, the *body* of determinate individuality, is its *originality*, what it has not done. But since the individual is also only what it has done, its body is also the expression of itself *produced* by it. It is also a *sign* that has not remained an immediate thing, but through which the individual only makes known what it *is* in the sense of putting its original nature to work.

311 Relating the moments present here to the preceding view, we have here a general human shape, or at least the general shape of a climate, continent, or people, just as previously we had the same general customs and cultivation. Added to this are particular circumstances and situation within universal actuality. Here this particular actuality exists as the particular formation of the individual's shape. On the other side, just as the individual's free activity and actuality as *its own* were previously set against what was already present, here stands

shape as the expression of *its* actualization, posited through itself: the features and forms of its self-active essence. But the universal and particular actuality that observation previously found outside the individual is here its own actuality, its inborn body. Into this same body [1807 245] falls the expression belonging to its activity. In the psychological view, actuality existing in and for itself and determinate individuality were to be related to each other. Here, however, the *whole determinate individuality* is observation's object, and each side of its opposition is itself this whole. Thus the outward whole includes not only *original being*, the inborn body, but also its formation belonging to inward activity. It is the unity of unformed and formed being, the individual's actuality permeated by being-for-itself. This whole, encompassing both the determinate, original, fixed parts and the features arising only through activity, *is*. This *being* is the *expression* of the inner, of the individual posited as consciousness and movement. Likewise, this *inner* is no longer formal, contentless, or indeterminate self-activity whose content and determinacy would lie, as before, in external circumstances. It is an original character determinate in itself, of which activity is only the form. We therefore consider the relationship between these two sides: how it should be determined, and what is meant by this *expression* of the inner in the outer.

312 Initially, this outer does not make the inner visible, or a being for another, as an *organ*. For the inner, insofar as it is in the [1807 246] organ, is *activity* itself. The speaking mouth, the working hand, and, if one wishes, the legs as well, are organs of actualization and accomplishment. They contain activity *as activity*, or the inner as such. But the externality the inner gains through them is the deed, as an actuality separated from the individual. Language and work are expressions in which the individual no longer keeps and possesses itself within itself, but lets the inner come wholly outside itself and surrenders it to another. One can therefore say equally that these expressions express the inner too much and too little. *Too much*: because the inner itself breaks out in them, no opposition remains between them and it. They give not merely an *expression* of the inner, but the inner itself immediately. *Too little*: because in language and

action the inner makes itself into another, it surrenders itself to the element of transformation. This reverses the spoken word and accomplished deed, making them something other than what they are in and for themselves as actions of this determinate individual. Through this externality and others' intervention, the works of actions lose the character of something lasting over against other individualities. Moreover, since they relate to the inner they contain as a separate, indifferent outer, [1807 247] *through the individual itself* they can inwardly be other than they appear. Either the individual intentionally makes them appear something different from what they truly are, or it is too unskilled to give itself the outward side it really wanted and to fix it so that others cannot distort its work. Activity as accomplished work thus has a double, opposed meaning: either it is *inner* individuality and *not* its *expression*, or as outer it is an actuality *free* of the inner, something wholly different from it. Because of this ambiguity, we must look for the inner as it *still is in the individual itself*, but visibly or outwardly. In the organ, however, it is only immediate *activity* itself, gaining its externality in the deed, which may or may not represent the inner. Considered according to this opposition, the organ thus does not provide the expression sought.

313 If outward shape could express inward individuality only insofar as it is not organ or *activity*, and thus is a *resting* whole, it would behave as a subsisting thing. It would quietly receive the inner as something alien into its passive existence and thereby become its *sign*: an external, contingent expression whose *actual* side is [1807 248] meaningless by itself—a language whose sounds and combinations of sounds are not the thing itself but are joined to it by free choice and contingent in relation to it.

314 Such an arbitrary connection between things external to each other yields no law. Physiognomy, however, is supposed to differ from other worthless arts and pernicious studies by considering determinate individuality in the *necessary* opposition of inner and outer: character as conscious essence and that same character as existing shape. It relates these moments as their concept relates them, so that they must constitute a law's content. In astrology, palmistry, and

similar sciences, by contrast, only outer seems related to outer, something to something alien to it. *This* constellation at birth, or, bringing the external closer to the body itself, *these* lines of the hand, are *external* moments in relation to long or short life and the individual's fate in general. As externalities they are indifferent to each other and lack the mutual necessity that is supposed to lie in the relationship of *outer* and *inner*.

315 Admittedly, the hand seems not so much external to fate as [1807 249] inwardly related to it. For fate is itself only the appearance of what determinate individuality is *in itself* as inner original determinacy. To know what individuality is in itself, the palmist and physiognomist take a shorter route than, for example, Solon. Solon thought this could be known only from and after the course of the whole life. He considered appearance; they consider the *in-itself*. But it is easy to see why the hand must present individuality's *in-itself* regarding its fate. Next to the organ of speech, it is chiefly through the hand that a person brings themselves into appearance and actualization. It is the animated craftsman of their fortune. One can say that it *is* what the person *does*. For in the hand as the active organ of self-accomplishment, the person is present as its animating force. And since the person is originally their own fate, the hand will express this in-itself.

316 This determination—that the *organ* of activity is *as much being* as the *activity* within it, or that inward *being-in-itself* is itself *present* in it and has a *being for* others—yields a view different from the preceding one. Organs in general previously proved incapable of being taken as *expressions* of the inner because activity *as activity* [1807 250] is present in them, whereas activity *as deed* is merely external. Inner and outer thus fall apart and are or can be alien to each other. But according to the determination just considered, the organ must also be taken as the *middle* between them. For the very fact that activity is *present* in it also constitutes an *externality* of that activity, and one different from the deed: this externality remains with and in the individual. This middle and unity of inner and outer is itself, first, also external. But then this externality is also taken back into the inner. As *simple* externality it stands opposed to dispersed exter-

nality: either merely an *individual* work or state, contingent for the whole individuality, or, as *total* externality, fate splintered into a multiplicity of works and states. The *simple lines of the hand*, then, likewise the *tone* and *range* of the *voice* as the individual determinacy of *speech*, and speech again as it gains a firmer existence through the hand than through the voice—*writing*, specifically *handwriting*—all this is *expression* of the inner. As *simple externality*, it relates in turn to the *manifold externality* of action and fate as something *inner*. Thus, if the individual's determinate nature and inborn distinctiveness, [1807 251] together with what it has become through cultivation, are initially taken as the *inner*, the essence of action and fate, this inner has its *appearance* and externality *first* in mouth, hand, voice, handwriting, and the other organs and their lasting determinations. Only *then* does it express itself *further* outward in its actuality in the world.

317 Since this middle is determined as expression that is also taken back into the inner, its existence is not restricted to the immediate organ of activity. It is rather the movement and form of the face and of bodily shape generally that accomplish nothing. According to this concept, these features and their movement are activity held back and remaining in the individual. In relation to actual activity, they are the individual's own supervision and observation of it: *expression* as *reflection on* actual expression. The individual is not mute toward and during its outward activity because it is also reflected into itself within that activity, and expresses this reflection. This theoretical activity, or the individual's talk with itself about its activity, is perceptible to others too, since it is itself an expression.

318 In this inner that remains inner in its expression, we thus observe the individual's *being reflected* [1807 252] out of its actuality. We must see what becomes of the necessity posited in this unity. This reflected being is first distinct from the deed itself. It can therefore be *something other* than the deed is, and be taken as such. One can see in someone's face whether they are *serious* about what they say or do. Conversely, however, what is supposed to express the inner is also an *existing* expression. It thus itself sinks into the determination of *being*, which is

absolutely contingent for the self-conscious essence. It is indeed expression, but also only like a *sign*, so that the constitution of what expresses the content is completely indifferent to that content. In this appearance the inner is indeed *visible* invisibility, but is not bound to it. It can equally exist in another appearance, just as a different inner can exist in the same appearance. Lichtenberg therefore rightly says: *"Suppose the physiognomist once caught hold of the human being: it would take only a bold decision to become incomprehensible again for thousands of years."* In the previous relationship, the circumstances present were something existing from which individuality took what *it* could and wanted, either submitting to it or reversing it. They therefore did not contain individuality's necessity and essence. [1807 253] Likewise, individuality's immediate appearing being here either expresses its reflection out of actuality and its being-within-itself, or is only a sign for it, indifferent to what it signifies and therefore truly signifying nothing. It is as much its face as its mask, which it can remove. Individuality permeates its shape, moves and speaks in it. But this whole existence equally turns into an indifferent being over against will and action. Individuality erases its former significance of containing its reflection into itself or its true essence, and instead places that essence in will and deed.

319 Individuality *gives up the reflection into itself* expressed in its *features* and *places its essence in the work*. In this it contradicts the relationship established by reason's instinct, when it takes to observing self-conscious individuality, concerning what is to count as individuality's *inner* and *outer*. This viewpoint leads us to the actual thought underlying physiognomic *science*, if one wishes to call it that. The opposition this observation has reached is formally that of practical and theoretical, both posited within the practical itself: individuality [1807 254] actualizing itself in action, in the broadest sense, and that same individuality as, within this action, it also reflects out of it into itself and makes action its object. Observation takes up this opposition in the same inverted relationship in which it is determined in appearance. It regards the *deed* itself and the work, whether in language or firmer actuality, as the *inessential outer*. It regards individuality's *being-within-itself* as the *essential inner*. Of the two sides practical

consciousness contains—intention and deed, its *opinion* about its action and the *action* itself—observation chooses the former as the true inner. This inner is supposed to have its more or less *inessential* expression in the deed, but its true expression in bodily shape. The latter expression is the individual spirit's immediate sensory presence. The inwardness supposed to be true is the particularity of intention and the individuality of being-for-itself: both are *meant* spirit. Observation's objects are therefore *meant* existence, and it seeks laws between things of this kind.

320 Immediate opinion about spirit's supposed presence is natural physiognomy: a hasty judgment of inner nature and character from the first sight of its shape. The object of this opinion is [1807 255] of a kind whose essence is truly to be something other than merely immediate sensory being. Admittedly, what is present is precisely this reflection into itself out of the sensory, within the sensory. Observation's object is visibility as visibility of the invisible. But this immediate sensory presence is spirit's *actuality* as it exists only for opinion. On this side observation busies itself with its meant existence, with physiognomy, handwriting, tone of voice, and so forth. It relates such existence to an equally *meant inner*. What is to be recognized is not the murderer or thief, but the *capacity to be one*. Fixed abstract determinacy is thereby lost in the concrete, infinite determinacy of the *single* individual, now requiring more elaborate portraits than those labels. Such elaborate portraits certainly say more than classification as murderer, thief, kindhearted, unspoiled, and so forth. But they fall far short of their purpose of expressing meant being, or single individuality—just as descriptions of shape that go beyond flat forehead, long nose, and so forth do. For individual shape, like individual self-consciousness, is inexpressible as meant being. A science of human knowledge aimed at the supposed person, and [1807 256] physiognomy aimed at the person's supposed actuality, seeking to raise natural physiognomy's unconscious judgment into knowledge, are therefore endless and groundless. They can never say what they mean, because they only mean, and their content is only meant.

321 The *laws* this science sets out to find are relationships between these two meant sides. They can therefore themselves be nothing but empty opinion. Moreover, this supposed knowledge, concerned with spirit's actuality, has precisely this as its object: spirit reflects out of its sensory existence into itself, and determinate existence is an indifferent contingency for it. Thus, when it finds its laws, it must immediately know that they say nothing, but are really pure chatter or only *an opinion of its own*. This expression truthfully says that these are the same: stating one's *opinion* and thereby offering not the matter itself but merely an opinion *of oneself*. In *content*, however, these observations cannot differ from the following: "It always rains when we have a fair," says the shopkeeper; "and whenever I dry laundry," says the housewife.

322 Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation this way, also says: "If someone said, 'You act like an honest [1807 257] man, but I can see from your figure that you are forcing yourself and are a scoundrel at heart,' truly, every decent fellow will, until the end of the world, answer such an address with a slap in the face." This response *hits the mark* because it refutes the first presupposition of such a science of opinion: that a person's *actuality* is their face and so forth. A person's *true being* is instead *their deed*. In it individuality is *actual*, and the deed sublates the *meant* in both its aspects. First, it sublates the meant as bodily, resting being. In action, individuality instead presents itself as the *negative* essence that only *is* insofar as it sublates being. Then the deed also sublates opinion's inexpressibility regarding self-conscious individuality, which in opinion is infinitely determinate and determinable. In the accomplished deed, this bad infinity is destroyed. The deed is something simply determinate and universal, graspable in an abstraction. It is murder, theft, a benefit, a brave deed, and so forth. One can *say what it is*. It *is* this, and its being is not merely a sign but the thing itself. It *is* this, and the individual person *is* what it *is*. In the simplicity of *this being*, the person is a universal essence existing for others and ceases to be merely meant. [1807 258] Admittedly, the person is not thereby posited as spirit. But we are discussing their *being* as being. *On one side*, the twofold being of *shape* and *deed* confront each other, and both are sup-

posed to be their actuality. Here only the deed must be asserted as their *genuine being*, not their figure, supposedly expressing what they think about their deeds, or what one thought they merely could do. Likewise, *on the other side*, when their *work* and their inner *possibility*, capacity, or intention are opposed, the work alone must count as their true actuality. This remains so even if they deceive themselves about it and, turning from their action into themselves, think they are inwardly something other than they are in the *deed*. In becoming a work, individuality entrusts itself to the objective element and does surrender itself to being altered and reversed. But precisely what determines the deed's character is whether it is an actual being that holds its ground or only an intended work that passes away, inherently nothing. Objectivity does not alter the deed itself. It merely shows *what* it is: whether it *is* or is *nothing*. Analyzing this being into intentions and similar subtleties, to explain the *actual* person—that is, their deed—back into meant being, must be left to the idleness of opinion. The person too may invent special intentions concerning their actuality. [1807 259] If this idleness wishes to put its deedless wisdom to work, deny the agent the character of reason, and mistreat them by declaring their figure and features rather than their deed to be their being, it must fear the response above. That response proves that figure is not the *in-itself*, but can instead be an object of treatment.

323 Looking at the full range of relationships in which self-conscious individuality can be observed standing toward its outer, one remains for observation to make its object. In psychology it is the *external actuality* of *things*, supposed to have its conscious *counterpart* in spirit and make spirit comprehensible. In physiognomy, by contrast, spirit is to be known in *its own* outer as a being that is its *language*: the visible invisibility of its essence. There remains the determination of actuality's side in which individuality expresses its essence in its immediate, fixed actuality that simply exists. This last relationship therefore differs from the physiognomic one. The latter is the individual's *speaking* presence. In its *acting* expression, the individual also presents its presence as *reflecting into and contemplating itself*: an expression [1807 260] that is itself movement, resting

features that are themselves essentially mediated being. But in the determination still to be considered, the outer is finally a wholly *resting* actuality. It is not in itself a speaking sign, but presents itself for itself, separate from self-conscious movement, and is a mere thing.

324 Concerning the inner's relationship to this outer, it first seems clear that it must be comprehended as a *causal relationship*. For a *necessary* relationship of one thing existing in itself to another thing existing in itself is this relationship.

325 For spiritual individuality to affect the body, it must itself be bodily as cause. The bodily element in which it exists as cause is the organ—not of activity directed at external actuality, but of the self-conscious essence's activity within itself, directed outward only toward its own body. It is not immediately clear which organs these could be. If we thought only of organs in general, the organ of work would easily be at hand, as would the organ of sexual drive, and so forth. But such organs are instruments or parts that spirit as one extreme uses as middle terms toward the other extreme, the external *object*. [1807 261] Here, however, an organ is meant in which the self-conscious individual, as extreme facing its own opposed actuality, preserves itself *for itself*. It is not also turned outward but is reflected within its action, and its side of *being* is not a *being for another*. In the physiognomic relationship, the organ is also considered as existence reflected into itself and commenting on activity. But this being is objective, and the result of physiognomic observation is that self-consciousness confronts precisely this actuality of its own as something indifferent. This indifference disappears when reflection into itself is itself *effective*. Existence thereby receives a necessary relationship to it. But to act on existence, this reflection must itself have a being, though not properly an objective being. It is to be pointed out as this organ.

326 In ordinary life, anger, for example, as such an inward activity, is located in the liver. Plato even grants the liver something higher, which some consider the highest: prophecy, or the gift of expressing the holy and eternal irrationally. But the movement the individual has in the liver, heart, and so forth cannot be

regarded as its movement wholly reflected into itself. [1807 262] Rather, in these it has already struck into the body and has an animal existence turning outward toward externality.

327 The *nervous system*, by contrast, is the organic's immediate rest within its movement. The *nerves* themselves are admittedly organs of consciousness already immersed in its outward direction. But brain and spinal cord may be considered the immediate presence of self-consciousness that remains within itself: neither objective nor going outward. Insofar as this organ's moment of being is a *being for another*, an existence, it is dead being, no longer self-consciousness's presence. Yet in its concept, this *being within itself* is a fluidity in which circles thrown into it immediately dissolve and no difference expresses itself as *existing*. Meanwhile, spirit itself is not abstractly simple but a system of movements in which it differentiates itself into moments while remaining free in this differentiation. It articulates its body generally for different functions, assigning each individual part to only one. So one can also imagine the fluid *being* of its *being-within-itself* as articulated. Indeed, it seems necessary to imagine it this way, since spirit's *being* reflected into itself in [1807 263] the brain is itself only a middle between its pure essence and its bodily articulation. This middle must therefore share the nature of both, and so, on the latter side, also contain *existing* articulation.

328 Spiritual-organic being also has the necessary side of a *resting, subsisting* existence. The former must withdraw as the extreme of being-for-itself and confront this other extreme as the object on which it acts as cause. If brain and spinal cord are spirit's bodily *being-for-itself*, skull and vertebral column are the other, separated extreme: the fixed, resting thing. But when thinking of spirit's proper dwelling, everyone thinks not of the back but only of the head. In investigating knowledge of the kind before us, we can be satisfied with this reason—not too poor for it—to limit this existence to the skull. Someone might think of the back because knowledge and activity are sometimes partly beaten *into*, partly beaten *out of* a person through it. But this would prove nothing toward including the spinal cord as spirit's dwelling and the column as its correspond-

ing existence, since it would prove too much. One can equally recall that [1807 264] other external ways are favored for getting at spirit's activity, to awaken or restrain it. The vertebral column is thus, if one wishes, *rightly* excluded. It is *constructed* as well as many other doctrines of natural philosophy that only the skull is left, though admittedly it does not contain spirit's *organs*. That was excluded earlier by the concept of this relationship, which placed the skull on the side of existence. Or, if we may not recall the matter's *concept*, experience teaches that, whereas one sees with the eye as organ, one does *not* murder, steal, write poetry, and so forth with the skull. The expression *organ* must therefore be avoided for the skull's *meaning* still to be discussed. Although people commonly say rational people care not about the word but the *matter*, this does not license naming a thing with a word that does not belong to it. That is both clumsiness and deception, thinking and pretending that only the right *word* is missing, while concealing that the matter—that is, the concept—is actually lacking. If the concept were present, it would also have its right word. So far, all that has been determined is that, as the brain is the living head, the skull is the caput mortuum.
[1807 265]

329 In this dead being, then, spiritual movements and the brain's determinate ways would have to present themselves as external actuality, though still in the individual itself. For their relationship to the skull, which as dead being has no spirit dwelling within it, the external mechanical relationship established above first offers itself. The actual organs—and these are in the brain—would push the skull out round here, hammer it broad there, or press it flat, or whatever other way one imagines this action. As itself part of the organism, the skull, like every bone, must admittedly be thought to form itself in a living way. Viewed thus, it would instead press upon the brain and set its external limit, for which, being harder, it is better equipped. But the same relationship would still govern their activity toward each other. Whether skull determines or is determined changes nothing in the causal connection generally. Only then the skull would become self-consciousness's immediate organ, since as *cause* it would contain

the side of *being-for-itself*. Yet insofar as *being-for-itself* as *organic vitality belongs equally to both*, the causal connection between them actually disappears. Their further formation would instead be inwardly connected [1807 266] as an organic, preestablished harmony. This leaves the two related sides free toward each other and each with its own *shape*, which need not correspond to the other's shape. Still more are shape and quality free toward each other, as a grape's shape and wine's taste are. But insofar as *being-for-itself* falls on the brain's side and *existence* on the skull's, a causal connection between them must *also* be posited within organic unity: a necessary relationship between them as external to each other, itself external, through which their *shapes* would determine each other.

330 But one can talk back and forth in many ways about how the organ of self-consciousness would act as cause on the opposite side. For we are discussing the constitution of a cause considered according to its *indifferent* existence, shape, and size: a cause whose inner and being-for-itself are supposed to be precisely something that does not concern immediate existence. First, the skull's organic self-formation is indifferent to mechanical action. Since the former is self-relation, the relationship between these two relationships is precisely indeterminacy and [1807 267] boundlessness itself. Further, even if the brain took spirit's differences into itself as existing differences and were a multiplicity of internal organs occupying different spaces—contrary to nature, which gives the concept's moments their own existence and therefore places the *fluid simplicity* of organic life *purely on one side*, and its *articulation* and *division* in its differences on the *other*, so that they appear as separate anatomical things, as they are to be grasped here—it would remain indeterminate whether an originally stronger spiritual moment must have a more *expanded* brain organ and a weaker one a more *contracted* organ, or exactly the reverse. It would be equally uncertain whether its *development* enlarged or diminished the organ, made it bulkier and thicker or finer. Since the cause's constitution remains indeterminate, so does its effect on the skull: whether it expands it or narrows and collapses it. If this effect is given the *finer* name *stimulation*, it remains uncertain whether it swells

like a blistering plaster made with cantharides or shrivels like vinegar. Plausible reasons can be offered for all such views. For the organic relationship, [1807 268] which intervenes just as much, lets one pass as readily as another and is indifferent to all this reasoning.

331 But observing consciousness is not concerned with determining this relationship. For what stands on one side is not the brain as an *animal* part, but the brain as *being* of *self-conscious* individuality. As settled character and moving conscious activity, individuality is *for itself* and *within itself*. Opposed to this is its actuality and existence for another. Being-for-and-within-itself is the essence and subject that has in the brain a being *subsumed under it*, receiving its value only through the meaning dwelling in it. But the other side of self-conscious individuality, the side of its existence, is *being* as independent and as subject, or as a *thing*: namely a bone. A *person's actuality and existence is their skull-bone*. This is the relationship and understanding the two sides have in the consciousness observing them.

332 That consciousness now wants the more determinate relationship of these sides. The skull-bone does have the general meaning of being spirit's immediate actuality. But spirit's many-sidedness gives its existence an equally manifold meaning. What must be obtained is the [1807 269] determinate meaning of the individual locations into which this existence is divided. We must see how these locations point to it within themselves.

333 The skull-bone is neither an organ of activity nor a speaking movement. One neither steals nor murders and so forth with it, nor does it alter its expression in the slightest for such deeds, to become an expressive gesture. Nor does this *existing thing* have the value of a *sign*. Facial expression, gesture, tone, even a column or a post driven into a deserted island, immediately announce that something else is meant by them beyond what they immediately *merely are*. They immediately declare themselves signs by containing a determinacy that points to something else because it does not properly belong to them. A skull, too, may suggest many thoughts, as Yorick's did to Hamlet. But the skull-bone

by itself is so indifferent and unconcerned a thing that immediately nothing can be seen or meant in it except itself. It may call to mind the brain and its determinacy, or differently formed skulls, but not a conscious movement. It contains neither facial expression nor gesture, nor an impression announcing its origin in conscious activity. For it is the actuality that was supposed to present, within individuality, [1807 270] another side: no longer being reflecting into itself, but purely *immediate being*.

334 Since the skull does not itself feel either, perhaps a more determinate meaning could still arise from particular sensations indicating, through proximity, what is meant by it. If a conscious way of spirit has its feeling at a particular location, perhaps that location's shape would indicate it and its particularity. Just as some complain of a painful tension somewhere in the head during strenuous thought, or even during *thinking* in general, so *stealing*, *murdering*, *writing poetry*, and so forth might each be accompanied by its own sensation, which would also have to possess its own special location. This more stirred and active place in the brain would probably further develop the adjacent place in the bone. Or through sympathy or consensus, the bone too would not remain idle, but enlarge, diminish, or otherwise form itself. What makes this hypothesis improbable, however, is that feeling in general is indeterminate, and feeling in the head as center might be a general shared feeling of all suffering. Other sensations would then mingle with the thief's, murderer's, or poet's [1807 271] tickle or pain in the head. They would be as hard to distinguish from one another and from merely bodily sensations as it is to determine a disease from the symptom of headache, even when restricting its meaning to the bodily.

335 In fact, from whichever side we consider the matter, every necessary mutual relationship disappears, as does any indication of it that speaks for itself. If the relationship is nevertheless to occur, what remains, necessarily, is a free, preestablished harmony *without a concept* between the corresponding determinations of both sides. For one side *is supposed to be spiritless actuality, a mere thing*. Thus on one side stands a collection of resting skull locations, and on the other a collection of spiritual properties whose multiplicity and determination

will depend on the state of psychology. The poorer the representation of spirit, the easier the matter becomes on this side. The properties become both fewer and more separated, fixed, and bony, hence more similar to and comparable with bone determinations. But although a poor representation of spirit makes much easier, a very large collection still remains on both sides. For observation, their relationship remains wholly contingent. If each of the children of Israel [1807 272] had to select from the sand by the sea, to which they are supposed to correspond, the grain of which they are the sign, the indifference and arbitrariness assigning each their grain would be just as great as that assigning skull locations and bone shapes to each mental faculty and passion, and also to the shades of character that finer psychology and human knowledge discuss, which would likewise have to be considered here. The murderer's skull has this—not organ, nor sign, but bump. Yet this murderer has many other properties, and other bumps, as well as hollows. We may choose among bumps and hollows. His murderous disposition can in turn be related to any bump or hollow, and these to any property. For the murderer is neither merely this abstraction of a murderer nor has only one elevation and one depression. Observations made here must therefore sound just like the shopkeeper's and housewife's rain at the fair and on laundry day. Shopkeeper and housewife could equally observe that it always rains when this neighbor passes or roast pork is eaten. Just as rain is indifferent to these circumstances, so for observation *this* [1807 273] spiritual determination is indifferent to *this* determinate being of the skull. For of the two objects of this observation, one is a dry *being-for-itself*, a bony property of spirit, and the other a dry *being-in-itself*. A thing as bony as either is completely indifferent to everything else. The high bump is as indifferent to a murderer nearby as the murderer is to a flat place near him.

336 The *possibility* that some property, passion, and so forth is connected with a bump in some location does, of course, remain irrefutable. One *can imagine* a murderer with a high bump at this skull location, a thief with one there. From this side the science of the skull can still expand greatly. At first it seems limited to joining a bump and property *in the same individual*, so that the individual

possesses both. But natural skull science—for there must be one just as there is natural physiognomy—already goes beyond this limit. It judges not only that a sly person has a fist-sized bump behind the ears, but also imagines that the bumps on the forehead belong not to the unfaithful wife herself but to her spouse. [1807 274] Equally, one can *imagine* the person living under the same roof as the murderer, or his neighbor, and further his fellow citizens and so forth, with high bumps somewhere on their skulls, just as one can imagine the flying cow first caressed by the crab riding a donkey, and afterward, and so forth. But if *possibility* means not the possibility *of imagining* but *inner* possibility, or the *concept*, then the object is an actuality that is, and is supposed to be, pure thing without such meaning. It can therefore possess that meaning only in representation.

337 Despite the two sides' indifference, the observer may proceed to determine relationships. He is partly encouraged by the general rational principle that *the outer expresses the inner*, partly supported by analogy with animal skulls. Animals may indeed have simpler characters than humans, but it is correspondingly harder to say what character they have, since not everyone's imagination can easily enter properly into an animal's nature. In asserting the laws he claims to have discovered, the observer finds *special help* in a distinction that must necessarily occur to us here too. The *being* of [1807 275] spirit at least cannot be taken as absolutely fixed and unalterable. A person is free. It is admitted that *original* being consists only of *predispositions* over which the person has considerable power, or which require favorable circumstances to develop. That is, spirit's *original* being must equally be described as something that does not exist as being. Suppose observations contradict what someone happens to assert as law: if the weather is fine at the fair or on laundry day, shopkeeper and housewife could say that it *really ought* to rain and the *predisposition* is nevertheless *present*. Similarly, skull observation could say this individual *really ought* to be as the skull declares according to the law and has an *original predisposition* that, *however*, has not developed. This quality is not present, but it *ought to be*. The *law* and *ought* rest on observing actual rain and actual disposition together

with this skull determination. But if *actuality* is absent, *empty possibility* counts for just as much. This possibility—that is, the proposed law's nonactuality—and hence observations contradicting it, must enter precisely because the individual's freedom and the developing circumstances are indifferent to *being* [1807 276] in general, both as original inner being and as outward bony being. The individual can be something other than it originally is inwardly, and still more other than what it is as a bone.

338 We thus obtain the possibility that this skull bump or hollow indicates either something actual or only a *predisposition*, and an indeterminate predisposition to anything at all—that it indicates something nonactual. We see a poor excuse meet its usual fate: it can itself be used against what it was meant to support. We see opinion brought by the nature of the matter to say, *thoughtlessly*, the *opposite* of what it holds fast: that this bone indicates something, but equally *does not*.

339 What hovers before opinion in this excuse is the true thought that precisely destroys it: *being* as such is not at all spirit's truth. A predisposition is already an *original being* that has no share in spirit's activity, and the bone is just such a being on its side. What exists without spiritual activity is a thing for consciousness. Far from being consciousness's essence, it is rather its opposite. Consciousness is *actual* for itself only through negating and destroying such being. [1807 277] From this side, passing off a bone as consciousness's *actual existence* must be considered a complete denial of reason. Yet it is passed off as this by being considered spirit's outer, since the outer is precisely existing actuality. It is no use saying that one *merely infers* from this outer to an inner that is *something else*, and that the outer is not the inner itself but only its *expression*. For in their relationship, the determination of actuality *thinking itself and thought* falls on the inner's side, while that of *existing actuality* falls on the outer's. Thus telling someone, "You—your inner—are this *because* your *bone* is constituted so," means nothing other than, "I regard a bone as *your actuality*." The response to such a judgment mentioned in physiognomy, a slap in the face, initially displaces the *soft* parts from their appearance and position. It proves

only that these are no true *in-itself*, not spirit's actuality. Here the response would properly have to go so far as smashing the judge's skull, to prove as palpably as his wisdom that a bone is nothing *in itself* for a person, much less *their* true actuality.
[1807 278]

340 The crude instinct of self-conscious reason will reject such skull science without examination: this other observing instinct of reason that has reached a presentiment of *knowledge*, but grasped it spiritlessly as the outer expressing the inner. Yet sometimes the worse a thought is, the less obvious its precise fault and the harder it is to explain. A thought is called worse the purer and emptier the abstraction it takes as essence. The opposition at issue here has as its members self-aware individuality and the abstraction of externality that has become wholly a *thing*: spirit's inner being grasped as fixed, spiritless being, opposed to just such being. Yet observing reason seems thereby to have reached its highest point, from which it must abandon itself and turn over. For only what is utterly bad contains the immediate necessity of reversing itself. Thus one can say of the Jewish people that precisely because they stand immediately before salvation's gate, they are and have been the most rejected. What they ought to be in and for themselves, this self-essentiality, they are not for themselves, but place it beyond themselves. Through this alienation they make a higher [1807 279] existence *possible*—if they could take their object back into themselves—than if they had remained within the immediacy of being. For spirit is greater the greater the opposition from which it returns into itself. It creates this opposition by sublating its immediate unity and alienating its being-for-itself. But if such a consciousness does not reflect itself, the middle in which it stands is an unhappy void, since what should fill it has become a fixed extreme. Thus this last stage of observing reason is its worst, but for that reason its reversal is necessary.

341 For an overview of the series of relationships considered so far, which make up observation's content and object, shows that in observation's *first mode*, observing inorganic nature's relationships, *sensory being already disappears* for

it. The moments of its relationship present themselves as pure abstractions and simple concepts. These were supposed to be firmly bound to the existence of things, but that existence is lost, so the moment proves to be pure movement and universal. This free process, complete within itself, retains the meaning of something objective, but now appears as a *one*. In the inorganic process, the one is the nonexistent inner. Existing as one, however, the process is the [1807 280] organic. As being-for-itself or negative essence, the one stands against the universal, withdraws from it, and remains free for itself. Thus the concept, realized only in the element of absolute singularity, does not find in organic existence its true expression of being there *as universal*. It remains external to organic nature or, what is the same, an *inner* of organic nature. The organic process is free only *in itself*, not *for itself*. In *purpose*, the being-for-itself of its freedom enters; it *exists* as another being, a self-conscious wisdom outside the organic process. Observing reason therefore turns to this wisdom, to spirit, the concept existing as universality, or purpose existing as purpose. Its own essence is now its object.

342 First it turns to spirit's purity. But because observation grasps the object moving in its differences as something existing, *laws of thinking* arise for it: relationships of something permanent to something permanent. Yet since these laws' content consists only of moments, they run together into the one of self-consciousness. Taken likewise as *existing*, this new object is *individual, contingent* self-consciousness. Observation therefore remains within meant spirit and the contingent relationship of conscious to unconscious actuality. Only spirit within itself [1807 281] is the necessity of this relationship. Observation therefore moves closer to its body and compares its willing and active actuality with its actuality reflected into itself and contemplating, which is itself objective. Though a language the individual has within itself, this outer is also, as sign, indifferent to the content it was supposed to signify, just as what posits the sign is indifferent to it.

343 Observation therefore finally returns from this changing language to *fixed being*. According to its concept, it declares that externality—not as organ, nor as language and sign, but as a *dead thing*—is spirit's external and immediate actuality. What the very first observation of inorganic nature sublated, namely that the concept should be present as thing, this last mode restores by making spirit's actuality itself into a thing, or conversely, by giving dead being the meaning of spirit. Observation has thereby come to state what our concept of it was: that reason's certainty seeks itself as objective actuality. Admittedly, one probably does not mean that spirit, represented by a skull, is thereby declared a thing. This thought is supposed to contain no [1807 282] materialism, as it is called; spirit is still supposed to be something other than these bones. But saying that it *is* itself means nothing other than that it is a *thing*. If *being* as such, or thinghood, is predicated of spirit, the true expression of this is that spirit is something like *a bone*. It must therefore count as highly important that the true expression has been found for saying purely of spirit that *it is*. Otherwise, when spirit is said to *be*, to have *a being*, to be a *thing*, a single *actuality*, one does not *mean* something that can be seen, taken in hand, pushed, and so forth. But that is what is *said*. What is truly said is thus expressed as: *spirit's being is a bone*.

344 This result now has a double meaning. First, its true meaning supplements the result of self-consciousness's previous movement. Unhappy self-consciousness alienated its independence and wrested its *being-for-itself* out into a *thing*. It thereby returned from self-consciousness into consciousness: the consciousness for which the object is a *being*, a *thing*. But what is thing is self-consciousness. It is thus the unity of I and being, the *category*. When its object is [1807 283] determined in this way, consciousness *has reason*. Consciousness, like self-consciousness, properly *is reason in itself*. But only consciousness for which the object has been determined as category can be said to *have* reason. Knowing what reason is remains distinct from this. The category, the *immediate* unity of *being* and *its-own*, must pass through both forms. Observing consciousness is precisely that consciousness to which it presents itself in the form of *being*. In its result, consciousness states as a proposition what it is unconsciously certain

of: the proposition contained in reason's concept. This is the *infinite judgment* that the self is a thing—a judgment that sublates itself. This result has therefore added this definite feature to the category: it is this self-sublating opposition. The *pure* category, existing for consciousness in the form of *being* or *immediacy*, is the still *unmediated*, merely *present* object, while consciousness relates to it equally without mediation. The moment of that infinite judgment is the transition from *immediacy* to mediation or *negativity*. The present object is therefore determined as negative, and consciousness as *self*-consciousness facing it. Or the category, having passed through the form of *being* in observation, is now posited in the form of [1807 284] being-for-itself. Consciousness no longer wants to *find itself immediately*, but to produce itself through its activity. *It itself* is for itself the purpose of its activity, just as in observing it was concerned only with things.

345 The result's other meaning is that of nonconceptual observation, already considered. It can grasp and express itself only by innocently declaring the bone, found as a sensory thing that does not also lose its objectivity for consciousness, to be self-consciousness's *actuality*. But it has no clarity of consciousness about its saying this. It does not grasp its proposition in the determinacy of subject and predicate and their relationship, much less as the infinite, self-dissolving judgment and concept. Instead, from a deeper self-consciousness of spirit, appearing here as natural decency, it conceals the disgrace of the naked, nonconceptual thought that takes a bone as self-consciousness's actuality. It whitewashes this thought through thoughtlessness itself, mixing in various relationships of cause and effect, sign, organ, and so on, which have no meaning here, and hiding the proposition's glaring character through distinctions borrowed from them.
[1807 285]

346 Brain fibers and the like, considered as spirit's being, are already something thought and merely hypothetical—not something *existent*, felt, or seen, not true actuality. When they *are there*, when seen, they are dead objects and no longer count as spirit's being. But proper objectivity must be *immediate and*

sensory, so that spirit is posited as actual in this dead objectivity—for bone is the dead insofar as it exists in the living being itself. The concept of this representation is that reason is for itself *all thinghood*, even *pure objectivity itself*. But it is this *in the concept*: only the concept is its truth. The purer the concept itself, the more foolish the representation into which it sinks when its content exists not as concept but as representation. This happens when the self-sublating judgment is taken not with consciousness of its infinity but as a permanent proposition, its subject and predicate each valid by itself: self fixed as self and thing as thing, yet one supposed to be the other. Reason, essentially concept, is immediately divided into itself and its opposite, an opposition just as immediately sublated for that very reason. But when it offers itself as itself and its opposite and is held fast in the wholly isolated moment of this [1807 286] separation, it is grasped irrationally. The purer its moments, the more glaring is the appearance of this content, which alone exists for consciousness or alone is innocently stated by it. The *depth* that spirit drives outward from within, but only as far as its *representing consciousness*, leaving it there, and this consciousness's *ignorance* of what it says, form the same union of high and low that nature naively expresses in the living being by joining the organ of its highest completion, the organ of procreation, with the organ of pissing. The infinite judgment as infinite would be the completion of life comprehending itself. But consciousness of it that remains within representation behaves as pissing.

B. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Itself.

347 Self-consciousness found the thing as itself and itself as thing. That is, *it is for it* that *in itself* it is objective actuality. It is no longer the *immediate* certainty of being all reality. Instead, for it the immediate in general has the form of something sublated, so that its *objectivity* counts only as a surface whose inner and essence is *self-consciousness itself*. The object to which it relates positively is therefore a self-consciousness. It has the form of thinghood: it is *independent*. But self-consciousness is certain that this independent object is nothing alien to it. It thus knows that *in itself* it is recognized by the object. It is *spirit*, certain that in the doubling of its self-consciousness and the independence of both, it

has unity with itself. This certainty must now rise to truth for it. What it takes itself to be *in itself* and in its *[1807 288] inner* certainty must enter its consciousness and become *for it*.

348 A comparison with the path so far already indicates in general the main stages of this actualization. Observing reason repeated, within the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*: sense-certainty, perception, and understanding. Similarly, this reason will again traverse the double movement of *self-consciousness* and pass from independence into its freedom. At first this active reason is aware of itself only as an individual. As such, it must demand and produce its actuality in the other. Then, as its consciousness rises to universality, it becomes *universal* reason. It is conscious of itself as reason, as already recognized in and for itself, uniting all self-consciousness within its pure consciousness. It is the simple spiritual essence, which, also coming to consciousness, is the *real substance* into which earlier forms return as their ground. Compared with this ground they are only individual moments of its becoming. They do tear themselves loose and appear as shapes of their own, but in fact have *existence* and *actuality* only as sustained by it, and their *truth* only insofar as they are and remain within it.
[1807 289]

349 Take this goal, the *concept* that has already emerged *for us*: recognized self-consciousness, which has the certainty of itself in another free self-consciousness, and precisely therein its truth. Taking it in its reality, or bringing out this still inward spirit as substance already advanced into existence, opens up within this concept *the realm of ethical life*. For ethical life is nothing other than the absolute spiritual *unity* of individuals' essence within their independent *actuality*. It is a self-consciousness universal in itself, so actual for itself in another consciousness that this other has complete independence, or is a thing for it. Precisely in this, it is conscious of *unity* with the other, and only in this unity with the objective essence is it self-consciousness. This ethical *substance*, in the *abstraction* of *universality*, is merely law *in thought*. But it is just as much immediately actual *self-consciousness*, or *custom*. Conversely, *individual* con-

sciousness is this existing one only insofar as, in its individuality, it is aware of universal consciousness as its being, insofar as its activity and existence are universal custom.

350 In a people's life, the concept of self-conscious reason's actualization has its completed reality: intuiting complete *unity* with the *other* in the other's independence, or having as my object this [1807 290] free *thinghood* of another that I find before me, which is the negative of myself, as *my being for me*. Reason is present as fluid, universal *substance*, as unchanging, simple *thinghood*. It also breaks into many completely independent beings, as light breaks into stars as innumerable points shining for themselves. In their absolute being-for-itself, these beings are dissolved in simple independent substance not only *in themselves* but *for themselves*. They are conscious of being these single independent beings because they sacrifice their individuality and this universal substance is their soul and essence. Equally, this universal is in turn their *activity* as individuals, or the work they produce.

351 The individual's *purely individual* activity and pursuits concern the needs it has as a natural being—that is, as *existing individuality*. Even its most ordinary functions do not come to nothing but have actuality through the universal preserving medium, the *power* of the whole people. Yet in universal substance the individual has not only this *form* of its activity's *subsistence* in general, but equally *its content*. What it does *is* the universal skill and custom of all. Even when this content becomes completely [1807 291] individualized, in its actuality it is interwoven with everyone's activity. The individual's *work* for its needs satisfies others' needs as much as its own, and it satisfies its own needs only through others' work. Just as the individual already *unconsciously* performs *universal* work in its *individual* work, it also performs universal work as its *conscious* object. The whole *as a whole* becomes its work, for which it sacrifices itself and thereby receives itself back from the whole. Nothing here is not reciprocal. In everything, the individual's independence gives itself its *positive* meaning of being for itself through dissolving its being-for-itself, through *negating* itself. This unity of being for another, or making oneself a thing, and being-for-

itself—this universal substance—speaks its *universal language* in the customs and laws of its people. But this existing, unchanging essence is nothing other than the expression of individuality itself in its singular form, which seems opposed to it. The laws state what each individual *is* and *does*. The individual recognizes them not only as its *universal* objective thinghood, but equally recognizes itself in this thinghood, or as *individualized* in its own individuality and in each fellow citizen. Thus in universal spirit each has only the [1807 292] certainty of finding nothing in existing actuality but itself. Each is as certain of others as of itself. I intuit in everyone that they are for themselves only these independent beings just as I am. I intuit free unity with others in them as a unity existing through them themselves just as through me. Them as me, me as them.

352 In a free people, then, reason is truly actualized. It is present, living spirit, in which the individual finds its *vocation*—its universal and individual essence—not merely stated and present as thinghood. The individual itself is this essence and has also fulfilled its vocation. The wisest men of antiquity therefore declared: *"Wisdom and virtue consist in living according to the customs of one's people."*

353 But self-consciousness, initially spirit only *immediately* and *according to the concept*, has stepped out of this happiness of having fulfilled its vocation and living within it. Or it has not yet reached this happiness. Both can equally be said.

354 Reason *must step out of this happiness*. For the life of a free people is *real ethical life* only *in itself*, or *immediately*. Ethical life is something *existing*, and thus this universal spirit is itself also individual. The whole of [1807 293] customs and laws is a *determinate* ethical substance. Only in the higher moment, *consciousness of its essence*, does it shed this limitation. Only in this knowing does it have its absolute truth, not immediately in its *being*. In its being it is partly limited; and partly its absolute limitation is precisely that spirit has the form of *being*.

355 Accordingly, *individual* consciousness, as it immediately exists in real ethical life or in the people, is solid trust. For it, spirit has not dissolved into its *abstract* moments. Thus it does not know itself as *being for itself as pure individuality* either. But once it reaches this thought, as it must, this *immediate* unity with spirit, or its *being* within spirit—its trust—is lost. *Isolated* for itself, it now takes itself, no longer universal spirit, as essence. The *moment of this individuality of self-consciousness* does indeed exist within universal spirit itself, but only as a vanishing magnitude. As soon as it appears for itself, it immediately dissolves within spirit and comes to consciousness only as trust. When it fixes itself—and every moment, because it is a moment of essence, must itself come to present itself as essence—the individual has set itself against laws and customs. These are merely a thought without absolute essentiality, an abstract [1807 294] theory without actuality. But the individual, as this I, regards itself as living truth.

356 Or self-consciousness *has not yet attained this happiness* of being ethical substance, the spirit of a people. For after returning from observation, spirit is not at first actualized through itself as spirit. It is posited only as *inner* essence or abstraction. Or it *is* only *immediately*. But as immediately existing, it is *individual*. It is practical consciousness entering the world it finds with the purpose of doubling itself in this determinacy of an individual: producing itself as this individual, as its existing counterpart and becoming conscious of this unity of its actuality with objective essence. It has the *certainty* of this unity. It takes the unity to exist *in itself*, or the agreement of itself and thinghood to be already present, needing only to become *for it* through its own activity. Its making is equally the *finding* of this unity. Since this unity is called *happiness*, the individual is sent out into the world by its spirit to *seek its happiness*.

357 Thus, although the truth of this rational self-consciousness is for us ethical substance, for it this is the beginning of its ethical experience of the world. Viewed as not yet having become that substance, this movement presses toward it. What sublates itself within the movement is the individual [1807 295] moments it regards as valid in isolation. They have the form of immediate willing, or *natural drive*, which reaches its satisfaction, and this satisfaction itself

becomes a new drive's content. But viewed as self-consciousness having lost the happiness of being within substance, these natural drives are joined to consciousness of their purpose as true vocation and essentiality. Ethical substance has sunk to a selfless predicate whose living subjects are individuals. These must fulfill their universality through themselves and provide from themselves for their vocation. In the first meaning, then, these shapes are ethical substance's becoming and precede it. In the second, they follow it and work out for self-consciousness what its vocation is. On the first side, in the movement through which the drives experience their truth, their immediacy or crudeness is lost and their content passes into a higher one. On the second, what is lost is consciousness's false representation that places its vocation in them. In the first case, the *goal* reached is immediate ethical substance. In the second, it is consciousness of that substance, specifically a consciousness knowing it as its own essence. Insofar as this is so, the movement would be morality's becoming, a higher shape than that first one. Yet these shapes also constitute only one side of its becoming: [1807 296] the side falling within *being-for-itself*, or in which consciousness sublates *its* purposes, not the side on which morality emerges from substance itself. Since these moments cannot yet mean purposes set up in opposition to lost ethical life, they count here in their unselfconscious content, and the goal they press toward is ethical substance. But nearer to our times is the form in which they appear after consciousness has lost its ethical life and repeats these forms in searching for it. They may therefore be presented more in the expression of this latter mode.

358 Self-consciousness, still only the concept of spirit, enters this path with the determination that it, as individual spirit, is its own essence. Its purpose is therefore to give itself actualization as an individual and, as this individual, to enjoy itself in that actualization.

359 In taking itself as essence in its *being-for-itself*, it is the *negativity* of the other. In its consciousness, it therefore faces, as the positive, something that indeed *is* but has for it the meaning of not being in itself. Consciousness appears divided into this actuality found before it and the *purpose* it accomplishes by sublating

that actuality, making its purpose actual in place of it. Yet its [1807 297] first purpose is its *immediate*, abstract *being-for-itself*: intuiting itself as *this individual* in another, or another self-consciousness as itself. Experiencing this purpose's truth raises self-consciousness higher. It now takes itself as purpose insofar as it is also *universal* and has the *law immediately* within it. But in carrying out this *law of its heart*, it experiences that the *individual* essence cannot preserve itself in the process. The good can be carried out only by sacrificing it. It becomes *virtue*. Virtue's experience can only be that its purpose is already accomplished in itself, happiness is found immediately in activity itself, and activity itself is the good. Through its movement, the concept of this whole sphere becomes available to self-consciousness: thinghood is spirit's own *being-for-itself*. Having found this concept, self-consciousness is reality for itself as individuality immediately expressing itself. It encounters no further resistance in an opposed actuality, and has only this self-expression itself as object and purpose.

[1807 298]

a. Pleasure and Necessity.

360 Self-consciousness, which in general regards itself as *reality*, has its object within itself. But it has this object only *for itself*, not yet as existing. *Being* faces it as an actuality different from its own. It aims, by carrying out its being-for-itself, to intuit itself as another independent essence. Its *first purpose* is to become conscious of itself as individual essence in another self-consciousness, or to make this other into itself. It is certain that *in itself* this other is already itself. Insofar as it has risen out of ethical substance and the quiet being of thought into its *being-for-itself*, it has behind it the law of custom and existence, observational knowledge, and theory, like a gray shadow already vanishing. For these are instead knowledge of something whose being-for-itself and actuality differ from those of self-consciousness. Instead of the seemingly heavenly spirit of universality in knowledge and activity, in which individual feeling and enjoyment are silent, the earth spirit has entered it. This spirit takes only the being that is individual consciousness's actuality as true actuality.

[1807 299]
It despises understanding and science,
The highest gifts of humankind—
It has surrendered to the devil
And must go to ruin.

361 It therefore plunges into life and carries out the pure individuality in which it appears. It does not so much make its happiness as immediately take and enjoy it. The shadows of science, laws, and principles, which alone stand between it and its own actuality, vanish like a lifeless mist unable to withstand the certainty of its reality. It takes life as one picks a ripe fruit, which offers itself just as much as it is taken.

362 Its activity is an activity of *desire* in only one moment. It aims not to destroy the whole objective essence, but only its form of otherness or independence, which is an essenceless appearance. For *in itself* it regards the other as the same essence, or its own selfhood. The element in which desire and its object subsist independently and indifferently to each other is *living existence*. Desire's enjoyment sublates this existence insofar as it belongs to its object. Here, however, the element giving both their separate actuality is instead the category: [1807 300] a being that is essentially *represented*. It is therefore *consciousness* of independence, whether natural consciousness or consciousness developed into a system of laws that preserves each individual for itself. For the self-consciousness that knows the other as *its own* selfhood, this separation does not exist in itself. Thus it attains the enjoyment of *pleasure*: consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness appearing independent, or intuition of the unity of both independent self-consciousnesses. It reaches its purpose, but precisely in this experiences its truth. It comprehends itself as *this individual essence existing for itself*. Yet actualizing this purpose is itself the purpose's sublation. For it becomes its own object not as *this individual*, but as *unity* of itself and the other self-consciousness, hence as sublated individual, or *universal*.

363 The pleasure enjoyed has the positive meaning of having become *itself* as objective self-consciousness, but equally the negative meaning of having sublated *itself*. Since it comprehended its actualization only in the first meaning, its experience enters consciousness as contradiction. In this contradiction, the attained actuality of its individuality sees itself destroyed by the negative *essence* that [1807 301] stands empty and without actuality against it, yet is its consuming power. This essence is nothing but the *concept* of what this individuality is in itself. But it is still the poorest shape of self-actualizing spirit. For it regards itself only as the *abstraction* of reason, or the *immediacy* of the *unity* of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself*. Its essence is therefore only the *abstract* category. Yet the category no longer has the form of *immediate, simple* being it had for observing spirit, where it is abstract *being*, or, posited as alien, *thinghood* in general. Here being-for-itself and mediation have entered this thinghood. It therefore appears as a *circle* whose content is the developed, pure relationship of simple essentialities. The actualization attained by this individuality thus consists only in casting this circle of abstractions out of the enclosure of simple self-consciousness into the element of *being for it*, or objective extension. What becomes *object* for self-consciousness as its essence in enjoying pleasure is therefore the spread of those empty essentialities: pure unity, pure difference, and their relationship. Beyond this, the object individuality experiences as its *essence* has no content. It is what is called *necessity*. For necessity, *[1807 302] fate*, and the like are precisely that of which one cannot say *what* it does, what its definite laws and positive content are. For it is the absolute pure concept itself intuited as *being*: the simple and empty but irresistible and undisturbable *relationship* whose work is only individuality's nothingness. It is this *fixed connection* because what is connected consists of pure essentialities, or empty abstractions. Unity, difference, and relationship are categories, each of which is nothing in and for itself, but only in relation to its opposite. They therefore cannot come apart. They are related through their *concept*, since they are pure concepts themselves. This *absolute relationship* and abstract movement constitute necessity. Thus merely individual individuality, whose content is still only reason's pure

concept, has not plunged from dead theory into life. Instead it has plunged only into consciousness of its own lifelessness. It receives itself only as empty, alien necessity, as *dead* actuality.

364 The transition takes place from the form of the *one* into *universality*, from one absolute abstraction into another: from the purpose of pure *being-for-itself*, which has cast off community with *others*, into its *pure* opposite, *being-in-itself*, [1807 303] therefore equally abstract. It thus appears that the individual has merely perished, the absolute brittleness of individuality shattered against an equally hard but continuous actuality. Since, as consciousness, it is the unity of itself and its opposite, this destruction still exists for it: its purpose and actualization, and the contradiction between what *it* took as essence and what is essence *in itself*. It experiences the double meaning in what it did: it *took its life*. It took life, but in doing so it instead grasped death.

365 This *transition* of its living being into lifeless necessity therefore appears to it as a reversal mediated by nothing. The mediator would have to be that in which both sides were one, so that consciousness recognized one moment in the other: its purpose and activity in fate, and its fate in its purpose and activity, *its own essence* in this *necessity*. But for this consciousness, that unity is precisely pleasure itself, or *simple, individual* feeling. For it, the transition from the moment of its purpose to that of its true essence is a pure leap into the opposite. For these moments are contained and connected not in feeling, but only in the pure self, which is a universal, or [1807 304] thinking. Through the experience in which its truth was to emerge for it, consciousness has therefore instead become a riddle to itself. The consequences of its deeds are not its deeds themselves for it. What happens to it is not, *for it*, experience of what it is *in itself*. The transition is not for it a mere change of form of the same content and essence, represented once as consciousness's content and essence, and again as its object, or *intuited* essence. Thus *abstract necessity* counts as the merely negative, uncomprehended *power of universality* against which individuality is shattered.

366 This is as far as the appearance of this shape of self-consciousness goes. Its last moment of existence is the thought of its loss in necessity, or the thought of itself as an essence absolutely *alien* to itself. But *in itself*, self-consciousness has survived this loss. For this necessity, or pure universality, is *its own* essence. This reflection of consciousness into itself—knowing necessity as *itself*—is a new shape of consciousness.
[1807 305]
b. The Law of the Heart and the Madness of Self-Conceit.

367 What necessity truly is within self-consciousness, it is for self-consciousness's new shape. In this shape, self-consciousness regards itself as the necessary. It knows *immediately* that it has the *universal*, or *law*, within itself. Because the law is *immediately* within consciousness's being-for-itself, it is called the *law of the heart*. Like the preceding shape, this shape is essence *for itself* as *individuality*. But it is richer by this determination: it regards this *being-for-itself* as necessary or universal.

368 The law immediately self-consciousness's own, or a heart that contains a law, is therefore the *purpose* it sets out to actualize. We must see whether its actualization will correspond to this concept, and whether in it consciousness will experience this law of its own as essence.

369 An actuality faces this heart. For in the heart the law is only *for itself*, not yet actualized; there is therefore also something *other* than the concept. This other is thereby determined as an actuality opposed to what is to be actualized, hence as the *contradiction* of *law* and *individuality*. [1807 306] It is thus, on one side, a law oppressing single individuality: a violent world order contradicting the law of the heart. On the other, it is humanity suffering under this law, following not the law of the heart but subject to an alien necessity. Clearly, this actuality appearing *opposite* the present shape of consciousness is nothing other than the previous divided relationship of individuality and its truth: the relationship of a cruel necessity crushing individuality. *For us*, the previous movement confronts the new shape because this shape has arisen from it in itself, so that the

moment from which it comes necessarily exists for it. But the new shape sees this moment as something *found before it*, since it has no consciousness of its *origin*. Its essence is instead to be *for itself*, or the negative against this positive in-itself.

370 This individuality thus aims to sublate the necessity contradicting the law of the heart and the suffering caused by it. It is no longer the frivolity of the preceding shape, which wanted only individual pleasure. It is the seriousness of a high purpose, seeking pleasure in displaying its own *excellent* essence and producing *humanity's welfare*. What [1807 307] it actualizes is law itself, and its pleasure is therefore also the universal pleasure of all hearts. For it the two are *undivided*: its pleasure is what accords with law, and actualizing the law of universal humanity prepares its individual pleasure. For within it, individuality and the necessary are *immediately* one: the law is the heart's law. Individuality has not yet been displaced from its position. Their unity has not come about through their mediating movement, not yet through discipline. Actualizing an immediate, *undisciplined* essence counts as displaying excellence and producing humanity's welfare.

371 By contrast, the law facing the law of the heart is separated from the heart and free for itself. Humanity belonging to it lives not in the happy unity of law and heart, but either in cruel separation and suffering, or at least without enjoying *itself* in *obeying* the law and without consciousness of its own excellence in *transgressing* it. Because that powerful divine and human order is separated from the heart, the heart regards it as an *appearance* that must lose what it still has: power and actuality. Its *content* [1807 308] may happen to agree with the law of the heart, and then the heart can accept it. But what accords with law purely as such is not essence for the heart. What matters is having consciousness *of itself* in it, having satisfied *itself* there. Where universal necessity's content does not agree with the heart, that necessity is nothing in itself even in content and must yield to the law of the heart.

372 The individual therefore *carries out* the law of its heart. It becomes *universal order*, and pleasure becomes an actuality lawful in and for itself. But in this actualization the law has in fact escaped the individual. What immediately comes about is only the relationship that was to be sublated. Precisely through its actualization, the law of the heart ceases to be the law of the *heart*. It acquires the form of *being* and is now *universal power*, indifferent to *this* heart. Thus, by *establishing* its *own* order, the individual no longer finds it as its own. Actualizing its law therefore produces not *its* law, but only its entanglement in the actual order. For although the actualization is *in itself* its own, it is alien for it: an order not merely alien but hostile and overwhelmingly powerful. Through its deed it places itself *in*, or rather [1807 309] *as*, the universal element of existing actuality. According to its own meaning, its deed itself is to have the value of universal order. But it has thereby released itself *freely* from itself. It continues growing for itself as universality and purifies itself of individuality. The individual, wanting to recognize universality only in the form of its immediate being-for-itself, therefore does not recognize itself in this free universality, although it also belongs to it, since it is its activity. This activity consequently has the inverted meaning of *contradicting* universal order, since its deed is to be the deed of *its* individual heart, not free universal actuality. Yet it has also in fact *recognized* that order. For the activity means positing its essence as *free actuality*, or recognizing actuality as its essence.

373 Through the concept of its activity, the individual has determined more closely how the actual universality to which it has made itself belong turns against it. As *actuality*, its deed belongs to the universal. But its content is its own individuality, seeking to preserve itself as this *individual* opposed to the universal. The issue is not establishing some determinate law. Rather, the immediate unity of the individual heart and universality is the thought raised into law and expected to hold: *every heart must recognize itself* in what is [1807 310] law. But only this individual's heart has posited its actuality in its deed, which expresses *its being-for-itself* or *its pleasure*. This deed is to count immediately as universal. That means it is truly something particular with only the form of universality: its

particular content is *as such* supposed to count as universal. Others therefore find in this content not their heart's law carried out, but *another's*. Precisely according to the universal law that each must find their heart in what is law, they turn against the actuality *it* established, just as it turned against theirs. Thus, where the individual first found only rigid law opposed to its excellent intentions and worthy of hatred, it now finds human hearts themselves opposed and hateful.

374 Since this consciousness knows universality only as *immediate*, and necessity as the necessity of the *heart*, it does not know the nature of actualization and effective action. As *existing*, these are in truth rather the *universal in itself*, within which the individuality of consciousness, entrusting itself to them to *be* as *this* immediate *individuality*, instead perishes. In being, therefore, it gains not *its own being* but the alienation *of itself*. Yet what it fails to recognize itself in is [1807 311] no longer dead necessity, but necessity animated by universal individuality. It took this divine and human order, which it found in force, as dead actuality. It supposed that those belonging to this order, like itself, lacked consciousness of themselves; it fixed itself as this heart existing for itself in opposition to the universal. But it instead finds the order animated by everyone's consciousness, as the law of all hearts. Indeed, it experiences actuality as living order precisely by actualizing the law of its heart. For this means nothing other than individuality becoming its own object as universal, in which, however, it does not recognize itself.

375 What this shape of self-consciousness therefore gains as truth from its experience *contradicts* what it is *for itself*. Yet what it is for itself has the form of absolute universality for it: the law of the heart, immediately one with *self*-consciousness. At the same time, the subsisting, living order is equally its *own essence* and work. It produces nothing other than this order, which is in equally immediate unity with self-consciousness. Belonging in this way to a doubled, opposed essentiality, self-consciousness contradicts itself and is shattered at its deepest core. The [1807 312] law of *this* heart is only that in which self-consciousness recognizes itself. But through the actualization of that law, the uni-

versally valid order has equally become its own *essence* and *actuality*. Thus both sides contradicting each other in its consciousness have for it the form of essence and its own actuality.

376 In expressing this moment of its consciously experienced destruction, and therein the result of its experience, it shows itself as this inward reversal of itself: the derangement of a consciousness whose essence is immediately nonessence, whose actuality is immediately nonactuality. Derangement cannot be understood as simply taking something essenceless as essential, something nonactual as actual, so that what is essential or actual for one person is not so for another, and consciousness of actuality and nonactuality, or essentiality and nonessentiality, fall apart. If something is in fact actual and essential for consciousness in general but not for me, then in being conscious of its nothingness I am also conscious of its actuality, since I am consciousness in general. When both are fixed, this is a unity constituting madness in general. In this, however, only [1807 313] an *object* is deranged for consciousness, not consciousness as such in and for itself. But in the result of experience that has emerged here, consciousness in its law is conscious *of itself* as this actual being. At the same time, since precisely this essentiality and actuality are *alienated* from it, it is conscious, as self-consciousness and absolute actuality, of its own nonactuality. Or it immediately regards both sides, in their contradiction, as *its essence*, which is therefore deranged at its deepest core.

377 The heart beating for humanity's welfare therefore passes into the raging of deranged self-conceit: consciousness's fury to preserve itself against destruction. It does this by casting out of itself the inversion it itself is, striving to regard and describe it as something other. Thus it declares the universal order an inversion of the heart's law and happiness, invented and administered to the nameless misery of deceived humanity by fanatical priests, indulgent despots, and their servants, who compensate for their own humiliation by humiliating and oppressing those below them. In this derangement, consciousness declares *individuality* to be the deranging and inverted thing, but an *alien*, *contingent* individuality. Yet the heart, or the *individuality of consciousness that immedi-*

ately [1807 314] wants to be universal, is itself this deranging and inverted thing. Its activity only produces this contradiction's becoming available to *its* consciousness. For it takes the heart's law as truth: something merely *meant*, which, unlike the established order, has not withstood daylight but instead perishes as soon as it shows itself there. Its law was supposed to have *actuality*. In this, law as *actuality*, as *valid order*, is its purpose and essence. But immediately it also regards *actuality*, precisely law as *valid order*, as nothing. Likewise, its *own* actuality, *itself* as individual consciousness, is its essence for it. But its purpose is to posit this as *existing*. Thus it instead immediately regards its self as nonindividual as essence, or as purpose in the form of law, hence as a universality that it itself would be for its consciousness. Through its activity this concept becomes its object. It therefore experiences its self as the nonactual, and nonactuality as its actuality. Thus it is not a contingent, alien individuality, but precisely this heart, that is inwardly inverted and inverting in every respect.

378 Yet since immediately universal individuality is inverted and inverting, this universal order is no less itself inherently inverted, since it is the law of all *hearts*, that is, of the inverted, [1807 315] as raging derangement declared. On one side, the resistance that one heart's law meets in other individuals proves the order to be the *law* of all hearts. Established laws are defended against one individual's law because they are not unconscious, empty, dead necessity, but spiritual universality and substance. Those in whom this substance has its actuality live as individuals within it and are conscious of themselves. Thus, even when they complain about this order as if it opposed their inner law and set the heart's opinions against it, they in fact cling to it in their hearts as their essence. If this order is taken from them, or they place themselves outside it, they lose everything. Since public order's actuality and power consist precisely in this, it appears as the self-identical, universally animated essence, and individuality as its form. But this order is equally the inverted.

379 For insofar as it is the law of all hearts and all individuals are immediately this universal, it is an actuality that is only the actuality of individuality *being for itself*, or of the heart. Thus the consciousness establishing its heart's law meets

resistance from others because it contradicts the *equally [1807 316] individual* laws of their hearts. In resisting it, they do nothing but establish and assert their own law. The *universal* present is therefore only universal resistance and struggle of everyone against everyone. Each asserts their own individuality but also fails to do so, since it meets the same resistance and is reciprocally dissolved by others. What seems public *order* is thus this universal feud, in which each grabs what they can, carries out justice upon others' individuality, and establishes their own, which equally disappears through others. This is the *way of the world*: the appearance of a lasting course that is only a *meant universality*, whose content is instead the essenceless play of individualities establishing and dissolving themselves.

380 Compare the two sides of universal order. This latter universality has as content restless individuality, for which opinion or individuality is law, the actual is nonactual, and the nonactual actual. But it is also the order's *side of actuality*, since individuality's *being-for-itself* belongs to it. The other side is the *universal* as *resting* essence, but precisely therefore only as an *inner*: not nothing, but not actuality. [1807 317] It can become actual only by sublating individuality, which has claimed actuality for itself. This shape of consciousness—seeking to become for itself, in law and in what is true and good *in itself*, not as individuality but only as *essence*; knowing individuality as inverted and inverting; and therefore having to sacrifice the individuality of consciousness—is *virtue*.

c. Virtue and the Way of the World.

381 In active reason's first shape, self-consciousness regarded itself as pure individuality, with empty universality facing it. In the second, each side of the opposition contained *both* moments, law and individuality. But one side, the heart, was their immediate unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relationship of virtue and the way of the world, both members are each unity and opposition of these moments, or a movement of law and individuality against each other, but in opposite directions. For virtuous consciousness, *law* is *essential* and individuality must be sublated, both [1807 318] in its own consciousness and in the way of the world. In its own consciousness, its individuality must be

disciplined under the universal, what is true and good in itself. But it still remains personal consciousness in this. True discipline is only the sacrifice of the whole personality, proving that it has not in fact remained attached to particulars. In this individual sacrifice, individuality in *the way of the world* is also destroyed, since individuality is also a simple moment common to both. In the way of the world, individuality behaves in the reverse way from how it is posited in virtuous consciousness: it makes itself essence and subordinates the good and true *in itself* to itself. Moreover, for virtue the way of the world is not merely this universal *inverted by individuality*. Absolute *order* is likewise a common moment. In the way of the world it is not present for consciousness as *existing actuality*, but is its *inner essence*. Thus virtue does not properly have to produce it in the first place. For producing, as *activity*, is consciousness of individuality, which must instead be sublated. Through this sublation, room is, so to speak, merely made for the *in-itself* of the way of the world to enter existence in and for itself.

382 The universal *content* of the actual way of the world has already emerged. More closely considered, [1807 319] it is again nothing but self-consciousness's two preceding movements. The shape of virtue arose from them. Since they are its origin, it has them before it, but aims to sublate its origin and realize itself, or become *for itself*. Thus on one side the way of the world is single individuality seeking its pleasure and enjoyment, indeed finding its destruction there and thereby satisfying the universal. But this satisfaction itself, like the other moments of the relationship, is an inverted shape and movement of the universal. Actuality is only the individuality of pleasure and enjoyment, while the universal opposes it: a necessity that is merely its empty shape, a merely negative reaction and contentless activity. The other moment of the way of the world is individuality wanting to be law in and for itself, and in this conceit disturbing established order. Universal law does maintain itself against this self-conceit. It no longer appears as something empty and opposed to consciousness, not as dead necessity, but as *necessity within consciousness itself*. Yet existing as the *conscious* relationship of absolutely contradictory actuality, it is derangement; exist-

ing as *objective* actuality, it is inversion in general. Thus on both sides the universal does present [1807 320] itself as the power of their movement, but this power's *existence* is only universal inversion.

383 The universal is now to receive its true actuality from virtue through sublating individuality, the principle of inversion. Virtue's purpose is thereby to reverse the inverted way of the world again and bring forth its true essence. In the way of the world, this true essence exists only as its *in-itself*, not yet as actual. Virtue therefore only *believes* in it. It sets out to raise this belief to sight, but without enjoying the fruits of its work and sacrifice. For insofar as it is *individuality*, it is the *activity* of the struggle it enters with the way of the world. Its purpose and true essence, however, is to defeat the actuality of the way of the world. The existence of the good brought about by this is therefore the cessation of virtue's *activity*, or of *consciousness* of individuality. How this struggle itself is sustained, what virtue experiences in it, whether the sacrifice it undertakes defeats the way of the world and brings virtue victory—all this must be decided from the nature of the living *weapons* the combatants wield. For the weapons are nothing other than the combatants' *essence* itself, appearing only for them mutually. Their weapons have therefore already emerged from what is present in itself in this struggle.
[1807 321]

384 For virtuous consciousness, the *universal* is true in *belief*, or *in itself*: not yet actual but *abstract* universality. In this consciousness itself it exists *as purpose*, and in the way of the world as *inner*. In precisely this determination, the universal in virtue also presents itself to the way of the world. For virtue *wants* to carry out the good and does not itself yet claim it as actuality. This determinacy can also be considered as follows: by entering the struggle against the way of the world, the good presents itself as being *for another*, as something not *in and for itself*. Otherwise, it would not seek first to give itself truth by overcoming its opposite. Saying that it is only *for another* means the same as what appeared earlier when viewed from the opposite side: it is still an *abstraction*, with reality only in relationship, not in and for itself.

385 The good or universal as it appears here is what is called *gifts, capacities, powers*. This is a way spiritual being exists in which it is represented as a universal needing the principle of individuality to animate and move it, and having its *actuality* in individuality. This principle *uses* the universal *well* insofar as it belongs to virtuous consciousness, but *misuses* it insofar as it belongs to the way of the world. It is a passive [1807 322] instrument governed by free individuality's hand, indifferent to the use individuality makes of it, and can also be misused to produce an actuality that is its destruction. It is lifeless material lacking independence of its own, which can be shaped one way or another, even to its ruin.

386 Since this universal is equally available to virtuous consciousness and the way of the world, one cannot see whether virtue, so equipped, will defeat vice. Their weapons are the same: these capacities and powers. Admittedly, virtue has placed in ambush its belief in the original unity of its purpose and the essence of the way of the world. This unity is to attack the enemy from behind during the struggle and accomplish the struggle *in itself*. Thus for the knight of virtue, his own *activity* and fighting are really sham combat. He *cannot* take it seriously, since he places his true strength in the good being *in and for itself*, that is, accomplishing itself. Nor *may* he let this sham combat become serious. For what he turns against the enemy and finds turned against himself, whose wear and damage he risks in both himself and his enemy, is not supposed to be the good itself. He fights to preserve and carry out the good. What [1807 323] is risked is only the indifferent gifts and capacities. Yet these are actually nothing other than that very universal without individuality which the struggle is to preserve and actualize. Moreover, through the concept of struggle itself, it is immediately *already actualized*. It is the *in-itself*, the *universal*, and its actualization means only that it is *also for another*. The two sides indicated above, through either of which it became an abstraction, *are no longer separate*. In and through the struggle, the good is posited in both ways at once. Yet virtuous consciousness enters the struggle against the way of the world as against something opposed to the good. What the way of the world offers it here is the universal, not merely as abstract universal but as animated by individuality and

existing for another, or the *actual good*. Thus wherever virtue lays hold of the way of the world, it always strikes places that are the existence of the good itself. As the way of the world's *in-itself*, the good is inseparably woven into all its appearance and also has its existence in its actuality. The way of the world is therefore invulnerable to virtue. All the moments in virtue itself that it was supposed to risk and sacrifice are equally existences of the good, and hence inviolable relationships. Fighting can therefore be only a [1807 324] wavering between preservation and sacrifice. Or rather, neither sacrificing one's own nor injuring the other's can occur. Virtue not only resembles the fighter whose sole concern in battle is keeping his sword spotless. It also began the battle to preserve the weapons. Not only can it not use its own; it must also keep the enemy's unharmed and protect them against itself, since all are noble parts of the good for which it entered the struggle.

387 For this enemy, by contrast, essence is not the *in-itself* but *individuality*. Its strength is therefore the negative principle for which nothing subsistent is absolutely sacred, which can risk and endure losing anything and everything. This makes its victory as certain within itself as through the contradiction entangling its opponent. What is *in itself* for virtue is only *for the way of the world*. The way of the world is free of every moment fixed for virtue and binding it. It has such a moment in its power because it regards the moment as something it can equally sublate or let subsist. It thereby also has power over the virtuous knight fastened to it. He cannot disentangle himself from it like a cloak thrown around him, leave it behind, and [1807 325] free himself. For it is his essence, which cannot be surrendered.

388 Finally, the hope in the ambush from which the *good in itself* is cunningly to attack the way of the world from behind is inherently nothing. The way of the world is awake, self-certain consciousness. It does not let anyone approach from behind but faces them everywhere, since it is precisely this: everything is *for it*, everything stands *before it*. If the *good in itself* exists *for* its enemy, it is in the struggle we have seen. But insofar as it is not *for the enemy* but *in itself*, it is the

passive instrument of gifts and capacities, material without actuality. Represented as existence, it would be a sleeping consciousness remaining somewhere behind, no one knows where.

389 Virtue is thus defeated by the way of the world because its purpose is in fact an abstract, nonactual *essence*, and because, regarding actuality, its activity rests on *differences* that lie only in *words*. It sought to bring the good into *actuality* through *sacrificing individuality*. But the side of *actuality* is itself nothing other than the side of *individuality*. The good was supposed to be what is *in itself*, opposed to what *is*. Yet the *in-itself*, taken in its reality and truth, is instead *being itself*. At first the *in-itself* is [1807 326] the *abstraction of essence* over against actuality. But abstraction is precisely what does not truly exist, but exists only *for consciousness*. Yet that means it is itself what is called *actual*, since the actual is what is essentially *for another*, or is *being*. Virtuous consciousness rests on this difference between *in-itself* and *being*, which has no truth. The way of the world was supposed to invert the good because it had *individuality* as its principle. But individuality is the principle of *actuality*, since it is precisely the consciousness through which *what is in itself* is equally *for another*. The way of the world reverses the unchanging, but actually reverses it from the *nothingness of abstraction into the being of reality*.

390 The way of the world thus defeats what constitutes virtue in opposition to it. It defeats virtue for which essenceless abstraction is essence. But it defeats nothing real. It defeats the creation of differences that are no differences, the pompous speeches about humanity's welfare and oppression, sacrifice for the good, and misuse of gifts. Such ideal essences and purposes collapse as empty words that lift the heart and leave reason empty, edify but build nothing. These declamations determinately express only this content: the individual [1807 327] claiming to act for such noble purposes and using such excellent phrases regards itself as an excellent being. This swelling makes its own and others' heads big, but big with empty inflation. Ancient virtue had a determinate, secure meaning. It had its *content-filled foundation* in the people's *substance*, and an *actual good already existing* as its purpose. It was therefore not directed against actual-

ity as *universal inversion* and against a *way of the world*. But the virtue considered here has left substance. It is essenceless virtue, virtue only of representation and words lacking that content. The emptiness of this rhetoric struggling with the way of the world would immediately be exposed if it had to say what its phrases mean. They are therefore *presupposed as known*. A demand to state this known meaning would be met either with a fresh flood of phrases or with an appeal to the heart, which says *inwardly* what they mean. That is, inability *actually to say it* would be admitted. The nothingness of this rhetoric also seems unconsciously to have become certain for our age's cultivation. All interest has vanished from that whole mass of phrases and the habit of puffing oneself up with them—a loss [1807 328] expressed in their producing only boredom.

391 The result emerging from this opposition is therefore that consciousness lets go, like an empty cloak, of the representation of something good *in itself* that has no actuality yet. In its struggle it has experienced that the way of the world is not as bad as it looked, since its actuality is the actuality of the universal. This experience removes the means of producing the good through *sacrificing* individuality. For individuality is precisely the *actualization* of what is in itself. Inversion ceases to be regarded as an inversion of the good, since it is instead precisely the conversion of the good as a mere purpose into actuality. Individuality's movement is the universal's reality.

392 Yet in fact what faced consciousness of the in-itself as the *way of the world* has equally been defeated and disappeared. In it, individuality's *being-for-itself* was opposed to essence or the universal and appeared as an actuality separated from *being-in-itself*. But actuality has proved to be in undivided unity with the universal. Thus the *being-for-itself* of the way of the world equally proves no longer to exist, just as virtue's *in-itself* is only a [1807 329] *view*. Individuality in the way of the world may think it acts only *for itself*, or *selfishly*. It is better than it thinks. Its activity is also activity *in itself*, *universal* activity. When it acts selfishly, it merely does not know what it is doing. When it asserts that everyone acts selfishly, it merely asserts that everyone lacks consciousness of what activity is.

When it acts *for itself*, this is precisely bringing what is as yet only *in itself* into actuality. Thus the purpose of *being-for-itself*, which thinks itself opposed to the in-itself—its empty cleverness and subtle explanations detecting self-interest everywhere—has disappeared just as much as the purpose of the *in-itself* and its rhetoric.

393 Thus *individuality's activity and pursuits are purpose in themselves. The use of powers, the play of their expressions*, gives them life, whereas otherwise they would be the dead in-itself. The in-itself is not an unexecuted, nonexistent, abstract universal. It is itself immediately this presence and actuality of individuality's process.

[1807 330]

C. Individuality That Is Real in and for Itself.

394 Self-consciousness has now grasped the concept of itself that was initially only ours: being all reality in the certainty of itself. Its purpose and essence are now the moving interpenetration of the universal—gifts and capacities—and individuality. The individual moments of this fulfillment and interpenetration *before the unity* into which they have merged are the purposes considered so far. They have vanished as abstractions and fantasies belonging to those first shallow shapes of spiritual self-consciousness. They have their truth only in the meant being of the heart, imagination, and speeches, not in reason. Now certain of its reality in and for itself, reason no longer seeks first to produce itself as *purpose in opposition* to immediately existing actuality. Instead, its consciousness has the category as such as its object. For the determination of self-consciousness as *being for itself* [1807 331] or *negative*, in which reason appeared, has been sublated. *It found* an *actuality* that was to be its negative, and only through sublating this did it actualize its *purpose* for itself. But *purpose* and *being-in-itself* have proved the same as *being for another* and *the actuality found before it*. Truth therefore no longer separates from certainty, whether the posited purpose is taken as self-certainty and its actualization as truth, or purpose as truth and actuality as certainty. Instead, essence and purpose in and for themselves are the certainty of immediate reality itself, the interpenetration of

being-in-itself and *being-for-itself*, of universal and individuality. Activity has its truth and actuality within itself, and *presenting* or *expressing individuality* is its purpose in and for itself.

395 With this concept, self-consciousness has therefore returned into itself from the opposed determinations the category had for it, and its relationship to the category, first as observing and then as active. It has the pure category itself as its object, or it is the category become conscious of itself. Its account with its previous shapes is thereby closed. They lie behind it in [1807 332] forgetfulness. They do not confront it as a world found before it, but develop only within itself as transparent moments. Yet they still separate within its consciousness as a *movement* of different moments not yet gathered into their substantial unity. But in *all* of them it holds fast the simple unity of being and self, which is their *genus*.—

396 Consciousness has thus cast off all opposition to and conditioning of its activity. It proceeds freshly *from itself*, directed not toward *another* but *toward itself*. Since individuality is actuality within itself, the *material* of its operation and the *purpose* of its activity lie in the activity itself. Activity therefore looks like the movement of a circle freely moving within itself in empty space, unhindered, now expanding, now contracting, perfectly content to play only within and with itself. The element in which individuality presents its shape means a pure receiving of this shape. It is daylight in general, to which consciousness wants to show itself. Activity changes nothing and opposes nothing. It is the pure form of translating from *not being seen* into *being seen*. The content brought to daylight and presented is nothing other than what this activity already is in itself. It is *in itself*: this is its form as unity *in thought*. It is *actual*: this is its form as [1807 333] *existing* unity. It itself is *content* only in this determination of simplicity over against the determination of its transition and movement.

a. The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deception, or the Matter Itself.

397 This individuality, real in itself, is at first again *individual* and *determinate*. Thus the absolute reality it knows itself to be is, as it becomes conscious of it, *abstract universal* reality: without fulfillment or content, merely the empty thought of this category. We must see how this concept of individuality real within itself determines itself in its moments, and how individuality becomes conscious of its own concept of itself.

398 The concept of this individuality, as it is for itself all reality, is initially a *result*. It has not yet presented its movement and reality, and is posited here *immediately* as *simple being-in-itself*. But negativity, the same thing that appears as movement, exists in the *simple in-itself* as *determinacy*. *Being*, or the simple in-itself, becomes a determinate [1807 334] range. Individuality therefore appears as original, determinate nature: as *original* nature, because it *is in itself*; as originally *determinate*, because the negative is in the *in-itself*, making it a quality. Yet this limitation of being *cannot limit consciousness's activity*, since the activity here is a complete *relationship to itself*. Relation to another, which would be its limitation, has been sublated. Nature's original determinacy is therefore only a simple principle: a transparent, universal element within which individuality remains as free and self-identical as it freely unfolds its differences, and is pure interaction with itself in its actualization. Thus indeterminate animal life breathes its breath, say, into the element of water, air, or earth, and within these into more determinate principles. It plunges all its moments into them, but despite the element's limitation keeps them in its power and itself in its unity, remaining the same universal animal life as this particular organization.

399 This determinate, original *nature* of consciousness, which remains free and whole within it, appears as the immediate and sole proper *content* of what the individual takes as purpose. It is indeed *determinate* content, but it is *content* at all only insofar as we consider *being-in-itself* in isolation. In [1807 335] truth, however, it is reality permeated by individuality: actuality as consciousness as an individual has it within itself, initially posited *as existing*, not yet as active. Yet for activity, this determinacy is not a limitation it would wish to go beyond. On one side, considered as an existing quality, it is the simple color of the ele-

ment in which activity moves. On the other, negativity is *determinacy* only in being, whereas *activity* itself is nothing but negativity. In active individuality, determinacy is therefore dissolved into negativity in general, or the totality of all determinacy.

400 In *activity* and consciousness of activity, simple original nature now enters the difference belonging to activity. *First*, it is present as object—specifically, as *object* still belonging to *consciousness*, as *purpose*—and thus opposed to an existing actuality. The *second* moment is the *movement* of purpose represented as resting: actualization, as purpose's relationship to wholly formal actuality, hence the representation of *transition* itself, or the *means*. Finally, the *third* is the object no longer as purpose, of which the agent is immediately conscious as *its own*, but as having come out of the agent and existing *for it* as *another*. Yet according to the concept of this sphere, these different [1807 336] sides must be held so that their content remains the same and no difference enters: neither between individuality and being in general, nor between *purpose* and *individuality* as *original nature*, nor between purpose and the actuality found before it. Nor is there a difference between *means* and individuality as absolute *purpose*, or between the *actuality produced* and purpose, original nature, or means.

401 First, then, individuality's originally determinate nature, its immediate essence, is not yet posited as active, and is called *particular* capacity, talent, character, and so forth. This distinctive coloring of spirit must be considered the sole content of purpose itself and alone as reality. If one imagined consciousness going beyond it and wanting to bring another content into actuality, one would imagine it working as *a nothing* into *nothing*. This original essence is also not merely purpose's content. In itself it is also the *actuality* that otherwise appears as activity's *given* material, an actuality *found before it* and to be formed through activity. For activity is only pure translation from the form of being not yet presented into presented being. The being-in-itself of the actuality opposed to consciousness has sunk to a mere empty appearance. [1807 337] In deciding to act, then, this consciousness does not let the appearance of existing actuality confuse it. Equally, it must gather itself from wandering among empty

thoughts and purposes into the original content of its essence. Admittedly, this original content exists *for* consciousness only *once it has actualized it*. But the distinction has disappeared between something existing *for consciousness* only *within it* and an actuality existing in itself outside it. Consciousness must act only so that what it is *in itself* may be *for it*. Or action is precisely spirit's becoming *as consciousness*. It therefore knows what it is *in itself* from its actuality. Thus the individual cannot know *what it is* before bringing itself into actuality through activity. But this seems to prevent it from determining its action's *purpose* before acting. Yet as consciousness it must first have the action before it as *wholly its own*, that is, as *purpose*. The individual approaching action therefore seems caught in a circle, each moment already presupposing the other, unable to find a beginning. It learns its original essence, which must be its purpose, *only from the deed*, but to act must have *the purpose beforehand*. Yet precisely for this reason it must begin *immediately* and, whatever [1807 338] the circumstances, proceed to activity without further concern about *beginning, means*, and *end*. For its essence and nature *in itself* are all in one: beginning, means, and end. As *beginning*, its nature is present in the *circumstances* of action. The *interest* the individual finds in something is the already given answer to the question of whether anything should be done here, and what. For what seems an actuality found before it is in itself its original nature, which has only the appearance of *being*. This appearance lies in the concept of activity dividing itself. Yet it expresses itself as *the individual's* original nature in the *interest* the individual finds in it. Likewise, the *how*, or *means*, is determined in and for itself. *Talent* too is nothing other than determinate original individuality considered as *inner means*, or *transition* of purpose into actuality. But the *actual* means and real transition are the unity of talent and the nature of the matter present in interest. In the means, talent represents the side of activity, the matter's nature the side of content. Both are individuality itself as the interpenetration of being and activity. What is present, then, is *circumstances found before it*, which *in themselves* are the individual's original nature; then interest, positing them precisely as *its own* or as *purpose*; finally the joining and sublation of this opposition in the *means*. This joining [1807 339] itself still falls within

consciousness, and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition. This remaining appearance of opposition is sublated through the *transition* itself, or *means*. For means is the *unity* of outer and inner, the opposite of the determinacy it has as *inner* means. It thus sublates this determinacy and posits itself, this unity of activity and being, equally as *outer*, as actualized individuality itself: individuality posited *for itself* as *existing*. In this way, the whole action never steps outside itself, whether as *circumstances*, *purpose*, *means*, or *work*.

402 But with the work, the difference between original natures seems to enter. Like the original nature it expresses, the work is *determinate*. Released from activity as *existing actuality*, it contains negativity as quality. Facing it, consciousness determines itself as containing determinacy as negativity *in general*, as activity. It is therefore universal over against the work's determinacy, can *compare* the work with others, and from this grasp individualities themselves as *different*. An individual whose work reaches further can be grasped either as stronger energy of will or as richer nature, a nature whose original determinacy is less limited; another as a weaker and [1807 340] poorer nature.

403 Against this inessential difference of *magnitude*, *good* and *bad* would express an absolute difference. But that difference does not occur here. What would be taken either way is equally activity and pursuit, individuality presenting and expressing itself. Therefore all is good, and one could not really say what the bad would be. What would be called a bad work is the individual life of a determinate nature actualizing itself in it. It would be spoiled into a bad work only by comparative thought. But such thought is empty, since it goes beyond the work's essence as individuality's self-expression and seeks and demands in it no one knows what. It could concern only the difference mentioned earlier. But as a difference of magnitude, this is inherently inessential, and here specifically because different works or individualities would be compared with each other. Yet they do not concern each other; each relates only to itself. Original nature alone is the *in-itself*, or what could underlie judgment of the work as its measure, and conversely. But the two correspond. Nothing exists *for* individuality

except *through* it. There is no *actuality* that is not its nature and [1807 341] activity, nor any activity or in-itself of individuality that is not actual. Only these moments should be compared.

404 Therefore there is no *exaltation*, *complaint*, or remorse at all. All such things come from thought imagining a different *content* and *in-itself* from the individual's original nature and its execution present in actuality. Whatever it does and whatever happens to it, it has done this and is this itself. It can have only consciousness of the pure translation of *itself* from possibility's night into presence's daylight, from the *abstract in-itself* into the meaning of *actual* being, and the certainty that what appears to it in the latter is nothing other than what slept in the former. Consciousness of this unity is indeed also a comparison. But what is compared has only the *appearance* of opposition, an appearance of form. For reason's self-consciousness, for which individuality is actuality within itself, this is nothing more than appearance. Thus the individual knows that in its actuality it can find nothing but actuality's unity with itself, or its self-certainty in its truth, and that it therefore always reaches its purpose. It can therefore *experience only joy in itself*.
[1807 342]

405 This is the concept that consciousness, certain of itself as the absolute interpenetration of individuality and being, makes of itself. Let us see whether experience confirms it and its reality agrees with it. The work is the reality consciousness gives itself. In it the individual is for itself what it is *in itself*, and the consciousness *for which* the individual becomes this in the work is not particular but *universal* consciousness. In the work it has placed itself outside itself in the element of universality, in the indeterminate space of being. Consciousness stepping back from its work is in fact universal—because in this opposition it becomes *absolute negativity*, or activity—over against its work, which is *determinate*. Thus it goes beyond itself as work and is itself the indeterminate space that does not find itself filled by its work. Earlier their unity was preserved in the concept precisely because the work as *existing* work was sublated. But it is supposed to *be*. We must see how, in the work's *being*, individuality will pre-

serve its universality and find satisfaction. First, the completed work must be considered by itself. It has received the whole nature of individuality along with it. Its *being* is therefore itself an activity in which all differences [1807 343] interpenetrate and dissolve. The work is thus thrown out into a *subsistence* in which original nature's *determinacy* actually turns toward other determinate natures and intervenes in them, as they do in it, losing itself as a vanishing moment in this universal movement. *Within the concept* of individuality real in and for itself, all moments—circumstances, purpose, means, and actualization—are equal, and originally determinate nature counts only as universal element. But when this element becomes objective being, its *determinacy* as such comes to light in the work and receives its truth in its dissolution. More closely, this dissolution appears as follows. In this determinacy, the individual has become actual for itself as *this individual*. But determinacy is not merely actuality's content; it is equally its form. Or actuality as such in general is precisely this determinacy of being opposed to self-consciousness. From this side it appears as the merely *found, alien* actuality that had disappeared from the concept. The work *is*: it exists for other individualities, and for them is an alien actuality in whose place *they* must put their own, to gain through *their* activity consciousness of *their* unity with actuality. Or *their* interest in [1807 344] that work, posited by *their* original nature, is different from the work's *own* interest, and the work is thereby made into something else. Thus the work is in general something perishable, extinguished through the counterplay of other powers and interests, presenting individuality's reality as vanishing rather than accomplished.

406 In its work, then, consciousness encounters the opposition of activity and being. In earlier shapes of consciousness this opposition was also activity's *beginning*; here it is only *result*. Yet in fact it also lay at the basis, since consciousness approached action as individuality real *in itself*. For action presupposed *determinate original nature* as the *in-itself*, and pure accomplishment for accomplishment's sake had this nature as its *content*. But pure activity is *self-identical* form, to which original nature's *determinacy* is therefore unequal.

Here as elsewhere it is indifferent which is called *concept* and which *reality*. Original nature is what is *thought*, or the *in-itself*, over against activity, in which alone it has its reality. Or original nature is the *being* both of individuality as such and of individuality as work, while activity is the original *concept* as absolute transition, or *becoming*. [1807 345] Consciousness experiences in its work this *inadequacy* of concept and reality lying in its essence. In the work it therefore becomes for itself what it truly is, and its empty concept of itself disappears.

407 In this fundamental contradiction of the work, which is the truth of individuality real in itself, all individuality's sides thus reappear as contradictory. Or the work, as the whole individuality's content placed out of *activity*—the negative unity holding all moments captive—into *being*, now releases them. In the element of subsistence they become indifferent to each other. Concept and reality therefore separate as purpose and what is the *original essentiality*. It is contingent whether purpose has true essence, or whether the in-itself is made purpose. Likewise, concept and reality separate again as *transition* into actuality and as *purpose*: it is contingent whether the *means* expressing purpose is chosen. Finally, taking these inner moments together, whether or not they have unity within themselves, the individual's *activity* is again contingent toward *actuality* in general. *Luck* decides, just as much for a poorly determined purpose and poorly chosen means as against them.

408 In its work, then, consciousness encounters the *opposition* between willing and accomplishing, purpose and means, and these inner elements taken together and actuality itself. [1807 346] This comprises in general the *contingency of its activity within itself*. Yet the activity's *unity* and *necessity* are equally present. This side encompasses the other, and the *experience of activity's contingency* is itself only a *contingent experience*. Activity's *necessity* consists in *purpose* being absolutely related to *actuality*. This unity is the concept of activity. Action occurs because activity in and for itself is actuality's essence. The work does indeed reveal the contingency that *having been accomplished* has over against *willing* and *accomplishing*. This experience, which seems bound to count as

truth, contradicts that concept of action. Yet consider the content of this experience in its completeness: it is the *vanishing work*. What *preserves itself* is not the *vanishing*. Rather, vanishing is itself actual and bound to the work, and itself vanishes with the work. The *negative itself perishes* with the *positive whose negation* it is.

409 This vanishing of vanishing lies in the very concept of individuality real in itself. For that in which the work vanishes, or what vanishes in it, and what was to give what has been called experience its superiority over individuality's concept of itself, is *objective actuality*. [1807 347] But this is a moment that even in this consciousness itself no longer has truth for itself. Its truth consists only in its unity with activity, and the *true work* is only that unity of *activity and being*, of *willing and accomplishing*. Because of the certainty underlying its action, consciousness therefore regards even the actuality *opposed* to that certainty as something existing only *for it*. For self-consciousness returned into itself, for which every opposition has disappeared, opposition can no longer arise in this form of its *being-for-itself* against *actuality*. Rather, the opposition and negativity appearing in the work affect not only the work's content, or consciousness's content, but actuality as such, and thereby the opposition and the work's vanishing that exist only through and within actuality. In this way consciousness reflects into itself out of its perishable work and asserts its concept and certainty as what *exists* and *remains*, against the experience of activity's *contingency*. It actually experiences its concept, in which actuality is only a moment, something *for it*, not what is in and for itself. It experiences actuality as a vanishing moment, and therefore regards it only as *being* in general, whose universality is the same as activity. This unity is the true work. It is *the matter itself*, which absolutely asserts itself and [1807 348] is experienced as what remains, independently of the matter that is the *contingency* of individual activity as such, of circumstances, means, and actuality.

410 *The matter itself* is opposed to these moments only insofar as they are supposed to count in isolation. But essentially, as the interpenetration of actuality and individuality, it is their unity. It is equally activity, and as activity, *pure activity*

in general, *therefore equally this individual's activity*. And this activity, as still belonging to the individual in opposition to actuality, is *purpose*. Equally, the matter itself is the *transition* from this determinacy into its opposite, and finally an *actuality* present *for consciousness*. *The matter itself* thus expresses the *spiritual* essentiality in which all these moments are sublated as independently valid, and so count only as universals. In it, consciousness's certainty of itself is objective essence, *a matter*: the object born out of self-consciousness as *its own*, without ceasing to be a free, proper object. For self-consciousness, the *thing* of sense-certainty and perception now has its meaning only through self-consciousness. This grounds the distinction between a *thing* and a *matter*. It will undergo a movement corresponding to sense-certainty and perception.
[1807 349]

411 Thus in *the matter itself*, the interpenetration of individuality and objectivity itself become objective, self-consciousness has gained its true concept of itself, or become conscious of its substance. At the same time, as it exists here, it is a consciousness of substance that has only just emerged and is therefore *immediate*. This is the determinate way spiritual essence is present here, not yet advanced into truly real substance. In this immediate consciousness of it, *the matter itself* has the form of *simple essence*. As universal, it contains all its different moments and belongs to them, but is also indifferent to them as determinate moments and free for itself. As this free, *simple, abstract* matter itself, it *counts as essence*. For this consciousness, the different moments—original determinacy, or *this individual's matter*, its purpose, means, activity itself, and actuality—are, on one side, individual moments it can leave and abandon in favor of *the matter itself*. On the other, they all have the matter itself as essence only in this sense: as their *abstract* universal, it is found *in* each of these different moments and can be their *predicate*. It is not yet itself the subject. Those moments count as subjects instead, since they fall on the side of *individuality* in general, while the matter itself is still only [1807 350] the simple universal. It is the *genus* finding itself in all these moments as its *species*, and equally free of them.

412 A consciousness is called *honest* when it has, on one hand, reached the idealism expressed by *the matter itself*, and on the other, has its truth in the matter itself as this formal universality. It is always concerned only with the matter itself. It therefore moves about among the matter's different moments or kinds. Failing to attain it in one of them or in one meaning, it thereby gets hold of it in another. Thus it actually always gains the satisfaction that, according to its concept, should fall to this consciousness. Whatever happens, it has accomplished and attained *the matter itself*. For as the *universal* genus of those moments, the matter itself is the predicate of all.

413 If it fails to bring a *purpose* into *actuality*, it has at least *willed* it. That is, it makes *purpose* as purpose, *pure activity* that does nothing, into *the matter itself*. It can therefore say and console itself that at least something has been *done* and *pursued*. Since the universal itself contains the negative, or vanishing, the work's destruction is also its *own* activity. It has provoked others to destroy it and still finds satisfaction in its actuality's *vanishing*, just as naughty boys [1807 351] enjoy *themselves* in the slap they receive, namely as its cause. Or if it has *not even tried* to carry out the matter itself and has *done nothing at all*, then it did not *want to*. *The matter itself* is precisely the *unity* of its *decision* and *reality*. It asserts that *actuality* is nothing other than its *wanting*. Finally, if something generally interesting to it has come about without its help, then this *actuality* is the matter itself for it precisely in its interest in it, although it did not produce it. If it is good fortune personally befalling it, it insists on this as its *deed* and *merit*. If it is some world event that otherwise does not concern it, it equally makes the event its own. *Interest without action* counts for it as the *side* it took for or against the event and *opposed* or *supported*.

414 Clearly, this consciousness's *honesty*, and the satisfaction it experiences everywhere, actually consist in *not bringing together the thoughts* it has about the matter itself. *The matter itself* is for it equally *its own* matter and *no work at all*, or *pure activity* and *empty purpose*, or even an *actuality without action*. It makes one meaning after another the subject of this predicate and forgets them one after another. Now, in merely *having willed*, or even *not having wanted*, the

matter itself has the [1807 352] meaning of *empty purpose* and of the unity of willing and accomplishing *in thought*. The consolation after purpose's destruction that it has at least *willed* or at least *purely acted*, like its satisfaction at having given others something to do, makes *pure activity*, or the utterly bad work, into essence. For a work that is no work at all must be called bad. Finally, in the fortunate event of *finding* actuality already present, this being without deed becomes the matter itself.

415 But the truth of this honesty is that it is not as honest as it looks. It cannot be so thoughtless as actually to let these different moments fall apart in this way. It must have immediate consciousness of their opposition, because they are absolutely related to each other. *Pure* activity is essentially *this* individual's activity. This activity is equally essentially an *actuality*, or a matter. Conversely, *actuality* exists essentially only as *its* activity and as *activity in general*. And *its* activity is at once actuality as much as activity in general. Thus, while it seems concerned only with *the matter itself* as *abstract actuality*, it is also concerned with the matter as *its own* activity. But equally, when it is concerned only with *activity* and *pursuit*, it is not serious about this: it is concerned with *a matter*, and with the matter as *its own*. Finally, when it seems to want only *its own* [1807 353] matter and *its own* activity, it is again concerned with *the matter in general*, or actuality remaining in and for itself.

416 Just as the matter itself and its moments appear here as *content*, they must also be present in consciousness *as forms*. They appear as content only to disappear, and each gives way to the other. They must therefore be present as *sublated* moments. In this form, however, they are aspects of consciousness itself. The *matter itself* is present as what exists *in itself*, or as its *reflection into itself*. But the way the moments *displace* one another is expressed in consciousness by their being posited there not in themselves, but only *for another*. Consciousness brings one moment of the content into the open and presents it *for others*. At the same time, however, it has reflected out of this moment into itself, and the opposite moment is equally present within it. It keeps this one to itself, as its own. Nor is one particular moment always the one *merely* dis-

played, while another is kept only inside. Instead, consciousness alternates between them. For it must make each essential both for itself and for others. *The whole* is the moving interpenetration of individuality and the universal. But for this consciousness the whole exists only as the *simple* essence, and thus as the abstraction of *the matter itself*. Its moments therefore fall outside it [1807 354] as separate things, apart from one another. The whole is fully expressed and presented *as a whole* only through the separating alternation between displaying something and keeping it to oneself. In this alternation consciousness has one moment for itself, as essential within its reflection, while another is present only externally *in it*, or for *others*. This produces a game between individuals in which they find that they both deceive and are deceived, both by themselves and by one another.

417 An individual therefore sets out to accomplish something. In doing so, the individual seems to have made something *the matter at issue*. The individual acts, exists for others through this action, and seems concerned with *actuality*. The others therefore take this action to show an interest in the matter as such. They take its purpose to be *that the matter should itself be accomplished*, regardless of whether the first individual does it or they do. Accordingly, they show that they have already accomplished it themselves, or, if not, they offer and provide help. But that consciousness has already moved away from where they think it is. What interests it in the matter is *its own* activity and effort. When they realize that this was *the matter itself*, they find that they have been deceived.—But in fact their own rush to help was nothing other than a wish to see and display *their own* activity, not *the matter itself*. In other words, they wanted to deceive the other in just the way they complain of having [1807 355] been deceived themselves.—It has now come to light that consciousness regards its *own activity* and *effort*, the exercise of *its powers*, as the matter itself. So it seems to pursue its essence *for itself*, not for others. It seems concerned with action only as *its own*, not as the action of *others*, and thus to leave the others equally free to pursue *their* matter. But once again they are mistaken. It has already left the place where they thought it was. It is not concerned with the

matter as *this particular matter of its own*, but with it as a *matter*, as something universal that exists for everyone. It therefore interferes in their activity and work. If it can no longer take the work out of their hands, it at least takes an interest by busying itself with judgments. If it stamps the work with its approval and praise, it means to praise not just the work itself but also *its own* generosity and restraint in not having spoiled the work, either as a work or through its criticism. By showing an interest in the *work*, it enjoys *itself* in it. A *work* it criticizes is equally welcome, because it provides just this enjoyment of *its own* activity. But those who feel or claim that this interference deceives them actually wanted to deceive in the same way themselves. They present their activity and effort as something only for themselves, in which they aim only at [1807 356] *themselves* and *their own* essence. Yet by doing something, and thereby presenting themselves and bringing themselves into the open, their deed immediately contradicts their claim that they want to exclude the public itself, universal consciousness, and everyone's participation. Actualization is, instead, the display of one's own in the universal element. Through it, what is one's own becomes, and is meant to become, everyone's *matter*.

418 It is therefore equally a deception of oneself and of others to claim to be concerned only with *the pure matter*. A consciousness that opens up a matter instead finds that others rush over like flies to freshly set-out milk, wanting to find themselves busy with it. They, in turn, find that it too is concerned with the matter not as an object but as *its own*. On the other hand, suppose that what is essential is meant to be only *activity itself*, the use of powers and abilities, or the expression of this individuality. Then each side equally finds that *everyone* stirs and considers themselves invited. Instead of *pure* activity, or the distinctive activity of a *single* individual, what has been opened up is something that is equally *for others*: *a matter itself*. The same thing happens in both cases. It merely has a different meaning from the one that was assumed and was meant to hold. Consciousness experiences both sides as equally essential [1807 357] moments. In this experience it learns *the nature of the matter itself*. It is neither merely a matter opposed to activity in general and to individual activity,

nor activity opposed to enduring existence—a *genus* free from these moments as its *species*. Rather, it is an essence whose *being* is the *activity* of the *single* individual and of all individuals, and whose activity is immediately *for others*, or is a *matter*. It is a matter only as the *activity of each and all*. It is the essence that is the essence of all essences: *spiritual essence*. Consciousness learns that none of those moments is the *subject*. Instead, each dissolves in *the universal matter itself*. The moments of individuality, which this consciousness thoughtlessly treated one after another as the subject, gather themselves into simple individuality. As *this* individuality, it is just as immediately universal. The matter itself thereby loses its position as predicate and its character as lifeless, abstract universality. Instead, it is substance permeated by individuality. It is the subject in which individuality exists both as itself, as *this* individual, and as *all* individuals. It is the universal that has *being* only as this activity of each and all. It has actuality because *this* consciousness knows it as its own individual actuality and as the actuality of everyone. The pure *matter itself* is what was defined above as the *category*: being that is the I, or the I that is being. But there it was *thought*, still distinct from [1807 358] *actual self-consciousness*. Here, however, the moments of actual self-consciousness have been posited as one with the simple category itself. This holds whether we call them its content, purpose, activity, and actuality, or its form: being-for-itself and being for another. The category is therefore also all content.

b. Reason as lawgiver.

419 In its simple being, spiritual essence is *pure consciousness* and *this self*-consciousness. The individual's *originally determinate nature* has lost its positive meaning of being, *in itself*, the element and purpose of the individual's activity. It is only a sublated moment, and the individual is a *self*, a universal self. Conversely, *the formal matter itself* finds its fulfillment in active individuality that differentiates itself within itself. For the differences within individuality make up the *content* of that universal. The category exists *in itself*, as the universal of *pure*

consciousness. It equally exists *for itself*, since the *self* of consciousness is equally a moment of it. It is absolute *being*, since that universality is the simple *self-equality of being*.

420 What is an object for consciousness therefore has the meaning of being *the true*. *It is* and *has validity* [1807 359] in the sense of *being* and *having validity in and for itself*. It is the *absolute matter*. It no longer suffers from the opposition between certainty and its truth, the universal and the individual, or purpose and its reality. Instead, its existence is the *actuality* and *activity* of self-consciousness. This matter is therefore *ethical substance*, and consciousness of it is *ethical* consciousness. Consciousness regards its object as *the true* because it unites self-consciousness and being in a single unity. It regards the object as *the absolute* because self-consciousness can no longer go beyond this object, and does not want to: in it, it is at home with itself. It *cannot* go beyond it, because the object is all being and power.—It *does not want to*, because the object is the *self*, or the will of this self. In its own character as an object, it is the *real* object, since it contains the distinction belonging to consciousness. It divides into constituent bodies, which are the *determinate laws* of absolute essence. These bodies do not cloud the concept. For the moments of being, pure consciousness, and the self remain enclosed within it. Their unity makes up the essence of these bodies and, within this distinction, no longer lets those moments fall apart.

421 These laws, or constituent bodies of ethical substance, are immediately acknowledged. We cannot ask where they come from or what justifies them, and look for something else. For anything other than [1807 360] the essence that exists *in and for itself* would be only self-consciousness itself. But self-consciousness is nothing other than this essence, since it is itself this essence's being-for-itself. This essence is the truth precisely because it is as much the *self* of consciousness as its *in-itself*, or pure consciousness.

422 Self-consciousness knows itself as the moment of this substance's *being-for-itself*. It therefore expresses the law's existence within itself by saying that *sound reason* immediately knows what is *right* and *good*. The law *has validity* for it just as *immediately* as it *knows* it. It immediately says: this *is* right and good. And it means precisely *this*. These are *determinate* laws. This is the matter itself, filled out and full of content.

423 What presents itself so immediately must be taken up and examined just as immediately. We examined the character of what sense-certainty immediately declares to be. We must likewise examine the character of the being expressed by this immediate ethical certainty, or of the immediately existing constituent bodies of ethical essence. Examples of a few such laws will show this. By taking them in the form of statements made by *knowing*, sound reason, we avoid having to introduce separately the moment that must be brought to bear on them when they are considered as *immediate* sensuous laws.

424 "*Everyone should speak the truth.*"—This duty is stated as unconditional. Yet [1807 361] a condition will immediately be admitted: *if* the person knows the truth. The command will now read: *everyone should speak the truth according to their knowledge and conviction at the time*. Sound reason—this very ethical consciousness that immediately knows what is right and good—will also declare that this condition was already so closely connected with its universal statement that this was what it *meant* by the command. But in fact it thereby admits that it violated the command in the very act of immediately stating it. It *said*: everyone should speak the truth. But it *meant*: everyone should speak it according to their knowledge and conviction about it. In other words, it *said something different from what it meant*. And to say something different from what one means is not to speak the truth. The corrected falsehood, or clumsiness, is now expressed as follows: *everyone should speak the truth according to their knowledge and conviction about it at the time*.—But the *universally necessary validity in itself* that the proposition intended to express has thereby turned into complete *contingency*. Whether the truth is spoken is left to the chance of whether I know it and can convince myself of it. Nothing more has been said than that

truth and falsehood should be spoken indiscriminately, according to whatever someone happens to know, believe, and understand. This *contingency of content* has *universality* only in the [1807 362] *form of a proposition* in which it is expressed. But as an ethical proposition it promises universal and necessary *content*, and so contradicts itself through the contingency of that content.—Finally, suppose the proposition is corrected so that the contingency of knowing and being convinced of the truth is to be removed, and the truth *should* also be *known*. This would be a command that directly contradicts the starting point. Sound reason was initially supposed to have the capacity to express the truth *immediately*. Now, however, we are told that it *should know* the truth, which means that it does not know how to express it *immediately*.—Considered from the side of *content*, that content has disappeared in the demand that one should *know* the truth. For this demand concerns *knowing in general*: one should know. What is demanded is therefore something free from all determinate content. But what was at issue here was *determinate* content, *a distinction* within ethical substance. Yet this *immediate* determination of substance is a content that proved instead to be completely contingent. When raised to universality and necessity, so that *knowing* is declared to be the law, it disappears instead.

425 Another famous command is: *Love your neighbor as yourself*. It addresses the individual in relation to other individuals, and *maintains this as a relation of one individual* to *another*, [1807 363] or as a relation of feeling. Active love—for inactive love has no being, and is therefore presumably not intended—aims to remove evil from a person and do that person good. To this end, one must distinguish what is evil for the person, what good is suited to countering this evil, and what the person's welfare is in general. In other words, I must love the person with *understanding*. Love without understanding will harm the person, perhaps more than hatred would. But in its richest and most important form, beneficence guided by understanding and directed to what matters is the state's universal action guided by understanding. Compared with this, the action of an individual as an individual becomes something so insignificant in general

that it is scarcely worth discussing. Moreover, the state's action has such great power that if individual action tried to oppose it—either by being a crime outright on its own account, or, out of love for someone else, by cheating the universal of the right and share it has in that person—it would be altogether futile and irresistibly destroyed. Beneficence that is a matter of feeling retains only the meaning of a wholly individual action, an emergency assistance as contingent as it is momentary. Chance determines not only its occasion, but also whether it produces any *work* at all, whether the result is not immediately undone again, and even turned instead into evil [1807 364]. This action for others' welfare, declared to be *necessary*, is therefore something that may or may not exist. If the occasion happens to arise, it may or may not produce a work, and may or may not be good. This law thus has no more universal content than the first one we considered. It does not express something that exists *in and for itself*, as it should if it is an absolute ethical law. Or such laws remain at the level of what *ought* to be, but have no *actuality*. They are not *laws*, but only *commands*.

426 The nature of the matter itself in fact makes it clear that we must give up universal, absolute *content*. For every *determination* posited in simple substance is *inadequate* to it, and its essence is to be this simplicity. In its simple absoluteness, the command itself expresses *immediate ethical being*. The distinction that appears within it is a determination, and thus a content that stands *below* the absolute universality of this simple being. Since absolute content must therefore be abandoned, content can possess only *formal universality*, or freedom from self-contradiction. For universality without content is formal universality. And absolute content itself means a distinction that is no distinction, or an absence of content.

[1807 365]

427 What remains for lawgiving is therefore the *pure form* of *universality*, or in fact the *tautology* of consciousness. This stands over against the content and is a *knowledge* not of the content that *exists*, or of the *content* proper, but of its *essence*, or its equality with itself.

428 Ethical essence is therefore not immediately itself a content, but only a standard for deciding whether a content is capable of being law because it does not contradict itself. Reason as lawgiver has been reduced to reason that merely *tests*.

c. Reason as tester of laws.

429 A distinction within simple ethical substance is a contingency for it. In the determinate command, we saw this emerge as the contingency of knowing, actuality, and action. The *comparison* between that simple being and the determination that did not correspond to it was something we made. In this comparison, simple substance proved to be formal universality, or pure *consciousness*. Free from the content, this consciousness stands over against it and is a *knowing* of it as determinate. In this way, universality remains what *the matter itself* was. But in consciousness it is something different. It is no longer the thoughtless, inert [1807 366] genus. Instead, it is related to the particular and counts as the particular's power and truth.—At first this consciousness seems to be the same testing that we ourselves previously carried out. Its activity seems able to be nothing other than what has already happened: a comparison of the universal with the determinate, which would reveal their inadequacy to one another, as before. But here the content has a different relation to the universal, because the universal has acquired a different meaning. It is *formal* universality, which a determinate content is capable of having, since within it the content is considered only in relation to itself. In our testing, the universal substance as a solid whole stood over against determinateness. The latter developed into the contingency of the consciousness into which substance entered. Here one term of the comparison has disappeared. The universal is no longer the substance that *exists* and *has validity*, or what is right in and for itself. It is simple knowledge, or form, which compares a content only with itself and examines whether it is a tautology. Laws are no longer given, but *tested*. For the testing consciousness, the laws are *already* given. It takes up their *content* in its simplicity. It does not, as we did, examine the individuality and contingency attached to their actuality. Instead, it stays with the command as a command, and relates to it as simply as its standard is simple.

[1807 367]

430 For this very reason, however, this testing does not get far. Precisely because the standard is tautology and is indifferent to the content, it accepts one content as readily as its opposite.—The question is whether it should be a law in and for itself that *property* should exist: *in and for itself*, not because it is useful for other purposes. Ethical essentiality consists precisely in the law being equal only to itself. Through this equality with itself, it is grounded in its own essence and is not conditional. Property in and for itself does not contradict itself. It is an *isolated* determination, or one posited as equal only to itself. Non-property, ownerless things, or communal ownership of goods are just as free from self-contradiction. That something belongs to nobody, or to the next person who takes possession, or to everyone together and to each according to need or in equal shares, is a *simple determination*, a *formal thought*, just like its opposite, property.—Of course, if an ownerless thing is considered as a *necessary object* of *need*, then it must become the possession of some individual. To make the thing's freedom from ownership into a law would instead be contradictory. But the thing's ownerlessness is not meant to be absolute ownerlessness. It is supposed to *come into someone's possession* according to the individual's *need*, not to be stored up, but [1807 368] to be used immediately. Yet providing for need entirely at random in this way contradicts the nature of the conscious being, which alone is at issue. For such a being must represent its need in the form of *universality*, provide for its whole existence, and acquire lasting resources. So the thought that a thing should fall by chance to the next self-conscious living being according to its need would not agree with itself.—Under communal ownership, where provision would be made in a universal and lasting way, each receives either as much *as they need*, in which case this inequality contradicts the essence of consciousness, whose principle is the *equality* of individuals; or goods are distributed *equally* according to the latter principle, in which case the share has no relation to need, although that alone is its concept.

431 But if non-property appears contradictory in this way, that is only because it has not been left as a *simple* determination. Property fares the same way when broken down into moments. The individual thing that is my property thereby counts as something *universal, established, and lasting*. Yet this contradicts its nature, which consists in being used and *disappearing*. At the same time, it counts as *mine*, something that all others acknowledge and [1807 369] exclude themselves from. But my being acknowledged implies instead my equality with everyone, the opposite of exclusion.—What I possess is a *thing*, that is, a being for others in general, quite universally and without any determination of being only for me. That *I* possess it contradicts its universal thinghood. Property therefore contradicts itself in every respect just as much as non-property. Each contains the two opposed, contradictory moments of individuality and universality.—But when each determination is conceived *simply*, as property or non-property, without further development, one is just as *simple* as the other: that is, neither contradicts itself.—The standard of law that reason has within itself therefore fits everything equally well, and so is in fact no standard at all.—It would also be strange if tautology, the principle of contradiction, were to be *more* for the knowledge of practical *truth* than it is acknowledged to be for the knowledge of theoretical truth: merely a formal criterion, something completely indifferent to truth and falsehood.

432 In the two moments just examined, which fill out the previously empty spiritual essence, two things have sublated themselves: first, the positing of immediate determinations in ethical substance, and then the knowledge of whether they are laws. The [1807 370] result thus seems to be that neither determinate laws nor knowledge of them is possible. But substance is *consciousness* of itself as absolute *essentiality*. It therefore cannot give up either the *distinction* within itself or the *knowledge* of that distinction. Lawgiving and the testing of laws have proved null. This means that, taken separately and in isolation, each is only an unsupported *moment* of ethical consciousness. The movement in which they appear has the formal meaning that ethical substance thereby presents itself as consciousness.

433 These two moments are further determinations of consciousness of *the matter itself*. As such, they can be regarded as forms of *honesty*. Just as honesty previously busied itself with its formal moments, it now busies itself with a content of goodness and rightness that ought to exist, and with testing such fixed truth. It thinks that sound reason and intelligent insight provide the commands with their force and validity.

434 Without this honesty, however, the laws do not count as the *essence* of *consciousness*, nor does testing count as activity *within* it. Instead, when these moments each appear on their own, *immediately*, as an *actuality*, one expresses an invalid establishment and existence of actual laws, the other an equally invalid release from them. As a determinate [1807 371] law, the law has a contingent content. Here this means that it is the law of an individual consciousness and has an arbitrary content. That immediate lawgiving is therefore the tyrant's outrage, which makes arbitrary will into law and ethical life into obedience to it—obedience to laws that are *only* laws, not also *commands*. Similarly, the second moment, the testing of laws, when isolated, means setting the immovable in motion. It means the outrage of a knowing that reasons itself free from absolute laws and regards them as an arbitrary will foreign to itself.

435 In both forms, these moments are a negative relation to substance, or to real spiritual essence. In them, substance does not yet have its reality. Consciousness still contains it in the form of its own immediacy. It is as yet only a *will* and *knowing* belonging to this individual, or the *ought* of an unactual command and a knowledge of formal universality. But as these ways of relating sublated themselves, consciousness returned into the universal, and those oppositions disappeared. Spiritual essence is actual substance because these ways do not hold separately, but only as sublated. The unity in which they are only moments is the self of consciousness. This self is now posited within spiritual essence [1807 372] and makes it actual, filled out, and self-conscious.

436 Spiritual essence therefore exists for self-consciousness, first of all, as law existing *in itself*. The universality of testing, which was formal and did not exist *in itself*, has been sublated. It is equally an eternal law, not grounded in the *will of this individual*. Instead, it exists in and for itself as the absolute *pure will of everyone*, in the form of immediate *being*. Nor is it a *command* that merely *ought* to be. It *is* and *has validity*. It is the category's universal I, which is immediately actuality, and the world is only this actuality. But because this *existing law* has unconditional validity, self-consciousness's obedience is not service to a master whose commands would be arbitrary and in whom it would not recognize itself. Instead, the laws are thoughts of its own absolute consciousness, thoughts it immediately *has* itself. Nor does it *believe* in them. Belief also intuits essence, but as something foreign. Ethical *self*-consciousness is *immediately* one with essence through the *universality* of its *self*. Belief, by contrast, begins with *individual* consciousness. It is that consciousness's movement of always approaching this unity without attaining the presence of its essence.—The former consciousness, by contrast, has sublated itself as an individual. This mediation has [1807 373] been accomplished. Only because it has been accomplished is this consciousness immediate self-consciousness of ethical substance.

437 The distinction between self-consciousness and essence is therefore completely transparent. Consequently, the *distinctions within essence* itself are not contingent determinations. Only self-consciousness could introduce inequality. Because it is united with essence, these distinctions are instead the constituent bodies of their articulation, permeated by their life. They are spirits clear to themselves and undivided, spotless heavenly figures that preserve, within their differences, the undefiled innocence and harmony of their essence.—Self-consciousness is likewise a simple, clear *relation* to them. They *are*, and nothing more: this constitutes consciousness of its relation to them. Thus, for Sophocles' Antigone, they have validity as the gods' *unwritten* and *unfailing* law: it lives not just now and yesterday, but forever, and no one knows where it came from. They *are*. If I ask how they arose and restrict them to the point of their origin, I have gone beyond them. For I am now the universal, while they

are conditional and limited. If they must justify themselves to my insight, I have already set their unshakable being-in-itself in motion. I consider them as something that may or may not be true for me [1807 374]. The ethical attitude consists precisely in holding unwaveringly to what is right, and refraining from moving it, shaking it, or tracing it back to something else.—Something is deposited with me for safekeeping. It *is* someone else's property, and I acknowledge this *because it is so*, while wavering in my relation to it. If I keep the deposit for myself, I commit no contradiction at all according to the principle of my testing, tautology. For I then no longer regard it as someone else's property. Keeping something that I do not regard as someone else's property is perfectly consistent. Changing *one's view* is no contradiction. For what is at issue is not the view as a view, but the object and content that must not contradict itself. I can change the view that something is my property into the view that it is someone else's property—as I do when I give something away—without becoming guilty of a contradiction. I can just as well go in the opposite direction.—Something is therefore not right because I find it free from self-contradiction. Rather, it is right because it is what is right. That something *is* someone else's property is *the basis*. I must not reason about that, or seek out or think up all kinds of thoughts, connections, and considerations; [1807 375] I must think neither of lawgiving nor of testing. Such movements of my thought would displace that relation. For in fact I could, at will, find the opposite equally consistent with my indeterminate, tautological knowing, and could therefore make it law. Instead, whether this determination or its opposite is right is determined *in and for itself*. On my own, I could make whichever I wanted into law, or just as well neither. Once I begin testing, I am already on an unethical path. It is because what is right exists for me *in and for itself* that I stand within ethical substance. In this way it is the *essence* of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, in turn, is *its actuality* and *existence*, its *self* and *will*.

VI. Spirit

[1807 376]
VI. *Spirit*.

438 Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world and of the world as itself.—The movement immediately preceding this showed how spirit comes to be. In that movement the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the concept of reason. In *observing* reason, this pure unity of the *I* and *being*, of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself*, is determined as the *in-itself*, or as *being*, and rational consciousness *finds* itself. But the truth of observation is instead the sublation of this immediate instinct to find, this unconscious existence of reason. The *intuited category*, the *thing found*, enters consciousness as the I's *being-for-itself*. The I now knows itself in objective essence as the *self*. But defining the category as being-for-itself opposed to being-in-itself is equally one-sided, a moment that sublates itself. For consciousness, the category therefore comes to be defined as it is in its universal truth: [1807 377] as essence existing *in and for itself*. This still *abstract* definition, which constitutes *the matter itself*, is at first only *spiritual essence*. Consciousness of it is a formal knowledge of it that busies itself with its various contents. In fact, as an individual consciousness, it is still distinct from substance. It either gives arbitrary laws or thinks that its knowledge as such contains the laws as they are in and for themselves, and regards itself as

the power that judges them.—Considered from the side of substance, this is spiritual essence existing *in and for itself* but not yet *conscious* of itself.—But essence existing *in and for itself* that is also actual as consciousness and presents itself to itself is *spirit*.

439 Its spiritual *essence* has already been called *ethical substance*. Spirit, however, is *ethical actuality*. It is the *self* of actual consciousness. Spirit—or rather, the self—confronts this consciousness as an objective, actual *world*. Yet for the self this world has lost all meaning of being foreign, just as the self has lost all meaning of being a separate being-for-itself, dependent on or independent of the world. As *substance*, and as universal, self-equal, enduring essence, spirit is the unmoved and undissolved *ground* and *starting point* of everyone's activity. As the *in-itself* of all self-consciousness, grasped in thought, it is their *purpose* and *goal*.—This substance is equally the universal *work* that [1807 378] produces itself through the *activity* of each and all as their unity and equality. For it is *being-for-itself*, the self, activity. As *substance*, spirit is unwavering, just *equality with itself*. But as *being-for-itself*, substance is the dissolved, self-sacrificing, generous essence within which each person accomplishes their own work, tears universal being apart, and takes their share of it. This dissolution and individualization of essence is precisely the *moment* of everyone's activity and self. It is the movement and soul of substance, and universal essence brought about by action. Substance is being that is dissolved within the self. Precisely for that reason it is not dead essence, but *actual* and *alive*.

440 Spirit is therefore the absolute, real essence that sustains itself. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions of it. They consist in spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling on particular ones. This isolation of such moments *presupposes* spirit itself and has its *subsistence* in spirit. It exists only within spirit, which is existence. Isolated in this way, the moments seem to *exist* as such. But their onward movement and return to their ground and essence showed that they are only moments, or vanishing quantities. This essence is precisely the movement and dissolution of these moments. Here, where spirit—or their reflection into themselves—is posited, our reflection can

briefly [1807 379] recall them from this perspective. They were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit is thus *consciousness* in general, including sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, insofar as, in analyzing itself, it holds fast to the moment of being an *objective, existing* actuality for itself, and disregards the fact that this actuality is its own being-for-itself. If, conversely, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its *being-for-itself*, it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of *being-in-and-for-itself*, as the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, it is consciousness that *has reason*. As the word *has* indicates, it has an object determined as rational *in itself*, or as having the standing of the category, but in such a way that the object does not yet have that standing for consciousness of it. This is the consciousness we have just finished considering. Finally, when spirit intuits this reason that it *has* as something that *is* reason—as reason that is *actual* within it and is its world—then it is in its truth. It *is* spirit; it is *actual ethical* essence.

441 As *immediate truth*, spirit is the *ethical life* of a *people*: the individual that is a world. It must advance to consciousness of what it immediately is, sublate beautiful ethical life, and [1807 380] reach knowledge of itself through a series of shapes. These differ from the previous shapes, however, in being real spirits, actualities in the proper sense. Instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, they are shapes of a world.

442 The *living ethical* world is spirit in its *truth*. When spirit first reaches abstract *knowledge* of its essence, ethical life collapses into the formal universality of legal right. Now divided within itself, spirit traces out one of its worlds in its objective element as a harsh actuality: the *realm of cultivation*. Opposed to it, in the element of thought, stands the *world of faith*, the *realm of essence*. But spirit withdraws into itself from this loss of itself. Grasped by this spirit, by the *concept*, both worlds are thrown into confusion and revolutionized by *insight* and its spread, the *Enlightenment*. The realm divided and spread out into a *here* and a *beyond* returns into self-consciousness. In *morality*, self-consciousness

now grasps itself as essentiality and essence as an actual self. It no longer places its *world* and the world's *ground* outside itself. Instead, it lets everything fade away within itself and, as *conscience*, is spirit *certain of itself*.
[1807 381]

443 The ethical world, the world torn apart into a here and a beyond, and the moral worldview are therefore the spirits whose movement and return into spirit's simple self existing for itself will unfold. As their goal and result, the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will emerge.
[1807 382]
A. *True spirit*: ethical life.

444 In its simple truth, spirit is consciousness, and it separates its moments from one another. *Action* divides it into substance and consciousness of substance. It also divides both substance and consciousness themselves. As universal *essence* and *purpose*, substance confronts itself as *individualized* actuality. The infinite middle is self-consciousness. *In itself*, self-consciousness is the unity of itself and substance, and it now becomes this *for itself*. It unites universal essence with its individualized actuality, raises this actuality to that essence, and acts ethically. It also brings that essence down to this actuality and carries out the purpose, the substance that was only thought. It produces the unity of its self and substance as *its work*, and thus as *actuality*.

445 In this separation of consciousness, simple substance has, on the one hand, come into opposition to self-consciousness. On the other, it thereby presents within itself the very nature of consciousness, [1807 383] of differentiating itself within itself, as a world articulated into its constituent bodies. It therefore splits into a differentiated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Likewise, the self-consciousness confronting it assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers. As knowing, it divides into ignorance of what it does and knowledge of it—a knowledge that is therefore deceived. In its deed it thus experiences both the contradiction between *those powers* into which substance split, and their mutual destruction. It also experiences the contradiction

between its knowledge of the ethical character of its action and what is ethical in and for itself. It finds *its own* downfall. In fact, however, through this movement ethical substance has become *actual self-consciousness*, or *this* self has become something existing *in and for itself*. But in this very process ethical life has perished.

a. *The ethical world*: human and divine law, man and woman.

446 As consciousness, the simple substance of spirit divides itself. Or, just as consciousness of abstract, sensuous being passes over into perception, [1807 384] so does immediate certainty of real, ethical being. For sense-perception, simple being becomes a thing with many properties. Likewise, for ethical perception, the situation in which one acts is an actuality with many ethical relations. But for the former, the useless multiplicity of properties contracts into the essential opposition of individuality and universality. Still more, for the latter, which is purified, substantial consciousness, the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes the twofold division into a law of individuality and a law of universality. Yet each of these constituent bodies of substance remains the whole spirit. In sense-perception, things have no substance other than the two determinations of individuality and universality. Here, however, these express only the superficial opposition of the two sides to one another.

447 In the essence we are considering here, individuality means *self-consciousness* in general, not an individual, contingent consciousness. In this determination, ethical substance is therefore *actual* substance, absolute spirit *realized* in the multiplicity of existing *consciousness*. It is the *community*. *For us*, when we entered the practical shape of reason in general, the community was absolute essence. Here it has emerged in its truth *for itself*, as conscious ethical essence and as the *essence for* the consciousness [1807 385] we have as our object. It is spirit that exists *for itself* by seeing itself *reflected in individuals*, and exists *in itself*, or as substance, by maintaining them within itself. As *actual substance*, it is *a people*; as *actual consciousness*, it is a *citizen* of that people. This conscious-

ness has its *essence* in simple spirit and its certainty of itself in the *actuality* of this spirit, the whole people. There it immediately has its *truth*: not in something unactual, but in a spirit that *exists* and *has validity*.

448 This spirit can be called human law because it exists essentially in the form of *actuality conscious of itself*. In the form of universality, it is the *known* law and the *existing* custom. In the form of individuality, it is actual certainty of itself in the *individual* in general. As government, it is certainty of itself as *simple individuality*. Its truth is *validity* openly displayed in the light of day: an *existence* that, for immediate certainty, takes the form of an existence released into independence.

449 But another power, *divine law*, confronts this ethical power and openness. For as the *movement* of *conscious activity*, ethical *state power* has its opposite in the *simple* and *immediate essence* of ethical life. As *actual universality*, it is a force directed against individual being-for-itself. And as [1807 386] actuality in general, it still has in *inner* essence something other than itself.

450 We have already noted that each opposed way in which ethical substance exists contains the whole substance and all moments of its content. So if the community is substance as actual activity conscious of itself, the other side has the form of immediate, or simply existing, substance. On the one hand, this is the inner concept, or universal possibility, of ethical life in general. On the other, it equally contains the moment of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness expressing ethical life within this element of *immediacy* or *being*—an *immediate* consciousness of itself in another, both as essence and as this self, a *natural ethical* community—is the *family*. As the *unconscious*, still inner concept, the family stands opposed to its self-conscious actuality. As the *element* of the people's actuality, it stands opposed to the people itself. As *immediate ethical being*, it stands opposed to ethical life that forms and maintains itself through *work* for the universal. The Penates, or household gods, stand opposed to universal spirit.

451 Although the family's *ethical being* is defined as *immediate*, the family is not an *ethical* essence within itself *insofar as* it is the *natural* relation among its members, or their *immediate* relation as *actual individuals*. For [1807 387] the ethical is *universal* in itself. This natural relation is essentially just as much a spirit, and is ethical only as spiritual essence. We must see what its distinctive ethical character consists in.—First, because the ethical is universal in itself, the ethical relation between family members is not a relation of feeling or love. It now seems that the ethical must be placed in the relation of the *individual* family member to the *whole* family as substance, so that the individual's activity and actuality have only the family as their purpose and content. But the conscious purpose of the whole's *activity*, insofar as it is directed toward the whole itself, is itself the individual. Acquiring and maintaining power and wealth is partly directed only toward need and belongs to desire. In its higher role, however, it serves only as a means. This higher determination does not fall within the family itself, but is directed toward what is truly universal, the community. It is instead negative toward the family. It consists in taking the individual out of the family, subduing the individual's natural character and individuality, and leading the individual toward *virtue*, toward life in and for the universal. The *positive* purpose distinctive to the family is the individual as such. Now, for this relation to be ethical, the individual—whether the person acting or the person to whom the action relates—cannot appear according to [1807 388] some *contingent circumstance*, as happens in some particular assistance or service. The content of ethical action must be substantial, or whole and universal. It can therefore relate only to the *whole* individual, or to the individual as universal. Nor can this merely mean *imagining* that a *service* advances the person's entire happiness, while as an immediate, actual action it only does something particular for them. Nor can it mean that, as education, the action actually takes the person as a whole as its object and produces that person as its work through a *series* of efforts. In that case, besides the purpose being negative toward the family, the *actual action* has only a limited content. Finally, it cannot mean emergency assistance that truly saves the whole individual. For such assistance is itself a wholly contingent deed, occasioned by an ordinary actuality that may or

may not exist. The action in question embraces the whole existence of the blood relative. Its object and content is not the citizen, who does not belong to the family, nor the person who is to become a citizen and *cease* to count as *this individual*. Rather, it takes *this* individual belonging to the family as a *universal* essence, lifted out of sensuous—that is, individual—actuality. Such action no longer concerns the *living*, but the *dead*. The dead person has gathered the long series of their scattered existence [1807 389] into its one completed shape and risen from the unrest of contingent life into the rest of simple universality. —Because the individual is *actual* and *substantial* only as a citizen, the individual, insofar as they are not a citizen and belong to the family, is only an *unactual*, strengthless shade.

452 This universality that the individual reaches *as such* is *pure being, death*. It is an *immediate, natural having-come-to-be*, not the *activity* of a *consciousness*. The family member's duty is therefore to add this latter side, so that the relative's final *being*, this *universal* being, will not belong to nature alone and remain something irrational. Instead, it is to be something *done*, in which the right of consciousness is upheld. Or rather, the action's meaning is that the rest and universality of self-conscious essence do not in truth belong to nature. The appearance of an action of this kind, which nature has arrogated to itself, must therefore be removed and the truth restored.—What nature did to the individual is the side from which their becoming universal presents itself as the movement of *something that exists*. This movement does fall within the ethical community and has the community as its purpose. Death is the completion and highest work that the individual as such undertakes for it. But insofar as the individual is essentially *individual*, it is contingent whether their death [1807 390] was directly connected with their work for the universal and resulted from it. And even if it was, death is *natural* negativity and the movement of the individual as *something that exists*, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness. Or, since the movement of *what exists* consists in its being sublated and reaching *being-for-itself*, death is the side of division in which the being-for-itself attained is something other than the exist-

ing being that entered the movement.—Because ethical life is spirit in its *immediate* truth, the sides into which its consciousness separates also fall within this form of *immediacy*. Individuality passes over into this *abstract* negativity. Without comfort or reconciliation *in itself*, it must *necessarily* receive them through an *actual, external action*.—Blood relationship therefore completes the abstract natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness. It interrupts nature's work and rescues the blood relative from destruction. Or rather, since destruction—the relative's becoming pure being—is necessary, the family itself takes on the deed of destruction.—In this way, *dead*, universal *being* too becomes a being returned into itself, a *being-for-itself*. Powerless, pure, *single* individuality is raised to *universal individuality*. The dead person has released their *being* from their [1807 391] *activity*, or negative one, and is empty individuality, only a passive *being for another*. The dead person is abandoned to all low, irrational individuality and to the forces of abstract materials. These are now stronger: the former because of the life it possesses, the latter because of their negative nature. The family wards off this dishonoring activity of unconscious desire and abstract entities, puts its own activity in its place, and joins the relative in marriage to the earth's bosom, to elemental, imperishable individuality. It thereby makes the relative a member of a community that instead overcomes and holds bound the forces of individual materials and the low forms of life that were being released against the relative and sought to destroy them.

453 This final duty therefore constitutes the complete *divine* law, or the positive *ethical* action toward the individual. Every other relation to the individual that goes beyond love and is ethical belongs to human law. It has the negative meaning of raising the individual above confinement within the natural community to which they belong as an *actual* individual. Now human right has as its content and power actual, self-conscious ethical substance, the whole people, while divine right and law have the individual who is beyond actuality. Yet this individual is not without power. [1807 392] Their power is the *abstract*, purely *universal*: the *elemental* individual. This elemental individual tears back into

pure abstraction, as into its essence, the individuality that breaks away from the element and constitutes the self-conscious actuality of the people, just as it is also that individuality's ground.—How this power manifests itself in the people will unfold further.

454 Within each law there are also *distinctions* and *stages*. For both essences contain the moment of consciousness, so distinction unfolds within them. This makes up their movement and their distinctive life. Examining these distinctions shows how the two *universal essences* of the ethical world *act* and are *self-conscious*, and how they *connect* and *pass over* into one another.

455 The *community*, the higher law whose validity lies openly in sunlight, has its actual life in *government*, in which it is an individual. Government is *actual* spirit *reflected into itself*, the simple *self* of the whole ethical substance. This simple power does allow the essence to spread out into its articulated parts and give each part subsistence and its own being-for-itself. In this, spirit has its *reality*, or *existence*, and the family is the *element* of this reality. But spirit is also the power of the whole that gathers these parts [1807 393] back into the negative one, makes them feel their lack of independence, and keeps them conscious that they have their life only in the whole. On the one hand, then, the community may organize itself into systems of personal independence and property, of rights of persons and rights in things. It may likewise articulate and make independent the ways of working for initially individual purposes—acquisition and enjoyment—into associations of their own. The spirit of universal association is the *simplicity* and *negative* essence of these systems that isolate themselves. To prevent their taking root and hardening in this isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and letting spirit evaporate, government must shake them internally from time to time through wars. It must thereby violate and disrupt their established order and right of independence. Individuals absorbed in these systems tear themselves away from the whole and strive for inviolable *being-for-itself* and personal security. Through the work imposed on them, government must make them feel their master, death. By dissolving the form of settled subsistence in this way, spirit prevents ethical existence from sinking into natural exis-

tence. It preserves and raises the self of its consciousness into *freedom* and its *power*.—Negative essence reveals itself as the community's proper *might* and the *power* [1807 394] of its self-preservation. The community therefore has the truth and confirmation of its might in the essence of *divine law* and the *underworld*.

456 Divine law, which rules in the family, likewise contains distinctions. Their relation makes up the living movement of its actuality. There are three relations: husband and wife, parents and children, and siblings as brother and sister. First, the *relation* of *husband* and *wife* is the *immediate* recognition of one consciousness in the other, and recognition of their mutual being-recognized. Because this is *natural* recognition, not ethical recognition, it is only the *representation* and *image* of spirit, not actual spirit itself.—But a representation or image has its actuality in something other than itself. This relation therefore has its actuality not within itself but in the child, an other whose coming-to-be it is, and in whom it itself disappears. This onward succession of generations has its subsistence in the people.—The devotion of husband and wife to one another is therefore mixed with natural relationship and feeling. Their relation does not have its return into itself within itself. The same holds for the second relation, the mutual *devotion* of *parents* and *children*. The devotion of parents [1807 395] to their children is affected by this very emotion: having consciousness of one's actuality in another and seeing being-for-itself come to be in that other, without receiving it back. Instead, it remains a foreign actuality of its own.—Conversely, the devotion of children toward parents is mixed with the emotion of having one's own coming-to-be, or in-itself, in another who is disappearing, and of attaining being-for-itself and one's own self-consciousness only by separating from the origin—a separation in which that origin dries up.

457 These two relations remain within transition and the inequality of the sides allotted to them.—The unmixed relation, however, occurs between *brother* and *sister*. They are the same blood, but blood that has reached *rest* and *equilibrium* in them. They therefore do not desire one another. Nor has either given being-for-itself to the other or received it from the other. Instead, they are free indi-

vidualities in relation to one another. As sister, the feminine therefore has the highest *intimation* of ethical essence. It does not reach *consciousness* and actuality of that essence, because the law of the family is essence existing *in itself*, *inner* essence. It does not lie in the daylight of consciousness, but remains inner feeling and the divine removed from actuality. The feminine is bound [1807 396] to these Penates, or household gods. In them it intuits both its universal substance and its individuality, but without this relation of individuality also being the natural relation of pleasure.—As *daughter*, a woman must see her parents disappear, with natural emotion and ethical calm. For only at the cost of this relation does she attain the *being-for-itself* of which she is capable. In her parents, then, she does not intuit her being-for-itself positively.—But in the relations of *mother* and *wife*, individuality is partly something natural belonging to pleasure, and partly something negative that sees only its own disappearance in them. Partly, for that very reason, it is something contingent that can be replaced by another individuality. In the household of ethical life, it is not *this* husband or *this* child, but *a husband, children in general*—not feeling, but the universal—that grounds these relations of woman. Her ethical character differs from man's precisely in this: in her orientation toward individuality and in her pleasure she remains immediately universal and foreign to the individuality of desire. In man, by contrast, these two sides separate. As a citizen he possesses the *self-conscious* power of *universality*, and thereby purchases the right of *desire*, while at the same time retaining freedom from it. Since individuality is mixed into this relation of woman, [1807 397] its ethical character is not pure. But insofar as it is pure, individuality is *indifferent*, and the woman lacks the moment of recognizing herself as *this* self in the other.—For the sister, however, the brother is tranquil, equal essence in general. Her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with natural relationship. The indifference of individuality and its ethical contingency are therefore absent from this relation. Here the moment of the recognizing and recognized *individual self* may assert its right, because it is connected with the equilibrium of blood and a relation without desire. The loss of her brother is therefore irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty toward him is the highest.

458 This relation is also the boundary at which the self-contained family dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side through which the family's spirit becomes individuality that turns toward something else and passes over into consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this *immediate, elemental*, and therefore properly *negative* ethical life of the family in order to acquire and produce actual ethical life conscious of itself.

459 He passes from divine law, in whose sphere he lived, to human law. The sister, however, becomes—or the wife remains—the head of the household and guardian of divine [1807 398] law. In this way the two sexes overcome their natural essence and appear in their ethical meaning, as differences that divide between themselves the two distinctions ethical substance gives itself. These two *universal* essences of the ethical world have their determinate *individuality* in *naturally* differentiated self-consciousness because ethical spirit is the *immediate* unity of substance and self-consciousness. This *immediacy*, on the side of reality and distinction, therefore also appears as the existence of a natural distinction.—This is the side that appeared as *originally determinate nature* in the shape of individuality real to itself, within the concept of spiritual essence. This moment loses the indeterminateness it still had there, and the contingent diversity of talents and abilities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes, whose natural character also acquires the meaning of their ethical determination.

460 Yet the distinction between the sexes and their ethical content remains within the unity of substance, and its movement is precisely substance's enduring coming-to-be. The spirit of the family sends the man out into the community, where he finds his self-conscious essence. Through him, the family has its universal substance and subsistence in the community. Conversely, the community [1807 399] has in the family the formal element of its actuality, and in divine law its power and confirmation. Neither exists in and for itself alone. In its living movement, human law starts from divine law, the law valid on earth from

the law below, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy. It equally returns to where it began. The power below, in turn, has its *actuality* on earth. Through consciousness it becomes existence and activity.

461 The universal ethical essences are therefore substance as universal consciousness and substance as individual consciousness. Their universal actuality is the people and the family; their natural self and active individuality is man and woman. In this content of the ethical world, we see the purposes achieved that the previous, unsubstantial shapes of consciousness set themselves. What reason grasped only as an object has become self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness had only within itself is present as true actuality.—What observation knew as something *found already there*, in which the self had no part, is here an already existing custom, but an actuality that is also the deed and work of the one who finds it.—The individual seeking the pleasure of *enjoying their individuality* finds it in the family. The necessity in which pleasure passes away is the individual's own [1807 400] self-consciousness as a citizen of their people. —Or it is this: knowing the *law of the heart* as the law of all hearts, and consciousness of the *self* as the acknowledged universal order.—It is *virtue* enjoying the fruits of its sacrifice. It accomplishes what it aims at: bringing essence out into actual presence. Its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, consciousness of *the matter itself* finds satisfaction in real substance, which positively contains and preserves the abstract moments of that empty category. In the ethical powers, substance has a true content that has replaced the unsubstantial commands that sound reason wanted to give and know. It thereby also has a standard full of content, determined within itself, for testing not laws, but what is done.

462 The whole is a tranquil equilibrium of all its parts. Each part is a spirit at home, seeking its satisfaction not beyond itself but possessing it within itself, because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium can be alive only if inequality arises within it and is brought back to equality by *justice*. But justice is neither a foreign essence existing beyond it nor the actuality, unworthy of justice, of mutual malice, betrayal, [1807 401] ingratitude, and so forth, which would execute judgment through thoughtless chance, as an uncompre-

hended connection and an unconscious doing and leaving undone. Rather, as the justice of *human* right, it brings being-for-itself that has left the equilibrium —the independence of classes and individuals—back into the universal. It is the government of the people: the self-present individuality of universal essence and everyone's own self-conscious will.—But the justice that brings the universal, when it becomes overpowering against the individual, back into equilibrium is equally the simple spirit of the person who has suffered wrong. It is not split into the sufferer and an essence beyond. The sufferer is the power below, and it is *their* Fury that pursues revenge. For their individuality, their blood, lives on in the household; their substance has an enduring actuality. The only wrong that can be done to an individual in the ethical realm is that something simply *happens* to them. The power that does consciousness this wrong, making it a mere thing, is nature. It is the universality not of the *community*, but the *abstract* universality of *being*. In undoing the wrong suffered, individuality turns not against the community, which has not wronged it, but against this abstract universality. As we have seen, consciousness belonging to the individual's blood undoes this [1807 402] wrong by making what has *happened* into a *work*, so that *being*, the *final* thing, is also something *willed*, and thus a source of gladness.

463 In its *subsistence*, the ethical realm is thus an unstained world, unpolluted by any division. Its movement is likewise the tranquil becoming of one of its powers into the other, so that each itself maintains and produces the other. We do see it divide into two essences and their actuality. But their opposition is instead the confirmation of each by the other. Where they immediately touch as actual powers, their middle and element is their immediate interpenetration. One extreme, universal self-conscious spirit, is joined to its other extreme, its power and element, *unconscious* spirit, through the *individuality* of *man*. Conversely, *divine* law has its individualization, or the *unconscious* spirit of the individual has its existence, in woman. Through her as its *middle*, it rises from its unactuality into actuality, from what does not know and is not known into the conscious realm. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle of

the whole and the element that, divided into these extremes of divine and human law, is equally their immediate union. It makes those first two syllogisms into the same syllogism [1807 403] and unites the opposed movements into one: actuality descending into unactuality—human law, organized into independent members, descending to the danger and test of death—and the law below ascending to the actuality of daylight and conscious existence. The former movement belongs to man, the latter to woman.

b. Ethical action: human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate.

464 Given the character of opposition in this realm, self-consciousness has not yet appeared in its right as *single individuality*. On one side, individuality counts here only as *universal will*; on the other, as the family's *blood*. *This individual* counts only as the *unactual shade*.—*No deed has yet been done*. But the deed is the *actual self*.—It disturbs the tranquil organization and movement of the ethical world. In that world, the two essences appear in an orderly harmony, each confirming and completing the other. Through the deed, this becomes a transition between *opposites*, in which each proves instead to be the nullity of itself [1807 404] and the other, rather than their confirmation. It becomes the negative movement, or eternal necessity, of terrible *fate*. Fate devours divine and human law, along with the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers exist, into the abyss of its *simplicity*. For us, it passes over into the *absolute being-for-itself* of purely individual self-consciousness.

465 The *ground* from which this movement begins and on which it proceeds is the ethical realm. But the *activity* of this movement is self-consciousness. As *ethical* consciousness, it is a *simple, pure orientation* toward ethical essentiality, or duty. It contains no arbitrary choice, no struggle or indecision, since the giving and testing of laws have been abandoned. Instead, ethical essentiality is for it immediate, unwavering, and free from contradiction. It therefore offers neither the sorry spectacle of finding itself in a conflict between passion and duty, nor the comic spectacle of a conflict between duty and duty. In content, the latter conflict is the same as that between passion and duty. For passion can equally be represented as duty: once consciousness withdraws into itself from duty's

immediate, substantial essentiality, duty becomes the formal universal into which every content fits equally well, as shown above. The conflict [1807 405] of duties is comic because it expresses a contradiction: an *opposed absolute*. It thus expresses the absolute and, immediately, the nullity of this so-called absolute, or duty.—Ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do and is decided in belonging either to divine or to human law. The immediacy of its decision is a *being-in-itself* and therefore also has the meaning of a natural being, as we have seen. Nature, not the contingency of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other. Or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual existence and actualization in the two sexes.

466 Ethical life essentially consists in this immediate *decidedness*, so that for consciousness only one law is the essence. At the same time, the ethical powers are actual in consciousness's *self*. They therefore acquire the meaning of *excluding* and being *opposed* to one another. In self-consciousness they exist *for themselves*, whereas in the ethical *realm* they exist only *in themselves*. Because ethical consciousness is *decided* for one of them, it is essentially *character*. For it, the two do not have equal *essentiality*. Their opposition therefore appears as an *unfortunate* conflict of duty only with an *actuality* that has no right. Ethical [1807 406] consciousness, as self-consciousness, stands within this opposition. As such, it also aims to subject this opposed actuality by force to the law to which it belongs, or to deceive it. Since each sees right only on its own side and wrong on the other, the consciousness belonging to divine law sees contingent human *violence* on the other side. The consciousness assigned to human law sees there the stubbornness and *disobedience* of inner being-for-itself. For the government's commands are the universal meaning, public and in the light of day. The will of the other law, however, is the meaning below, enclosed within the inward realm. In its existence it appears as the will of individuality and, in contradicting the first law, is an outrage.

467 This produces in consciousness the opposition of the *known* and *unknown*, just as in substance it produces that of the *conscious* and *unconscious*. The absolute *right* of ethical *self-consciousness* comes into conflict with the divine *right* of *essence*. For self-consciousness as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essence. But in its substance, self-consciousness is the unity of itself and this opposite. Ethical self-consciousness is consciousness of substance. The object opposed to self-consciousness has therefore completely lost the meaning [1807 407] of having essence for itself. The spheres in which the object is only a *thing* have long disappeared. So have those in which consciousness establishes something from within itself and makes an individual moment into the essence. Against such one-sidedness, actuality has a power of its own. Allied with truth against consciousness, it first shows consciousness what truth is. But ethical consciousness has drunk from the cup of absolute substance, forgetting all the one-sidedness of being-for-itself, its purposes, and its distinctive concepts. In this water of the Styx, it has therefore also drowned all the objective world's own essentiality and independent significance. Its absolute right is thus that, when it acts according to ethical law, it should find in this actualization nothing other than the accomplishment of that law itself, and that the deed should show nothing other than what the ethical activity is.—As both absolute *essence* and absolute *power*, the ethical cannot suffer any distortion of its content. If it were only absolute *essence* without power, individuality could distort it. But as ethical consciousness, individuality has renounced distortion by giving up one-sided being-for-itself. Conversely, mere power would be distorted by essence if power still were such a being-for-itself. Because of this unity, [1807 408] individuality is the pure form of substance, which is the content. Activity is the passage from thought into actuality, merely as the movement of an opposition without essence, whose moments have no particular content or essentiality differing from one another. Ethical consciousness's absolute right is therefore that the *deed*, the *shape* of its *actuality*, should be nothing other than what it *knows*.

468 But ethical essence has split itself into two laws, while consciousness, as an undivided relation to law, is assigned to only one. This *simple* consciousness insists on its absolute right that essence should have *appeared* to it, as ethical consciousness, as it is *in itself*. Equally, essence insists on the right of its *reality*, or on being twofold. Yet this right of essence does not confront self-consciousness as something located elsewhere. It is self-consciousness's own essence. It has its existence and power only within self-consciousness, and its opposition is the *deed* of *self-consciousness*. For precisely by existing for itself as a self and proceeding to the deed, self-consciousness rises out of *simple immediacy* and itself posits *division*. Through the deed, it gives up the determination of ethical life as the simple certainty of immediate truth. It posits the separation of itself into itself as active and the opposed actuality that is negative for it [1807 409]. Through the deed, it therefore becomes *guilty*. For the deed is its *activity*, and activity is its ownmost essence. *Guilt* also acquires the meaning of *crime*: as simple ethical consciousness, it has turned toward one law, renounced the other, and violates this other through its deed.—*Guilt* is not the indifferent, ambiguous situation in which the deed, as it *actually* lies in the light of day, might or might not be the *activity* of its self. That would suggest that something external and contingent could attach itself to activity without belonging to it, so that from this side the activity would be innocent. Rather, activity is itself this division: positing itself for itself and, opposed to it, a foreign, external actuality. That such an actuality exists belongs to activity itself and occurs through it. Only non-action is therefore innocent, like the being of a stone—not even that of a child.—In its content, however, ethical *action* contains the moment of crime because it does not sublate the *natural* distribution of the two laws between the two sexes. Instead, as an *undivided* orientation toward law, it remains within *natural immediacy*. As activity, it makes this one-sidedness into guilt: grasping only one side of essence and relating negatively to the other, that is, violating it. We will later state more precisely where guilt and crime, activity and action fall within universal ethical life [1807 410]. This much is immediately clear: it is not *this individual* who acts and is guilty. For as *this* self the individual is only the unactual shade, or exists only as a universal

self. Individuality is purely the *formal* moment of *activity* in general. The content is laws and customs, and, specifically for the individual, those of their class. The individual is substance as genus, which through its determination becomes a species, but the species remains at the same time the universality of the genus. Within a people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only as far as particularity, not to single individuality that posits in its activity an exclusive self, an actuality negative to itself. Instead, its action is grounded in secure trust in the whole, unmixed with anything foreign, with fear or hostility.

469 Ethical self-consciousness now experiences in its deed the developed nature of *actual* action, whether it has committed itself to divine or to human law. The law manifest to it is essentially connected with the opposite law. Essence is the unity of both, but the deed has carried out only one against the other. Since the two are essentially connected, fulfilling one calls forth the other, and calls it forth as what the deed has made it: a violated [1807 411] essence, now hostile and demanding revenge. For action, only one side of the decision in general lies in the light of day. But *in itself* the decision is the negative, which sets against itself an other, something foreign to itself as knowing. Actuality therefore keeps the other side, foreign to knowledge, hidden within itself. It does not show itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself. It does not show the son his father in the man who wrongs him and whom he kills; nor his mother in the queen he takes as his wife. In this way a power that shuns the light stalks ethical self-consciousness. Only after the deed is done does it break out and catch consciousness in the deed. For the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it. The agent cannot deny the crime and their guilt.—The deed consists in moving the unmoved and bringing forth what was enclosed only as a possibility. It thus connects the unconscious with the conscious, what does not exist with being. In this truth, then, the deed comes into the sunlight: as something in which a conscious element is joined to an unconscious one, one's own to something foreign. It appears as divided essence, whose other side consciousness experiences as its own too, but as a power it has violated and stirred into hostility.

[1807 412]

470 The right that lay in ambush may be present for the acting *consciousness* not in its distinctive shape, but only *in itself*, in the inward guilt of the decision and action. But ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, when it *knows beforehand* the law and power it confronts, takes them for violence and wrong, for an ethical contingency, and knowingly commits the crime, as Antigone does. The accomplished deed reverses its view. *Accomplishment* itself declares that what is *ethical* must be *actual*, since the *actuality* of the purpose is the purpose of action. Action expresses precisely the *unity* of *actuality* and *substance*. It declares that actuality is not contingent for essence, but allied with it and granted to nothing that is not truly right. For the sake of this actuality, and for the sake of its own activity, ethical consciousness must acknowledge its opposite as its own. It must acknowledge its guilt: "*because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred*"—

471 This acknowledgment expresses the sublation of the division between ethical *purpose* and *actuality*. It expresses the return to the ethical *attitude* that knows that nothing has validity except what is right. But the agent thereby gives up its *character* and the *actuality* of its self, and has perished [1807 413]. Its *being* consists in belonging to its ethical law as its substance. But in acknowledging the opposite, this law has ceased to be its substance. Instead of its actuality, it has attained unactuality, the ethical attitude.—Substance does appear *in* individuality as its *pathos*, while individuality appears as what gives substance life and therefore stands above it. But substance is a pathos that is also individuality's character. Ethical individuality is immediately, and in itself, one with this universal of its own. It exists only within it and cannot survive the downfall that this ethical power suffers through the opposite power.

472 Yet it is certain that the individuality whose pathos is this opposite power *suffers no more evil than it has inflicted*. The movement of ethical powers against one another, and of the individualities that bring them into life and action, reaches its *true end* only when both sides experience the same downfall. For nei-

ther power has any advantage over the other that would make it a *more essential* moment of substance. The equal essentiality of the two and their indifferent coexistence constitute their being without a self. In the *deed*, however, they exist as selves, but as different selves. This contradicts the unity of the self and constitutes their lack of right [1807 414] and their necessary downfall. *Character*, too, belongs in its pathos or substance to only one power. At the same time, on the side of knowing, each character is divided into a conscious and an unconscious element. Each itself calls forth this opposition, and through the deed even its not-knowing is its work. It thus incurs the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would therefore be only a partial and unfinished work that advances irresistibly toward the equilibrium of both. Only in the equal subjection of both sides is absolute right accomplished. Ethical substance then appears as the negative power that devours both sides, or as almighty and just *fate*.

473 If the two powers are taken in their determinate content and its individualization, the picture of their embodied conflict presents itself in two ways. Formally, it is the conflict of ethical life and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and a contingency brought about through nature. This contingency has a right against self-consciousness because the latter is only *true* spirit, only in *immediate* unity with its substance. In content, the picture presents the division between divine and human law.—The young man leaves unconscious essence, the spirit of the family, and becomes the individuality of the community. But [1807 415] he still belongs to the nature from which he tore himself away. This shows itself in his appearing in the contingency of two brothers, who seize control of the community with equal right. The inequality of earlier and later birth, as a natural distinction, has no significance *for them*, who are entering ethical essence. But government, as the simple soul or self of the people's spirit, cannot tolerate a duality of individuality. Nature, as the chance of plurality, confronts the ethical necessity of this unity. The two therefore fall into conflict, and their equal right to state power destroys them both, who are equally in the wrong. From the human point of view, the one who is not *in pos-*

session and attacks the community headed by the other has committed the crime. Right, by contrast, is on the side of the one who knew how to treat the other merely as an *individual*, detached from the community, and expelled him in this powerlessness. He has attacked only the individual as such, not the community, not the essence of human right. The community, attacked and defended by empty individuality, preserves itself, while the brothers bring about one another's downfall. For the individuality that ties the whole's danger to its own *being-for-itself* has excluded itself from the community and dissolves within itself. But the community [1807 416] will honor the one who was on its side. The other, who already proclaimed the community's devastation on its walls, will be punished by the government—the restored simplicity of the community's self—by being denied the final honor. Whoever came to assault the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be stripped of the honor of their whole completed essence, the honor of the departed spirit.

474 In this way the universal easily strikes off the pure tip of its pyramid and does win a *victory* over the rebellious principle of individuality, the family. Yet it has thereby only entered into *battle* with divine law; self-conscious spirit has only entered into battle with the unconscious. For the latter is the other essential power, and is therefore not destroyed by the former, but only offended. Against the powerful law in the light of day, however, it has only the bloodless shade to help it achieve *actual* effect. As the law of weakness and darkness, it therefore initially yields to the law of daylight and strength, since its power has validity below, not on earth. But the actual, by taking honor and power from the inward, has thereby consumed its own essence. Manifest spirit has the root of its power in the underworld. The people's *certainty*, secure of itself and assuring itself, has the *truth* of its oath binding everyone into one only in the [1807 417] unconscious, silent substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. This turns manifest spirit's accomplishment into its opposite. It experiences its highest right as the highest wrong, its victory as its own downfall. The dead person whose right has been violated therefore knows how to find instruments of revenge as actual and powerful as the power that injured them. These powers

are other communities, whose altars dogs or birds have defiled with the corpse. Instead of being raised into unconscious universality through its proper return to the elemental individual, the corpse has remained above ground in the realm of actuality. As the power of divine law, it now acquires a self-conscious, actual universality. These communities rise in hostility and destroy the community that dishonored and shattered its own power, the family's devotion.

475 In this presentation, the movement of human and divine law expresses its necessity in individuals. In them the universal appears as a *pathos*, and the activity of the movement as *individual* activity, which gives its necessity the appearance of contingency. But individuality and activity constitute the principle of individuality in general, which in its pure universality was called inner [1807 418] divine law. As a moment of the manifest community, it has not only that underground effect—or an effect that is external in the form it takes—but also an equally manifest existence and movement, actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was presented as the simple movement of individualized pathos acquires a different appearance. The crime and the destruction of the community grounded in it acquire the proper form of their existence.—Human law, then, is the community in its universal existence, masculinity in its activity in general, and government in its actual activity. It *is*, *moves*, and *preserves itself* by consuming within itself the separation of the Penates, the household gods—that is, the independent division into families headed by femininity—and keeping them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. But the family is also its element in general, and individual consciousness its universal active ground. The community secures its subsistence only by disturbing family happiness and dissolving self-consciousness into the universal. It therefore produces its internal enemy in what it suppresses and what is also essential to it: femininity in general. Femininity—the eternal irony of the community—uses intrigue to change the government's universal purpose [1807 419] into a private purpose. It turns the government's universal activity into the work of this particular individual and perverts the state's universal property into the family's possession and ornament. It thereby makes the serious wisdom of mature age

—which has died to individuality, to pleasure and enjoyment as well as actual activity, and thinks and cares only for the universal—an object of ridicule for immature youth's high spirits and of contempt for its enthusiasm. In general, it raises the power of youth to authority: the son, in whom the mother has given birth to her master; the brother, in whom the sister has man as her equal; the young man, through whom the daughter is freed from her dependence and attains the enjoyment and dignity of wifehood.—The community can preserve itself only by suppressing this spirit of individuality. Yet because it is an essential moment, the community also produces it, and through its suppressive attitude produces it as a hostile principle. This principle, however, separating itself from the universal purpose, is only evil and null in itself. It could accomplish nothing if the community itself did not acknowledge youth's power—masculinity that is not mature and still remains within individuality—as the *power* of the whole. For the community is a people, is itself individuality, and essentially exists *for itself* only insofar as *other individualities* [1807 420] *exist for it*, insofar as it *excludes* them and knows itself independent of them. The community's negative side, suppressing the separation of individuals *within* but *acting on its own* toward the *outside*, has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and form in which the essential moment of ethical substance—the absolute *freedom* of the ethical *self* from all existence—is present in its actuality and confirmation. On one side, war makes the individual *systems* of property and personal independence, as well as individual *personality* itself, feel the power of the negative. On the other, in war this same negative essence rises as what preserves the whole. The brave young man, in whom femininity takes pleasure, the suppressed principle of ruin, comes into the open and becomes authoritative. Now natural power, and what appears as the chance of good fortune, decide the existence of ethical essence and spiritual necessity. Since ethical essence's existence rests on strength and fortune, *it is already decided* that it has perished.—Just as previously only the Penates perished in the people's spirit, so now the *living* spirits of peoples perish through their individuality in a *universal* community.

Its *simple universality* is spiritless and dead, and its life is the *single* individual as an individual. The ethical shape of spirit [1807 421] has disappeared, and another takes its place.

476 This downfall of ethical substance and its passage into another shape is therefore determined by ethical consciousness being essentially *immediately* directed toward law. This determination of immediacy means that nature in general enters ethical action. Its actuality reveals only the contradiction and seed of ruin that ethical spirit's beautiful harmony and tranquil equilibrium contain precisely in that tranquility and beauty. For immediacy has the contradictory meaning of being both nature's unconscious rest and spirit's self-conscious, restless rest.—Because of this natural character, this ethical people is in general an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited. It thus finds its sublation in another individuality. But this determination, when posited in existence, is limitation and equally the negative in general and the self of individuality. When it disappears, spirit's life and this substance conscious of itself in everyone are lost. Substance emerges in them as a *formal universality*. It no longer lives within them as living spirit. Instead, the simple solidity of their individuality has shattered into many points.
[1807 422]
c. *The legal condition*.

477 The universal unity into which the living, immediate unity of individuality and substance returns is the spiritless community. It has ceased to be the substance of individuals that is not conscious of itself. They now count within it, according to their individual being-for-itself, as selves and substances. The universal has splintered into the atoms of an absolute multiplicity of individuals. This dead spirit is an *equality* in which *all* count as *each*, as *persons*.—What was called hidden divine law in the ethical world has in fact emerged from its inwardness into actuality. In that world the *individual* had validity and actuality only as the universal *blood* of the *family*. As *this* individual, the individual was the *departed* spirit *without a self*. Now, however, the individual has emerged from this unactuality. Because ethical substance is only *true* spirit,

spirit returns into *certainty* of itself. It is that substance as the *positive* universal, but its actuality is to be a *negative*, universal *self*.—We saw the powers and shapes of the ethical world sink into the simple necessity of empty *fate*. This power over them is substance reflecting itself into its simplicity. But absolute essence reflecting itself into itself—precisely that necessity of empty [1807 423] fate—is nothing other than the *I* of self-consciousness.

478 So this I now counts as essence existing *in and for itself*. Its *being-recognized* is its substantiality. But this is *abstract universality*, because its content is *this unyielding self*, not the self dissolved in substance.

479 Personality has therefore emerged here from the life of ethical substance. It is the independence of consciousness that has *actual validity*. The *unactual thought* of this independence, which comes about by *renouncing actuality*, appeared earlier as *Stoic* self-consciousness. Just as Stoic self-consciousness arose from mastery and servitude, the immediate existence of *self-consciousness*, so personality has arisen from immediate *spirit*, which is everyone's universal ruling will and equally the obedience with which they serve. What for Stoicism was the *in-itself* only in *abstraction* is now an *actual world*. Stoicism is nothing other than the consciousness that reduces the principle of the legal condition—spiritless independence—to its abstract form. By fleeing from *actuality*, it attained only the thought of independence. It exists absolutely *for itself* by not attaching its essence to any existence, but by giving up all existence and placing its essence solely in the unity of pure thought. In the same way, the right of a person is attached neither to a [1807 424] richer or more powerful existence of the individual as such, nor to a universal living spirit. Instead, it is attached to the pure one of the individual's abstract actuality, or to the individual as self-consciousness in general.

480 Just as Stoicism's *abstract* independence presented its actualization, so this actualization will also repeat the movement of that first independence. That first independence passes into the skeptical confusion of consciousness: a rambling of the negative that wanders without shape from one contingency of

being and thought to another. It dissolves them in absolute independence, but equally produces them again. In fact, it is only the contradiction between the independence and dependence of consciousness.—Likewise, the personal independence of *legal right* is instead this same universal confusion and mutual dissolution. For what counts as absolute essence is self-consciousness as the person's pure, *empty one*. Against this empty universality, substance has the form of *fullness* and *content*. This content is now completely released and disordered, since the spirit that subdued it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—In its *reality*, this empty one of the person is therefore a contingent existence and an inessential movement and activity that achieves no stability. Like skepticism, the formalism of legal right [1807 425] is thus, by its concept, without content of its own. It finds a manifold subsistence, possession, already there, and, like skepticism, stamps it with the same abstract universality, through which it is called *property*. In skepticism, however, actuality so determined is called *appearance* in general and has only a negative value; in legal right it has a positive one. The negative value consists in the actual having the meaning of the self as thinking, as the universal *in itself*. The positive value consists in its being *mine* in the meaning of the category, as an *acknowledged* and *actual* validity.—Both are the same *abstract universal*. The actual content, or *determination*, of what is mine—whether an external possession or the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. Content therefore belongs to a *power of its own*, different from the formal universal: chance and arbitrary will.—In its actual validity itself, consciousness of legal right therefore experiences instead the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality. To describe an individual as a *person* expresses contempt.

481 The free power of content takes this form: the dispersion into the absolute *multiplicity* of personal atoms is, through the nature of this determination, also gathered into *one* point, foreign to them and equally [1807 426] spiritless. On one side, like the rigidity of their personality, this point is purely individual actuality. But opposed to their empty individuality, it also has for them the

meaning of all content and therefore of real essence. Against their supposedly absolute, but intrinsically inessential actuality, it is universal power and absolute actuality. In this way, this lord of the world is, for himself, the absolute person who also encompasses all existence. For his consciousness, no higher spirit exists. He is a person, but the solitary person who has confronted *everyone*. These others constitute the valid universality of the person. For the individual as such is true only as the universal multiplicity of individuality. Separated from this, the solitary self is in fact the unactual, powerless self.—At the same time, it is consciousness of the content that has confronted that universal personality. But freed from its negative power, this content is the chaos of spiritual powers. Unleashed as elemental beings, they rage wildly and destructively against one another in unrestrained excess. Their powerless self-consciousness is the impotent enclosure and ground of their tumult. Knowing himself as the sum of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual God. But since he is only the [1807 427] formal self, unable to control those powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous excess.

482 The lord of the world has actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive force he exercises against the self of his subjects confronting him. For his power is not the *unity* of spirit in which persons would recognize their own self-consciousness. Instead, as persons they exist for themselves, and from the absolute rigidity of their pointlike existence they exclude continuity with others. They therefore stand in a merely negative relation both to one another and to him, who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity, he is the essence and content of their formalism. But he is a content foreign to them, a hostile essence that instead sublates precisely what they regard as their essence: being-for-itself without content. As the continuity of their personality, he destroys that very personality. When the content foreign to it asserts itself within legal personality—and it does assert itself within persons, because it is their reality—legal personality therefore experiences, instead, its own lack of substance. The destructive digging around in this inessential

ground, by contrast, gives itself consciousness of its universal dominion. But this self is mere devastation, and therefore exists only outside itself. It is instead the throwing away of its self-consciousness.
[1807 428]

483 This is the character of the side on which self-consciousness as absolute essence is *actual*. But *consciousness driven back into itself* from this actuality thinks its own lack of essence. Earlier, we saw the Stoic independence of pure thought pass through skepticism and find its truth in unhappy consciousness: the truth about its being-in-and-for-itself. At that time, this knowledge appeared only as the one-sided view of consciousness as such. Here, its *actual* truth has arrived. It consists in this: the *universal validity* of self-consciousness is reality alienated from it. This *validity* is the self's universal actuality, but it is just as immediately an inversion: the loss of its essence.—The actuality of the self, absent in the ethical world, has been gained through that world's return into the *person*. What was united there now appears developed, but alienated from itself.
[1807 429]
B. *Spirit alienated from itself: cultivation*.

484 Ethical substance kept opposition enclosed within its simple consciousness, and kept this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. Essence therefore has the simple determination of *being* for consciousness, which is immediately directed toward it and whose custom it is. Consciousness does not count for itself as *this exclusive self*. Nor does substance mean an existence excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to unite itself, and which it would also have to produce, only by alienating itself. But the spirit whose self is absolutely separate confronts its content as an equally hard actuality. Here the world is determined as something external, the negative of self-consciousness. Yet this world is spiritual essence. In itself, it is the interpenetration of being and individuality. Its existence is the *work* of self-consciousness, but also an immediately present actuality foreign to it, with a being of its own, in which self-consciousness does not recognize itself. It is the [1807 430] external essence and the free content of legal right. But this external actuality, which

the lord of the world of legal right encompasses within himself, is not merely this elemental essence contingently present for the self. It is the self's labor, though not its positive labor, but rather its negative labor. It obtains its existence through self-consciousness's *own* externalization and loss of essence. Amid the devastation ruling the world of legal right, the external violence of the unbound elements seems to inflict this on self-consciousness. On their own, these elements are only pure devastation and their own dissolution. But this dissolution, their negative essence, is precisely the self. The self is their subject, their activity and coming-to-be. Yet this activity and coming-to-be, through which substance becomes actual, is the alienation of personality. For the self that has validity in and for itself *immediately*, that is, *without alienation*, has no substance and is the plaything of those raging elements. *Its* substance is therefore its externalization itself, and externalization is substance, or the spiritual powers that organize themselves into a world and thereby preserve themselves.

485 In this way substance is *spirit*, the self-conscious *unity* of self and essence. But each also has the meaning of alienation for the other. Spirit is *consciousness* of an objective actuality free for itself. Yet this consciousness is confronted by that unity of self and [1807 431] essence: *actual* consciousness is confronted by *pure consciousness*. On one side, actual self-consciousness passes through its externalization into the actual world, and this world returns into self-consciousness. On the other, this very actuality, both the person and objectivity, is sublated. They are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is *pure consciousness*, or *essence*. The present immediately has its opposite in its *beyond*, which is its thinking and its being-thought; just as the beyond has its opposite in the world on this side, which is its actuality alienated from it.

486 This spirit therefore develops not just *one* world, but a doubled world, divided and opposed.—The world of ethical spirit is its own *present*. Each of its powers therefore exists within this unity and, insofar as the two differ, in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the meaning of being the negative of self-consciousness. Even the departed spirit is present in the *blood* of kinship, in the *self*

of the family. The government's universal *power* is the people's *will*, its self. Here, however, what is present means only objective *actuality*, which has its consciousness beyond itself. Each individual moment, as *essence*, receives this essence, and with it actuality, from another. Insofar as it is actual, its essence is something other than its actuality. Nothing has a spirit grounded and dwelling within itself, [1807 432] but exists outside itself in a foreign spirit. The equilibrium of the whole is not a unity remaining at home with itself and finding rest through its return into itself. Instead, it rests on the alienation of opposites. The whole, like each individual moment, is therefore a reality alienated from itself. It divides into a realm in which *self-consciousness is actually* both itself and its object, and another realm, that of *pure* consciousness. Beyond the first, this has no actual presence but exists in *faith*. The ethical world returned from the separation of divine and human law and their shapes—and its consciousness from the separation of knowledge and unconsciousness—into its fate, into the *self* as the *negative power* of this opposition. So too these two realms of self-alienated spirit will return into the *self*. But the former self was the first, immediately valid *self*, the individual *person*. This second self, returning into itself from its externalization, will be the *universal self*, consciousness that grasps the *concept*. These spiritual worlds, all of whose moments claim a fixed actuality and unspiritual subsistence of their own, will dissolve in *pure insight*. As the self *grasping* itself, pure insight completes cultivation. It grasps nothing but the self, and everything as the self. That is, it *comprehends* everything, erases all objectivity, and [1807 433] changes all *being-in-itself* into *being-for-itself*. Directed against faith as the foreign realm of *essence* beyond, it is the *Enlightenment*. In this realm too, where alienated spirit takes refuge in the consciousness of self-equal rest, Enlightenment completes alienation. It disrupts the household that spirit keeps here by bringing in the utensils of the world here below. Spirit cannot deny that these are its property, since its consciousness belongs to this world as well.—In this negative business, pure insight also realizes itself and produces its own object: unknowable *absolute essence* and the *useful*. Actuality has in this way lost all substantiality, and nothing in it is any longer *in itself*. Thus both the realm of faith and that of the real world are over-

thrown. This revolution produces *absolute freedom*. With it, previously alienated spirit has returned completely into itself, leaves this land of cultivation, and passes into another land, the land of *moral consciousness*.

[1807 434]

I. The world of self-alienated spirit.

487 This spirit's world divides into two. The first is the world of actuality, or of its alienation itself. The other is the world it builds for itself in the ether of pure consciousness by rising above the first. Precisely because this second world is *opposed* to that alienation, it is not free from it. Instead, it is only the other form of alienation. Alienation consists precisely in having consciousness in two worlds and encompasses both. What we consider here is therefore not self-consciousness of absolute essence as it is *in and for itself*, not religion, but *faith* insofar as it is *flight* from the actual world and thus does not exist *in and for itself*. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore itself immediately twofold. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit rises. But it is the element not only of *faith* but equally of the *concept*. The two therefore enter together, and faith is considered only in opposition to the concept.

[1807 435]

a. *Cultivation* and its realm of actuality.

488 The spirit of this world is spiritual *essence* permeated by a *self*-consciousness that knows itself to be immediately present as *this being-for-itself*, and knows *essence* as an actuality confronting it. But the existence of this world, like the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on a movement: self-consciousness externalizes its personality, thereby produces its world, and relates to this world as something foreign that it must now take possession of. Yet renouncing its being-for-itself is itself the production of actuality, and through this renunciation it therefore immediately takes possession of actuality.—Or self-consciousness is *something*, has *reality*, only insofar as it alienates itself. Through this, it posits itself as universal, and this universality is its validity and actuality. This *equality* with everyone is therefore not the equality of legal right, not the immediate recognition and validity of self-consciousness simply because it *is*. Rather,

its validity comes through the alienating mediation of having made itself conform to the universal. The spiritless universality of legal right accepts and authorizes every natural form of character and [1807 436] existence. The universality valid here, however, is one that has *come to be*, and for that reason it is *actual*.

489 What gives the individual validity and actuality here is therefore *cultivation*. The individual's true *original nature* and substance is the spirit of *alienation* of *natural* being. This externalization is therefore both the individual's *purpose* and *existence*. It is also the *means*, or *transition*, both of *substance as thought* into *actuality* and, conversely, of *determinate individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality *cultivates* itself into what it is *in itself*. Only through this does it *exist in itself* and have actual existence. It has as much actuality and power as it has cultivation. Although the self here knows itself to be actual as *this* self, its actuality consists solely in sublating the natural self. The originally *determinate* nature is therefore reduced to an *inessential* difference of degree, to a greater or lesser energy of will. But the will's purpose and content belong solely to universal substance itself and can only be universal. A particular nature made into purpose and content is something *powerless* and *unactual*. It is a *type* struggling vainly and ridiculously to put itself into effect. It is the contradiction of giving the particular an actuality that is immediately the universal. If individuality is therefore wrongly placed in the [1807 437] *particularity* of nature and character, then the real world contains no individualities and characters. Instead, individuals have an equal existence for one another. That supposed individuality is only the existence *meant*, which has no permanence in this world, where only what externalizes itself, and thus only the universal, gains actuality.—What is *meant* therefore counts as what it is: a type. Art, "type," is not quite the same as *espèce*, "the most dreadful of all nicknames, for it signifies mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt." But *Art* and being *good of one's type* are German expressions that add to this meaning an

honest-looking air, as though it were not meant so badly. Or they actually do not yet include consciousness of what a type is, and what cultivation and actuality are.

490 What appears, in relation to the single *individual*, as the individual's cultivation is the essential moment of *substance* itself: the immediate passage of its universality as thought into actuality, or its simple soul, through which the *in-itself* is *recognized* and has *existence*. The movement of individuality cultivating itself is therefore immediately its coming-to-be as universal, objective essence: the coming-to-be of the actual world. Although this world has come to be through individuality, for self-consciousness it is something [1807 438] immediately alienated, with the form of an unmoved actuality. Yet self-consciousness is also certain that the world is its substance, and sets out to take possession of it. It gains this power over it through cultivation. From this side, cultivation appears as self-consciousness making itself conform to actuality, as far as the energy of its original character and talent allows. What appears here as the individual's force, under which substance would come and would thereby be sublated, is the same as substance's actualization. For the individual's power consists in conforming to substance: in externalizing its self, and thus positing itself as objectively existing substance. Its cultivation and its own actuality are therefore the actualization of substance itself.

491 The self is actual for itself only as *sublated*. For it, therefore, it does not constitute the unity of *consciousness* of itself and of the object. Instead, the object is its negative.—Through the self as soul, substance therefore develops in its moments so that each opposite animates the other. Through its alienation, each gives the other subsistence and equally receives subsistence from it. At the same time, each moment has its determination as a validity that cannot be overcome and a fixed actuality against the other. Thought fixes this distinction in the most universal [1807 439] way through the absolute opposition of *good* and *bad*. Fleeing one another, these can in no way become the same. But this fixed being has as its soul the immediate passage into its opposite. Existence is instead the reversal of each determination into its opposite, and only this alien-

ation is the essence and preservation of the whole. We must now consider this movement that actualizes and animates the moments. Alienation will alienate itself, and through it the whole will take itself back into its concept.

492 First, we must consider simple substance itself in the immediate organization of its existing, still unanimated moments.—Nature unfolds into universal elements. *Air* is the *enduring*, purely universal, transparent essence. Water is the essence that is always *sacrificed*. *Fire* is their *animating* unity, which constantly dissolves their opposition and equally divides their simplicity into that opposition. Finally, *earth* is the *solid knot* of this articulation and the *subject* of these essences and their process, their departure and return. In the same way, inner *essence*, or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality, unfolds as a world into similar universal but spiritual masses. The *first* is spiritual essence *universal in itself* and *equal to itself*. The other is the essence *existing for itself*, [1807 440] become *unequal* within itself, *sacrificing* and *giving itself up*. The *third*, as self-consciousness, is subject and immediately has within itself the power of fire. In the first essence it is conscious of itself as *being-in-itself*. In the second it has the coming-to-be of *being-for-itself* through the sacrifice of the universal. But spirit itself is the whole's *being-in-and-for-itself*. It *divides* into substance as enduring and substance as self-sacrificing, and equally *takes them back* into its unity, both as the erupting flame that consumes them and as their enduring shape.—We see that these essences correspond to the community and the family of the ethical world, but without possessing their homelike spirit. Yet whereas fate is foreign to that spirit, here self-consciousness is, and knows itself as, the actual power of these essences.

493 These members must be considered both as they are first represented within pure consciousness as *thoughts*, or as *existing in themselves*, and as they are represented in actual consciousness as *objective* essences.—In that simple form, the first, as the *self-equal*, immediate, unchanging *essence* of all consciousness, is the *good*: the independent spiritual power of the *in-itself*, beside which the movement of consciousness existing for itself is only incidental. The other, by contrast, [1807 441] is *passive* spiritual essence, or the universal insofar as it gives

itself up and lets individuals draw from it consciousness of their individuality. It is the null essence, the *bad*.—This absolute dissolution of essence is itself enduring. The first essence is the foundation, starting point, and result of individuals, and they are purely universal within it. The second, by contrast, is on one side self-sacrificing *being for another*, and on the other, precisely for that reason, their constant return to themselves as *individuals* and their enduring *becoming-for-themselves*.

494 But these simple *thoughts* of good and bad are just as immediately alienated from themselves. They are *actual*, present in actual consciousness as *objective* moments. Thus the first essence is *state power*, the other *wealth*.—State power is both simple *substance* and the universal *work*: the absolute *matter itself*, in which individuals have their *essence* expressed and their individuality is nothing but consciousness of their *universality*. It is also the work and simple *result* from which the fact that it comes from their *activity* has disappeared. It remains the absolute foundation and subsistence of all their activity.—Through this determination of unchanging equality with itself, this *simple*, ethereal substance of their life is *being*, and therefore only *being for another*. In itself it is thus immediately its own opposite [1807 442], *wealth*. Although wealth is the passive or null essence, it too is universal spiritual essence. It is both the constantly *emerging result* of everyone's *work* and *activity*, and what dissolves again into everyone's *enjoyment*. In enjoyment, individuality does come to exist *for itself*, or as *individual*. But this enjoyment itself results from universal activity, just as it in turn produces universal labor and everyone's enjoyment. The *actual* simply has the spiritual meaning of being immediately universal. In this moment, every individual does think they are acting *selfishly*. For this is the moment in which individuals give themselves consciousness of existing for themselves, and they therefore do not take it to be spiritual. Yet even viewed externally, it is clear that in their enjoyment each gives everyone something to enjoy; in their labor each works for everyone as much as for them-

selves, and everyone works for them. Their *being-for-itself* is therefore *universal* in itself. Self-interest is something merely intended, unable to make actual what it intends: doing something that would not benefit everyone.

495 In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose. It intuits its double essence in them: its *being-in-itself* in one, its *being-for-itself* in the other.—But as spirit it is also the negative *unity* of their subsistence and of the separation between individuality and the universal, or between [1807 443] actuality and the self. Rule and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects: things from which the individual knows itself *free*, and between which it thinks it can choose, or even choose neither. As this free, *pure* consciousness, it confronts essence as something that exists only *for it*. It then has essence *as essence* within itself.—In this pure consciousness, the moments of substance are not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of *good* and *bad*.—Further, self-consciousness is the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of what is thought to objective essence. It is essentially *judgment*.—The immediate determinations of the two sides of actual essence have already shown which is good and which bad: state power is good, wealth bad. But this first judgment cannot count as a spiritual judgment. For it determines one side only as *being-in-itself*, or positive, and the other only as *being-for-itself* and negative. But as spiritual essences, each is the interpenetration of both moments, and those determinations therefore do not exhaust them. The self-consciousness relating to them exists *in and for itself*. It must therefore relate to each in a twofold way, which will reveal their nature as determinations alienated from themselves.
[1807 444]

496 For self-consciousness, the object in which it finds itself is *good* and exists *in itself*. The object in which it finds its own opposite is bad. The *good* is objective reality's *equality* with it; the *bad* is reality's *inequality* with it. At the same time, what is good and bad *for it* is good and bad *in itself*. For self-consciousness is precisely that in which these two moments—being *in itself* and being *for it*—are the same. It is the actual spirit of objective essences. Judgment demonstrates

its power over them, a power that *makes* them what they are *in themselves*. Their criterion and truth is not how they are immediately *equal* or *unequal* within themselves—that is, abstract being-in-itself or being-for-itself—but what they are in spirit's relation to them: their equality or inequality with spirit. Spirit's *relation* to them, which are initially posited as *objects* and become the *in-itself through spirit*, also becomes their *reflection into themselves*. Through this they acquire actual spiritual being, and what *their spirit* is emerges. But just as their first, *immediate determination* differs from spirit's *relation* to them, so the third, their own spirit, will differ from the second.—Their *second in-itself*, which first emerges through spirit's relation to them, must already turn out differently from their *immediate* in-itself. For this *mediation* by spirit instead moves their *immediate* determination and makes it something else.
[1807 445]

497 Accordingly, consciousness existing *in and for itself* does find in *state power* its *simple essence* and *subsistence* in general, but not its *individuality* as such. It finds its *in-itself*, but not its *being-for-itself*. Instead, it finds activity as individual activity denied and subjected to obedience. Faced with this power, the individual therefore reflects into itself. For it, state power is the oppressive essence and the *bad*: instead of being equal to individuality, it is utterly unequal to it.—*Wealth*, by contrast, is the *good*. It aims at universal enjoyment, gives itself up, and provides everyone with consciousness of their self. *In itself*, it is universal beneficence. If it withholds some benefit or does not accommodate every need, this is a contingency that does not impair its universal, necessary essence: sharing itself with all individuals and being a giver with a thousand hands.

498 These two judgments give the thoughts of good and bad a content opposite to the one they had for us.—But so far self-consciousness has related to its objects only incompletely, using only the standard of *being-for-itself*. Consciousness is equally essence *existing in itself* and must also make this side its standard. Only then is spiritual judgment complete. From this side, *state* [1807 446] *power* expresses its *essence* for it. State power is partly law at rest, partly government and command that orders the individual movements of universal activity. The

former is simple substance itself; the latter is its activity that animates and preserves itself and everyone. In state power, then, the individual finds its ground and essence expressed, organized, and put into action.—Through enjoying *wealth*, by contrast, it does not experience its universal essence. It gains only *transitory* consciousness and enjoyment of itself as an *individuality* existing for itself, and of its *inequality* with its essence.—Here, then, the concepts of good and bad receive the opposite content to their previous one.

499 Each of these two ways of judging finds an *equality* and an *inequality*. The first judging consciousness finds state power *unequal* to itself and the enjoyment of wealth *equal* to itself. The second, conversely, finds the former equal and the latter *unequal* to itself. There is a double *finding-equal* and a double *finding-unequal*: an opposed relation to the two real essentialities.—We must judge this different judging itself, applying the standard we established. According to it, consciousness's relation of *finding-equal* is the *good*, and its relation of finding-unequal is the *bad*. We must now hold these two ways of relating themselves as *different shapes of consciousness* [1807 447]. Because consciousness relates in different ways, it itself falls under the distinction of being good or bad. This does not depend on its having either *being-for-itself* or pure *being-in-itself* as its principle, since both are equally essential moments. The twofold judging we considered presented the principles separately and therefore contains only *abstract* ways of *judging*. Actual consciousness contains both principles. The distinction falls solely within its *essence*: in its *relation* of itself to the real.

500 The ways of relating are opposed. One relates to state power and wealth as something *equal* to itself, the other as something *unequal*.—The consciousness that finds equality in its relation is *noble*. In public power it sees what is equal to itself: it has in public power its *simple essence* and that essence's activity. It stands in a service of actual obedience and inner respect toward it. Likewise, in wealth it sees what provides consciousness of its other essential side, *being-for-itself*. It therefore also regards wealth as *essence* in relation to itself, acknowledges the person from whom it enjoys benefits as a benefactor, and considers itself obliged to be grateful.

501 Consciousness of the other relation, by contrast, is *base*. It holds fast to its *inequality* with [1807 448] both essentialities. In ruling power, it therefore sees a fetter and oppression of *being-for-itself*. It hates the ruler, obeys only with hidden malice, and is always ready to revolt. In wealth, through which it comes to enjoy its being-for-itself, it likewise sees only inequality—inequality with enduring *essence*. For wealth brings it only to consciousness of individuality and transitory enjoyment. It loves wealth but despises it, and when enjoyment disappears—as it inherently does—it also regards its relation to the wealthy person as having disappeared.

502 So far, these relations express only *judgment*: the determination of what the two essences are as *objects* for consciousness, not yet what they are *in and for themselves*. The reflection represented in judgment is, on one side, as yet only *for us* a positing of both determinations and therefore an equal sublation of both. It is not yet their reflection for consciousness itself. On the other side, they *are* as yet only immediate *essences*. They have neither *become* essences nor contain *self*-consciousness. The consciousness for which they exist is not yet what animates them. They are predicates that are not yet themselves subject. Because of this separation, the whole of spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each subject to a one-sided determination.—At first the two sides of alienation were *indifferent* [1807 449] to one another: on one side the *in-itself* of pure consciousness, namely the determinate *thoughts* of good and bad; on the other their *existence* as state power and wealth. This indifference rose to a relation between the two, to *judgment*. Likewise, this external relation must rise to inner unity, or to the relation of thought to actuality. The spirit of the two shapes of judgment must emerge. This happens when *judgment* becomes a *syllogism*, the mediating movement in which the necessity and middle of the two sides of judgment emerge.

503 In judgment, then, noble consciousness finds itself confronting state power. State power is not yet a self, but only universal substance. Yet noble consciousness is conscious of it as its *essence*, its purpose and absolute content. In relating positively to state power in this way, it relates negatively to its own purposes, its

particular content and existence, and lets them disappear. It is the heroism of *service*: the *virtue* that sacrifices individual being to the universal and thereby brings the universal into existence; the *person* who voluntarily renounces possession and enjoyment, and acts and is actual for the existing power.

504 This movement joins the universal with existence in general, just as through this externalization existing consciousness cultivates itself into essentiality. What consciousness alienates in [1807 450] service is its consciousness immersed in existence. But alienated *being* is the *in-itself*. Through this cultivation, it therefore gains respect for itself and among others.—Through the same movement, state power, which was initially only the universal *in thought*, the *in-itself*, becomes the *existing* universal, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience it gains through self-consciousness's *judgment* that state power is *essence*, and through self-consciousness's free sacrifice of itself. This activity, which joins essence with the self, produces a *double* actuality: itself as what has *true* actuality, and state power as *the true* that *has validity*.

505 But through this alienation, state power is not yet a self-consciousness knowing itself as state power. Only its *law*, or its *in-itself*, has validity. It does not yet have a *particular will*. For serving self-consciousness has not yet externalized its pure self and thereby animated state power with it, but only with its being. It has sacrificed only its *existence* to state power, not its *being-in-itself*.—This self-consciousness counts as conforming to *essence*. It is recognized for its *being-in-itself*. Others find their *essence* active in it, but not their being-for-itself. Their thought or pure consciousness is fulfilled, but not their individuality. It therefore has standing in their *thoughts* and [1807 451] enjoys *honor*. It is the *proud* vassal who acts for state power insofar as state power is not a will of its own, but an *essential* will. It values itself only in this *honor*, only in the *essential* representation of general opinion, not in the *grateful* representation of individuality, since it has not helped individuality attain its *being-for-itself*. Its *language*, if it were to relate to state power's own will, which has not yet come to be, would be the *advice* it gives for the universal good.

506 Faced with this advice, state power therefore still lacks a will and does not decide between the different opinions about the universal good. It is not yet *government*, and thus not yet truly actual state power.—*Being-for-itself*, the *will* that has not yet been sacrificed as will, is the inward, secluded spirit of the classes. While speaking of the *universal* good, it reserves its own *particular* good for itself, and is inclined to substitute this chatter about the universal good for action. The sacrifice of existence made in service is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death. But enduring the danger of death and surviving it leaves behind a determinate existence and thus a *particular being-for-itself*. Such a particular being-for-itself makes advice for the universal good ambiguous and suspect. In fact, it reserves its own opinion and particular will against [1807 452] state power. It therefore still relates to state power unequally, and falls under the determination of base consciousness: always ready to rebel.

507 It must sublate this contradiction. The contradiction has the form of *being-for-itself* standing in inequality with the universality of state power. At the same time it has the form that the externalization of existence, when it completes itself in death, is itself an existing externalization, not one returning into consciousness. Consciousness does not survive it and exist *in and for itself*, but merely passes into its unreconciled opposite. The true sacrifice of *being-for-itself* is therefore only one in which it gives itself up as completely as in death, but equally preserves itself in this externalization. Through this it becomes actual as what it is in itself: the identical unity of itself and itself as its opposite. When the secluded inward spirit, the self as such, comes forth and alienates itself, state power is also raised to a self of its own. Without this alienation, the actions of honor, of noble consciousness, and the counsels of its insight would remain ambiguous, still concealing private intention and self-will in that secluded reserve.

508 But this alienation happens only in *language*, which here appears in its distinctive [1807 453] meaning.—As *law* and *command* in the ethical world, and initially as *advice* in the world of actuality, language has *essence* as its content and is essence's form. Here, however, it takes the form that it itself is as its content,

and has validity as *language*. It is the power of speaking as such that accomplishes what must be accomplished. For language is the *existence* of the pure self as self. In it, the *individuality existing for itself* of self-consciousness comes as such into existence, so that it exists *for others*. Otherwise, *I* as this *pure* I am not *there*. In every other expression, the I is immersed in an actuality and in a shape from which it can withdraw. It reflects out of its action, as out of its facial expression, into itself, leaving such incomplete existence—always containing as much too much as too little—lying there without a soul. Language, however, contains the I in its purity. Language alone expresses *I*, the I itself. This *existence* of the I is, as *existence*, an objectivity that bears its true nature. *I* is *this* I, but equally *universal*. Its appearance is just as immediately the externalization and disappearance of *this* I, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The *I* that expresses itself is *heard*. It is a contagion in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it exists and is universal self-consciousness.—In being *heard*, its [1807 454] *existence* itself has immediately *died away*. This otherness has been taken back into itself. And this is precisely its existence: as a self-conscious *now*, not to be there just as it is there, and to be there through this disappearance. This disappearance is therefore itself immediately its remaining. It is its own knowledge of itself, and its knowledge of itself as having passed into another self, having been heard, and being universal.

509 Spirit acquires this actuality here because the extremes whose *unity* it is are also immediately determined as actualities of their own, existing for themselves. Their unity has split into rigid sides, each of which is for the other an actual object excluded from it. Unity therefore emerges as a *middle* excluded and distinguished from the separate actuality of the sides. It thus itself has an actual objectivity different from its sides and exists *for them*: that is, it has existence. *Spiritual substance* comes into existence as such only when it has gained, as its sides, self-consciousnesses that know this pure self as an *immediately valid* actuality, and equally know immediately that it is this only through alienating *mediation*. Through the former, the moments are purified into the category knowing itself, and thereby to the point of being moments of spirit. Through

the latter, spirit enters [1807 455] existence as spirituality.—It is thus the middle that presupposes those extremes and is produced through their existence. But it is equally the spiritual whole erupting between them, dividing itself into them, and only through this contact producing each as a whole in its principle. —The two extremes' already being *in themselves* sublated and dissolved produces their unity. This unity is the movement that joins them together, exchanges their determinations, and joins these determinations together—and does so *in each extreme*. This mediation therefore posits the *concept* of each extreme in its actuality, or makes what each is *in itself* into its *spirit*.

510 Through this, the two extremes—state power and noble consciousness—have been divided. State power has divided into the abstract universal that is obeyed and the will existing for itself, which does not yet itself belong to that universal. Noble consciousness has divided into the obedience of sublated existence, or the *being-in-itself* of self-respect and honor, and pure being-for-itself not yet sublated: the will still kept in reserve. The two moments into which both sides have been purified, and which are therefore moments of language, are the *abstract universal*, called the universal good, and the *pure self* that in service renounced its consciousness immersed in manifold existence. In their concept the two are the same, since the pure [1807 456] self is precisely the abstract universal. Their unity is therefore posited as their middle. But the *self* is so far actual only at the extreme of consciousness, and the *in-itself* only at the extreme of state power. Consciousness lacks state power's having passed over to it not merely as *honor*, but actually. State power lacks being obeyed not merely as the so-called *universal good*, but as will, or being the deciding self. The unity of the concept, in which state power still remains and into which consciousness has purified itself, becomes actual in this *mediating movement*. Its simple existence as the *middle* is language.—Yet language does not yet have two selves, present as *selves*, for its sides. State power is only now being animated into a self. This language is therefore not yet spirit as it fully knows and expresses itself.

511 Because noble consciousness is the extreme of the self, it appears as the source of the *language* through which the sides of the relation take shape as animated wholes.—The heroism of silent service becomes the *heroism* of *flattery*. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual middle that divides itself. It reflects not only its own extreme back into itself, but also the extreme of universal power back into that power itself. It makes [1807 457] this power, which initially exists only *in itself*, into *being-for-itself* and the individuality of self-consciousness. The spirit of this power thereby becomes that of being an *absolute monarch*.—*Absolute*: the language of flattery raises power into its purified *universality*. As a product of language, of existence purified into spirit, this moment is a purified equality with itself.—*Monarch*: language equally raises *individuality* to its summit. On this side of simple spiritual unity, what noble consciousness externalizes is the pure *in-itself of its thought*, its I itself. More precisely, language raises individuality, otherwise only something *meant*, into its existing purity by giving the monarch a proper *name*. For only in the name is the individual's *distinction* from all others not merely *meant*, but made actual by everyone. In the name, the individual *counts* as purely individual not only in their own consciousness, but in everyone's consciousness. Through it, then, the monarch is absolutely separated and singled out from everyone, and alone. In it he is the atom that can communicate nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is therefore the reflection into itself, or *actuality*, that universal power has *within itself*. Through the name it is the *monarch*. Conversely, he, *this individual*, knows *himself, this individual*, [1807 458] to be universal power because the nobles gather around the throne not merely ready to serve state power, but as *ornaments*, and because they are always *telling* its occupant what he *is*.

512 The language of their praise is thus the spirit that joins the two extremes *within state power itself*. It reflects abstract power into itself, gives it the other extreme's moment—willing and deciding *being-for-itself*—and thereby gives it self-conscious existence. Or through this, this *individual, actual* self-consciousness comes to *know itself with certainty* as power. It is the point of the self into

which the many points have flowed together through the externalization of *inner certainty*.—But state power's own spirit consists in having its actuality and nourishment in the sacrifice of noble consciousness's activity and thought. It is therefore *independence alienated from itself*. Noble consciousness, the extreme of *being-for-itself*, receives back the extreme of *actual universality* in exchange for the universality of thought that it externalized. State power has *passed over* to it. Only in noble consciousness is state power truly put into action. In its *being-for-itself*, state power ceases to be the *inert essence* it appeared as at the extreme of abstract being-in-itself.—Considered *in itself*, *state power reflected into itself*, or its having become spirit, means nothing other [1807 459] than its having become a *moment* of *self-consciousness*, that is, existing only as *sublated*. It is now essence whose spirit is to be sacrificed and given away, or it exists as *wealth*.—It does also continue to exist as an actuality opposed to the wealth it is always becoming according to its concept. But its concept is precisely this movement: through the service and reverence by which it comes to be, it passes into its opposite, into the externalization of power. Through noble consciousness's throwing itself away, then, the distinctive *self* that is state power's will becomes, for itself, a universality externalizing itself, a complete individuality and contingency abandoned to every more powerful will. What remains of its *universally* acknowledged and incommunicable independence is the empty name.

513 If noble consciousness defines itself as relating to universal power in an *equal* way, its truth is instead to keep its own being-for-itself in service, while in actually renouncing its personality it is the actual sublation and tearing apart of universal substance. Its spirit is a relation of complete inequality. On one side, in its honor it retains its will. On the other, in giving up that will it both alienates itself from its inner self [1807 460] and becomes supremely unequal to itself, and subjects universal substance to itself, making substance wholly unequal to itself.—It is clear that its determination in *judgment*, as opposed to what was

called base consciousness, has therefore disappeared, and with it base consciousness too. The latter has achieved its purpose: bringing universal power under being-for-itself.

514 Enriched in this way by universal power, self-consciousness exists as *universal beneficence*, or this beneficence is *wealth*, which is itself once again an object for consciousness. For consciousness, wealth is indeed the subjected universal, but through this first sublation the universal has not yet returned absolutely into the self.—The *self* does not yet have *itself as self* as its object, but the *sublated universal essence*. Since this object has only just come to be, an *immediate* relation of consciousness to it is posited. Consciousness has therefore not yet displayed its inequality with it. It is noble consciousness, which receives its being-for-itself from the universal that has become inessential, and therefore acknowledges wealth and is grateful to the benefactor.

515 Wealth already contains the moment of being-for-itself. It is not the universal of state power, which has no self, or spirit's unresisting inorganic nature, but that nature [1807 461] holding fast to itself through will against whoever wants to seize it for enjoyment. But since wealth has only the form of essence, this is one-sided being-for-itself: not the *in-itself*, but rather the sublated in-itself, the individual's inessential return into itself in enjoyment. Wealth therefore needs animation itself. The movement of its reflection consists in its becoming *being-in-and-for-itself* instead of merely being-for-itself; in its becoming essence instead of being sublated essence. It thereby gains its own spirit within itself.—Since the form of this movement was explained earlier, we need only determine its content here.

516 Here, then, noble consciousness relates to the object not as essence in general. Instead, *being-for-itself* itself is foreign to it. It *finds* its self as such already alienated, as an objective, fixed actuality that it must receive from another fixed being-for-itself. Its object is being-for-itself, and thus *its own*. But because it is

an object, it is also immediately a foreign actuality with its own being-for-itself and will. In other words, it sees its self in the power of a foreign will, on which it depends whether that will wishes to hand this self over to it.
[1807 462]

517 Self-consciousness can abstract from any particular aspect. In an obligation concerning such an aspect, it therefore retains its recognition and *validity in itself* as an essence existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself outside itself and belonging to another on the side of its pure, ownmost *actuality*, or its I. It sees its *personality* as such dependent on another's contingent personality, on the chance of a moment, an arbitrary will, or some otherwise utterly indifferent circumstance.—In the legal condition, what lies in the power of objective essence appears as a *contingent content* from which one can abstract. The power does not affect the *self as such*; on the contrary, the self is recognized. But here it sees its certainty of itself as such to be utterly inessential, pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is therefore the feeling both of this deepest degradation and of the deepest rebellion. As the pure I intuits itself outside itself and torn apart, everything that has continuity and universality, everything called law, good, and right, is also torn apart and destroyed in this disruption. Everything equal is dissolved, since the *purest inequality* is present: the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, being-for-itself's being outside itself. The pure I itself is absolutely disintegrated.
[1807 463]

518 This consciousness does receive back from wealth the objectivity of being-for-itself and sublate it. Yet it is not merely incomplete according to its concept, as the previous reflection was, but dissatisfied for itself. In this reflection, since the self receives itself as an object, immediate contradiction is posited within the pure I itself. But as self, it also immediately stands above this contradiction. It is the absolute elasticity that again sublates this sublation of the self. It rejects the degradation of having its being-for-itself come to it as something foreign. Rebelling against receiving itself in this way, it exists *for itself* in the very act of *receiving*.

519 The relation of this consciousness is therefore bound up with this absolute disruption. Within its spirit, the distinction by which it was defined as noble in contrast to *base* consciousness disappears, and the two are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can also be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness receiving the benefit, and must be considered separately.—It was inessential being-for-itself, essence given away. But through sharing itself it becomes the *in-itself*. By fulfilling its determination to sacrifice itself, it sublates the individuality of enjoying only for itself. As sublated individuality, it is *universality*, or *essence*.—What it shares, what it gives others, is *being-for-itself*. But it [1807 464] does not give itself up as nature with no self, as the unresisting condition of life freely offering itself. It gives itself as self-conscious essence that holds onto itself for itself. It is not the inorganic power of the element, known by the receiving consciousness as inherently perishable. Instead, it is power over the self, knowing itself to be *independent* and *arbitrary*, and also knowing that what it distributes is another's self.—Wealth therefore shares the client's degradation, but arrogance takes the place of rebellion. On one side, like the client, it knows *being-for-itself* as a contingent *thing*. But it is itself this contingency in whose power personality lies. In this arrogance, it thinks it has maintained another I-self through a meal and thereby gained the subjection of that self's innermost essence. It overlooks the other's inward rebellion. It overlooks the complete throwing off of every fetter, this pure disruption, for which everything equal and everything stable is torn apart, since the *self-equality* of being-for-itself has become utterly unequal to it. This disruption therefore tears apart the benefactor's opinion and view most of all. Wealth stands immediately before this innermost abyss, this bottomless depth in which all support and substance have disappeared. Yet in this depth it sees only an ordinary thing, a plaything of its [1807 465] mood, a chance event of its arbitrary will. Its spirit is to be utterly inessential opinion, the surface abandoned by spirit.

520 Self-consciousness had its language toward state power, or spirit emerged as an actual middle between these extremes. Likewise, it has language toward wealth, and still more its rebellion has its language. The language that gives wealth con-

sciousness of its essentiality, and thereby takes possession of it, is also the language of flattery, but ignoble flattery. For what it expresses as essence it knows to be essence given away, not existing *in itself*. But as already noted, the language of flattery is still one-sided spirit. Its moments are indeed the *self*, purified into pure existence through the cultivation of service, and the *being-in-itself* of power. Yet the consciousness of this language does not contain the pure concept in which the simple *self* and the *in-itself*, that pure I and this pure essence or thought, are the same. It does not contain this unity of the two sides between which interaction occurs. For it, the object is still the *in-itself* opposed to the self. Or the *object* is not also its own *self* as such.—The language of disruption, however, is complete language and the true existing spirit of this whole world of cultivation. This self-consciousness, characterized [1807 466] by a rebellion that rejects its degradation, is immediately absolute equality with itself in absolute disruption: the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the equality of the judgment of identity in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this judgment of identity is also infinite. For this personality is absolutely divided, and subject and predicate are utterly *indifferent existing beings* that have nothing to do with one another and no necessary unity. Indeed, each is the power of a personality of its own. *Being-for-itself* has *its being-for-itself* as its object, as something utterly *other* and also just as immediately as *itself*: itself as an other. This other does not have a different content. Rather, the content is the same self in the form of absolute opposition and an indifferent existence that is completely its own.—Here, then, the spirit of this real world of cultivation is present, *conscious* of itself in its truth and of its *concept*.

521 It is this absolute, universal reversal and alienation of actuality and thought: *pure cultivation*. What is experienced in this world is that neither the *actual essences* of power and wealth, nor their determinate *concepts*, good and bad, nor consciousness of good and bad, noble and base consciousness, possess truth. Instead, all these [1807 467] moments turn into one another, and each is its own opposite.—Universal power, which is *substance*, attains its own spirituality

through the principle of individuality. Yet it receives its own self only as the name attached to it, and when it is *actual* power it is instead the powerless essence that sacrifices itself.—But this surrendered essence without a self, or the self become a thing, is instead essence's return into itself. It is *being-for-itself existing for itself*, the existence of spirit.—The *thoughts* of these essences, of *good* and *bad*, are likewise reversed in this movement. What is defined as good is bad; what is defined as bad is good. Consciousness of each moment, judged as noble and base consciousness, is in its truth equally the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to be. Noble consciousness is just as base and degraded as degradation turns into the nobility of self-consciousness's most cultivated freedom.—Formally considered, everything is likewise *outwardly* the reverse of what it is *for itself*. And what it is for itself is not what it truly is, but something different from what it wants to be. Being-for-itself is instead the loss of itself, and alienation of itself is instead self-preservation.—What is present, then, is this: all moments exercise a universal justice [1807 468] upon one another. Each is as much alienated within itself as it forms itself into its opposite and thereby reverses that opposite.—But true spirit is precisely this unity of the absolutely separated. It comes into existence itself as their middle precisely through the *free actuality* of these extremes *without a self*. Its existence is universal *speaking* and a *judging* that tears apart. In this judging all those moments that are supposed to count as essences and actual members of the whole dissolve, while judging is itself equally this self-dissolving play with itself. This judging and speaking is therefore what is true and unconquerable, while conquering everything: what this real world is *truly and solely* concerned with. Each part of this world reaches the point where its spirit is expressed, or where it is spoken of with wit and what it is gets said.—Honest consciousness takes each moment as an enduring essentiality. It is the uncultivated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it equally does the reverse. Disrupted consciousness, however, is consciousness of reversal, and indeed of absolute reversal. The concept rules within it, bringing together thoughts that lie far apart for honesty. Its language is therefore witty.

522 The content of spirit's speech of and about itself is therefore the reversal of all concepts and [1807 469] realities, the universal deception of itself and others. Precisely for that reason, the shamelessness of declaring this deception is the greatest truth. This speech is the madness of the musician "who piled up and mixed thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every sort of character. Now he descended to hell in a deep bass, then tightened his throat and tore through the heights of the air with a falsetto, by turns raging, soothed, commanding, and mocking."—To tranquil consciousness, which honestly places the melody of the good and true in the equality of tones, that is, in a single note, this speech appears as "a rambling of wisdom and madness, a mixture of as much skill as baseness, of ideas as correct as they are false, of as complete a perversion of feeling and as perfect a disgrace as of total openness and truth. It will be unable to refuse to enter into all these tones and run up and down the whole scale of feelings, from the deepest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion. A ridiculous trait will be blended into the latter, robbing them of their nature." The former feelings will have, in their very openness, a reconciling trait, and in their shattering depth the all-powerful trait that gives spirit to itself.
[1807 470]

523 Against the speech of this confusion clear to itself, consider the speech of that *simple consciousness* of the true and good. Faced with the open, self-conscious eloquence of the spirit of cultivation, it can only be monosyllabic. For it can tell this spirit nothing that spirit does not itself know and say. If it goes beyond its monosyllables, it therefore says the same thing spirit expresses, but also commits the folly of thinking it says something new and different. Even its syllables, *disgraceful, base*, already amount to this folly, since spirit says them about itself. In its speech, this spirit reverses everything monotonous, since such self-equality is only an abstraction and in its actuality is reversal within itself. Straightforward consciousness, by contrast, defends the good and noble—that is, what remains equal to itself in its expression—in the only way possible here: by saying that it does not lose its worth because it is *connected* or *mixed* with the

bad, since this is its *condition* and *necessity*, and nature's *wisdom* lies in this. In thinking it contradicts spirit, this consciousness has merely summed up the content of spirit's speech in a trivial way. Thoughtlessly making the *opposite* of the noble and good into the *condition* and *necessity* of the noble and good, it thinks it says something other than that what is called noble and [1807 471] good is in its essence its own reverse, just as, conversely, the bad is the excellent.

524 Suppose simple consciousness replaces this spiritless *thought* with the *actuality* of excellence by presenting it in an *example*, a fictional case or a true anecdote, thereby showing that excellence is no empty name but *exists*. Against it stands the *universal* actuality of the whole real world's reversed activity. Within this, that example is therefore only something wholly isolated, an *espèce*. To present the existence of the good and noble as an isolated anecdote, whether fictional or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said about it.—Finally, suppose simple consciousness demands the dissolution of this entire world of reversal. It cannot demand that the *individual* withdraw from it, for Diogenes in his barrel is conditioned by it. The demand made of the individual is precisely what counts as bad: caring *for oneself* as an *individual*. Directed toward universal *individuality*, however, the demand for this withdrawal cannot mean that reason should again give up the spiritually cultivated consciousness it has attained, sink the wide-ranging wealth of its moments back into the simplicity of the natural heart, and fall back into the wilderness and proximity to animal consciousness, [1807 472] which is called nature and also innocence. Rather, the demand for this dissolution can be directed only to the *spirit* of cultivation itself: that it return to itself from its confusion as *spirit* and gain a still higher consciousness.

525 In fact, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. Consciousness's self-conscious, self-expressing disruption is mocking laughter at existence, at the confusion of the whole, and at itself. At the same time, it is the dying away of this whole confusion, still hearing itself.—This vanity of all actuality and every determinate concept, hearing itself, is the real world's double reflection into itself: first into *this self* of consciousness as *this* self, and second into its pure *universality*, or into thought. From the first side, spirit that has come to itself

looks into the world of actuality and still has that world as its purpose and immediate content. From the other side, its gaze is partly turned only inward and negatively against the world, and partly away from the world toward heaven, with the world's beyond as its object.

526 On that side of the return into the self, the *vanity* of all *things* is spirit's *own vanity*, or spirit *is* vain. It is the self existing for itself that knows not only how to judge and chatter about everything, but how to express wittily the fixed essences of actuality [1807 473] and the fixed determinations posited by judgment in their *contradiction*. This contradiction is their truth.—Considered formally, it knows everything as alienated from itself: *being-for-itself* separated from *being-in-itself*; what is meant and intended separated from truth; and *being for another* separated from both—what is professed separated from the actual meaning, the true matter and intention.—It therefore knows how to express each moment correctly against the other, and the reversal of them all in general. Whatever something may be determined as, it knows better what it is than that thing itself is. It knows the substantial on the side of the *discord* and *conflict* that it unites within itself, but not on the side of this unity. It therefore knows very well how to *judge* the substantial, but has lost the ability to *grasp* it. —This vanity also needs the vanity of all things to give itself consciousness of the self through them. It therefore produces their vanity itself and is the soul sustaining it. Power and wealth are the highest purposes of its effort. It knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it cultivates itself into the universal, comes to possess the universal, and in this possession has universal validity. Power and wealth are the actual, acknowledged powers. But this validity of its own is itself vain. Precisely in taking possession of them, it knows them not to be essential selves, but instead knows itself as their power and them as vain. It presents its being outside them even [1807 474] while possessing them in witty language, which is therefore its highest interest and the truth of the whole. In this language, *this* self—as this pure self belonging neither to actual nor to thought determinations—becomes for itself spiritual, truly universally valid. It *is* the self-disrupting nature of all relations and their conscious disruption. But

only as rebellious self-consciousness does it know its own disruption, and in knowing it, it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity all content becomes negative, no longer capable of being grasped positively. The positive object is only the *pure I itself*, and disrupted consciousness is *in itself* this pure self-equality of self-consciousness returned into itself.

b. Faith and pure insight.

527 The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of cultivation. But once this whole has become alienated from itself, beyond it stands the unactual world *of pure consciousness*, or of *thought*. Its content is what is purely thought; thought is its absolute element. But since thought is initially the *element* of this world, consciousness merely *has* these thoughts, [1807 475] without yet *thinking* them or knowing that they are thoughts. Instead, for it they have the form of *representation*. For consciousness passes from actuality into pure consciousness, but is itself still generally within actuality's sphere and determination. Disrupted consciousness is as yet only *in itself* the *self-equality* of pure consciousness: for us, not for itself. It is therefore only an *immediate* elevation, not yet completed within itself. It still contains its opposite principle, by which it is conditioned, without having mastered it through a mediating movement. The essence of its thought therefore does not count for it as *essence* merely in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of *ordinary actuality*: an actuality raised into another element without losing there the determination of an actuality not thought.—It must be essentially distinguished from the *in-itself* that is the essence of *Stoic* consciousness. For Stoic consciousness, only the *form of thought* as such had validity, with some content foreign to it, taken from actuality. For this consciousness, however, it is not the *form of thought* that has validity. It must likewise be distinguished from the *in-itself* of virtuous consciousness. For virtuous consciousness, essence does relate to actuality and is the essence of actuality itself, but is as yet only unactual essence. For the consciousness here, essence counts as actual essence, even though beyond [1807 476] actuality. Likewise, the right and good in themselves of lawgiving reason, and the universal of consciousness testing laws, do not have the determination of

actuality.—If, therefore, within the world of cultivation itself, pure thought fell as one side of alienation, as the standard of abstract good and bad in judging, then, having passed through the movement of the whole, it has been enriched by the moment of actuality and thus of content. Yet this actuality of essence is also only an actuality of *pure*, not *actual*, consciousness. Though raised into the element of thought, it does not yet count as a thought for this consciousness. Rather, it lies beyond consciousness's own actuality, because the former is the flight from the latter.

528 Here *religion*—for clearly this is what is being discussed—appears as the faith of the world of cultivation, not yet as it is *in and for itself*.—It has already appeared to us in other determinations: as *unhappy consciousness*, as a shape of the unsubstantial movement of consciousness itself.—In ethical substance too, it appeared as faith in the underworld. But consciousness of the departed spirit is not properly *faith*. It is not essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond actual consciousness. Instead, the departed spirit itself has [1807 477] immediate presence; its element is the family.—Here, however, religion has, on one side, emerged from *substance* and is pure consciousness of it. On the other, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, *essence* from its *existence*. Religion is therefore no longer the unsubstantial movement of consciousness, but still has the determination of opposition to actuality as *this* in general, and to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular. It is therefore essentially only a *faith*.

529 This *pure consciousness* of absolute essence is *alienated*. We must examine more closely how that of which it is the other determines itself, and consider pure consciousness only in connection with it. At first, this pure consciousness seems to confront only the *world* of actuality. But since it is flight from that world, and thus the *determination* of *opposition*, it contains this determination within itself. Pure consciousness is therefore essentially alienated within itself, and faith constitutes only one of its sides. The other side has already arisen for us as well. Pure consciousness is reflection out of the world of cultivation in such a way that its substance, and the constituent bodies into which it articu-

lates itself, have shown themselves as what they are in themselves: *spiritual* essentialities, absolutely restless movements or determinations that immediately sublate themselves in their opposites. Their essence, simple [1807 478] consciousness, is therefore the simplicity of *absolute distinction*, which is immediately no distinction. It is thus pure *being-for-itself*, not that of *this individual*, but the self *universal* within itself as a restless movement attacking and penetrating the *tranquil essence* of *the matter*. Within it there is therefore the certainty that immediately knows itself as truth: pure thought as the *absolute concept* in the power of its *negativity*. This negativity destroys every objective essence supposed to confront consciousness and makes it a being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is also equally *simple*, precisely because its distinction is no distinction. As this form of simple reflection into itself, however, it is the element of faith. In faith, spirit has the determination of *positive universality*, of *being-in-itself*, against that being-for-itself of self-consciousness.—Driven back into itself from the inessential world that merely dissolves, spirit is in truth, in undivided unity, both the *absolute movement* and *negativity* of its appearance and its inwardly *satisfied* essence and positive *rest*. But since it lies generally under the determination of *alienation*, these two moments separate as a doubled consciousness. The former is *pure insight*: the spiritual *process* gathering itself together in *self*-consciousness. It confronts and opposes consciousness of the positive, the form of objectivity [1807 479] or representation. Its own object, however, is only the *pure I*.—Simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil equality with itself, by contrast, has inner *essence* as essence for its object. Pure insight therefore initially has no content within itself, since it is negative being-for-itself. Faith, by contrast, possesses content without insight. Pure insight does not move beyond self-consciousness. Faith too has its content in the element of pure self-consciousness, but in *thought*, not in *concepts; in pure consciousness, not in pure self-consciousness*. It is thus indeed pure consciousness of *essence*, that is, of the *simple inward*, and therefore *is* thought. This is the chief moment in faith's nature, usually overlooked. The *immediacy* with which essence is present in faith consists in its object being *essence*, that is, *pure thought*. But when *thought* enters *consciousness*, or pure consciousness enters

self-consciousness, this *immediacy* acquires the meaning of an objective *being* beyond consciousness of the self. Through this meaning that the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thought* acquire in *consciousness*, the *essence* of faith falls from thought into *representation* and becomes a supersensible world, essentially an *other* of self-consciousness [1807 480].—In pure insight, by contrast, the passage of pure thought into consciousness has the opposite determination. Objectivity has the meaning of a merely negative content that sublates itself and returns into the self. That is, only the self is properly its object, or the object has truth only insofar as it has the form of the self.

530 Just as faith and pure insight both belong to the element of pure consciousness, they are also both the return from the actual world of cultivation. They therefore present themselves from three sides. First, each exists *in and for itself*, apart from every relation. Second, each relates to the *actual* world opposed to pure consciousness. Third, each relates to the other within pure consciousness.

531 In *believing* consciousness, the side of *being-in-and-for-itself* is its absolute object, whose content and determination have emerged. For according to the concept of faith, this object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the real world therefore also constitutes the organization of this other world. The difference is that here the parts, in becoming spiritual, do not alienate themselves. Instead, they are essences existing in and for themselves, spirits returned into themselves and remaining at home with themselves.—The movement [1807 481] of their transition is therefore only for us an alienation of the determination in which they differ, and only for us a *necessary* series. For faith, however, their distinction is a tranquil diversity and their movement an *event*.

532 To name them briefly according to the external determination of their form: just as state power, or the good, was first in the world of cultivation, here too the first is *absolute essence*, spirit existing in and for itself insofar as it is simple, eternal *substance*. But in realizing its concept of being spirit, substance passes over into *being for another*. Its self-equality becomes *actual, self-sacrificing*

absolute essence. It becomes a *self*, but a transitory self. The third is therefore the return of this alienated self and humbled substance into their original simplicity. Only in this way is substance represented as spirit.—

533 Taken back into themselves by thought from the changing actual world, these differentiated essences are unchanging, eternal spirits whose being is to think the unity they constitute. Although removed from self-consciousness in this way, these essences nevertheless intervene in it. If essence remained unmoved in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain foreign to self-consciousness. But the externalization of this substance, and then its spirit, contain the moment of actuality and thereby take part in [1807 482] believing self-consciousness. Or believing consciousness belongs to the real world.

534 In this second relation, believing consciousness partly has its own actuality in the real world of cultivation and constitutes that world's spirit and existence, which we have considered. But it also confronts this actuality of its own as something vain, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in having a witty consciousness of the world's reversal. For believing consciousness is simple consciousness, which counts wit as vain because wit still has the real world as its purpose. Instead, actuality confronts the tranquil realm of its thought as a spiritless existence that must therefore be overcome externally. By sublating sensuous knowledge and activity, this obedience of service and praise produces consciousness of unity with essence existing in and for itself. Yet it does not produce unity as intuited, actual unity. This service is only a continual production that does not fully achieve its goal in the present. The congregation does attain this unity, since it is universal self-consciousness. But for individual self-consciousness, the realm of pure thought necessarily remains beyond its actuality. Or, insofar as this realm has entered actuality through the externalization of eternal essence, it is an uncomprehended [1807 483] sensuous actuality. But one sensuous actuality remains indifferent to another, and the beyond has merely acquired the additional determination of distance in

space and time.—The concept, however, spirit's actuality present to itself, remains in believing consciousness the *inward* that is and effects everything, but does not itself emerge.

535 In *pure insight*, however, the concept is the only actual thing. This third side of faith—being an object for pure insight—is the proper relation in which faith appears here.—Pure insight itself must likewise be considered partly in and for itself, partly in relation to the actual world insofar as it still exists positively as vain consciousness, and finally in that relation to faith.

536 We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself. Just as faith is the tranquil, pure *consciousness* of spirit as *essence*, pure insight is spirit's *self*-consciousness. It therefore knows essence not as *essence* but as absolute *self*. It thus aims to sublate every independence *other* than self-consciousness, whether that of the actual or of what exists *in itself*, and to make it into the *concept*. It is not merely the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth. It *knows* that it is this. [1807 484]

537 But as its concept appears, it is not yet *realized*. Its consciousness therefore still appears as a *contingent, individual* consciousness, and what is essence for it appears as a *purpose* it must actualize. At first it has only the *intention* of making *pure insight universal*: of making everything actual into the concept, and into a concept in every self-consciousness. The intention is *pure*, since its content is pure insight. This insight is equally *pure*, since its content is only the absolute concept, which has no opposition in an object and is not limited within itself. The unlimited concept immediately contains both sides: everything objective is to have only the meaning of *being-for-itself*, of self-consciousness; and self-consciousness is to have the meaning of being *universal*, so that pure insight becomes the property of every self-consciousness. This second side of the intention is a result of cultivation insofar as cultivation has destroyed both the distinctions of objective spirit—the parts and judgment-determinations of its world—and the distinctions appearing as originally determinate natures. Genius, talent, and particular abilities in general belong to the world of

actuality insofar as it still has the side of being a spiritual animal kingdom, fighting and deceiving over the essences of the real world in mutual violence and confusion.—Within it, these distinctions [1807 485] do not have a place as honest specimens. Individuality is not content with the unactual *matter itself*, nor does it have a *particular* content and purposes of its own. Instead, it counts only as something universally valid, namely as cultivated. Difference is reduced to lesser or greater energy: a difference of *magnitude*, that is, an inessential one. But this last diversity has perished when, in consciousness's complete disruption, difference turned into an absolutely qualitative difference. What is other to the I there is only the I itself. In this infinite judgment, all one-sidedness and peculiarity of original being-for-itself are erased. The self knows that it is its own object as pure self. This absolute equality of the two sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is therefore simple *essence* without distinction within itself, and equally the universal *work* and universal possession. In this *simple* spiritual substance, self-consciousness both gives itself and preserves in every object consciousness of *this* individuality of its own, or of *activity*. Conversely, its individuality is *equal to itself* and universal within this substance.—Pure insight is therefore the spirit that calls to *every* consciousness: *be for yourselves* what you all are *in yourselves—rational*.

[1807 486]

II. *The Enlightenment*.

538 The specific object against which pure insight directs the power of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness confronting it within the same element. But pure insight also relates to the actual world, since, like faith, it is the return from that world into pure consciousness. We must first see the character of its activity against that world's impure intentions and distorted insights.

539 We have already mentioned the tranquil consciousness that confronts this whirlpool dissolving and producing itself again. It constitutes the side of pure insight and intention. But as we saw, this tranquil consciousness contains no *particular insight* into the world of cultivation. Instead, that world itself has the most painful feeling and truest insight about itself: the feeling of being the dis-

solution of everything that establishes itself, broken on the wheel through every moment of its existence and shattered in every bone. It is equally the language of this feeling and the judging, [1807 487] witty speech about every side of its condition. Pure insight can therefore have no activity or content of its own here. It can relate only as the formal, faithful *apprehension* of the world's own witty insight and its language. This language is scattered; its judging is a moment's rambling, immediately forgotten again, and a whole only for a third consciousness. As *pure* insight, this third consciousness can therefore distinguish itself only by gathering those scattered traits into a universal picture, and then making them everyone's insight.

540 By this simple means, pure insight will bring this world's confusion to dissolution. For it has become clear that the essence of this actuality does not lie in its constituent bodies or determinate concepts and individualities. Instead, it has its substance and support only in spirit existing as judging and discussing. The interest in having a content for this reasoning and chatter alone preserves the whole and the bodies of its articulation. In this language of insight, its self-consciousness is still for itself *this individual existing for itself*. But the vanity of the content is also the vanity of the self that knows the content to be vain. Tranquilly apprehending consciousness now collects from all this witty chatter of vanity the most striking formulations, the ones that cut through to the matter. Thus, along with the [1807 488] rest of existence's vanity, the soul that still preserves the whole perishes: the vanity of witty judging. The collection shows most people a wit better than their own, or at least shows everyone a more varied wit. It shows knowing better and judging in general as something universal and now universally known. The only remaining interest thereby erases itself, and individual insight dissolves into universal insight. Yet above vain knowledge, knowledge of essence still stands firm. Pure insight first appears in its proper activity when it turns against faith.

a. The Enlightenment's *struggle* with superstition.

541 The different ways consciousness relates negatively—skepticism, theoretical idealism, and practical idealism—are subordinate shapes compared with *pure insight* and its spread, the *Enlightenment*. For pure insight is born from substance, knows the pure *self* of consciousness as absolute, and takes its stand together with pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Faith and [1807 489] insight are the same pure consciousness, but are opposed in form. For faith, essence is *thought*, not *concept*, and is therefore utterly opposed to *self*-consciousness. For pure insight, essence is the *self*. Each is therefore for the other the other's sheer negative.—As they confront one another, faith possesses all *content*, since in its tranquil element of thought every moment gains subsistence. Pure insight, by contrast, initially has no content and is instead content's pure disappearance. But through its negative movement against what is negative to it, it will realize itself and give itself a content.

542 It knows faith as opposed to itself, to reason and truth. In general, it sees faith as a web of superstition, prejudices, and errors. For it, consciousness of this content further organizes itself into a realm of error. Within this, false insight exists first as the *universal mass* of consciousness, immediate, trusting, and without reflection into itself. But false insight also contains the moment of reflection into itself, or self-consciousness, separated from that trusting innocence: an insight and evil intention remaining for itself in the background, by which the mass is deceived. This mass is the victim of fraud by a *priesthood*, which carries out its jealous vanity of keeping insight exclusively to itself, [1807 490] along with its other self-interest. At the same time, the priesthood conspires with *despotism*. As the synthetic unity, without concept, of the real realm and this ideal realm—a strangely inconsistent essence—despotism stands above both the crowd's bad insight and the priests' bad intention, while also combining both within itself. Through the deceitful priesthood, it takes advantage of the people's stupidity and confusion, despising both, to rule undisturbed and satisfy its desires and arbitrary will. Yet at the same time, it is itself the same dullness of insight, the same superstition and error.

543 The Enlightenment does not engage these three sides of the enemy indiscriminately. Its essence is pure insight, the *universal* in and for itself. Its true relation to the other extreme therefore seeks what is *common* and *equal* in both. The side of *individuality* that isolates itself from universal, trusting consciousness is opposed to enlightenment and cannot be touched by it immediately. The will of the deceitful priesthood and the oppressive despot is therefore not the immediate object of its activity. Rather, its object is insight without will, not individualized into being-for-itself: the *concept* of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the mass but is not yet present there as concept. But [1807 491] by tearing this honest insight and its trusting essence away from prejudices and errors, pure insight wrests from evil intention the reality and power of its deception. Its realm has its *ground* and *material* in the mass's universal consciousness without concept, just as *being-for-itself* has its *substance* in *simple* consciousness in general.

544 Pure insight's relation to the trusting consciousness of absolute essence now has two sides. On one side, it is *in itself* the same as this consciousness. On the other, within the simple element of its thought, this consciousness lets absolute essence and its parts freely give themselves subsistence. It lets them count only as its *in-itself*, and thus objectively, while denying its *being-for-itself* within this in-itself.—According to the first side, this faith is *in itself*, for pure insight, pure *self*-consciousness, and needs only to become this *for itself*. In this concept of faith, pure insight therefore has the element in which it realizes itself in place of false insight.

545 From this side—that both are essentially the same and pure insight's relation takes place through and within the same element—its communication is *immediate*, and its giving and receiving an undisturbed flowing together. Whatever other stakes may have been driven into consciousness, it is *in itself* this simplicity [1807 492] in which everything is dissolved, forgotten, and unguarded, and which is therefore absolutely receptive to the concept. Communicating pure insight can consequently be compared to a tranquil expansion, or to the *spread* of a fragrance through an unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating infection

that does not first announce itself as something opposed to the indifferent element into which it slips, and therefore cannot be warded off. Only after the infection has spread does it *exist for consciousness*, which had surrendered to it without concern. For consciousness received into itself a simple essence equal both to itself and to consciousness, but also the simplicity of *negativity* reflected into itself. This negativity subsequently unfolds, according to its nature, as something opposed, thereby reminding consciousness of its former way of being. It is the concept: simple knowing that knows itself and also its opposite, but knows this opposite as sublated within itself. Thus, once pure insight exists for consciousness, it has already spread. The struggle against it betrays that the infection has occurred. The struggle is too late, and every remedy only worsens the disease. For it has seized the marrow of spiritual life: consciousness in its concept, or its pure essence itself. There is therefore no power within consciousness superior to it. Because it is in essence itself, its still [1807 493] isolated expressions can be driven back and its superficial symptoms subdued. This is highly advantageous to it. It now neither wastes its power uselessly nor shows itself unworthy of its essence, as it does when it breaks out in symptoms and isolated eruptions against faith's content and the connections of faith's external actuality. Instead, now an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it creeps right through the vital organs. Soon it has thoroughly taken possession of every organ and limb of the unconscious idol, and "on *one fine morning* it nudges its companion with an elbow, and bang! Crash! The idol lies on the ground."—On *one fine morning*, whose noon is not bloody, if the infection has penetrated every organ of spiritual life. Memory alone then preserves the dead way of spirit's former shape as a history that has passed away, no one knows how. In this way, the new serpent of wisdom, raised up for worship, has merely shed a withered skin without pain.

546 But this silent weaving onward of spirit within the simple interior of its substance, hiding its activity from itself, is only one side of pure insight's realization. Its spread does not consist merely in like joining like, and its actualization is not merely an expansion without opposition. Rather, the activity of [1807

494] negative essence is just as essentially a developed movement differentiating itself within itself. As conscious activity, it must set out its moments in determinate, manifest existence, and must be present as loud noise and violent struggle against the opposed as such.

547 We must therefore see how *pure insight* and *intention* relate *negatively* to the other, opposed to them, that they find already present.—Since their concept is all essentiality and nothing exists outside them, pure insight and intention relating negatively can be only the negative of themselves. As insight, pure insight thus becomes the negative of pure insight: untruth and unreason. As intention, it becomes the negative of pure intention: lying and impurity of purpose.

548 It entangles itself in this contradiction by entering into conflict and thinking it is fighting something *other*.—It merely thinks this, for its essence as absolute negativity consists in containing otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category: knowing and the *object* of knowing are the same. What pure insight expresses as its other, as error or a lie, can therefore be nothing other than itself. It can condemn only what it is. What is not rational has no *truth*, or what is not comprehended *does not exist*. When reason speaks of something *other* [1807 495] than itself, it therefore in fact speaks only of itself. It does not move outside itself.—This struggle with its opposite consequently also has the meaning of being its *actualization*. Its actualization consists precisely in the movement of developing its moments and taking them back into itself. One part of this movement is the differentiation in which comprehending insight confronts itself as *object*. As long as it remains in this moment, it is alienated from itself. As pure insight, it has no *content* at all. The movement of its realization consists in *itself* becoming its content. No other content can become its own, because it is the self-consciousness of the category. But at first, in opposing this content to itself, it knows it only as *content*, not yet as itself, and so fails to recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore means recognizing as its own the content that is initially objective for it. Its result will thus be neither the restoration of the errors it fights nor merely its original concept. It will be an

insight recognizing the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as itself: its concept recognizing itself.—The nature of the Enlightenment's struggle with errors—to fight itself in them and condemn in them what it affirms—is *for us*, or is what enlightenment and its struggle are *in themselves*. The first side [1807 496] of this struggle, however, is its contamination by taking negative relating into its self-equal *purity*. This is how it is an *object for faith*, which therefore experiences it as lying, unreason, and bad intention, just as faith is error and prejudice for enlightenment.—Regarding its content, enlightenment is initially empty insight whose content appears to it as an other. It therefore *finds* this content in faith as something not yet its own, an existence completely independent of it.

549 At first, and in general, enlightenment therefore grasps its object by taking it as *pure insight*. Failing to recognize itself, it thus declares the object to be error. In *insight* as such, consciousness grasps an object so that it becomes for consciousness the essence of consciousness, or an object consciousness penetrates, within which it preserves itself, remains at home with itself and present to itself. Since consciousness is thus the object's movement, it produces the object. Enlightenment correctly describes faith as precisely this when it says that faith's absolute essence is a being of its own consciousness, its own thought, something produced by consciousness. It thereby declares faith to be error and fiction about the very thing enlightenment itself is.—Enlightenment wants to teach faith this new wisdom, but tells it nothing new. For faith's object is precisely [1807 497] this: the pure essence of its own consciousness. Consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated within it, but instead trusts it. This means precisely that *within it* consciousness finds itself *as this* consciousness, or as *self*-consciousness. The *certainty of self* of someone I trust is for me the *certainty of myself*. I recognize my being-for-myself in that person: that they acknowledge it and that it is their purpose and essence. But trust is faith, because its consciousness *relates immediately* to its object and therefore also intuits that it is *one* with it, within it.—Further, when my object is that in which I recognize myself, I am also present to myself there as an *other* self-con-

sciousness in general. That is, it is a self-consciousness that has been alienated there from its particular individuality, its natural character and contingency. Yet it partly remains self-consciousness there, and partly is, precisely there, *essential* consciousness, like pure insight.—The concept of insight includes more than consciousness recognizing itself in the object it understands and having itself *immediately* within that object, without leaving what is thought and only then returning into itself. Consciousness is also conscious of itself as the *mediating* movement, or of itself as *activity*, as production. Through this, the unity of itself as *self* and the object exists *for it* in thought.—Faith too is precisely this consciousness. *Obedience* [1807 498] *and activity* are a necessary moment through which certainty of being within absolute essence comes about. This activity of faith does not indeed appear to produce absolute essence itself. But faith's absolute essence is essentially not *abstract* essence located beyond believing consciousness. It is the spirit of the congregation, the unity of abstract essence and self-consciousness. In its being this spirit of the congregation, the congregation's activity is an essential moment. It is this spirit *only through production* by consciousness—or rather, *not without* being produced by consciousness. For production is essential, but it is just as essential that it is not the sole ground of essence. It is only a moment. Essence also exists in and for itself.

550 From the other side, the concept of pure insight is to itself an *other* as its object, since precisely this negative determination constitutes the object. From the other side, then, enlightenment also describes faith's essence as something *foreign* to self-consciousness, not *its* essence, but a changeling slipped into its place. But here enlightenment is completely foolish. Faith experiences it as speech that does not know what it is saying and does not understand the matter when it talks about priestly fraud and deception of the people. [1807 499] It speaks as though some hocus-pocus of conjuring priests had substituted something absolutely *foreign* and *other* as essence for consciousness. At the same time, it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, trusts it, and seeks its favor. That is, consciousness intuits in it both *its pure* essence and *its* individual and universal *individuality*, and through its

activity produces this unity of itself with its essence. Enlightenment immediately describes as consciousness's *ownmost* what it describes as *foreign* to consciousness.—How, then, can it speak of fraud and deception? By itself *immediately* saying the opposite of what it asserts about faith, it shows itself to faith instead as the conscious *lie*. How can deception and fraud occur where consciousness, in its truth, immediately has *certainty of itself*, where it possesses *itself* in its object by both finding and producing itself there? The distinction is no longer present even in the words.—If the general question has been posed, *whether it is permissible to deceive a people*, the answer must in fact be that the question is worthless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter. —Brass may be sold for gold and forged bills of exchange for genuine ones in individual cases. A lost battle may be passed off to many people as a [1807 500] victory, and other lies about sensuous things and individual events may be made credible for a time. But in knowledge of essence, in which consciousness has immediate *certainty of itself*, the thought of deception falls away entirely.

551 Let us see further how faith experiences enlightenment in the *distinct* moments of its consciousness, to which the view just presented initially referred only in general. These moments are pure thought—or, as object, *absolute essence* in and for itself—then faith's *relation* to it as *knowing*, the *ground of its faith*, and finally its relation to it in its activity, or *its service*. Just as pure insight has failed to recognize and has denied itself in faith generally, so it will behave perversely in these moments as well.

552 Pure insight relates negatively to believing consciousness's *absolute essence*. This essence is pure *thought*, and pure thought posited within itself as object, or as *essence*. In believing consciousness, this *in-itself* of thought also receives for consciousness existing for itself the form—but only the empty form—of objectivity. It has the determination of something *represented*. But to pure insight, since it is pure consciousness on the side of the *self existing for itself*, the *other* appears as a *negative* of [1807 501] *self-consciousness*. This could still be taken either as the pure *in-itself* of thought or as the *being* of sense-certainty. But since it is also for the *self*, and this *self* having an object is actual consciousness, pure insight's

distinctive object as such is an *existing, ordinary thing* of *sense-certainty*. This object of its own appears to it in faith's *representation*. It condemns the representation, and in it its own object. But it already wrongs faith by grasping faith's object in such a way that it is its own. Accordingly, it says of faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood with eyes that do not see, or a little bread dough that grew in the field and, transformed by human beings, is sent back there; or in whatever other ways faith gives essence a human form, makes it an object, and represents it to itself.

553 Enlightenment, which claims to be pure, here makes what for spirit is eternal life and holy spirit into an actual, *perishable thing*. It soils it with the inherently null view of sense-certainty—a view not present at all to worshiping faith, so that enlightenment is simply lying when it attributes it to faith. What faith reveres is for it in no way stone or wood or bread dough or any other temporal, sensuous thing. If enlightenment takes it into its head to say that faith's object [1807 502] is *also* this, or even that it is this in itself and in truth, then, on one side, faith knows *that Also* just as well, but it lies outside its worship. On the other, for faith something like a stone and so on does not exist *in itself* at all. Only the essence of pure thought exists in itself for faith.

554 The *second moment* is faith's relation to this essence as *knowing* consciousness. As thinking, pure consciousness, faith has this essence immediately. But pure consciousness is equally a *mediated* relation of certainty to truth, a relation constituting the *ground* of *faith*. For enlightenment, this ground likewise becomes a contingent *knowledge of contingent* events. But the ground of knowledge is the *knowing* universal, and in its truth absolute *spirit*. In abstract pure consciousness, or thought as such, this is only absolute *essence*. As self-consciousness, however, it is *knowledge* of itself. Pure insight likewise posits this knowing universal, the *simple spirit knowing itself*, as the negative of self-consciousness. It is itself indeed *pure mediated* thought, thought mediating itself with itself; it is pure knowledge. But it is *pure insight, pure knowledge* that does not yet know itself, for which it is not yet the case that it is this pure mediating movement. This movement therefore appears to it, like everything it itself is, as

an other. In the course of actualizing itself, then, it develops this essential [1807 503] moment of its own. But the moment appears to it as belonging to faith and, in its determination as external to pure insight, as a contingent knowledge of just such ordinary, actual histories. It therefore invents the claim that religious faith grounds its certainty on a few *individual historical testimonies*. Considered as historical testimonies, these would certainly not give the degree of certainty about their content that newspaper reports give us about some event. It further claims that faith's certainty rests on the chance *preservation* of these testimonies: preservation by paper on one side, and by the skill and honesty of transferring them from one paper to another on the other; and finally on correctly grasping the sense of dead words and letters. But in fact it does not occur to faith to attach its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies. In its certainty, faith is a natural, unforced relation to its absolute object, a pure knowledge of it that does not mix letters, paper, and copyists into its consciousness of absolute essence, or mediate itself with essence through such things. Instead, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowledge. It is spirit itself that bears witness to itself, both in the *interior* of *individual* consciousness and through the *universal presence* of everyone's faith in it. If faith also wants to give itself, from history, the kind of [1807 504] grounding or at least confirmation of its content that enlightenment speaks of, and seriously thinks and acts as though this mattered, then it has already let enlightenment lead it astray. Its efforts to ground or secure itself in this way are only testimonies it gives of its infection.

555 The third side still remains: *consciousness's relation to absolute essence* as *activity*. This activity sublates the individual's particularity, or the natural way of its being-for-itself. From this comes the certainty of being pure self-consciousness, of being one with essence in its activity—that is, as individual consciousness *existing for itself*.—Since in activity *suitability to purpose* and *purpose* are distinguished, and pure insight also *relates negatively* to this activity and denies itself here as in the other moments, it must present itself as lacking understanding in regard to *suitability to purpose*. For insight joined with intention, the agreement

of means and purpose, appears to it as an other, indeed as its opposite. In regard to *purpose*, it must make the bad—enjoyment and possession—its purpose and thereby prove itself the most impure intention, since pure intention too, as an other, is impure intention.

556 Accordingly, regarding *suitability to purpose*, we see enlightenment finding it foolish when the believing individual gives itself the higher consciousness of not [1807 505] being tied to natural enjoyment and pleasure by *actually* denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and proving *through the deed* that its contempt for them is not a *lie* but *true*.—It likewise finds it foolish that the individual frees itself from its determination as absolutely individual, excluding all others and possessing property, by relinquishing its property itself. Through this, the individual shows *in truth* that it is not serious about its isolation, but is above the natural necessity of individualizing itself and, in this absolute individualization of being-for-itself, denying others as the same *as itself*.—Pure insight finds both unsuitable to their purpose and wrong: *unsuitable* to prove oneself free of pleasure and possession by denying oneself pleasure and giving away a possession. It will therefore, conversely, declare someone a *fool* who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating.—It also finds it *wrong* to deny oneself a meal, or to give away butter and eggs not in exchange for money, or money not in exchange for butter and eggs, but outright, without receiving anything of the sort in return. It declares a meal or possession of such things an end in itself. It thereby declares itself in fact a very impure intention, essentially concerned with such enjoyment and possession. As pure intention, it in turn also asserts the necessity of rising [1807 506] above natural existence and greed for its means. It merely finds it foolish and wrong to prove this elevation *through the deed*. Or this pure intention is in truth fraud: it professes and demands an *inward* elevation, but declares it superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to be serious about it, to *actually carry it out* and *prove its truth*.—It therefore denies itself both as pure insight, by denying activity that is immediately suited to its purpose, and as pure intention, by denying the intention of proving oneself free from the purposes of individuality.

557 This is how enlightenment gives itself to faith's experience. It appears in this bad light because, through its relation to another, it gives itself a *negative reality*, or presents itself as its own opposite. Yet pure insight and intention must give themselves this relation, because it is their actualization.—This actualization first appeared as negative reality. Perhaps enlightenment's *positive reality* is better constituted. Let us see how it behaves.—Once every prejudice and superstition has been banished, the question arises: *what next? What truth has enlightenment spread in their place?*—It has already expressed this positive content in its eradication of error, since that alienation of itself is equally its positive reality.—In what is absolute [1807 507] spirit for faith, enlightenment grasps whatever *determination* it discovers as wood, stone, and so on, as individual actual things. In general, it understands *all determination*—all spirit's content and fullness—in this way as something *finite*, as *human essence and representation*. *Absolute essence* therefore becomes for it a *vacuum* to which no determinations or predicates can be attributed. Such a mating would be blameworthy in itself, and it is precisely such a mating that has produced the monsters of superstition. Reason, *pure insight*, is itself certainly not empty, since its own negative exists *for it* and is its content. It is rich, but only in individuality and limitation. Its insightful good manners consist in letting nothing of this sort belong to absolute essence or attributing it to that essence. These manners know how to put themselves and their wealth of finitude in their proper place and treat the absolute worthily.

558 Opposed to this empty essence stands the *second moment* of enlightenment's positive truth: the *individuality* of consciousness and all being in general, excluded from absolute essence, as *absolute being-in-and-for-itself*. Consciousness, which in its very first actuality is *sense-certainty* and *opinion*, returns here to that point from the whole course of its experience. It is once again knowledge of its own *pure negative*, or of *sensuous things*: *existing beings* that stand indifferently opposite its *being-for-itself*. Here, however, it is not [1807 508] *immediate*, natural consciousness. It has *become* such for itself. Initially abandoned to all the entanglements into which its unfolding plunges

it, and now led back to its first shape by pure insight, it has *experienced* this shape as the *result*. *Grounded* in insight into the nullity of all other shapes of consciousness, and thus of everything beyond sense-certainty, this sense-certainty is no longer opinion. Instead, it is absolute truth. The nullity of everything beyond sense-certainty is indeed only a negative proof of this truth. But it is capable of no other proof. For the positive truth of sense-certainty within itself is precisely the *unmediated* being-for-itself of the concept itself as object, and indeed in the form of otherness: every consciousness is *absolutely certain* that it *is*, that *other actual things* exist outside it, and that in its *natural* being it, like these things, exists *in and for itself*, or *absolutely*.

559 Finally, *the third moment of enlightenment's truth* is the relation of individual essences to absolute essence, the relation of the first two moments. As pure insight into the *equal* or *unlimited*, insight also *goes beyond* the *unequal*—finite actuality—or beyond itself as mere otherness. Beyond this, it has *the empty*, to which it therefore relates sensuous [1807 509] actuality. The two sides do not enter the determination of this *relation* as *content*, since one is the empty. Content is therefore present only through the other, sensuous actuality. But the *form* of the relation, in determining which the side of the *in-itself* plays a part, can be made as one pleases. For form is what is *negative in itself*, and therefore what is opposed to itself: being as well as nothing, the *in-itself* as well as its *opposite*. Or, what is the same, the relation *of actuality* to the *in-itself* as the *beyond* is as much a *negating* as a *positing* of actuality. Finite actuality can therefore properly be taken in whatever way is needed. The sensuous is now related *positively* to the absolute as the *in-itself*, and sensuous actuality itself exists *in itself*: the absolute makes, tends, and cares for it. Again, actuality is also related to the absolute as its opposite, as its *non-being*. In this relation it does not exist in itself, but only *for another*. In the previous shape of consciousness, the opposed *concepts* were defined as *good* and *bad*. For pure insight, by contrast, they become the purer abstractions of being *in itself* and being *for another*.

560 But in fact both ways of considering the finite—its positive and its negative relation to the in-itself—are equally necessary. Everything therefore exists as much *in itself* as it exists *for another*, or everything is [1807 510] *useful*.—Everything gives itself up to others, now lets others use it and exists *for them*, and now, so to speak, gets back up on its hind legs, keeps its distance from others, exists for itself, and uses the other in turn.—For the human being, as the thing *conscious* of this relation, its essence and position follow from this. As it immediately is, as natural consciousness, the human being exists *in itself*, is *good*, and as an individual is *absolute*. Other things exist *for it*. Indeed, since for the human being as a self-conscious animal the moments have the meaning of universality, *everything* is for its pleasure and delight. Just as it came from God's hand, it walks about the world as a garden planted for it.—It must also have picked from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. In this it possesses a benefit that distinguishes it from everything else. For its inherently good nature *also* happens to be such that excessive delight harms it. Or rather, its individuality *also has its beyond* within it: it can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Against this, reason is a useful means of properly limiting this going beyond—or rather of preserving itself in going beyond what is determinate, for this is the power of consciousness. The enjoyment of conscious essence, *universal* in itself, must itself be not determinate but universal in variety and duration. Moderation therefore has the determination of [1807 511] preventing pleasure from being interrupted in its variety and duration. That is, moderation's determination is immoderation.—Just as everything is useful to the human being, so the human being is useful too. Its determination is equally to make itself a member of the troop who is useful to the community and universally serviceable. As much as it cares for itself, it must also give itself up for others. As much as it gives itself up, it cares for itself. One hand washes the other. Wherever it finds itself, it is in the right place: it benefits others and is made use of.

561 Different things are useful to one another in different ways. But all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence: being related to the absolute in the twofold way, positively—thereby existing *in and for themselves*—and negatively

—thereby existing *for others*. The *relation* to absolute essence, or religion, is therefore the most useful of all useful things. For it is *pure usefulness itself*: the subsistence of all things, or their *being-in-and-for-themselves*, and the falling away of all things, or their *being for another*.

562 For faith, of course, this positive result of enlightenment is as much an abomination as enlightenment's negative behavior toward it. This *insight* into absolute essence, seeing nothing in it but precisely the *absolute* essence, *the supreme being, or the empty*; this *intention* that everything in its immediate existence exists *in itself*, or [1807 512] is good; and finally, the exhaustive expression of the *relation* of individual conscious being to absolute essence—*religion*—by the concept of usefulness: all this is utterly *abhorrent* to faith. This *wisdom* peculiar to enlightenment necessarily appears to faith both as *banality* itself and as the *admission* of banality. For it consists in knowing nothing about absolute essence, or, what is the same, knowing only this perfectly flat truth about it: that it is merely *absolute essence*. On the other hand, it knows only finitude, and indeed knows finitude as the true, and knows this knowledge of finitude as the true to be the highest.

563 Against enlightenment, faith has divine right, the right of absolute *equality with itself*, or pure thought. It experiences nothing but wrong from enlightenment, which distorts every one of faith's moments and makes them something other than what they are within faith. Enlightenment, however, has only human right against faith and on behalf of its truth. For the wrong it commits is the right of *inequality* and consists in reversing and changing. This right belongs to the nature of *self-consciousness* as opposed to simple essence or *thought*. But because enlightenment's right is the right of self-consciousness, it will not merely *also* retain its right, leaving two equal rights of spirit confronting one another, neither able to satisfy the other. Instead, it will assert absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negativity [1807 513] of the concept, which not only exists *for itself* but also reaches over its opposite. Faith itself, because it is consciousness, will be unable to deny enlightenment its right.

564 For enlightenment does not confront believing consciousness with principles peculiar to itself, but with principles that believing consciousness itself contains. It merely brings together faith's *own thoughts*, which fall apart without faith being conscious of this. In connection with *one* of faith's ways, it merely reminds faith of the *others* it *also* has, but always forgets while attending to another. It proves itself pure insight against faith precisely by seeing the whole in a *determinate* moment. It thus introduces the *opposite* relating to that moment and, reversing one within the other, brings out the negative essence of both thoughts, the *concept*. It therefore appears to faith as distortion and lying because it shows the *otherness* of faith's moments. In doing so, it seems immediately to make them something other than what they are in their individuality. But this *other* is equally essential and is truly present in believing consciousness itself. Faith simply does not think of it, but has it elsewhere. It is therefore neither foreign to faith nor something faith can deny.

565 But enlightenment itself, which reminds faith of the opposite of its isolated moments, [1807 514] is just as little enlightened about itself. It relates purely *negatively* to faith insofar as it excludes its own content from its purity and takes it as its own *negative*. It therefore neither recognizes itself in this negative, in faith's content, nor, for this very reason, brings its two thoughts together: the thought it introduces and the thought against which it introduces it. Since it does not recognize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it remains within the opposition of the two moments. It acknowledges only one—the one opposed to faith in each case—and separates the other from it, just as faith does. It therefore does not produce the unity of both as their unity, that is, the concept. But the concept *arises* for it on its own, or enlightenment merely finds it *already there*. For pure insight's realization is in itself precisely this: insight, whose essence is the concept, first becomes an absolute *other* to itself and denies itself—for the concept's opposition is absolute—and from this otherness comes to itself, or to its concept.—But enlightenment *is* only this movement. It is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, which does come to itself as object, but takes this object for an *other*. Nor does

it know the concept's nature: that what is undifferentiated is what absolutely separates itself.—Against faith, then, insight [1807 515] is the *power* of the concept insofar as it is the movement and relating of moments lying apart in faith's consciousness, a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Here lies the absolute *right* of the force it exercises over faith. But the *actuality* to which it brings this force lies precisely in this: believing consciousness is itself the concept, and therefore itself acknowledges the opposite that insight introduces to it. Enlightenment therefore retains its right against faith because it brings to bear within faith what is necessary for faith itself and what faith contains within itself.

566 First, enlightenment asserts the concept's moment of being an *activity* of *consciousness*. It asserts this *against* faith: that faith's absolute essence is the essence *of its* consciousness as a self, or that it is *produced* by consciousness. For believing consciousness, its absolute essence, though its *in-itself*, is not at the same time a foreign thing *standing* within it, no one knows how or from where. Instead, its trust consists precisely in *finding* itself there as *this* personal consciousness, and its obedience and service in producing this essence as *its* absolute essence through its *activity*. Enlightenment properly only reminds faith of this when faith expresses purely the *in-itself* of absolute essence *beyond* consciousness's *activity*.—But although enlightenment brings the [1807 516] opposite moment of faith's *activity* against faith's one-sidedness, against the *being* that alone occupies faith's thought here, enlightenment likewise does not bring its own thoughts together. It isolates the pure moment of *activity* and says of faith's *in-itself* that it is *only* something *produced* by consciousness. But activity isolated and opposed to the *in-itself* is contingent activity and, as representing, a production of fictions—representations that do not exist *in themselves*. This is how enlightenment regards faith's content.—Conversely, pure insight equally says the opposite. By asserting the moment of *otherness* contained in the concept, it describes faith's essence as something that *has nothing to do with* consciousness, something *beyond* it, foreign and unknown to it. For

faith, just as it trusts this essence on one side and has *certainty of itself* within it, so on the other this essence is unfathomable in its ways and unattainable in its being.

567 Enlightenment further asserts against believing consciousness a right that faith itself concedes when enlightenment regards the object of faith's reverence as stone and wood, or as some other finite, anthropomorphic determination. For faith is this divided consciousness, having a *beyond* of *actuality* and a pure *this side* of that beyond. In fact, therefore, it *also* contains this view of the sensuous thing, [1807 517] according to which the thing *has validity in and for itself*. But it does not bring together these two thoughts of *what exists in and for itself*, which for it is now *pure essence*, now an ordinary *sensuous thing*.—Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view. For, lacking the concept, the distinctions of its supersensible realm are a series of independent *shapes*, and their movement is an *event*. That is, they exist only in *representation* and have the manner of sensuous being.—Enlightenment, for its part, likewise isolates *actuality* as an essence abandoned by spirit, and determination as an immovable finitude, rather than as a *moment* in essence's own spiritual movement: neither nothing nor something *existing in and for itself*, but something vanishing.

568 Clearly, the same applies to the *ground* of *knowledge*. Believing consciousness itself acknowledges contingent *knowledge*, since it relates to contingencies and absolute essence itself has for it the form of represented, ordinary actuality. Believing consciousness is thus *also* a certainty that does not contain truth within itself. It acknowledges itself as such an inessential consciousness, on this side of spirit that assures and confirms itself.—But it forgets this moment in its immediate spiritual knowledge of absolute [1807 518] essence.—Enlightenment, which reminds it of this, again thinks *only* of contingent knowledge and forgets the other. It thinks only of mediation through a *foreign* third, not of mediation in which the immediate is itself the third through which it mediates itself with the other, namely with *itself*.

569 Finally, in its view of faith's *activity*, enlightenment finds the throwing away of enjoyment and possessions wrong and unsuitable to its purpose.—Regarding wrongness, it gains believing consciousness's agreement because faith itself acknowledges this actuality: possessing, retaining, and enjoying property. In asserting property, faith behaves all the more stubbornly and in isolation, and abandons itself all the more crudely to enjoyment, because its religious activity, which *gives up* possession and enjoyment, falls beyond this actuality and purchases its freedom on that side. Through this opposition, this service of sacrificing natural pursuits and enjoyment in fact has no truth. Retention takes place *alongside* sacrifice. Sacrifice is only a *sign*, actually sacrificing only a small part and therefore in fact merely *representing* sacrifice.

570 Regarding *suitability to purpose*, enlightenment finds it clumsy to throw away *a* possession in order to know and prove oneself free of *possession*, or to deny oneself *a* pleasure in order to be free of [1807 519] *pleasure*. Believing consciousness itself grasps absolute activity as *universal* activity. Not only is the action of its absolute essence as its object universal for it, but individual consciousness too is to prove itself wholly and universally freed from its sensuous essence. Throwing away an *individual* possession or renouncing an *individual* pleasure is not this *universal* action. In action, the *purpose*, which is universal, and the *execution*, which is individual, must essentially stand before consciousness in their inadequacy to one another. The action therefore proves to be one in which consciousness has no share. It thus proves, properly speaking, too *naive* to be an action. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself free of pleasure in meals; too naive, like Origen, to remove other pleasure *from one's body* in order to prove it done away with. The action itself proves to be an *external*, *individual* activity. Desire, however, is rooted *inwardly* and is *universal*. Its pleasure disappears neither with the tool nor through individual deprivation.

571 But enlightenment, for its part, here isolates the *inward, unactual* against actuality, just as it held fast to the externality of [1807 520] thinghood against faith's inwardness in intuition and devotion. It places what is essential in *intention*, in *thought*, thereby sparing itself the actual accomplishment of liberation

from natural purposes. On the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element whose fulfillment lies in natural drives. These are justified precisely by being inward, by belonging to *universal* being, to nature.

572 Enlightenment therefore has irresistible force over faith because the moments it brings to bear are found within faith's own consciousness. Consider the effect of this force more closely. Enlightenment's conduct toward faith seems to tear apart the *beautiful* unity of *trust* and immediate *certainty*, to contaminate faith's *spiritual* consciousness with low thoughts of *sensuous* actuality, and to destroy its heart, *tranquil* and *secure* in submission, through the *vanity* of understanding and of its own will and accomplishment. But in fact enlightenment instead initiates the sublation of the *thoughtless*, or rather *conceptless, separation* present in faith. Believing consciousness uses double measures and weights. It has two kinds of eyes, ears, tongue, and language. It has doubled all its representations without comparing this double meaning. Or faith lives in two kinds of perception: one belonging to *sleeping* consciousness living purely in [1807 521] thoughts without concepts, the other to waking consciousness living purely in sensuous actuality. It keeps a separate household in each.—Enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with the representations of the sensuous world, and shows the heavenly world this finitude. Faith cannot deny it, because faith is self-consciousness and thus the unity to which both ways of representing belong and in which they do not fall apart. For they belong to the same inseparable, *simple* self into which faith has passed.

573 Faith has thereby lost the content that filled its element, and collapses into a dull weaving of spirit within itself. It is expelled from its realm, or this realm is plundered. This happens because waking consciousness has seized all its distinctions and extent, claimed all its parts as the earth's property, and returned them to earth. But faith is not satisfied by this, since this illumination has everywhere produced only individual essence. As a result, nothing speaks to spirit except inessential actuality and a finitude that spirit has abandoned.—Faith has no content and cannot remain in this emptiness. Or, going beyond the finite, which is its only content, it finds only the empty. It is therefore *pure longing*. Its

truth is an empty *beyond* for which no suitable content can any longer be found, [1807 522] since everything has been put to other uses.—In fact, faith has thereby become the same as enlightenment: consciousness of the relation of the finite existing in itself to an absolute without predicates, unknown and unknowable. The only difference is that *enlightenment* is *satisfied*, while *faith* is *unsatisfied* enlightenment. Yet we will see whether enlightenment can remain satisfied. That longing of clouded spirit, mourning the loss of its spiritual world, lies in wait. Enlightenment itself contains this blemish of unsatisfied longing: as *pure object*, in its *empty* absolute essence; as *activity* and *movement*, in *going beyond* its individual essence toward an unfulfilled beyond; and as *fulfilled object*, in the *lack of a self* in the useful. It will sublate this blemish. A closer examination of the positive result that is its truth will show that the blemish is already sublated in itself within that result.

b. The truth of the Enlightenment.

574 Spirit's dull weaving, no longer distinguishing anything within itself, has thus inwardly passed beyond consciousness, which by contrast has become clear to itself.—The necessity and condition of this clarity's first moment are [1807 523] determined by pure insight—insight that is concept *in itself*—actualizing itself. It does so by positing otherness, or determinateness, within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, that is, negation of the concept. This negation is equally pure. The *pure thing* has thereby come to be: absolute essence with no further determination. More precisely, as absolute concept, pure insight differentiates differences that no longer are differences: abstractions or pure concepts that no longer support themselves, but have support and distinction only through *the whole movement*. This differentiation of the undifferentiated consists precisely in the absolute concept making itself its own *object*, and positing itself as *essence* opposed to that *movement*. Essence thereby lacks the side on which abstractions or differences are *kept apart*, and thus becomes *pure thought* as *pure thing*.—This is therefore precisely that dull, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself into which faith sank when it lost its differentiated content. It is also that *movement* of pure self-consciousness for which it is supposed to

be the absolutely foreign beyond. For since this pure self-consciousness is movement in pure concepts, in differences that are none, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, that is, pure *feeling* or pure *thinghood*.—But the concept alienated [1807 524] from itself—for it still stands here at this stage of alienation—does not recognize this *same essence* of both sides, of self-consciousness's movement and its absolute essence. It does not recognize their *same essence*, which is in fact their substance and subsistence. Since it does not recognize this unity, essence counts for it only in the form of an objective beyond. Differentiating consciousness, which thus has the in-itself outside itself, counts as finite consciousness.

575 Over that absolute essence, enlightenment itself enters the conflict with itself that it previously had with faith, and divides into two parties. A party proves itself *victorious* only by splitting into two parties. For in doing so, it shows that it possesses within itself the principle it fought, and has thereby sublated the one-sidedness with which it previously appeared. The interest previously divided between it and the other party now falls wholly within it and forgets the other, because it finds within this party itself the opposition that occupies it. Yet this opposition has also been raised into the higher, victorious element, where it presents itself purified. Thus the discord arising within a party, which seems a misfortune, proves instead to be its good fortune.

576 Pure essence itself contains no distinction. Distinction therefore comes to it through two such pure essences emerging for consciousness, or [1807 525] a twofold consciousness of this essence.—Pure absolute essence exists only in pure thought, or rather is pure thought itself. It is therefore utterly *beyond* finite consciousness, beyond *self*-consciousness, and is only negative essence. But in this way it is precisely *being*, the negative of self-consciousness. As self-consciousness's *negative*, it is *also* related to it. It is *external being*. Related to self-consciousness, within which distinctions and determinations fall, this being acquires the distinctions of being tasted, seen, and so forth. The relation is *sense*-certainty and perception.

577 Suppose we start from this *sensuous* being, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstract from these determinate ways in which consciousness relates. What remains is pure *matter*, as a dull weaving and movement within itself. Here it is essential to observe that *pure matter* is only what *remains* when we *abstract* from seeing, feeling, tasting, and so forth. That is, it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so forth. It is not *matter* that is seen, felt, or tasted, but color, a stone, a salt, and so on. Matter is instead *pure abstraction*. In it, therefore, the *pure essence* of *thought*, or pure thought itself, is present as the absolute without internal distinction, determination, or predicates.
[1807 526]

578 One enlightenment calls absolute essence that absolute without predicates existing in thought beyond actual consciousness, from which we started. The other calls it *matter*. If they were distinguished as *nature* and spirit or *God*, the unconscious weaving within itself would lack the wealth of unfolded life required to be nature, while spirit or God would lack consciousness differentiating itself within itself. As we have seen, both are utterly the same concept. The difference lies not in the matter itself, but purely in the different starting points of the two formations, and in each stopping at a point of its own in thought's movement. If they went beyond these points, they would meet and recognize as the same what one professes to find an abomination and the other finds foolishness. For one, absolute essence is in its pure thought, or immediately for pure consciousness, outside finite consciousness, as finite consciousness's *negative* beyond. If it reflected that, first, this simple immediacy of thought is nothing other than *pure being*, and second, what is *negative* for consciousness also relates to consciousness—that in a negative judgment the *is* (the copula) equally holds the two separated terms together—then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would emerge as that of *something externally existing*, [1807 527] and thus as the same as what is called *pure matter*. The missing moment of *presence* would have been gained.—The other enlightenment starts from sensuous being, then *abstracts* from the sensuous relations of tasting, seeing, and so forth, and makes it the pure *in-itself*, *absolute matter*,

what is neither felt nor tasted. In this way, this being has become the simple without predicates, the essence of *pure consciousness*. It is the pure concept as *existing in itself*, or *pure thought within itself*. In its consciousness, this insight does not take the opposite step from *what exists*, which *purely* exists, to what is thought, which is the same as what *purely* exists; or from the purely positive to the purely negative. Yet the positive is *pure* only through negation, while the *purely* negative, as pure, is equal to itself within itself and thereby positive.—Or neither enlightenment has reached the concept of Cartesian metaphysics, that *being-in-itself* and *thought* are the same. Neither has reached the thought that *being, pure being*, is not something *concrete and actual*, but *pure abstraction*. Nor, conversely, has either reached the thought that pure thought, equality with itself, or essence, is partly the *negative* of self-consciousness and therefore *being*, and partly, as immediate simplicity, equally nothing other than *being*. *Thought* is *thinghood*, or *thinghood* is *thought*.
[1807 528]

579 Here essence initially contains *division* only by belonging to two kinds of consideration. On the one hand, essence must have distinction within itself. On the other, precisely through this the two ways of considering it come together into one. For the abstract moments of pure being and the negative, through which they differ, are then united in the object of these ways of considering.—The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure trembling within itself, or of pure thinking of itself. This simple movement turning on its axis must fling itself apart, since it is movement only by distinguishing its moments. This differentiation leaves the unmoved behind as the empty shell of pure *being*, no longer any actual thought or life within itself. For as distinction, differentiation is all content. But by placing itself *outside* that *unity*, it is thereby the alternation of the moments of *being-in-itself*, *being for another*, and *being-for-itself*, an alternation *not returning into itself*. It is actuality as the object of pure insight's actual consciousness: *usefulness*.

580 However bad usefulness may look to faith, to sentimentality, or to the abstraction calling itself speculation that fixes the *in-itself* for itself, it is in usefulness that pure insight completes its realization and is its own [1807 529] *object*. It no longer denies this object, nor does the object count for it as the empty or a pure beyond. For as we saw, pure insight is the existing concept itself, or pure personality equal to itself, differentiating itself within itself so that each thing it differentiates is itself pure concept, that is, immediately not differentiated. It is simple, pure self-consciousness existing equally *for itself* and *in itself* in immediate unity. Its *being-in-itself* is therefore not enduring *being*, but immediately ceases to be anything in its distinction. But a being that immediately has no support does not exist *in itself*. It exists essentially *for another*, the power that absorbs it. Yet this second moment, opposed to the first, to *being-in-itself*, disappears just as immediately as the first. Or, as *being only for another*, it is instead *disappearance* itself, and *return into itself* has occurred: *being-for-itself* is *posited*. But as equality with itself, this simple being-for-itself is instead *a being*, and therefore *for another*.—The useful expresses this nature of pure insight in the *unfolding of its moments*, or pure insight as *object*. It is something subsisting *in itself*, or a thing. This being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment. It is thus absolutely *for another*, but it is for another only to the same degree that it is in itself. These opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of [1807 530] being-for-itself. Yet although the useful expresses pure insight's concept, it is not pure insight as such, but pure insight as *representation*, or as its *object*. It is only the restless alternation of those moments. One of them is indeed the return into itself as such, but only as *being-for-itself*, that is, an abstract moment stepping to one side, opposed to the others. The useful itself is not the negative essence that contains these moments in their opposition also *undivided in one and the same respect*, or as a *thinking*, as they are in pure insight. The moment of *being-for-itself* is indeed present in the useful, but not so that it *reaches over* the other moments, the *in-itself* and *being for another*, and would thus be the *self*. In the useful, then, pure insight has as its *object* its own concept in its *pure* moments. It is consciousness of this *metaphysics*, but not yet comprehension of it. It has not yet reached the *unity* of *being* and the *concept*

itself. Since the useful still has for pure insight the form of an object, pure insight still has a *world* distinguished from itself, although this world no longer exists in and for itself. But since the oppositions have emerged at the summit of the concept, the next stage will be their collapse together, and enlightenment's experience of the fruits of its deeds.
[1807 531]

581 Consider the object attained, in relation to this entire sphere. The actual world of cultivation had gathered itself into the *vanity* of self-consciousness: into *being-for-itself*, which still has that world's confusion as its content and is still the *individual* concept, not yet the concept *universal* for itself. But returned into itself, it is *pure insight*: pure consciousness as pure *self*, or negativity, just as faith is this same consciousness as *pure thought*, or positivity. In that self, faith has the moment that completes it. But faith perishes through this completion, and now in pure insight we see both moments: absolute essence, which is purely *thought*, or negative, and *matter*, which is positive, *existing* being.—This completeness still lacks the *actuality* of self-consciousness belonging to *vain* consciousness: the world from which thought rose into itself. This missing element is attained in usefulness insofar as pure insight has gained positive objectivity there. Through this, it is actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its *world*. It has become the truth of the whole preceding world, both ideal and real. Spirit's first world is the extensive realm of its scattered existence and individualized *certainty* of itself, just as nature scatters its life into [1807 532] infinitely varied shapes without their *genus* being present. The second contains the *genus* and is the realm of *being-in-itself*, or *truth*, opposed to that certainty. But the third, the useful, is *truth* that is equally *certainty* of itself. The realm of the truth of *faith* lacks the principle of *actuality*, or certainty of itself as *this individual*. Actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual, however, lacks the *in-itself*. In pure insight's object the two worlds are united. The useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness sees through it and has in it its *individual certainty* of itself, its enjoyment, its *being-for-itself*. In this way it gains *insight* into the object, and this insight contains the object's

true essence: being something seen through, or *for another*. This insight is therefore itself *true knowledge*. In this relation, self-consciousness also immediately has universal certainty of itself, its *pure consciousness*. *Truth*, presence, and *actuality* are thus united in the relation. Both worlds are reconciled, and heaven has been transplanted down to earth.

[1807 533]

III. *Absolute freedom and terror*.

582 Consciousness has found its concept in usefulness. But this concept is partly still an *object*, and partly, for that very reason, still a *purpose* that consciousness does not yet immediately possess. Usefulness is still the predicate of the object, not itself subject, or consciousness's immediate and sole *actuality*. This is the same point that appeared earlier: *being-for-itself* has not yet proved itself the substance of the other moments. If it had, the useful would immediately be nothing other than consciousness's self, and consciousness would thereby possess it.—But this withdrawal of the useful's form of objectivity has already occurred *in itself*. From this inward revolution emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness: *absolute freedom*.

583 In fact, only an empty appearance of objectivity remains to separate [1807 534] self-consciousness from possession. On one side, all the subsistence and validity of the determinate members in the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have altogether returned into this simple determination as their ground and spirit. On the other, this determination no longer has anything of its own for itself. It is instead pure metaphysics, pure concept, or self-consciousness's knowledge. In the useful's *being-in-and-for-itself* as object, consciousness recognizes that its *being-in-itself* is essentially *being for another*. *Being-in-itself* as what *has no self* is in truth the passive, or what exists for another self. But the object exists for consciousness in this abstract form of *pure being-in-itself*, since consciousness is pure *insight*, whose differences have the pure form of concepts.—The *being-for-itself* into which being for another returns—the self—is not a self peculiar to what is called object and different from the I. For consciousness as pure insight is not an *individual* self con-

fronted by the object as likewise a *self of its own*. Instead, it is the pure concept, the self looking into the self, the absolute seeing of *itself* doubled. Its certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept is the essence of all actuality. So if the useful was only the alternation of moments not returning into its own *unity*, and therefore still an object for knowledge, it ceases to be this. For knowledge [1807 535] is itself the movement of those abstract moments. It is the universal self, the self both of itself and of the object, and as universal it is this movement's unity returning into itself.

584 Spirit is thereby present as *absolute freedom*. It is self-consciousness grasping that its certainty of itself is the essence of all spiritual bodies in both the real and supersensible worlds. Or conversely, essence and actuality are consciousness's knowledge of *itself*.—It is conscious of its pure personality, and within that of all spiritual reality; all reality is only spiritual. For it, the world is simply its will, and this is universal will. Indeed, it is not the empty thought of will placed in silent or represented consent. It is really universal will, the will of all *individuals* as such. For will is in itself consciousness of personality, or of each person. It is to exist as this true, actual will, as the *self*-conscious essence of each and every personality, so that each always does everything undivided, and what appears as the whole's activity is the immediate, conscious activity of *each*.

585 This undivided substance of absolute freedom rises to the world's throne without any power being able to resist it. For in truth, consciousness alone is the element in which spiritual essences or [1807 536] powers have their substance. Their whole system, organized and preserved through division into bodies, has therefore collapsed once individual consciousness grasps the object as having no essence other than self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept an existing *object* was its differentiation into separate, *subsisting* bodies. But when the object becomes concept, nothing subsisting remains within it. Negativity has penetrated all its moments. The concept enters existence in this way: every individual consciousness rises out of the sphere to which it was assigned, no longer finds its essence and work in this particularized body, but grasps its self as the *concept* of will and all bodies as

essences of this will. It can therefore actualize itself only in a labor that is the whole labor. In this absolute freedom, then, all classes—the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself—are erased. The individual consciousness that belonged to such a member, and willed and accomplished within it, has sublated its limitation. Its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work.

586 Here the object and *distinction* have lost the meaning of *usefulness*, which was the predicate of all real being. Consciousness does not begin its movement from the object as *something foreign*, from which it would [1807 537] only then return into itself. Instead, the object is for it consciousness itself. Opposition therefore consists solely in the distinction between *individual* and *universal* consciousness. But individual consciousness is immediately for itself what only had *the appearance* of opposition: it is universal consciousness and will. The *beyond* of this actuality hovers over the corpse of the vanished independence of real being or the being of faith only as the vapor of a stale gas, the empty supreme being.

587 After the sublation of the differentiated spiritual bodies and individuals' limited life, as well as spirit's two worlds, only universal self-consciousness's movement within itself remains. It is an interaction of this self-consciousness in the forms of *universality* and *personal* consciousness. Universal will *withdraws into itself* and is *individual* will, confronted by universal law and work. But this *individual* consciousness is just as immediately conscious of itself as universal will. It is conscious that its object is law it has itself given and work it has itself accomplished. In passing into activity and creating objectivity, it therefore produces nothing individual, but only laws and actions of state.

588 This movement is therefore consciousness's interaction with itself, in which it releases nothing in the shape of a *free* [1807 538] *object* confronting it. It follows that consciousness can accomplish no positive work: neither universal works of language nor of actuality, neither laws and universal institutions of *conscious* freedom nor deeds and works *of willing* freedom.—The work into

which freedom giving itself *consciousness* could make itself would consist in its making itself, as *universal* substance, into an *object* and *enduring being*. This otherness would be the distinction within freedom by which it divided into subsisting spiritual bodies and the members of different powers. These bodies would partly be *thought-things*: a separate legislative, judicial, and executive *power*. Partly they would be the *real essences* that emerged in the real world of cultivation and, on closer consideration of universal activity's content, the particular bodies of labor further differentiated as more specialized *classes*.—Universal freedom that had thus separated into its members and thereby made itself an *existing* substance would be free from single individuality, and would distribute the *multitude* of *individuals* among its different members. But personality's activity and being would thereby find themselves limited to one branch of the whole, one kind of activity and being. Placed in the element of *being*, personality would acquire the meaning of being *determinate*. It would cease to be truly universal self-consciousness. Such self-consciousness will [1807 539] not let itself be cheated of *actuality* by the *representation* of obeying *self-given* laws assigning it a part, nor by being *represented* in lawgiving and universal activity. It will not be cheated of the actuality of giving the law *itself* and accomplishing not an individual work, but the universal work *itself*. For where the self is merely *represented* and *pictured*, it is not *actual*. Where another *stands in* for it, it is not.

589 Individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this *universal work* of absolute freedom as existing substance. Nor does it find itself in the proper *deeds* and *individual* actions of freedom's will. For the universal to accomplish a deed, it must gather itself into the one of individuality and place an individual self-consciousness at its head. For universal will is *actual* will only in a self that is one. But this excludes *all other individuals* from the *whole* of this deed. They have only a limited share in it, so the deed would not be the deed of *actual universal* self-consciousness.—Universal freedom can therefore produce no positive work or deed. Only *negative activity* remains to it. It is only the *Fury* of disappearance.

590 But the highest actuality, the one most opposed to universal freedom—or rather the only object that still arises for it—is the [1807 540] freedom and individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For this universality, which does not let itself reach the reality of organic articulation and aims to preserve itself in undivided continuity, also differentiates itself within itself because it is movement, or consciousness in general. Indeed, because of its own abstraction, it separates into equally abstract extremes: simple, inflexible, cold universality, and the separate, absolutely hard rigidity and stubborn pointlikeness of actual self-consciousness. Once universal freedom has finished eradicating the real organization and now subsists for itself, this is its only object. The object no longer has any other content, possession, existence, or external extent. It is only this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self. The only place it can be seized is its *abstract* existence in general.—Since these two are indivisibly, absolutely for themselves, they can send no part into the middle through which they might connect. Their relation is therefore completely *unmediated*, pure negation: the negation of the individual as *existing* within the universal. Universal freedom's only work and deed is therefore *death*, a *death* without inner scope or fullness. For what is negated is the unfilled point of the absolutely free self. It is therefore the [1807 541] coldest, most commonplace death, with no more significance than cutting through a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.

591 The banality of this syllable contains the wisdom of government, universal will's understanding of how to accomplish itself. Government is itself nothing other than the point establishing itself, or the individuality of universal will. As a willing and accomplishing that starts from one point, it also wills and accomplishes a determinate arrangement and action. On one side, it thereby excludes the other individuals from its deed. On the other, it thereby constitutes itself as a determinate will opposed to universal will. It simply cannot present itself as anything other than a *faction*. Only the *victorious* faction is called government. Precisely in its being a faction lies the immediate necessity of its downfall. Conversely, being government makes it a faction and guilty. Universal will takes

government's actual action as the crime government commits against it. Government, however, has nothing determinate and external by which the guilt of the will opposed to it could present itself. For as *actual* universal will, it confronts only unactual pure will, *intention*. *Becoming suspect* therefore takes the place of *being guilty*, or has its meaning and effect [1807 542]. The external reaction against this actuality, which lies in the simple inwardness of intention, consists in the bare eradication of this existing self. There is nothing else to take from it except its being itself.

592 In this distinctive *work* of its own, absolute freedom becomes its own object, and self-consciousness experiences what freedom *is*. *In itself*, freedom is precisely this *abstract self-consciousness* that eradicates within itself every distinction and all subsistence of distinction. As this, freedom is its own object. The *terror* of death is the intuition of its negative essence. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of its own completely different from its concept of itself: that universal will is only the *positive* essence of personality, and that personality knows itself in universal will only positively, or as preserved. Instead, this self-consciousness, which as pure insight completely separates its positive and negative essence—the absolute without predicates as pure *thought* and as pure *matter*—now has before it the absolute *transition* from one into the other in its actuality.—Universal will, as absolutely *positive*, actual self-consciousness, turns into *negative* essence because it is this self-conscious actuality *raised* to *pure* thought or *abstract* matter. It proves equally to be the *sublation* of *thinking oneself*, or of self-consciousness.
[1807 543]

593 As the *pure* equality with itself of universal will, absolute freedom therefore contains *negation*, and with it *distinction* in general, and develops distinction again as *actual* distinction. For in universal will equal to itself, pure *negativity* has the *element* of subsistence, or the *substance*, in which its moments realize themselves. It has the matter it can use for its determination. Insofar as this substance has shown itself as the negative for individual consciousness, the organization of spiritual bodies therefore develops again, and the multitude of indi-

vidual consciousnesses is assigned to them. Having felt fear of their absolute master, death, these consciousnesses again accept negation and distinctions. They subordinate themselves to the bodies and return to a divided and limited work, but thereby to their substantial actuality.

594 From this tumult, spirit would have been thrown back to its starting point, the ethical and real world of cultivation. That world would merely have been refreshed and rejuvenated by fear of the master returning into people's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse this cycle of necessity anew and repeat it forever if the result were merely the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance. In such an interpenetration, self-consciousness, having experienced the power of its universal essence as negative toward it, [1807 544] would want to know and find itself not as this particular self, but only as universal. It could therefore also tolerate universal spirit's objective actuality, which excludes it as particular.—But in absolute freedom, there was no interaction between consciousness immersed in manifold existence, or fixing determinate purposes and thoughts for itself, and an *external* world with validity, whether of actuality or thought. Instead, the interaction was between the world, present wholly in the form of consciousness as universal will, and self-consciousness, likewise contracted from all extended existence and manifold purposes and judgments into the simple self. The cultivation it gains through interaction with that essence is therefore the highest and last: seeing its pure, simple actuality immediately disappear and pass into empty nothingness. In the world of cultivation itself, self-consciousness does not reach the point of intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction. Instead, its negation is a filled one: either the honor or wealth it gains in place of the self it alienated; or the language of spirit and insight that disrupted consciousness gains; or the heaven of faith; or the useful of enlightenment. All these determinations are lost in the loss the self experiences in absolute [1807 545] freedom. Its negation is meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative containing nothing positive, nothing fulfilling. —At the same time, however, this negation in its actuality is not something *foreign*. It is neither the universal *necessity* beyond, in which the ethical world per-

ishes, nor the individual contingency of one's own possessions or of an owner's mood, on which disrupted consciousness sees itself dependent. Instead, it is *universal will*, which in this final abstraction contains nothing positive and therefore can give nothing back in return for sacrifice. But precisely for that reason it is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness. Or it is the purely positive because it is the purely negative. In the inner concept, meaningless death, the self's unfilled negativity, turns into absolute positivity. For consciousness, its immediate unity with universal will—its demand to know itself as this determinate point within universal will—turns into the utterly opposite experience. What disappears for it in this experience is abstract *being*, or the immediacy of the substanceless point. This vanished immediacy is universal will itself, as which consciousness now knows itself insofar as it is *sublated immediacy*, and insofar as it is pure knowledge or pure will. Through this it knows universal will as itself and itself as essence, but not [1807 546] as *immediately existing* essence. It knows universal will neither as revolutionary government nor as the anarchy striving to establish anarchy, and itself neither as the center of this faction nor of the opposite faction. Instead, *universal will* is its *pure knowing and willing*, and *it* is universal will as this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose *itself* in this, since pure knowing and willing is more truly itself than the atomic point of consciousness. It is therefore the interaction of pure knowledge with itself. Pure *knowledge* as *essence* is universal will, but this *essence* is absolutely nothing but pure knowledge. Self-consciousness is thus pure knowledge of essence as pure knowledge. Further, as *individual self*, it is only the form of the subject or of actual activity, known by it as *form*. Likewise, for it *objective* actuality, *being*, is form utterly without a self, since it would be what is not known; but this knowledge knows knowledge as essence.

595 Absolute freedom has therefore reconciled the opposition of universal and individual will with itself. Self-alienated spirit, driven to the height of its opposition, where pure willing and what wills purely are still differentiated, reduces this opposition to transparent form and finds itself within it.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes into the realm of faith and insight, absolute freedom

passes from its self-destroying [1807 547] actuality into another land of self-conscious spirit. There, in this unactuality, freedom counts as the true. Spirit refreshes itself in the thought of freedom insofar as it *is and remains thought*, and knows this being enclosed within self-consciousness as perfect and complete essence. The new shape of *moral spirit* has arisen.
[1807 548]
C. *Spirit certain of itself: morality*.

596 The ethical world showed the spirit that was only departed within it, *the individual self*, to be its fate and truth. But this *legal person* has its substance and fulfillment outside itself. The movement of the world of cultivation and faith sublates this abstraction of the person. Through completed alienation, through the highest abstraction, substance first becomes *universal will* for spirit's self, and finally becomes its property. Here, then, knowledge at last seems to have become completely equal to its truth. For its truth is this knowledge itself, and all opposition between the two sides has disappeared—not *for us*, or *in itself*, but for self-consciousness itself. For it has mastered the opposition of consciousness itself. Consciousness rests on the opposition between certainty of itself and the object. But now, for consciousness itself, the object is certainty of itself, knowledge, just as certainty of itself as [1807 549] such no longer has purposes of its own, and thus no longer exists in determinateness, but is pure knowledge.

597 Self-consciousness's knowledge is therefore for it *substance* itself. In an undivided unity, substance is for it both *immediate* and absolutely *mediated*. *Immediate*: like ethical consciousness, it itself knows and does duty and belongs to duty as its nature. But it is not *character*, as ethical consciousness is. Because of its immediacy, ethical consciousness is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one ethical essentiality, and has the side of *not knowing*.—It is *absolute mediation*, like consciousness cultivating itself and believing consciousness. For it is essentially the self's movement of sublating the abstraction of *immediate existence* and becoming universal for itself. Yet it does this neither through pure alienation and tearing apart of its self and actuality, nor through flight. Instead,

it is *immediately present* to itself in its substance, since substance is its knowledge, the intuited pure certainty of itself. And precisely *this immediacy*, its own actuality, is all actuality. For the immediate is *being* itself, and as pure immediacy purified through absolute negativity, it is pure *being* in general, or *all* being.

598 Absolute essence is therefore not exhausted by the determination of being the simple *essence* of *thought*. [1807 550] Instead, it is all *actuality*, and this actuality exists only as knowledge. What consciousness did not know would have no meaning and could have no power for it. All objectivity and world have withdrawn into its knowing will. It is absolutely free in knowing its freedom, and precisely this knowledge of its freedom is its substance, purpose, and sole content.

a. The moral worldview.

599 Self-consciousness knows duty as absolute essence. It is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness. Duty cannot take the form of something foreign for it. But enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as *consciousness*. The object is immediate knowledge, and so purely permeated by the self, it is not an object. Yet self-consciousness is essentially mediation and negativity. Its concept contains a relation to *otherness*, and it is consciousness. On one side, since duty constitutes its only essential purpose and object, this otherness is for it a completely *meaningless* actuality. But since this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it relates to this otherness completely freely and [1807 551] indifferently. On the other side, therefore, existence is completely released by self-consciousness and equally relates only to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also becomes its consciousness's negative object. This object is thereby a world completed within itself into an individuality of its own: an independent whole of distinctive laws, an independent course and free actualization of them. It is a *nature* in general. Its laws and activity belong to itself, as to an essence that is as unconcerned with moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is with it.

600 From this determination, a *moral worldview* develops. It consists in the *relation* between *moral* being-in-and-for-itself and *natural* being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is grounded, on one side, in the complete mutual *indifference* and separate *independence* of *nature* and *moral* purposes and activity. On the other side, it is grounded in consciousness of duty's sole essentiality and nature's complete lack of independence and essence. The moral worldview contains the development of the moments contained in this relation of such utterly conflicting presuppositions.

601 First, then, moral consciousness in general is presupposed. Duty counts as essence for this consciousness, which is *actual* and *active*, and fulfills duty in its actuality and deed. But for this [1807 552] moral consciousness, nature's presupposed freedom is also present. Or it *experiences* that nature is unconcerned with giving it consciousness of the unity of its own actuality with nature's, and therefore *perhaps* lets it become *happy*, and *perhaps not*. Immoral consciousness, by contrast, may by chance find its actualization where moral consciousness sees only an *occasion* for action. But through that action moral consciousness does not see the good fortune of execution and the enjoyment of accomplishment fall to it. It therefore finds reason instead to complain of this condition in which it and existence do not fit one another, and of the injustice that limits it to having its object only as *pure duty*, while denying it the sight of this object, and of *itself*, actualized.

602 Moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and leave this moment out of its absolute purpose. The purpose expressed as *pure duty* essentially contains this *individual* self-consciousness. *Individual conviction* and knowledge of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. In the *purpose* become *objective*, in *fulfilled* duty, this moment is *individual* consciousness intuiting itself as actualized, or *enjoyment*. Enjoyment is therefore not immediately contained in the concept of morality considered as *attitude*, [1807 553] but in the concept of its *actualization*. Yet through this it is also contained in morality as *attitude*. For attitude aims not to remain attitude opposed to action, but to *act*, or actualize itself. Expressed as the whole, with consciousness of its moments, the purpose

is therefore this: fulfilled duty should be both purely moral action and realized *individuality*, and *nature*, as the side of *individuality* opposed to the abstract purpose, should be *one* with that purpose.—The experience of disharmony between the two sides is necessary because nature is free. Yet duty alone is equally what is essential, and nature has no self in relation to it. That whole *purpose* constituted by harmony contains actuality itself within it. It is also the *thought* of *actuality*. The harmony of morality and nature—or, since nature matters only insofar as consciousness experiences nature's unity with consciousness, the harmony of morality and happiness—is *thought* as necessarily *existing*, or is *postulated*. For *demanding* expresses that something not yet actual is thought as *existing*: a necessity not of the *concept* as concept, but of *being*. Yet necessity is also essentially relation through the concept. The *being* demanded therefore does not belong to the representing of contingent consciousness. It lies in the concept of morality itself, whose [1807 554] true content is the *unity* of *pure* and *individual* consciousness. It belongs to individual consciousness that this unity should exist *for it* as an actuality. In the purpose's *content*, this is happiness; in its *form*, existence in general.—This demanded existence, or unity of the two, is therefore not a wish. Considered as a purpose, it is not one whose attainment is still uncertain. It is a demand of reason, or reason's immediate certainty and presupposition.

603 That first experience and this postulate are not the only ones. A whole circle of postulates opens up. For nature is not merely this completely free, *external* mode in which consciousness would have to realize its purpose as in a pure object. Consciousness is *within itself* essentially something *for which* this other free actuality exists. That is, consciousness itself is contingent and natural. This nature, which is its own, is *sensibility*. In the *shape* of willing, as *drives* and *inclinations*, sensibility has for itself a *determinate* essentiality of its own, or *individual purposes*, and therefore opposes pure will and its pure purpose. But against this opposition, what is essential for pure consciousness is instead sensibility's relation to it, sensibility's absolute unity with it. Both pure thought and consciousness's sensibility are *in themselves one consciousness*, and pure thought is

precisely that for [1807 555] which and within which this pure unity exists. But for pure thought as consciousness, there is opposition between itself and the drives. In this conflict of reason and sensibility, what is essential for reason is that the conflict dissolve and that the unity of the two emerge as *result*. This is not that *original* unity in which both are present in one individual, but a unity emerging from their *known* opposition. Only such unity is *actual* morality. For it contains the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or only then actual and in fact a self, and also universal. Or it expresses that *mediation* which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Of the two moments of the opposition, sensibility is simply *otherness*, or the negative, while the pure thought of duty is essence, none of which can be given up. It therefore seems that the unity produced can come about only through sublating sensibility. But sensibility is itself a moment of this coming-to-be, the moment of *actuality*. For the present, then, we must content ourselves with expressing this unity by saying that sensibility should *conform* to morality.—This unity too is a *postulated being*. It does not *exist*, since what *does exist* is consciousness, or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness. Yet it is also not an in-itself like [1807 556] the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side and its harmony with moral consciousness therefore falls outside moral consciousness. Here nature is the nature within consciousness itself. What is at issue is morality as such, a harmony belonging to the acting self itself. Consciousness must therefore bring this harmony about itself and make continual progress in morality. But morality's *completion* must be *deferred to infinity*. For if it actually occurred, moral consciousness would sublate itself. This is because *morality* is moral *consciousness* only as negative essence, for whose pure duty sensibility has only a *negative* meaning, only that of *not conforming*. In harmony, however, *morality* as *consciousness*, or its *actuality*, disappears, just as in moral *consciousness*, or actuality, its *harmony* disappears. Completion therefore cannot actually be attained, but only thought as an *absolute task*: one that remains a task unconditionally. Yet its content must also be thought as something that absolutely *must be* and does not remain a task. Whether one represents consciousness as completely sublated at this goal or not, it can no longer be [1807

557] clearly distinguished how this should really be understood in the dark distance of infinity, where attainment of the goal must be pushed precisely for this reason. Properly, it must be said that the determinate representation should not interest us or be sought, because it leads to contradictions: a task that is to remain a task and yet be fulfilled; a morality that is no longer to be consciousness, no longer actual. But if we consider that completed morality would contain a contradiction, the holiness of moral essentiality would suffer, and absolute duty would appear as something unactual.

604 The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final purpose of the *world*. The other was the harmony of morality and sensuous will, the final purpose of *self-consciousness* as such. The first was therefore harmony in the form of the *in-itself*, the other in the form of *being-for-itself*. What connects these two thought extremes of final purpose as their middle is the movement of *actual* action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract distinctness, have not yet become objects. This happens in actuality, where the sides appear within consciousness proper, each as the *other* of the other. The postulates arising from this now contain harmonies existing *in and for themselves*, where previously there were only separate harmonies existing *in themselves* and *for themselves*.

605 As the *simple knowing* and *willing* of pure *duty*, moral consciousness in action [1807 558] relates to an object opposed to its simplicity: the actuality of the *manifold case*. It thereby has a manifold moral *relation*. Here, in content, the *many* laws in general arise; in form, the contradictory powers of knowing consciousness and the unconscious arise.—First, regarding the *many duties*, only *pure duty* within them has validity for moral consciousness in general. The *many duties*, as many, are *determinate* and therefore as such are nothing holy for moral consciousness. Yet they are also *necessary* through the concept of *action*, which includes a manifold actuality and therefore a manifold moral relation. They must therefore be regarded as existing in and for themselves.

Further, since they can exist only in a moral *consciousness*, they are also in a consciousness other than the one for which only pure duty as pure exists in and for itself and is holy.

606 It is therefore postulated that *another* consciousness exists that sanctifies them, or knows and wills them as duties. The first consciousness keeps pure duty *indifferent* to every *determinate content*, and duty is only this indifference to content. The other consciousness, however, contains the equally essential relation to action and the *necessity* of *determinate* content. Since duties have validity for it as *determinate* duties, content as [1807 559] such is as essential for it as the form through which content is duty. This is therefore a consciousness in which the universal and the particular are absolutely one. Its concept is thus the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of moral consciousness *equal to itself* from actuality, which as *manifold being* conflicts with duty's simple essence. But the first postulate expresses only the *existing* harmony of morality and nature, because nature there is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of *being*. Now, by contrast, this *in-itself* is essentially posited as consciousness. For what exists now has the form of the *content* of *duty*, or is the *determinateness* in *determinate duty*. The in-itself is therefore the unity of things that, as *simple essentialities*, are essentialities of thought and thus exist only in a consciousness. This consciousness is therefore now a lord and ruler of the world, producing the harmony of morality and happiness and also sanctifying duties as *many*. The latter means that for consciousness of *pure duty*, determinate duty cannot immediately be holy. Yet since determinate duty is likewise *necessary* for actual action, which is determinate, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another. This other consciousness therefore mediates between determinate and pure duty and is the ground of determinate duty's validity too.
[1807 560]

607 In actual action, however, consciousness behaves as this self, as a completely individual self. It is directed toward actuality as such and has actuality as its purpose, since it wants to accomplish. *Duty in general* therefore falls outside it into another essence that is consciousness and the holy lawgiver of pure duty. Precisely because it acts, acting consciousness immediately regards what is other than pure duty as valid. Pure duty is therefore the content of another consciousness and is holy for the acting consciousness only indirectly, namely in that other consciousness.

608 It has thus been posited that duty's validity as holy *in and for itself* falls outside actual consciousness. Actual consciousness therefore stands generally on one side as *imperfect* moral consciousness. In its *knowing*, it knows itself as a consciousness whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent. Likewise, in its *willing*, it knows itself as a consciousness whose purposes are affected by sensibility. Because of its unworthiness, it can therefore regard happiness not as necessary but as contingent, and expect it only through grace.

609 Although its actuality is imperfect, duty nevertheless counts as essence for its *pure* willing and knowing. In the concept, insofar as the concept is opposed to reality, or in thought, consciousness is therefore perfect. But absolute essence is precisely this thing thought and postulated beyond actuality [1807 561]. It is therefore the thought in which morally imperfect knowing and willing count as perfect. Since absolute essence thus accepts this knowing and willing as having full worth, it also grants happiness according to worthiness, namely according to the *merit attributed* to moral consciousness.

610 In this, the worldview is complete. For in the concept of moral self-consciousness, both sides—pure duty and actuality—are posited in a single unity. Neither is therefore posited as existing in and for itself, but as a *moment*, or as sublated. This comes to be for consciousness in the final part of the moral worldview. Consciousness places pure duty in an essence other than itself. That is, it posits duty partly as something *represented*, and partly as something that is not what has validity in and for itself; instead, the nonmoral counts as perfect.

Likewise, consciousness posits itself as a consciousness whose actuality, inadequate to duty, is sublated and, as *sublated*, or within the *representation* of absolute essence, no longer contradicts morality.

611 For moral consciousness itself, however, its moral worldview does not mean that it develops its own concept within that worldview and makes the concept its object. It is conscious neither of this opposition of form nor of the opposition in content, [1807 562] whose parts it does not relate and compare with one another. Instead, it rolls onward in its development without being the *concept* holding the moments together. For it knows only *pure essence*, or the object insofar as the object is *duty*, insofar as it is the *abstract* object of its pure consciousness, as pure knowledge or as itself. It therefore relates only by thinking, not by comprehending. The object of its *actual* consciousness is consequently not yet transparent to it. It is not the absolute concept, which alone grasps *otherness* as such, or its absolute opposite, as itself. Its own actuality, like all objective actuality, does indeed count for it as *inessential*. But its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, and nature has therefore also arisen opposite it as something equally free. Both are equally present in it: the *freedom of being* and being's enclosure within consciousness. Its object therefore comes to be as something *existing* that is *at the same time* only *thought*. In the last part of its view, the content is essentially posited so that its *being* is something *represented*. This combination of being and thought is expressed as what it in fact is: *representation*.

612 If we consider the moral worldview in this way—so that this objective mode is nothing other than the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, which self-consciousness makes objective for itself— [1807 563] then this consciousness of the form of its origin yields another shape of its presentation.—The first thing, the starting point, is *actual* moral self-consciousness, or that *such a consciousness exists*. For the concept posits self-consciousness with the determination that, for it, all actuality in general has essence only insofar as it conforms to duty. The concept posits this essence as knowledge, that is, in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is therefore itself actual: it *is* an actual moral

consciousness.—As consciousness, it now represents its content to itself as an object, namely as the *final purpose of the world*, as the harmony of morality and all actuality. But it represents this unity as an *object* and is not yet the concept that has power over the object as such. This unity is therefore for it a negative of self-consciousness, or falls outside it as a beyond of its actuality, yet at the same time as something that is *also* thought as *existing*, but is only thought.

613 What remains for it, as a self-consciousness that is *different* from the object, is therefore the lack of harmony between the consciousness of duty and actuality —its own actuality. The proposition now reads: *there is no actual self-consciousness that is morally complete*. And morality exists at all only when it is complete. Duty is the *pure*, unmixed *in-itself*, and morality consists only in conformity with [1807 564] this purity. So the second proposition means, in general, that *nothing morally actual exists*.

614 But third, since it is one self, it is *in itself* the unity of duty and actuality. This unity therefore becomes its object as complete morality—but as something *beyond* its actuality, which nevertheless is supposed to be actual.

615 In this goal, the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, both self-conscious actuality and duty are posited only as sublated moments. Neither exists on its own. Yet their essential character is to be *free of the other*. In their unity, therefore, neither is any longer free of the other; each is sublated. In terms of content, they thus become objects such that *each counts for the other*. In terms of form, this exchange between them is at the same time only *represented*. Or what is *not actually* moral is nevertheless moral in representation, because it is also pure thought and rises above its actuality; it is accepted as fully valid. This restores the first proposition, that there *is* a moral self-consciousness, but combines it with the second, that there *is* none. That is, there *is* one, but only in representation. Or there is none, but another consciousness nevertheless allows it to count as one.

[1807 565]

b. *Dissemblance*.

616 In the moral worldview we see, on the one hand, consciousness *itself consciously producing* its object. We see that it neither finds the object as something foreign nor has it develop for it unconsciously. Instead, it always proceeds from a ground on which it *posits the objective essence*. It therefore knows this essence as itself, since it knows itself as the *active agent* that produces it. Here, then, it seems to reach peace and satisfaction. It can find these only where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other hand, however, it itself places the object *outside itself*, as something beyond it. Yet this being in and for itself is equally posited as something that is not free of self-consciousness, but exists for its purposes and through it.

617 In fact, then, the moral worldview is nothing but the development of the different sides of this underlying contradiction. To use a Kantian expression where it fits best, it is a *whole nest* of thoughtless contradictions. In this development consciousness fixes one moment and [1807 566] immediately passes from it to the other, sublating the first. But once it has *set up* this second moment, it *also shifts* it again, making its opposite the essence instead. At the same time it is conscious of its contradiction and of this *dissemblance*. For it passes from one moment to its opposite *immediately in relation to that very moment*. Precisely *because* a moment has no reality for it, it posits that same moment as *real*. Or, what amounts to the same thing, to maintain that *one moment* exists in itself, it maintains that the *opposite* exists in itself. In doing so it admits that it is not really serious about any of them. We must examine this more closely in the moments of this dizzying movement.

618 Let us first leave aside the presupposition that an actual moral consciousness exists. This is not made in immediate relation to anything preceding it. Let us turn instead to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. This harmony is supposed to exist *in itself*, not for actual consciousness, not in the present. Instead, the present is only the contradiction between the two. In the present, *morality* is assumed to be *there*, while actuality is placed in a position in which it does not harmonize with morality. But *actual* moral consciousness is an *acting* consciousness. This is precisely what makes its morality actual. In

action itself, however, that position is immediately shifted. For action is nothing [1807 567] but realizing the inner moral purpose, nothing but producing an *actuality determined by the purpose*, or the harmony of the moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the completed action exists for consciousness: it is the *present existence* of this unity of actuality and purpose. In the completed action consciousness sees itself realized as this individual, or sees existence returned into itself. Enjoyment consists in this. So the actuality of the moral purpose also contains the form of that actuality called enjoyment and happiness.—Action therefore immediately fulfills in fact what had been declared not to take place, what was supposed to be only a postulate, only something beyond. Through its deed consciousness thus says that it is not serious about postulating. The meaning of action is rather to make present what was supposed not to be present. Harmony is postulated for the sake of action: what is to become *actual* through action must be so *in itself*, or actuality would not be *possible*. The connection between action and the postulate therefore takes this form: for the sake of action, that is, for the sake of the *actual* harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as *not actual*, as *beyond*. [1807 568]

619 In *acting*, then, consciousness is not serious about the *mismatch* between purpose and actuality in general. On the other hand, it seems serious about *action* itself. But in fact an actual action is only the action of an *individual* consciousness. It is therefore itself only something individual, and its work is contingent. The purpose of reason, however, as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world. This is a final purpose that goes far beyond the content of this individual action, and must therefore be placed beyond all actual action in general. Because the universal good is to be accomplished, nothing good is done. In fact, however, the *nullity* of actual action and the *reality* of the *whole* purpose alone, which have now been asserted, are again shifted in every respect. Moral action is not something contingent and limited, since its essence is pure *duty*. This constitutes the *one whole* purpose. So action, as its realization, accomplishes the whole absolute purpose, however limited its

content may otherwise be. Or suppose actuality is again taken as nature, which has its *own* laws and stands opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law in it. Then, since duty as such is the essence, the point is in fact *not to accomplish* pure duty, which is the whole [1807 569] purpose. For such accomplishment would have as its purpose not pure duty but its opposite, *actuality*. Yet the claim that actuality is not the point is itself again shifted. For according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially *active* consciousness. Action should therefore certainly take place. Absolute duty should be expressed throughout nature, and the moral law should become natural law.

620 So if we accept this *highest good* as the essence, consciousness is not serious about morality at all. For in this highest good nature has no law different from morality's. This removes moral action itself, since action exists only on the presupposition of something negative that the action must sublate. But if nature conforms to the moral law, action, by sublating what exists, would violate that law.—This assumption therefore admits that the essential condition is one in which moral action is unnecessary and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality is posited by the concept of moral action as bringing the two into agreement. From this side, too, it thus says: because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not exist at all.
[1807 570]

621 If we bring together these moments through which consciousness rolled onward in its moral representations, we see that it sublates each in its opposite. It starts from the claim that *for it* morality and actuality do not harmonize. But it is not serious about this, since in action this harmony is present *for it*. Nor is it serious about this *action*, since action is something individual, whereas its purpose is so high: *the highest good*. But this again only shifts the issue, since all action and all morality would disappear in it. Or it is not really serious about *moral* action. What is most desirable, what is absolute, is instead that the highest good should be accomplished and moral action become unnecessary.

622 From this result consciousness must roll onward in its contradictory movement, and must necessarily shift away again from the *sublation* of moral action. Morality is what exists in itself. For it to take place, the world's final purpose cannot have been accomplished. Moral consciousness must instead exist *for itself* and find a *nature opposed to it*. But in its own self it must be complete. This leads to the second postulate: its harmony with the nature immediately within it, with sensibility. Moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure, independent of inclinations and drives, so that it [1807 571] has destroyed the purposes of sensibility within itself.—But it again shifts away from this asserted sublation of its sensible being. It acts, brings its purpose into actuality, and self-conscious sensibility, which is supposed to be sublated, is precisely the middle term between pure consciousness and actuality. It is pure consciousness's instrument or organ for realizing itself, and is what is called drive or inclination. So it is not serious about sublating inclinations and drives, since these are precisely *self-consciousness realizing itself*. Yet they are not to be *suppressed*, either, but only to *conform* to reason. And they do conform to it, since moral *action* is nothing but consciousness realizing itself and thus giving itself the form of a *drive*. That is, it is immediately the present harmony of drive and morality. But in fact drive is not merely this empty form, capable of having within it a motive other than itself and being driven by that motive. Sensibility is a nature with its own laws and springs of action within itself. Morality therefore cannot seriously mean to be the driving force of drives, the angle of inclination of inclinations. Since these have their own fixed character and distinctive content, the consciousness to which they conformed would instead conform to them. Moral self-consciousness rejects such conformity. The [1807 572] harmony of the two therefore exists only *in itself* and is *postulated*.—The *present* harmony of morality and sensibility was just asserted in moral action. But *now* this is shifted away. It lies beyond consciousness in a misty distance, where nothing can any longer be distinguished precisely or comprehended. For the attempt we just made to comprehend this unity did not succeed.—In this in-itself, however, consciousness gives itself up altogether. This in-itself is its moral completion, in which the struggle between morality and sensibility has ended, and the

latter conforms to the former in an incomprehensible way.—This completion therefore again only shifts the issue. In fact, *morality* itself would give itself up in it. For morality is only the consciousness of the absolute purpose as *pure*, and thus as *opposed* to all other purposes. It is equally the *activity* of this pure purpose insofar as it is conscious of rising above sensibility, of sensibility's interference, and of its opposition and struggle against it.—Consciousness itself immediately states that it is not serious about moral completion by shifting it out into *infinity*, that is, by asserting it as never completed.

623 Only this intermediate condition of incompletion, then, is valid for it. Yet this condition is at least supposed to be a *progression* toward completion. But it cannot be even this, since [1807 573] progress in morality would instead be an approach toward its destruction. The goal would be the nothingness mentioned above, the sublation of morality and consciousness itself. But coming closer and closer to nothing means *decreasing*. Besides, *progress* in general, like *decrease*, would assume differences of *magnitude* in morality. But there can be no question of these in it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is *pure* duty, no difference at all can be considered, least of all the superficial difference of magnitude. There is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.

624 Since consciousness is therefore not serious about moral completion but instead about the intermediate condition—that is, as just explained, about nonmorality—we return from another side to the content of the first postulate. We cannot see how happiness can be demanded for this moral consciousness on the grounds that it *deserves* it. It is conscious of its incompletion, and therefore cannot in fact demand happiness as something earned, something of which it is worthy. It can demand it only through a free act of grace: that is, it can demand happiness *as such*, in and for itself, and expect it not on that absolute ground but through chance and arbitrary choice.—In this, nonmorality says exactly what it is: that what matters is not morality but [1807 574] happiness in and for itself, without relation to morality.

625 This second side of the moral worldview also sublates the other assertion of its first side, which presupposes disharmony between morality and happiness.—It claims to experience that, in the present, moral people often fare badly while immoral people often fare well. But the intermediate condition of incomplete morality, which has proved essential, plainly shows that this perception and supposed experience only shifts the issue. For if morality is incomplete—that is, if morality in fact does *not* exist—what can there be to the experience that it fares badly?—At the same time it has emerged that happiness in and for itself is what matters. This shows that the judgment that the immoral person fares well did not mean that an injustice was occurring. Since morality is incomplete in general, the designation of an individual as immoral falls away *in itself*, and therefore has only an arbitrary basis. The judgment drawn from experience thus means only that some people ought not to receive happiness in and for itself. That is, it is *envy*, using morality as its cover. But the reason why others should receive so-called happiness is [1807 575] good friendship, which *wishes* this grace—that is, this chance—for them and itself, and *gladly lets them have it*.

626 Morality in moral consciousness is therefore incomplete. This is what is now asserted. But its essence is to be only what is *complete and pure*. Incomplete morality is therefore impure, or is immorality. Morality itself thus exists in a being other than actual consciousness: a holy moral lawgiver.—The *incomplete* morality within consciousness, which provides the basis for this postulate, *initially* means the following. When morality is posited as *actual* within consciousness, it stands in relation to an *other*, to an existence. It thus acquires otherness or difference within itself, and this produces a multiplicity of moral commands. But at the same time moral self-consciousness regards these *many* duties as inessential. What matters is only the *one* pure duty, and *for it* they have no truth insofar as they are *determinate*. They can therefore have their truth only in another being. Through a holy lawgiver they are holy, which they are not for moral self-consciousness.—But this again only shifts the issue. For moral self-consciousness is the absolute for itself, and duty is simply only what

it knows as duty. But it knows only pure duty as duty. What is not holy for it is not holy in itself, and what is not holy in itself cannot be made holy [1807 576] by the holy being. Nor is moral consciousness serious at all about letting something be sanctified *by another* consciousness rather than itself. For it, only what is holy through *itself and within it* is holy at all.—So it is no more serious about this other being's holiness. For something was supposed to acquire essential standing in that being which has none for moral consciousness, that is, none in itself.

627 If the holy being was postulated so that duty would be valid in it not as pure duty but as a multiplicity of *determinate* duties, this too must therefore be shifted. The other being must be holy only insofar as *pure duty* alone is valid in it. In fact, pure duty is valid only in another being, not in moral consciousness. Although pure morality alone seems to count in moral consciousness, this must nevertheless be put differently, since it is also natural consciousness. Morality in it is affected and conditioned by sensibility. It therefore does not exist in and for itself, but is something contingent in free *willing*; and within consciousness as pure *willing*, it is something contingent in *knowing*. Morality therefore exists *in and for itself* in another being.

628 Here, then, this being is purely complete morality because morality in it does not stand in [1807 577] relation to nature and sensibility. But the *reality* of pure duty is its *realization* in nature and sensibility. Moral consciousness locates its imperfection in morality's having a *positive* relation to nature and sensibility within it. For it regards an exclusively *negative* relation to them as an essential moment of morality. The pure moral being, by contrast, is above the *struggle* with nature and sensibility, and therefore does not stand in a *negative* relation to them. In fact, then, only a *positive* relation to them remains for it—precisely what just counted as incomplete, as immoral. But *pure morality* entirely separated from actuality, so that it equally had no positive relation to it, would be an unconscious, nonactual abstraction. In it the concept of morality

—being the thought of pure duty, and a willing and doing—would be completely sublated. This supposedly pure moral being therefore again shifts the issue and must be given up.

629 But in this purely moral being, the moments of the contradiction in which this synthetic representation moves around draw together. So do the opposed *alsos*, which it lets follow one another without bringing these thoughts together, always replacing one opposite with the other. They come [1807 578] so close that consciousness must abandon its moral worldview and flee back into itself.

630 It recognizes its morality as incomplete because it is affected by an opposed sensibility and nature. These partly cloud morality itself as such, and partly give rise to a mass of duties that leave it at a loss in the concrete case of actual action. For each case combines many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing with many properties. And when *determinate* duty is the purpose, it has a content; its *content* is part of the purpose, and morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its *reality* in another being. But this reality means nothing other than that morality here exists *in and for itself*: *for itself*, that is, as the morality of a *consciousness*; *in itself*, that is, having *existence* and *actuality*.—In that first, incomplete consciousness, morality is not carried out. There it is the *in-itself* in the sense of a *thing of thought*. For it is associated with nature and sensibility, with the actuality of being and consciousness, which makes up its content; and nature and sensibility are morally null.—In the second being, morality is present as *complete*, not as an unfulfilled thing of thought. But this completion consists precisely in morality's having existence in a *consciousness*, having *actuality* as well as *free [1807 579] actuality*, existence in general; in its being not empty but fulfilled and full of content. That is, morality's completion is placed in the presence within it of what was just defined as morally null. At one moment it is supposed to be valid solely as the nonactual thing of thought belonging to pure abstraction, yet equally to have no validity in this form. Its truth is supposed to consist in being opposed to actuality, entirely free and empty of it, and then again in being actuality.

631 The syncretism of these contradictions, spread out in the moral worldview, collapses into itself. The distinction on which it rests—between something that must necessarily be thought and posited, yet is at the same time inessential—becomes a distinction no longer present even in the words. What is finally posited as different, both as null and as real, is one and the same: existence and actuality. And what is supposed to exist absolutely only *beyond* actual being and consciousness, yet equally only within them and to be null as a beyond, is pure duty and the knowledge of it as the essence. Consciousness makes this distinction that is no distinction. It declares actuality both null and real, and pure morality both the true [1807 580] essence and without essence. It thus states together the thoughts it previously separated. It itself says that it is not serious about this determination and about separating the moments of the *self* and the *in-itself*. Instead, what it declares to be the absolute *being* outside consciousness it keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness; and what it declares to be the absolutely *thought*, or the absolute *in-itself*, it therefore regards as having no truth.—Consciousness comes to see that separating these moments is dissemblance, and it would be *hypocrisy* to maintain them nonetheless. But as morally pure self-consciousness, it recoils in disgust back into itself from this mismatch between its *representation* and its *essence*, from this untruth that declares true what it regards as untrue. It is *pure conscience*, which scorns such a moral representation of the world. *Within itself* it is simple spirit, certain of itself, acting conscientiously and immediately without the mediation of those representations, and having its truth in this immediacy.—But if this world of dissemblance is nothing other than the development of moral self-consciousness in its moments, and thus its *reality*, then its return into itself will not change its essence. Its return into itself is instead only the *attained awareness* that [1807 581] its truth is a pretense. It *would* still have to *pass this off* as *its* truth, since it would have to express and present itself in objective representation. But it *would know* that this was only dissemblance. It would thus in fact be hypocrisy, and that *scorn* for dissemblance would already be hypocrisy's first expression.

c. *Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness*.

632 The antinomy of the moral worldview was that a moral consciousness exists and that none exists—or that duty's validity lies beyond consciousness, and conversely takes place only within it. This had been brought together in the representation in which nonmoral consciousness counted as moral, its contingent knowing and willing were accepted as fully valid, and happiness was granted to it by grace. Moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself, but transferred it to a being other than itself. But placing outside itself what it must necessarily think is just as much a contradiction in form as the former was in content. [1807 582] Yet what appears contradictory is in itself precisely the same thing, and the moral worldview moves around in separating it and dissolving the separation again. Pure duty as *pure knowing* is nothing other than the *self* of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is *being* and *actuality*. Equally, what is supposed to be beyond *actual* consciousness is nothing other than pure thought, and thus in fact the self. So *for us*, or *in itself*, self-consciousness returns into itself and knows as itself the being in which the *actual* is at the same time *pure knowing* and *pure duty*. It is for itself what is fully valid in its contingency. It knows its immediate individuality as pure knowing and acting, as true actuality and harmony.

633 This *self of conscience*, spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and being, is the *third self* that has emerged for us from the third world of spirit. We should briefly compare it with the previous selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the self of the *person*. Its existence is *being recognized*. Just as the person is the self empty of substance, its existence is likewise abstract actuality. The person *counts*, and does so immediately. The self is the point immediately at rest in the element of its being. It is not separated from its universality, so the two [1807 583] are not in movement and relation to one another. The universal is undifferentiated within it, and is neither the self's content, nor is the self filled through itself.—The *second self* is the world of cultivation that has reached its truth, or the spirit of division restored to itself: absolute freedom. In this self, that first immediate unity of individuality and universality falls apart. The universal, which remains equally

a purely spiritual essence, being recognized, or universal will and knowing, is the self's *object* and content, and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of existence free from the self. In this self, therefore, it reaches no fulfillment and no positive content, no world. Moral self-consciousness does release its universality, so that it becomes a nature of its own, while equally holding it within itself as sublated. But it is only the dissembling play of alternation between these two determinations. Only as conscience does it have, in its *self-certainty*, the *content* for the previously empty duty, as well as for empty right and the empty universal will. And because this self-certainty is equally *immediate*, it has existence itself.

634 Having reached this truth of itself, moral self-consciousness therefore abandons —or rather sublates within itself—the separation from which dissemblance arose: the separation of the *in-itself* and the *self*, of pure duty as pure *purpose* [1807 584] and *actuality* as a nature and sensibility opposed to pure purpose. Returned into itself in this way, it is *concrete* moral spirit. It does not give itself, in the consciousness of pure duty, an empty standard opposed to actual consciousness. Instead, pure duty and the nature opposed to it are both sublated moments. It is a *moral* being *realizing itself* in immediate unity, and its action is immediately a *concrete* moral shape.

635 A case calling for action is present. It is an objective actuality for knowing consciousness. As conscience, consciousness knows it in an immediate, concrete way, and the case is at the same time only as consciousness knows it. Knowing is contingent insofar as it differs from the object. But spirit certain of itself is no longer such contingent knowing, no longer the creation within itself of thoughts different from actuality. The separation of the *in-itself* and the *self* has been sublated. So in the sensory *certainty* of knowing, the case is immediately as it is *in itself*, and it is *in itself* only as it is in this knowing.—Action as realization is thereby the pure form of willing. It simply reverses actuality as an *existing* case into an actuality *done*, and the mere mode of *objective* knowing into the mode of knowing [1807 585] *actuality* as something produced by consciousness. Just as sense-certainty is immediately taken up into spirit's in-itself

—or rather reversed—this reversal too is simple and unmediated. It is a transition through the pure concept without changing the content, which is determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows it.—Further, conscience does not divide the circumstances of the case into different duties. It does not act as a *positive universal medium* in which the many duties, each for itself, acquired unshakable substantiality. That would mean *either* that no action at all could take place, since every concrete case contains opposition in general and, as a moral case, the opposition of duties, so that in determining action one side, one duty, would always be *violated*; *or* that, if action took place, one of the opposed duties would actually be violated. Conscience is instead the negative one, or absolute self, that destroys these different moral substances. It is simple action in accordance with duty, which does not fulfill this or that duty but knows and does what is concretely right. It is thus, for the first time, moral *action* as action, into which the previous inactive consciousness of morality has passed.—A consciousness that makes distinctions may analyze the deed's concrete shape into different properties—that is, here, [1807 586] into different moral relations. It may declare each of these absolutely valid, as it must if they are to be duties, or compare and examine them. In conscience's simple moral action the duties are so submerged that each of these individual essences is immediately *curtailed*. In conscience's unshakable certainty, the testing that shakes duty does not take place at all.

636 Nor does conscience contain that wavering uncertainty of a consciousness which now places so-called pure morality outside itself in another, holy being and regards itself as unholy, and then again places moral purity within itself and the connection of the sensible with the moral in the other being.

637 It renounces all these positions and shifts of the moral worldview by renouncing the consciousness that grasps duty and actuality as contradictory. According to that consciousness, I act morally when I am *conscious* of accomplishing only pure duty, not *anything else*. In fact, this means *when I do not* act. But when I actually act, I am conscious of an *other*, of an *actuality* already present and one I want to produce. I have a *determinate* purpose and fulfill a

determinate duty. [1807 587] Something *other* is involved than pure duty, which alone was supposed to be intended.—Conscience, by contrast, is the awareness that when moral consciousness declares *pure duty* to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose disguises the issue. The issue itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought, and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality. This actuality is that of consciousness itself, not as a thing of thought but as an individual. *For itself*, conscience has its truth in its *immediate certainty* of itself. This *immediate*, concrete self-certainty is the essence. Viewed in terms of the opposition belonging to consciousness, its own immediate *individuality* is the content of moral doing; and its *form* is precisely this self as pure movement, namely as *knowing* or as *its own conviction*.

638 Considered more closely in its unity and in the meaning of its moments, moral consciousness grasped itself only as the *in-itself* or *essence*. But as conscience it grasps its *being-for-itself*, or its *self*.—The contradiction of the moral worldview *dissolves*: the distinction underlying it proves to be no distinction, and it contracts into pure negativity. But this is precisely the *self*: a simple *self* [1807 588] that is equally *pure* knowing and knowing itself as *this individual* consciousness. This self therefore makes up the content of the previously empty essence. For it is the *actual*, which no longer means a nature foreign to the essence and independent in its own laws. As the negative, it is the *difference* within the pure essence: a content, and indeed one valid in and for itself.

639 Further, as pure knowing equal to itself, this self is the *universal without qualification*. So this very knowing, *as its own* knowing, as conviction, is *duty*. Duty is no longer the universal confronting the self. It is known to have no validity in this separation. The law now exists for the self's sake, not the self for the law's sake. But law and duty therefore mean not only *being-for-itself* but also *being-in-itself*. For because this knowing is equal to itself, it is precisely the *in-itself*. In consciousness this *in-itself* also separates from that immediate unity with being-for-itself. Confronting it in this way, it is *being, being for another*.—Duty itself, as duty deserted by the self, is now known to be only a *moment*. It has

sunk from its meaning as *absolute essence* to a being that is not self, not *for itself*, and thus is *being for another*. But this *being for another* remains an essential moment for that very reason. For the self as consciousness constitutes the opposition of being-for-itself and [1807 589] being for another; and duty is now immediately *actual* consciousness within itself, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.

640 This *being for another* is therefore the substance that *exists in itself* and is distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pure duty, or the *abstract in-itself*. Rather, it is the essential moment of relating to others as *universality*. It is the common element of self-consciousnesses, and this is the substance in which the deed has *subsistence* and *actuality*: the moment of *being recognized* by others. Moral self-consciousness lacks this moment of being recognized, of *pure consciousness that exists*. For that reason it does not act or realize anything at all. Its *in-itself* is for it either the abstract, *nonactual* essence or *being* as an *actuality* that is not spiritual. But the *existing actuality* of conscience is one that is *self*: existence conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being recognized. Doing is therefore only the translation of its *individual* content into the *objective* element, in which that content is universal and recognized. Precisely its being recognized makes the action actual. The action is recognized and therefore actual because existing actuality is immediately linked with conviction or knowing; or because knowing its purpose is immediately the element of existence, universal recognition. For [1807 590] the action's *essence*, duty, consists in conscience's *conviction* about it. This conviction is precisely the *in-itself* itself. It is self-*consciousness universal in itself*, or *being recognized*, and thus actuality. What is done with the conviction of duty is therefore immediately something that subsists and exists. There is no longer any question here of good intentions failing to be accomplished, or of goodness faring badly. Instead, what is known as duty fulfills itself and comes into actuality. For what accords with duty is precisely what is universal to all self-consciousnesses, what is recognized and therefore

exists. But separated and taken alone, without the self's content, this duty is *being for another*, something transparent that means only an essence without content in general.

641 If we look back at the sphere in which *spiritual reality* first appeared, its concept was that expressing individuality is what exists *in and for itself*. But the shape that immediately expressed this concept was *honest consciousness*, occupied with the *abstract matter itself*. There this *matter itself* was *predicate*. Only in conscience is it *subject*, which has posited all the moments of consciousness within itself, and for which all these moments—substantiality in general, external existence, and the essence of thought—are contained in this self-certainty. The *matter itself* has substantiality in general in ethical life, external existence in [1807 591] cultivation, and the self-knowing essence of thought in morality. In conscience it is the *subject* that knows these moments within itself. Whereas honest consciousness always grasps only *the empty matter itself*, conscience gains it in its fulfillment, which it gives it through itself. It has this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as *moments*, and, as their negative essence, controls them.

642 Consider conscience in relation to the particular determinations of the opposition that appears in action, and its awareness of their nature. It first relates as *knowing* to the *actuality* of the *case* in which action is required. Insofar as this knowing contains the moment of *universality*, knowing involved in conscientious action requires comprehending the actuality before it without restriction, and thus knowing and considering the circumstances of the case precisely. But because this knowing *knows* universality as a *moment*, its knowledge of these circumstances is aware that it does not comprehend them, or is not conscientious in this respect. The truly universal and pure relation of knowing would be a relation to something not *opposed* to it, to itself. But *action*, through the opposition essential to it, relates to a negative of consciousness, to an *actuality existing in itself*. As the absolute *other* to the simplicity of [1807 592] pure consciousness, or as multiplicity *in itself*, this actuality is an absolute plurality of circumstances. It divides and spreads endlessly backward into its conditions,

sideways into its coexistence with other circumstances, and forward into its consequences.—Conscientious consciousness is aware of this nature of the matter and of its relation to it. It knows that it does not know the case in which it acts with the universality demanded, and that its claim to have conscientiously considered every circumstance is empty. Yet this knowledge and consideration of all circumstances is not entirely absent. It exists only as a *moment*, as something only for *others*. Its incomplete knowledge counts for it as sufficiently complete knowledge because it is *its* knowledge.

643 The same holds for the universality of the *essence*, or the determination of content by pure consciousness.—Conscience proceeding to action relates to the case's many sides. The case divides, and so does pure consciousness's relation to it. Through this, the multiplicity of the case becomes a multiplicity of *duties*.—Conscience knows that it must choose and decide among them. None is absolute in its determinacy or content; only *pure duty* is absolute. But in its reality this abstraction has acquired the meaning of the self-conscious I. [1807 593] As conscience, spirit certain of itself rests within itself, and its *real* universality, or its duty, lies in its pure *conviction* of duty. As such, this *pure* conviction is as empty as pure *duty*: pure in the sense that nothing within it, no determinate content, is duty. But action is required; the individual must *determine* something. Spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has acquired the meaning of the self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in its immediate *self-certainty*. As determination and content, this is *natural* consciousness, that is, drives and inclinations.—Conscience recognizes no content as absolute for it, since it is the absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines *from itself*. But the sphere of the self into which determinacy as such falls is so-called sensibility. To have a content from immediate self-certainty, nothing else is at hand.—Everything that appeared in earlier shapes as good or bad, as law and right, is an *other* than immediate self-certainty. It is a *universal* that is now a being for another. Or, viewed differently, it is an object that mediates consciousness with itself, stepping between it and its own truth, separating it from itself rather than being its immediacy.—For conscience, however,

self-certainty is pure immediate [1807 594] truth. This truth is therefore its immediate self-certainty represented as *content*: that is, in general, the individual's arbitrary choice and the contingency of its unconscious natural being.

644 At the same time this content counts as moral *essence* or *duty*. For pure duty, as already emerged in examining laws, is entirely indifferent to every content and accommodates any content. Here it also has the essential form of *being-for-itself*. This form of individual conviction is nothing other than the awareness of pure duty's emptiness, and of its being only a moment. Its substantiality is a predicate whose subject is the individual. The individual's arbitrary choice gives duty its content, can attach any content to this form, and fasten its conscientiousness to it.—An individual increases their property in a certain way. Everyone has a duty to provide for their own preservation and that of their family, and no less for the *possibility* of being useful to their fellow human beings and doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is duty, since this content is immediately contained in their self-certainty. They further see that they fulfill this duty in this case. Others may regard this particular way as fraud. *They* focus on other sides of the concrete case, but the *individual* [1807 595] holds to this side by being conscious of increasing property as pure duty.—Similarly, what others call violence and injustice fulfills the duty to maintain one's independence against others. What they call cowardice fulfills the duty to preserve one's life and the possibility of being useful to one's fellow human beings. But what they call courage instead violates both duties. Cowardice must not be so clumsy as not to know that preserving life and the possibility of being useful to others are duties, not to be *convinced* that its action accords with duty, and not to know that accordance with duty consists in this *knowing*. Otherwise it would commit the blunder of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled duty, this will be lacking no more in action called cowardice than in action called courage. Like every other content, this content too can belong to the abstraction called duty.

Conscience thus knows what it does as duty. Since it knows this, and conviction of duty is accordance with duty itself, it is recognized by others. The action thereby counts and has actual existence.

645 Against this freedom, which places any chosen content in the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowing as readily as any other, it is no use asserting that a different [1807 596] content ought to be placed there. Whatever it is, every content has the *stain of determinacy*, from which pure knowing is free. It can scorn that determinacy just as it can accept any of it. In being determinate, every content stands on the same level as every other, even if it seems to have the character of sublating the particular within itself. In an actual case, duty divides into *opposition* in general, and thereby into that of *individuality* and *universality*. It may therefore seem that the duty whose content is the universal itself immediately has the nature of pure duty, so that form and content become entirely appropriate to one another. Thus, for example, action for the universal good would be preferable to action for the individual's good. But this universal duty is, in general, what is *present* as substance existing in and for itself, as right and law, and is valid *independently* of the individual's knowledge and conviction as well as their immediate interest. It is therefore precisely what morality in general is directed against in its *form*. As for its *content*, this too is *determinate*, insofar as the universal good is *opposed* to the individual's good. Its law is thus one from which conscience knows itself to be entirely free. Conscience grants itself absolute authority to add to it or take from it, to omit it or fulfill it.—Further, that [1807 597] distinction between duty toward the individual and toward the universal is not fixed, given the nature of opposition in general. Instead, what the individual does for themselves also benefits the universal. The more they have provided for themselves, the greater not only their *possibility of helping others*. Their *actuality* itself consists only in being and living in connection with others. Their individual enjoyment essentially means giving up what is theirs to others and helping them obtain their enjoyment. Fulfilling duty toward the individual, and thus toward oneself, therefore also fulfills duty toward the universal.—The *consideration* and *comparison* of duties that would

enter here would amount to calculating the advantage the universal would gain from an action. But this would both surrender morality to the necessary *contingency* of *insight* and contradict conscience's very essence, which is to *cut short* this *calculation* and consideration and decide from itself without such grounds.

646 In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of the *in-itself* and *being-for-itself*, in the unity of pure thought and individuality. It is spirit certain of itself, which has its truth within itself, in its self, in its knowing, and in knowing as knowledge of duty. It maintains itself precisely because whatever is *positive* in the action—both its [1807 598] content and the form of duty and knowledge of it—belongs to the self, to its self-certainty. But whatever claims to *confront* the self as an *in-itself of its own* counts as untrue, as only sublated, only a moment. What counts, therefore, is not *universal knowledge* in general, but *its knowledge* of the circumstances. Into duty, as universal *being-in-itself*, it places the content taken from its natural individuality, since this is the content present within it. Through the universal medium in which it is, this becomes the *duty* it carries out. Empty pure duty is thereby posited as sublated, or as a moment. This content is its sublated emptiness, or its fulfillment.—But conscience is equally free of every content in general. It absolves itself from every determinate duty claiming validity as law. In the power of its self-certainty, it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, to bind and to release.—This *self-determination* therefore immediately accords with duty without qualification. Duty is knowing itself. But this simple selfhood is the in-itself, since the *in-itself* is pure equality with itself, and that equality is in this consciousness.—

647 This pure knowing is immediately *being for another*. For as pure equality with itself, it is *immediacy*, or being. But this being is at the same time the pure universal, the selfhood of all. Or action is recognized and therefore actual. [1807 599] This being is the element through which conscience immediately stands in a relation of equality with all self-consciousnesses. This relation means not selfless law, but the self of conscience.

648 Yet because this right thing that conscience does is also *being for another*, an inequality seems to enter it. The duty it accomplishes is a *determinate* content. This is indeed the *self* of consciousness, and thus its *knowledge* of itself, its *equality* with itself. But once accomplished and placed in the universal medium of *being*, this equality is no longer *knowing*, no longer that distinguishing which immediately sublates its distinctions. Instead, in *being*, the distinction is posited as subsisting. The action is a *determinate* action, unequal to the element of everyone's self-consciousness, and therefore not necessarily recognized. Both sides, acting conscience and the universal consciousness recognizing this action as duty, are equally *free* from the determinacy of this doing. Because of this freedom, their relation in the shared medium of connection is instead a relation of complete inequality. The consciousness for which the action exists is thus completely uncertain about the acting spirit certain of itself. This spirit acts; it posits a determinacy as existing. Others hold to this *being* as its [1807 600] truth, and are certain of it there. In it, spirit has expressed *what* counts for it as duty. But it is free from any *determinate* duty. It has left the place where they think it actually is, and this medium of being itself, and duty as existing *in itself*, count for it only as a moment. So what it places before them it also shifts away again, or rather has immediately shifted already. For its *actuality* is not this duty and determination placed outside it, but the actuality it has in its absolute self-certainty.

649 They therefore do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil. Or rather, not only can they not know; they must also take it to be evil. For just as it is free from the *determinacy* of duty and from duty as existing *in itself*, so are they. They themselves know how to shift away what it places before them. This expresses only the *self* of another, not their own. They not only know themselves free of it; they must dissolve it in their own consciousness, destroy it through judgment and explanation, to preserve their self.

650 But conscience's action is not only this *determination* of being deserted by the pure self. What is to count and be recognized as duty does so only through knowledge and conviction of it as duty, through [1807 601] knowing oneself in

the deed. If the deed ceases to have this self within it, it ceases to be what alone constitutes its essence. Deserted by this consciousness, its existence would be an ordinary actuality, and the action would appear to us as the fulfillment of its pleasure and desire. Here, what is to *exist* has essential standing only through being *known* as individuality expressing itself. This *being known* is what is recognized and what should have *existence as such*.

651 The self enters existence *as self*. Spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its *immediate* action is not what counts and is actual. Neither the *determinate* nor what *exists in itself* is recognized, but only the self-knowing *self* as such. The element of subsistence is universal self-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the action's *effect*. This does not endure there or acquire permanence. Only self-consciousness is recognized and gains actuality.

652 Here we again see *language* as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing *for others*, immediately *present as such*, and universal as *this* self-consciousness. It is the self separating itself from itself, becoming objective to itself as pure I—I. In this objectivity it preserves itself as *this* self just as immediately as it merges with others and is *their* [1807 602] self-consciousness. It hears itself just as it is heard by others, and hearing is precisely *existence become self*.

653 The content language has gained here is no longer the inverted, inverting, and torn self of the world of cultivation. It is spirit returned into itself, certain of itself and, within its self, of its truth or recognition, and recognized as this knowing. The language of ethical spirit is law and the simple command, and lament, which is more a tear shed over necessity. Moral consciousness, by contrast, is still *silent*, closed within its inwardness. In it the self does not yet have existence; existence and the *self* initially stand in an external relation to one another. But language emerges only as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses. The *existing self* is immediately universal, multiple recognition that is simple in this multiplicity. The content of conscience's language is *the self knowing itself as essence*. This alone it expresses, and

this expression is the true actuality of doing and the action's validity. Consciousness expresses its *conviction*. Only in this conviction is the action duty, and it *counts* as duty only because the conviction is *expressed*. For universal self-consciousness is free of the *determinate* action that *only exists*. The action as *existence* [1807 603] counts for nothing to it; what counts is the *conviction* that the action is duty, and this is actual in language.—Here, realizing the action does not mean translating its content from the form of *purpose* or *being-for-itself* into the form of *abstract* actuality. It means translating it from the form of immediate *self-certainty*, which knows its knowing or being-for-itself as the essence, into the form of the *assurance* that consciousness is convinced of duty, and as conscience knows duty *from itself*. This assurance thus assures us that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.

654 Whether the assurance of acting from conviction of duty is *true*, whether what is done is *really duty*—these questions or doubts have no meaning against conscience.—The question whether the *assurance is true* would presuppose that the inner intention differed from the alleged one. That is, the willing of the individual self could separate itself from duty, from the will of universal and pure consciousness. The latter would be put into speech, while the former would be the action's real driving force. But this distinction between universal consciousness and the individual self is precisely what has been sublated, and conscience is its sublation. The immediate knowing of the self certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention is right because it is its intention. All that is required [1807 604] is that it know this and say it: say that it is convinced that its knowing and willing are right. Expressing this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity. In it, consciousness recognizes the *necessary universality of the self*. By calling itself *conscience*, it calls itself pure self-knowing and pure abstract willing. That is, it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes others and is *equal* to them, since they are precisely this pure self-knowing and willing too, and that is therefore also recognized by them. The essence of right lies in the willing of the self certain of itself, in this knowledge that the self is the essence.—Anyone who says they act this way from conscience therefore

speaks the truth, since their conscience is the knowing and willing self. But it is essential that they *say* this, since this self must also be a *universal* self. It is not universal in the action's *content*, since this is in itself indifferent because of its *determinacy*. Universality instead lies in the action's form. This form is what must be posited as actual. It is the *self*, actual as such in language, declaring itself to be the true, and thereby recognizing all selves and being recognized by them.

655 Thus conscience, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, places whatever content it chooses into its knowing and willing. It is moral genius, [1807 605] knowing the inner voice of its immediate knowledge as a divine voice. And since in this knowledge it equally immediately knows existence, it is the divine creative power that has living force in its concept. It is equally worship within itself, since its action is the intuition of this divinity of its own.

656 This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the worship of a *community*, and pure inward self-*knowing* and self-hearing move onward to the moment of *consciousness*. Its intuition of itself is its *objective* existence, and this objective element is the expression of its knowing and willing as something *universal*. Through this expression the self becomes valid and the action becomes an accomplishing deed. The actuality and subsistence of its doing are universal self-consciousness. But conscience's expression posits its self-certainty as pure, and therefore universal, self. Others accept the action because of this speech, in which the self is expressed and recognized as the essence. The spirit and substance of their association are therefore their mutual assurance of conscientiousness and good intentions, their delight in this mutual purity, and their refreshment in the splendor of knowing, expressing, cherishing, and tending such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its *abstract* [1807 606] consciousness from its *self-consciousness*, its life is only *hidden* in God. God is indeed *immediately* present to its spirit and heart, to its self. But what is manifest—its actual consciousness and that consciousness's mediating movement—is for it something other than that hidden inwardness and the immedi-

acy of the present essence. In conscience's completion, however, the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is sublated. It knows that *abstract* consciousness is precisely *this self*, this being-for-itself certain of itself. It knows that in the *immediacy* of the self's *relation* to the in-itself —which, posited outside the self, is the abstract essence and what is hidden from it—*difference is sublated*. For a *mediating* relation is one in which the related terms are not one and the same but an *other* for one another, and are one only in a third. An *immediate* relation, however, means in fact nothing other than unity. Consciousness has risen above the thoughtlessness of still treating these distinctions, which are no distinctions, as distinctions. It knows the immediacy of the essence's presence within it as the unity of the essence and its self, and thus knows its self as the living in-itself. It knows this knowing of its own as religion, which, as intuited or existing knowing, is the community's speech about its spirit.
[1807 607]

657 Here, then, we see self-consciousness returned into its innermost self, for which all externality as such disappears—into the intuition of I = I, in which this I is all essence and existence. It sinks into this concept of itself. For it has been driven to the furthest point of its extremes, in such a way that the distinct moments through which it is real, or still exists as *consciousness*, are these pure extremes not only for us. What it is for itself, what for it is *in itself*, and what for it is *existence*, have evaporated into abstractions that no longer have any hold or substance for this consciousness itself. Everything that was previously essence for consciousness has retreated into these abstractions.—Refined to this purity, consciousness is its poorest shape. The poverty constituting its only possession is itself a vanishing. This absolute *certainty*, into which substance has dissolved, is absolute *untruth*, collapsing into itself. It is absolute *self-consciousness*, in which *consciousness* sinks away.

658 Consider this sinking within itself. For consciousness, the *substance existing in itself* is *knowing* as *its own* knowing. As consciousness, it is divided into the opposition between itself and the object that is the essence for it. But this very

object is completely transparent: it is *its self*, and its consciousness is only knowledge of itself. All life and all spiritual essence have returned into this [1807 608] self and lost their difference from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions. None stands; each loses itself in the other and produces it. This is unhappy consciousness's interchange with itself, but an interchange that takes place for consciousness itself within it, and is conscious of being the concept of reason, which unhappy consciousness is only *in itself*. Its absolute self-certainty therefore immediately turns, for it as consciousness, into an utterance, into the objectivity of its being-for-itself. But this created world is its *speech*, which it has just as immediately heard, and whose echo alone returns to it. This return therefore does not mean that consciousness exists *in and for itself* in it. For the essence is not an *in-itself* for it, but is itself. Nor does it have *existence*, since the objective never becomes a negative of the actual self, just as this self never reaches actuality. It lacks the strength to externalize itself, the strength to make itself a thing and endure being. It lives in fear of staining the splendor of its inwardness through action and existence. To preserve its heart's purity, it flees contact with actuality. It persists in its obstinate inability to relinquish its self, sharpened to the ultimate abstraction, and to give itself substantiality, or transform its thinking into being and entrust itself to absolute difference. The hollow [1807 609] object it produces for itself therefore now fills it with the consciousness of emptiness. Its doing is longing, which only loses itself as it becomes an object without essence. Going beyond this loss and falling back into itself, it finds itself only as lost.—In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy so-called *beautiful soul*, it burns itself out within itself and vanishes like a shapeless mist dissolving into air.

659 But this silent merging of the marrowless essences of evaporated life must also be taken in the other meaning of conscience's *actuality*, and in the *appearance* of its movement. Conscience must be considered as acting.—The *objective* moment in this consciousness was determined above as universal consciousness. Self-knowing knowledge, as *this* self, is distinct from other selves. The lan-

guage in which all mutually recognize one another as acting conscientiously—this universal *equality*—breaks apart into the inequality of individual being-for-itself. Each consciousness is equally reflected entirely into itself out of its universality. This necessarily brings about the opposition of individuality to other individuals and to the universal. This relation and its movement must be considered.—Or this universality and duty have the wholly opposite meaning of determinate *individuality* that exempts itself from the universal. [1807 610] For it, pure duty is only universality brought to the *surface* and turned outward. Duty lies only in words and counts as a being for another. At first conscience, directed only *negatively* against duty as *this determinate, given duty*, knows itself free from it. But by filling empty duty *from itself* with a *determinate* content, it has the positive awareness that as *this* self it makes the content for itself. Its pure self, as empty knowing, has no content or determination. The content it gives this self is taken from its self *as this* determinate self, from itself as natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is indeed aware of its pure self. But in its action's *purpose* as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this particular individual, and of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others—the opposition between universality or duty and its reflection out of universality.

660 When the opposition into which conscience enters as *acting* is expressed within it in this way, it is also inequality outwardly, in the element of existence: the inequality of its particular individuality with other individuals.—Its particularity consists in the two moments constituting its consciousness, the self and the in-itself, having *unequal worth* within it. Specifically, self-certainty [1807 611] is the essence *as against the in-itself*, or the *universal*, which counts only as a moment. Opposed to this inward determination stands the element of existence, or universal consciousness. For this consciousness, universality, duty, is instead the essence, while individuality that exists for itself against the universal counts only as a sublated moment. To this holding fast to duty, the first con-

sciousness counts as *evil*, because it is the inequality of its *being-within-itself* with the universal. And because it also declares its doing to be equality with itself, duty and conscientiousness, it counts as *hypocrisy*.

661 The *movement* of this opposition is initially the formal establishment of equality between what evil is inwardly and what it expresses. Its evil must come to light, so that its existence equals its essence: *hypocrisy* must be *unmasked*.—The inequality within hypocrisy has not already returned to equality merely because, as people commonly say, hypocrisy proves its respect for duty and virtue by assuming their *appearance* and using it as a mask for its own consciousness no less than for others'. This recognition of the opposite is supposed to contain equality and agreement in itself.—But hypocrisy is equally withdrawn from this recognition in language [1807 612] and reflected into itself. In using what *exists in itself* only as a *being for another*, it instead contains its own contempt for it, and a display to everyone of its lack of essence. For what lets itself be used as an external tool shows itself to be a thing without any weight of its own.

662 Nor does this equality come about either through evil consciousness's one-sided insistence on itself or through the judgment of universal consciousness.—Suppose the former denies what it is before the consciousness of duty, and maintains that what the latter calls badness, absolute inequality with the universal, is action according to inner law and conscience. Its inequality with the other remains in this one-sided assurance of equality, since the other does not believe or recognize it.—Or, since one-sided insistence on *one* extreme dissolves itself, evil would thereby admit itself to be evil, but would *immediately* sublate itself in doing so, and would neither be hypocrisy nor unmask itself as such. It does in fact admit itself to be evil by asserting that, opposed to the recognized universal, it acts according to *its* inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its *individuality* and *arbitrary choice*, they would not be something inward and its own, but what is universally recognized. Anyone who therefore says they act against others according to *their own* law and [1807 613] conscience says in fact that they mistreat them. But *actual*

conscience is not this insistence on knowing and willing opposed to the universal. Rather, the universal is the element of its *existence*, and its language expresses its doing as *recognized* duty.

663 Universal consciousness's insistence on its judgment no more unmasks and dissolves hypocrisy.—When it cries out against hypocrisy, calling it bad, base, and so forth, it appeals in this judgment to *its* law, just as *evil* consciousness appeals to *its own*. For the former appears in opposition to the latter, and therefore as a particular law. It thus has no advantage over the other, but instead legitimizes it. This zeal does precisely the opposite of what it means to do: it shows what it calls true duty, which ought to be *universally* recognized, as *unrecognized*, and thereby grants the other the same right of being-for-itself.

664 But this judgment also has another side, through which it introduces the dissolution of the existing opposition.—The consciousness *of the universal* does not relate to the first consciousness as *actual* and *acting*, since the first is instead the actual one. It stands opposed to it as the consciousness not caught in the opposition of individuality and universality that enters [1807 614] action. It remains in the universality of *thought*, relates as an *apprehending* consciousness, and its first action is only judgment.—Through this judgment, as just noted, it places itself *alongside* the first consciousness, and *through this equality* the first comes to intuit itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty relates *by apprehending, passively*. But this puts it in contradiction with itself as the absolute will of duty, as what determines entirely from itself. It is easy for it to preserve its purity, since it *does not act*. It is hypocrisy that wants judging to count as an *actual* deed and proves its integrity not through action but through expressing excellent sentiments. It is therefore exactly like the consciousness it accuses of putting duty only into its speech. In both, actuality is equally distinct from speech: in one through the action's *self-interested purpose*, in the other through the *absence of action* altogether. The necessity of action lies in speaking of duty itself, since without deeds duty has no meaning at all.

665 But judging must also be considered as a positive action of thought, and it has a positive content. From this side, the contradiction within apprehending consciousness and its equality with the first become even [1807 615] more complete.—Acting consciousness expresses this determinate doing of its own as duty, and judging consciousness cannot deny this. For duty itself is the contentless form capable of any content. Or the concrete action, differentiated within itself in its many sides, contains the universal side taken as duty just as much as the particular side constituting the individual's share and interest. Now judging consciousness does not stop at that side of duty, and at the agent's knowledge that this is their duty, the relation and situation of their actuality. Instead it holds to the other side, shifts the action inward, and explains it from an *intention* different from the action itself and from a self-interested *motive*. Just as every action can be considered in terms of its conformity to duty, so can it be considered in this other way, in terms of *particularity*. For as action it is the individual's actuality.—This judging thus removes the action from its existence and reflects it inward, or into the form of its own particularity.—If fame accompanies it, judging knows this inwardness as a *craving* for fame. If the action suits the individual's station in general without going beyond it, and is such that individuality does not have that station attached to it as an external determination, but fills this universality through [1807 616] itself and thereby shows itself capable of a higher station, judgment knows its inwardness as ambition, and so forth. In action in general, the agent comes to intuit *themselves* in objectivity, or to feel themselves in their existence, and thus to enjoy it. Judgment therefore knows the inwardness as a drive toward personal happiness, even if this consists only in inward moral vanity, the enjoyment of being conscious of one's excellence, and the anticipated taste of hoped-for future happiness.—No action can escape such judgment. For duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is nonactual. It has its actuality in individuality's doing, and the action thereby has the side of particularity.—No one is a hero to their valet. But this is not because the hero is not a hero; it is because the valet is—the valet, who deals with the hero not as a hero but as someone eating, drinking, dress-

ing, in general in the individuality of need and representation. Similarly, there is no action in which judging cannot set the side of individuality against the action's universal side, and play morality's valet toward the agent.

666 This judging consciousness is thus itself *base*, because it divides the action, produces its [1807 617] inequality with itself, and holds fast to it. Further, it is *hypocrisy*, because it passes off such judging not as *another way* of being evil but as the *right consciousness* of the action. In its nonactuality and vanity of knowing well and knowing better, it places itself above the deeds it disparages, and wants its deedless talk to count as an excellent *actuality*.—In thus making itself equal to the agent it judges, it is recognized by that agent as the same as itself. The agent finds that it is not merely apprehended by judging consciousness as something foreign and unequal to it; rather, judging consciousness is equal to it in its own constitution. Intuiting this equality and *expressing* it, the agent *confesses* to the other. It expects that, just as the other has in fact placed itself on an equal footing, it will also return its *speech*, express its equality in that speech, and bring recognizing existence into being. Its confession is not degradation, humiliation, or self-abasement in relation to the other. For this expression is not one-sided, positing its *inequality* with the other. It expresses itself only because it intuits *the other's equality* with itself. From its side, in its confession, it expresses *their equality*. It expresses this because language is the *existence* of spirit as immediate self. It therefore expects the other to contribute its own part to this existence.
[1807 618]

667 But the confession of evil, *"I am so,"* receives no answering confession of the same kind. That was not what the other's judging meant—quite the opposite! It rejects this community and is the hard heart that exists for itself and refuses continuity with the other.—The scene thereby reverses. The consciousness that confessed sees itself rejected and sees the other as being in the wrong. The other refuses to let its inwardness emerge into the existence of speech. Against evil it sets the beauty of its soul, and against confession the stiff neck of its unchanging character and the silence that keeps itself within itself and will not throw

itself away before another. Here spirit certain of itself is posited in its highest outrage. For it intuits itself in the other as this *simple knowing of the self*. Even the other's external shape is not something without essence, like wealth, not a thing. Instead, what confronts it is thought, knowing itself. It is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure *knowing* that refuses to establish communication with it—with the consciousness that, in its confession, has already renounced *isolated being-for-itself*, and posited itself as sublated particularity and thus as continuity with the other, as universal. But the other reserves *within itself* its uncommunicating being-for-itself. In the confessing consciousness it retains [1807 619] that same character, which the confessing consciousness has already cast off. It thereby shows itself to be a consciousness abandoned by spirit and denying spirit. For it does not recognize that spirit, in its absolute self-certainty, is master over every deed and actuality, and can cast them off and undo them. Nor does it recognize the contradiction it commits in not accepting the casting-off that has occurred in *speech* as a true casting-off, while it itself has the certainty of its spirit not in an actual action but in its inwardness and that inwardness's existence in the *speech* of its judgment. It is therefore itself what obstructs the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence of speech and into spirit's equality. Through this hardness it produces the inequality that still remains.

668 Now insofar as spirit certain of itself, as a beautiful soul, lacks the strength to externalize its self-knowledge that holds itself within itself, it cannot reach equality with the rejected consciousness, and thus cannot reach the intuited unity of itself in the other, cannot reach existence. Equality therefore comes about only negatively, as a spiritless being. The beautiful soul without actuality is caught in the contradiction between its pure self and that self's necessity to externalize itself into being and turn into actuality. In the *immediacy* of this fixed opposition—an immediacy that alone is the middle term and [1807 620] reconciliation of the opposition heightened to pure abstraction, and that is pure being or empty nothing—it is consciousness of this contradiction in its

unreconciled immediacy. It is therefore shattered into madness and wastes away in yearning consumption. It does thereby in fact give up its hard insistence on *its being-for-itself*, but produces only the spiritless unity of being.

669 The necessity of the true reconciliation—the *self-conscious* reconciliation that *exists*—is already contained in what came before. The breaking of the hard heart and its elevation to universality are the same movement expressed in the consciousness that confessed. Spirit's wounds heal without leaving scars. The deed is not imperishable; spirit takes it back into itself. The side of individuality present in it, whether as intention or as its existing negativity and limitation, is what immediately vanishes. The realizing *self*, the form of its action, is only a *moment* of the whole. So too is the knowing that determines through judgment and fixes the distinction between the individual and universal sides of action. That evil consciousness posits this externalization of itself, or posits itself as a moment, drawn into confessing existence by intuiting itself in the other. But just as its one-sided, unrecognized existence of particular [1807 621] being-for-itself must break, so the other's one-sided, unrecognized judgment must break. Just as the first displays spirit's power over its actuality, the second displays its power over its determinate concept.

670 The latter renounces divisive thought and the hardness of the being-for-itself that holds to it because it in fact intuits itself in the former. By casting off its actuality and making itself a *sublated this*, the first consciousness in fact presents itself as universal. It returns from its external actuality into itself as essence. Universal consciousness therefore recognizes itself in it.—The forgiveness it grants the first is a relinquishment of itself, of its *nonactual* essence, to which it makes the other, which was *actual* action, equal. It recognizes as good what was called evil through the determination action received in thought. Or rather, it lets go of this distinction made by determinate thought and of its determining judgment existing for itself, just as the other lets go of its determination of action existing for itself.—The word of reconciliation is *existing* spir-

it, which intuits the pure knowing of itself as *universal* essence in its opposite: in the pure knowing of itself as *individuality* absolutely within itself. It is a mutual recognition that is *absolute spirit*.

671 Spirit enters existence only at the extreme point where its pure self-knowledge is opposition to itself and interchange with itself. Knowing that its [1807 622] *pure knowing* is the abstract *essence*, it is this knowing duty in absolute opposition to the knowing that knows itself, as absolute *individuality* of the self, to be the essence. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the individuality knowing itself as essence to be null in itself, to be *evil*. The latter is absolute discreteness, which knows itself in its pure oneness as absolute, and that universal as nonactual, existing only *for others*. Both sides have been refined to this purity, in which they no longer contain any selfless existence, any negative of consciousness. Instead, that *duty* is the unchanging character of its self-knowing, and this evil equally has its purpose in its *being-within-itself* and its actuality in its speech. The content of this speech is the substance of its subsistence. It is the assurance of spirit's certainty within itself.—Both spirits certain of themselves have no purpose other than their pure self, and no reality or existence other than precisely this pure self. But they are still different, and their difference is absolute because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. It is absolute not only for us but for the concepts themselves that stand in this opposition. For these concepts are indeed *determinate* in relation to one another, but also universal in themselves. They therefore fill the self's entire scope, and this self has no other content than this [1807 623] determinacy of its own, which neither goes beyond it nor is narrower than it. For the one, the absolutely universal, is pure self-knowing just as much as the other, the absolute discreteness of individuality; and both are only this pure self-knowing. Both determinations are therefore the knowing pure concepts whose determinacy is itself immediately knowing, or whose *relation* and opposition is the I. Through this they are *for one another* these utterly opposed terms. It is the entirely *inward* that has thus stepped opposite itself and into existence. They constitute *pure knowing*, posited through this opposition as *consciousness*. But it is not yet *self-*

consciousness. It gains this realization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is itself instead the *unseparated continuity* and *equality* of I = I. And each, *for itself*, sublates itself within itself through the contradiction of its pure universality, which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and separates itself from it. Through this externalization, knowing divided in its *existence* returns into the unity of the *self*. It is the *actual* I, universal knowing of *itself* in its *absolute opposite*, in knowing *within itself*, which is itself wholly universal because of the purity of its isolated inwardness. The reconciling *yes*, in which both I's relinquish their opposed *[1807 624] existence*, is the *existence* of the *I* extended into a duality, remaining equal to itself within it and having self-certainty in its complete externalization and opposite. It is God appearing among those who know themselves as pure knowing.

VII. Religion

[1807 625]
VII. *Religion*.

672 In the shapes considered so far, distinguished in general as *consciousness, self-consciousness, reason*, and *spirit*, *religion* has also appeared as consciousness of the *absolute essence* in general. But it appeared from the *standpoint of consciousness* aware of the absolute essence. The absolute essence itself *in and for itself*, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.

673 Already *consciousness*, insofar as it is *understanding*, becomes consciousness of the *supersensible*, or the *inner* aspect of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is *selfless*. It is initially only the *universal*, still far from being spirit knowing itself as spirit.—Then *self-consciousness*, which reaches completion in the shape of *unhappy* consciousness, was only the *pain* of spirit struggling back toward objectivity but failing to reach it. The unity of *individual* self-consciousness and [1807 626] its unchanging *essence*, toward which it brings itself, therefore remains *beyond* it.—The immediate existence of *reason*, which emerged for us from that pain, and reason's distinctive shapes have no religion, because their self-consciousness knows or seeks *itself* in the *immediate* present.

674 In the ethical world, however, we saw a religion: the *religion* of the *underworld*. It is faith in the terrible, unknown night of *fate*, and in the Eumenid of the *departed spirit*. The former is pure negativity in the form of universality, the latter the same negativity in the form of individuality. In the latter form, then, the absolute essence is indeed the *self*, and is *present*, as the self can be nothing else. But the *individual* self is *this* individual shade, with universality, which is fate, separated from it. It is indeed a shade, a *sublated this*, and thus a universal self. But that negative meaning has not yet turned into this positive one. So the sublated *self* also still immediately means this particular self without essence.—Fate without the self, however, remains the unconscious night that never reaches distinction within itself or the clarity of self-knowing.

675 This faith in the nothingness of necessity and in the underworld becomes *faith* in *heaven*, because the departed self must unite with its [1807 627] universality, unfold within it what it contains, and so become clear to itself. But we saw this *realm* of faith develop its content only in the element of thought, without the concept, and therefore perish in its fate, namely in the *religion* of *enlightenment*. In enlightenment, understanding's supersensible beyond is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness remains satisfied on this side. It knows the supersensible—the *empty* beyond, neither knowable nor to be feared—as neither self nor power.

676 Finally, the religion of morality restores the absolute essence as a positive content, but combines this content with enlightenment's negativity. It is a *being* equally taken back into the self and kept enclosed there, and a *differentiated content* whose parts are negated as immediately as they are posited. But the fate in which this contradictory movement sinks is the self conscious of itself as the fate of *essence* and *actuality*.

677 In religion, self-knowing spirit is immediately its own pure *self-consciousness*. The shapes of it already considered—true spirit, self-alienated spirit, and spirit certain of itself—together constitute spirit in its *consciousness*, which confronts its *world* and does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience spirit brings

under its control its objective world [1807 628] in general, and also its representation and determinate concepts. It is now self-consciousness at home with itself. In this self-consciousness it has for itself, *represented as an object*, the meaning of being universal spirit, containing all essence and all actuality within itself. But it does not exist in the form of free actuality or of nature appearing independently. It does have *shape*, or the form of being, since it is the *object* of its consciousness. But because in religion this consciousness is posited with the essential determination of being *self*-consciousness, the shape is entirely transparent to itself. The actuality it contains is enclosed or sublated within it, precisely as when we say *all actuality*: it is *thought*, universal actuality.

678 In religion, then, the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free *otherness*. Its *existence* is therefore distinct from its *self-consciousness*, and its actual reality falls outside religion. Both indeed belong to one spirit, but its consciousness does not embrace both at once. Religion appears as one part of its existence, activity, and pursuits, whose other part is life in its actual world. We know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit—or spirit in religion—are the same. Religion's completion therefore consists in [1807 629] the two becoming equal to one another. Not only must religion encompass its actuality; conversely, spirit as self-conscious spirit must become actual to itself and the *object of its consciousness*.—Insofar as in religion spirit *represents* itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed in religion is the shape and clothing of its representation. But in this representation actuality does not receive its full due: to be not only clothing but independent, free existence. Conversely, because it lacks completion within itself, it is a *determinate* shape that does not attain what it is supposed to present, namely self-conscious spirit. For its shape to express spirit itself, it would have to be nothing other than spirit; spirit would have to appear to itself, or be actual to itself, as it is in its essence. Only through this would it also achieve what may seem to demand the opposite: that the *object* of its conscious-

ness also have the form of free actuality. But only spirit that is an object to itself as absolute spirit is for itself an equally free actuality while remaining conscious of itself within it.

679 At first we distinguish self-consciousness from consciousness proper, *religion* from spirit in its world, or the *existence* of spirit. The latter consists in the whole of spirit [1807 630] insofar as its moments present themselves as separating and each existing for itself. These moments are *consciousness*, *self-consciousness*, *reason*, and *spirit*—spirit, that is, as immediate spirit, which is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their *combined* totality constitutes spirit in its worldly existence in general. Spirit as such contains the previous shapes in the universal determinations, the moments just named. Religion presupposes their entire course and is their *simple* totality or absolute self.—Their course in relation to religion, however, must not be represented as occurring in time. Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes that are shapes of the whole *spirit* as such present themselves in succession. For only the whole has actuality proper, and thus the form of pure freedom in relation to an other, which expresses itself as time. But spirit's *moments*—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—have no existence distinct from one another, because they are moments.—Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments, so, third, the individualized determination of these moments themselves must be distinguished from them. For we saw each moment differentiate itself again within itself in a course of its own, taking different shapes: for example, sense-certainty [1807 631] and perception were distinguished within consciousness. These latter aspects separate in time and belong to a *particular whole*.—For spirit descends from its *universality*, through *determination*, to *individuality*. The determination, or middle term, is *consciousness, self-consciousness*, and so forth. But *individuality* consists in the shapes of these moments. These therefore present spirit in its individuality or *actuality*, and differ in time, yet in such a way that the later shape retains the earlier ones within itself.

680 Religion is therefore the completion of spirit, in which its individual moments —consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—*return*, and *have returned, into their ground*. Together these moments make up the *existing actuality* of the whole spirit, which only *is* as the movement of these sides of itself that differentiates them and returns into itself. The coming-to-be *of religion in general* is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But each of these attributes was presented not merely as determined in general, but as it is *in and for itself*: that is, as it runs its course within itself as a whole. This has produced not only the coming-to-be of religion *in general*. Those complete courses of its *individual* sides also contain the *determinations of religion* itself. The whole spirit, the spirit of religion, is in turn the movement [1807 632] from its immediacy to *knowing* what it is *in itself*, or immediately. It moves toward making the *shape* in which it appears to its consciousness completely equal to its essence, so that it intuits itself as it is.—In this coming-to-be it therefore itself exists in *determinate* shapes, which constitute the differences of this movement. At the same time, a determinate religion thus also has a *determinate actual* spirit. Consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general. Correspondingly, to the *determinate* shapes of self-knowing spirit belong the *determinate* forms that developed separately within each of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. For its actual spirit, the *determinate* shape of religion selects, from the shapes of each of its moments, the one that corresponds to it. The *one* determinacy of religion reaches through every side of its actual existence and stamps them with this shared character.

681 The shapes that have appeared so far now arrange themselves differently from the order in which they appeared. First we must briefly make the necessary observations about this.—In the series considered, each moment deepened into itself and developed into a whole within its own distinctive principle. Knowing was the depth, or the [1807 633] spirit, in which these moments, which have no subsistence for themselves, had their substance. But this substance has now emerged. It is the depth of spirit certain of itself, which does not allow an indi-

vidual principle to isolate itself and make itself into a whole within itself. Instead, gathering and holding all these moments together within itself, it advances in this collective wealth of its actual spirit. All its particular moments jointly take on and receive within themselves the same determinacy of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself and its movement are their true actuality, and the *being-in-and-for-itself* belonging to each individual moment.—The previous single series, then, marked its returns into itself by nodes as it advanced, but continued from them again in a single line. It is now, as it were, broken at these nodes, the universal moments, and has fallen into many lines. Gathered into one bundle, these also unite symmetrically, so that the same distinctions into which each particular line shaped itself internally meet one another.—The whole presentation makes clear on its own how to understand this coordination of universal directions presented here. It is therefore unnecessary to observe that these differences must essentially be grasped only as moments of becoming, not as parts. [1807 634] In actual spirit they are attributes of its substance; in religion, rather, they are only predicates of the subject. —Likewise, *in themselves* or *for us*, all forms in general are indeed contained in spirit and in every spirit. But for its actuality in general, the only thing that matters is which determinacy exists for it in its *consciousness*, in which it has expressed its self, or in which shape it knows its essence.

682 The distinction made between *actual* spirit and spirit knowing itself as spirit, or between itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is sublated in spirit knowing itself in its truth. Its consciousness and self-consciousness are reconciled. But here religion is initially *immediate*, so this distinction has not yet returned into spirit. Only the *concept* of religion is posited. In this concept, the essence is *self-consciousness*, which is all truth for itself and contains all actuality in this truth. As consciousness, this self-consciousness has itself for its object. Spirit that initially knows itself only *immediately* is therefore spirit to itself in the *form* of *immediacy*, and the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself is *being*. This being is indeed *filled* not with sensation or manifold material, nor with other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations, but with

spirit; and spirit knows it [1807 635] as all truth and actuality. In this way this *fulfillment* is not equal to its *shape*: spirit as essence is not equal to its consciousness. It is actual as absolute spirit only when it exists for itself in its *truth* as it does in its *self-certainty*, or when the extremes into which it divides as consciousness exist for one another in the shape of spirit. The shape spirit assumes as the object of its consciousness remains filled with spirit's certainty as its substance. Through this content, the possibility that the object might sink into pure objectivity, into the form of self-consciousness's negativity, disappears. Spirit's immediate unity with itself is the foundation, or pure consciousness, *within* which consciousness divides. Enclosed within its pure self-consciousness in this way, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a *nature* in general. What it produces in this movement are instead its shapes as spirits, which together constitute the completeness of its appearance. This movement itself is the coming-to-be of its complete actuality through the individual sides of that actuality, or through its incomplete actualities.

683 Its first actuality is the concept of religion itself, or religion as *immediate*, and therefore *natural religion*. In it, spirit knows itself as its object in natural or immediate [1807 636] shape. But its *second* actuality is necessarily knowing itself in the shape of *sublated naturalness*, or of the *self*. This is therefore the *religion of art*. For the shape rises to the form of the *self* through consciousness's *production*, by which consciousness intuits its doing, or the self, in its object. Finally, the *third* sublates the one-sidedness of the first two: the *self* is just as much something *immediate* as *immediacy is self*. In the first, spirit is in the form of consciousness in general; in the second, in that of self-consciousness; in the third, in the form of their unity. It has the shape of *being-in-and-for-itself*. Since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is *revealed religion*. Yet although spirit reaches its true *shape* in it, *shape* itself and *representation* remain the unovercome side from which it must pass into the *concept*, in order entirely to dissolve the form of objectivity within the concept, which

equally contains this opposite within itself. Spirit will then have grasped its own concept as we alone have so far grasped it. And because its shape, or the element of its existence, is the concept, that shape is spirit itself.

[1807 637]

A. *Natural Religion*.

684 Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself and exists for itself in the form of objectivity: it *is*. At the same time it is *being-for-itself. It is for itself*; it is the side of *self*-consciousness as opposed to the side of its consciousness, or of its relating to itself as *object*. Its consciousness contains opposition, and thereby the *determinacy* of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This alone concerns us in this consideration of religion, since its unshaped essence, or its pure concept, has already emerged. But the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness also falls within the latter. The shape of religion contains neither spirit's existence as nature free from thought nor as thought free from existence. It is instead existence preserved in thought, as well as something thought that exists for itself.—One [1807 638] religion differs from another according to the *determinacy* of this shape in which spirit knows itself. Yet we must also note that presenting its self-knowledge according to this *single determinacy* does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The series of different religions that will emerge equally presents only the different sides of one religion—indeed, of *each individual* religion. Representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in every one. Yet the difference must also be considered as a difference of religion. For since spirit exists in the distinction between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the movement aims to sublate this principal distinction and give the shape that is consciousness's object the form of self-consciousness. But this distinction is not already sublated because the shapes contained in consciousness also have the moment of self within them, and the god is *represented as self-consciousness*. The *represented* self is not the *actual* self. For the self, like any further determination of the shape, truly to belong to that shape, it must in part be placed there through self-consciousness's doing; in part, the lower determination must

prove to be sublated and comprehended by the higher. For something represented ceases to be merely represented and foreign to its knowing only when the self has produced it, and thus intuits the [1807 639] object's determination as *its own*, and so itself in the object.—Through this activity the lower determination has also disappeared. For doing is the negative that accomplishes itself at the expense of another. Insofar as the lower determination still occurs, it has retreated into inessentiality. Conversely, where the lower still rules but the higher also occurs, one has a place beside the other without selfhood. Thus although the different representations within a single religion present the entire movement of its forms, the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness has taken the determination of consciousness's object into itself, fully appropriated it through its doing, and knows it as essential in contrast to the others.—The truth of faith in a determination of religious spirit shows itself in *actual* spirit's being constituted like the shape in which it intuits itself in religion. For example, the incarnation of God that occurs in Eastern religion has no truth, because its actual spirit lacks this reconciliation.—This is not the place to return from the totality of determinations to an individual one and show the shape in which it and its particular religion contain the completeness of the others. The higher form placed back under a lower one [1807 640] loses its meaning for self-conscious spirit and belongs to it only superficially and in its representation. It must be considered in its own distinctive meaning, and where it is the principle of this particular religion and is confirmed by its actual spirit.

a, *The Being of Light*.

685 Spirit as the *essence* that is *self-consciousness*—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as itself—is initially only *its concept* in relation to the reality it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness. Against the daylight of this unfolding, this concept is the night of its essence; against the existence of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative mystery of its birth. This mystery contains its revelation within itself. For existence has its

necessity in this concept, because the concept is self-knowing spirit and therefore has within its essence the moment of being consciousness and representing itself objectively.—It is the pure I that has self-certainty in its externalization, in itself as *universal object*. Or this object is for it the interpenetration of all thought and all actuality.
[1807 641]

686 In the immediate first division of self-knowing absolute spirit, its shape has the determination belonging to *immediate consciousness*, or *sense*-certainty. It intuits itself in the form of *being*, but not the spiritless *being* filled with contingent determinations of sensation that belongs to sense-certainty. It is being filled with spirit. It also includes the form that appeared in immediate *self-consciousness*: the form of the *lord* in relation to spirit's self-consciousness retreating from its object.—This *being* filled with the concept of spirit is therefore the *shape* of spirit's *simple* relation to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. By this determination it is the pure *being of light* of the sunrise, containing and filling everything and preserving itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, *darkness*. The movements of its own externalization, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are outpourings of light. In their simplicity they are also its becoming-for-itself and return from its existence: streams of fire consuming shape. The difference it gives itself does proliferate in the substance of existence and develop into the forms of nature. But the essential simplicity of its thought wanders through them without stability or understanding, [1807 642] expands their limits into measurelessness, and dissolves their beauty, heightened to magnificence, in its sublimity.

687 The content this pure *being* develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an inessential play alongside this substance. The substance only *rises*, without *descending* into itself, becoming subject, and giving its distinctions stability through the self. Its determinations are only attributes that do not grow into independence but remain only names of the many-named One. This One is clothed in the

manifold powers of existence and shapes of actuality as in selfless ornaments. They are only messengers of its power, lacking their own will, intuitions of its glory, and voices of its praise.

688 But this reeling life must determine itself as *being-for-itself* and give its vanishing shapes subsistence. The *immediate being* in which it confronts its consciousness is itself the *negative* power dissolving its distinctions. It is therefore in truth the *self*, and spirit accordingly moves on to knowing itself in the form of self. Pure light scatters its simplicity into an infinity of forms and offers itself as a sacrifice to being-for-itself, so that the individual may take subsistence for itself from its substance.

[1807 643]

b. *The Plant and the Animal*.

689 Self-conscious spirit has withdrawn into itself from shapeless essence, or raised its immediacy to self in general. It determines its simplicity as a multiplicity of being-for-itself, and is the religion of spiritual *perception*, in which it breaks up into countless spirits, weaker and stronger, richer and poorer. This pantheism, initially the *peaceful* subsistence of these spirit-atoms, becomes *hostile* movement within itself. The innocence of the *religion of flowers*, which is only a selfless representation of the self, passes into the seriousness of struggling life, into the guilt of the *religion of animals*. The peace and powerlessness of intuiting individuality pass into destructive being-for-itself.—It is no help to have taken the *death of abstraction* away from perceived things and raised them to beings of spiritual perception. The animation of this realm of spirits carries that death within it through its determinacy and negativity, which overreach their innocent indifference. Through this, dispersal into the multiplicity of peaceful plant shapes becomes a hostile movement in which the hatred of their being-for-itself wears them away.—The *actual* self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit [1807 644] is a multitude of isolated, unsociable national spirits that fight one another to the death in their hatred, and become conscious of determinate animal shapes as their essence. For they are nothing other than animal spirits, separate animal lives conscious of themselves without universality.

690 But in this hatred the determinacy of purely negative being-for-itself wears itself away, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters another shape. *Sublated being-for-itself* is the *form* of the *object* produced through the self, or rather is the produced self wearing itself away—that is, becoming a thing. The worker therefore gains the upper hand over the animal spirits that merely tear apart. The worker's doing is not merely negative but peaceful and positive. Spirit's consciousness is now the movement beyond immediate *being-in-itself* as well as abstract *being-for-itself*. The in-itself has been reduced by opposition to a determinacy. It is therefore no longer absolute spirit's own form, but an actuality that its consciousness finds confronting it as ordinary existence and sublates. This consciousness is equally not only this sublating being-for-itself. It also produces its representation, being-for-itself placed outside itself in the form of an object. Yet this production is not complete: it is a conditioned activity, shaping something already there.
[1807 645]
c. *The Master Craftsman*.

691 Spirit thus appears here as the *master craftsman*. Its doing, through which it produces itself as an object but has not yet grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive kind of work, like bees building their cells.

692 Because the first form is immediate, it is the abstract form of understanding, and the work is not yet filled with spirit within itself. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks are the works of this craftsman of strict form: simple combinations of straight lines, with flat surfaces and equal proportions between parts, in which the incommensurability of the round has been eliminated. Because the form belongs merely to understanding, it does not contain its meaning within itself; it is not the spiritual self. The works therefore only receive spirit within them as a foreign, departed spirit that has left its living interpenetration with actuality and, itself dead, enters these lifeless crystals. Or they relate externally to spirit as something itself external and not existing as spirit—as to the rising light that casts its meaning upon them.

693 The separation from which working spirit starts has become objective to it in its work: the separation between *being-in-itself*, which becomes the material it [1807 646] works on, and *being-for-itself*, which is *the side* of working self-consciousness. Its further effort must aim to sublate this separation of soul and body, clothing and shaping the soul in itself and animating the body. As the two sides are brought closer, they retain against one another the determinacy of represented spirit and of its surrounding covering. Spirit's unity with itself contains this opposition of individuality and universality. As the work approaches itself in its sides, it also comes closer to working self-consciousness, and self-consciousness reaches knowledge of itself in the work as it is in and for itself. But it thus initially constitutes only the abstract side of spirit's *activity*, which does not yet know its content within itself but in its work, which is a thing. The craftsman himself, the whole spirit, has not yet appeared. He is still the inward, hidden essence, which as a whole is present only divided into active self-consciousness and its produced object.

694 The master craftsman therefore works the surrounding dwelling, the external actuality initially raised only to understanding's abstract form, into a more animated form. He uses plant life for this. It is no longer sacred, as it was to the earlier powerless [1807 647] pantheism. Instead, he grasps himself as the essence existing for itself, takes plant life as something useful, and reduces it to an exterior and decoration. But it is not used unchanged. The worker of self-conscious form also eliminates the perishability inherent in this life's immediate existence, and brings its organic forms closer to the stricter, more universal forms of thought. Left free, organic form proliferates in particularity. Subjugated on one side by the form of thought, it in turn raises these straight-lined and flat shapes into a more animated roundness—a mixture that becomes the root of free architecture.

695 This dwelling, the side of the *universal element* or spirit's inorganic nature, now also encloses a shape of *individuality*. This brings spirit—previously separated from existence, inward or external to it—closer to actuality, and thereby makes the work more like active self-consciousness. The worker first reaches for

the form of *being-for-itself* in general, the *animal shape*. He proves that he is no longer immediately conscious of himself in animal life by setting himself against it as the productive power and knowing himself in it as *his* work. Through this, the animal shape also becomes a sublated shape, the hieroglyph of another meaning, of a [1807 648] thought. The worker therefore no longer uses it alone and whole, but mixes it with the shape of thought, with the human shape. Yet the work still lacks the shape and existence in which the self exists as self. It still lacks the capacity to express within itself that it encloses an inner meaning. It lacks language, the element in which the meaning that fills it is itself present. So even when the work has entirely purified itself of the animal and bears only the shape of self-consciousness, it is still a soundless shape. It needs the ray of the rising sun to have a sound, and this, produced by light, is only a tone, not language, showing only an external self, not the inward one.

696 Opposed to this external self of the shape stands the other shape, indicating that it has something *inward* within it. Nature returning into its essence reduces its living multiplicity, which individualizes itself and becomes confused in its movement, to an inessential shell, the *covering of the inward*. And this inward is at first still simple darkness, the motionless, black, formless stone.

697 Both presentations contain *inwardness* and *existence*, the two moments of spirit. Both contain both moments at once, in opposite relations: the self both as [1807 649] inward and as outward. The two must be united.—The soul of the human-shaped statue does not yet come from within. It is not yet language, the existence that is inward in itself. And the inward of multiform existence is still soundless, not differentiating itself within itself, and still separated from its exterior, to which all differences belong.—The master craftsman therefore unites the two in a mixture of natural and self-conscious shape. These ambiguous beings, riddles to themselves, join the conscious struggling with the unconscious, the simple inward with the multiform exterior, the darkness of thought with the clarity of expression, and burst into the language of profound, hard-to-understand wisdom.

698 In this work, the instinctive labor that produced an unconscious work opposite self-consciousness comes to an end. For in it, an equally self-conscious inwardness expressing itself meets the craftsman's activity, which constitutes self-consciousness. He has worked his way up to the division of his consciousness in which spirit encounters spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it is its own shape and the object of its consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode of immediate natural shape are therefore purified. These monstrosities of shape, [1807 650] speech, and deed dissolve into spiritual shaping: an exterior that has gone inward, an inwardness that expresses itself from itself and within itself; into thought that gives birth to itself, maintains its shape in conformity with itself, and is clear existence. Spirit is an *artist*. [1807 651]

B. *The Religion of Art*.

699 Spirit has raised the shape in which it exists for its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself, and produces such a shape for itself. The master craftsman has abandoned *synthetic* work, the *mixing* of the heterogeneous forms of thought and nature. Since the shape has gained the form of self-conscious activity, he has become a spiritual worker.

700 If we ask which *actual* spirit has the consciousness of its absolute essence in the religion of art, it proves to be *ethical*, or *true*, spirit. It is not only the universal substance of all individuals. Since for actual consciousness this substance has the shape of consciousness, this also means that, having individualization, it is known by them as their own essence and work. For them it is neither the being of light, in whose unity self-consciousness's being-for-itself is contained only negatively, only [1807 652] in passing away, and intuits the lord of its actuality; nor is it the restless consumption of peoples hating one another; nor their subjugation into castes that together give the appearance of an organized, complete whole that lacks the universal freedom of individuals. Instead, it is the free people in which ethical custom constitutes the substance of all, whose actuality and existence all and each individual know as their own will and deed.

701 But the religion of ethical spirit is its elevation above its actuality, its return *from its truth* into pure *knowing of itself*. Since the ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not contain the principle of self-consciousness's pure individuality, its religion appears in its completion only as it *departs* from its *subsistence*. For the *actuality* of ethical substance rests partly on its peaceful *unchangeability* against the absolute movement of self-consciousness, and thus on self-consciousness's not yet having withdrawn into itself from its peaceful custom and firm trust. It rests partly on its organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, and on its division into the groups of social estates and their particular activities, which cooperate toward the whole. It thus rests on the individual's satisfaction with the limitation of their existence, and on their not yet having grasped the unlimited [1807 653] thought of their free self. But that peaceful, *immediate* trust in substance returns into trust *in oneself* and into *self-certainty*. The multiplicity of rights and duties, like limited activity, is the same dialectical movement of ethical life as is the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement that finds peace and stability only in the simplicity of spirit certain of itself.—Ethical life's completion into free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, are therefore individuality withdrawn into itself: ethical spirit's absolute lightheartedness, which has dissolved within itself all the fixed distinctions of its subsistence and the groups of its organic structure. Perfectly sure of itself, it has reached unlimited joy and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself is ambiguous: peaceful subsistence and fixed truth, as well as absolute unrest and the passing away of ethical life. But it turns into the latter. For ethical spirit's truth is still only this substantial essence and trust, in which the self does not know itself as free individuality, and which therefore perishes in this inwardness, or in the self's becoming free. Thus when trust is broken and the people's substance is fractured within itself, spirit, which was the middle term between unstable extremes, has now [1807 654] stepped out into the extreme of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, mourning the loss of its world and now producing its essence, raised above actuality, from the purity of the self.

702 In such an epoch absolute art emerges. Earlier, art is instinctive work, immersed in existence, working out of it and into it. Its substance is not free ethical life, and therefore its working self does not have free spiritual activity either. Later, spirit goes beyond art to gain its higher presentation: namely, to be not only the *substance* born from the self, but, in its presentation as object, *this self*. It must not only give birth to itself from its concept, but have its concept itself as its shape, so that the concept and the produced artwork mutually know themselves as one and the same.

703 Ethical substance has thus withdrawn from its existence into its pure self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is the side of the concept, or of the *activity* by which spirit produces itself as object. It is pure form, because in ethical obedience and service the individual has worked away all unconscious existence and fixed determination, just as substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself into subject. From [1807 655] this night of pure self-certainty, ethical spirit rises again as a shape freed from nature and its immediate existence.

704 The *existence* of the pure concept, into which spirit has fled from its body, is an individual whom spirit chooses as the vessel of its pain. Spirit is present in this individual as their universal and their power, by which they suffer violence—as their pathos, to which their self-consciousness surrenders and loses its freedom. But that positive power of universality is overcome by the individual's pure self as the negative power. Aware of its strength that cannot be lost, this pure activity struggles with unshaped essence. Becoming master of it, it makes pathos its material and gives itself its content. This unity emerges as a work: universal spirit individualized and represented.

a. *The Abstract Artwork*.

705 As immediate, the first artwork is abstract and individual. For its part, it must move out of its immediate and objective mode toward self-consciousness, just as self-consciousness, for its part, aims in worship to sublate the [1807 656] dis-

tinction it first gives itself against its spirit, and thereby produce the artwork alive within itself.

706 The first way in which artistic spirit places its shape and its active consciousness furthest apart is the immediate way: the shape *exists* as a *thing* in general.—Within itself it divides into the distinction between individuality, which has the shape of self, and universality, which presents inorganic essence in relation to the shape as its surroundings and dwelling. By raising the whole into the pure concept, this dwelling gains its pure form belonging to spirit. It is neither understanding's crystal, housing the dead or illuminated by an external soul, nor the mixture of the forms of nature and thought initially emerging from the plant, in which thought's activity is still *imitation*. Instead, the concept strips away what still clings to the forms from roots, branches, and leaves, and purifies them into structures in which the crystal's straight lines and flat surfaces are raised into incommensurable relations. Thus the animation of the organic is taken into understanding's abstract form, while its essence—incommensurability for understanding—is preserved.

707 But the god dwelling within is the black stone drawn out of the animal covering and penetrated by the [1807 657] light of consciousness. Human shape strips off the animal element with which it was mixed. For the god, the animal is only a contingent disguise. It steps beside the god's true shape and no longer counts for anything on its own, but sinks to meaning something else, to a mere sign. The god's shape thereby also strips off within itself dependence on the natural conditions of animal existence, and indicates the internal arrangements of organic life as fused into its surface and belonging only to it.—But the god's *essence* is the unity of nature's universal existence and self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality appears opposed to nature. At first also an *individual* shape, its existence is one of nature's elements, just as its self-conscious actuality is an individual national spirit. But in this unity that element is reflected into spirit: nature transfigured by thought and united with self-conscious life. The divine shape therefore contains its natural element as sublated, as a dim memory. The wild essence and confused struggle of the elements' free existence, the

unethical realm of the Titans, have been defeated and banished to the edge of actuality become clear to itself, to the murky boundaries of the world that finds itself and rests in spirit. These [1807 658] old gods—heaven, earth, ocean, sun, the blind Typhon-like fire of the earth, and so forth—into which the being of light, begetting with darkness, first particularizes itself, are replaced by shapes containing only a dimly reminiscent echo of those Titans. These are no longer natural beings, but clear ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.

708 This simple shape has therefore eliminated within itself the unrest of infinite individualization and gathered it into peaceful individuality. It has done so both as a natural element, which is necessary only as universal essence but contingent in its existence and movement, and as the people, which, dispersed into particular groups of activity and individual points of self-consciousness, exists in manifold senses and activities. The moment of unrest therefore stands opposed to it: *self-consciousness* stands opposed to the *essence*. As the birthplace of this shape, self-consciousness retained nothing for itself but being *pure activity*. The artist gave the work everything belonging to substance, but gave themselves as a determinate individuality no actuality in the work. They could give it completion only by externalizing their particularity, shedding their body and raising themselves to the abstraction of pure doing.—In this first immediate production, the separation between the work and its [1807 659] self-conscious activity has not yet been reunited. The work is therefore not actually animated on its own, but is a *whole* only together with its *coming-to-be*. What is ordinary about the artwork—that it is produced in consciousness and made by human hands—is the moment of the concept existing as concept, confronting the work. And if this concept, as artist or as viewer, is selfless enough to declare the artwork absolutely animated within itself and forget itself as maker or observer, we must insist against this on the concept of spirit, which cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of itself. But this moment stands opposed to the work because, in this first division of itself, spirit gives both sides their abstract determinations of *doing* and being a *thing* against one another. Their return into the unity from which they started has not yet occurred.

709 The artist therefore experiences in the work that they have produced *no being equal to themselves*. A consciousness does indeed return to them from it, in that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit that is their essence. But since this animation returns the artist's self-consciousness only as admiration, it is instead the animation's confession to the artist that it is not their equal. When it returns as joy in general, [1807 660] the artist does not find in it the pain of forming and generating the work, or the effort of their labor. Others may also judge the work or offer sacrifices to it, putting their consciousness into it in whatever way they choose. If they set themselves above it with their knowledge, the artist knows how much more their *deed* is than those people's understanding and talk. If they place themselves *below* it and recognize in it their ruling *essence*, the artist knows themselves as its master.

710 The artwork therefore requires another element of existence, the god another emergence than this descent from the depths of its creative night into the opposite—into externality, into the determination of the *thing* without self-consciousness. This higher element is *language*: an existence that is immediately self-conscious existence. As *individual* self-consciousness exists in it, it is equally immediate as a *universal* contagion. The complete particularization of being-for-itself is at the same time fluidity and the universally communicated unity of many selves. Language is the soul existing as soul. The god whose shape has language as its element is therefore the artwork animated within itself. In its existence it immediately contains the pure activity that confronted it when it existed as a thing. Or, in its essence becoming objective, self-consciousness immediately remains with itself. Remaining with itself in its essence in this way, [1807 661] it is *pure thought*, or devotion, whose *inwardness* also has *existence* in the hymn. The hymn retains the individuality of self-consciousness within it; when heard, this individuality also exists as universal. Devotion kindled in all is the spiritual stream conscious of itself in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, as the same *doing* of all and as *simple being*. As this universal self-consciousness of all, spirit has its pure inwardness as well as being for others and the being-for-itself of individuals in one unity.

711 This language differs from another language of the god, which is not that of universal self-consciousness. The *oracle* of the god, in artistic religion as well as in earlier religions, is the god's necessary first language. For its *concept* equally entails that it is the essence of nature and of spirit, and therefore has not only natural but also spiritual existence. Insofar as this moment lies only in its *concept* and is not yet realized in religion, the language is, for religious self-consciousness, the language of a *foreign* self-consciousness. Self-consciousness still foreign to its community does not yet *exist in the way* its concept requires. The self is simple and therefore wholly *universal* being-for-itself. But self-consciousness separated from the community's self-consciousness is initially only an *individual* one.—The content of this particular and [1807 662] individual language follows from the universal determinacy in which absolute spirit is posited in its religion in general.—The universal spirit of the sunrise, which has not yet particularized its existence, thus expresses equally simple and universal propositions about essence. Their substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, but because of this universality also appears trivial to self-consciousness developing further.

712 The more cultivated self, raising itself to *being-for-itself*, is master over the pure pathos of substance, over the objectivity of the rising being of light. It knows that simplicity of truth as what *exists in itself*, not having the form of contingent existence through a foreign language, but *as the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives forever, and no one knows where it came from*.—Here the universal truth revealed by the being of light has withdrawn inward or below, and has thereby been raised out of the form of contingent appearance. In the religion of art, by contrast, because the god's shape has assumed consciousness and thus individuality in general, the god's own language is the oracle, which knows the particular affairs of its people and announces what is useful concerning them. For the god is the spirit of the ethical people. But *knowing thought* claims the universal truths for itself, since they are known as what *exists in itself*. Their language is [1807 663] no longer foreign to it, but its own. That sage of antiquity sought what is good and beautiful in his own thought, but left to his

daemon the inferior, contingent content of knowledge: whether it was good for him to associate with this or that person, or good for an acquaintance to make this journey, and similar insignificant things. Likewise, universal consciousness obtains knowledge of contingent matters from birds, trees, or the fermenting earth, whose vapor takes away self-consciousness's sound judgment. For the contingent is what lacks judgment and is foreign. Ethical consciousness therefore also lets itself be determined about it in a thoughtless and foreign way, as by throwing dice. When an individual determines themselves through their understanding and deliberately chooses what is useful to them, this self-determination rests on the determinacy of their particular character. This is itself contingent. Understanding's knowledge of what is useful to the individual is therefore just the same sort of knowledge as that of those oracles or the lot. The only difference is that someone consulting an oracle or a lot expresses the ethical attitude of indifference toward the contingent, whereas understanding treats what is in itself contingent as the essential interest of its thought and knowledge. Higher than both, however, is to make deliberation the oracle of contingent action, but to know this deliberate action itself, because of its relation to the [1807 664] particular and its usefulness, as something contingent.

713 The true self-conscious existence spirit gains in language that is not the language of a foreign, and therefore contingent rather than universal, self-consciousness is the artwork we saw earlier. It stands opposed to the thing-like artwork of the statue. The latter is existence at rest; the former is vanishing existence. In the statue, objectivity released into freedom lacks its own immediate self. In the other work, by contrast, objectivity remains too enclosed within the self, reaches too little shaping, and, like time, immediately ceases to exist as it exists.

714 *Worship* constitutes the movement of the two sides in which the divine shape *moving* in the pure feeling element of self-consciousness and the divine shape *resting* in the element of thinghood mutually give up their different determinations. The unity that is the concept of their essence comes into existence. In

worship, the self gives itself the consciousness of the divine essence descending to it from its beyond. Through this, the divine essence, previously nonactual and merely objective, gains the proper actuality of self-consciousness.

715 This concept of worship is already contained and present in itself in the stream of hymnic song. This devotion is the self's immediate pure satisfaction through and within itself. It [1807 665] is the purified soul, which in this purity is immediately only essence and one with essence. Because of its abstraction, it is not consciousness distinguishing its object from itself. It is therefore only the night of that object's existence and the *prepared place* of its shape. *Abstract worship* thus raises the self to being this pure *divine element*. The soul consciously accomplishes this purification. Yet it is not the self that has descended into its depths and knows itself as evil. It is something *existing*, a soul that purifies its exterior by washing and clothes it in white garments, and leads its inwardness through the represented path of labors, punishments, and rewards: the path of cultivation that externalizes particularity in general, through which the soul reaches the dwellings and community of blessedness.

716 This worship is initially only *a secret* accomplishment, that is, merely represented and nonactual. It must be *actual* action; nonactual action contradicts itself. Through it, *consciousness proper* rises into its *pure* self-consciousness. In consciousness proper, the essence has the meaning of a free object. Through actual worship this object returns into the self. And insofar as in pure consciousness it means the pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends from its universality through this [1807 666] mediation into individuality, and so joins with actuality.

717 The two sides' entry into action is determined as follows. For the self-conscious side, insofar as it is *actual* consciousness, the essence presents itself as *actual nature*. On the one hand, nature belongs to it as possession and property, and counts as existence that does not *exist in itself*. On the other hand, nature is *its own* immediate actuality and individuality, which it likewise regards as nonessential and sublates. But for its *pure* consciousness that external nature

also has the *opposite* meaning: it is the essence *existing in itself*, before which the self sacrifices its inessentiality, just as, conversely, it sacrifices nature's inessential side to itself. The action is thus a spiritual movement because it is two-sided. It sublates the abstraction of the *essence*, as devotion determines the object, and makes it actual; and it sublates the *actual*, as the agent determines the object and itself, raising it into universality.

718 The action of worship itself therefore begins with the pure *surrender* of a possession, which its owner pours away or lets go up in smoke, apparently quite uselessly for themselves. Before the essence of their pure consciousness, they thereby renounce possession, the right of property and its enjoyment, personality, and the return of doing [1807 667] into the self. They reflect the action into the universal, or the essence, rather than into themselves.—Conversely, however, the *existing essence* equally perishes in this. The sacrificed animal is the *sign* of a god; the fruits consumed are *living* Ceres and Bacchus *themselves*. In the animal die the powers of the higher right, which has blood and actual life; in the fruits die the powers of the lower right, which is bloodless and possesses secret, cunning power.—Insofar as the sacrifice of divine substance is *doing*, it belongs to the self-conscious side. For this actual doing to be possible, the essence must already have sacrificed itself *in itself*. It has done so by giving itself *existence* and making itself an *individual animal* and *fruit*. The acting self presents this relinquishment, already accomplished by the essence *in itself*, in existence and for its consciousness. It replaces the essence's *immediate* actuality with the higher actuality, namely *its own*. For the unity produced, the result of sublating the individuality and separation of both sides, is not merely negative fate but has a positive meaning. Only to the abstract underground essence is the sacrifice wholly surrendered, thereby marking the reflection of possession and being-for-itself into the universal as distinct from the self as such. But this is also only [1807 668] a small *part*. The other sacrifice is only the destruction of what cannot be used, and instead prepares the victim for a meal, whose feast cheats the action of its negative meaning. In the first sacrifice the sacrificer keeps most of it, and in the second the useful part, for *their enjoyment*. This

enjoyment is the negative power sublating both the *essence* and *individuality*. At the same time it is the positive actuality in which the essence's *objective* existence is transformed into *self-conscious* existence, and the self is conscious of its unity with the essence.

719 Although this worship is an actual action, its meaning lies mostly in devotion. What belongs to devotion is not objectively produced, while the result deprives itself of existence in *enjoyment*. Worship therefore goes further and initially remedies this lack by giving its devotion *objective subsistence*. It does this as communal or individual work available to everyone, producing the god's dwelling and adornment in the god's honor.—This partly sublates the statue's objectivity, since through this consecration of gifts and labors the worker wins the god's favor and intuits their self as belonging to the god. Partly, too, this doing is not the artist's individual work; this particularity has dissolved into universality. But it is not only the [1807 669] god's honor that is achieved, and the blessing of divine favor does not flow to the worker only in *representation*. The work also has a meaning opposite to its first meaning of externalization and another's honor. The god's dwellings and halls are for human use; the treasures stored there belong to human beings in time of need. The honor the god enjoys in its adornment is the honor of the skilled and generous people. At the festival the people likewise adorn their own dwellings and clothes, and their activities with elegant equipment. In this way, in return for their gifts, they receive repayment from the grateful god and proofs of the favor through which they united with the god in work. They receive these not in hope and a later actuality, but have, in the act of honoring and offering gifts, immediate enjoyment of their own wealth and adornment.

b. *The Living Artwork*.

720 The people approaching its god in the worship of the religion of art is the ethical people, which knows its state and the state's actions as its own will and accomplishment. This spirit, confronting the self-conscious people, [1807 670] is therefore not the being of light, which, being selfless, does not contain the certainty of individuals within itself, but is instead only their universal essence

and the ruling power in which they vanish... The worship of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence therefore gives its followers back only this in general: that they are their god's people. It gains for them only their subsistence and simple substance in general, not their actual self, which is instead rejected. For they worship their god as empty depth, not as spirit. But the worship of the religion of art, on the other hand, lacks that abstract *simplicity* of essence, and thus its *depth*. Yet the *essence immediately united with the self* is *in itself* spirit and *knowing truth*, although not yet truth known, or knowing itself in its depth. Because the essence here thus has the self within it, its appearance is friendly to consciousness. In worship consciousness gains not only the general authorization of its subsistence, but also its existence self-conscious within that essence. Conversely, the essence has its actuality not selflessly in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose *self* is recognized in its substance.

721 From worship, then, emerge self-consciousness satisfied in its essence and the god returned into it as its dwelling. This *dwelling*, considered on its own, is the night of substance, or its pure individuality. [1807 671] But it is no longer the artist's tense individuality, still unreconciled with its essence becoming *objective*. It is the satisfied night, which has its pathos within it without need, because it returns from intuition, from sublated objectivity.—This *pathos*, considered on its own, is the essence of the *sunrise*, but it has now *set* within itself, and has its setting—self-consciousness, and thus existence and actuality—within itself.—Here it has passed through the movement of its realization. Lowering itself from its pure essence to an objective natural force and its expressions, it is an existence for the other, for the self that consumes it. In its fruit, the silent essence of selfless nature reaches the stage at which, preparing and digesting itself, it offers itself to self-endowed life. It reaches its highest perfection in the usefulness of being edible and drinkable. For in this it is the possibility of a higher existence and touches spiritual existence. In its metamorphosis, the

earth-spirit has developed partly into quietly powerful substance, partly into spiritual fermentation: there into the feminine principle of nourishment, here into the masculine principle of the self-driving force of self-conscious existence.

722 In this enjoyment, then, that rising being of light is disclosed for what it is. Enjoyment is its mystery. [1807 672] For the mystical is not the concealment of a secret or ignorance, but consists in the self knowing itself as one with the essence, so that the essence is revealed. Only the self is manifest to itself; or what is manifest is so only in immediate self-certainty. But worship has posited simple essence within this certainty. As a useful thing it has not only existence that is seen, felt, smelled, and tasted; it is also the object of desire. Through actual enjoyment it becomes one with the self and is thereby completely disclosed and revealed to it.—What is said to be revealed to reason or the heart is in fact still secret. For it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both objective certainty and the certainty of enjoyment. In religion this certainty is not merely thoughtless and immediate, but also the self's purely knowing certainty.

723 What worship has thus revealed within self-conscious spirit is the *simple* essence as movement: partly emerging from its nocturnal concealment into consciousness to be consciousness's quietly nourishing substance; partly losing itself again in the underground night, in the self, and lingering above only with a mother's quiet longing.—But the louder drive is the many-named being of light of the sunrise [1807 673] and its reeling life. This too has relinquished its abstract being, first gathered itself into the objective existence of fruit, and then, surrendering to self-consciousness, reached actuality proper within it. Now it roams about as a band of frenzied women: nature's unrestrained intoxication in self-conscious shape.

724 Yet what has been disclosed to consciousness is only absolute spirit as this simple essence, not spirit as spirit within itself: only *immediate* spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, properly higher gods, whose individuality

includes self-consciousness as such as an essential moment. Spirit has therefore not yet sacrificed itself to consciousness as *self-conscious* spirit, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.

725 This unstable intoxication of the god must settle into an *object*. Inspiration that did not reach consciousness must produce a work that confronts it as a work just as complete as the statue confronted the earlier artist's inspiration, but not as lifeless within itself: as a *living* self.—Such worship is the festival that human beings give in their own honor, though they do [1807 674] not yet put the meaning of absolute essence into such a person. For only the *essence* has been revealed to them, not spirit—not as something that *essentially* takes human shape. But this worship lays the ground for that revelation and sets out its moments separately. Here it presents the *abstract* moment of the essence's living *bodily existence*, just as earlier it presented the unity of both in unconscious frenzy. The human being therefore takes the statue's place as a shape trained and developed into perfectly free *movement*, just as the statue is perfectly free *rest*. While every individual knows how to present themselves at least as a torchbearer, one stands out among them as movement given shape, the smooth development and fluid strength of every limb: an animated, living artwork joining beauty with strength. The adornment that honored the statue is awarded to this person as the prize of their strength, together with the honor among their people of being, in place of the stone god, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.

726 The two presentations just considered contain the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual essence, but still lack their equilibrium. In Bacchic inspiration the self is outside itself; in beautiful bodily existence the spiritual essence is outside itself. That dullness of consciousness and its wild stammering must be taken into the [1807 675] clear existence of the latter, and the latter's spiritless clarity into the former's inwardness. The complete element in which inwardness is as outward as outwardness is inward is again language. But it is neither the oracle's language, entirely contingent and individual in content, nor the feeling hymn praising only an individual god, nor the contentless stammering of

Bacchic frenzy. Instead, language has gained its clear and universal content. Its *clear* content, because the artist has worked their way out of the first wholly substantial inspiration into a shape that is their own existence, penetrated in all its movements by the self-conscious soul and living with it. Its *universal* content, because in this festival honoring the human being the one-sidedness of statues disappears: they contain only one national spirit, one determinate character of divinity. The beautiful athlete is indeed the honor of their particular people, but is a bodily individuality in which the detailed fullness and seriousness of meaning, and the inward character of spirit bearing the particular life, concerns, needs, and customs of that people, have perished. In this externalization into complete bodily existence, spirit has cast off the particular impressions and echoes of nature that it contained as the people's actual spirit. Its people is [1807 676] therefore no longer conscious in it of its particularity, but rather of having cast this off and of the universality of its human existence.

c. *The Spiritual Artwork*.

727 The national spirits that become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal merge into one. Similarly, the particular beautiful national spirits unite in one pantheon, whose element and dwelling are language. Pure intuition of itself as *universal humanity* has this form in the national spirit's actuality: it joins with others, with whom it forms one nation by nature, in a common undertaking, and for this work forms a collective people and thus a collective heaven. Yet this universality, which spirit reaches in its existence, is only the first universality. It has only just departed from ethical individuality, has not yet overcome its immediacy, and has not formed one state from these peoples. The ethical life of the actual national spirit rests partly on individuals' immediate trust in the whole of their people, partly on the immediate participation of everyone, despite differences of social estate, in the [1807 677] government's decisions and actions. In their union—initially not into a lasting order but only for a shared action—that freedom of participation of all and each is

temporarily set aside. This first community is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the rule of abstract thought, which would deprive individuals of their self-conscious share in the will and deed of the whole.

728 The assembly of national spirits forms a circle of shapes now encompassing all of nature and the whole ethical world. They too stand under one's *supreme command* rather than his *sovereignty*. Considered on their own, they are the universal substances of what the *self-conscious* essence is and does *in itself*. But this essence constitutes the power, and initially at least the center, around which those universal beings busy themselves, a center that seems to connect their affairs only contingently. Yet the return of divine essence into self-consciousness already contains the ground for self-consciousness being the center of those divine powers. At first it hides the essential unity under the form of a friendly external relation between the two worlds.

729 The form of [1807 678] consciousness in which this content appears necessarily has the same universality as the content. It is no longer the actual doing of worship, but a doing raised not yet into the concept, but initially into *representation*, into the synthetic connection of self-conscious and external existence. The existence of this representation, *language*, is the first language, *epic* as such. It contains universal content at least as the *completeness* of the world, though not as the *universality* of *thought*. The *singer* is the individual and actual person from whom, as the subject of this world, it is produced and sustained. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne: reflection and developed inwardness, the recollection of the previously immediate essence. He is the organ disappearing in his content. What counts is not his own self but his muse, his universal song. Yet what is in fact present is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of gods, is linked through the middle term of particularity with individuality, the singer. The middle term is the people in its heroes, who are individual human beings like the singer, but only *represented* and therefore also *universal*, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.

730 In this epic, then, what comes about *in itself* in worship is *presented* to consciousness: the relation of the divine to the human. The content is an *action* of the self-conscious essence. *Acting* disturbs the repose of [1807 679] substance and stirs the essence, thereby dividing its simplicity and opening it into the manifold world of natural and ethical powers. Action violates the peaceful earth; it is the pit which, animated by blood, calls forth the departed spirits. Thirsting for life, they receive it in self-consciousness's doing. The business toward which the universal effort is directed acquires two sides: the *self-endowed* side of being carried out by a collective body of actual peoples and the individuals at their head, and the *universal* side of being carried out by their substantial powers. But their *relation* was determined above as the *synthetic* connection of universal and individual, or *representation*. The judgment of this world depends on this determination.—The relation of the two is therefore a mixture that divides the unity of doing inconsistently and needlessly throws the action back and forth from one side to the other. The universal powers have the shape of individuality and thus the principle of action within them. Their activity therefore appears as a doing just as free and entirely originating in themselves as human action. Both gods and human beings have therefore done one and the same thing. The seriousness of those powers is a ridiculous excess, since human beings are in fact the force of acting individuality; and the effort and [1807 680] labor of human beings are equally useless, since the gods instead direct everything.—Mortals living for a day, who are nothing, are also the powerful *self* that subjects the universal essences to itself, wounds the gods, and gives them actuality and an interest in action at all. Conversely, these powerless universalities, which feed on human gifts and only through human beings get anything to do, are the natural essence and material of all events, and equally the ethical material and pathos of doing. Their elemental natures are brought into actuality and active relation only by individuality's free self. Yet they are equally the universal that withdraws from this connection, remains unrestricted in its determination, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity erases the point-like agent and its configurations, preserves itself pure, and dissolves everything individual in its fluidity.

731 Just as they fall into this contradictory relation with the opposing self-endowed nature, their universality also conflicts with their own determination and its relation to others. They are the eternally beautiful individuals, resting in their own existence, raised above transience and foreign force.—But they are also *determinate* elements, *particular* [1807 681] gods, and thus relate to others. Yet this relation to others, which through its opposition is a conflict with them, is a comic forgetting of their eternal nature.—Determinacy is rooted in divine subsistence and, in its limitation, has the independence of the whole individuality. Through this, their characters also lose the sharpness of their distinctive traits and mix in their ambiguity.—A purpose of activity, and their activity itself, directed against another and thus against an invincible divine force, is a contingent, empty display of bluster. It equally dissolves and turns the action's apparent seriousness into a harmless, self-assured game without result or outcome. But if the negative, or their determinacy, appears in the nature of their divinity only as the inconsistency of their activity and the contradiction between purpose and outcome, and that independent security retains its superiority over the determinate, then precisely through this the *pure power* of the *negative* confronts them as their ultimate power, over which they are powerless. They are the universal and positive against mortals' *individual self*, which cannot withstand their power. But the *universal self* therefore hovers above them and above this whole world of representation, to which all the content belongs: the *conceptless emptiness* of *necessity*. This is an occurrence before [1807 682] which they remain selfless and mourn, since these *determinate* natures do not find themselves in this purity.

732 But this necessity is the *unity of the concept*, to which the contradictory substantiality of the individual moments is subject. In it, the inconsistency and contingency of their doing fall into order, and the play of their actions gains its seriousness and value in the actions themselves. The content of the world of representation plays out its movement freely for itself in the *middle*, assembled around the individuality of a hero. Yet in his strength and beauty the hero feels his life broken and mourns as he faces an early death. For *individuality firm*

within itself and actual has been excluded to the extremes and divided into its moments, which have not yet found and united with one another. One individual, the *abstract*, nonactual one, is necessity, which takes no part in the life of the middle, any more than does the other, *actual* individual, the singer, who keeps outside it and disappears in his representation. Both extremes must approach the content. One, necessity, must fill itself with content; the other, the singer's language, must take part in it. And the content, previously left to itself, must gain within itself the certainty and fixed determination of the negative.
[1807 683]

733 This higher language, *tragedy*, thus gathers more closely together the dispersed moments of the essential and acting world. The divine *substance* separates into its shapes *according to the nature of the concept*, and its *movement* likewise conforms to it. As for form, by entering into the content language ceases to narrate, just as the content ceases to be merely represented. The hero himself is the speaker. The presentation shows the listener, who is also a spectator, *self-conscious* human beings who *know* their right and purpose, the power and will of their determinacy, and know how to *say* them. They are artists. Unlike the language accompanying ordinary activity in actual life, they do not unconsciously, naturally, and naively express the *external* aspect of their decision and undertaking. They express the inner essence, demonstrate the right of their action, and thoughtfully maintain and clearly express the pathos to which they belong in its universal individuality, free from contingent circumstances and personal particularity. Finally, the *existence* of these characters consists in *actual* human beings who put on the persons of the heroes and present them in actual speech —not narration, but their own speaking. Just as being made by human hands is essential to the statue, the actor is essential to his mask—not as an external condition from which the consideration of art must abstract. Or insofar [1807 684] as it must indeed abstract from this, that says precisely that art does not yet contain the true, proper self within it.

734 The *universal ground* on which the movement of these shapes generated from the concept takes place is the consciousness of the first, representing language and of its selfless content let loose in its parts. It is the common people in general, whose wisdom comes to speech in the *chorus* of *elders*. The chorus represents the people in its powerlessness, since the people itself forms only the positive and passive material of the governing individuality confronting it. Lacking the power of the negative, it cannot hold together and restrain the wealth and colorful fullness of divine life. Instead it lets it run apart, and in its reverent hymns praises each individual moment as an independent god—now this one, now another. But when it senses the seriousness of the concept striding over these shapes and shattering them, and sees how badly its praised gods fare when they venture onto this ground where the concept rules, it is not itself the negative power that intervenes actively. Instead it remains in the selfless thought of that power, in the consciousness of *foreign fate*, and supplies the empty wish for peace and the weak words of appeasement. In its *fear* before the higher powers, the immediate arms of [1807 685] substance, before their struggle with one another, and before the simple self of necessity that crushes them too, like the living beings tied to them; and in its *pity* for these beings, whom it also knows as the same as itself, it has only the inactive terror of this movement, equally helpless regret, and finally the empty peace of submission to necessity. Necessity's work is grasped neither as the character's necessary action nor as the absolute essence's doing within itself.

735 On this observing consciousness, as on the indifferent ground of representation, spirit appears not in dispersed multiplicity but in the concept's simple division. Its substance therefore shows itself torn apart only into its two extreme powers. These elemental *universal* essences are also self-conscious *individualities*: heroes who place their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it the determinacy of their character, and constitute its activity and actuality. —As noted, this universal individualization descends further into the immedi-

ate actuality of existence proper and presents itself to a crowd of spectators. In the chorus, this crowd has its counterpart—or rather, its own representation expressing itself.

736 The content and movement of spirit that is its own object here have already been considered as the nature and [1807 686] realization of ethical substance. In its religion spirit gains consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in a purer form and simpler shape. Through its concept, ethical substance divided in *content* into the two powers determined as *divine* and *human*, or underground and upper right—the former the *family*, the latter *state power*, with the *female* character belonging to the first and the *male* to the second. The circle of gods, previously multiform and unstable in its determinations, is therefore restricted to these powers, which through this determination approach individuality proper. For the earlier dispersal of the whole into manifold abstract powers appearing as substantial is the *dissolution* of the *subject*, which comprehends them only as *moments* within its self. Individuality is therefore only the superficial form of those essences. Conversely, any distinction of *characters* beyond the one named must be counted as contingent personality, external in itself.

737 At the same time the essence divides in its *form*, or *knowing*. *Acting* spirit, as consciousness, confronts the object on which it acts, and which is therefore determined as the knower's *negative*. The agent thus stands in the opposition of knowing and not knowing. It takes its purpose from its character and knows it [1807 687] as ethical essence. But because of its character's determinacy, it knows only one power of substance, while the other is hidden from it. Present actuality is therefore one thing *in itself* and another for consciousness. In this relation, upper and lower right take on the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and the power that conceals itself and lies in ambush. One is the *side of light*: the god of the oracle, who in his natural moment arose from the sun illuminating everything, and knows and reveals everything—*Phoebus*, and *Zeus*, his father. But this truth-speaking god's commands and announcements of what *is* are instead deceptive. For in its concept

this knowing is immediately not knowing, because *consciousness* within itself is this opposition in acting. Both the one who could solve the riddle of the Sphinx himself and the one who trusts like a child are therefore sent to destruction by what the god reveals to them. This priestess through whom the beautiful god speaks is nothing other than the ambiguous sisters of fate, who drive people to crime through their promises and, through the double meaning of what they offered as security, deceive anyone relying on the apparent sense. Hence a consciousness purer than the latter, who believes witches, and more reflective [1807 688] and thorough than the former, who trusts the priestess and the beautiful god, delays revenge after his father's spirit itself reveals the crime that murdered him, and arranges further proofs—because this revealing spirit could also be the devil.

738 This distrust is justified because knowing consciousness places itself in the opposition between its self-certainty and objective essence. Ethical consciousness claims the right that actuality is nothing *in itself* against absolute law. But it experiences that its knowing is one-sided, its law only the law of its character, and that it has grasped only one power of substance. Action itself is this inversion of the *known* into its *opposite*, into *being*. It is the reversal of the right of character and knowing into the right of the opposite, with which the former is linked in substance's essence—into the Erinys of the other power and character, stirred to hostility. This *lower* right sits enthroned with *Zeus* and enjoys equal authority with manifest right and the knowing god.

739 Acting individuality restricts the chorus's world of gods to these three essences. One is *substance*, equally the power of the hearth and the spirit of family piety, and the universal power of state and [1807 689] government. Since this distinction belongs to substance as such, it does not individualize itself for representation into two distinct shapes, but in actuality has the two persons of its characters. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and not knowing falls within *each actual self-consciousness*, and divides between two individual shapes only in abstraction, in the element of universality. For the hero's self exists only as whole consciousness and is therefore essentially the *whole* distinction belong-

ing to form. But its substance is determinate, and only one side of the distinction of content belongs to it. The two sides of consciousness, which in actuality do not each have a separate individuality of their own, therefore each receive a particular shape *in representation*: one that of the revealing god, the other that of the Erinys remaining hidden. In part they enjoy equal honor; in part the *shape* of *substance*, Zeus, is the necessity of their *relation* to one another. Substance is the relation in which knowing exists for itself but has its truth in the simple; the distinction through which actual consciousness exists has its ground in the inner essence that erases it; and *certainty's assurance*, clear to itself, has its confirmation in *forgetfulness*.

740 Consciousness opened up this opposition through action. Acting according to manifest knowing, [1807 690] it experiences that knowing's deception. Devoted in content to one attribute of substance, it violated the other and thereby gave it a right against itself. Following the knowing god, it instead grasped what was not manifest, and pays for having trusted knowing. Since ambiguity is knowing's nature, it had to be present *for consciousness* too, as a *warning*. The priestess's frenzy, the witches' inhuman shape, the voice of the tree or bird, the dream, and so forth are not the ways in which truth appears, but warning signs of deception, of the lack of reflection, of the individuality and contingency of knowing. Or, what amounts to the same thing, the opposed power consciousness violates is present as declared law and valid right, whether the law of family or of state. Against this, consciousness followed its own knowing and hid from itself what was manifest. But the truth of the powers of content and consciousness confronting one another is the result that both have equal right, and therefore, in the opposition action produces, equal wrong. The movement of doing proves their unity in the mutual downfall of both powers and self-conscious characters. The opposition's reconciliation with itself is the *Lethe* of the *underworld* in death—or the *Lethe* of the *upper world* as acquittal, not from guilt, which consciousness cannot [1807 691] deny because it acted, but from crime, and as its atoning peace. Both are *forgetfulness*: the disappearance of the actuality and doing of the powers of sub-

stance, their individualities, and the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For none is the essence for itself. Instead, the essence is the whole's repose within itself, fate's motionless unity, the peaceful existence and thus inactivity and lifelessness of family and government, the equal honor and thus indifferent nonactuality of Apollo and the Erinys, and the return of their inspiration and activity into simple Zeus.

741 This fate completes the depopulation of heaven—that thoughtless mixture of individuality and essence, a mixture through which the essence's doing appears inconsistent, contingent, and unworthy of it. For individuality, attached to essence only superficially, is inessential. The banishment of such representations without essence, demanded by ancient philosophers, thus already begins in tragedy in general: the concept governs the division of substance, individuality is thereby essential, and the determinations are absolute characters. The self-consciousness represented in tragedy therefore knows and recognizes [1807 692] only one supreme power, and knows this Zeus only as the power of state or hearth. In the opposition of knowing, it knows him only as the father of knowing the *particular*, which becomes a shape—and as Zeus of the oath and of the Erinys, of the *universal* inwardness dwelling in concealment. The moments dispersing further out of the concept into representation, which the chorus accepts one after another, are by contrast not the hero's pathos but sink for him into passion: contingent, inessential moments, praised by the selfless chorus but incapable of constituting the heroes' character or of being expressed and honored by them as their essence.

742 But the persons of the divine essence itself, as well as the characters of its substance, also merge into the simplicity of the unconscious. Against self-consciousness, this necessity is determined as the negative power of all appearing shapes. Self-consciousness does not recognize itself in this necessity but instead perishes there. The self appears only allotted to the *characters*, not as the center of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple *certainty* of itself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the *substantial* essence, and *abstract* necessity. It is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Since actual

self-consciousness is still distinguished from substance and fate, it is *partly* the chorus, [1807 693] or rather the watching crowd. This movement of divine life fills the crowd with fear as something *foreign*, or as something close produces in it only the emotion of inactive *pity*. Partly, insofar as consciousness joins in the action and belongs to the characters, this union is external, a *playing of a role*, because the true union of self, fate, and substance is not yet present. The hero appearing before the spectator splits into mask and actor, person and actual self.

743 The heroes' self-consciousness must emerge from its mask and present itself as knowing itself to be the fate both of the chorus's gods and of the absolute powers themselves, and as no longer separated from the chorus, universal consciousness.

744 *Comedy* therefore initially has this side: actual self-consciousness presents itself as the fate of the gods. As *universal* moments, these elemental essences are not self and are not actual. They do have the form of individuality, but this is only imagined in them and does not belong to them in and for themselves. The actual self does not have such an abstract moment as its substance and content. It, the subject, is therefore raised above such a moment as above an individual property. Wearing this mask, it expresses the irony of the mask's wish to be something [1807 694] for itself. The posturing of universal essence is exposed to the self: it shows itself caught in an actuality and drops its mask precisely when it wants to be something proper. Appearing here in its meaning as actual, the self plays with the mask it puts on at one point to be its person. But just as quickly it emerges again from this appearance in its own nakedness and ordinariness, showing that these are not distinct from the proper self, the actor, or from the spectator.

745 This universal dissolution of shaped essence in general within its individuality becomes more serious in content, and thus more mischievous and bitter, insofar as that content has its more serious and necessary meaning. Divine substance unites the meaning of natural and ethical essence within itself. As

regards nature, actual self-consciousness already shows itself as fate in using nature for its adornment, dwelling, and so forth, and in feasting on its sacrifice. To it the secret has been disclosed of how things stand with nature's essence as self. In the mystery of bread and wine it makes that essence its own, together with the meaning of inner essence; and in comedy it is conscious of the irony of this meaning in general.—Insofar as this meaning contains ethical essence, it is partly the people in its [1807 695] two sides, the state or demos proper, and family individuality; partly self-conscious pure knowing, or rational thought of the universal.—That *demos*, the universal mass knowing itself as lord and ruler and as the understanding and insight deserving respect, constrains and deceives itself through the particularity of its actuality. It presents the ridiculous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and vulgarity. When the principle of its individuality separated from the universal steps forward in the proper shape of actuality, openly appropriating and managing the commonwealth whose secret injury it is, the contrast is exposed more directly: the universal as theory against what matters in practice, the complete release of the purposes of immediate individuality from universal order, and their mockery of it.

746 Rational *thought* removes divine essence from its contingent shape. Opposed to the chorus's conceptless wisdom, which offers various moral sayings and accepts a host of laws and determinate concepts of duty and right, it raises them into the simple ideas of the *beautiful* and the *good*.—The movement of this [1807 696] abstraction is consciousness of the dialectic that these maxims and laws have within themselves, and thereby of the disappearance of the absolute validity in which they previously appeared. When the contingent determination and superficial individuality that representation lent to divine essences disappear, on their *natural* side they have only the nakedness of their immediate existence. They are clouds, a vanishing mist, like those representations. In their *thought* essentiality, having become the *simple* thoughts of the *beautiful* and *good*, they accommodate being filled with any chosen content. The power of dialectical knowing abandons determinate laws and maxims of action to the

pleasure and frivolity of the young, who are thereby seduced; and it puts weapons of fraud into the hands of old age, anxious and concerned and confined to life's individuality. The pure thoughts of the beautiful and good thus offer a comic spectacle. Freed from opinion—which contains both their determinacy as content and their absolute determinacy, consciousness's holding fast to them—they become empty, and thereby the plaything of opinion and the arbitrary choice of contingent individuality.

747 Here, then, the previously unconscious fate, consisting in empty repose and forgetfulness [1807 697] and separated from self-consciousness, is united with it. The *individual self* is the negative power through and in which the gods disappear, together with their moments: existing nature and the thoughts of its determinations. At the same time, the self is not the emptiness of disappearance. It preserves itself in this nothingness, is at home with itself, and is the only actuality. The religion of art has completed itself in it and returned completely into itself. Because individual consciousness in its self-certainty presents itself as this absolute power, that power has lost the form of something *represented*, *separated* from *consciousness* in general and foreign to it, as were the statue, the living beautiful body, the content of epic, and the powers and persons of tragedy. Nor is this unity the *unconscious* unity of worship and the mysteries. Instead, the actor's proper self coincides with his person, as does the spectator, who is completely at home in what is presented and sees himself playing. What this self-consciousness intuits is that whatever assumes the form of essence against it instead dissolves and is surrendered within its thinking, existence, and doing. It is the return of everything universal into self-certainty, which is thereby this complete freedom from fear and the [1807 698] absence of essence in anything foreign, a well-being and ease of consciousness found nowhere else outside this comedy.

[1807 699]

C. *Revealed Religion*.

748 Through the religion of art, spirit has passed from the form of *substance* into that of *subject*. For this religion *produces* its shape, and thus posits within it *doing*, or *self-consciousness*, which only disappears in the terrible substance and does not grasp itself in trust. This incarnation of divine essence begins with the statue, which has only the *external* shape of self within it, while the *inward* self, its activity, falls outside it. In worship, however, both sides have become one. In the result of the religion of art, this unity in its completion has also passed over to the extreme of the self. All essentiality has sunk into spirit completely certain of itself in the individuality of consciousness. The proposition expressing this lightheartedness reads: *the self is the absolute essence*. The essence that was substance, and in [1807 700] which the self was an accident, has sunk into a predicate. In *this self-consciousness*, which nothing confronts in the form of essence, spirit has lost its *consciousness*.

749 This proposition, *the self is the absolute essence*, clearly belongs to nonreligious, actual spirit. We must recall which shape of actual spirit expresses it. That shape will also contain the proposition's movement and reversal, reducing the self to a predicate and raising substance to subject. This must happen in such a way that the reversed proposition does not make substance subject merely *in itself* or *for us*, or, what is the same, restore substance so that spirit's consciousness is led back to its beginning, natural religion. Rather, the reversal must be accomplished *for and through self-consciousness* itself. By consciously giving itself up, self-consciousness is preserved in its externalization and remains the subject of substance. But as equally externalized, it also has consciousness of substance. Or, by *producing* substance as subject through its sacrifice, this subject remains its own self. In the two propositions, the subject merely disappears in the first substantiality, while in the second substance is merely predicate. Both sides are therefore present in each with an opposite inequality of worth. What is achieved is that the [1807 701] union and interpenetration of both natures emerge, in which both, with equal worth, are equally *essential* and also only *moments*. Through this, spirit is both *consciousness* of itself as its *objective* substance and simple *self-consciousness* remaining within itself.

750 The religion of art belongs to ethical spirit, which we earlier saw perish in the *condition of legal right*: that is, in the proposition *the self as such, the abstract person, is absolute essence*. In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people; it is *fulfilled* universality. But *simple individuality* rises out of this content, and its lightheartedness purifies it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this, the *reality* of ethical spirit is lost. The contentless spirits of individual peoples are assembled in one pantheon—not a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form leaves each to itself, but the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which strips them of body and grants being-in-and-for-itself to the spiritless self, the individual person.

751 But through its emptiness this self has released the content. Consciousness is essence only *within itself*. Its own *existence*, the person's legal recognition, is unfulfilled abstraction. It therefore possesses instead only the thought of itself; or, as it *exists* and knows itself as object, it is *nonactual*. It is therefore only the Stoic *[1807 702] independence* of *thought*. Passing through the movement of skeptical consciousness, this independence finds its truth in the shape called *unhappy self-consciousness*.

752 This consciousness knows how things stand with the abstract person's actual validity, and equally with that person's validity in pure thought. It knows such validity instead as complete loss. It is itself this self-conscious loss and the externalization of its self-knowledge.—We see that this unhappy consciousness forms the opposite side and completion of comic consciousness, which is perfectly happy within itself. All divine essence returns into the latter; or it is the complete *externalization* of *substance*. The former, conversely, is the tragic fate of the *self-certainty* that is supposed to exist in and for itself. It is consciousness of the loss of all *essentiality* in *this certainty* of itself, and of the loss of this very self-knowledge—of substance as well as self. It is the pain that expresses itself in the harsh words: *God is dead*.

753 In the condition of legal right, then, the ethical world and its religion have sunk into comic consciousness, and unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this *entire* loss. It has lost both the intrinsic worth of its immediate personality and that of its mediated, *thought* personality. Likewise, [1807 703] trust in the gods' eternal laws has fallen silent, as have the oracles that claimed to know the particular. The statues are now corpses whose animating soul has fled, just as the hymns are words whose faith has fled. The gods' tables lack spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness receives no joyful unity of itself with the essence. The works of the muse lack the power of spirit whose self-certainty arose from the crushing of gods and human beings. They are now what they are for us: beautiful fruits broken from the tree. A friendly fate offered them to us as a girl presents those fruits. It does not give the actual life of their existence, the tree that bore them, the earth and elements that made up their substance, the climate that constituted their determinacy, or the changing seasons that governed their coming-to-be.—Similarly, with those artworks fate gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but only the veiled recollection of that actuality.—Our activity in enjoying them is therefore not worship, through which our consciousness would gain its complete, fulfilling truth. It is instead the external activity that wipes, perhaps, [1807 704] raindrops or specks of dust from these fruits. In place of the inward elements of the surrounding, generating, and inspiring actuality of ethical life, it erects the elaborate scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence—language, history, and so forth—not to live its way into them, but only to represent them within itself. Yet the girl offering the picked fruits is more than their nature unfolded into its conditions and elements—tree, air, light, and so forth—which offered them immediately. For in a higher way she gathers all this into the gleam of her self-conscious eye and the gesture of offering. Likewise, the spirit of fate offering us those artworks is more than that people's ethical life and actuality. For it is the *recollection that takes back inward* the spirit still *externalized* in them. It is the spirit of tragic fate, gathering all those individual gods and attributes of substance into the one pantheon, into spirit self-conscious of itself as spirit.

754 All the conditions of its emergence are present. This totality of its conditions constitutes its *coming-to-be*, its *concept*, or its emergence *in itself*.—The circle of art's productions encompasses the forms of absolute substance's externalizations. Substance exists in the form of individuality as a thing, as an *existing* object [1807 705] of sensory consciousness; as pure language, or the coming-to-be of the shape whose existence does not step out of the self and is a purely *vanishing* object; as immediate *unity* with universal *self-consciousness* in its inspiration, and as mediated unity in the doing of worship; as beautiful *self-endowed bodily existence*; and finally as existence raised into *representation* and expanded into a world, which at last gathers itself into universality that is equally *pure self-certainty*.—These forms, and on the other side the *world* of the *person* and of right, the devastating savagery of the released elements of content, as well as the *thought* person of Stoicism and the unstable unrest of skeptical consciousness, form the circumference of shapes standing expectant and pressing around the birthplace of spirit coming to be as self-consciousness. The pain and longing of unhappy self-consciousness, penetrating them all, is their center and the shared birth pang of its emergence: the simplicity of the pure concept containing those shapes as its moments.

755 Spirit has within it the two sides represented above as the two reversed propositions. One is that *substance* externalizes itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other, conversely, that *self-consciousness* externalizes [1807 706] itself and makes itself thinghood, or the universal self. In this way both sides have come toward one another, and their true union has arisen. Substance's externalization, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of *necessity*, or the fact that substance is self-consciousness *in itself*. Conversely, self-consciousness's externalization expresses its being the universal essence *in itself*. Or, because the self is pure being-for-itself remaining at home with itself in its opposite, it expresses that *for it* substance is self-consciousness, and precisely thereby spirit. Of this spirit, which has left the form of substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, we can therefore say—if we wish to use relations drawn from natural generation—

that it has an *actual* mother but a father *existing in itself*. For *actuality*, or self-consciousness, and the *in-itself* as substance are its two moments. Through their mutual externalization, each becoming the other, spirit enters existence as their unity.

756 Insofar as self-consciousness one-sidedly grasps only *its own* externalization, true spirit has not yet come to be for it, even if its object is thus equally being and self and it knows all existence as spiritual essence. This is so insofar as being in general, or [1807 707] substance, has not equally on its side externalized itself *in itself* and become self-consciousness. For then all existence is spiritual essence only *from the standpoint of consciousness*, not in its own self. Spirit is in this way only *imagined into* existence. This imagining is *fantasy*, which puts into nature and history, into the world and the mythical representations of earlier religions, an inner meaning other than the one they immediately offer consciousness in their appearance—or, regarding religions, other than what the self-consciousness whose religions they were knew within them. But this meaning is borrowed, a garment that does not cover the nakedness of appearance or win faith and reverence. It remains consciousness's own murky night and ecstasy.

757 For this meaning of the objective not to be mere imagining, it must exist *in itself*. That is, *first* it must arise for consciousness from the *concept* and emerge in its necessity. In this way, through knowing *immediate consciousness*, or consciousness of the *existing* object, self-knowing *spirit* has arisen for us through that consciousness's necessary movement. *Second*, this concept, which as immediate also had the shape of *immediacy* for its consciousness, has given itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*: that is, according to the very same [1807 708] necessity of the concept by which *being*, or *immediacy*, the contentless object of sensory consciousness, externalizes itself and becomes I for consciousness.—But the *thinking in-itself*, or *knowing necessity*, differs from the *immediate in-itself*, or *existing necessity* itself. Yet this distinction also does not lie outside the concept, since the concept's *simple unity* is *immediate being* itself. The concept is equally what externalizes itself, or the coming-to-be of *intuited neces-*

sity, and what remains with itself within necessity and knows and comprehends it.—The *immediate in-itself* of spirit giving itself the shape of self-consciousness means nothing other than that actual world-spirit has reached this knowledge of itself. Only then does this knowledge also enter its consciousness as truth. How that happened has emerged above.

758 Absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself* and therefore also for its *consciousness*. This now appears as the *world's faith* that spirit *exists* as a self-consciousness, that is, as an actual human being; that it exists for immediate certainty; that believing consciousness *sees*, *feels*, and *hears* this divinity. Thus it is not imagining: it is *actually the case*. Consciousness then does not start from *its own* inwardness, from thought, and connect *within itself* the thought of God with [1807 709] existence. It starts from immediate present existence and recognizes God in it.—The moment of *immediate being* is present in the concept's content in this way: religious spirit, in the return of all essentiality into consciousness, has become a *simple* positive self, just as actual spirit as such, in unhappy consciousness, is this same *simple* self-conscious negativity. The self of existing spirit thus has the form of complete immediacy. It is posited neither as thought or represented nor as produced, as happens with the immediate self partly in natural religion and partly in the religion of art. Instead, this God is immediately intuited by the senses as self, as an actual individual human being. Only so *is* he self-consciousness.

759 This incarnation of divine essence, or its essentially and immediately having the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of absolute religion. In it, essence is known as spirit; or this religion is spirit's consciousness of itself as spirit. For spirit is the knowing of itself in its externalization: the essence that is the movement of retaining equality with itself in its otherness. But this is substance insofar as in its accidental being it is equally reflected into itself—not indifferent toward it as toward something inessential, and thus situated in something foreign, [1807 710] but *within itself* there; that is, insofar as it is *subject* or *self*.—In this religion the divine essence is therefore *revealed*. Its being revealed plainly consists in its being known for what it is. But it is known pre-

cisely by being known as spirit, as essence that is essentially *self-consciousness*.—For *consciousness*, something in its object is secret when that object is an *other*, or *foreign*, to it, and when it does not know it as *itself*. This secrecy ends when absolute essence as spirit is consciousness's object. For then in its relation to consciousness it is *self*: consciousness immediately knows itself in it, or is revealed to itself in it. It is revealed to itself only in its own self-certainty. That object of its is the *self*. But the self is not foreign; it is the inseparable unity with itself, the immediately universal. It is the pure concept, pure thought or *being-for-itself*, which is immediately *being* and thus *being for another*, and as this *being for another* is immediately returned into itself and at home with itself. It is therefore what is truly and solely revealed. The good, the just, the holy, creator of heaven and earth, and so forth are *predicates* of a subject—universal moments held at this point, and existing initially only in consciousness's return into thought.—When *they* are known, their ground and essence, the *subject* itself, is not yet revealed. [1807 711] Likewise, they are the *determinations* of the universal, not *this universal* itself. But the *subject* itself, and thus also *this pure universal*, is revealed as *self*. For the self is precisely this inwardness reflected into itself, which is immediately present and is the very certainty of the self to which it is present. To be revealed according to its *concept* is therefore spirit's true shape, and this shape of its, the concept, is likewise alone its essence and substance. It is known as self-consciousness and is immediately revealed to self-consciousness, since it is this itself. Divine nature is the same as human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.

760 Here, then, consciousness—or the way the essence exists for itself, its shape—is in fact equal to its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness. It is therefore also an *existing* object, and this *being* equally immediately means *pure thought*, absolute essence.—Absolute essence existing as an actual self-consciousness seems to have *descended* from its eternal simplicity. In fact, however, only through this has it reached its *highest* essence. For only when the concept of essence has attained its simple purity is it absolute *abstraction*, which is *pure thought* and thus the self's pure individuality, and, because of its simplicity, the

immediate, or *being*.—What is called sensory consciousness is precisely this pure *abstraction*. [1807 712] It is this thinking for which *being* is the *immediate*. The lowest is therefore also the highest; what is revealed, having come entirely out onto the *surface*, is precisely thereby the *deepest*. The highest essence being seen, heard, and so forth as an existing self-consciousness is therefore in fact the completion of its concept. Through this completion, the essence *exists* just as immediately as it is essence.

761 This immediate existence is also not solely and merely immediate consciousness, but religious consciousness. Its immediacy inseparably means not only an *existing* self-consciousness, but also the purely thought or absolute *essence*. Religious consciousness is conscious of what we are conscious of in our concept: that *being is essence*. This *unity* of being and essence, of *thought* that is immediately *existence*, is both this religious consciousness's *thought*, or *mediated* knowing, and *its immediate* knowing. For this unity of being and thought is *self*-consciousness, and itself *exists*; or the *thought* unity also has this shape of what it is. God is therefore *revealed* here *as he is; he exists* as he is *in himself*. He exists as spirit. God is accessible only in pure speculative knowing, exists only in it, and is only this knowing itself, since he is spirit. And this speculative knowing is the knowing of revealed religion. Speculative knowing knows him as *thought*, or pure essence, knows this thought as being and as [1807 713] existence, and knows existence as its own negativity, hence as self, *this* self and universal self. Revealed religion knows exactly this.—The hopes and expectations of the previous world pressed toward this revelation alone: to intuit what absolute essence is and find themselves in it. Self-consciousness receives this joy, and it seizes the whole world: to see itself in absolute essence. For absolute essence is spirit; it is the simple movement of those pure moments. This movement itself expresses that the essence is known as spirit only by being intuited as *immediate* self-consciousness.

762 This concept of spirit itself knowing itself as spirit is itself immediate and not yet developed. The essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is revealed. This first being-revealed is itself *immediate*. But immediacy is equally pure mediation or

thought, and must therefore display this within itself as such.—Considered more specifically, in the immediacy of self-consciousness spirit is *this individual* self-consciousness, opposed to *universal* self-consciousness. It is an excluding one, which for the consciousness *for which* it exists still has the unresolved form of a *sensory other*. That consciousness does not yet know spirit as its own; or spirit does not yet exist as universal, as all self, just as it exists as *individual* self. The shape does not yet have the form of the *concept*: that is, of the [1807 714] universal self, the self that in its immediate actuality is equally sublated, thought, universality, without losing that actuality in universality.—But the next, itself immediate form of this universality is not already the form *of thought* itself, *of the concept as concept*. It is the universality of actuality, the totality of selves, and the elevation of existence into representation. As everywhere else—to give a definite example—the sublated *sensory this* is first the thing of *perception*, not yet the *universal* of understanding.

763 This individual human being, as whom absolute essence is revealed, therefore accomplishes within himself as individual the movement of *sensory being*. He is the *immediately* present God; through this his *being* passes into *having been*. The consciousness for which he has this sensory presence ceases to see and hear him; it *has* seen and heard him. Only by its merely *having* seen and heard him does it itself become spiritual consciousness. Or, just as he previously rose for it as *sensory existence*, he has now risen *in spirit*.—For as a consciousness seeing and hearing him through the senses, it is itself only immediate consciousness. It has not sublated the inequality of objectivity, has not taken it back into pure thought, but knows this objective individual, not itself, as spirit. In the disappearance of the immediate existence of what is known as [1807 715] absolute essence, the immediate receives its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate self of actuality, but as the community's *universal self-consciousness*, resting in its own substance, just as that substance is universal subject in it. Not the individual on his own, but the individual together with the community's consciousness and what he is for it, constitutes his complete whole.

764 But *pastness* and *distance* are only the incomplete form in which the immediate mode is mediated or posited as universal. This mode is only superficially dipped into the element of thought, preserved there *as* sensory mode, and not made one with the nature of thought itself. It is raised only into *representation*, since representation is the synthetic connection of sensory immediacy and its universality, or thought.

765 This *form of representation* constitutes the determinacy in which spirit becomes conscious of itself in this community of its own. The community is not yet spirit's self-consciousness developed to its concept as concept; mediation is still incomplete. In this connection of being and thought, then, there remains the defect that spiritual essence still carries an unreconciled division into a here and a beyond. The *content* is true, but all its moments, posited in the element of representation, have the character of not being comprehended. Instead, they appear as [1807 716] completely independent sides relating *externally* to one another. For the true content also to receive its true form for consciousness, consciousness needs the higher cultivation that raises its intuition of absolute substance into the concept and reconciles its consciousness with its self-consciousness *for itself*, as has happened for us or *in itself*.

766 We must consider this content in the way it is within spirit's consciousness.—Absolute spirit is *content*: thus it is in the shape of its *truth*. But its truth is not only to be the community's substance, or its *in-itself*, nor only to emerge from this inwardness into the objectivity of representation. It is to become actual self, reflect itself into itself, and be subject. This, then, is the movement it accomplishes in its community, or this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is *in and for itself* is therefore not brought out by, as it were, unraveling its rich life in the community and tracing it back to its first thread—perhaps to the representations of the first imperfect community, or even to what the actual human being said. Underlying this reduction is the instinct to move toward the concept. But it confuses *origin* as the *immediate existence* of the first appearance with the *simplicity* of the *[1807 717] concept*. Through this impoverishment of spirit's life, through clearing away the community's representation and

its activity toward that representation, what arises is therefore not the concept but mere externality and individuality: the historical mode of immediate appearance and the spiritless recollection of a single intended shape and its past.

767 Spirit is initially the content of its consciousness in the form of *pure substance*, or is the content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the movement of descending to existence or individuality. The middle term between them is their synthetic connection, consciousness of becoming other, or representation as such. The third is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit. Its separation in representation consists in being in a *determinate* way; but this determinacy is nothing other than one of its moments. Its detailed movement is therefore to unfold its nature in each of its moments as in an element. As each of these circles completes itself within itself, this reflection into itself is also the transition into the other. *Representation* forms the middle between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only *one* of the determinations. At the same time, [1807 718] however, as shown, its character as synthetic connection spreads over all these elements and is their shared determinacy.

768 The content itself that we must consider has already appeared in part as the representation of *unhappy* and *believing* consciousness. In the former, however, it was determined as content *produced from consciousness* and *longed for*, in which spirit can find neither fulfillment nor rest, because the content is not yet its content *in itself*, or as its *substance*. In the latter it was considered as the world's selfless *essence*, or as the essentially *objective* content of representation—a representation fleeing actuality in general and therefore lacking the *certainty of self-consciousness*, which separates itself from representation partly as the vanity of knowing and partly as pure insight.—The community's consciousness, by contrast, has this content as its *substance*, just as it is the community's *certainty* of its own spirit.

769 Spirit, initially represented as substance in the *element of pure thought*, is therefore immediately the simple, self-equal, eternal *essence*. Yet it has not this abstract *meaning* of essence but the meaning of absolute spirit. But spirit is precisely this: to be not meaning, not inwardness, but the actual. Simple eternal essence would therefore be spirit only in empty words if it remained at the representation and expression of [1807 719] simple eternal essence. Yet because simple essence is abstraction, it is in fact the *negative within itself*: the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in itself in the *essence*. That is, it is absolute *difference* from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As *essence* it exists only *in itself*, or for us. But since this purity is precisely abstraction or negativity, it exists *for itself*, or is the *self*, the *concept*.—It is therefore *objective*. Since representation grasps and expresses the *necessity* of the concept just stated as an *occurrence*, it will be said that eternal essence *generates* an other for itself. But in this otherness it has equally immediately returned into itself. For the difference is difference *in itself*: it is immediately distinguished only from itself, and is therefore unity returned into itself.

770 Thus three moments are distinguished: *essence*; *being-for-itself*, which is the essence's otherness and for which the essence exists; and *being-for-itself*, or self-knowing *in the other*. The essence intuits only itself in its being-for-itself. In this externalization it is only at home with itself. Being-for-itself that excludes itself from essence is the *essence's knowledge of itself*. It is the word whose utterance leaves the speaker externalized and emptied, but which is equally immediately heard. Only this [1807 720] hearing of itself is the word's existence. The distinctions made are therefore dissolved as immediately as they are made, and made as immediately as they are dissolved. The true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.

771 This movement within itself expresses absolute essence as *spirit*. Absolute essence not grasped as spirit is only abstract emptiness, just as spirit not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. Grasped in their purity, its *moments* are restless concepts that exist only as being their opposite within themselves and having their rest in the whole. But the community's *representation* is not

this *comprehending* thought. It has the content without its necessity, and instead of the concept's form it brings the natural relations of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Because it thus proceeds through *representation* within thought itself, the essence is indeed revealed to it, but through this synthetic representation its moments partly fall apart for it, so that they do not relate to one another through their own concept. Partly, too, it withdraws from this pure object of its own and relates to it only externally. The object is revealed to it by someone foreign, and in this thought of spirit it recognizes neither itself nor the nature of pure self-consciousness. [1807 721] We must go beyond the form of representation and those relations taken from nature, and therefore especially beyond treating the moments of the movement that spirit is as isolated, unchanging substances or subjects instead of transitional moments. As noted earlier in another respect, this going-beyond must be seen as the pressure of the concept. But insofar as it is only instinct, it misunderstands itself, rejects the content with the form, and, what is the same, reduces it to a historical representation and an inherited piece of tradition. Only faith's purely external aspect is retained here, and therefore as something dead without knowledge. Its *inward* aspect has disappeared, since this would be the concept knowing itself as concept.

772 Absolute spirit represented in *pure essence* is indeed not *abstract* pure essence. Rather, precisely because pure essence is only a moment in spirit, it has sunk into an *element*. But the presentation of spirit in this element has the same formal defect as *essence* as essence. Essence is the abstract and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other. Likewise, *spirit* in the element of essence is the *form* of *simple unity*, which for that very reason is equally essentially a becoming-other.—Or, what amounts to the same thing, eternal essence's relation to its being-for-itself is [1807 722] the immediately simple relation of pure thought. In this *simple* intuition of itself in the other, *otherness* is therefore not posited as such. It is difference as immediately *no difference* in pure thought: a recognition *of love*, in which the two were not *opposed* in their essence.—Spirit expressed in

the element of pure thought is essentially itself this: to exist not only in pure thought but as *actual*. For its concept itself contains *otherness*, that is, the sublation of the pure, merely thought concept.

773 Because the element of pure thought is abstract, it is itself instead the *other* of its simplicity, and therefore passes into the proper element of *representation*. In this element the moments of the pure concept acquire a *substantial* existence against one another, and are equally *subjects*. They do not possess for a third party the indifference of being toward one another, but, reflected into themselves, separate themselves from and oppose one another.

774 Spirit that is thus only eternal or abstract becomes *an other* to itself, or enters existence, and immediately *immediate existence*. It therefore *creates* a *world*. This *creation* is representation's word for the *concept* itself in its absolute movement: for the fact that the simple, or pure thought, declared absolute, is, because it is abstract, instead the negative and thus what is opposed to itself, or the *other*. Or, to say the same in yet another [1807 723] form: what is posited as *essence* is simple *immediacy*, or *being*. But as immediacy or being it lacks self, and thus, lacking inwardness, is *passive*, or *being for another*.—This *being for another* is also *a world*. Spirit in the determination of *being for another* is the peaceful subsistence of the moments previously enclosed in pure thought, hence the dissolution of their simple universality and their separation into their own particularity.

775 But the world is not only this spirit scattered into completeness and its external order. Since spirit is essentially the simple self, this self is equally present in the world: *existing* spirit, the individual self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself from itself as an other, or as world.—Since this individual self is initially posited so immediately, it is not yet *spirit for itself*. It therefore does not *exist as* spirit; it can be called *innocent*, but hardly *good*. To be self and spirit in fact, it must first become an *other* to itself, just as eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness. Since this spirit is determined as initially existing only immediately, or as dispersed into the multi-

plicity of its consciousness, its becoming-other is knowing's going *into itself* in general. Immediate existence turns into thought, or [1807 724] merely sensory consciousness into consciousness of thought. And because this thought comes from immediacy, or is *conditioned*, it is not pure knowing but thought with otherness within it, and thus thought opposed to itself: the thought of *good* and *evil*. The human being is represented as having lost the form of equality with himself by picking from the tree of knowledge of *good* and *evil*, and as having been driven out of the condition of innocent consciousness, out of nature offering itself without labor, out of paradise, the garden of animals. This is represented as something that *happened*, as something not necessary.

776 Since this withdrawal into itself by existing consciousness immediately determines itself as becoming *unequal* to itself, *evil* appears as the first existence of consciousness withdrawn into itself. And because the thoughts of *good* and *evil* are wholly opposed, and this opposition is not yet dissolved, this consciousness is essentially only evil. Yet precisely because of this opposition, *good* consciousness also stands against it, together with their relation to one another.—Immediate existence turns into *thought*, and *being-within-itself* is thereby more closely determined partly as itself thinking, partly as the moment of the essence's *becoming-other*. Becoming evil can therefore be placed further back, outside the existing world, already in the first realm of thought. It can thus [1807 725] be said that the firstborn son of light himself fell by withdrawing into himself, but that another was immediately generated in his place. Incidentally, forms such as *falling* and *son*, belonging only to representation and not to the concept, conversely reduce the concept's moments to representation, or carry representation into the realm of thought.—It is equally indifferent whether a multiplicity of other shapes is placed beside the simple thought of *otherness* in eternal essence, and *withdrawal into itself* is placed within them. This addition must also be approved, because the moment of *otherness* thereby expresses difference as it should: not merely multiplicity in general, but determinate difference as well. One part, the son, is the simple essence knowing itself as essence; the other part is the externalization of being-for-itself that lives only

in praise of the essence. In this latter part one can then also place the taking-back of externalized being-for-itself and evil's withdrawal into itself. Insofar as otherness divides in two, spirit would be more determinate in its moments and, if they are counted, expressed as a unity of four—or even, because the multitude itself divides again into two parts, those remaining good and those becoming evil, as a unity of five.—But *counting* the moments can be considered useless in general. For partly what is distinguished [1807 726] is itself equally only *one*: precisely the *thought* of difference, which is only one thought, just as it is *this* distinguished term, the second against the first. Partly, too, the thought gathering the many into one must be dissolved out of its universality and distinguished into more than three or four distinct terms. Against the absolute determinacy of the abstract one, the principle of number, this universality appears as indeterminacy in relation to number itself. Thus one could speak only of *numbers* in general, not of a *number* of distinctions. Thinking here of number and counting at all is therefore entirely superfluous, just as elsewhere the mere difference of magnitude and quantity is conceptless and says nothing.

777 *Good* and *evil* were the determinate distinctions of thought that emerged. Since their opposition is not yet dissolved, and they are represented as essences of thought each independent for itself, the human being is the self without essence and the synthetic ground of their existence and struggle. But these universal powers equally belong to the self, or the self is their actuality. According to this moment, then, just as evil is nothing other than the withdrawal into itself of spirit's natural existence, conversely good enters actuality and appears as an existing self-consciousness.—What in purely thought spirit is only indicated as the *becoming-other* of [1807 727] divine essence in general here approaches its realization for representation. For representation, this realization consists in divine essence's self-abasement, in which it renounces its abstraction and nonactuality.—Representation takes the other side, evil, as an occurrence foreign to divine essence. To grasp it within divine essence itself, *as its wrath*, is the highest and hardest effort of representation struggling with itself—an effort that remains fruitless because it lacks the concept.

778 The alienation of divine essence is therefore posited in its double manner. Spirit's self and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself. Its alienation consists in their separation and in one's unequal worth against the other. This inequality is therefore double, producing two combinations whose common moments are those stated. In one, *divine essence* counts as essential, while natural existence and the self count as inessential and to be sublated. In the other, by contrast, *being-for-itself* counts as essential, and the simple divine as inessential. Their still empty middle is *existence* in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.

779 This opposition is dissolved not so much through the struggle of the two, represented as [1807 728] separate and independent essences. Their *independence* entails that *in itself*, through its concept, each must dissolve itself within itself. Struggle belongs only where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence, and confront one another only as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they exist essentially only in their opposed relation. As independent, by contrast, they have their essentiality outside the opposition. Their movement is therefore their own free movement. Thus, just as the movement of both is movement *in itself*, since it must be considered within them themselves, so it is also begun by the one determined against the other as existing in itself. This is represented as voluntary doing. But the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept: what exists in itself, determined as such only in opposition, has for that very reason no true subsistence. Therefore the side for which not being-for-itself but the simple counts as essence externalizes itself, goes into death, and thereby reconciles absolute essence with itself. For in this movement it presents itself as *spirit*. Abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and self-endowed actuality. This otherness, or its sensory presence, is taken back through the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as *universal*. The essence has thereby become itself in it. [1807 729] The immediate existence of actuality has ceased to be foreign or external to it, since it is sublated, universal. This death is therefore its rising as spirit.

780 The sublated immediate presence of self-conscious essence is that essence as universal self-consciousness. This concept of the sublated individual self that is absolute essence therefore immediately expresses the constitution of a community. Having so far remained in representation, the community now returns into itself as into the self. Spirit thus passes from the second element of its determination, representation, into the *third*, self-consciousness as such.—If we consider further how that representation proceeds, we first see this expressed: divine essence assumes human nature. This already *states* that *in themselves* the two are not separate. Similarly, divine essence's externalizing itself *from the beginning*, its existence withdrawing into itself and becoming evil, does not state but *contains* that *in itself* this evil existence is not foreign to it. Absolute essence would have only this empty name if there truly were an *other* to it, if there were a *falling away* from it. The moment of *being-within-itself* instead constitutes the essential moment of spirit's *self*.—That *being-within-itself*, and thus only then *actuality*, belongs to the essence itself is *concept* for us. Insofar as it is concept, [1807 730] it appears to representing consciousness as an incomprehensible *occurrence*. For this consciousness the *in-itself* takes the form of *indifferent being*. Yet the thought that those seemingly mutually exclusive moments—absolute essence and the self existing for itself—are not separate *also* appears to this representation, since it possesses the true content. But it appears afterward, in the externalization of divine essence becoming flesh. This representation is in this way still *immediate* and therefore not spiritual, or knows the essence's human shape initially only as particular, not yet universal. For this consciousness it becomes spiritual in the movement of the shaped essence sacrificing its immediate existence again and returning to essence. Only essence as *reflected into itself* is spirit.—Here, then, is represented the *reconciliation* of divine essence with the *other* in general, and specifically with the *thought* of that other, *evil*.—If this reconciliation is expressed according to *its concept* as consisting in *evil* being *in itself the same* as *good*, or in divine essence being *the same* as nature in its full scope, while nature separated from divine essence is only *nothing*, this must be regarded as an unspiritual manner of expression, which necessarily produces misunderstandings.—Insofar as evil is *the same* as

good, evil is precisely not evil and good not good; instead, both are sublated. Evil in general is [1807 731] being-for-itself within itself, and good the selfless simple. When both are expressed according to their concept, their unity is also evident. For being-for-itself within itself is simple knowing, and the selfless simple is equally pure being-for-itself within itself.—As much as we must therefore say that according to this concept good and evil—that is, insofar as they are not good and evil—are *the same*, we must equally say that they are *not* the same but utterly *different*. For simple being-for-itself, or pure knowing, is equally pure negativity, or absolute difference within itself.—Only these two propositions complete the whole. Against the assertion and assurance of the first must stand, with invincible stubbornness, insistence on the other. Both have equal right and therefore equal wrong. Their wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *nonidentity*, as something true, fixed, and actual, and resting in them. Neither one nor the other has truth, but precisely their movement: the simply same is abstraction and thus absolute difference, while difference, as difference in itself, is distinguished from itself and is therefore equality with itself. Exactly the same applies to the *sameness* of divine essence and nature in general, and [1807 732] human nature in particular. Divine essence is nature insofar as it is not essence; nature is divine according to its essence. But spirit is where both abstract sides are posited as they truly are, namely as *sublated*—a positing that cannot be expressed through judgment and its spiritless *is*, its connecting word.—Likewise, nature is *nothing outside* its essence. But this nothing itself equally *is*. It is absolute abstraction, therefore pure thought or being-within-itself, and with the moment of its opposition to spiritual unity it is *evil*. The difficulty in these concepts is solely holding fast to the *is* and forgetting the thinking in which the moments both *are* and *are not* —are only the movement that spirit is.—This spiritual unity, or the unity in which distinctions exist only as moments or as sublated, is what has come to be for representing consciousness in that reconciliation. Since it is the universality of self-consciousness, this consciousness has ceased to be representing; the movement has returned into it.

781 Spirit is therefore posited in the third element, in *universal self-consciousness*. It is its *community*. The community's movement, as self-consciousness distinguishing itself from its representation, is to *produce* what has come to be *in itself*. The dead divine human being, or human God, is *in himself* universal [1807 733] self-consciousness; he must become this *for this self-consciousness*. Or self-consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition of representation: the evil side, for which natural existence and individual being-for-itself count as essence. This side, represented as independent, not yet as a moment, must because of its independence raise itself in and for itself to spirit, or display spirit's movement within itself.

782 It *is natural spirit*. The self must withdraw from this naturalness and go into itself; that would mean becoming *evil*. But it is already evil *in itself*. Going into itself therefore consists in *convincing itself* that natural existence is evil. The world's *existing* becoming-evil and being-evil, like the *existing* reconciliation of absolute essence, fall within representing consciousness. But in *self-consciousness* as such, this represented content falls, in form, only as a sublated moment. For the *self* is the negative, and thus *knowing*: a knowing that is a pure doing of consciousness within itself.—This moment of the *negative* must equally express itself in the content. Since the essence is already reconciled with itself *in itself*, and is spiritual unity in which the parts of representation are *sublated*, or *moments*, this presents itself in each part of representation here receiving the *opposite* meaning from the one it had before. Each meaning thereby completes itself in the other, and only thereby is the [1807 734] content spiritual. Since determinacy is equally its opposite, unity in otherness—the spiritual—is complete, just as earlier for us, or *in itself*, the opposed meanings united and themselves sublated the abstract forms of *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *nonidentity*.

783 Thus, whereas in representing consciousness natural self-consciousness's *becoming inward* was *existing evil*, in the element of self-consciousness *becoming inward* is *knowledge of evil* as something that exists *in itself* in existence. This knowing is therefore certainly a becoming-evil, but only the coming-to-be

of the *thought* of *evil*. It is therefore recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself from nature's immediacy, determined as evil, it is an abandonment of that immediacy and the dying-away of sin. Consciousness abandons not natural existence as such, but natural existence also as something known as evil. The immediate movement of *going into itself* is equally mediated: it presupposes itself, or is its own ground. The ground of going into itself is that nature has already gone into itself in itself. Because of evil, the human being must go into himself; but *evil* is itself this going-into-itself.—Precisely for this reason, this first movement is itself only immediate, or its *simple concept*, because it is the same as its [1807 735] ground. Movement, or becoming-other, must therefore still enter in its more proper form.

784 Beyond this immediacy, then, the *mediation* of representation is necessary. *In itself*, *knowing* nature as spirit's untrue existence, and this universality of the self that has gone into itself, are spirit's reconciliation with itself. For self-consciousness that does not comprehend, this *in-itself* receives the form of something *existing* and *represented to it*. Comprehension for it is therefore not grasping this concept, which knows sublated naturalness as universal and thus reconciled with itself. It is grasping that *representation*: through the *occurrence* of divine essence's own externalization, through its incarnation and death that have occurred, divine essence is reconciled with its existence.—Grasping this representation now expresses more precisely what was called spiritual resurrection within it earlier, or the becoming of its individual self-consciousness into universal self-consciousness, into the community.—The divine human being's *death as death* is *abstract* negativity, the immediate result of the movement ending only in *natural* universality. It loses this natural meaning in spiritual self-consciousness, or becomes its concept just stated. Death is transfigured from what it immediately means, the nonbeing of *this individual*, [1807 736] into the *universality* of spirit living in its community, dying and rising there daily.

785 What belongs to the element of *representation*—that absolute spirit as *an individual*, or rather as a *particular*, presents spirit's nature in its existence—is thus transferred here into self-consciousness itself, into knowing that preserves itself

in its *otherness*. This knowing therefore does not actually *die*, as the *particular* is *represented* as having *actually* died. Instead its particularity dies away in its universality, that is, in its *knowing*, which is the essence reconciling itself with itself. The immediately preceding *element of representation* is thus posited here as sublated, or has returned into the self, into its concept. What in that element merely existed has become subject.—Precisely thereby the *first element, pure thought*, and eternal spirit within it are no longer beyond either representing consciousness or the self. Rather, the whole's return into itself is precisely its containing all moments within itself.—The mediator's death grasped by the self is the sublation of his *objectivity*, or his *particular being-for-itself*. This *particular* being-for-itself has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other side, precisely thereby the *universal* has become self-consciousness, and the pure or nonactual spirit of mere thought has become *actual*.—The mediator's death is the death not only of his *natural side*, or his [1807 737] particular being-for-itself. It is not only the already dead shell, stripped from essence, that dies, but also the *abstraction* of divine essence. For insofar as his death has not yet completed reconciliation, he is the one-sided being that knows the simplicity of thought as *essence* opposed to actuality. This extreme of the self does not yet have equal worth with the essence; the self has this only in spirit. The death of this representation therefore also contains the death of the *abstraction of divine essence* not posited as self. It is unhappy consciousness's painful feeling that *God himself has died*. This harsh expression expresses the innermost simple knowing of itself, consciousness's return into the depths of the night of I = I, which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. This feeling is therefore in fact the loss of *substance* and of its confrontation with consciousness. But it is also substance's pure *subjectivity*, or pure self-certainty, which substance lacked as object, as the immediate, or as pure essence. This knowing is therefore the *inspiration* through which substance becomes subject, its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and it has thus become *actual*, simple, and universal self-consciousness.

786 Thus spirit is spirit knowing *itself*. It knows *itself*: what is its object, or its [1807 738] representation, is the true absolute *content*. As we saw, this content expresses spirit itself. At the same time spirit is not only the *content* of self-consciousness and not only an object *for it*, but also *actual spirit*. It is this by passing through the three elements of its nature. This movement through itself constitutes its actuality. What moves is spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and it is equally *the moving* itself, or the substance through which the subject passes. The concept of spirit emerged for us as we entered religion as the movement of spirit certain of itself, forgiving evil and thereby also relinquishing its own simplicity and hard unchangeability. Or it emerged as the movement in which the absolutely *opposed* recognizes itself as *the same*, and this recognition breaks forth as the *yes* between these extremes. Religious consciousness, for which absolute essence is revealed, *intuits* this concept and sublates the *distinction* between its *self* and what it *intuits*. Just as it is subject, so it is also substance, and thus itself *is* spirit precisely because and insofar as it is this movement.

787 But this community is not yet complete in this self-consciousness of its own. Its content is for it generally in the form of *representation*. This division also still affects its *actual spirituality*, its return from representation, just as the element of pure thought itself was affected [1807 739] by it. The community does not also have consciousness of what it is. It is spiritual self-consciousness that does not have itself as such as its object, or does not open itself into consciousness of itself. Instead, insofar as it is consciousness, it has the representations considered.—We see self-consciousness at its final turning point becoming *inward* and reaching *knowledge* of *being-within-itself*. We see it externalize its natural existence and gain pure negativity. But the *positive* meaning—that this negativity, or pure *inwardness* of *knowing*, is equally the *self-equal essence*, or that substance here attains absolute self-consciousness—is an *other* for devotional consciousness. It grasps the side that pure knowing's becoming-inward is *in itself* absolute simplicity or substance as the representation of something that is so not according to the *concept*, but as an act of atonement by *another*. Or it does

not see that this depth of the pure self is the force drawing *abstract essence* down from its abstraction and raising it to self through the power of this pure devotion.—The self's doing thereby retains this negative meaning toward the self, because substance's externalization on its own side is for the self an *in-itself* that it does not equally grasp and comprehend, or find in *its own* doing as such.—Since *in itself* this [1807 740] unity of essence and self has come about, consciousness also has this *representation* of its reconciliation, but as representation. It obtains satisfaction by *externally* adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of its unity with essence. Its satisfaction itself therefore remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation thus enters its consciousness as something *distant*, distant in the *future*, just as the reconciliation accomplished by the other *self* appears distant in the *past*. Just as the *individual* divine human being has a father *existing in himself* and only an *actual* mother, so the universal divine human being, the community, has its *own doing* and *knowing* as its father, but *eternal love* as its mother. It only *feels* this love; it does not intuit it in its consciousness as an actual immediate *object*. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still divided from its consciousness, and its actuality is still fractured. What enters its consciousness as the *in-itself*, or the side of *pure mediation*, is reconciliation lying beyond. What enters as *present*, as the side of *immediacy* and *existence*, is the world still awaiting its transfiguration. The world is indeed reconciled with essence *in itself*. And the *essence* is indeed known no longer to recognize the object as alienated from itself, but as equal to itself in its love. But [1807 741] for self-consciousness this immediate present does not yet have spirit's shape. Thus in its immediate consciousness the community's spirit is separated from its religious consciousness. The latter does declare that *in themselves* they are not separate, but this is an *in-itself* not realized, or not yet equally become absolute being-for-itself.

VIII. Absolute knowing

[1807 742]

VIII. *Absolute Knowing*.

788 The spirit of revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such. Or, what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness. Spirit itself in general, and the moments distinguishing themselves within it, fall into representation and the form of objectivity. Representation's *content* is absolute spirit. All that remains is to sublate this mere form—or rather, because it belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have emerged in consciousness's shapes.—This overcoming of consciousness's object must not be taken one-sidedly, as its showing itself returning into the self. More precisely, the object as such both presented itself to consciousness as vanishing, and, still more, the externalization of [1807 743] self-consciousness is what posits thinghood. This externalization has not only a negative but a positive meaning, and has this meaning not only for us, or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. *For it*, the object's negative character, or its self-sublation, has positive meaning—or self-consciousness *knows* the object's nullity—on the one hand because self-consciousness externalizes itself. For in this externalization it posits *itself* as object, or, because of the inseparable unity of *being-for-itself*, posits the object as itself. On the other hand, this also contains the further moment that it has equally sublated this externalization and objectivity

and taken them back into itself, and thus remains at home with itself in *its* otherness as such.—This is the movement of *consciousness*, which in it is the totality of its moments.—It must likewise relate to the object according to the totality of its determinations and have grasped it in this way according to each. This totality of the object's determinations makes *it in itself* spiritual essence. For consciousness it becomes this in truth by consciousness's grasping each individual determination as self, or through the spiritual relation to them just described.

789 The object is therefore partly *immediate* being, or a thing in general, corresponding to immediate consciousness; partly a becoming-other of itself, its relation, or *being for another* and [1807 744] *being-for-itself*, determinacy, corresponding to *perception*; partly *essence*, or as universal, corresponding to understanding. As a whole it is the syllogism, or movement of the universal through determination to individuality, as well as the reverse movement from individuality through individuality as sublated, or determination, to the universal.—According to these three determinations, then, consciousness must know the object as itself. Yet what we are discussing is not knowing as pure comprehension of the object. This knowing is to be shown only in its coming-to-be, or in its moments on the side belonging to consciousness as such; the moments of the concept proper, or pure knowing, are to be shown in the form of shapes of consciousness. Thus in consciousness as such the object does not yet appear as the spiritual essence we have just expressed, and consciousness's relation to it is not its consideration in this totality as such, or in its pure conceptual form. Instead it is partly a shape of consciousness in general, partly a number of such shapes that *we* gather together, and in which the totality of the object's moments and of consciousness's relation can be shown only as dissolved into its moments.

790 For this side of grasping the object as it exists in the shape of consciousness, [1807 745] then, we need only recall the earlier shapes of consciousness that have already appeared.—Regarding the object as immediate, as *indifferent being*, we saw observing reason *seek* and *find* itself in this indifferent thing. That

is, it was conscious of its doing as equally external as the object of which it was conscious was merely immediate.—At its highest point we also saw it express its determination in the infinite judgment that *the being of the I is a thing*.—And indeed a sensory, immediate thing. If the I is called *soul*, it is admittedly also represented as a thing, but an invisible, intangible thing, and so forth—in fact, therefore, not as immediate being or as what is meant by a thing.—Taken as it immediately reads, that judgment is spiritless, or rather spiritlessness itself. But according to its *concept* it is in fact the most spiritually rich. This *inward* aspect, not yet *present* in it, is what the other two moments to be considered express.

791 *The thing is I*. In fact, in this infinite judgment the thing is sublated. It is nothing in itself; it has meaning only in relation, only *through the I* and *its relation* to the thing.—This moment emerged for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment. Things are simply *useful* and must be considered only according to their [1807 746] usefulness.—*Cultivated* self-consciousness, which has passed through the world of self-alienated spirit, has through its externalization produced the thing as itself. It therefore still retains itself within the thing and knows its lack of independence, or knows that the thing is *essentially* only *being for another*. Or, to express fully the *relation*—that is, what alone here constitutes the object's nature—the thing counts for consciousness as something *existing for itself*. Consciousness declares sense-certainty absolute truth, but declares this *being-for-itself* itself a moment that only vanishes and passes into its opposite, being for another, surrendered to it.

792 But knowing the thing is not yet complete in this. The thing must be known as self not only according to immediacy of being and determinacy, but also as *essence* or *inwardness*. This is present in *moral self-consciousness*. It knows its knowing as *absolute essence*, or *being* simply as pure willing or knowing. Nothing *is* except this willing and knowing. Other things have only inessential being—that is, being not *in itself*, only its empty shell. Insofar as moral consciousness releases *existence* from the self in its representation of the world, it equally takes existence back into itself. Finally, as conscience it is no longer this still alternating positioning and shifting of existence and self. It knows that its

[1807 747] *existence* as such is this pure self-certainty. The objective element into which it places itself as acting is nothing other than the self's pure knowing of itself.

793 These are the moments composing spirit's reconciliation with its consciousness proper. Taken separately, they are individual, and only their spiritual unity constitutes the power of this reconciliation. But the last of these moments is necessarily this unity itself and, as is clear, in fact combines them all within itself. Spirit certain of itself in its existence has nothing as the element of *existence* but this self-knowing. Declaring that it does what it does from conviction of duty —this language of its own—is the *validity* of its action.—Acting is the first separation, *in itself*, of the concept's simplicity and the return from this separation. This first movement turns into the second when the element of recognition sets itself, as *simple* knowing of duty, against the *difference* and *division* lying in action as such, and thus forms an iron actuality against action. But in forgiveness we saw this hardness relinquish and externalize itself. Here, therefore, for self-consciousness actuality as *immediate existence* has no meaning other than being pure knowing. Likewise, as *determinate* existence, or [1807 748] relation, what confronts itself is a knowing partly of this purely individual self, partly of knowing as universal. This also posits that the *third* moment, *universality* or *essence*, counts for each of the opposed sides only as *knowing*. Finally they equally sublate the empty opposition still remaining and are the knowing of I—I: this *individual* self that is immediately pure knowing, or universal.

794 This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus shows itself accomplished from two sides: once in religious spirit, the other time in consciousness itself as such. They differ in that the former is reconciliation in the form of *being-in-itself*, the latter in the form of *being-for-itself*. As considered, they initially fall apart. In the order in which its shapes appeared to us, consciousness had long since reached partly the individual moments of this reconciliation, partly their union, before religion too gave its object the shape of actual self-consciousness. The union of both sides has not yet been shown. It

closes this series of spirit's shapes. For in it spirit comes to know itself not only as it is *in itself*, or according to its absolute *content*, nor only as it is *for itself*, according to its contentless form or the side of self-consciousness, but as it is *in and for itself*.
[1807 749]

795 But this union has already happened *in itself*, including in religion, in representation's return into self-consciousness. Yet it has not happened according to its proper form, since the religious side is the side of the *in-itself*, which stands opposed to self-consciousness's movement. The union therefore belongs to this other side, which in the opposition is the side of reflection into itself. It is thus the side containing itself and its opposite, not only *in itself*, or in a universal way, but *for itself*, or developed and differentiated. The content, as the other side of self-conscious spirit insofar as it is the *other* side, is present and has been shown in its completeness. The union still lacking is the concept's simple unity. This concept is also already present on the side of self-consciousness itself. But as it appeared earlier, it has, like every other moment, the form of being a *particular shape* of *consciousness*.—It is therefore that part of the shape of spirit certain of itself which remains within its concept, and was called the *beautiful soul*. It is spirit's self-knowledge in its pure transparent unity: self-consciousness knowing this pure knowledge of *pure being-within-itself* as spirit—not merely intuition of the divine, but the divine's self-intuition.—When this concept holds itself fixed against its realization, it is the one-sided shape [1807 750] whose disappearance into empty mist, but also whose positive externalization and advance, we saw. Through this realization, the self-insistence of this objectless self-consciousness—the concept's *determinacy* against its *fulfillment*—is sublated. Its self-consciousness gains the form of universality, and what remains to it is its true concept, or the concept that has gained its realization. It is the concept in its truth, namely in unity with its externalization: knowledge of pure knowing, not as the abstract *essence* that duty is, but as essence that is *this* knowing, *this* pure self-consciousness, and therefore also true *object*, since it is the self existing for itself.

796 This concept gave itself fulfillment partly in *acting* spirit certain of itself, partly in *religion*. In religion it gained absolute *content as content*, or in the form of *representation*, of otherness for consciousness. In the other shape, by contrast, the form is the self itself, since it contains *acting* spirit certain of itself: the self lives through the life of absolute spirit. As we see, this shape is that simple concept, but a concept giving up its eternal *essence*, *existing*, or acting. It has *division*, or emergence, in the concept's *purity*, since this is absolute abstraction or negativity. Likewise, it has the element of its actuality [1807 751] or being within it, in pure knowing itself. For pure knowing is simple *immediacy*, which is equally *being* and *existence*, and *essence*: the former negative thought, the latter positive thought itself. Finally, this existence is equally a reflection into itself out of pure knowing, both as existence and as duty—or a being *evil*. This going-into-itself constitutes the *opposition* of the *concept*, and thus the emergence of *nonacting, nonactual* pure knowledge of essence. But its emergence in this opposition is participation in it. Pure knowledge of essence has *in itself* externalized its simplicity, since it is the *division*, or negativity, that the concept is. Insofar as this division is *becoming-for-itself*, it is evil; insofar as it is the *in-itself*, it is what remains good.—What first happens *in itself* is also *for consciousness*, and itself equally doubled: both *for consciousness* and as consciousness's *being-for-itself*, or its own doing. What is already posited *in itself* is therefore now repeated as consciousness's knowledge of it and as conscious doing. Each side gives up, for the other, the independence of the determinacy in which it confronts the other. This relinquishment is the same renunciation of the concept's one-sidedness that constituted the beginning *in itself*. But now it is *its* renunciation, just as the concept it renounces is its own.—That *in-itself* of the beginning, as negativity, is in truth equally *mediated*. It now therefore *posits* itself as it is in truth, and the *[1807 752] negative*, as the *determinacy* of each for the other and in itself, is what sublates itself. One side of the opposition is the inequality of *being-within-itself* in its *individuality* with universality; the other is the inequality of its abstract universality with the self. The first dies to its being-for-itself, externalizes itself, and confesses. The second renounces the hardness of its abstract universality and thereby dies to its lifeless self and

motionless universality. Thus the first has completed itself through the moment of universality that is essence, and the second through universality that is self. Through this movement of action, spirit has emerged as the pure universality of knowing that is self-consciousness—as self-consciousness that is the simple unity of knowing. For spirit is spirit only by *existing*, raising its existence into *thought* and thereby into absolute *opposition*, and returning from this opposition precisely through it and within it.

797 What in religion was *content*, or the form of representing an *other*, is here the *self's* own *doing*. The concept unites them in the fact that the *content* is the *self's* own *doing*. For, as we see, this concept is the knowledge of the self's doing within itself as all essentiality and all existence: the knowledge of *this subject* as *substance*, and of substance as this knowledge of its doing.—What we have added here is only, partly, the *gathering* [1807 753] of the individual moments, each of which in its principle presents the life of the whole spirit; partly, holding fast to the concept in the form of the concept, whose content had already emerged in those moments and which itself had already emerged in the form of a *shape of consciousness*.

798 This final shape of spirit—spirit that also gives its complete and true content the form of self, thereby realizing its concept while remaining in its concept in this realization—is absolute knowing. It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, or *comprehending knowing*. *Truth* is not only *in itself* completely equal to *certainty*, but also has the *shape* of self-certainty. Or in its existence—that is, for knowing spirit—it is in the *form* of self-knowing. Truth is the *content* that in religion is still unequal to its certainty. But this equality consists in the content's receiving the shape of self. Through this, what the essence itself is, namely the *concept*, has become the element of existence, or the *form of objectivity* for consciousness. Spirit *appearing* to consciousness in this element—or, what is the same here, produced by consciousness within it—*is science*.

799 The nature, moments, and movement of this knowing have thus emerged as the pure [1807 754] *being-for-itself* of self-consciousness. It is I, which is *this I* and no other, and which is equally immediately *mediated*, or sublated *universal* I.—It has a *content* that it *distinguishes* from itself, since it is pure negativity, or self-division; it is *consciousness*. In its difference this content is itself the I, since it is the movement of sublating itself, or the same pure negativity that the I is. In this differentiated content the I is reflected into itself. The content is *comprehended* only because the I remains at home with itself in its otherness. More precisely, this content is nothing other than the movement just expressed. For it is spirit traversing itself, and doing so *for itself* as spirit, by having the shape of the concept in its objectivity.

800 As for this concept's *existence*, however, *science* does not appear in time and actuality until spirit has reached this consciousness of itself. As spirit knowing what it is, it exists neither earlier nor anywhere else than after completing the work of overcoming its imperfect shaping, obtaining for its consciousness the shape of its essence, and thereby reconciling its *self-consciousness* with its *consciousness*.—Spirit existing in and for itself, distinguished in its moments, is knowing *existing for itself*, *comprehension* in general, which as such has not yet reached [1807 755] *substance*, or is not absolute knowing within itself.

801 In actuality, knowing substance exists earlier than its form, or conceptual shape. For substance is the still undeveloped *in-itself*, or the ground and concept in its still motionless simplicity. It is thus the *inwardness*, or spirit's self, that does not yet *exist*. What *exists* is present as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or the object of *representing* consciousness in general. Knowing is spiritual consciousness for which what is *in itself* exists only insofar as it is *being for the self* and *being of the self*, or concept. For this reason, knowing initially has only a poor object, compared with which substance and its consciousness are richer. The revelation substance has in this consciousness is in fact concealment, since substance is still *selfless being*, and only self-certainty is revealed to itself. Thus initially only the *abstract moments* of substance belong to *self*-consciousness. But as these drive themselves further as pure movements, self-con-

sciousness enriches itself until it has wrested the whole substance from consciousness, absorbed into itself the entire structure of substance's essences, and —since this negative relation to objectivity is equally positive, a positing—produced substance from itself and thereby also restored it for consciousness. Thus in the *concept* knowing itself as concept, [1807 756] the *moments* appear earlier than the *fulfilled whole*, whose coming-to-be is the movement of those moments. In *consciousness*, by contrast, the whole, though uncomprehended, is earlier than the moments.—*Time* is the *concept* itself that *exists* and presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition. Spirit therefore necessarily appears in time, and appears in time as long as it has not *grasped* its pure concept—that is, has not erased time. Time is the *external*, intuited pure self *not grasped* by the self, the merely intuited concept. When the concept grasps itself, it sublates its temporal form, comprehends intuiting, and is comprehended and comprehending intuition.—Time therefore appears as the fate and necessity of spirit not complete within itself: the necessity to enrich self-consciousness's share in consciousness, to set in motion the *immediacy* of the *in-itself*—the form in which substance exists in consciousness—or, conversely, taking the in-itself as the *inward*, to realize and reveal what is initially only *inward*: that is, to claim it for self-certainty.

802 For this reason we must say that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*, or, as the same thing is also expressed, that is not present as *felt truth*, as *inwardly revealed* eternity, as *believed* holiness, or whatever other expressions are used. For [1807 757] experience is precisely this: the content—and it is spirit—is *in itself*, substance, and thus *object* of *consciousness*. But this substance, which is spirit, is spirit's *becoming* what it is *in itself*. Only as this becoming that reflects itself into itself is spirit in itself truly *spirit*. In itself it is the movement that knowing is: the transformation of that *in-itself* into the *for-itself*, of *substance* into *subject*, of *consciousness's* object into *self-consciousness's* object, that is, into an equally sublated object, or into the *concept*. It is the circle returning into itself, presupposing its beginning and reaching it only at the end.—Since spirit is therefore necessarily this differentiating within itself, its whole, intuited, con-

fronts its simple self-consciousness. Since the whole is thus differentiated, it is differentiated into its intuited pure concept, *time*, and into the content, or the *in-itself*. Substance as subject contains the necessity, *at first only inward*, of presenting itself within itself as what it is *in itself*, *as spirit*. Only the completed objective presentation is also substance's reflection, or its becoming self.—Before spirit has completed itself *in itself*, as world-spirit, it cannot reach its completion as *self-conscious* spirit. Religion's content therefore expresses what *spirit is* earlier in time than science does, but science alone is spirit's true knowledge of itself.
[1807 758]

803 The movement of bringing forth the form of its self-knowledge is the work spirit accomplishes as *actual history*. Insofar as the religious community is initially absolute spirit's substance, it is crude consciousness, whose existence is all the more barbarous and harsh the deeper its inner spirit is, and whose dull self has all the harder labor with its essence, the content of its consciousness foreign to it. Only after giving up the hope of sublating alienation in an external—that is, foreign—way does it turn to itself, to its own world and present. For the sublation of the foreign way is the return into self-consciousness. It discovers this world and present as its property and has thus taken the first step down from the *intellectual world*, or rather toward animating that world's abstract element with the actual self. Through observation, on the one hand, it finds existence as thought and comprehends it, and conversely finds existence in its thought. At first it has thus itself abstractly expressed the immediate *unity* of thought *and being*, of abstract essence and self, and has *more purely* expressed the first being of light as the unity of extension and being—for extension is a simplicity more equal to pure thought than light is. It has thereby reawakened in thought the *substance* of the sunrise. But spirit also shrinks back in horror from this abstract unity, from this *selfless* substantiality, and [1807 759] asserts individuality against it. Only after externalizing individuality in cultivation, thereby making it existence and asserting it throughout all existence, reaching the thought of usefulness, and grasping existence as its will in absolute freedom, does spirit

thus bring out the thought of its innermost depth and express essence as I = I. But this I = I is movement reflecting itself into itself. For since this equality as absolute negativity is absolute difference, the I's self-equality confronts this pure difference, which, as pure and also objective to the self knowing itself, must be expressed as *time*. Thus, just as essence was earlier expressed as the unity of thought and extension, it would have to be grasped as the unity of thought and time. But difference left to itself, time without rest or stability, instead collapses into itself. It is the objective repose of *extension*, while extension is pure equality with itself, the I.—Or the I is not only self, but the *self's equality with itself*. This equality is complete and immediate unity with itself; or *this subject* is equally *substance*. Substance taken alone would be contentless intuition, or the intuition of a content that, being determinate, would have only accidental status and lack necessity. Substance would count as [1807 760] absolute only insofar as it was thought or intuited as *absolute unity*. All content, in its difference, would have to fall outside substance into a reflection that does not belong to it, since substance would not be subject, not what reflects over itself and into itself, or not comprehended as spirit. If content were nevertheless to be discussed, this would be partly only to throw it into the empty abyss of the absolute; partly it would be gathered externally from sensory perception. Knowing would seem to have arrived at things, at their difference from itself and at the difference of manifold things, without anyone comprehending how or from where.

804 But spirit has shown itself to us as neither merely self-consciousness's withdrawal into its pure inwardness, nor its mere immersion in substance and the nonbeing of its difference. It is instead *this movement* of the self: externalizing itself and immersing itself in its substance, equally withdrawing from substance into itself as subject and making substance its object and content, while sublating this difference of objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's differentiation of itself from its substance, or the concept dividing itself, the withdrawal into itself and coming-to-be of the pure I. Since this difference is the pure doing of I = I, the concept is the necessity and emer-

gence of *existence*, which has substance as its [1807 761] essence and subsists for itself. But existence's subsistence for itself is the concept posited in determinacy, and thus equally the concept's movement *within itself* of descending into simple substance, which is subject only as this negativity and movement.—The I must neither hold itself fixed in the *form* of *self-consciousness* against the form of substantiality and objectivity, as if afraid of its externalization—spirit's strength is instead to remain equal to itself in its externalization, and, as what exists *in and for itself*, to posit *being-for-itself* just as much as only a moment as being-in-itself—nor is the I a third thing throwing the differences back into the abyss of the absolute and declaring their equality there. Knowing instead consists in this apparent inactivity, which merely considers how what is differentiated moves within itself and returns into its unity.

805 In knowing, then, spirit has concluded the movement of its shaping insofar as this shaping is burdened with consciousness's unovercome difference. It has gained the pure element of its existence, the concept. In the *freedom* of its *being*, the content is the self externalizing itself, or the *immediate* unity of self-knowing. Considered in the content, the pure movement of this externalization constitutes the content's *necessity*. Different content as *determinate* exists in relation, not in itself; and it is its unrest of sublating itself, [1807 762] or *negativity*. Thus necessity, or difference, is equally the self, just as free being is. In this self-endowed *form*, in which existence is immediately thought, the content is *concept*. Having gained the concept, spirit therefore unfolds existence and movement in this ether of its life, and is *science*. In science, the moments of spirit's movement no longer present themselves as determinate *shapes* of *consciousness*. Since consciousness's difference has returned into the self, they present themselves as *determinate concepts* and as their organic movement grounded within itself. In the phenomenology of spirit, each moment is the difference of knowing and truth, and the movement in which this difference sublates itself. Science, by contrast, does not contain this difference and its sublation. Instead, because the moment has the form of the concept, it unites the objective form of truth and the knowing self in immediate unity. The moment does not

appear as this movement of passing back and forth from consciousness or representation into self-consciousness and conversely. Instead, it appears in its pure shape, freed from its appearance in consciousness: the pure concept. The concept's advance depends solely on its pure *determinacy*. Conversely, to each abstract moment of science there corresponds a shape of appearing spirit in general. Just as existing spirit is not richer than science, so in its [1807 763] content it is not poorer either. Knowing science's pure concepts in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of its reality in which its essence, the concept—posited within science as *thought* in its *simple* mediation—unfolds the moments of this mediation and presents itself according to its inner opposition.

806 Science contains within itself this necessity of giving up the form of the pure concept, and the concept's transition into *consciousness*. Precisely because self-knowing spirit grasps its concept, it is immediate equality with itself, which in its difference is *certainty of the immediate*, or *sensory consciousness*—the beginning from which we started. This release of itself from the form of its self is the highest freedom and security of its self-knowing.

807 Yet this externalization is still incomplete. It expresses self-certainty's *relation* to the object, which, precisely because it is in the relation, has not gained its complete freedom. Knowing knows not only itself but also its own negative, or its limit. To know its limit means to know how to sacrifice itself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent occurrence*, intuiting its pure *self* as *time* outside it, and equally its *being* as space. This latter becoming of spirit, *nature*, is its [1807 764] living immediate becoming. Nature, externalized spirit, is in its existence nothing other than this eternal externalization of its *subsistence* and the movement that establishes the *subject*.

808 But the other side of its becoming, *history*, is *knowing, self-mediating* becoming —spirit externalized into time. Yet this externalization is equally the externalization of itself; the negative is its own negative. This becoming presents a slow

movement and succession of spirits, a gallery of images, each equipped with spirit's complete wealth. It moves so slowly precisely because the self must penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance. Since spirit's completion consists in completely *knowing* what *it is*, its substance, this knowing is its *withdrawal into itself*, in which it leaves its existence and hands its shape over to recollection. In its withdrawal into itself it has sunk into the night of its self-consciousness, but its vanished existence is preserved there. This sublated existence —the former one, but born anew from knowing—is the new existence, a new world and shape of spirit. In this new world spirit must just as unselfconsciously begin again from its immediacy and grow great again from it, as if everything preceding were lost to it and it had learned nothing from the experience of earlier spirits. But *recollection, the taking-inward*, has preserved them and is the inwardness and in fact the higher form [1807 765] of substance. Thus when this spirit begins its cultivation again from the beginning, seeming to start only from itself, it also begins at a higher level. The realm of spirits that has formed itself in existence in this way constitutes a succession in which one replaced another, and each took over the world's realm from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of depth, and this depth is *the absolute concept*. This revelation is therefore the sublation of its depth, or its *extension*: the negativity of this I within itself, which is its externalization or substance—and its *time*, in which this externalization externalizes itself within itself and is thus, in its extension, equally in its depth, the self. *The goal*, absolute knowing, or spirit knowing itself as spirit, has for its path the recollection of spirits as they are within themselves and accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, on the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is history; on the side of their comprehended organization it is the *science* of *appearing knowing*. Both together, comprehended history, form the recollection and the place of skulls of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it would be lifeless and alone. Only—

from the cup of this realm of spirits
its infinity foams up to it.