

The Phenomenology of Spirit

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

Musean Translation

MOUSEIA

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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the 1807 first edition, all 808 standard paragraphs in eight chapters plus Preface and Introduction, for fidelity, Hegel's argument, clarity and structure. German witness: Deutsches Textarchiv, CC BY-SA 4.0; page markers keep the 1807 pagination.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written 1807 · Philosophy

SOURCE

Original text from deutschestextarchiv.de.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Paragraph numbers follow the Miller/Findlay 1977 scheme, with its documented split of one source paragraph and merge of another; the 1807 chapter and page numbers are kept in place. Machine-assisted translations with recorded source-language review, not human scholarly certification.

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Preface



1 An explanation of the kind customarily prefixed to a work in a preface—concerning the author's purpose, the circumstances that prompted the work, and the relation in which the author believes it stands to earlier or contemporary treatments of the same subject—seems, in a philosophical work, not merely superfluous but, by the nature of the matter, inappropriate and contrary to its purpose. For whatever might suitably be said about philosophy in a preface—for example, a historical *account* of its tendency and standpoint, its general content and results, a combination of miscellaneous assertions and [1807 II] assurances about the true—cannot count as the manner in which philosophical truth is to be presented. Moreover, because philosophy essentially inhabits the element of universality, which encompasses the particular, it is more liable than other sciences to the appearance that its purpose or final results express the matter itself, indeed in its complete essence, while its elaboration is, by contrast, inessential. With a general conception of anatomy, however—as, say, knowledge of the parts of the body considered in their lifeless existence—we are convinced that we do not yet possess the matter itself, the content of this science, but must also take the trouble to attend to the particulars. Furthermore, in such an aggregate of items of knowledge, which does not rightly bear the name of science, conversation about its purpose and similar generalities does not differ from the historical, nonconceptual manner in which its content itself—

these nerves, muscles, and so forth—is discussed. In philosophy, by contrast, an inconsistency would arise: use would be made of a manner [1807 III] that philosophy itself shows to be incapable of grasping the truth.

2 Likewise, defining the relation in which a philosophical work believes it stands to other efforts concerning the same subject introduces an extraneous interest and obscures what matters in the cognition of truth. The more firmly opinion fixes the opposition between the true and the false, the more it tends to expect either agreement with or opposition to a given philosophical system, and to see only one or the other in an explanation concerning it. It understands the diversity of philosophical systems not so much as the progressive development of truth as it sees in that diversity only contradiction. The bud disappears as the blossom breaks forth, and one might say that the latter refutes the former; likewise, the fruit declares the blossom to be a false existence of the plant, and takes its place as the plant's truth. These forms do not merely differ; they also displace one another as mutually incompatible. Yet their fluid nature also makes them moments [1807 IV] of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but each is as necessary as the other; only this equal necessity constitutes the life of the whole. But opposition to a philosophical system usually neither understands itself in this way, nor does the consciousness apprehending it generally know how to free it, or keep it free, from its one-sidedness, and to recognize mutually necessary moments in what appears to be at odds and in conflict with itself.

3 The demand for such explanations, and the satisfaction of that demand, may seem to be concerned with what is essential. Where could the inner substance of a philosophical work be expressed more fully than in its purposes and results, and how could these be known more precisely than through their difference from what the age otherwise produces in the same sphere? But if such activity is to count as more than the beginning of cognition, if it is to count as actual cognition, it must in fact be numbered among the devices for evading the matter itself while combining the appearance of seriousness and effort on its behalf [1807 V] with actually sparing oneself that effort. For the matter is

not exhausted in its *purpose*, but in its *elaboration*; nor is the *result* the *actual* whole, but rather the result together with its becoming. The purpose by itself is the lifeless universal, just as the tendency is a mere impulse still lacking actuality; and the bare result is the corpse that has left that actuality behind. Likewise, *difference* is rather the *limit* of the matter; it is where the matter ceases, or what the matter is not. Such preoccupation with purposes or results, and with the differences and assessments of the one and the other, is therefore easier work than it may seem. For instead of engaging with the matter, such activity is always beyond it; instead of dwelling in it and forgetting itself there, such knowing always reaches for something else, and remains with itself rather than being with the matter and surrendering itself to it. It is easiest to judge what has substance and solidity, harder to grasp it, and hardest of all to produce its presentation, which unites the two.
[1807 VI]

4 Cultivation, and the labor of emerging from the immediacy of substantial life, must always begin by acquiring knowledge of general principles and viewpoints, by working one's way up, initially, only to the thought of the matter in general, and equally by supporting or refuting it with reasons, grasping its concrete and abundant fullness in its determinations, and knowing how to give an orderly account and a serious judgment of it. But this beginning of cultivation will next give way to the seriousness of a fulfilled life, which leads into the experience of the matter itself; and when, in addition, the seriousness of the concept descends into its depths, such knowledge and judgment will retain their proper place in conversation.

5 The true shape in which truth exists can only be its scientific system. My purpose has been to help bring philosophy closer to the form of science—to the goal of laying aside its name of *love* of *knowing* and becoming *actual knowing*. The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in its nature, [1807 VII] and the only satisfactory explanation of this is the presentation of philosophy itself. But the external necessity, insofar as it is grasped universally, apart from the contingencies of the person and the individual's circumstances, is the

same as the inner necessity in the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To show that the time has come for philosophy to be raised to science would therefore be the sole true justification of attempts directed to this purpose, since it would demonstrate the necessity of that purpose, indeed would at the same time accomplish it.

6 In locating the true shape of truth in scientific form—or, what is the same, in maintaining that truth has the element of its existence in the *concept* alone—I know that this seems to contradict a conception, and its consequences, as presumptuous as it is widespread in the convictions of the age. An explanation concerning this contradiction therefore seems not superfluous, although here it can itself be no more than an assurance, like that against which it is directed. If, namely, the true exists only in [1807 VIII] what is called now intuition, now immediate knowledge of the absolute, religion, being—not being at the center of divine love, but the being of that center itself—or rather exists only as this, then the presentation of philosophy is required, on this basis, to take the very opposite of the form of the concept. The absolute is not to be comprehended but felt and intuited; not its concept but the feeling and intuition of it are to take the lead and find expression.

7 If the appearance of such a demand is considered in its wider context, and we look at the stage self-conscious spirit has now reached, spirit has gone beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought—beyond this immediacy of its faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty consciousness possessed of its reconciliation with essence and of that essence's universal presence, inward and outward. It has not merely passed beyond this into the opposite extreme of its insubstantial reflection into itself, but beyond that too. Its essential life is not merely lost to it; [1807 IX] it is also conscious of this loss and of the finitude that is its content. Turning away from the husks, confessing that it lies in evil and reviling this condition, it now asks of philosophy not so much *knowledge* of what it *is* as, through philosophy, to attain once more the restoration of that substantiality and solidity of being. To meet this need, philosophy is therefore supposed not so much to open up substance's

enclosure and raise it to self-consciousness—not so much to bring its chaotic consciousness back to the order of thought and the simplicity of the concept—as to pour together the distinctions of thought, suppress the differentiating concept, and restore the feeling of essence; to provide not so much *insight* as *edification*. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion and love are the bait demanded to awaken the desire to bite; not the concept but ecstasy, not the coldly advancing necessity of the matter but fermenting inspiration, is to sustain and progressively unfold the wealth of substance.
[1807 X]

8 Corresponding to this demand is the strenuous, almost zealously agitated effort to tear people out of their absorption in the sensuous, the commonplace, and the singular, and direct their gaze to the stars—as though, wholly forgetful of the divine, they were on the point of satisfying themselves, like worms, with dust and water. Once they had furnished a heaven with a vast wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of everything that is lay in the thread of light by which it was bound to heaven; along this thread, instead of dwelling in *this* present, the gaze slipped beyond it, up to divine essence, to a presence, so to speak, beyond this world. The eye of spirit had to be forcibly directed toward earthly things and held there; and it took a long time to work the clarity that only the supramundane possessed into the dullness and confusion enveloping the sense of this world, and to make attention to the present as such—what was called *experience*—engaging and valid. Now the opposite need seems to prevail: sense is so deeply rooted in earthly things [1807 XI] that equal force is needed to raise it above them. Spirit shows itself so impoverished that, like a traveler in a sandy desert longing for a simple drink of water, it seems to long for no more than the scant feeling of the divine in general for its refreshment. By what suffices for spirit we may measure the greatness of its loss.

9 Yet this contentment in receiving, or parsimony in giving, is not fitting for science. Anyone seeking only edification, anyone wishing to shroud the earthly diversity of existence and thought in mist and craving the indeterminate enjoy-

ment of this indeterminate divinity, may look for it wherever it is to be found; they will easily find the means to conjure up some enthusiasm and puff themselves up with it. But philosophy must beware of wanting to be edifying.

10 Still less should this contentment, which renounces science, claim that such inspiration and obscurity are something higher than science. This prophetic talk imagines that it remains precisely at the center and in the depths, looks contemptuously upon [1807 XII] determinateness (the *horos*), and deliberately keeps its distance from the concept and necessity, as from reflection, which dwells only in finitude. Yet just as there is an empty breadth, there is also an empty depth; just as there is an extension of substance that pours out into finite multiplicity without the strength to hold it together, so this is an intensity without substance which, holding itself to be sheer force without expansion, is the same as superficiality. The strength of spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition. At the same time, when this nonconceptual substantial knowing professes to have submerged the self's distinctive character in essence, and to philosophize truly and reverently, it conceals from itself that, instead of being devoted to God, its rejection of measure and determination merely gives free rein now to the contingency of content within itself, now to its own arbitrariness within that content. Abandoning themselves to the unrestrained fermentation of substance, such people imagine that, by veiling self-consciousness and surrendering understanding, they are *his own*, to whom God gives wisdom in sleep; [1807 XIII] what they do indeed receive and bring forth in sleep is therefore also dreams.

11 It is not difficult, moreover, to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period. Spirit has broken with the world of its existence and representation as it has been until now, and is on the point of sinking it into the past, engaged in the labor of its own transformation. Admittedly, spirit is never at rest, but always in advancing movement. Yet just as, in a child, after long, quiet nourishment, the first breath breaks off that gradual, merely quantitative progress—a qualitative leap—and now the child is born, so spirit, forming

itself, ripens slowly and quietly toward its new shape, dissolving one small portion after another of the structure of its preceding *world*. Its tottering is indicated only by isolated symptoms; the frivolity and boredom spreading through the established order, the indeterminate intimation of something unknown, are heralds of something else approaching. This gradual crumbling, which did not alter the countenance of the whole, is interrupted by the dawn that, in a [1807 XIV] flash, sets before us at once the structure of the new world.

12 But this new world has no more complete actuality than a newborn child, and it is essential not to lose sight of this. Its first appearance is only its immediacy, or its concept. Just as a building is not finished when its foundations have been laid, so the concept of the whole, once attained, is not the whole itself. Where we wish to see an oak in the strength of its trunk, the spread of its branches, and the masses of its foliage, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. Thus science, the crowning achievement of a world of spirit, is not complete at its beginning. The beginning of the new spirit is the product of a far-reaching revolution in manifold forms of cultivation, the prize of a path with many turns and of equally manifold effort and exertion. It is the whole that has returned into itself from its succession as well as its extension, the whole's *simple concept* as it has come to be. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in those configurations, now become moments, developing and giving themselves shape anew, but in their [1807 XV] new element, in the meaning that has come to be.

13 While, on the one hand, the first appearance of the new world is only the whole veiled in its *simplicity*, or its universal ground, consciousness, on the other hand, still has the wealth of the preceding existence present in memory. It misses in the newly appearing shape the expansion and particularization of the content; still more, it misses the developed form through which differences are securely determined and ordered into their fixed relations. Without this development, science lacks universal *intelligibility* and appears to be the esoteric possession of a few individuals—an esoteric possession because it is as yet present only in its concept, or its inwardness; of a few individuals because its unex-

panded appearance makes its existence something singular. Only what is completely determined is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, capable of being learned and becoming everyone's property. The intelligible form of science is the path to it offered to everyone and made alike for all; and to attain rational knowing through understanding is the [1807 XVI] just demand of consciousness as it approaches science. For understanding is thinking, the pure I in general; and what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common to science and unscientific consciousness, enabling the latter to enter the former immediately.

14 Science that is only beginning, and thus has not yet achieved either completeness of detail or perfection of form, is open to criticism on this account. But if such criticism is meant to strike at its essence, it would be as unjust as it is inadmissible to refuse to recognize the demand for this development. This opposition seems to be the principal knot at which scientific cultivation is presently wearing itself out, and about which it has not yet reached a proper understanding. One side insists on the wealth of material and intelligibility; the other disdains at least the latter and insists on immediate rationality and divinity. Even if the first side has been silenced, whether by the force of truth alone or also by the other's vehemence, and even if it feels itself overcome [1807 XVII] as regards the foundation of the matter, it is not thereby satisfied as regards those demands, for they are justified but unfulfilled. Its silence belongs only half to the victory; the other half belongs to the boredom and indifference that usually follow expectations constantly aroused and promises left unfulfilled.

15 As regards content, those on the other side sometimes make it easy enough for themselves to achieve great breadth. They draw onto their ground a mass of material—namely, what is already known and ordered—and, by occupying themselves chiefly with peculiarities and curiosities, seem all the more to possess the rest, with which knowledge in its own way has already finished, while also mastering what is still unregulated; thus they seem to subject everything to the absolute idea, which thereby appears to be recognized in everything and to have grown into an extensive science. Yet closer examination shows that this

expansion has not come about through one and the same thing giving itself different shapes; rather, it is the shapeless repetition of one and the same thing, merely applied externally [1807 XVIII] to different material and acquiring a tedious semblance of diversity. The idea, which may well be true in itself, in fact never moves beyond its beginning if its development consists in nothing but such a repetition of the same formula. The knowing subject carrying one unmoving form around among what is given, the material dipped from outside into this resting element—this no more fulfills what is demanded than arbitrary fancies about the content do: what is demanded is a wealth springing from itself and a self-determining difference of shapes. Rather, it is a monochromatic formalism, which arrives at a differentiation of material only because that material is already prepared and familiar.

16 At the same time, this formalism maintains that such monotony and abstract universality are the absolute; it assures us that dissatisfaction with them shows an inability to seize the absolute standpoint and hold fast to it. If formerly the empty possibility of imagining something otherwise sufficed to refute a conception, and that same bare possibility, the universal thought, also possessed the entire positive [1807 XIX] value of actual cognition, here likewise we see all value ascribed to the universal idea in this form of nonactuality, and the dissolution of the differentiated and determinate—or rather the casting of it into the abyss of emptiness, without further development or any justification in itself—passing for a speculative manner of contemplation. Here, to consider some existence as it is in the *absolute* consists in nothing more than saying that, although it has just been spoken of as something, in the absolute, in A = A, there is no such thing at all, but everything in it is one. To oppose this one piece of knowledge, that in the absolute everything is the same, to cognition that distinguishes and is fulfilled, or seeks and demands fulfillment—or to pass off one's *absolute* as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black—is the naivety of a void of cognition. The formalism denounced and reviled by recent philosophy, and reproduced within that philosophy itself, will not disappear from science, even if its inadequacy is known and felt, until cognition of absolute actuality

[1807 XX] has become perfectly clear about its own nature. Since a general conception, when it precedes an attempt at its elaboration, makes that elaboration easier to grasp, it is useful to indicate its broad outline here, with the further intention of using the occasion to remove certain forms whose habitual use obstructs philosophical cognition.

17 In my view—which must justify itself through the presentation of the system itself—everything depends on grasping and expressing the true not as *substance*, but equally as *subject*. At the same time, it must be observed that substantiality encompasses the universal, or the *immediacy of knowing*, no less than that immediacy which is *being*, or immediacy *for* knowing. If conceiving God as the one substance outraged the age in which this determination was pronounced, the reason lay partly in the instinct that self-consciousness is submerged in it rather than preserved; but partly, too, the opposite position, which holds fast to thinking as thinking, to *universality*, is the same simplicity, or [1807 XXI] undifferentiated, unmoving substantiality. And if, thirdly, thinking unites the being of substance as such with itself and grasps immediacy or intuition as thinking, the question remains whether this intellectual intuition does not fall back into inert simplicity and present actuality itself in a nonactual manner.

18 Living substance is, furthermore, the being that is in truth *subject*, or, what amounts to the same thing, that is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation of its becoming other with itself. As subject, it is pure, *simple negativity*, and thereby the splitting of the simple, or an opposing duplication that is in turn the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition. Only this *self-restoring* equality, or reflection into itself in otherness—not an *original* unity as such, or an *immediate* unity as such—is the true. It is the becoming of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its purpose and has it as its beginning, and is actual only through its elaboration and its end.
[1807 XXII]

19 Thus the life of God and divine cognition may indeed be expressed as love's play with itself; but this idea sinks into edification and even insipidity if it lacks the seriousness, the pain, the patience, and the labor of the negative. *In itself*, that life may well be an unclouded equality and unity with itself, which takes neither otherness and alienation nor the overcoming of this alienation seriously. But this *in-itself* is abstract universality, in which its nature of *being for itself*, and thus the self-movement of form in general, is disregarded. If form is declared equal to essence, it is for that very reason a misunderstanding to suppose that cognition can be content with the in-itself or essence and dispense with form—that the absolute principle or absolute intuition makes the elaboration of the former or the development of the latter dispensable. Precisely because form is as essential to essence as essence is to itself, essence must be grasped and expressed not merely as essence, that is, as immediate substance or pure self-intuition of the divine, but equally as *form*, and [1807 XXIII] in the entire wealth of developed form. Only thereby is it grasped and expressed as actual.

20 The true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence completing itself through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially *result*, that only at the *end* is it what it is in truth; and its nature consists precisely in being something actual, subject, or the becoming of itself. However contradictory it may seem that the absolute is to be comprehended essentially as result, a little reflection corrects this appearance of contradiction. The beginning, the principle, or the absolute as first and immediately pronounced, is only the universal. Just as, when I say "*all* animals," these words cannot count as a zoology, so it is plain that the words "divine," "absolute," "eternal," and so forth do not express what is contained in them; and only such words do in fact express intuition as the immediate. Anything more than such a word, even the transition to a proposition, is a *becoming-other* that must be taken back, is a mediation. Yet mediation is what is regarded with horror, [1807 XXIV] as though absolute cognition were surrendered by making more of it than merely that it is nothing absolute and does not exist at all in the absolute.

21 But this horror in fact stems from unfamiliarity with the nature of mediation and of absolute cognition itself. For mediation is nothing other than self-equality in movement, or reflection into itself, the moment of the I that is for itself, pure negativity, or *simple becoming*. The I, or becoming in general, this mediating, is, by virtue of its simplicity, precisely immediacy in the process of becoming, and the immediate itself. Thus reason is misunderstood when reflection is excluded from the true and not grasped as a positive moment of the absolute. Reflection makes the true a result, but equally sublates this opposition to its becoming; for this becoming is equally simple and therefore does not differ from the form of the true, which shows itself as *simple* in the result. Rather, it is precisely this having-returned into simplicity. Although the embryo is *in itself* a human being, it is not so *for itself*; it is so for itself only [1807 XXV] as cultivated reason that has *made* itself what it is *in itself*. Only this is its actuality. But this result is itself simple immediacy, for it is self-conscious freedom, resting within itself, which has not set opposition aside and left it lying there, but is reconciled with it.

22 What has been said can also be expressed by saying that reason is *purposive activity*. The elevation of supposed nature above misunderstood thinking, and especially the banishment of external purposiveness, has brought the form of *purpose* in general into disrepute. Yet, as Aristotle too defines nature as purposive activity, purpose is the immediate, the resting element which itself moves, or is subject. Its abstract power to move is *being-for-itself*, or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning only because the beginning is purpose —or the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or pure actuality, within itself. The accomplished purpose, or the existent actual, is movement and unfolded [1807 XXVI] becoming; but precisely this unrest is the self. It is therefore equal to the immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself; but that which has returned into itself is precisely the self, and the self is self-related equality and simplicity.

23 The need to represent the absolute as *subject* made use of propositions such as "*God* is the eternal," or "the moral world order," or "love," and so forth. In such propositions the true is merely posited outright as subject, but not presented as the movement of reflecting itself into itself. A proposition of this kind begins with the word "*God*." By itself, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name; only the predicate says *what he is*, supplies its fulfillment and meaning. The empty beginning becomes actual knowing only in this end. In this respect, it is not apparent why one does not speak solely of the eternal, the moral world order, and so forth, or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts—being, the one, and so forth—of what constitutes the meaning, without adding the meaningless sound as well. Yet the word marks precisely that what is posited is not a being or essence [1807 XXVII] or a universal in general, but something reflected into itself, a subject. At the same time, however, this is merely anticipated. The subject is assumed as a fixed point to which predicates are attached as their support by a movement belonging to the one who knows it, a movement not regarded as belonging to the point itself; yet only through that movement would the content be presented as subject. As this movement is constituted, it cannot belong to the subject; but once that point is presupposed, the movement cannot be constituted otherwise: it can only be external. Thus the anticipation that the absolute is subject is not only not the actuality of this concept, but even makes that actuality impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as a resting point, whereas its actuality is self-movement.

24 Among the various consequences flowing from what has been said, one may single out this: knowing is actual, and can be presented, only as science or as *system*. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or principle of philosophy, if true, is for that very reason also false, because it is a fundamental proposition or principle. It is therefore easy to refute it. [1807 XXVIII] The refutation consists in showing its deficiency; but it is deficient because it is only the universal or principle, the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it is drawn and developed from the principle itself—not effected from outside through opposing assurances and fancies. It would thus properly be the principle's development,

and thereby the remedying of its deficiency, if it did not misunderstand itself by attending only to its *negative* side and failing to become conscious of the *positive* side of its progress and result as well. Conversely, the genuinely *positive* elaboration of the beginning is at the same time equally a negative attitude toward it, namely toward its one-sided form of being initially only *immediate*, or *purpose*. It may thus equally be taken as the refutation of what constitutes the *ground* of the system, but better as a demonstration that the *ground*, or principle, of the system is in fact only its *beginning*.

25 That the true is actual only as system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the conception that pronounces the absolute to be *spirit*—the most sublime concept, and one belonging to the modern age and its [1807 XXIX] religion. The spiritual alone is the *actual*; it is essence, or what is *in itself*—that which *relates itself*, or is determinate, *otherness* and *being-for-itself* —and which, in this determinateness, or its being-outside-itself, remains within itself; or it is *in and for itself*. But initially it is this being-in-and-for-itself only for us, or *in itself*; that is, it is spiritual *substance*. It must also be this *for itself*—must be knowledge of the spiritual and knowledge of itself as spirit; that is, it must be an *object* to itself, but just as immediately an object that is *mediated*, that is, sublated, reflected into itself. It is *for itself* only for us insofar as its spiritual content is produced by itself; but insofar as it is for itself also for its own self, this self-production, the pure concept, is at the same time its objective element, in which it has its existence. In this way, in its existence, it is for itself an object reflected into itself. Spirit that knows itself thus as spirit is *science*. Science is its actuality and the realm it builds for itself in its own element.

26 *Pure* self-cognition in absolute otherness, this ether *as such*, is the ground [1807 XXX] and soil of science, or *knowing in general*. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness inhabit this element. But this element itself attains its completion and transparency only through the movement of its becoming. It is pure spirituality, or the universal, which has the mode of simple immediacy. Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because substance in general is spirit, it is *transfigured essentiality*, reflection that is itself simple, or

immediacy, being that is reflection into itself. Science, for its part, demands that self-consciousness have raised itself into this ether in order to be able to live, and to live, with science and in it. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science at least provide the ladder to this standpoint. This right rests on the individual's absolute independence, which it knows it possesses in every shape of its knowing; for in each, whether recognized by science or not, and whatever its content, the individual is at the same time absolute form, or has *immediate certainty* of itself, and, if this expression [1807 XXXI] is preferred, thereby unconditional *being*. If science regards the standpoint of consciousness—knowing objective things in opposition to itself, and itself in opposition to them—as its *other*, regarding that in which consciousness is at home as, rather, the loss of spirit, consciousness in turn regards the element of science as a remote beyond in which it no longer possesses itself. Each of these two sides seems to the other the inversion of truth. For natural consciousness to entrust itself immediately to science is an attempt, attracted by it knows not what, to walk on its head for a change; the compulsion to adopt this unfamiliar posture and move about in it is a violence it is expected to inflict upon itself, as unprepared for as it seems unnecessary. Whatever science may be in itself, in relation to immediate self-consciousness it presents itself as something inverted in opposition to it; or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, science bears the form of nonactuality so long as self-consciousness stands for itself outside it. Science must therefore unite that element with itself, [1807 XXXII] or rather show that and how it belongs to science itself. Lacking actuality, science is only the *in-itself*, the *purpose* that is as yet only something *inward*, not spirit but initially only spiritual substance. It must express itself and become for itself; this means nothing other than that it must posit self-consciousness as one with itself.

27 It is this becoming of *science in general*, or of *knowing*, that this *Phenomenology* of Spirit presents as the first part of its system. Knowing as it first is, or *immediate spirit*, is what is devoid of spirit, or *sensuous consciousness*. To become knowing proper, or to produce the element of science that is its pure concept, it

must labor its way along a long path. This becoming, as set forth in its content and the shapes that appear within it, appears as something other than the guidance of unscientific consciousness to science; also as something other than the grounding of science—and certainly as something other than the inspiration which begins immediately with absolute knowing, as though shot from a pistol, and has already finished [1807 XXXIII] with other standpoints simply by declaring that it takes no notice of them.

28 But the task of leading the individual from its uncultivated standpoint to knowing had to be grasped in its universal sense, and the universal individual, world spirit, considered in its cultivation. As regards the relation between the two, each moment appears in the universal individual as it acquires concrete form and a shape of its own. The particular individual, however, is incomplete spirit, a concrete shape whose entire existence falls within one determinateness, and in which the others are present only in blurred outlines. In spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has sunk to an inconspicuous moment; what was formerly the matter itself is now only a trace; its shape is veiled and has become a simple shading. The individual whose substance is the higher spirit passes through this past in the way someone taking up a higher science goes through the preparatory knowledge long possessed, in order to bring its content to mind: they recall its memory without [1807 XXXIV] dwelling on it or finding their interest there. Thus each individual also passes through the stages of cultivation of universal spirit, but as shapes spirit has already laid aside, as stages of a path already worked out and leveled. In matters of knowledge, we see what occupied the mature minds of men in earlier ages reduced to the knowledge, exercises, and even games of boyhood; and in educational progress we shall recognize the history of the world's cultivation traced, as it were, in silhouette. This past existence is already acquired property of universal spirit, which constitutes the substance of the individual, or its inorganic nature. From the individual's side, its cultivation in this respect consists in acquiring what is thus given, consuming its inorganic nature within

itself and taking possession of it for itself. But this is equally nothing other than universal spirit, or substance, giving itself its self-consciousness, or its becoming and reflection into itself.

29 Science presents this formative movement both in its detail and necessity, and also presents in its configuration what has already sunk to a [1807 XXXV] moment and possession of spirit. The goal is spirit's insight into what knowing is. Impatience demands the impossible: attaining the goal without the means. On the one hand, the *length* of this path must be endured, for every moment is necessary; on the other, one must *dwell* at each, for each is itself an individual, entire shape, and is considered absolutely only insofar as its determinateness is considered as a whole or something concrete, or the whole is considered in the distinctive character of this determination. Because the substance of the individual, because world spirit, has had the patience to pass through these forms over the long extension of time and undertake the immense labor of world history, and because it could attain consciousness of itself through no lesser labor, the individual certainly cannot comprehend its substance with less. Meanwhile, its labor is also lighter, because this has been accomplished *in itself*—the content is already actuality effaced into possibility, immediacy subdued. Already something *thought*, it is the property of individuality; it is no longer *existence* that must be transformed into *being-in-itself*, [1807 XXXVI] but only the *in-itself* into the form of *being-for-itself*. The manner of this must be determined more closely.

30 What the individual is spared in this movement is the sublation of *existence*; what still remains, however, is *representation* and *familiarity* with the forms. Existence taken back into substance has, through that first negation, only been transferred *immediately* into the element of the self; thus it still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy or unmoving indifference as existence itself, or has merely passed into *representation*. At the same time it has thereby become something *familiar*, something spirit has finished with, in which its activity, and hence its interest, no longer resides. If the activity that finishes with existence is immediate or existent mediation, and thus the move-

ment only of particular spirit that does not comprehend itself, knowing, by contrast, is directed against the representation thereby produced, against this familiarity; it is the activity of the universal self and the interest of thinking.

31 What is familiar is not, merely because it is *familiar*, cognized. The [1807 XXXVII] most common way of deceiving oneself and others is to presuppose something as familiar in cognition, and to accept it as such; for all its talk back and forth, such knowing never moves from the spot, without knowing what is happening to it. Subject and object, and so forth, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, and so forth, are uncritically taken as familiar and valid foundations, and constitute fixed points both of departure and return. The movement goes back and forth between these points, which remain unmoved, and thus proceeds only over their surface. Accordingly, apprehension and examination also consist in seeing whether everyone finds what is said of them in their own representation, whether it seems so and is familiar to them or not.

32 The *analysis* of a representation, as formerly practiced, was already nothing other than the sublation of the form of its familiarity. To separate a representation into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of the representation as found, but constitute the immediate property of the self. Admittedly, this analysis arrives only at *thoughts* that are themselves familiar, fixed, and [1807 XXXVIII] resting determinations. But this *separated*, nonactual element is itself an essential moment; for only by separating itself and making itself nonactual is the concrete self-moving. The activity of separation is the power and labor of the *understanding*, the most astonishing and greatest power—or rather, absolute power. The circle that rests enclosed within itself and, as substance, holds its moments, is the immediate and therefore unastonishing relation. But that the accidental, detached from its surrounding context as such—that what is bound and actual only in its connection with something else—should acquire an existence of its own and a separate freedom: this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thinking, of the pure I. Death, if we wish to call that nonactuality by this name, is the most dreadful thing; and to hold fast to what is dead requires the greatest

strength. Powerless beauty hates the understanding because it demands of beauty what beauty cannot do. Yet the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but the life that endures death and maintains itself in it. Spirit wins its truth only when, in absolute dismemberment, [1807 XXXIX] it finds itself. It is not this power as the positive that looks away from the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or false, and then, having finished with it, turn away to something else. Rather, spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and dwelling with it. This dwelling is the magical power that converts the negative into being. It is the same as what was called subject above: by giving determinateness existence in its element, subject sublates abstract immediacy—that is, immediacy that merely *is* in general—and is thereby true substance, being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside itself, but is itself mediation.

33 That what is represented should become the property of pure self-consciousness, this elevation to universality in general, is only one side, not yet completed cultivation. The mode of study in antiquity differs from that of modern times in that the former was the actual, thorough cultivation of natural consciousness. Testing itself particularly at every part of its existence and philosophizing about everything it encountered, it produced itself as a universality active through and through. In [1807 XL] modern times, by contrast, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; the effort to grasp and appropriate it is more an unmediated forcing forth of the inward and a truncated production of the universal than the latter's emergence from the concrete and the diversity of existence. The work now therefore consists not so much in purifying the individual of the immediate sensuous mode and making it into substance that thinks and is thought, as rather in the opposite: actualizing and animating the universal through the sublation of fixed, determinate thoughts. But it is far harder to bring fixed thoughts into fluidity than sensuous existence. The reason is the one already given: those determinations have the I, the power of the negative or pure actuality, as the substance and element of their existence; sensuous determinations, by contrast, have only powerless abstract immediacy, or being

as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inward *immediacy*, recognizes itself as a moment, or when pure self-certainty abstracts from itself —not leaving itself out or setting itself aside, but relinquishing the *fixity* [1807 XLI] of its self-positing, both the fixity of the pure concrete that the I itself is in opposition to differentiated content, and the fixity of differentiated elements which, posited in the element of pure thinking, share in that unconditionality of the I. Through this movement pure thoughts become *concepts*, and only then are what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, what their substance is —spiritual essentialities.

34 This movement of pure essentialities constitutes the nature of scientific form in general. Considered as the interconnection of its content, it is the necessity and expansion of that content into an organic whole. Through it, the path by which the concept of knowing is attained likewise becomes a necessary and complete becoming, so that this preparation ceases to be a contingent philosophizing that attaches itself, as chance dictates, to this or that object, relation, or thought of imperfect consciousness, or seeks to ground the true by reasoning back and forth, drawing conclusions and inferences from determinate thoughts. Instead, through the movement of the concept, this path will encompass the complete [1807 XLII] worldliness of consciousness in its necessity.

35 Such a presentation further constitutes the *first* part of science because the existence of spirit, as what comes first, is nothing other than the immediate or the beginning, while the beginning is not yet spirit's return into itself. The *element of immediate existence* is therefore the determinateness distinguishing this part of science from the others. Stating this difference leads to a discussion of some fixed thoughts that customarily arise here.

36 The immediate existence of spirit, *consciousness*, has the two moments of knowing and objectivity negative to knowing. As spirit develops in this element and unfolds its moments, this opposition belongs to them, and they all appear as shapes of consciousness. The science of this path is the science of the *experience* consciousness undergoes; substance is considered as it and its movement are

consciousness's object. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what is in its experience; for what is in experience is only spiritual substance, specifically as the *object* of its self. [1807 XLIII] But spirit becomes an object, for it is this movement of becoming *an other to itself*, that is, *the object of its own self*, and sublating this otherness. And experience is precisely the name for this movement in which the immediate, the unexperienced—that is, the abstract, whether of sensuous being or of a simple element merely thought—alienates itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and only now is thereby presented in its actuality and truth, and is also the property of consciousness.

37 The inequality occurring in consciousness between the I and the substance that is its object is their difference, the *negative* in general. It may be regarded as the *deficiency* of both, but it is their soul, or what moves them; for this reason some of the ancients comprehended the *void* as what moves, grasping what moves as the *negative*, but not yet grasping the negative as the self. Now, although this negative initially appears as the inequality of the I with the object, it is equally the inequality of substance with itself. What seems to take place outside substance, to be an activity against it, is its own doing, and substance shows itself [1807 XLIV] to be essentially subject. When it has shown this completely, spirit has made its existence equal to its essence; it is an object to itself as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy and of the separation of knowing and truth is overcome. Being is absolutely mediated; it is substantial content that is just as immediately the property of the I, self-like, or the concept. With this, the Phenomenology of Spirit concludes. What spirit prepares for itself in it is the element of knowing. In this element the moments of spirit now spread out in the *form of simplicity*, which knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowing, but remain in the simplicity of knowing, are the true in the form of the true, and their diversity is only diversity of content. Their movement, organizing itself in this element into a whole, is *logic*, or *speculative philosophy*.

38 Since that system of spirit's experience encompasses only its *appearance*, the advance from it to the science of the *true*, which is in the *shape* of the *true*, seems merely negative; and one might [1807 XLV] wish to be spared the negative as the *false*, and demand to be led straight to truth: why occupy oneself with the false? The demand already discussed above, that one should begin immediately with science, must here be answered with regard to the nature of the negative as the *false* in general. Conceptions concerning this chiefly obstruct entry into truth. This will provide an occasion to speak of mathematical cognition, which unphilosophical knowing regards as the ideal that philosophy ought to strive to attain, but has so far striven for in vain.

39 The *true* and the *false* belong among the determinate thoughts held motionless to be separate essences, one standing fixed and isolated on this side, the other on that, with no communion between them. Against this it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be handed over ready-made and pocketed as it is. Nor *is* there a false, any more than there is an evil. Admittedly, evil and falsity are not as bad as the devil, for in him they are even made into a particular *subject*; as falsity and [1807 XLVI] evil they are only *universals*, yet still have an essentiality of their own in relation to one another. The false—for it alone is at issue here—would be the other, the negative of substance, which, as the content of knowing, is the true. But substance is itself essentially the negative, partly as differentiation and determination of content, partly as *simple* differentiating, that is, as self and knowing in general. One can indeed know falsely. That something is known falsely means that knowing is unequal to its substance. Yet this very inequality is differentiating in general, which is an essential moment. Their equality does indeed arise from this differentiation, and this equality that has come to be is truth. But it is not truth as though the inequality had been discarded like dross from pure metal, nor even as the tool is left apart from the finished vessel; rather, inequality, as the negative, as the self, is itself still immediately present in the true as such. Yet it cannot therefore be said that the *false* constitutes a moment, let alone a component, of the true. In the expression that there is something true in everything false, the two are

treated [1807 XLVII] like oil and water, which cannot mix and are combined only externally. Precisely because these terms signify the moment of *complete otherness*, they must no longer be used where that otherness is sublated. Just as the expression "the *unity* of subject and object," of finite and infinite, of being and thinking, and so forth, has the awkwardness that object and subject and so forth mean what they are *outside their unity*, and are thus not meant within the unity as what their expression says, so the false is no longer, as false, a moment of truth.

40 *Dogmatism* in the manner of thinking in knowledge and in the study of philosophy is nothing other than the opinion that the true consists in a proposition that is a fixed result, or is immediately known. Questions such as when Caesar was born, how many toises a stadion contained and which stadion was meant, and so forth, should receive a *precise* answer; likewise it is determinately true that the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right triangle. But the nature of such a so-called truth is [1807 XLVIII] different from the nature of philosophical truths.

41 As regards *historical* truths, to mention them briefly, insofar as their purely historical aspect is considered, it will readily be conceded that they concern singular existence, a content in its contingency and arbitrariness, determinations of it that are not necessary. Yet even such bare truths as the example cited are not without the movement of self-consciousness. To know one of them, much must be compared, books consulted, or investigation undertaken in some other way; even in the case of immediate intuition, knowledge of it together with its reasons is alone held to have true value, although supposedly it is really only the bare result that matters.

42 As for *mathematical* truths, still less would someone be regarded as a geometer who knew Euclid's theorems *by rote*, without their proofs, without knowing them, as one might put it by contrast, *from within*. Likewise, knowledge acquired by measuring many [1807 XLIX] right triangles, that their sides stand in the familiar relation to one another, would be considered unsatisfactory. Yet

even in mathematical cognition, the *essentiality* of proof does not have the meaning and nature of being a moment of the result itself; rather, in the result the proof is over and has vanished. As a result, the theorem is indeed *something recognized as true*. But this added circumstance does not concern its content, only its relation to the subject; the movement of mathematical proof does not belong to what is the object, but is an activity *external* to the matter. Thus the nature of the right triangle does not itself divide up in the way presented in the construction necessary to prove the proposition expressing its relation; the entire production of the result is a course and means of cognition. In philosophical cognition too, the becoming of *existence* as existence differs from the becoming of *essence*, or the inner nature of the matter. But first, philosophical cognition contains both, whereas mathematical cognition presents only the becoming of *existence*, that is, of the *being* of the nature of the matter in *cognition* as [1807 L] such. Second, philosophical cognition also unites these two particular movements. The inward arising, or becoming of substance, is inseparably a passing over into the outward, or into existence, being for another; and conversely, the becoming of existence is a taking itself back into essence. Movement is thus the twofold process and becoming of the whole, so that each at the same time posits the other, and each therefore also has both within it as two aspects. Together they constitute the whole by dissolving themselves and making themselves its moments.

43 In mathematical cognition, insight is an activity external to the matter; it follows that the true matter is altered by it. Thus the means—construction and proof—certainly contains true propositions, but it must equally be said that the content is false. In the above example, the triangle is torn apart, and its parts added to other figures that the construction brings into being upon it. Only at the end is the triangle restored—the triangle that is really at issue, that was lost sight of in the course of the procedure and appeared only in pieces belonging to other wholes. Here, then, we see [1807 LI] negativity of content enter as well, which would have to be called a falsity of that content just as much as the disappearance of thoughts held fixed in the movement of the concept.

44 But the actual deficiency of this cognition concerns both cognition itself and its material in general. As regards cognition, first, the necessity of the construction is not discerned. It does not emerge from the concept of the theorem, but is prescribed; and one must blindly obey the instruction to draw precisely these lines, when infinitely many others could be drawn, knowing no more than the good faith that this will serve to carry out the proof. Afterward this fitness for purpose does indeed become apparent, but it is only external precisely because it appears only afterward, in the proof. Likewise, the proof follows a path that begins somewhere, without our yet knowing its relation to the result that is to emerge. Its progress takes up *these* determinations and relations and leaves others aside, without our immediately seeing according to what necessity; an external purpose governs this movement.
[1807 LII]

45 The *self-evidence* of this deficient cognition, in which mathematics takes pride and with which it boasts against philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its *purpose* and the deficiency of its *material*, and is therefore of a kind philosophy must disdain. Its *purpose*, or concept, is *magnitude*. This is precisely the inessential, nonconceptual relation. The movement of knowing therefore proceeds on the surface, does not touch the matter itself, the essence or concept, and is for that reason no comprehending. The *material* about which mathematics provides its gratifying store of truths is *space* and the *one*. Space is the existence into which the concept inscribes its differences as into an empty, dead element, in which they are likewise unmoving and lifeless. The *actual* is not something spatial in the way it is considered in mathematics; neither concrete sensuous intuition nor philosophy concerns itself with the kind of nonactuality mathematical things are. In such a nonactual element there is accordingly only nonactual truth, that is, fixed, dead propositions; one can stop at any of them. The next begins afresh on its own, [1807 LIII] without the first moving itself onward into the other, and without a necessary connection thereby arising through the nature of the matter itself. Because of that principle and element—and herein lies the formal character of mathematical self-evidence—knowing

also proceeds along the line of *equality*. For what is dead, because it does not move itself, does not arrive at differences of essence, at essential opposition or inequality, and hence not at the transition of one opposite into the other, not at qualitative, immanent movement, not at self-movement. For magnitude, the inessential difference, is all that mathematics considers. It abstracts from the fact that the concept divides space into its dimensions and determines their connections and the connections within them; it does not consider, for example, the relation of line to plane; and where it compares the diameter of a circle with its circumference, it encounters their incommensurability, that is, a relation of the concept, an infinite that eludes its determination.

46 Immanent, so-called pure mathematics also does not set *time* as time against [1807 LIV] space as the second material of its consideration. Applied mathematics does indeed deal with time, as with movement and other actual things, but it takes synthetic propositions—that is, propositions about their relations as determined by their concept—from experience, and merely applies its formulas to these presuppositions. That the so-called proofs it frequently gives of such propositions—as those concerning the equilibrium of the lever, the relation of space and time in falling motion, and so forth—are offered and accepted as proofs is itself only a proof of how great cognition's need for proof is: where it has nothing more, it esteems even the empty semblance of proof and finds satisfaction in it. A critique of those proofs would be as noteworthy as it would be instructive, partly to cleanse mathematics of this false finery, partly to show its limits and, from them, the necessity of another kind of knowing. As for *time*, which one might suppose would constitute, as the counterpart of space, the material of the other part of pure mathematics, it is the existent concept itself. The principle of [1807 LV] *magnitude*, of nonconceptual difference, and the principle of *equality*, of abstract, lifeless unity, cannot occupy themselves with that pure unrest of life and absolute differentiation. Thus this negativity becomes the second material of this cognition only as paralyzed, namely as the *one*; this cognition, an external activity, degrades what moves itself into mere material, so as now to have in it an indifferent, external, lifeless content.

47 Philosophy, by contrast, considers not *inessential* determination, but determination insofar as it is essential; its element and content are not the abstract or nonactual, but the *actual*, what posits itself and lives within itself, existence in its concept. It is the process that produces and passes through its moments, and this entire movement constitutes the positive and its truth. This truth therefore equally encompasses the negative, what would be called the false if it could be considered something from which one should abstract. Rather, the vanishing must itself be regarded as essential, not in the determination of something fixed, cut off from the true [1807 LVI] and left lying outside it, no one knows where; nor is the true to be regarded as the resting, dead positive on the other side. Appearance is the arising and passing away that itself does not arise and pass away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality and movement of the life of truth. The true is thus the Bacchic revel in which no member is sober; and because each, in separating itself, just as immediately dissolves, the revel is equally transparent and simple repose. Before the tribunal of that movement, the individual shapes of spirit, like determinate thoughts, do not endure; but they are positive, necessary moments just as much as they are negative and vanishing. In the *whole* of the movement, grasped as repose, what differentiates itself within it and gives itself particular existence is preserved as something that *recollects itself*, whose existence is knowing itself, just as this knowing is equally immediately existence.

48 It might seem necessary to say more in advance about the *method* of this movement, or of science. But its concept already lies in what has been said, and its actual [1807 LVII] presentation belongs to logic, or rather is logic itself. For method is nothing other than the structure of the whole set forth in its pure essentiality. As regards what has hitherto been current on this subject, however, we must be conscious that the system of representations concerning what philosophical method is also belongs to a vanished cultivation. If this should sound boastful or revolutionary—a tone from which I know myself to be far removed—it should be remembered that the scientific display lent by mathematics—definitions, divisions, axioms, sequences of theorems, their proofs,

fundamental propositions, and the deductions and inferences drawn from them—is already, at least in opinion itself, *outdated*. Even if its unsuitability is not clearly understood, little or no use is made of it any longer, and even if it is not disapproved in itself, it is not loved. Yet we must have the prejudice in favor of excellence that it establishes itself in use and makes itself liked. It is not difficult to see, however, that the manner of putting forward a proposition, adducing reasons for it, and likewise [1807 LVIII] refuting the opposite proposition with reasons, is not the form in which truth can appear. Truth is its own movement within itself, whereas that method is cognition external to its material. It is therefore peculiar to mathematics and must be left to it, since, as noted, mathematics has the nonconceptual relation of magnitude for its principle and dead space, as well as the equally dead one, for its material. In a freer manner, too—that is, mingled more with arbitrariness and contingency—it may remain in ordinary life, in conversation or historical instruction aimed more at curiosity than cognition, as a preface more or less is. In ordinary life, consciousness has for its content items of knowledge, experiences, sensuous concrete things, also thoughts and principles—in general, whatever counts as something given, or as a fixed, resting being or essence. Consciousness partly runs along this content, partly interrupts its connection by freely exercising its arbitrary will upon it, and behaves as an external determining and handling of it. It traces the content back to something certain, if only to the feeling of the moment, and conviction is [1807 LIX] satisfied when it has reached a resting point familiar to it.

49 But if the necessity of the concept banishes the looser course of argumentative conversation as well as the stiffer course of scientific pomp, it has already been recalled above that its place must not be taken by the absence of method in presentiment and inspiration, and the arbitrariness of prophetic speech, which despises not merely that kind of scientific form but scientific form altogether.

50 Equally, now that Kantian *triplicity*—as yet merely rediscovered by instinct, still dead and uncomprehended—has been raised to its absolute significance, and true form has thereby been established in its true content and the concept of science has emerged, we must not regard as scientific that use of this form

through which we see it degraded into a lifeless schema, a veritable phantom, and scientific organization into a table. This formalism, already discussed in general above, whose manner we shall now specify more closely, imagines it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a [1807 LX] shape when it has predicated of it some determination of the schema—whether subjectivity or objectivity, or magnetism, electricity, and so forth, contraction or expansion, east or west, and the like. These can be multiplied infinitely, since in this manner every determination or shape can in turn be used with another as a form or moment of the schema, and each can gratefully render the other the same service—a circle of reciprocity through which one learns nothing of the matter itself, neither what the one nor what the other is. In this procedure, sensuous determinations are partly taken from ordinary intuition, though they are supposed to *mean* something other than they say; partly, what has meaning in itself, the pure determinations of thought—subject, object, substance, cause, the universal, and so forth—is used just as unexamined and uncritically as in ordinary life, and like strengths and weaknesses, expansion and contraction. Thus that metaphysics is as unscientific as these sensuous representations. [1807 LXI]

51 In place of the inner life and self-movement of an existence, such a simple determinateness drawn from intuition—here meaning sensuous knowing—is now pronounced according to a superficial analogy, and this external, empty application of the formula is called *construction*. Such formalism stands in the same case as every other. How dull would a mind have to be not to be taught in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic diseases, with as many plans of treatment, and not to be transformed in this short time from a practitioner of routine into a theoretical physician, since such instruction was sufficient for this only recently? If the formalism of the philosophy of nature teaches, for example, that understanding is electricity, or the animal is nitrogen, or is *equal* to south or north, and so forth, or represents it—whether as baldly as expressed here or brewed together with more terminology—inexperience may well fall into admiring amazement at such power,

which brings together what seems far apart, and at the violence this connection inflicts upon the resting sensuous element, giving it the semblance of a concept while [1807 LXII] sparing itself the main thing, the expression of the concept itself or the meaning of the sensuous representation. It may revere profound genius in this, delight in the cheerful character of such determinations, since they replace the abstract concept with something intuitable and make it more pleasing, and congratulate itself on its intimated kinship of soul with such splendid activity. The trick of such wisdom is as quickly learned as it is easy to practice; once known, its repetition becomes as intolerable as the repetition of a conjuring trick one has seen through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no harder to handle than a painter's palette containing only two colors, say red and green, with which to color a surface red if a historical scene is wanted, green if a landscape is required. It would be difficult to decide which is greater here: the complacency with which everything in heaven, on earth, and under the earth is daubed with this wash, or the conceit concerning the excellence of this [1807 LXIII] universal remedy; each supports the other. What this method produces, by sticking the few determinations of the universal schema onto everything heavenly and earthly, every natural and spiritual shape, and arranging everything in this way, is nothing less than a report as clear as sunlight on the organism of the universe: namely, a table resembling a skeleton with little labels pasted on, or the rows of closed jars with their attached labels in a grocer's shop. It is as clear as either of these; and just as in the former flesh and blood have been removed from the bones, while in the latter the thing itself, which is hardly alive either, is hidden in the jars, so this table has omitted or concealed the living essence of the matter. It has already been observed above that this manner also perfects itself into monochromatic absolute painting: ashamed even of the differences of the schema, it submerges them as belonging to reflection in the emptiness of the absolute, so that pure identity, formless whiteness, may be established. The uniform coloring of the schema and its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the transition from one to [1807 LXIV] the other are each as much dead understanding and external cognition as the rest.

52 Yet excellence not only cannot escape the fate of being thus drained of life and spirit, and of seeing lifeless knowing and its vanity drape themselves in its flayed skin. Rather, even in this fate we must recognize the power it exercises over hearts, if not over minds, as well as the development into universality and determinateness of form in which its perfection consists, and which alone makes it possible for this universality to be used for superficiality.

53 Science may organize itself only through the concept's own life; in it, the determinateness externally pasted onto existence from the schema is the self-moving soul of the fulfilled content. The movement of what is consists, on the one hand, in becoming an other to itself and thus becoming its own immanent content; on the other, it takes this unfolding, or this existence of its own, back into itself—that is, makes itself into a *moment* and simplifies itself into determinateness. In the former movement, *negativity* is differentiating and the positing of *existence*; in [1807 LXV] this return into itself, it is the becoming of *determinate simplicity*. In this way the content shows that its determinateness is not received from another and attached to it; rather, it gives itself that determinateness and assigns itself, from itself, to a moment and a place in the whole. Tabulating understanding keeps to itself the necessity and concept of the content, what constitutes the concrete, the actuality and living movement of the matter it arranges—or rather, it does not keep this to itself, but does not know it; for if it possessed this insight, it would surely show it. It does not even know the need for such insight; otherwise it would abandon its schematizing, or at least know itself to possess in it no more than a table of contents. It gives only the table of contents, but does not supply the content itself. Even if the determinateness is one such as magnetism, something concrete or actual in itself, it has nevertheless sunk to something dead when it is merely predicated of another existence and not cognized as that existence's immanent life, or in the way it has its native and distinctive self-production and presentation within it. To add this [1807 LXVI] main thing, formal understanding leaves to others. Instead of entering into the immanent content of the matter, it always surveys the whole and stands above the singular existence of which it speaks—that is, it

does not see it at all. Scientific cognition, however, demands rather that we surrender ourselves to the life of the object, or, what is the same, have its inner necessity before us and express it. Immersing itself thus in its object, scientific cognition forgets that overview which is only knowing's reflection out of the content into itself. Yet, submerged in the material and advancing in its movement, it returns into itself—but not before the fulfillment, or content, takes itself back into itself, simplifies itself into determinateness, reduces itself to one side of an existence, and passes over into its higher truth. Thereby the simple whole that surveys itself emerges of itself from the wealth in which its reflection seemed lost.

54 In general, because, as expressed above, substance is in itself subject, all content is its own reflection into itself. The subsistence, or substance, of an [1807 LXVII] existence is self-equality, for its inequality with itself would be its dissolution. But self-equality is pure abstraction, and this is *thinking*. When I say *quality*, I say simple determinateness; through quality an existence is distinguished from another, or is an existence; it is for itself, or subsists, through this simplicity with itself. But thereby it is essentially *thought*. Here it is comprehended that being is thinking; herein lies the insight usually lacking in ordinary nonconceptual talk of the identity of thinking and being. Now because the subsistence of existence is self-equality or pure abstraction, it is the abstraction of itself from itself, or is itself its inequality with itself and its dissolution—its own inwardness and withdrawal into itself—its becoming. Through this nature of what is, and insofar as what is has this nature for knowing, knowing is not an activity handling the content as something alien, not reflection into itself out of the content. Science is not that idealism which replaced *assertive* dogmatism as an *assuring [1807 LXVIII] dogmatism*, or the *dogmatism of self-certainty*. Rather, as knowing sees the content return into its own inwardness, its activity is both immersed in the content, for it is the content's immanent self, and at the same time returned into itself, for it is pure self-equality in otherness. Thus it is the cunning that, seeming to refrain from activity, watches how determi-

nateness and its concrete life, precisely in supposing itself to pursue its self-preservation and particular interest, is the reverse: an activity dissolving itself and making itself a moment of the whole.

55 If the significance of *understanding* was stated above from the side of the self-consciousness of substance, what has been said here illuminates its significance in the determination of substance as being. Existence is quality, self-equal determinateness or determinate simplicity, determinate thought; this is the understanding of existence. Thereby it is *nous*, as which Anaxagoras first recognized essence. Those after him comprehended the nature of existence more determinately as *eidos* or *idea*, that is, *determinate universality, kind*. The expression *kind* may seem too commonplace [1807 LXIX] and too slight for the ideas, for the beautiful and holy and eternal, rampant in our time. But in fact the idea expresses neither more nor less than kind. Yet we now often see an expression that precisely designates a concept disdained, and another preferred which, if only because it belongs to a foreign language, envelops the concept in mist and thus sounds more edifying. Precisely in being determined as kind, existence is simple thought; *nous*, simplicity, is substance. Because of its simplicity or self-equality, substance appears fixed and enduring. But this self-equality is equally negativity; through it that fixed existence passes over into its dissolution. Determinateness at first seems to be what it is only through relating itself to *another*, and its movement seems inflicted upon it by an alien power; but that it has its otherness within itself and is self-movement is contained precisely in that *simplicity* of thinking itself. For this simplicity is self-moving and self-differentiating thought, its own inwardness, the pure *concept*. Thus the *character of understanding* is a becoming, and as this becoming it is *rationality*.
[1807 LXX]

56 *Logical necessity* in general consists in this nature of what is: to be its concept in its being. Logical necessity alone is the rational and the rhythm of the organic whole; it is *knowing* of the content just as much as the content is concept and essence—or it alone is the *speculative*. The concrete shape, moving itself, makes itself into simple determinateness; thereby it raises itself to logical form and is

in its essentiality. Its concrete existence is only this movement and is immediately logical existence. It is therefore unnecessary to impose formalism externally on concrete content; the latter is in itself the transition into the former, which, however, ceases to be this external formalism because form is the native becoming of the concrete content itself.

57 This nature of scientific method—on the one hand, to be inseparable from the content, and on the other, to determine its rhythm through itself—has, as already recalled, its proper presentation in speculative philosophy. What has been said here does indeed express the concept, but can count for no more than an anticipatory assurance. Its truth does not lie in this partly narrative [1807 LXXI] exposition; and it is therefore just as little refuted by assurances to the contrary, that things are not so but are instead thus and so, by recalling and recounting habitual representations as settled and familiar truths, or even by serving up and vouching for novelties from the shrine of inward divine intuition. Such a reception is usually knowing's first reaction to something unfamiliar, in order to save its freedom and its own insight, its own authority against an alien authority—for this is the shape in which what is now first encountered appears—and also to remove the appearance, and the supposed kind of disgrace, of having learned something. Likewise, when the unfamiliar is accepted with applause, the reaction of the same kind consists in what in another sphere was ultrarevolutionary speech and action.

58 What matters, therefore, in the *study* of *science* is to take upon oneself the strenuous labor of the concept. This requires attention to the concept as such, to simple determinations such as *being-in-itself*, *being-for-itself*, *self-equality*, and so forth; for these are pure [1807 LXXII] self-movements that one might call souls, if their concept did not designate something higher than souls. To the habit of running along representations, their interruption by the concept is as irksome as it is to formal thinking that argues back and forth in nonactual thoughts. The former habit must be called material thinking, a contingent consciousness merely immersed in the material, which therefore finds it difficult at the same time to lift its self purely out of the material and be with itself. The

other, argumentation, by contrast, is freedom from the content and vanity toward it; it is required to make the effort to surrender this freedom and, instead of being the arbitrarily moving principle of the content, to submerge this freedom in it, let it move through its own nature—that is, through the self as its own—and contemplate this movement. To refrain from intruding one's own fancies into the immanent rhythm of concepts, not to interfere with it through arbitrariness or wisdom acquired elsewhere: this restraint is itself an essential moment of attention to the concept.
[1807 LXXIII]

59 We must bring into sharper focus the two aspects of the argumentative attitude to which conceptual thinking is opposed. On the one hand, argumentation takes a negative attitude toward the content apprehended, knows how to refute and nullify it. The insight that things are not so is the merely *negative*; it is the final point, which does not itself go beyond itself to a new content. Rather, to have a content again, something *else* must be taken up from somewhere. It is reflection into the empty I, the vanity of its knowing. But this vanity expresses not only that this content is vain, but also that the insight itself is so; for it is the negative that does not behold the positive within itself. Because this reflection does not gain its own negativity as content, it is not in the matter at all, but always beyond it; hence it imagines that asserting emptiness always puts it further ahead than an insight rich in content. In conceptual thinking, by contrast, as shown earlier, the negative belongs to the content itself and is the [1807 LXXIV] *positive*, both as the content's *immanent* movement and determination and as their *whole*. Grasped as result, it is what emerges from this movement, the *determinate* negative, and thereby equally a positive content.

60 But insofar as such thinking has a content, whether of representations or thoughts or a mixture of both, it has another aspect that makes comprehension difficult for it. The remarkable nature of this aspect is closely connected with the essence of the idea stated above, or rather expresses the idea as it appears as the movement that is apprehension in thought. Just as, in the negative attitude just discussed, argumentative thinking is itself the self into which the content

returns, so, in its positive cognition, the self is instead a represented *subject* to which the content relates as accident and predicate. This subject constitutes the basis to which the content is attached, and upon which the movement runs back and forth. In conceptual thinking things are otherwise. Since the concept is the object's own self, presenting itself as *its becoming*, it is not a resting subject bearing accidents unmoved, but the concept that moves and takes its determinations back into [1807 LXXV] itself. In this movement that resting subject itself perishes; it enters into the differences and content, and constitutes rather the determinateness—that is, the differentiated content—and its movement, instead of remaining opposed to it. Thus the firm ground that argumentation has in the resting subject wavers, and only this movement itself becomes the object. The subject that fulfills its content ceases to go beyond it and cannot have still other predicates or accidents. Conversely, the dispersion of the content is thereby bound beneath the self; the content is not the universal that, free from the subject, would belong to several subjects. Thus in fact the content is no longer predicate of the subject, but is the substance, the essence and concept of what is being discussed. Representational thinking, whose nature is to run along accidents or predicates and rightly, because they are no more than predicates and accidents, to go beyond them, is checked in its course when what has the form of a predicate in the proposition is substance itself. It suffers, to put it this way, a counterthrust. [1807 LXXVI] Beginning from the subject as though this would remain the foundation, it finds, since the predicate is instead substance, that the subject has passed over into the predicate and is thereby sublated. And since what seems to be predicate has thus become the entire, independent mass, thinking cannot wander freely but is arrested by this weight. Ordinarily the subject is first laid down as the *objective*, fixed self; from here the necessary movement advances to the multiplicity of determinations or predicates. Here the knowing I itself takes the place of that subject and is the linking of the predicates and the subject that sustains them. But since that first subject enters into the determinations themselves and is their soul, the second subject, namely the knowing subject, still finds in the predicate the first subject, with which it supposes itself already finished and beyond which it wishes to return

into itself. Instead of being able to act in the movement of the predicate, as argumentation about whether this or that predicate should be assigned to the subject, it still has to deal with the self of the content; it is to be not for itself, but together with this self.
[1807 LXXVII]

61 Formally, what has been said can be expressed as follows: the nature of judgment or the proposition in general, which includes the difference between subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity into which the former turns contains the counterthrust against that relation. This conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the unity of the concept that destroys it resembles the conflict in rhythm between meter and accent. Rhythm results from the suspended middle and union of the two. Likewise, in the philosophical proposition, the identity of subject and predicate is not to annihilate their difference, which the form of the proposition expresses; rather, their unity is to emerge as a harmony. The form of the proposition is the appearance of the determinate sense, or the accent distinguishing its fulfillment; but that the predicate expresses substance and the subject itself falls into the universal is the *unity* in which that accent dies away.

62 To illustrate what has been said by examples: in the proposition "*God is being*," the predicate is *being*; it has substantial meaning, in which the subject dissolves. Being is [1807 LXXVIII] here meant to be not predicate but essence; thereby God seems to cease being what he is through the position of the proposition, namely the fixed subject. Instead of advancing in its transition from subject to predicate, thinking feels itself checked, since the subject is lost, and thrown back to the thought of the subject because it misses it. Or, since the predicate itself is pronounced as a subject, as *being*, as the *essence* exhausting the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject immediately in the predicate as well. Now, instead of having entered into itself in the predicate and gained the free position of argumentation, it is still immersed in the content, or at least is required to be immersed in it. Likewise, when it is said that "the *actual* is the *universal*," the actual as subject vanishes in its predicate. The universal is not to

have merely the meaning of a predicate, so that the proposition would say that the actual is universal; rather, the universal is to express the essence of the actual. Thus thinking loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject just as much as it is thrown back onto that ground in the predicate, and [1807 LXXIX] in the predicate returns not into itself but into the subject of the content.

63 This unfamiliar check largely accounts for complaints about the unintelligibility of philosophical writings, provided the individual otherwise possesses the cultivation required to understand them. In what has been said we see the reason for the quite specific reproach often made against them, that several passages must first be read repeatedly before they can be understood—a reproach supposedly containing something improper and conclusive, so that, if justified, it permits no further reply. The preceding discussion makes clear how matters stand. The philosophical proposition, because it is a proposition, awakens the opinion that the ordinary relation of subject and predicate, and knowing's accustomed attitude, apply. Its philosophical content destroys this attitude and the opinion accompanying it; opinion experiences that something other than what it meant is meant, and this correction of its opinion compels knowing to return to the proposition and now grasp it differently.

64 One difficulty that ought to be avoided is the mixing of the speculative [1807 LXXX] and argumentative manners, when what is said of the subject has at one time the meaning of its concept, but at another only the meaning of its predicate or accident. One manner disrupts the other, and only a philosophical exposition strictly excluding the ordinary relation between the parts of a proposition would achieve plastic form.

65 In fact, nonspeculative thinking too has a valid right that is disregarded in the manner of the speculative proposition. The sublation of the form of the proposition must not take place only *immediately*, through the mere content of the proposition. Rather, this opposite movement must be expressed; it must not be merely that inward check, but this return of the concept into itself must be *pre-*

sented. This movement, which accomplishes what proof was otherwise supposed to accomplish, is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. It alone is the *actual* speculative element, and only its expression is speculative presentation. As a proposition, the speculative is only the *inward* check and the return of essence into itself that has *no existence*. Thus philosophical [1807 LXXXI] expositions often refer us to this *inward* intuition, thereby sparing themselves the presentation of the proposition's dialectical movement that we demanded. The *proposition* is to express *what* the true is; but the true is essentially subject, and as such is only the dialectical movement, this course that produces itself, leads itself onward, and returns into itself. In other kinds of cognition, proof constitutes this aspect of expressed inwardness. But once dialectic was separated from proof, the concept of philosophical demonstration was in fact lost.

66 One may object here that dialectical movement likewise has propositions as its parts or elements; thus the difficulty indicated seems always to recur and to be a difficulty of the matter itself. This resembles what happens in ordinary proof, where the reasons it employs themselves require further grounding, and so on to infinity. But this form of grounding and conditioning belongs to the kind of proof from which dialectical movement differs, and thus to external cognition. As for dialectical movement itself, its element is the [1807 LXXXII] pure concept; hence it has a content that is through and through subject in itself. Thus no content occurs that would behave as an underlying subject to which its meaning belonged as a predicate; the proposition is immediately a merely empty form. Apart from the self sensuously intuited or represented, it is chiefly the name as name that designates the pure subject, the empty, nonconceptual one. For this reason it may be useful, for example, to avoid the name "*God*," because this word is not immediately at the same time concept, but the proper name, the fixed repose of the underlying subject. By contrast, being, or the one, singularity, subject itself, and so forth immediately indicate concepts as well. Even if speculative truths are stated of that subject, their content nevertheless lacks the immanent concept because the subject is present only as a resting sub-

ject; and through this circumstance they readily acquire the form of mere edification. From this side, therefore, the obstacle lying in the habit of grasping the speculative predicate according to the form of the proposition, rather than as concept and essence, can be increased through the fault of the [1807 LXXXIII] philosophical exposition itself, or diminished. Faithful to insight into the nature of the speculative, the presentation must retain the dialectical form and admit nothing except insofar as it is comprehended and is the concept.

67 Just as obstructive to the study of philosophy as the argumentative attitude is the nonargumentative conceit concerning established truths that their possessor thinks there is no need to return to, but lays down as foundations and believes capable of being pronounced, and used to judge and dismiss. From this side, it is particularly necessary that philosophizing once more be made a serious business. In all sciences, arts, skills, and crafts, the conviction prevails that to possess them requires manifold effort in learning and practice. With regard to philosophy, by contrast, the prejudice now seems to prevail that, although everyone has eyes and fingers and is not thereby able to make shoes if given leather and tools, everyone nevertheless immediately knows how to philosophize and judge philosophy [1807 LXXXIV] because they possess the measure for it in their natural reason—as though they did not likewise possess the measure for a shoe in their foot. Possession of philosophy seems to be located precisely in the lack of knowledge and study, and philosophy to cease where these begin. It is frequently regarded as a formal knowing devoid of content, and there is a great lack of insight that what is truth, even in content, in any branch of knowledge or science can deserve this name only when it has been produced by philosophy; that the other sciences, however much they may try to reason without philosophy, cannot without it possess life, spirit, and truth within themselves.

68 As regards philosophy proper, we see immediate revelation of the divine and common sense—which has neither labored at nor cultivated itself through other knowledge or through actual philosophizing—regard themselves straightaway as a complete equivalent and as good a substitute for the long path of cul-

tivation, for the movement as rich as it is deep through which spirit attains knowing, as chicory [1807 LXXXV] is praised as a substitute for coffee. It is not pleasing to observe ignorance, and a crudity lacking form as much as taste, incapable of holding its thinking to an abstract proposition, still less to the connection of several, proclaim itself now freedom and tolerance of thought, now genius. The latter, as is well known, once ran rampant in poetry just as it now does in philosophy; but instead of poetry, the productions of this genius, when they had a meaning, produced trivial prose, or, if they went beyond it, deranged talk. So now a natural philosophizing, which considers itself too good for the concept and, because it lacks the concept, takes itself to be intuitive and poetic thinking, brings to market arbitrary combinations of an imagination merely disorganized by thought—creations that are neither fish nor flesh, neither poetry nor philosophy.

69 By contrast, flowing along the calmer bed of common sense, natural philosophizing offers up a rhetoric of trivial truths. If their insignificance is pointed out, it assures us in reply that their meaning and [1807 LXXXVI] fulfillment are present in its heart, and must also be present in others, believing that in speaking of innocence of heart, purity of conscience, and the like, it has said ultimate things against which no objection can be made and beyond which nothing further can be demanded. But what mattered was that the best should not remain within, but be brought to daylight from this shaft. The effort of putting forward ultimate truths of that kind could long have been spared, for they have long been found, for example, in the catechism, in popular proverbs, and so forth. It is not difficult to catch such truths in their indeterminacy or distortion, often to show their very opposite within the consciousness that holds them. In trying to extricate itself from the confusion produced within it, this consciousness will fall into fresh confusion and may well burst out that things are definitely *thus* and *thus*, but those objections are *sophistries*—a catchword of ordinary common sense against cultivated reason, just as ignorance of philosophy has committed the expression *daydreams* to memory once and for all for use against it. By appealing to [1807 LXXXVII] feeling, its inward ora-

cle, common sense has finished with anyone who disagrees; it must declare that it has nothing further to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same within themselves. In other words, it tramples the root of humanity underfoot. For humanity's nature is to press toward agreement with others, and its existence lies only in the achieved community of consciousnesses. What is inhuman, what is animal, consists in remaining within feeling and being able to communicate only through it.

70 If one were to ask for a royal road to science, none more comfortable could be indicated than relying on common sense and, to keep up with the times and with philosophy, reading reviews of philosophical works, perhaps even their prefaces and opening paragraphs. These give the general principles on which everything depends; the reviews, besides historical information, also give the assessment which, precisely because it is an assessment, is even beyond what is assessed. This ordinary road is traveled in a dressing gown; but in the [1807 LXXXVIII] vestments of a high priest strides the exalted feeling of the eternal, the holy, the infinite—a path that is rather itself already immediate being at the center, the genius of profound original ideas and lofty flashes of thought. Yet just as such depth does not yet reveal the source of essence, so these rockets are not yet the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific insight can be won only in the labor of the concept. It alone can produce the universality of knowing, which is neither the ordinary indeterminacy and poverty of common sense, but cultivated and complete cognition, nor the extraordinary universality of a rational capacity corrupted by indolence and the conceit of genius, but truth that has reached its native form and is capable of being the property of all self-conscious reason.

71 Since I locate that through which science exists in the self-movement of the concept, the consideration that the aspects cited, and other external aspects of our age's representations of the nature and shape of truth, diverge from this—indeed [1807 LXXXIX] are wholly opposed to it—seems to promise no favorable reception for an attempt to present the system of science in this determination. Meanwhile, I may reflect that although, for example, the excellence of

Plato's philosophy is sometimes located in his scientifically worthless myths, there have also been times, even called times of enthusiasm, in which Aristotelian philosophy was esteemed for its speculative depth, and Plato's Parmenides, perhaps the greatest work of art of ancient *dialectic*, was regarded as the true unveiling and *positive expression of divine life*. Even amid much obscurity in what *ecstasy* produced, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be nothing other than the *pure concept*. Further, the excellence of philosophy in our time itself places its value in scientific form and, even if others take it differently, in fact establishes itself only through that form. Thus I may also hope that this attempt to vindicate science for the concept and present it in this, its distinctive element, will know how to gain acceptance through the inner truth of the matter. We [1807 XC] must be convinced that the true has the nature of making its way when its time has come, and appears only when that time has come, hence never appears too early or finds an unripe public; and also that the individual needs this effect in order to test against it what is still their solitary concern and experience the conviction, which initially belongs only to particularity, as something universal. But here the public must often be distinguished from those who behave as its representatives and spokespeople. In some respects the public behaves differently from these, indeed oppositely. If it good-naturedly takes the blame upon itself when a philosophical work does not appeal to it, these representatives, certain of their competence, lay all the blame on the writer. The effect upon the public is quieter than the activity of these dead when they bury their dead. If general insight is now altogether more cultivated, its curiosity more alert and its judgment more quickly determined, so that the feet of those who will carry you out are already at the door, one must often distinguish from this the slower effect that corrects [1807 XCI] both the attention compelled by imposing assurances and the dismissive censure, and only after some time gives one party a contemporary world, while another thereafter has no posterity.

72 Moreover, in an age when the universality of spirit has grown so strong and singularity has, as is fitting, become so much more indifferent, and when that universality also holds to and demands its full scope and cultivated wealth, the share in spirit's total work falling to the activity of the individual can only be small. Thus the individual must, as the nature of science already entails, forget itself all the more, and certainly become and do what it can; but correspondingly less must be demanded of it, just as it may expect less of itself and claim less for itself.

Introduction



First Part. Science of the Experience of Consciousness.

73 It is natural to suppose that, before philosophy approaches the matter itself—namely, the actual cognition of what is in truth—it is necessary first to reach an understanding about cognition, regarded as the instrument by which one takes possession of the absolute, or as the medium through which one beholds it. The concern seems justified: partly that there may be different kinds of cognition, one more suitable than another for attaining this final purpose, and that a wrong choice among them may therefore lead us astray; partly, too, that since cognition is a capacity of a determinate kind and scope, without a more precise determination of its nature and limits we may grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth. This concern must indeed turn into the conviction that the entire undertaking of acquiring for consciousness, through cognition, what is in itself is absurd in its very concept, and that a boundary falls between cognition and the absolute, separating them utterly. For if cognition is the instrument for taking possession of absolute essence, it is immediately apparent that applying an instrument to a thing does not leave it [1807 4] as it is for itself, but instead shapes and alters it. Or if cognition is not the instrument of our activity but a kind of passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then here too we receive truth not as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In both cases we employ a means that immediately produces the

opposite of its purpose; or rather, the absurdity is that we employ a means at all. It seems, admittedly, that this difficulty can be remedied by knowing how the *instrument* operates, since this makes it possible to subtract from the result the part belonging to the instrument in the representation of the absolute we receive through it, and so obtain the true in its purity. But this correction would in fact merely bring us back to where we were before. If we remove from a shaped thing what the instrument has done to it, the thing—here the absolute—is for us just what it was before this consequently superfluous effort. If the instrument were merely to bring the absolute closer to us, without altering anything in it, as a bird is caught by a limed twig, the absolute would surely mock this cunning if it were not already, in and for itself, with us and willing to be with us; for cognition would in [1807 5] this case be a cunning device, since through its manifold efforts it gives the appearance of doing something quite different from merely producing an immediate and hence effortless relation. Or if the examination of cognition, conceived as a *medium*, teaches us its law of refraction, it is equally useless to subtract this from the result; for cognition is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself through which truth touches us, and if this were subtracted, only the pure direction, or the empty place, would have been indicated to us.

74 Meanwhile, if the concern about falling into error generates distrust of science, which sets to work without such misgivings and actually cognizes, it is not apparent why, conversely, one should not distrust this distrust and be concerned that this fear of error is already the error itself. In fact it presupposes something, indeed a good deal, as truth, and bases its misgivings and consequences on what must itself first be examined to see whether it is true. It presupposes, namely, *representations* of *cognition* as an *instrument* and *medium*, and also a *difference between ourselves and this cognition*; above all, however, it presupposes that the absolute stands *on one side*, and *cognition on the other*, for itself and separated from the absolute, yet something real—or, in other words,

that [1807 6] cognition, which, being outside the absolute, is surely also outside truth, is nevertheless truthful. Through this assumption, what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of truth.

75 This consequence follows from the fact that the absolute alone is true, or the true alone absolute. It may be rejected by drawing the distinction that a cognition which does not cognize the absolute, as science intends, may nevertheless be true, and that cognition in general, though incapable of grasping the absolute, may nevertheless be capable of another truth. But we gradually see that such talk back and forth comes down to an obscure distinction between an absolute true and some other true, and that the absolute, cognition, and so forth are words presupposing a meaning which is precisely what must first be attained.

76 Instead of troubling ourselves with such useless representations and expressions concerning cognition as an instrument for getting hold of the absolute, or as a medium through which we behold truth, and so forth—relations to which all these representations of a cognition separated from the absolute and an absolute separated from cognition presumably amount—instead of the excuses that incapacity for science draws from [1807 7] the presupposition of such relations, in order at once to escape the labor of science and give itself the appearance of serious and zealous effort, and instead of struggling with answers to all this, we could simply reject them as contingent and arbitrary representations, and even regard the associated use of words such as the absolute, cognition, objective and subjective, and innumerable others whose meaning is presupposed as universally familiar, as a deception. For the pretense, partly that their meaning is universally familiar and partly that one possesses their concept oneself, seems intended rather to spare us the main thing: giving this concept. With more right, however, we could spare ourselves the trouble of taking any notice of such representations and expressions, by which science itself is to be warded off; for they constitute only an empty appearance of knowing that immediately vanishes before science as it comes on the scene. Yet in coming on the scene, science is itself an appearance; its appearance is not yet science elaborated and

unfolded in its truth. It is immaterial here whether one imagines that *science* is the appearance because it comes on the scene *alongside something else*, or calls that other untrue knowing its appearance. But science must [1807 8] free itself from this semblance, and can do so only by turning against it. For science can neither simply reject knowing that is not truthful as an ordinary view of things, assuring us that it is an altogether different cognition and that this knowing is nothing to it, nor appeal to the intimation of something better within that knowing itself. By the former *assurance*, science would declare its *being* to be its power; but untrue knowing likewise appeals to the fact that *it is*, and *assures* us that science is nothing to it. *One* bare assurance, however, is worth just as much as another. Still less can science appeal to the better intimation present in untruthful cognition and supposedly pointing to science within that cognition itself; for, on the one hand, it would again be appealing to a being, and on the other, to itself as it exists in untruthful cognition—that is, to an inferior mode of its being, and to its appearance rather than to what it is in and for itself. For this reason, the presentation of appearing knowing is to be undertaken here.

77 Since this presentation has only appearing knowing as its object, it seems not itself to be free science moving in its distinctive shape; rather, from this standpoint it can be taken as the path of natural consciousness pressing toward true [1807 9] knowing, or as the path of the soul journeying through the succession of its configurations as stations prescribed by its nature, so that it may purify itself into spirit by attaining, through complete experience of itself, knowledge of what it is in itself.

78 Natural consciousness will prove to be only the concept of knowing, or not real knowing. But since it immediately regards itself as real knowing, this path has a negative meaning for it, and what is the realization of the concept counts for it rather as the loss of itself; for on this path it loses its truth. It can therefore be regarded as the path of *doubt*, or, more properly, the path of despair. For what occurs on it is not what is usually understood by doubting: a shaking of this or that supposed truth, followed by an appropriate disappearance of doubt and a return to that truth, so that in the end the matter is taken as before. Rather, it is

conscious insight into the untruth of appearing knowing, for which what is most real is in truth only the unrealized concept. This self-accomplishing skepticism is therefore also not what serious zeal for truth and science imagines it has prepared [1807 10] and equipped itself with: namely, the *resolution* not to submit in science to others' thoughts on authority, but to examine everything oneself and follow only one's own conviction—or, better still, to produce everything oneself and regard only one's own deed as the true. Rather, the succession of its configurations through which consciousness passes on this path is the detailed history of the *cultivation* of consciousness itself into science. That resolution represents cultivation, in the simple manner of a resolution, as immediately accomplished and done; this path, in contrast to that untruth, is the actual carrying-out. Following one's own conviction is certainly more than submitting to authority; but changing belief based on authority into belief based on one's own conviction does not necessarily change its content and put truth in the place of error. To be stuck in the system of opinion and prejudice on the authority of others or from one's own conviction differs only through the vanity accompanying the latter manner. By contrast, skepticism directed at the entire scope of appearing consciousness first makes spirit capable of examining what truth is, by bringing about despair concerning so-called natural representations, thoughts, and opinions, [1807 11] which it is indifferent to call one's own or others', and with which consciousness that sets *straightaway* to examining is still filled and encumbered, and thus is in fact incapable of what it wishes to undertake.

79 The *completeness* of the forms of nonreal consciousness will result from the necessity of the progression and connection themselves. To make this comprehensible, we may observe in general beforehand that the presentation of untruthful consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* movement. Natural consciousness generally takes this one-sided view of it; and a knowing that makes this one-sidedness its essence is one of the shapes of incomplete consciousness falling within the course of the path itself, where it will present itself. It is namely the skepticism that always sees in the result only *pure nothing*, and

abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinately the nothing *of that from which it results*. But only when taken as the nothing of that from which it comes is nothing in fact the true result; it is thereby itself something *determinate* and has a *content*. Skepticism that ends with the abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot advance beyond this, but must wait to see whether something new presents itself, and what, so as to cast it into the same empty abyss [1807 12]. When, by contrast, the result is grasped as it is in truth, as *determinate* negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition has been made through which the progress along the complete succession of shapes comes about of itself.

80 The *goal*, however, is set for knowing just as necessarily as the succession of its progression; it is where knowing no longer needs to go beyond itself, where it finds itself, and the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept. Progress toward this goal is therefore also unstoppable, and satisfaction cannot be found at any earlier station. What is confined to a natural life cannot of itself go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by another, and this being torn beyond itself is its death. Consciousness, however, is for itself its *concept*, and thereby immediately a going-beyond the limited and, since this limited belongs to it, beyond itself. With the singular, the beyond is at the same time posited for it, even if only, as in spatial intuition, *beside* the limited. Thus consciousness suffers at its own hands this violence of spoiling its limited satisfaction. Feeling this violence, anxiety before truth may well recoil and strive to preserve [1807 13] what threatens to be lost. But it can find no rest: if it wishes to remain in thoughtless inertia, thought stunts thoughtlessness and its unrest disturbs inertia; or if it entrenches itself as sentimentality, assuring us that it finds everything *good in its own kind*, this assurance likewise suffers violence from reason, which finds something not good precisely insofar as it is a kind. Or fear of truth may hide from itself and others behind the appearance that precisely its ardent zeal for truth makes it so difficult, indeed impossible, to find any truth other than the single truth of vanity: always to be cleverer than any thoughts one has from oneself or others. This vanity, which knows how to

nullify every truth, return from it into itself, and feast upon its own understanding—which always knows how to dissolve all thoughts and find, instead of all content, only the barren I—is a satisfaction that must be left to itself; for it flees the universal and seeks only being-for-itself.

81 Just as these preliminary, general remarks have been made about the manner and necessity of the progression, it may also be useful to recall something about *the method of carrying it out*. Conceived as a *relation* of *science* to *appearing* knowing, and as an *investigation* [1807 14] and *examination of the reality of cognition*, this presentation seems unable to take place without some presupposition laid down as a *standard*. For examination consists in applying an assumed standard, and the decision whether what is examined is correct or incorrect lies in its resulting equality or inequality with that standard; the standard in general, and likewise science if science were the standard, is thereby assumed as *essence*, or as *what is in itself*. But here, where science is only coming on the scene, neither science itself nor anything else has justified itself as essence or as what is in itself; and without something of this kind no examination seems possible.

82 This contradiction and its removal will emerge more determinately if we first recall the abstract determinations of knowing and truth as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness, namely, *distinguishes* something from itself to which it at the same time *relates itself*; or, as this is expressed, something is *for it*. The determinate aspect of this *relating*, or of something's *being for a consciousness*, is *knowing*. But from this being for another we distinguish *being-in-itself*; what is related to knowing is likewise distinguished from it, and posited as *being* also outside this relation. The aspect of this in-itself is called *truth*. What these [1807 15] determinations really are does not concern us further here; for since appearing knowing is our object, its determinations too are initially taken up as they immediately present themselves, and they do indeed present themselves as they have been grasped.

83 Now if we investigate the truth of knowing, it seems that we investigate what it is *in itself*. Yet in this investigation it is *our* object, it is *for us*; and its *in-itself* that emerged would thus be rather its being *for us*. What we asserted as its essence would be not its truth, but only our knowledge of it. The essence or standard would fall within us, and what was compared with it and judged through this comparison would not necessarily have to acknowledge it.

84 But the nature of the object we investigate frees us from this separation, or this semblance of separation and presupposition. Consciousness supplies its standard within itself, and the investigation will thereby be a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction just made falls within it. Within consciousness, one thing is *for another*, or consciousness has within it the determinateness of the moment of knowing in general; at the same time, this other is for consciousness not merely *for it*, but also outside this relation, or *in itself*: [1807 16] the moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness declares within itself to be the *in-itself* or the *true*, we have the standard that consciousness itself establishes for measuring its knowing. If we call *knowing* the *concept*, but essence or the *true* that which is, or the *object*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds to the object. But if we call *the essence*, or the in-itself *of the object, the concept*, and understand by the *object*, by contrast, the object as *object*, namely as it is *for another*, then the examination consists in seeing whether the object corresponds to its concept. It is clear that both are the same; what is essential, however, is to hold fast throughout the investigation to the fact that these two moments, *concept and object*, being *for another* and being *in itself*, fall within the very knowing we investigate. We therefore need not bring standards with us or apply *our* fancies and thoughts in the investigation; by leaving these aside we succeed in considering the matter as it is *in and for itself*.

85 But not only is an addition from us superfluous in this respect, that concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself; we are also spared the labor of comparing the two and of the actual *examination*, so that, as [1807 17] consciousness examines itself, all that

remains for us from this side too is pure observation. For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself: consciousness of what is the true for it, and consciousness of its knowledge of this. Since both are *for it*, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not comes to be *for it*. The object admittedly seems to be for consciousness only as consciousness knows it; consciousness seems unable, as it were, to get behind the object to discover how it is *not for consciousness*, but *in itself*, and hence unable to examine its knowing against the object. Yet precisely in knowing an object at all, the difference is already present: *for consciousness*, something is the *in-itself*, while another moment is knowing, or the object's being *for consciousness*. The examination rests on this distinction, which is present. If the two do not correspond in this comparison, consciousness seems obliged to alter its knowing to make it conform to the object; but in the alteration of knowing the object itself in fact alters for consciousness as well. For the existing knowing was essentially knowing of the object; with knowing, the object too becomes another, since it essentially belonged to this knowing. Thus consciousness comes to see that what [1807 18] was formerly the *in-itself* for it is not in itself, or was *in itself only for consciousness*. Accordingly, when consciousness finds in its object that its knowing does not correspond to it, the object itself also fails to stand firm; or the standard of examination changes when that of which it was to be the standard does not withstand the examination. The examination is thus not only an examination of knowing, but also of its standard.

86 This *dialectical* movement that consciousness exercises upon itself, upon both its knowing and its object, *insofar as the new true object arises for consciousness from it*, is properly what is called *experience*. In this connection, one moment in the course just mentioned must be brought out more closely, which will cast new light on the scientific aspect of the following presentation. Consciousness knows *something*; this object is essence, or the *in-itself*; but it is also the *in-itself for consciousness*, and with this the ambiguity of this true enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects: one, the first *in-itself*; the second, *the being-*

for-consciousness of this in-itself. The latter initially seems to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, a representing not of an object, but only of its knowledge of that first object. Yet, as shown earlier, the first [1807 19] object changes for consciousness in this process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes for consciousness something that is *the in-itself only for consciousness*. But then this, *the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*, is the true; that is, this is *essence*, or its *object*. This new object contains the nullity of the first; it is the experience undergone concerning it.

87 In this presentation of the course of experience there is a moment through which it seems not to agree with what is ordinarily understood by experience. The transition, namely, from the first object and the knowledge of it to the other object, *in relation to which* experience is said to have been undergone, was specified in such a way that knowledge of the first object, or the first in-itself's being *for* consciousness, is itself to become the second object. Ordinarily, by contrast, it seems that we experience the untruth of our first concept *in relation to another* object that we happen to find contingently and externally, so that in general only the pure *apprehension* of what is in and for itself falls within us. In the former view, however, the new object shows itself as having come to be through a *reversal of consciousness* itself. This consideration of the matter is our addition, through which the succession of consciousness's experiences is raised to a scientific course; it is not present for the consciousness we observe. But this [1807 20] is in fact also the same circumstance already discussed above regarding the relation of this presentation to skepticism: namely, that the result arising each time in an untruthful knowing must not collapse into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be grasped as the nothing *of that of which it is the result*—a result containing what is true in the preceding knowing. This presents itself here in the following way: as what first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to a knowledge of it, and the *in-itself* becomes *the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself*, this is the new object, with which a new shape of consciousness also appears, for which something other than what was essence for the preceding shape is now essence. This circumstance guides the entire succes-

sion of the shapes of consciousness in their necessity. Only this necessity itself, or the *arising* of the new object that presents itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing what is happening to it, is what takes place for us, as it were, behind its back. A moment of *being-in-itself*, or *being-for-us*, thereby enters its movement, a moment that does not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the *content* of what arises for us is *for consciousness*, and we comprehend only its formal aspect, or its pure arising; *for consciousness*, [1807 21] what has thus arisen is only as object, *for us* it is at the same time as movement and becoming.

88 Through this necessity, this path to science is itself already *science*, and is thereby, in its content, science of the *experience of consciousness*.

89 The experience consciousness undergoes concerning itself can, according to its concept, encompass nothing less than its entire system, or the whole realm of spirit's truth. The moments of this truth thus present themselves in this distinctive determinateness: not as abstract, pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them; through this, the moments of the whole are *shapes of consciousness*. As consciousness drives itself onward toward its true existence, it will reach a point at which it casts off its semblance of being encumbered with something alien that is only for it and as an other, or where appearance becomes equal to essence. Its presentation thereby coincides with precisely this point of the science of spirit proper; and finally, when consciousness itself grasps this essence of its own, it will designate the nature of absolute knowing itself.

I. Sense-certainty



[1807 22]
I. Sense-certainty; or *the This* and *Meaning*.

90 The knowing that is first or immediately our object can be none other than knowing that is itself immediate, *knowing* of the *immediate*, or of *what is*. We must behave just as *immediately*, or *receptively*, thus alter nothing in it as it presents itself, and keep comprehension away from apprehension.

91 The concrete content of *sense-certainty* makes it appear immediately as the *richest* cognition, indeed as a cognition of infinite wealth, for which no limit can be found, whether we go *outward* in space and time, in which this wealth is spread, or take a piece from this fullness and go *into it* by division. It also appears as the *truest* cognition, for it has not yet omitted anything from the object, but has it before it in its entire completeness. Yet this *certainty* in fact declares itself to be the [1807 23] most abstract and poorest *truth*. Of what it knows it says only this: it *is*; and its truth contains solely the *being* of the matter. Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as pure *I*; or *I* am in it only as pure *this one*, and the object likewise only as pure *this*. I, *this one*, am *certain* of *this* thing not because *I*, as consciousness, have developed myself in relation to it and moved thought in manifold ways; nor because *the thing* of which I am certain would, through a multitude of different characteristics, be a rich relation within itself or a manifold relation to others. Neither concerns the

truth of sense-certainty; in it neither I nor the thing has the meaning of a manifold mediation: I does not mean a manifold representing or thinking, nor the thing manifold characteristics. Rather, the thing *is*, and it *is* only because it *is*. That it *is* is what is essential to sensuous knowing, and this pure *being*, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. Equally, certainty as *relation* is an *immediate*, pure relation; consciousness is *I*, nothing more, a pure *this one*; the *singular* knows pure this, or *the singular*.

92 But in the *pure being* that constitutes the essence of this certainty and which it declares as its truth, much else is also at play, if we observe it. [1807 24] An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an *example* of it. Among the innumerable differences occurring in it, we everywhere find the principal distinction: in it, the two *thises* already mentioned immediately fall out of pure being, a *this one* as *I*, and a *this as object*. If *we* reflect on this difference, it emerges that neither the one nor the other is merely *immediate* in sense-certainty, but is at the same time *mediated*: I have certainty *through* another, namely the thing; and this likewise is in certainty *through* another, namely through I.

93 It is not only we who make this distinction between essence and example, immediacy and mediation; we find it in sense-certainty itself, and must take it up in the form it has there, not as we have just determined it. In sense-certainty one is posited as simply and immediately being, or as essence: *the object*. The other, however, is posited as inessential and mediated, as what is in certainty not *in itself*, but through another: I, *a knowing* that knows the object only because *the object* is, and that can either be or not be. But the object *is*, is the true and essence; it *is*, indifferent to whether it is known or not; it remains even if it is not known, whereas [1807 25] knowing is not if the object is not.

94 The object must therefore be considered to see whether, in sense-certainty itself, it is in fact the essence that sense-certainty claims it to be; whether this concept of it, that it is essence, corresponds to the way it is present in sense-cer-

tainty. To this end we must not reflect on it and ponder what it might be in truth, but merely consider it as sense-certainty has it within itself.

95 *Sense-certainty* itself must therefore be asked: *What is the this?* If we take it in the twofold shape of its being, as the *now* and as the *here*, the dialectic it has within it will acquire a form as intelligible as the this itself is. To the question "*What is the now?*" we therefore answer, for example, "*The now is night*." A simple experiment suffices to test the truth of this sense-certainty. We write this truth down; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than by our preserving it. If *now, this noon*, we look again at the written truth, we shall have to say that it has gone stale.

96 The now that is night is *preserved*, that is, it is treated as what it is claimed to be, as something *that is*; but it proves rather to be something that is not. The *now* [1807 26] itself does indeed maintain itself, but as something that is not night; likewise it maintains itself against the day that it now is, as something that is also not day, or as something *negative* in general. This self-maintaining now is therefore not immediate but mediated, for it is determined as enduring and self-maintaining *through* the nonbeing of another, namely day and night. At the same time it is still as simple as before: *now*, and in this simplicity indifferent to what else is at play in it. Just as night and day are not its being, it is equally also day and night; it is not affected at all by this otherness of its own. Such a simple element, which is through negation, neither this nor that, a *not-this*, and equally indifferent to being this as well as that, we call a *universal*. The universal is thus in fact the true of sense-certainty.

97 We also *express* the sensuous as a universal. What we say is: "*this*," that is, the *universal this*; or "*it is*," that is, *being in general*. Admittedly, we do not *represent* to ourselves the universal this or being in general, but we *express* the universal; or we simply do not speak as we *mean* in this sense-certainty. Yet language, as we see, is the truer; in it we ourselves immediately refute our *meaning*, and

since the universal is the true of sense-certainty, and [1807 27] language expresses only this true, it is altogether impossible for us ever to say a sensuous being that we *mean*.

98 The same will be the case with the other form of the this, with *the here*. *The here* is, for example, the *tree*. I turn around, and this truth has vanished and reversed itself into its opposite: *the here is not a tree*, but rather *a house*. The *here* itself does not vanish; rather, *it is* enduring in the vanishing of house, tree, and so forth, and indifferent to being house or tree. The *this* thus shows itself again as *mediated simplicity*, or as *universality*.

99 For this sense-certainty, as it demonstrates within itself the universal as the truth of its object, *pure being* thus remains as its essence, but not as immediate: rather, as a being for which negation and mediation are essential. Thus it is not what we *mean by being*, but *being* with the *determination* that it is abstraction, or the purely universal; and *our meaning*, for which the true of sense-certainty is not the universal, alone remains over against this empty or indifferent now and here.

100 If we compare the relation in which *knowing* and the *object* first appeared with the relation they come to occupy in this [1807 28] result, it has been reversed. The object, which was to be the essential, is now the inessential of sense-certainty, for the universal into which it has turned is no longer the kind of object that was supposed to be essential for sense-certainty. Rather, sense-certainty is now present in the opposite, namely in knowing, which was previously the inessential. Its truth is in the object as *my* object, or in *meaning*: the object is because *I* know of it. Sense-certainty has thus indeed been driven out of the object, but is not thereby sublated; it has only been forced back into the I. We must see what experience shows us concerning this reality of it.

101 The force of its truth thus now lies in the *I*, in the immediacy of my *seeing, hearing*, and so forth; the vanishing of the singular now and here that we mean is prevented by *my* holding them fast. *The now is day* because I see it; *the here is a tree* for the same reason. But in this relation sense-certainty experiences the

same dialectic within itself as in the preceding one. *I, this one*, see the tree and *assert the tree as the here*; but *another I* sees the house and asserts that the here is not a tree but rather a house. Both truths have the same authentication, namely the immediacy of seeing, and the security and assurance [1807 29] of both concerning their knowing; but the one vanishes in the other.

102 What does not vanish in this is *I* as *universal*, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but a simple seeing mediated through the negation of this house and so forth, and therein just as simple and indifferent toward whatever else is at play, toward house and tree. I is only universal, like *now, here, or this* in general; I do indeed mean a *singular I*, but I can no more say what I mean by I than what I mean by now and here. When I say *this here, now*, or *a singular*, I say *all these, all heres, nows, singulars*; likewise, when I say *I, this singular* I, I say, in general, *all* I's; everyone is what I say: *I, this singular I*. If science is presented with the demand, as a touchstone it could not possibly withstand, to deduce, construct, find a priori, or however one wishes to express it, a so-called *this thing* or *this human being*, it is reasonable that the demand should *say* which *this* thing or which *this* I it means; but to say this is impossible.

103 Sense-certainty thus experiences that its essence is neither in the object nor in the I, and that immediacy is the immediacy of neither the one nor the other; for in both, what I mean is rather something [1807 30] inessential, and the object and I are universals in which the now and here and I that I mean do not endure, or *are* not. We thereby come to posit the *whole* of sense-certainty itself as its *essence*, no longer merely one moment of it, as occurred in the two cases in which first the object opposed to the I, then the I, was to be its reality. Thus it is only *whole* sense-certainty itself that holds fast to itself as *immediacy*, thereby excluding from itself all the opposition that previously occurred.

104 This pure immediacy is therefore no longer concerned with the otherness of the here as tree, which passes into a here that is not-tree, with the otherness of the now as day, which passes into a now that is night, or with another I for whom something else is object. Its truth maintains itself as a self-identical rela-

tion that makes no distinction of essentiality and inessentiality between the I and the object, and into which therefore no difference at all can penetrate. I, this one, thus assert the here as tree and do not turn around so that the here would become a not-tree for me; nor do I take notice that another I sees the here as not-tree, or that I myself at another time take the here as not-tree, the now as not-day. Rather, I am pure [1807 31] intuition; I, for my part, hold to this: the now is day, or equally to this: the here is tree. Nor do I compare the here and now themselves with one another, but hold fast to *one* immediate relation: the now is day.

105 Since this certainty thus no longer wishes to come forward when we draw its attention to a now that is night, or to an I for whom it is night, we approach it and have it show us the now being asserted. We must have it *shown* to us, for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of *this* I, who restricts itself to a *now* or a *here*. If we took up this truth *afterward*, or stood *at a distance* from it, it would have no meaning at all, for we would sublate the immediacy essential to it. We must therefore enter the same point of time or space, have it shown to us—that is, let ourselves be made into that same this I which is the one knowing with certainty. Let us therefore see the nature of the immediate that is pointed out to us.

106 The *now* is shown: *this now. Now*; it has already ceased to be as it is shown. The *now* that *is* other than the one shown, and we see that the now is precisely this: in being, already no longer to be. The now as it is shown to us is a *having-been*, and this is its truth; it does not have the truth of being. It is nevertheless true, then, that it has been [1807 32]. But what *has been* is in fact *no essence; it is not*, and it was being that was at issue.

107 In this pointing-out, then, we see only a movement, with the following course: 1) I point out the now; it is asserted as the true. But I show it as having been, or as something sublated; I sublate the first truth, and 2) I now assert as the second truth that it *has been*, is sublated. 3) But what has been is not; I sublate the having-been or being-sublated, the second truth, thereby negate the negation of

the now, and so return to the first assertion: that *now* is. The now and the pointing-out of the now are thus so constituted that neither the now nor the pointing-out of the now is something immediate and simple; rather, each is a movement containing different moments. *This* is posited, but rather *an other* is posited, or the this is sublated; and this *otherness*, or sublation of the first, is itself *sublated again*, and so a return is made to the first. But this first, reflected into itself, is not exactly the same as it was initially, namely something *immediate*; rather, it is precisely something *reflected into itself*, or *simple*, which, as an otherness, remains what it is: a now that is absolutely many nows. And this is the true now: the now as a simple day containing many nows, hours; such a now, an hour, is likewise many minutes, and these nows [1807 33] likewise many nows, and so forth. *Pointing-out* is thus itself the movement expressing what the now is in truth: a result, or a multiplicity of nows gathered together. And pointing-out is the experience that now is a *universal*.

108 The *here pointed out*, which I hold fast, is likewise a *this* here that is in fact *not this* here, but a front and behind, an above and below, a right and left. The above is itself likewise this manifold otherness in above, below, and so forth. The here that was to be pointed out vanishes into other heres, but these vanish equally; what is pointed out, held fast, and enduring is a *negative this*, which *is* only insofar as the *heres* are taken as they are supposed to be, but in this sublate themselves. It is a simple complex of many heres. The here meant would be the point; but the point *is* not. Rather, when it is pointed out as being, the pointing-out shows itself to be not immediate knowing, but a movement from the here meant, through many heres, into the universal here, which is a simple multiplicity of heres just as the day is a simple multiplicity of nows.

109 It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing other than the simple history of its movement, or its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing other than this history. Natural consciousness therefore also always advances [1807 34] of itself to this result, to what is true in sense-certainty, and undergoes the experience of it; but it equally always forgets it again and begins the movement afresh. It is therefore astonishing when, against this experience, it is

maintained as universal experience, as a philosophical assertion, and even as the result of skepticism, that the reality or being of external things as *these*, or sensuous things, has absolute truth for consciousness. Such an assertion at the same time does not know what it is saying, does not know that it says the opposite of what it wishes to say. The truth for consciousness of the sensuous *this* is supposed to be universal experience; but rather the opposite is universal experience. Every consciousness itself sublates again a truth such as "*the here is a tree*" or "*the now is noon*," and expresses the opposite: the here is *not* a tree *but* a house; and whatever in this assertion sublating the first is again just such an assertion of a sensuous this, consciousness proceeds equally to sublate. In all sense-certainty, what is experienced in truth is only what we have seen: the *this* as a *universal*, the opposite of what that assertion assures us is universal experience. In connection with this appeal to universal experience, we may be permitted to anticipate the practical [1807 35] standpoint. From this standpoint, those who assert that truth and certainty of the reality of sensuous objects may be told that they must be sent back to the lowest school of wisdom, namely the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and must first learn the secret of eating bread and drinking wine. For the initiate into these mysteries comes not merely to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it; and partly carries out their nullity in them himself, partly sees it carried out. Even animals are not excluded from this wisdom, but rather prove most deeply initiated into it; for they do not stand before sensuous things as things that are in themselves, but, despairing of this reality and wholly certain of their nullity, simply seize them and consume them. And all nature, like the animals, celebrates these manifest mysteries, which teach what the truth of sensuous things is.

110 But those who make such an assertion also themselves immediately say the opposite of what they mean, in accordance with the preceding remarks—a phenomenon perhaps best suited to prompting reflection on the nature of sense-certainty. They speak of the existence of *external* objects, which can be determined more precisely as *actual*, absolutely *singular, entirely personal*, [1807 36]

individual things, each of which has no absolute equal; this existence is supposed to have absolute certainty and truth. They mean *this* piece of paper on which I write *this*, or rather have written it; but they do not say what they mean. If they actually wanted to *say* this piece of paper that they mean, and wanted to *say* it, this is impossible, because the sensuous this that is meant is *unreachable* by language, which belongs to consciousness, to what is universal in itself. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore decay; those who had begun its description could not complete it, but would have to leave it to others, who would finally themselves admit that they were speaking of a thing that *is* not. They thus do indeed mean *this* piece of paper, which here is an entirely different one from the above; but they say actual *things*, *external* or *sensuous objects*, absolutely *singular* beings, and so forth—that is, they say of them only the *universal*. Hence what is called the ineffable is nothing other than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant. If nothing further is said of something than that it is *an actual thing*, an *external object*, it is expressed only as the most universal of all, and thereby its *equality* with everything is expressed rather than its distinctness. If I say *a singular thing*, I say it rather as something entirely *universal*, for all [1807 37] are a singular thing; and likewise *this* thing is anything one pleases. More precisely designated as *this piece of paper*, then *all* and *every* paper is *a this* piece of paper, and I have still only said the universal. But if I try to assist speech—which has the divine nature of immediately reversing meaning, making it into something else, and thus not letting it *get a word out* at all—by *pointing out* this piece of paper, I experience what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is. I point it out as a *here* that is a here of other heres, or is in itself a *simple togetherness* of many *heres*, that is, a universal. I thus apprehend it as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate, *I perceive*.

II. Perception



[1807 38]

II. Perception; or the *Thing* and *Deception*.

111 Immediate certainty does not take the true to itself, for its truth is the universal, whereas it wishes to take the *this*. Perception, by contrast, takes what is for it as a universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, so too its moments that immediately distinguish themselves within it are universal: I is a universal, and the object a universal. That principle has *arisen* for us, and our apprehension of perception is therefore no longer an appearing apprehension, as was that of sense-certainty, but a necessary one. In the arising of the principle, the two moments that merely *fall out* in its appearance have at the same time come to be: one, namely, the movement of pointing-out, the other the same movement, but as something simple; the former is *perceiving*, the latter the *object*. The object is essentially the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the moments, the object their being gathered together. For us, or [1807 39] in itself, the universal as principle is the *essence* of perception; and against this abstraction, the two differentiated elements, the perceiving and the perceived, are the *inessential*. But in fact, because both are themselves the universal or essence, both are essential. Yet since they relate to one another as opposites, only one can be essential in the relation, and the difference between essential and inessential must be distributed between them.

The one determined as simple, the object, is essence, indifferent to whether it is perceived or not; perceiving, however, as movement, is the inconstant, which may or may not be, and the inessential.

112 This object must now be determined more closely, and this determination briefly developed from the result that has emerged; the more detailed development does not belong here. Since its principle, the universal, is something *mediated* in its simplicity, the object must express this within it as its nature; it thereby shows itself as *the thing of many properties*. The wealth of sensuous knowing belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, in which it was only incidentally at play; for perception alone has *negation*, difference or multiplicity, within its essence.

113 The this is thus posited as *not this*, or as *sublated*, and thereby not nothing, but [1807 40] a determinate nothing, or *a nothing of a content*, namely *the this*. The sensuous itself is thereby still present, but not as it was supposed to be in immediate certainty, as the singular meant, but as a universal, or as what will determine itself as a *property*. *Sublation* exhibits its true twofold meaning, which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a *negating* and a *preserving*. Nothing, as *nothing of the this*, preserves immediacy and is itself sensuous, but a universal immediacy. Being, however, is a universal through having mediation or the negative within it; when it *expresses* this in its immediacy, it is a *differentiated, determinate* property. *Many* such properties are thereby posited at once, one the negative of another. Since they are expressed in the *simplicity* of the universal, these *determinatenesses*, which properly become properties only through a further determination, *relate to themselves*, are *indifferent* to one another, each for itself, free of the others. But simple, self-equal universality itself is in turn distinct from these determinatenesses of its own and free; it is pure self-relation, or the *medium* in which all these determinatenesses are, and in which, as in a *simple* unity, they therefore *interpenetrate* without *touching* one another. For precisely [1807 41] through participating in this universality they are indifferently for themselves. This abstract universal medium, which may be called *thinghood* in general, or *pure essence*, is nothing other than the *here* and *now* as

they have proved to be: namely, a *simple togetherness* of many, but the many are themselves, *in their determinateness*, *simple universals*. This salt is a simple here and at the same time manifold: it is white, and *also* pungent, *also* cubical in shape, *also* of a determinate weight, and so on. All these many properties are in one simple *here*, in which they therefore interpenetrate; none has a different here from another, but each is everywhere in the same here in which the other is. And at the same time, without being separated by different heres, they do not affect one another in this interpenetration: the white does not affect or alter the cubical, neither affects the pungent, and so on. Rather, since each is itself a simple *relating-to-itself*, it leaves the others undisturbed and relates to them only through the indifferent *also*. This *also* is thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the *thinghood* gathering them together in this way.

114 In the relation that has emerged, only the character of positive universality has so far been observed and developed; but another side presents itself, which must also be included. Namely, if the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent [1807 42] and related entirely only to themselves, they would not be *determinate*; for they are so only insofar as they *differ* and *relate to others* as opposites. According to this opposition, however, they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as negation. Their differentiation, insofar as it is not indifferent but exclusive, negating others, thus falls outside this simple medium; and the medium is therefore not merely an *also*, indifferent unity, but also *one, exclusive unity*. The one is the *moment of negation* as it itself relates to itself in a simple way and excludes another, and through which *thinghood* is determined as a *thing*. In the property, negation is as *determinateness* immediately one with the immediacy of being, which through this unity with negation is universality; but as *one*, negation is as it is freed from this unity with its opposite and is in and for itself.

115 In these moments together, the thing as the true of perception is complete, insofar as it is necessary to develop it here. It is α) indifferent, passive universality, the *also* of the many properties, or rather *matters*; β) negation likewise as simple, or the *one*, the exclusion of opposed properties; and γ) the many *proper-*

ties themselves, [1807 43] the relation of the first two moments: negation as it relates to the indifferent element and spreads out within it as a multitude of differences; the point of singularity radiating into multiplicity in the medium of subsistence. Insofar as these differences belong to the indifferent medium, they are themselves universal, relate only to themselves, and do not affect one another; insofar as they belong to negative unity, however, they are at the same time exclusive, but necessarily have this opposed relation to properties removed from *their also*. Sensuous universality, or the *immediate* unity of being and the negative, is a *property* only insofar as the one and pure universality are developed out of it and distinguished from one another, and it unites them with one another. Only this relation of the property to the pure essential moments completes the *thing*.

116 Such, then, is the constitution of the thing of perception; and consciousness is determined as perceiving insofar as this thing is its object. It has *only to take* the object and behave as pure apprehension; what thereby results for it is the true. If consciousness itself did anything in this taking, it would alter the truth through such addition or omission. Since the object is the true and universal, the self-equal, while consciousness is for itself the [1807 44] changeable and inessential, it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object incorrectly and deceives itself. The perceiver is conscious of the possibility of deception; for in universality, which is the principle, *otherness* itself is immediately present for it, but as the *null*, the sublated. Its criterion of truth is therefore *self-equality*, and its attitude is to apprehend as self-equal. Since the diverse is also for it, it is a relating of the various moments of its apprehension to one another; but if an inequality emerges in this comparison, this is not an untruth of the object, for the object is the self-equal, but an untruth of perceiving.

117 Let us now observe what experience consciousness undergoes in its actual perceiving. *For us*, this experience is already contained in the development just given of the object and of consciousness's attitude toward it, and will be only the development of the contradictions present there. The object I apprehend presents itself as *purely one*; I also become aware in it of the property, which is

universal and thereby goes beyond singularity. The first being of the objective essence as a one was therefore not its true being; since *it* is the true, the untruth falls within me, and the apprehension was incorrect. For the sake of the *universality* [1807 45] of the property, I must rather take the objective essence as a *community* in general. I now further perceive the property as *determinate*, *opposed* to another and excluding it. I thus did not in fact apprehend the objective essence correctly when I determined it as a *community* with others, or as continuity; rather, for the sake of the property's *determinateness*, I must divide the continuity and posit the essence as an excluding one. In the separated one I find many such properties that do not affect one another but are indifferent to one another. Thus I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as something *excluding*; instead, just as it was previously only continuity in general, it is now a universal *common medium*, in which many properties, as sensuous *universals*, are each for themselves and, as *determinate*, exclude the others. But the simple and true that I perceive is thereby not a universal medium either, but the *singular property* for itself, which, however, is thus neither property nor determinate being; for it is now neither in a one nor in relation to others. Yet it is a property only in the one, and determinate only in relation to others. As this pure relating-to-itself, it remains only *sensuous being* in general, since it no longer has the character of negativity within it; and consciousness [1807 46] for which there is now a sensuous being is only a *meaning* —that is, it has gone entirely out of perception and back into itself. Yet sensuous being and meaning themselves pass over into perception; I am thrown back to the beginning and swept again into the same cycle, sublating itself at every moment and as a whole.

118 Consciousness thus necessarily runs through the cycle again, but not in the same way as the first time. For it has experienced concerning perception that its result and truth is its dissolution, or reflection into itself out of the true. It has thereby become determinate for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially constituted: namely, not as simple pure apprehension, but as being, *in its apprehension*, at the same time *reflected into itself out of the true*. This return of

consciousness into itself, which immediately *mingles* with pure apprehension —for it has shown itself essential to perception—alters the true. Consciousness at the same time recognizes this side as its own and takes it upon itself, whereby it will thus preserve the true object in its purity. Perception now therefore has the aspect that consciousness is driven back into itself, as happened in sense-certainty, but initially not in [1807 47] the sense in which it occurred there, as though the *truth* of perception fell within consciousness; rather, consciousness recognizes that the *untruth* occurring in perception falls within it. But through this recognition it is at the same time capable of sublating that untruth; it distinguishes its apprehension of the true from the untruth of its perceiving, corrects the latter, and insofar as it itself undertakes this correction, truth does indeed fall *within consciousness* as the truth of *perceiving*. The attitude of consciousness now to be considered is therefore so constituted that it no longer merely perceives, but is also conscious of its reflection into itself and separates this from simple apprehension itself.

119 I thus first become aware of the thing as *one*, and must hold it fast in this true determination; if something contradicting it occurs in the movement of perception, this must be recognized as my reflection. Now various properties also occur in perception, which seem to be properties of the thing; but the thing is one, and we are conscious that this diversity, through which it would cease to be one, falls within us. Thus this thing is in fact white only when brought to *our* eye, pungent *also* when brought to *our* tongue, *also* cubical to *our* touch, and so forth. We take the complete diversity of these aspects not from [1807 48] the thing but from ourselves; they fall apart for us in this way in our eye, which is entirely different from our tongue, and so forth. We are thus the *universal medium* in which such moments separate themselves and are for themselves. By regarding the determination of being a universal medium as our reflection, we thus preserve the thing's self-equality and truth of being one.

120 But these *various aspects* that consciousness takes upon itself are *determinate*, whether each is considered for itself or as situated in the universal medium; white is only in opposition to black, and so forth, and the thing is one precisely

through opposing itself to others. Yet it does not exclude others from itself insofar as it is one, for being one is universal self-relation, and through being one it is rather equal to all; it excludes through *determinateness*. The things themselves are thus *determinate in and for themselves*; they have properties through which they distinguish themselves from others. Since the *property* is the thing's *own* property, or a determinateness within the thing itself, it has *several* properties. For, first, the thing is the true, it is *in itself*; and what is in it is in it as its own essence, not for the sake of others. Thus, second, the determinate properties are not merely for the sake of other [1807 49] things and for other things, but in the thing itself; but they are determinate properties *in it* only insofar as they are several properties differing from one another. And third, since they are thus in thinghood, they are in and for themselves and indifferent to one another. It is therefore in truth the thing itself that is white and *also* cubical, *also* pungent, and so forth; or the thing is the *also*, or the *universal medium*, in which the many properties subsist outside one another without touching and sublating one another; and taken thus, it is taken as the true.

121 In this perceiving, consciousness is at the same time conscious that it is *also* reflected into itself, and that the moment opposed to the *also* occurs in perceiving. This moment, however, is the thing's *unity* with itself, which excludes difference from itself. It is therefore this unity that consciousness must take upon itself; for the thing itself is the *subsistence of the many different* and *independent properties*. Thus it is said of the thing that *it is* white, *also* cubical, and also pungent, and so forth. But *insofar as* it is white, it is not cubical; and *insofar as* it is cubical and also white, it is not pungent, and so forth. The *positing-as-one* of these properties belongs only to consciousness, which must therefore not let them coincide as one in the thing. To this end it brings in the *insofar as*, through which it keeps them [1807 50] apart and preserves the thing as the also. Strictly speaking, consciousness takes *being-one* upon itself only when what was called property is represented as *free matter*. In this way the thing is raised to the true *also*, becoming a collection of matters and, instead of being one, a merely enclosing surface.

122 If we look back at what consciousness previously took upon itself and now takes upon itself, at what it previously ascribed to the thing and now ascribes to it, it emerges that consciousness alternately makes both itself and the thing into both: into the pure *one* without multiplicity, and into an *also* dissolved into independent matters. Through this comparison, consciousness thus finds that not only does *its* taking of the true have within it the *diversity of apprehension* and *return into itself*, but rather the true itself, the thing, shows itself in this twofold way. The experience is thereby present that the thing *presents itself* in a determinate way *for apprehending consciousness*, but *at the same time* is *reflected out of* the manner in which it offers itself *and into itself*, or has in itself an opposite truth.

123 Consciousness has thus itself also emerged from this second manner of behaving in perception, namely taking the thing as the true and self-equal, [1807 51] but itself as unequal, as returning into itself out of equality. The object is now for it this entire movement that was previously distributed between the object and consciousness. The thing is *one*, reflected into itself; it is *for itself*; but it is also *for another*, and indeed it is *something different* for itself *from what it is* for another. Accordingly, the thing is for itself and *also* for another, a *twofold*, diverse being; but it is *also one*, and being-one contradicts this diversity of its own. Consciousness would accordingly have to take this positing-as-one upon itself again and keep it away from the thing. It would therefore have to say that the thing, *insofar as* it is for itself, is not for another. Yet being-one also belongs to the thing itself, as consciousness has experienced; the thing is essentially reflected into itself. The *also*, or indifferent difference, thus falls within the thing just as much as *being-one* does; but since the two are different, they fall not within the same thing, but within *different* things. The contradiction present in objective essence in general is distributed between two objects. Thus the thing is indeed in and for itself, equal to itself; but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the unity of the thing is preserved, and otherness is at the same time outside it, as well as outside consciousness.
[1807 52]

124 Although the contradiction of objective essence is thus distributed among different things, difference will nevertheless thereby enter the separate singular thing itself. The *different things* are thus posited *for themselves*, and the conflict falls reciprocally within them in such a way that each differs not from itself, but only from the other. Yet each is thereby *itself determined as something differentiated*, and has the essential difference from the others *within it*; but at the same time not so that this would be an opposition within itself. Rather, for itself it is *simple determinateness*, which constitutes its *essential* character distinguishing it from others. In fact, since diversity is within it, this diversity is necessarily present within it as an *actual* difference of manifold characteristics. But because determinateness constitutes the thing's *essence*, through which it distinguishes itself from others and is for itself, this further manifold character is the *inessential*. The thing thus does indeed have within its unity the *twofold insofar as*, but with *unequal value*; hence this being-opposed does not become an actual opposition of the thing itself. Rather, insofar as the thing enters opposition through its *absolute difference*, it has that opposition to another thing outside it. The further multiplicity is admittedly also necessarily present in the thing, so that it cannot be absent [1807 53] from it, but it is *inessential* to the thing.

125 This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now determined in such a way that through it the thing stands in opposition to others, yet is supposed to preserve itself for itself in that opposition. But it is a thing, or a one that is for itself, only insofar as it does not stand in this relation to others; for in this relation there is posited rather connection with another, and connection with another is the cessation of being-for-itself. Precisely through its *absolute character* and its opposition, the thing *relates* to *others* and is essentially only this relating; but relation is the negation of its independence, and the thing rather perishes through its essential property.

126 The necessity of consciousness's experience that the thing perishes precisely through the determinateness constituting its essence and its being-for-itself may be considered briefly, according to the simple concept, as follows. The

thing is posited as *being-for-itself*, or as absolute negation of all otherness; hence as absolute negation relating only to itself. But self-related negation is the sublation *of itself*, or having its essence in another.

127 In fact, the determination of the object as it has emerged contains nothing else. It [1807 54] is supposed to have an essential property constituting its simple being-for-itself, yet alongside this simplicity also to have diversity within itself, which is admittedly to be *necessary*, but not to constitute its *essential* determinateness. Yet this is a distinction that now lies only in words; the *inessential* that is nevertheless also supposed to be *necessary* sublates itself, or is what was just called the negation of itself.

128 Thus the final *insofar as* falls away, which separated being-for-itself from being-for-another; rather, the object is *in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: for itself insofar as it is for another*, and *for another insofar as it is for itself*. It is *for itself*, reflected into itself, one; but this being-*for-itself*, reflected into itself, one, is in a unity with its opposite, *being-for-another*, and is therefore posited only as sublated. Or this *being-for-itself* is just as *inessential* as what alone was supposed to be inessential, namely the relation to another.

129 The object is thereby sublated in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses that were supposed to constitute its essentiality, just as it became something sublated in its sensuous being. From sensuous being it becomes a universal; but this universal, since it *comes from the sensuous*, is essentially [1807 55] *conditioned* by it, and hence is not truly self-equal universality at all, but universality *affected by an opposition*, which therefore divides into the extremes of singularity and universality, the one of properties and the also of free matters. These pure determinatenesses seem to express *essentiality* itself, but they are only a *being-for-itself* encumbered with *being-for-another*; yet since both are essentially *in one unity*, unconditioned, absolute universality is now present, and only here does consciousness truly enter the realm of understanding.

130 Sensuous singularity thus does indeed vanish in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and become universality, but only *sensuous universality*. Meaning has vanished, and perception takes the object as *it is in itself*, or as a universal in general; singularity therefore emerges in it as true singularity, as the *being-in-itself* of the *one*, or as *being-reflected into itself*. But it is still a *conditioned* being-for-itself, *beside which* another being-for-itself occurs: universality opposed to singularity and conditioned by it. Yet these two contradictory extremes are not merely *beside one another*, but in one unity; or, what is the same, what they have in common, *being-for-itself*, is encumbered with opposition in general—that is, at the same time it is not *being-for-itself*. These [1807 56] moments, the sophistry of perception seeks to rescue from their contradiction and hold fast through distinguishing *respects*, through the *also* and the *insofar as*, and finally to seize the true through distinguishing the *inessential* and an *essence* opposed to it. Yet instead of preventing deception in apprehension, these expedients themselves prove null, and the true supposedly to be won through this logic of perception proves to be its opposite in one and the same respect, and thus to have for its essence universality without distinction or determination.

131 These empty abstractions of *singularity* and the *universality* opposed to it, of *essence* linked with an inessential, of an *inessential* that is nevertheless also necessary, are the powers whose plaything is perceptive understanding, often called common sense. Common sense, which takes itself to be solid, real consciousness, is in perceiving only the play of *these abstractions*; in general it is always poorest where it means to be richest. Driven about by these null essences, thrown from one into the arms of the other, and resisting truth [1807 57] through its sophistry, as it tries alternately to hold fast and assert now the one, now its exact opposite, it supposes philosophy to deal only with *things of thought*. Philosophy does indeed deal with these, and recognizes them as pure essences, absolute elements and powers; but thereby it also recognizes them *in their determinateness* and is therefore master over them, whereas perceiving understanding takes them for the true and is sent by them from one error into

another. It does not itself become conscious that such simple essentialities govern within it, but always supposes it is dealing with wholly solid material and content, just as sense-certainty does not know that the empty abstraction of pure being is its essence. Yet in fact these abstractions are what understanding runs back and forth along through all material and content; they are what holds that content together and rules it, and alone constitute what the sensuous *as essence* is for consciousness, what determines consciousness's relations to it, and what the movement of perception and its true runs its course upon. This course, a constantly alternating determination of the true and sublation of this determining, actually constitutes the daily and constant life and activity of perceiving consciousness, which supposes itself to move in truth. In it consciousness advances irresistibly toward the result of equally sublating all these essential essentialities or determinations, [1807 58] but in each individual moment it is conscious only of this *one determinateness* as the true, and then again of its opposite. It does indeed scent their lack of essence; to rescue them from the threatening danger, it turns to the sophistry of asserting as true what it itself just asserted as untrue. What the nature of these untrue essences actually seeks to drive this understanding toward is *bringing together the thoughts* of that *universality* and *singularity*, of the *also* and the *one*, of that *essentiality* which is *necessarily* linked with an *inessentiality*, and of an *inessential* that is nevertheless necessary—the *thoughts* of these nonessences—and thereby sublating them. Against this it struggles, using the supports of the *insofar as* and the various *respects*, or taking one thought upon itself so as to keep the other separate and preserve it as true. But the nature of these abstractions brings them together in and for themselves; common sense is their prey, driven about in their whirling circle. In wishing to give them truth, now taking their untruth upon itself, now calling deception a semblance of unreliable things, and separating the essential from what is necessary to them yet supposedly inessential, holding fast to the former as their truth against the latter, common sense does not preserve their truth, but gives itself untruth.

III. Force and understanding

[1807 59]

III. Force and Understanding, Appearance and the Supersensible World.

132 In the dialectic of sense-certainty, consciousness has lost its hearing and seeing, and so forth; and as perception it has arrived at thoughts, which, however, it first brings together in the unconditionally universal. Now this unconditioned would itself again be nothing other than the *extreme* of *being-for-itself*, taking its stand on one side, if it were taken as a resting, simple essence; for nonessence would then stand opposite it. But related to this, it would itself be inessential, and consciousness would not have emerged from the deception of perception. Yet it has proved to be something that has returned into itself out of such conditioned being-for-itself. This unconditioned universal, which is now consciousness's true object, is still its *object*; consciousness has not yet grasped its *concept* as *concept*. The two must be essentially distinguished: for consciousness the object has returned into itself from its relation to another [1807 60] and thereby *in itself* become concept; but consciousness is not yet for itself the concept, and therefore does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us*, this object has come to be through the movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is interwoven with its becoming, and reflection on both sides is the same, or only one. But because consciousness had in this movement only objective essence, not consciousness as such, for its content, the result

must be posited for it in an objective significance, and consciousness as still withdrawing from what has come to be, so that this, as objective, is essence for it.

133 Understanding has thereby indeed sublated its own untruth and the untruth of the object; and what has come to be for it through this is the concept of the true: as a true that is *in itself*, that is not yet concept, or lacks the *being-for-itself* of consciousness, and that understanding lets take its course without knowing itself in it. This true pursues its essence for itself, so that consciousness has no part in its free realization, but merely watches it and purely apprehends it. *We* must therefore initially still take consciousness's place and be the concept that develops what is contained in the result; only in this developed object, which offers itself to [1807 61] consciousness as something that is, will consciousness become for itself comprehending consciousness.

134 The result was the unconditionally universal, initially in the negative, abstract sense that consciousness negated its one-sided concepts and abstracted them away, namely relinquished them. But in itself the result has the positive meaning that in it the unity of *being-for-itself* and *being-for-another*, or absolute opposition, is immediately posited as the same essence. At first this seems to concern only the form of the moments in relation to one another; but being-for-itself and being-for-another are equally the *content* itself, because opposition in its truth can have no nature other than what has emerged in the result: namely, that the content held true in perception in fact belongs only to form and dissolves into its unity. This content is at the same time universal; there can be no other content that, through its particular character, would escape returning into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would be some determinate manner of being for itself and relating to another. Yet *being-for-itself* and *relating-to-another in general* constitute its *nature* and *essence*, whose truth is to be unconditionally universal; and the result is utterly universal.
[1807 62]

135 But because this unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness, the difference of form and content emerges within it, and in the shape of content the moments have the appearance in which they first offered themselves: on the one hand, a universal medium of many subsisting matters; on the other, a one reflected into itself, in which their independence is extinguished. The former is the dissolution of the thing's independence, or the passivity that is a being-for-another; the latter, however, is being-for-itself. We must see how these moments present themselves in the unconditioned universality that is their essence. It is initially clear that, because they are only in this universality, they no longer lie apart at all, but are essentially sides sublating themselves in themselves, and only their passing over into one another is posited.

136 The one moment thus appears as essence that has taken its stand on one side, as universal medium, or as the subsistence of independent matters. But the *independence* of these matters is nothing other than this medium; or this *universal* is entirely the *multiplicity* of such diverse universals. That the universal is in itself in undivided unity with this multiplicity means, however, that these matters are each where the other is: they interpenetrate reciprocally—yet without touching, since conversely the many differentiated elements are just as independent. Their pure [1807 63] porosity, or their being-sublated, is thereby also posited. This being-sublated in turn, or the reduction of this diversity to *pure being-for-itself*, is nothing other than the medium itself, and this is the *independence* of the differences. Or the elements posited as independent pass over immediately into their unity, and their unity immediately into unfolding, and this back again into reduction. This movement, however, is what is called *force*. One moment of it, namely force as the spreading-out of the independent matters in their being, is its *expression*; but force as their having-vanished is force *driven back into itself* out of its expression, or *force proper*. But first, force driven back into itself *must* express itself; and second, in expression it is just as much force *being within itself* as, in this being-within-itself, it is expression. In thus preserving both moments in their immediate unity, it is properly understanding, to which the concept of force belongs, that is *the concept* sustaining the dif-

ferentiated moments as differentiated; for *in force itself* they are supposed not to be differentiated. The difference is thus only in thought. Or, in the foregoing, only the concept of force, not its reality, has as yet been posited. But in fact force is the unconditionally universal, which is in itself just what it is *for another*, or which has difference—for difference is nothing other than [1807 64] being *for another*—within itself. Thus, for force to be in its truth, it must be released entirely from thought and posited as the substance of these differences: that is, *first*, force as this whole force essentially remaining *in and for itself*, and *then* its *differences* as *substantial*, or as moments subsisting for themselves. Force as such, or as driven back into itself, is thus for itself an *excluding* one, for which the unfolding of matters is *another subsisting essence*, and two differentiated, independent sides are thereby posited. Yet force is also the whole, or remains what it is according to its concept: namely, these *differences* remain pure forms, superficial, *vanishing moments*. The *differences* between force proper *driven back into itself* and the *unfolding* of independent matters would at the same time not exist at all unless they had a *subsistence*, or force would not be unless it *existed* in this opposed manner; but that it exists in this opposed manner means nothing other than that both moments are themselves at the same time *independent*. Thus what must be considered is this movement of the two moments constantly making themselves independent and sublating themselves again. In general it is clear that this movement is nothing other than the movement of perception, in which both sides, the perceiving and the perceived, [1807 65] are at the same time, on the one hand, one and undifferentiated as the *apprehension* of the true, yet equally each side is *reflected* into itself, or for itself. Here these two sides are moments of force; they are in a unity just as much as this unity, appearing as the middle against the extremes that are for themselves, continually divides itself into precisely these extremes, which are only through this division. Thus the movement that previously presented itself as the self-annihilation of contradictory concepts here has *objective* form, and is the movement of force, from which the unconditionally universal emerges as result as something *nonobjective*, or as the *inner* of things.

137 Force, as it has been determined, when represented *as such*, or as *reflected into itself*, is one side of its concept, but as a substantialized extreme, namely the one posited under the determinateness of the one. Thus the *subsistence* of the unfolded matters is excluded from force and is *another* than it. Since it is necessary that *force itself* be this *subsistence*, or that it *express itself*, its expression is represented as *that other approaching* force and soliciting it. But in fact, since force *necessarily* expresses itself, it has within itself what was posited as another essence. The positing of force as *a one*, and of its essence, expressing itself, as something other approaching it from outside, must be taken back; rather, force is itself this universal [1807 66] medium of the subsistence of the moments as matters; or *it has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be the other that solicits is rather force itself. It thus now exists as the medium of the unfolded matters. But it has just as essentially the form of the being-sublated of the subsisting matters, or is essentially *one*. *This being-one* is thus *now*, since *force* is posited as the medium of matters, *something other than force*, and force has this essence of its own outside it. But since force must necessarily be what it is *not yet* posited as being, *this other approaches* and solicits force to reflection into itself, or sublates its expression. In fact, however, *force itself* is this being-reflected-into-itself, or this being-sublated of expression; being-one vanishes *as* it appeared, namely as *an other*: *force is itself this*; it is force driven back into itself.

138 What appears as another, soliciting force both to expression and to return into itself, is, as is immediately evident, *itself force*; for the other shows itself as universal medium no less than as one, and in such a way that each of these shapes at the same time appears only as a vanishing moment. Thus through another being for it, and its being for another, force has not yet gone beyond its concept at all. But at the same time two forces are present; the concept of both is indeed the same, but it has gone out of its unity into duality. Instead of [1807 67] opposition remaining essentially only a moment throughout, it seems to have escaped the dominion of unity by splitting into entirely *independent forces*. We must examine more closely what this independence amounts to. Initially, the second force appears as what solicits, and, in its content, as universal medium,

over against the force determined as solicited. But since the former is essentially an alternation of these two moments and is itself force, it is in fact likewise universal medium *only insofar as it is solicited to be so*, and equally negative unity, or what solicits the return of force, only *through being solicited*. Thus this difference between the two—that one was to be *soliciting*, the other *solicited*—also transforms into the same interchange of determinatenesses with one another.

139 The play of the two forces thus consists in this opposed determination of both, their being-for-one-another in this determination, and the absolute, immediate exchange of the determinations—a transition through which alone these determinations are, in which the forces seem to appear *independently*. What solicits is posited, for example, as universal medium, and what is solicited, by contrast, as force driven back into itself; but the former is itself universal medium only because the other is force driven back into itself. [1807 68] Or rather, the latter is what solicits the former and first makes it a medium. The former has its determinateness only through the other, and is soliciting only insofar as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting; and it just as immediately loses this determinateness given to it, for the determinateness passes over to the other, or rather has already passed over to it. The alien element soliciting force appears as universal medium, but only because it has been solicited by force to do so; this means, however, that *force posits* it in this way and *is rather itself essentially* universal medium. Force posits what solicits in this way because this other determination is essential to *force*, that is, because *force is rather itself this determination*.

140 To complete the insight into the concept of this movement, we may also note that the differences themselves show themselves in a twofold difference: *first* as differences *of content*, insofar as one extreme is force reflected into itself, while the other is the medium of matters; *second* as differences of *form*, insofar as one solicits and the other is solicited, the former active, the latter passive. According to the difference of content, they *are* differentiated in general, or for us; according to the difference of form, however, they are independent, separating themselves from and opposing one another in their relation. That the extremes in

[1807 69] these two respects are thus nothing *in themselves*, but that these aspects, in which their differentiated essence was supposed to consist, are only vanishing moments, an immediate passing-over of each into its opposite—this becomes present for consciousness in perceiving the movement of force. But for us, as recalled above, there was also this: in themselves the differences vanished as *differences of content and form*, and on the side of form, the *active, soliciting*, or *being-for-itself* was essentially the same as what presented itself on the side of content as force driven back into itself; the passive, *solicited*, or being-for-another on the side of form was the same as what presented itself on the side of content as the universal medium of many matters.

141 From this it emerges that the concept of force becomes *actual* through duplication into two forces, and how it does so. These two forces exist as essences that are for themselves; but their existence is such a movement toward one another that their *being* is rather a pure *being-posited by another*—that is, their being has rather the pure meaning of *vanishing*. They are not extremes that retain something fixed for themselves and send only an external property toward one another into the middle and into their contact; rather, what they are, they are only in this middle and contact. In this there is immediately just as much force's being-driven-back-into-itself, or *being-for-itself*, as [1807 70] expression, soliciting as being-solicited. These moments are thus not distributed between two independent extremes that offer one another only an opposed tip; rather, their essence is simply this: each is only through the other, and what each thus is through the other, it immediately no longer is in being it. Thus they in fact have no substances of their own that would bear and preserve them. Rather, the *concept* of force maintains itself as *essence* in its *actuality* itself; *force as actual* is simply only in its *expression*, which is at the same time nothing other than a sublating of itself. If this *actual* force is represented as free from its expression and as being for itself, it is force driven back into itself; but this determinateness is in fact, as has emerged, itself only a moment of *expression*. Thus only the *thought* of force remains as its truth; and, without support, the moments of its actuality, its substances and its movement, collapse into an undifferentiated

unity that is not force driven back into itself, for this is itself only such a moment. Rather, this unity is *its concept as concept*. The realization of force is thus at the same time the loss of reality; in it force has rather become something entirely different, namely this *universality*, which understanding first or immediately recognizes as force's essence, and which also proves itself its essence in [1807 71] its supposed reality, in the actual substances.

142 Insofar as we regard *the first* universal as the *concept* of understanding, in which force is not yet for itself, the second is now force's *essence* as it presents itself *in and for itself*. Or conversely, if we regard the first universal as the *immediate*, which was to be an *actual* object for consciousness, this second is determined as the *negative* of sensuously objective force; it is force as, in its true essence, it is only an *object of understanding*. That first would be force driven back into itself, or force as substance; but this second is the *inner* of things, as *inner*, which is the same as the concept as concept.

143 This true essence of things has now determined itself in such a way that it is not immediately for consciousness; instead, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner and, as understanding, *looks through this middle of the play of forces into the true background of things*. The middle joining the two extremes, understanding and the inner, is the developed *being* of force, which is now for understanding itself a *vanishing*. It is therefore called *appearance*, for we call *semblance* a *being* that is immediately in itself a *nonbeing*. But it is not merely a semblance, but appearance, a *whole* of semblance. This *whole* as whole, or *universal*, is what constitutes the [1807 72] *inner*: the *play of forces* as its *reflection* into itself. In it, the essences of perception are objectively *posited* for consciousness as they are in themselves: namely, as moments immediately transforming themselves into their opposite without rest or being, the one immediately into the universal, the essential immediately into the inessential, and conversely. This play of forces is therefore the developed negative; but its truth is the positive, namely the *universal*, the object that is *in itself*. Its *being for consciousness* is mediated by the movement of *appearance*, in which the *being of perception* and the sensuously objective in general have only a negative meaning.

Consciousness thus reflects itself out of this into itself as into the true, but as consciousness again makes this true into an objective *inner*, and distinguishes this reflection of things from its own reflection into itself, just as the mediating movement is likewise still objective for it. This inner is therefore for consciousness an extreme opposed to it; but it is the true for consciousness because, in this inner as the *in-itself*, consciousness at the same time has its self-certainty, or the moment of its being-for-itself. Yet it is not conscious of this ground, for the *being-for-itself* that the inner was supposed to have in itself would be nothing other than negative movement; but for consciousness this is still the [1807 73] *objective*, vanishing appearance, not yet its *own* being-for-itself. Thus the inner is indeed concept for consciousness, but consciousness does not yet know the nature of the concept.

144 In this *inner true*, as the *absolutely universal*, purified of the *opposition* between universal and singular and come to be *for understanding*, a *supersensible* world as the *true* world now first opens above the *sensuous* world as the *appearing world*; above the vanishing *here-and-now*, the enduring *beyond*: an in-itself that is the first and therefore itself imperfect appearance of reason, or only the pure element in which truth has its *essence*.

145 *Our object* is thus now the syllogism whose extremes are the inner of things and understanding, and whose middle is appearance; but the movement of this syllogism yields the further determination of what understanding beholds in the inner through the middle, and the experience it undergoes concerning this relation of being joined together.

146 The inner is still a *pure beyond* for consciousness, for consciousness does not yet find itself in it; it is *empty*, for it is only the nothing of appearance, and positively the simple universal. This mode of being of the inner immediately agrees with those who say that the inner of things cannot be cognized; but the ground would have to be grasped differently. Of this inner, [1807 74] as it immediately is here, there is indeed no knowledge; but not because reason is too shortsighted, limited, or whatever else one wishes to call it—about which nothing is yet

known here, for we have not yet penetrated so deeply—but because of the simple nature of the matter itself: namely, because nothing is cognized in the *empty*, or, expressed from the other side, because the inner is determined precisely as the *beyond* of consciousness. The result is certainly the same whether a blind person is placed amid the wealth of the supersensible world—if it has any, whether as its own distinctive content or as consciousness itself—or a sighted person is placed in pure darkness, or, if one prefers, in pure light, if the supersensible world is only this. In pure light the sighted person sees as little as in pure darkness, and just as much as the blind person amid the fullness of wealth lying before them. If there were nothing more to the inner and to being joined with it through appearance, nothing would remain but to hold to appearance —that is, take something as true that we know is not true—or to fill the empty with daydreams, *appearances* that consciousness produces for itself, so that there might yet be something in it. For although this empty first came to be as emptiness of objective things, *as emptiness in itself* it must also be taken as the emptiness of all spiritual relations and of the differences of consciousness as [1807 75] consciousness. This *utterly empty* element, also called the *holy*, would have to submit to such poor treatment, for it would deserve no better, since even daydreams are better than its emptiness.

147 But the inner, or the supersensible beyond, has *arisen*; it *comes* from appearance, and appearance is its mediation. Or *appearance is its essence*, and in fact its fulfillment. The supersensible is the sensuous and perceived posited as it is in *truth*; but the *truth* of the *sensuous* and perceived is to be *appearance*. The supersensible is thus *appearance as appearance*. If this is taken to mean that the supersensible is *therefore* the sensuous world, or the world as it is *for immediate sense-certainty and perception*, this is a perverted understanding. For appearance is rather *not* the world of sensuous knowing and perceiving as being, but that world posited *as sublated*, or in truth *as inner*. It is customary to say that the supersensible is *not* appearance; but by appearance one then understands not appearance, but rather the *sensuous* world as itself real actuality.
[1807 76]

148 Understanding, which is our object, stands precisely at this point: the inner has become for it only the universal, still unfulfilled *in-itself*. The play of forces has only this negative meaning, not to be in itself, and only this positive meaning, to be what *mediates*, but outside the inner. Yet understanding's relation to the inner through mediation is its movement, through which the inner will acquire fulfillment for it. The play of forces is *immediate* for understanding; but the *true* for it is the simple inner. Thus the movement of force is likewise the true only as *simple* in general. But we have seen that this play of forces has this character: the force *solicited* by another force is equally what *solicits* that other, which itself becomes soliciting only through this. Here, too, there is only immediate alternation, or the absolute interchange of the *determinateness* that constitutes the sole *content* of what appears: to be either universal medium or negative unity. In its determinate appearance it itself immediately ceases to be what it appears as; through its determinate appearance it solicits the other side, which thereby *expresses itself*—that is, this side is now immediately what the first was supposed to be. Each of these two sides, the *relation* of soliciting and the *relation* of determinate, opposed content, is *for itself* absolute [1807 77] inversion and interchange. Yet these two relations are themselves again the same, and the difference of *form*, being solicited and soliciting, is the same as the difference of *content*: the solicited as such is namely the passive medium, while the soliciting is the active, negative unity, or the one. Through this, all difference of *particular forces* supposedly present in this movement vanishes in relation to one another altogether; for they rested solely on those differences, and the difference between the forces likewise collapses with those two into only one. Thus neither force, nor soliciting and being solicited, nor the determinateness of being a subsisting medium and a unity reflected into itself is anything singly for itself, nor are they different oppositions. Rather, what is in this absolute alternation is only *difference as universal*, or as that into which the many oppositions have been reduced. This *difference as universal* is therefore *the simple element in the play of force itself*, and its truth; it is the *law of force*.

149 Absolutely changing appearance becomes *simple difference* through its relation to the simplicity of the inner, or of understanding. The inner is initially only the universal in itself; but this *universal*, simple in itself, is essentially just as absolutely *universal difference*, for it is [1807 78] the result of change itself, or change is its essence. Yet change, as posited in the inner as it is in truth, is thereby taken up into the inner as equally absolutely universal difference, brought to rest and remaining equal to itself. Or negation is an essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation, in the universal is thus *universal difference*. It is expressed in *law*, as the *enduring* image of unstable appearance. The *supersensible* world is thereby a *tranquil realm of laws*, admittedly beyond the perceived world, for the latter presents law only through constant change, yet equally *present* in it, and its immediate, still image.

150 This realm of laws is indeed the truth of understanding, which has its *content* in the difference present in law; but at the same time it is only understanding's *first truth* and does not fill out appearance. Law is present in appearance, but is not its entire presence; under ever different circumstances it has an ever different actuality. A side of appearance thus remains *for itself*, which is not in the inner; or appearance is in truth not yet posited as *appearance*, as *sublated* being-for-itself. This deficiency of law must likewise emerge within law itself. What it seems to lack is that, although it has difference itself within it, it has difference as universal, indeterminate. [1807 79] But insofar as it is not *the* law in general but *a* law, it has determinateness within it; and indefinitely *many* laws are thereby present. Yet this multiplicity is rather itself a deficiency, for it contradicts the principle of understanding, for which, as consciousness of the simple inner, *unity* universal in itself is the true. Understanding must therefore rather let the many laws collapse into *one* law, as, for example, the law according to which the stone falls and the law according to which the heavenly spheres move have been comprehended as *one* law. But in this collapse into one another the laws lose their determinateness; the law becomes ever more superficial, and what has in fact been found is not the unity of *these determinate* laws, but a law omitting their determinateness—just as the one law uniting within it the laws

of bodies falling on earth and of heavenly motion in fact expresses neither. The unification of all laws in *universal attraction* expresses no further content than the *mere concept of law itself*, posited in it as *being*. Universal attraction says only that *everything has an enduring difference from another*. Understanding supposes it has thereby found a universal law expressing universal actuality *as such*; but in fact it has found only the *concept* of [1807 80] *law itself*, though in such a way that it at the same time says: *all* actuality is lawful *in itself*. The expression *universal attraction* is therefore of great importance insofar as it is directed against thoughtless *representation*, to which everything presents itself in the shape of contingency and for which determinateness has the form of sensuous independence.

151 Thus universal attraction, or the pure concept of law, stands opposed to determinate laws. Insofar as this pure concept is regarded as essence, or as the true inner, the *determinateness* of determinate law itself still belongs to appearance, or rather to sensuous being. Yet the pure *concept* of law goes not only beyond the law that, itself *determinate*, stands opposed to *other determinate* laws, but also *beyond law* as such. The determinateness in question is itself properly only a vanishing moment, which can no longer occur here as essentiality; for only law is present as the true. But the *concept* of law is turned against *law* itself. In law, namely, difference itself is apprehended *immediately* and taken up into the universal, but thereby also a *subsistence* of the moments whose relation the law expresses, as indifferent essentialities that are in themselves. Yet these parts of the [1807 81] difference within law are themselves at the same time determinate sides; the pure concept of law as universal attraction must be grasped in its true meaning in such a way that, in it as absolutely *simple*, the *differences* present in law as such themselves *return again into the inner as simple unity*. This unity is the inner *necessity* of law.

152 Law is thereby present in a twofold way: once as law, in which the differences are expressed as independent moments; the other time in the form of *simple* having-returned-into-itself, which may again be called *force*, but in such a way that it is not force driven back into itself, but force in general, or as the concept

of force—an abstraction drawing into itself the very differences of what attracts and what is attracted. Thus, for example, *simple* electricity is *force*; the expression of difference, however, falls within *law*: this difference is positive and negative electricity. In falling motion, *force* is the simple element, *gravity*, which has the *law* that the magnitudes of the differentiated moments of motion, elapsed *time* and traversed *space*, relate to one another as root and square. Electricity itself is not difference in itself, or in its essence the dual essence of positive and negative [1807 82] electricity; hence one customarily says that it *has* the law of *being* in this way, or even that it *has the property* of expressing itself so. This property is indeed the essential and sole property of this force, or is *necessary* to it. But necessity here is an empty word: force simply *must* duplicate itself in this way *because* it *must*. If, admittedly, *positive* electricity is posited, *negative* electricity is also necessary *in itself*; for the *positive* is only as relation to a *negative*, or the positive is *in itself* difference from itself, as is equally the negative. But that electricity as such divides itself in this way is not what is necessary in itself; as *simple force*, electricity is indifferent to its law of *being* positive and negative. And if we call the former its concept, the latter its being, its concept is indifferent to its being; it merely *has* this property—that is precisely to say, the property is not necessary to it *in itself*. This indifference takes another shape when it is said that being positive and negative belongs to the *definition* of electricity, or that this is simply *its concept and essence*. Then its being would mean *its existence* in general; but that definition does not contain the *necessity of its existence*. It exists either because one *finds* it—that is, it is not necessary at all—or its existence is through other forces, that is, its necessity is external. But in placing [1807 83] necessity in the determinateness of *being through another*, we fall back into the *multiplicity* of determinate laws we have just left in order to consider *law* as law. Only with this is its *concept* as concept, or its necessity, to be compared; but in all these forms necessity has so far shown itself only an empty word.

153 The indifference of law and force, or of concept and being, is present in another way besides the one indicated. In the law of motion, for example, it is necessary that motion *divide* into time and space, or again into distance and velocity. Since motion is only the relation of those moments, it, the universal, is here indeed divided *in itself*; but these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not express within themselves this origin from one. They are indifferent to one another: space is represented as capable of being without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity—just as their magnitudes are indifferent to one another, since they do not relate as *positive* and *negative*, and hence do not relate to one another through *their essence*. Thus the necessity of *division* is indeed present here, but not the necessity of the *parts* as such for one another. For this reason, however, that first necessity is itself only a falsely projected [1807 84] necessity; for motion is not itself represented as *simple*, or as pure essence, but *already* as divided. Time and space are its *independent* parts, or *essences in themselves*; or distance and velocity are modes of being or representing, one of which can well be without the other, and motion is therefore only their *superficial* relation, not their essence. Represented as simple essence or as force, motion is indeed *gravity*, which, however, does not contain these differences within it at all.

154 Thus in both cases difference is no *difference in itself*: either the universal, force, is indifferent to the division present in law, or the differences, the parts of law, are indifferent to one another. Yet understanding *has* the concept of *this difference in itself*, precisely because law is, on the one hand, the inner that is *in itself*, but is at the same time *differentiated within itself*. That this difference is thus *inner* difference is present in law's being *simple* force, or as its *concept*, and hence a *difference of the concept*. But this inner difference still falls only *within understanding*, and is not yet *posited in the matter itself*. Thus what understanding expresses is only its *own* necessity: a difference it makes only in such a way as at the same time to express that the difference is no *difference of the matter itself*. This necessity, [1807 85] lying only in words, is thus the recounting of the moments that constitute its circle. They are indeed differentiated, but their

difference is at the same time expressed as no difference of the matter itself, and is therefore itself immediately sublated again. This movement is called *explanation*. Thus a *law* is pronounced; from it, its universal in itself, or its ground, is distinguished as *force*; but of this difference it is said that it is none, that rather the ground is constituted in exactly the same way as the law. The singular occurrence of lightning, for example, is grasped as a universal, and this universal expressed as the *law* of electricity; explanation then gathers the *law* into *force* as the law's essence. This force is then *so constituted* that, when it expresses itself, opposed electricities emerge and vanish again into one another; that is, *force is constituted exactly like law*. It is said that the two are not differentiated at all. The differences are pure universal expression, or law, and pure force; but both have *the same* content, *the same* constitution. Thus difference as difference of content, that is, of the *matter*, is also taken back again.

155 In this tautological movement, as becomes apparent, understanding persists in the tranquil unity of its object, and the movement falls only [1807 86] within understanding itself, not within the object. It is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so clear that, while making preparations to say something different from what has already been said, it rather says nothing, but merely repeats the same thing. Nothing new arises in the matter itself through this movement; rather, the movement comes into consideration as a movement of understanding. But in it we now recognize precisely what was missing in law: absolute change itself, for this *movement*, when we examine it more closely, is immediately its own opposite. It posits *a difference* that is not merely *no difference* for us, but that the movement itself sublates as difference. This is the same change that presented itself as the play of forces; in that play there was the difference between soliciting and solicited force, between force expressing itself and force driven back into itself. But these were differences that in truth were none, and hence also immediately sublated themselves again. There is not merely bare unity present, so that *no difference would be posited*; rather, there is this *movement*, that *a difference is indeed made, but*, because it is none, *is sublated again*. Thus with explanation, the alteration and change that previously

lay outside the inner, only in appearance, has penetrated the supersensible itself; but our consciousness has passed over from the inner as object to [1807 87] the other side, into *understanding*, and has the change within it.

156 This change is thus not yet a change of the matter itself, but presents itself as *pure change* precisely because the *content* of the moments of change remains the same. But since the *concept*, as the concept of understanding, is the same as the *inner* of things, *this change becomes for understanding a law of the inner*. Understanding thus *experiences* that it is a *law of appearance itself* that differences arise which are no differences; or that *like repels itself from itself*; and equally that the differences are only such as are in truth none, and sublate themselves; or that *unlike attracts itself*. This is a *second law*, whose content is opposed to what was previously called law, namely difference enduringly equal to itself; for this new law expresses rather the *becoming-unequal of the equal* and the *becoming-equal of the unequal*. The concept asks thoughtlessness to bring both laws together and become conscious of their opposition. The second is admittedly also law, or an inner, self-equal being, but rather a self-equality of inequality, a constancy of inconstancy. In the play of forces this law emerged as precisely this absolute passing-over and as pure change: the *like*, force, [1807 88] *divides* itself into an opposition that initially appears as an independent difference, but in fact proves *to be none*. For it is the *like* that repels itself from itself, and what is thus repelled therefore essentially attracts itself, since it is *the same*. The difference made, since it is none, thus sublates itself again. It thereby presents itself as a difference *of the matter itself*, or as absolute difference; and this difference of the *matter* is thus nothing other than the like that has repelled itself from itself, and hence posits only an opposition that is none.

157 Through this principle, the first supersensible world, the tranquil realm of laws, the immediate image of the perceived world, is inverted into its opposite. Law was in general what *remained equal to itself*, as did its differences; but now it is posited that both are rather their own opposite: the *self-equal* rather repels itself from itself, and the self-unequal rather posits itself as self-equal. In fact only with this determination is difference *inner*, or difference *in itself*, since the

equal is unequal to itself and the unequal equal to itself. This *second supersensible world* is in this way the *inverted* world, and indeed, since one side is already present in the first supersensible world, the *inversion* of this *first*. The inner is thereby completed as appearance. For the first supersensible world was only the *immediate* [1807 89] elevation of the perceived world into the universal element; it had its necessary counterpart in the perceived world, which still retained *for itself the principle of change* and *alteration*. The first realm of laws lacked that principle, but receives it as inverted world.

158 According to the law of this inverted world, then, the *like* of the first is what is *unequal* to itself, and the *unequal* of the first is likewise *unequal to itself*, or becomes *equal* to itself. In determinate moments this will appear as follows: what is sweet in the law of the first is sour in this inverted in-itself; what is black there is white here. What in the law of the first is north pole in the magnet is, in its other supersensible in-itself—namely in the earth—south pole; but what is south pole there is north pole here. Likewise, what in the first law of electricity is the oxygen pole becomes in its other supersensible essence the hydrogen pole; and conversely, what is the hydrogen pole there becomes the oxygen pole here. In another sphere, according to *immediate law*, revenge upon the enemy is the highest satisfaction of injured individuality. But *this law*—to show myself as essence against someone who does not treat me as a self-being, and rather to sublate that person as essence—is *inverted* through the principle of the other world *into its opposite*: the restoration of myself as essence through the sublation of the alien essence [1807 90] turns into self-destruction. Now if this inversion, presented in the *punishment* of crime, is made into *law*, it too is again only the law of one world, which has an *inverted* supersensible world *standing opposite* it, in which what is despised in the former comes to honor, and what is honored there comes into contempt. Punishment that, according to the *law of the first* world, dishonors and destroys the human being is transformed in its *inverted world* into the pardon that preserves that person's essence and brings honor.

159 Viewed superficially, this inverted world is the opposite of the first in such a way that it has the first outside it and repels that first world from itself as an inverted *actuality*: *one* is *appearance*, the *other* the *in-itself*; *one* is the world as it is *for another*, the *other*, by contrast, as it is *for itself*. Thus, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet would be *properly*, or *inwardly* in the thing, sour; or what is north pole in the actual magnet of appearance would be south pole *in its inner or essential being*; what presents itself as oxygen pole in appearing electricity would be hydrogen pole in nonappearing electricity. Or an action that is a crime *in appearance* could supposedly be properly good *inwardly*—a bad action could have a good intention; punishment would be punishment only *in appearance*, but *in itself*, or in [1807 91] another world, a benefit to the criminal. Yet such oppositions of inner and outer, appearance and supersensible, as two kinds of actualities, are no longer present here. The repelled differences are not distributed anew between two such substances that would bear them and lend them a separate subsistence, through which understanding would fall back out of the inner into its former position. One side or substance would again be the world of perception, in which one of the two laws pursued its essence; and opposite it would be an inner world, *just such a sensuous world* as the first, but in *representation*. It could not be pointed out as a sensuous world, not seen, heard, or tasted, and yet it would be represented as such a sensuous world. But in fact, if *one of the elements posited* is something perceived, and its *in-itself*, as its inversion, is likewise something *sensuously represented*, then the sour that would be the in-itself of the sweet thing is just as actual a thing as the sweet, a *sour thing*; the black that would be the in-itself of the white is actual black; the north pole that is the in-itself of the south pole is the north pole *present in the same magnet*; the oxygen pole that is the in-itself of the hydrogen pole is the *present* oxygen pole of the same pile. But the *actual* crime has *its inversion* and *its in-itself* as *possibility* in *intention* as [1807 92] such, though not in a good intention; for the truth of intention is only the deed itself. As regards its content, however, crime has its reflection into itself, or its inversion, in *actual* punishment; this is the reconciliation of law with the actuality opposed to it in crime. Finally, *actual* punishment has its *inverted* actuality

within it in such a way that it is a realization of law through which the activity law has as punishment *sublates itself*: from active, law becomes again *tranquil* and valid law, and the movement of individuality against law, and of law against individuality, has died away.

160 Thus from the representation of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensible world, the sensuous representation of fixing differences in a diverse element of subsistence must be removed; and this absolute concept of difference must be purely presented and apprehended as inner difference, the repulsion of like as like from itself and the equality of the unequal as unequal. Pure change, or *opposition within itself, contradiction, must be thought*. For in difference that is inner, the opposed is not merely *one of two*—otherwise it would be something *that is*, not something opposed—but is the opposite of an [1807 93] opposite, or the other is itself immediately present within it. I do indeed place the opposite *here*, and *there* the other of which it is the opposite; thus the *opposite* on one side, in and for itself without the other. Yet precisely because I have here *the opposite in and for itself*, it is the opposite of itself, or in fact has the other immediately within itself. Thus the supersensible world that is the inverted world has at the same time reached over the other world and has it within itself; it is for itself the inverted world, that is, the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as *inner*, or difference *in itself*, or is it as *infinity*.

161 Through infinity we see law completed into necessity within itself, and all moments of appearance taken up into the inner. To say that the simple element of law is infinity means, according to what has emerged: *α*) it is something *self-equal* that is nevertheless *difference* in itself; or it is like that repels itself from itself, or divides itself in two. What was called *simple* force *duplicates itself* and through its infinity is law. *β*) What is divided, constituting the parts represented in *law*, presents itself as subsisting; and considered without the concept of inner difference, space and [1807 94] time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity, are indifferent and without necessity both for one another and for gravity itself, just as this simple gravity is indifferent to

them, or simple electricity to positive and negative. γ) Through the concept of inner difference, however, this unequal and indifferent element—space and time, and so forth—is a *difference* that is no *difference*, or only a difference of the *like*, and its essence is unity. As positive and negative they are animated toward one another, and their being is rather this: to posit themselves as nonbeing and sublate themselves in unity. Both differentiated elements subsist; they are *in themselves*; they are *in themselves as opposites*, that is, the opposite of themselves; they have their other within them and are only one unity.

162 This simple infinity, or absolute concept, is the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, to be called the universal blood which, omnipresent, is neither clouded nor interrupted by any difference, but is itself rather all differences and their being-sublated. It thus pulses within itself without moving, trembles within itself without unrest. It is *self-equal*, for the differences are tautological: differences that are none. This self-equal essence therefore relates only to itself; *to itself*: then this is another to which the relation goes, and *relating [1807 95] to itself* is rather *division in two*, or precisely that self-equality is inner difference. These *divided elements* are thus *in and for themselves*, each an opposite—*of another*: then the *other* is already expressed together with it; or it is not the opposite *of another* but only *the pure opposite*: then it is thus in itself its own opposite. Or it is not an opposite at all but purely for itself, a pure self-equal essence with no difference within it: then we need not ask, still less regard the torment of such a question as philosophy, or even consider it unanswerable for philosophy, *how* difference or otherness comes from this pure essence, *out of it*. For division has already occurred: difference has been excluded from the self-equal and set beside it; what was to be *the self-equal* is thus already one of the divided elements rather than absolute essence. That *the self-equal divides itself* therefore equally means that it sublates itself as already divided, sublates itself as otherness. The *unity* of which it is commonly said that difference cannot emerge from it is in fact itself only one moment of division; it is the abstraction of simplicity opposed to difference. But since it is [1807 96] abstraction, only one of the opposites, it is already said that it is division; for if unity is something

negative, something *opposed*, it is posited precisely as what has opposition within it. The differences between *dividing in two* and *becoming-self-equal* are therefore equally only *this movement of self-sublation*; for since the self-equal, which is first supposed to divide itself or become its opposite, is an abstraction, or *itself already* something divided, its dividing is thereby a sublation of what it is, and hence the sublation of its being-divided. *Becoming-self-equal* is equally a dividing; what becomes *equal to itself* thereby takes its stand opposite division —that is, it thereby places itself *on one side*, or rather *becomes something divided*.

163 Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which what is determined in any way—for example, as being—is rather the opposite of this determinateness, has indeed already been the soul of everything so far; but only in the *inner* has it itself first emerged freely. Appearance, or the play of forces, already presents infinity itself, but as *explanation* it first emerges freely; and when, finally, it is an object for consciousness *as what it is*, consciousness is *self-consciousness*. Understanding's *explanation* initially constitutes only the description of what [1807 97] self-consciousness is. Understanding sublates the differences present in law, already purified but still indifferent, and posits them in one unity, force. But this becoming-equal is equally immediately a dividing, for understanding sublates the differences and thereby posits the one of force only by making a new difference, that of law and force, which, however, is at the same time no difference. And toward this, that the difference is equally no difference, understanding itself advances by again sublating this difference, letting force be constituted just as law is. Yet this movement or necessity is thus still the necessity and movement of understanding; or, *as such*, it is *not understanding's object*. Rather, in it understanding has as objects positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, attractive force, and a thousand other things constituting the content of the moments of the movement. Precisely for this reason there is so much self-satisfaction in explanation: in it consciousness, to put it this way, is in immediate conversation with itself and enjoys only itself; though it seems to be pursuing something else, in fact it is only occupied with itself.

164 In the opposed law as the inversion of the first law, or in inner difference, infinity itself does indeed become the *object* of understanding; but understanding again misses it as [1807 98] such by distributing difference in itself, the self-repulsion of like and the unlikes that attract one another, between two worlds again, or two substantial elements. The *movement* as it is in experience is here for understanding a happening, and the like and the unlike are *predicates* whose essence is an existent substrate. What is an object for understanding in sensuous covering is for us an object in its essential shape, as pure concept. This apprehension of difference as it is *in truth*, or apprehension of *infinity* as such, is *for us*, or *in itself*. The exposition of its concept belongs to science; but consciousness, as it has this concept *immediately*, appears again as a form of its own, or a new shape of consciousness, which does not recognize its essence in what preceded, but regards that essence as something entirely different. Since this concept of infinity is its object, consciousness is thus consciousness of difference as something *immediately* just as much sublated; it is *for itself*, it is *differentiation of the undifferentiated*, or *self-consciousness*. I *distinguish myself from myself*, and *in this it is immediately for me that what is distinguished is not distinguished*. I, the like, repel myself from myself; but this differentiated element, posited as unequal, is immediately, in being differentiated, no difference for me. Consciousness of another, of an object [1807 99] in general, is indeed itself necessarily *self-consciousness*, being-reflected into itself, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The *necessary progression* from the previous shapes of consciousness, for which their true was a thing, something other than themselves, expresses precisely this: not only is consciousness of the thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes. Yet this truth is present only for us, not yet for consciousness. Self-consciousness, however, has only become *for itself*, not yet *as unity* with consciousness in general.

165 We see that, in the inner of appearance, understanding in truth experiences nothing other than appearance itself, though not as it is as the play of forces, but that same play in its absolutely universal moments and their movement; in

fact it experiences only *itself*. Raised above perception, consciousness presents itself as joined with the supersensible through the middle of appearance, through which it looks into this background. The two extremes, one of the pure inner, the other of the inner looking into this pure inner, have now coincided; and just as they have vanished as extremes, so too the middle has vanished as something other than them. This curtain has thus been drawn away from before the inner, and the looking of the inner into the inner is present: the looking of the *undifferentiated* like, [1807 100] which repels itself, posits itself as a *differentiated* inner, but *for which* the *nondifferentiation* of both is equally immediate—*self-consciousness*. It becomes apparent that behind the so-called curtain supposedly concealing the inner there is nothing to see unless *we* ourselves go behind it, just as much in order that there may be seeing as that there may be something behind it that can be seen. Yet it emerges at the same time that we cannot simply go straight behind it without further ado; for this knowing, which is the truth of *the representation* of appearance and its inner, is itself only the result of an elaborate movement through which the modes of consciousness—meaning, perception, and understanding—vanish. And it will equally emerge that cognition of *what consciousness knows in knowing itself* requires further elaboration, the unfolding of which follows.

IV. Self-consciousness



[1807 101]

IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty.

166 In the modes of certainty considered so far, the true is for consciousness something other than consciousness itself. But the concept of this true vanishes in the experience of it: as the object immediately was *in itself*—the existent of sense-certainty, the concrete thing of perception, the force of understanding—it proves rather not to be in truth. Instead, this *in-itself* emerges as a manner in which the object is only for another; its concept sublates itself in the actual object, or the first immediate representation sublates itself in experience, and certainty was lost in truth. But now there has arisen what did not come about in those earlier relations: a certainty equal to its truth, for certainty is itself its object, and consciousness is itself the true. There is admittedly an otherness in this too: consciousness differentiates, but differentiates something that for it [1807 102] is at the same time not differentiated. If we call the movement of knowing *concept*, and knowing as tranquil unity, or as I, the *object*, we see that not only for us but for knowing itself the object corresponds to the concept. Or, in the other manner, if we call what the object is *in itself* the *concept*, but what it is as *object*, or *for another*, the object, it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-another are the same; for the *in-itself* is consciousness, but consciousness is equally that *for which* another—the *in-itself*—is. And it is for conscious-

ness that the in-itself of the object and its being for another are the same. I is the content of the relation and the relating itself; it is itself against another and at the same time reaches over this other, which for it is likewise only itself.

167 With self-consciousness, then, we have now entered the native realm of truth. We must see how the shape of self-consciousness first appears. If we consider this new shape of knowing, knowing of itself, in relation to what preceded, knowing of another, the latter has indeed vanished; but its moments have at the same time equally been preserved, and the loss consists in their being present here as they are in themselves. The *being* of meaning, the *singularity* and the [1807 103] *universality* opposed to it in perception, and the *empty inner* of understanding are no longer essences but moments of self-consciousness—that is, abstractions or differences that *for consciousness* itself are at the same time null, or no differences, and purely vanishing essences. Thus only the principal moment itself seems to have been lost, namely *simple independent subsistence* for consciousness. But in fact self-consciousness is reflection out of the being of the sensuous and perceived world, and essentially return from *otherness*. As self-consciousness it is movement; but since it distinguishes from itself *only itself as* itself, difference is for it *immediately sublated* as otherness. Difference *is* not, and *self-consciousness* is only the motionless tautology "I am I"; insofar as difference does not also have for it the shape of *being*, it is not self-consciousness. Thus otherness is for it *as a being*, or as a *differentiated moment*; but its own unity with this difference is also for it, as a *second differentiated* moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness is preserved as *consciousness*, and for it the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved; but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself. The world is thereby for self-consciousness a subsistence that is, however, only *appearance*, or [1807 104] difference that *in itself* has no being. But this opposition of its appearance and its truth has only truth, namely the unity of self-consciousness with itself, for its essence; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness—that is, self-consciousness is *desire* in general. As self-consciousness, consciousness now has a twofold object: one, the immediate object, the

object of sense-certainty and perception, which, however, *for it* is marked with the *character of the negative*; and the second, namely *itself*, which is the true *essence* and initially is present only in opposition to the first. In this, self-consciousness presents itself as the movement in which this opposition is sublated and the equality of itself with itself comes to be for it.

168 Yet the object that is the negative for self-consciousness has, for its part, *for us*, or *in itself*, returned into itself just as consciousness has on the other side. Through this reflection into itself it has become *life*. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself *as being* also has within it, insofar as it is posited as being, not merely the mode of sense-certainty and perception, but is being reflected into itself; and the object of immediate desire is *something living*. For the *in-itself*, or the *universal* result of understanding's relation to the [1807 105] inner of things, is differentiation of what is not to be differentiated, or the unity of what is differentiated. But this unity is just as much, as we have seen, its repulsion of itself from itself, and this concept *divides* into the opposition of self-consciousness and life: the former the unity *for which* the infinite unity of differences is; the latter, however, *is* only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time *for itself*. Thus the object is *in itself* just as independent as consciousness. Self-consciousness, which is utterly *for itself* and immediately marks its object with the character of the negative, or is initially *desire*, will therefore rather experience the object's independence.

169 The determination of life as it emerges from the concept, or the universal result with which we enter this sphere, suffices to characterize it without further developing its nature from this determination; its circle closes in the following moments. *Essence* is infinity as the *being-sublated* of all differences, pure movement turning on its axis, the repose of itself as absolutely restless infinity; *independence* itself, in which the differences of movement are dissolved; the simple essence of time, which in this self-equality has the solid shape of space. Yet the [1807 106] *differences* are just as much present in this *simple universal* medium *as differences*; for this universal fluidity has its negative nature only insofar as it is a *sublation of them*. But it cannot sublate the differentiated elements unless

they have a subsistence. Precisely this fluidity, as self-equal independence, is itself their *subsistence*, or *substance*, in which they thus are as differentiated members and parts *being-for-themselves*. *Being* no longer has the meaning of the *abstraction of being*, nor does their pure essentiality have the meaning of the *abstraction of universality*; rather, their being is precisely that simple fluid substance of pure movement within itself. But the *difference* of these members *from one another*, *as* difference, consists in no other *determinateness* at all than the determinateness of the moments of infinity, or of pure movement itself.

170 The independent members are *for themselves*; but this *being-for-themselves* is rather just as *immediately* their reflection into unity as this unity is division into independent shapes. Unity is divided because it is absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because *it* is *subsistence*, difference too has independence only *in it*. This independence of shape appears as something *determinate, for another*, for it is something divided; and the *sublation* of division takes place to that extent through another. [1807 107] But it is equally within the shape itself; for precisely that fluidity is the substance of the independent shapes, and this substance is infinite. Shape is therefore, in its very subsistence, division, or the sublation of its being-for-itself.

171 If we distinguish more closely the moments contained here, we see that as the *first* moment we have the *subsistence of independent* shapes, or the suppression of what differentiation is in itself: namely, not to be in itself and to have no subsistence. The *second* moment, however, is the *subjection* of that subsistence to the infinity of difference. In the first moment there is the subsisting shape; as substance *being-for-itself*, or infinite in its determinateness, it stands against *universal* substance, denies this fluidity and continuity with universal substance, and asserts itself as not dissolved in this universal, but rather as maintaining itself through separation from this inorganic nature of its own and through consuming it. Life in the universal fluid medium, a *tranquil* laying-out of shapes, thereby becomes the movement of these shapes, or life as *process*. Simple universal fluidity is the *in-itself*, and the difference of shapes the *other*. But through this difference, fluidity itself becomes *the other*; for it is now *for*

difference, which is in and for itself and hence [1807 108] is the infinite movement by which that tranquil medium is consumed: life as *living*. Yet this *inversion* is therefore in turn an *inversion within itself*: what is consumed is essence; individuality, maintaining itself at the expense of the universal and giving itself the feeling of its unity with itself, precisely thereby sublates *its opposition to the other, through which it is for itself*. The *unity* with itself that it gives itself is precisely the *fluidity* of differences, or *universal dissolution*. Conversely, however, the sublation of individual subsistence is equally its production. For since the *essence* of the individual shape is universal life, and what is for itself is in itself simple substance, in positing *the other* within itself it sublates this *simplicity* of its own, or its essence; that is, it divides simplicity, and this division of undifferentiated fluidity is precisely the positing of individuality. Thus the simple substance of life is its division into shapes, and at the same time the dissolution of these subsisting differences; and the dissolution of division is just as much division, or articulation into members. The two sides of the entire movement that were distinguished thereby coincide: namely, configuration tranquilly laid out in the universal medium of independence, and the process of life. The latter is just as much configuration as it is sublation of shape [1807 109]; and the first, configuration, is just as much sublation as it is articulation. The fluid element is itself only the *abstraction* of essence, or is *actual* only as shape; and its articulating itself is again a dividing of what is articulated, or a dissolving of it. This entire cycle constitutes life: neither what is first expressed, the immediate continuity and solidity of its essence, nor subsisting shape and the discrete that is for itself, nor their pure process, nor again the simple gathering together of these moments, but the whole that develops itself, dissolves its development, and in this movement maintains itself as simple.

172 Since the movement departs from the first immediate unity, passes through the moments of configuration and process to the unity of these two moments, and thereby returns again to the first simple substance, this *reflected unity* is other than the first. In contrast to that *immediate* unity, or unity expressed as a *being*, this second unity is the *universal*, which has all these moments within it as sub-

lated. It is the *simple genus*, which does not *exist for itself as* this *simple element* in the movement of life itself; rather, in this *result*, life points to something other than what it is, namely to consciousness, for which it is as this unity, or as genus.
[1807 110]

173 But this other life, for which *genus* is as such and which is genus for itself—self-consciousness—is initially for itself only as this simple essence, and has itself as *pure I* for its object. In its experience, which must now be considered, this abstract object will become enriched for it and acquire the unfolding we have seen in life.

174 The simple I is this genus, or the simple universal for which differences are none, only insofar as it is the *negative essence* of the shaped, independent moments; and self-consciousness is thereby certain of itself only through sublating this other, which presents itself to it as independent life. It is *desire*. Certain of the nullity of this other, it posits that nullity *for itself* as its truth, annihilates the independent object, and thereby gives itself self-certainty as *true* certainty, as a certainty that has come to be for self-consciousness itself in an *objective manner*.

175 Yet in this satisfaction it experiences the independence of its object. Desire and the self-certainty attained in its satisfaction are conditioned by the object, for this certainty is through sublation of this other; for this sublation to be, this other must be. Thus through its negative relation self-consciousness cannot sublate the object; rather, it therefore produces the object again, as well as desire. In [1807 111] fact, something other than self-consciousness is the essence of desire; and through this experience this truth has come to be for self-consciousness itself. Yet at the same time self-consciousness is equally absolutely for itself, and is so only through sublating the object; and its satisfaction must come to it, for it is the truth. On account of the object's independence, it can therefore attain satisfaction only insofar as the object itself carries out negation within itself; and the object must carry out this negation of itself within

itself, for it is *in itself* the negative, and must be for the other what it is. Since it is negation within itself and is at the same time independent in this, it is consciousness. In life, which is the object of desire, *negation* is either *in another*, namely in desire, or as *determinateness* against another indifferent shape, or as life's *inorganic universal nature*. But this universal independent nature, in which negation is as absolute, is genus as such, or as *self-consciousness. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness*.

176 Only in these three moments is the concept of self-consciousness complete: a) pure undifferentiated I is its first immediate object. b) But this immediacy is itself absolute mediation; it is only as sublation of the independent object, or it is desire. The [1807 112] satisfaction of desire is indeed self-consciousness's reflection into itself, or certainty become truth. c) But the truth of this certainty is rather twofold reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. There is an object for consciousness that in itself posits its otherness, or difference, as null, and is independent in this. The differentiated, merely *living* shape does indeed itself also sublate its independence in the process of life, but with its difference it ceases to be what it is; the object of self-consciousness, however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself. It is thereby genus for itself, universal fluidity in the distinctive character of its separation; it is living self-consciousness.

177 There is a *self-consciousness for a self-consciousness*. Only through this is it in fact; for only in this does the unity of itself in its otherness come to be for it. *I*, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not an *object*; the object of desire, however, is only *independent*, for it is the universal, indestructible substance, the fluid self-equal essence. When a self-consciousness is the object, it is I just as much as object. With this, the concept *of spirit* is already present for us. What further comes to be for consciousness is the experience of what [1807 113] spirit is: this absolute substance which, in the complete freedom and independence of its opposition—namely, of different self-consciousnesses that are for themselves—is their unity; *I* that is *we*, and *we* that is *I*. Only in self-consciousness, as the concept of spirit, does consciousness have its turning point, at

which it steps out of the colorful semblance of the sensuous here-and-now and out of the empty night of the supersensible beyond into the spiritual daylight of the present.

[1807 114]

A. Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness; Lordship and Bondage.

178 Self-consciousness is *in and for itself* insofar as, and through the fact that, it is in and for itself for another; that is, it is only as something recognized. The concept of this unity of self-consciousness in its duplication, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is a many-sided and many-meaninged interweaving. Its moments must therefore partly be kept precisely apart, partly at the same time, in this differentiation, also be taken and cognized as not differentiated, or always in their opposed meaning. The double meaning of what is differentiated lies in the essence of self-consciousness: to be infinite, or immediately the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited. The unfolding of the concept of this spiritual unity in its duplication presents to us the movement of *recognition*.

179 For self-consciousness there is another self-consciousness; it has come *outside itself*. [1807 115] This has a twofold meaning: *first*, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* essence; *second*, it has thereby sublated the other, for it also does not see the other as essence, but *itself* in the other.

180 It must sublate this *otherness of its own*; this is the sublation of the first double meaning, and therefore itself a second double meaning. *First*, it must set out to sublate *the other* independent essence in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as essence; *second*, it thereby sets out to sublate *itself*, for this other is itself.

181 This double-meaninged sublation of its double-meaninged otherness is equally a double-meaninged return *into itself*; for *first*, through sublation it receives itself back, since through sublating *its* otherness it becomes equal to itself again.

Second, however, it equally gives the other self-consciousness back to that self-consciousness; for it was itself in the other, and it sublates this being of *its own* in the other, thus releases the other again into freedom.

182 Yet this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has been presented in this way as *the doing of one*; but this doing of one itself has the twofold meaning of being equally *its own doing* and *the doing of the other*. For the other is equally independent, enclosed within itself, and there is nothing in it that is not through itself. The first [1807 116] does not have the object before it as the object initially is only for desire, but as an independent object that is for itself; hence it can accomplish nothing for itself with regard to this object unless the object does in itself what the first self-consciousness does to it. The movement is therefore simply the twofold movement of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees *the other* do the same as *it* does; each itself does what it demands of the other, and therefore does what it does *only* insofar as the other does the same. One-sided doing would be useless, because what is to happen can come about only through both.

183 Doing is thus double-meaninged not only insofar as it is a doing equally *against itself* and *against the other*, but also insofar as it is inseparably equally *the doing of one* and *of the other*.

184 In this movement we see the process that presented itself as the play of forces repeat itself, but in consciousness. What in that process was for us is here for the extremes themselves. The middle is self-consciousness, which divides into the extremes, and each extreme is this interchange of its determinateness and absolute transition into the opposite. As consciousness it does indeed come *outside itself*, yet in its being-outside-itself it is at the same time retained within itself, *for itself*, and its outside-itself is *for it*. It is for it that it immediately *is*, and [1807 117] *is not*, another consciousness; and equally that this other is for itself only insofar as it sublates itself as being-for-itself, and is for itself only in the other's being-for-itself. Each is for the other the middle through which each mediates and unites itself with itself, and each is for itself and the other an

immediate essence that is for itself, yet at the same time is for itself in this way only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing one another*.

185 This pure concept of recognition, of the duplication of self-consciousness in its unity, must now be considered as its process appears for self-consciousness. It will first present the side of the *inequality* of the two, or the emergence of the middle into the extremes, which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.

186 Self-consciousness is initially simple being-for-itself, self-equal through excluding everything *other from itself*; its essence and absolute object is for it *I*. And in this *immediacy*, or in this *being* of its being-for-itself, it is *singular*. Whatever else is for it is an inessential object marked with the character of the negative. But the other is also a self-consciousness; an individual appears opposite an individual. Appearing thus *immediately*, they are for one another in the manner of ordinary objects: *independent* shapes, consciousnesses immersed in the *being* [1807 118] of *life*—for the existent object has here determined itself as life—which have not yet accomplished *for one another* the movement of absolute abstraction, of eradicating all immediate being and being only the purely negative being of self-equal consciousness; or they have not yet presented themselves to one another as pure *being-for-itself*, that is, as *self*-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of itself, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth; for its truth would be only that its own being-for-itself had presented itself to it as an independent object, or, what is the same, that the object had presented itself as this pure self-certainty. According to the concept of recognition, however, this is possible only when, as the other does for it, so it does for the other: each in itself, through its own doing and again through the other's doing, accomplishes this pure abstraction of being-for-itself.

187 But its *presentation* of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is bound to no determinate *existence*, not to the universal singularity of exis-

tence in general, not to life. This presentation is *twofold* doing: the doing of the other and doing through oneself. Insofar as it is *the other's* doing, each thus seeks [1807 119] the other's death. Yet in this the second aspect, *doing through oneself*, is also present; for the former involves staking one's own life. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is therefore determined in such a way that they *prove* themselves and one another through the struggle for life and death. They must enter this struggle, for they must raise their self-certainty of *being for themselves* to truth, in the other and in themselves. And it is only through staking life that freedom is proved, that it is proved that for self-consciousness neither *being*, nor the *immediate* manner in which it appears, nor its immersion in the expanse of life is essence; rather, nothing is present within it that is not for it a vanishing moment, and it is only pure *being-for-itself*. The individual who has not risked life can indeed be recognized as a *person*, but has not attained the truth of this being-recognized as an independent self-consciousness. Equally, each must seek the other's death as it stakes its own life; for the other counts for it as no more than itself. Its essence presents itself to it as an other; it is outside itself; it must sublate its being-outside-itself. The other is a variously entangled and existent consciousness; self-consciousness must intuit its otherness as pure being-for-itself, or as absolute negation.
[1807 120]

188 Yet this proving through death sublates both the truth that was to emerge from it and, with it, self-certainty in general. For just as life is the *natural* position of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is its *natural* negation, negation without independence, which thus remains without the required significance of recognition. Through death, certainty has indeed come to be that both risked their lives and held life in contempt, in themselves and in the other; but not for those who underwent this struggle. They sublate their consciousness posited in this alien essentiality, which is natural existence, or they sublate themselves and are sublated as *extremes* wishing to be for themselves. But the essential moment thereby vanishes from the play of interchange: that of dividing into extremes of opposed determinatenesses. And the middle

collapses into a dead unity divided into dead, merely existent, unopposed extremes; the two do not mutually give themselves to, and receive themselves back from, one another through consciousness, but merely leave one another free, indifferently, as things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which *sublates* in such a way that it *preserves* and *maintains* what is sublated, and thereby survives its being-sublated.
[1807 121]

189 In this experience, self-consciousness comes to see that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness, the simple I is the absolute object, which, however, for us, or in itself, is absolute mediation and has subsisting independence as an essential moment. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; through it a pure self-consciousness is posited, and a consciousness that is not purely for itself but for another—that is, as *existent* consciousness, or consciousness in the shape of *thinghood*. Both moments are essential; since they are initially unequal and opposed, and their reflection into unity has not yet emerged, they are as two opposed shapes of consciousness: one the independent consciousness for which being-for-itself is essence; the other the dependent consciousness for which life, or being-for-another, is essence. The former is the *lord*, the latter the *bondsman*.

190 The lord is consciousness *being-for-itself*, but no longer merely its concept; rather, consciousness being-for-itself that is mediated with itself through *another* consciousness, namely one to whose essence it belongs to be synthesized with independent *being*, or thinghood in general. The lord relates to these two moments: to a *thing* as such, [1807 122] the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is essential. And since the lord is a) as the concept of self-consciousness, immediate relation of *being-for-itself*, but b) now at the same time as mediation, or as a being-for-itself that is for itself only through another, the lord relates a) immediately to both, and b) mediately to each through the other. The lord relates *to the bondsman mediately through independent being*; for precisely to this the bondsman is held. It is the chain

from which the bondsman could not abstract in the struggle, and hence proved dependent, possessing independence in thinghood. But the lord is the power over this being, for in the struggle the lord proved that it counts only as something negative; and since the lord is the power over it, while this being is the power over the other, the lord has this other under domination in this syllogism. Likewise, the lord relates *mediately through the bondsman to the thing*; the bondsman, as self-consciousness in general, also relates negatively to the thing and sublates it. But the thing is at the same time independent for the bondsman, who therefore cannot, through negation, finish with it to the point of annihilation, but merely *works upon* it. For the lord, by contrast, through this mediation there *comes to be* the *immediate* relation as pure negation of the thing, or *enjoyment*. What desire failed to do, the lord succeeds in doing: finishing with the thing and satisfying himself in [1807 123] enjoyment. Desire failed in this because of the thing's independence; but the lord, having inserted the bondsman between the thing and himself, thereby joins himself only with the thing's dependence and enjoys it purely, leaving the side of independence to the bondsman, who works upon it.

191 In these two moments the lord's being-recognized through another consciousness comes to be for the lord; for this consciousness posits itself in them as inessential, once in working upon the thing, the other time in dependence upon a determinate existence. In both, it cannot become master over being and attain absolute negation. Thus the moment of recognition is present here in which the other consciousness sublates itself as being-for-itself, and thereby itself does what the first does against it. Equally, the other moment is present, that this doing of the second is the first's own doing; for what the bondsman does is properly the lord's doing. For the lord only being-for-itself is essence; the lord is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and thus the pure essential doing in this relation; the bondsman, however, is a doing that is not pure but inessential. Yet for recognition proper, the moment is lacking in

which the lord also does against himself what he does against the other, and the bondsman also does against the other what he does against himself. There has [1807 124] thereby arisen a one-sided and unequal recognition.

192 In this relation, inessential consciousness is for the lord the object constituting the *truth* of the lord's self-certainty. But it is clear that this object does not correspond to its concept; rather, in that in which the lord has fulfilled himself, something entirely different from an independent consciousness has come to be for him. What is for him is not such a consciousness, but rather a dependent one; the lord is thus not certain of *being-for-itself* as truth, but his truth is rather inessential consciousness and its inessential doing.

193 Accordingly, the *truth* of independent consciousness is *bondsman consciousness*. This admittedly appears initially *outside* itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. Yet just as lordship showed that its essence is the inversion of what it wishes to be, so bondage too will, rather, in its fulfillment become the opposite of what it immediately is. As consciousness *driven back* into itself, it will enter into itself and turn into true independence.

194 We have seen only what bondage is in the relation of lordship. But it is self-consciousness, and what it accordingly is in and for itself must now be considered. Initially, for [1807 125] bondage, the lord is essence; thus *independent consciousness being-for-itself* is for it *the truth*, which, however, is not yet *for it within itself*. Yet it has this truth of pure negativity and *being-for-itself in fact within itself*, for it has *experienced* this essence within itself. For this consciousness has felt anxiety not for this or that, nor for this or that moment, but for its entire essence; for it has felt the fear of death, the absolute lord. In this fear it has been inwardly dissolved, has trembled throughout within itself, and everything fixed in it has quaked. But this pure universal movement, the absolute fluidification of all subsistence, is the simple essence of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, *pure being-for-itself*, which is thereby *in* this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-itself is also *for it*, for in the lord it is its *object*.

Furthermore, this consciousness is not merely this universal dissolution *in general*, but in serving it *actually* carries the dissolution out: in all *singular* moments it sublates its attachment to natural existence and works it away.

195 Yet the feeling of absolute power in general, and in the particulars of service, is only dissolution *in itself*; and although fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom, in this fear consciousness is not, *for itself*, *being-for-itself*. Through work, however, it comes to itself. In the moment [1807 126] corresponding to desire in the lord's consciousness, the side of the inessential relation to the thing seemed indeed to have fallen to the serving consciousness, since in that relation the thing retains its independence. Desire has reserved for itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unmixed self-feeling. But this satisfaction is therefore itself only a vanishing, for it lacks the *objective* side, or *subsistence*. Work, by contrast, is *inhibited* desire, *delayed* vanishing; or it *forms*. The negative relation to the object becomes the object's *form*, and something *enduring*, precisely because the object has independence for the worker. This *negative* middle, or formative *doing*, is at the same time the *singularity*, or pure being-for-itself, of consciousness, which now in work steps outside itself into the element of endurance. Through this, working consciousness thus comes to intuit independent being *as itself*.

196 Forming, however, has not only this positive meaning, that in it serving consciousness becomes for itself, as pure *being-for-itself*, something *existent*; it also has a negative meaning against its first moment, fear. For in forming the thing, its own negativity, its being-for-itself, becomes its object only through its sublating the opposed, existent *form*. Yet this objective *negative* is precisely the alien essence before which it [1807 127] trembled. But now it destroys this alien negative, posits *itself* as such a negative in the element of endurance, and thereby becomes *for itself* something *being-for-itself*. In the lord, being-for-itself is for it *an other*, or only *for it*; in fear, being-for-itself is *within it*; in forming, being-for-itself becomes for it *its own*, and it becomes conscious that it itself is in and for itself. Through being *set outside*, form does not become something other than itself for consciousness; for precisely that form is its pure being-for-

itself, which therein becomes truth for it. Through this rediscovery of itself through itself, it thus becomes *a mind of its own*, precisely in work, in which it seemed only to be *another's mind*. For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service in general, as well as forming, are necessary, and both at the same time in a universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal level and does not spread over the conscious actuality of existence. Without forming, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become for itself. If consciousness forms without the first absolute fear, it is only a vain mind of its own; for its form, or negativity, is not negativity *in itself*, and its forming therefore cannot give it consciousness of itself as essence. If it has not endured absolute fear, but only some anxiety, negative essence has remained for it something [1807 128] external; its substance has not been infected by it through and through. Since not all the fulfillments of its natural consciousness have been shaken, it still belongs *in itself* to determinate being; its own mind is *obstinacy*, a freedom that still remains within bondage. Just as little as pure form can become its essence, so little is that form, considered as spreading over the singular, universal forming, absolute concept; rather, it is a skill that masters only some things, not universal power and the entire objective essence.

[1807 129]

B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness; Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness.

197 For independent self-consciousness, on the one hand, only the pure abstraction *of the I* is its essence; and on the other, as this abstraction develops and gives itself differences, this differentiating does not become for it objective essence *being-in-itself*. This self-consciousness thus does not become an I that truly differentiates itself in its simplicity, or remains equal to itself in this absolute differentiation. Consciousness driven back into itself, by contrast, becomes its own object in forming, as the form of the things formed; and in the lord it intuits its being-for-itself at the same time as consciousness. But for serving consciousness as such, these two moments—*itself* as independent object, and this object

as a consciousness, and thus its own essence—fall apart. Yet since *for us*, or *in itself*, *form* and *being-for-itself* are the same, and in the [1807 130] concept of independent consciousness *being-in-itself* is consciousness, the side of *being-in-itself*, or *thinghood*, which form acquired in work, is no other substance than consciousness; and a new shape of self-consciousness has come to be for us: a consciousness which, as infinity, or the pure movement of consciousness, is its own essence; which *thinks*, or is free self-consciousness. For to be one's own object not as *abstract I*, but as I that at the same time has the meaning of *being-in-itself*, or to relate to objective essence in such a way that it has the meaning of the *being-for-itself* of the consciousness for which it is—this is *thinking*. For *thinking*, the object moves not in representations or shapes but in *concepts*, that is, in a differentiated being-in-itself which is immediately for consciousness not something differentiated from it. What is *represented, shaped, existent*, as such, has the form of being something other than consciousness; a concept, however, is at the same time something *existent*—and this difference, insofar as it is in the concept itself, is its determinate content. Yet because this content is at the same time comprehended, consciousness remains *immediately* conscious of its unity with this determinate and differentiated existent—not as in representation, where it must first expressly remind itself that this is *its* representation; rather, the concept is immediately *my* [1807 131] concept for me. In thinking *I am free*, because I am not in another, but remain utterly with myself, and the object that is essence for me is, in undivided unity, my being-for-myself; and my movement in concepts is a movement within myself. Yet in determining this shape of self-consciousness, it is essential to hold fast to this: it is *thinking* consciousness *in general*, or its object is the *immediate* unity of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*. Consciousness that is like itself, repelling itself from itself, becomes for itself an *element being-in-itself*; but it is this element for itself only as universal essence in general, not as this objective essence in the development and movement of its manifold being.

198 As is well known, this freedom of self-consciousness, when it appeared as an appearance conscious of itself in the history of spirit, was called *Stoicism*. Its principle is that consciousness is thinking essence, and that something has essentiality for it, or is true and good for it, only insofar as consciousness behaves in it as thinking essence.

199 The manifold, internally differentiated expanse, singularization, and entanglement of life is the object upon which desire and work act. This manifold doing has now contracted into the simple differentiation [1807 132] present in the pure movement of thinking. Essentiality no longer belongs to difference presenting itself as a *determinate thing*, or as *consciousness of a determinate natural existence*, as a feeling, or as *desire* and a *purpose for it*, whether posited by *one's own* or by *an alien consciousness*; rather, essentiality belongs only to difference that is *thought*, or is immediately not differentiated from me. This consciousness thus takes a negative attitude toward the relation of lordship and bondage. Its doing consists in not having its truth, in lordship, in the bondsman, nor, as bondsman, in the lord's will and in its serving; rather, whether on the throne or in chains, in all the dependence of its singular existence, it is to be free and preserve the lifelessness that continually *withdraws* from the movement of existence, from acting as from suffering, *into the simple essentiality of thought*. Obstinacy is freedom that fastens upon a singularity and stands *within* bondage; Stoicism, however, is freedom that always immediately comes out of bondage and returns into the *pure universality* of thought. As a universal form of world spirit, it could appear only in a time of universal fear and bondage, but also of universal cultivation, which had raised forming to the level of thinking. [1807 133]

200 Although the essence for this self-consciousness is neither something other than itself nor the pure abstraction of the I, but I that has otherness within it, though as a difference in thought, so that in its otherness it has immediately returned into itself, this essence of its own is at the same time only an *abstract* essence. The freedom of self-consciousness is *indifferent* to natural existence, and has therefore *equally released this existence into freedom*; and *reflection* is

twofold. Freedom in thought has only *pure thought* for its truth, a truth without the fulfillment of life; and it is therefore also only the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself. For only *thinking* in general is as yet its essence, form as such, which has returned into itself from the independence of things. Yet if individuality were to present itself as living in action, or, as thinking, to grasp the living world as a system of thought, *thought itself* would have to contain a *content*: for the former expansion, a content of what is good, for the latter, of what is true, so that *throughout*, in *what is for consciousness*, there would be no ingredient other than the concept, which is essence. But as the concept here separates itself as *abstraction* from the multiplicity of things, it has *no content within itself*, but *a given content*. Consciousness does indeed eradicate the content as an alien *being* by thinking it; but the [1807 134] concept is *determinate* concept, and this *determinateness* of it is the alien element it has within it. Stoicism was therefore embarrassed when asked, as the expression went, for the *criterion* of truth in general—that is, properly, for a *content of thought itself*. To the question *what* is good and true, it again offered *contentless* thinking itself as its answer: the true and good were supposed to consist in rationality. But this self-equality of thinking is again only pure form, in which nothing determines itself. The general words concerning the true and good, wisdom and virtue, at which Stoicism must stop, are therefore indeed uplifting in general, but because they can in fact attain no expansion of content, they soon begin to produce boredom.

201 This thinking consciousness, as it has determined itself as abstract freedom, is thus only the incomplete negation of otherness. Merely *withdrawn* into itself from existence, it has not accomplished itself within itself as the absolute negation of existence. Content counts for it only as thought, admittedly, but at the same time as *determinate* thought, and determinateness as such counts as well.

202 *Skepticism* is the realization of that of which Stoicism is only the concept, and the actual experience of what freedom of thought [1807 135] is; this freedom is *in itself* the negative and must present itself as such. With the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thought of itself, independent existence, or

enduring determinateness, has in fact fallen out of infinity and stands opposite it; in skepticism, the complete inessentiality and dependence of this other now become present *for consciousness*. Thought becomes the complete thinking that annihilates the being of the *manifoldly determined* world, and the negativity of free self-consciousness becomes for itself, in this manifold configuration of life, real negativity. It is clear that just as Stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of *independent* consciousness that appeared as the relation of lordship and bondage, so skepticism corresponds to its *realization*, as the negative direction toward otherness, desire and work. But whereas desire and work could not carry out negation for self-consciousness, this polemical direction against the manifold independence of things will, by contrast, succeed, because it turns against them as a free self-consciousness already completed within itself; more precisely, because it has *thinking*, or infinity, within itself, and in this the independent elements, according to their difference, are for it only vanishing magnitudes. The differences that in the pure thinking of itself are only the [1807 136] abstraction of differences here become *all* differences, and all differentiated being becomes a difference of self-consciousness.

203 The *doing* of *skepticism* in general and its *manner* have thereby been determined. It exhibits the *dialectical movement* that sense-certainty, perception, and understanding are, as well as the lack of essence in what counts as *determinate* in the relation of ruling and serving, and for abstract thinking itself. That relation also contains within itself a *determinate manner* in which ethical laws, too, are present as commands of lordship; the determinations in abstract thinking, however, are concepts of science, into which contentless thinking expands, attaching the concept, in what is in fact only an external manner, to the being that is independent for it and constitutes its content, and accepting as valid only *determinate* concepts, even if they are also pure abstractions.

204 The *dialectical*, as negative movement as it immediately *is*, initially appears to consciousness as something to which it is delivered over and which is not through consciousness itself. As *skepticism*, by contrast, this movement is a moment of self-consciousness, for which it does not merely *happen* that its true

and real vanish without its knowing how; rather, in the certainty of its freedom, self-consciousness itself lets this other, which presents itself as real, [1807 137] vanish. It lets vanish not only the objective as such, but its own attitude toward it, in which the objective counts and is asserted as objective: thus also its *perceiving*, its *fixing* of what it is in danger of losing, *sophistry*, and its *true determined and established from itself*. Through this self-conscious negation it procures for itself, *for its own self*, *the certainty of its freedom*, produces the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to *truth*. What vanishes is the determinate, or the difference that, in whatever manner and from whatever source, sets itself up as fixed and unalterable. It has nothing enduring within it and *must* vanish before thinking, because what is differentiated is precisely this: not to be *in itself*, but to have its essentiality only in another. Thinking, however, is insight into this nature of the differentiated; it is negative essence as simple.

205 Thus, in the alteration of everything that seeks to establish itself for it, skeptical self-consciousness experiences its own freedom as given and maintained through itself; it is for itself this ataraxia of thinking itself, the unalterable and *true certainty of itself*. This certainty does not emerge from something alien, whose manifold development has collapsed into itself, as a result that has left its becoming behind; rather, consciousness itself is *absolute dialectical unrest*, [1807 138] this mixture of sensuous and thought representations whose differences collapse, and whose *equality* likewise dissolves again—for equality is itself *determinateness* against the *unequal*. Yet precisely in this, instead of being self-equal consciousness, this consciousness is in fact only an utterly contingent confusion, the vertigo of an ever self-producing disorder. *It is this for itself*; for it itself maintains and produces this moving confusion. It therefore also acknowledges this; it acknowledges itself to be an entirely *contingent, singular* consciousness—an *empirical* consciousness, which follows what has no reality for it, obeys what is no essence for it, does and brings into actuality what has no truth for it. Yet just as it counts itself in this way as *singular, contingent*, and in fact animal life, and *lost* self-consciousness, so, conversely, it also again makes itself into the *universal self-equal* consciousness; for it is the negativity of all sin-

gularity and all difference. From this self-equality—or rather within it itself—it falls back again into that contingency and confusion, for precisely this moving negativity deals only with singulars and busies itself with contingencies. This consciousness is thus this unconscious rambling back and forth from one extreme of self-equal self-consciousness to the other of [1807 139] contingent, confused, and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together; *at one time* it recognizes its freedom as elevation above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and *at another* equally acknowledges itself again as a falling-back into *inessentiality* and a wandering about within it. It lets the inessential content vanish in its thinking, but precisely therein it is consciousness of something inessential; it expresses absolute *vanishing*, but the *expressing is*, and this consciousness is the vanishing expressed. It declares the nullity of seeing, hearing, and so forth, and it *itself sees, hears*, and so forth; it declares the nullity of ethical essentialities and itself makes them the powers of its action. Its doing and its words always contradict one another, and it equally has within itself the twofold contradictory consciousness of unalterability and equality, and of complete contingency and inequality with itself. But it keeps this contradiction of itself apart, and behaves toward it as it does in its purely negative movement generally. If *equality* is pointed out to it, it points out *inequality*; and when this inequality that it has just expressed is now held before it, it passes over to pointing out *equality*. Its talk is in fact the quarrel of obstinate [1807 140] boys, one of whom says A when the other says B, and B again when the other says A, and who purchase, through contradiction *with themselves*, the pleasure of remaining in contradiction *with one another*.

206 In skepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as a consciousness that contradicts itself; from this experience a *new shape* emerges, bringing together the two thoughts that skepticism keeps apart. Skepticism's thoughtlessness about itself must disappear, because it is in fact *one* consciousness that contains both these modes. This new shape is therefore a consciousness that is *for itself* the doubled consciousness of itself as self-liberating, unchangeable, and equal to

itself, and of itself as utterly self-confounding and self-inverting—and is the consciousness of this contradiction of its own.—In stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself; in skepticism, this freedom realizes itself and annihilates the other side, that of determinate existence, but instead doubles *itself*, and now finds itself to be twofold. Thus the doubling previously distributed between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, has returned into one; the doubling of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential to the concept of spirit, is now present, but not yet its unity, and *unhappy consciousness* is consciousness [1807 141] of itself as a doubled, merely contradictory essence.

207 This *unhappy consciousness, divided within itself*, must therefore, because this contradiction of its essence is to it *one* consciousness, always have the other consciousness present within either one. Thus, precisely when it believes it has attained victory and the repose of unity, it is immediately driven out of each again. But its true return into itself, or its reconciliation with itself, will exhibit the concept of spirit become living and entered into existence, because it already contains this: as one undivided consciousness, it is doubled. It *is* itself the looking of one self-consciousness into another, and it *is* itself both; the unity of both is also its essence for it, but *for itself* it is not yet this essence itself, not yet the unity of both.

208 Since at first it is only the *immediate unity* of both, while for it the two are not the same but opposed, one of them, namely the simple, unchangeable consciousness, counts for it as *essential*, while the other, the manifold, changeable consciousness, counts as *inessential*. *For it*, the two are essences alien to each other; because it is consciousness of this contradiction, it places itself on the side of changeable consciousness and regards itself as inessential. But as consciousness of unchangeableness, or of simple essence, it must at the same time strive [1807 142] to free itself from the inessential—that is, from itself. For although *for itself* it is only the changeable consciousness, and the unchangeable is something alien to it, *it is itself* simple and therefore unchangeable consciousness, and is thus conscious of this as *its* essence, yet in such a way that,

again, *it itself*, for itself, is not this essence. The position it assigns to the two therefore cannot be their indifference to each other, that is, cannot be its own indifference toward the unchangeable. Rather, it is immediately both itself, and for it *the relation of the two* is a relation of the essential to the inessential, so that the latter must be sublated. But since for it both are equally essential and contradictory, it is only the contradictory movement in which the opposite does not come to rest in its opposite, but reproduces itself there only as an opposite.

209 There is thus a struggle against an enemy over whom victory is instead defeat, in which attaining one thing means instead losing it in its opposite. Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only pain over this existence and activity, for in them it is conscious only of its opposite as the essence, and of its own nullity. It passes beyond this in an ascent to the unchangeable. But this ascent is itself this consciousness; it is therefore immediately [1807 143] consciousness of the opposite, namely of itself as singularity. The unchangeable that enters consciousness is thereby at the same time touched by singularity, and is present only along with it; instead of singularity having been eradicated in consciousness of the unchangeable, it continually emerges there.

210 In this movement, however, consciousness experiences precisely this *emergence of singularity in the unchangeable*, and *of the unchangeable in singularity*. *For it*, singularity *in general* comes to be *in* the unchangeable essence, and at the same time *its own* singularity comes to be there. For the truth of this movement is precisely the *oneness* of this doubled consciousness. *This unity comes to be for it*, but *initially* it is itself a unity *in which the difference* between the two still predominates. Consciousness thus finds three ways in which singularity is linked with the unchangeable. *First*, it itself emerges again for itself as opposed to the unchangeable essence, and is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which remains the element of the whole relationship. *Second*, however, the *unchangeable* itself, for consciousness, has *singularity within it*, so that singularity is a shape of the unchangeable, to which the entire mode of existence thus passes over. *Third*, consciousness finds *itself* as this singular being in the unchangeable. The *first* unchangeable is for it only the *alien* essence that con-

demns singularity; [1807 144] since the *second* is a *shape of singularity* like itself, it becomes, *third*, spirit, has the joy of finding itself within it, and becomes conscious that its singularity is reconciled with the universal.

211 What presents itself here as the mode and relationship of the unchangeable emerged as the *experience* that divided self-consciousness undergoes in its unhappiness. This experience is admittedly not *its one-sided* movement, for it is itself unchangeable consciousness, and this is therefore at the same time singular consciousness; the movement is just as much the movement of unchangeable consciousness, which appears in it as much as the other does. For it runs through these moments: first being unchangeable in opposition to the singular in general, then itself singular in opposition to the other singular consciousness, and finally one with it. But this consideration, insofar as it belongs to us, is premature here, for so far only unchangeableness as the unchangeableness of consciousness has emerged for us. This is therefore not true unchangeableness, but still burdened with an opposition; the unchangeable *in and for itself* has not emerged, and we therefore do not know how it will behave. All that has emerged here is that, for the consciousness that is our object here, these indicated determinations appear in the unchangeable.
[1807 145]

212 For this reason, then, unchangeable *consciousness*, even in taking shape, retains the character and foundation of division and of being-for-itself over against singular consciousness. Thus, for the latter, the unchangeable's receiving the shape of singularity is, in general, an *event*; likewise, singular consciousness merely *finds* itself opposed to it, and so has this relationship *by nature*. That it finally *finds itself* within the unchangeable does indeed appear to it as partly brought about by itself, or as occurring because it is itself singular; but a part of this unity belongs to the unchangeable, both as regards its origin and insofar as it exists, and the opposition remains within this unity itself. In fact, through the unchangeable's *taking shape*, the moment of the beyond has not only remained but has instead been further entrenched. For although the shape of singular actuality seems, on the one hand, to have brought the unchangeable

closer to consciousness, on the other hand it now confronts consciousness as an opaque, sensuous *one*, with all the unyielding resistance of something *actual*. The hope of becoming one with it must remain hope—that is, without fulfillment and presence—for between hope and fulfillment stands precisely the absolute contingency or immovable indifference that lies in this taking shape itself, the very ground of hope. Through the nature of the *existent one*, through the actuality it has [1807 146] assumed, it necessarily happens that it has vanished in time, has been in space and far away, and remains absolutely far away.

213 If at first the mere concept of divided consciousness determined itself as striving to sublate itself as singular and to become unchangeable consciousness, its striving now has this determination: rather, it must sublate its relationship to the pure, *shapeless* unchangeable and establish for itself only the relation to *the unchangeable that has taken shape*. For the *oneness* of the singular with the unchangeable is now its *essence* and *object*, just as in the concept only the shapeless, abstract unchangeable was the essential object; and the relationship constituted by this absolute division of the concept is now what it must turn away from. But it must raise its initially external relation to the shaped unchangeable, as an alien actuality, into an absolute becoming-one.

214 The movement in which inessential consciousness strives to attain this oneness is itself *threefold*, corresponding to the threefold relationship it will have to its beyond that has taken shape: first as *pure consciousness*; second as a *singular being* that relates to *actuality* through desire and work; and third as *consciousness of its being-for-itself*.—We must now see how these three modes of its being are present and determined within that general [1807 147] relationship.

215 First, then, considered as *pure consciousness*, the unchangeable that has taken shape seems, insofar as it is for pure consciousness, to be posited as it is in and for itself. Yet what it is in and for itself has, as already remarked, not yet emerged. Its being in consciousness as it is in and for itself would surely have to proceed from it rather than from consciousness. As things stand, however, its

presence here is at first only one-sidedly brought about by consciousness, and is therefore not perfect and true, but remains burdened with imperfection or an opposition.

216 Yet although unhappy consciousness thus does not possess this presence, it has also gone beyond pure thinking insofar as this is stoicism's abstract thinking, which *looks away from singularity* altogether, and skepticism's merely *restless* thinking—which is in fact only singularity as unconscious contradiction and its ceaseless movement. It has gone beyond both: it brings pure thinking and singularity together and holds them together, but has not yet risen to that thinking *for which* the singularity of consciousness is reconciled with pure thinking itself. Rather, it stands midway, where abstract thinking touches the singularity of consciousness [1807 148] as singularity. It itself *is* this contact; it is the unity of pure thinking and singularity. *For it*, too, there is this thinking singularity, or pure thinking, and the unchangeable essentially exists itself as singularity. But it does not recognize *for itself* that this object of its own—the unchangeable, which for it essentially has the shape of singularity—is *it itself*: itself, which is the singularity of consciousness.

217 Therefore, in this first mode, in which we consider it as *pure consciousness*, it does not *relate to its object* through thought. Although it is itself *in itself* pure thinking singularity, and its object is just this, *their relation to each other is not itself pure thinking*. Thus it goes, so to speak, only *toward* thinking, and is *devotion*. As devotion, its thinking remains the shapeless resonance of pealing bells, or a warm, misty saturation, a musical thinking that does not attain the concept, which would be the sole immanent, objective mode. Its object does indeed come to this infinite, pure, inward feeling, but enters it as something not comprehended, and therefore as something alien. Thus there is present the inward movement of the *pure* heart, which *feels* itself, but painfully, as division: the movement of an infinite *longing*, certain that its essence is such a pure heart, pure *thinking* [1807 149] that *thinks itself as singularity*, and that this object, precisely because it thinks itself as singularity, knows and recognizes that longing. At the same time, however, this essence is the unattainable *beyond*,

which flees as it is grasped, or rather has already fled. It has already fled: for on the one hand it is the unchangeable thinking itself as singularity, and consciousness therefore immediately reaches itself within it—*itself*, but as *what is opposed to the unchangeable*. Instead of grasping the essence, consciousness merely *feels*, and has fallen back into itself; since, in reaching it, consciousness cannot exclude itself as this opposite, it has grasped only inessentiality instead of the essence. Just as, on one side, in striving to reach *itself in the essence*, it grasps only its own separate actuality, so on the other it cannot grasp the other *as singular*, or as *actual*. Wherever it is sought, it cannot be found, for it is supposed to be precisely *a beyond*, something that cannot be found. Sought as singular, it is not a *universal*, a thought *singularity*, not concept, but a *singular* as object, or *something actual*: an object of immediate sense-certainty, and for that very reason only something that has vanished. Thus only the *grave* of its life can become present to consciousness. But because this is itself an *actuality*, and it is contrary [1807 150] to actuality's nature to afford lasting possession, even this presence of the grave is only the struggle of an effort that must be lost. Yet once consciousness has experienced that *the grave* of its *actual* unchangeable essence has *no actuality*, that *vanished singularity* as vanished is not true singularity, it will give up seeking unchangeable singularity as *actual*, or holding fast to it as vanished. Only through this does it become capable of finding singularity as true, or as universal.

218 Initially, however, *the heart's return into itself* must be understood as its having actuality for itself as a *singular being*. It is the *pure heart* that, *for us* or *in itself*, has found itself and is satisfied within itself. For although *for it*, in its feeling, essence separates itself from it, in itself this feeling is *self*-feeling: it has felt the object of its pure feeling, and this object is itself. It therefore emerges from this as self-feeling, or as something actual that is for itself. In this return into itself, its *second relationship* has come to be for us: that of desire and work. By sublating and enjoying the alien essence, namely that essence in the form of independent things, desire and work confirm for consciousness the inward certainty of itself that it has attained for us. But unhappy consciousness merely *finds* itself

as *[1807 151] desiring* and *working*; it is not aware that its finding itself in this way rests on inward certainty of itself, and that its feeling of essence is this self-feeling. Since it does not have this certainty *for itself*, its inwardness instead remains a fractured certainty of itself. The confirmation it would gain through work and enjoyment is therefore likewise *fractured*; or rather, it must itself destroy this confirmation, so that in it it does indeed find confirmation, but only confirmation of what it is for itself, namely its division.

219 For this consciousness, the actuality toward which desire and work are directed is no longer something *null in itself*, merely to be sublated and consumed by it. Rather, like consciousness itself, it is an *actuality broken in two*, which is null in itself only on one side, but on the other is also a sanctified world. It is a shape of the unchangeable, for the unchangeable has acquired singularity within itself; and because, as unchangeable, it is universal, its singularity has the significance of all actuality in general.

220 If consciousness were independent consciousness for itself, and actuality were for it null in and for itself, it would attain a feeling of its independence in work and enjoyment because it would itself be what [1807 152] sublated actuality. But since actuality is for it a shape of the unchangeable, it cannot sublate it by itself. Rather, although it does attain the annihilation of actuality and enjoyment, for it this happens essentially because the unchangeable itself *surrenders* its shape and *leaves* it to consciousness to enjoy.—Here consciousness, for its part, *likewise* appears as actual, but also as inwardly fractured; and in its working and enjoying this division exhibits itself as a break into a *relationship to actuality*, or *being-for-itself*, and a *being-in-itself*. The former relationship to actuality is *alteration* or *activity*, being-for-itself, which belongs to *singular* consciousness as such. But within this it is also *in itself*; this side belongs to the unchangeable beyond. These are its abilities and powers, an alien gift that the unchangeable likewise leaves to consciousness to use.

221 In its activity, then, consciousness initially stands in the relationship of two extremes. As the active here-and-now it stands on one side, and opposite it stands passive actuality; both are related to each other, but both have also withdrawn into the unchangeable and hold fast to themselves in themselves. Thus, on either side, only a surface detaches itself toward the other and enters into the interplay of movement against it.—The extreme of actuality is sublated by the active extreme; but actuality, [1807 153] for its part, can be sublated only because its unchangeable essence itself sublates it, repels itself from itself, and surrenders what has been repelled to activity. Active power appears as *the might* in which actuality dissolves. But for this consciousness, for which the *in-itself*, or essence, is something other than itself, this might, as which it appears in activity, is consequently the beyond of itself. Thus, instead of returning into itself from its activity and having confirmed itself for itself, consciousness instead reflects this movement of activity back into the other extreme. That extreme is thereby exhibited as purely universal, as the absolute might from which the movement has proceeded in every direction, and which is the essence both of the dissolving extremes as they first appeared and of the interchange itself.

222 Unchangeable consciousness *renounces* its shape and *surrenders* it, while singular consciousness *gives thanks*, that is, *denies itself* the satisfaction of being conscious of its *independence*, and assigns the essence of activity away from itself to the beyond. Through these two moments, in which both sides *reciprocally give themselves up*, consciousness does indeed come to possess its *unity* with the unchangeable. Yet this unity is also affected by separation, fractured within itself once more, and from it the opposition of the universal and the singular emerges again. For [1807 154] consciousness renounces the satisfaction of its self-feeling only *in appearance*, while obtaining its *actual* satisfaction; for *it has been* desire, work, and enjoyment; *it*, as consciousness, has *willed, acted*, and *enjoyed*. Likewise its *giving thanks*, in which it recognizes the other extreme as the essence and sublates itself, is itself *its own* activity, which counterbalances the other extreme's activity and sets an *equal* activity against the benefit that

surrenders itself. If that extreme leaves consciousness its *surface*, consciousness *also*, however, gives thanks; and in doing so, since it gives up its activity itself, that is, its *essence*, it actually does more than the other, which merely casts off a surface of itself. Thus the whole movement reflects itself into the *extreme of singularity*, not only in actual desiring, working, and enjoying, but even in giving thanks itself, where the opposite seems to happen. In this, consciousness feels itself to be this singular being, and does not let the semblance of its renunciation deceive it, for the truth of that renunciation is that it has not given itself up. What has come about is only the doubled reflection into the two extremes, and the result is a repeated splitting into the opposed consciousness of the *unchangeable* and consciousness of the *opposed* willing, accomplishing, enjoying, and renouncing itself—or of *singularity that is for itself* in general.
[1807 155]

223 Thus the *third relationship* in the movement of this consciousness has begun. It emerges from the second as a consciousness that has in truth proved itself independent through its willing and accomplishing. In the first relationship it was only the *concept* of actual consciousness, or the *inward heart*, which is not yet actual in activity and enjoyment; the *second* is this actualization as external activity and enjoyment. But having returned from this, consciousness is such that it has *experienced* itself as actual and effective consciousness, or for which it is *true* that it is *in and for itself*. Here, however, the enemy has now been discovered in its most characteristic shape. In the heart's struggle, singular consciousness is present only as a musical, abstract moment; in work and enjoyment, as the realization of this essenceless being, it can immediately forget *itself*, and the conscious *selfhood* within this actuality is cast down by thankful recognition. Yet this casting down is in truth a return of consciousness into itself, specifically into itself as the actuality that is true for it.

224 This third relationship, in which this true actuality is one extreme, is its *relation*, as nullity, to universal essence; the movement of this relation remains to be considered.
[1807 156]

225 As regards, first, the opposed relation of consciousness, in which for it its *reality is immediately what is null*, its actual activity thus becomes an activity of nothing, its enjoyment a feeling of its unhappiness. Activity and enjoyment thereby lose all *universal content and significance*, for through these they would have a being-in-and-for-themselves; both withdraw into singularity, which consciousness is intent on sublating. Consciousness is conscious of itself as *this actual singular being* in its animal functions. Instead of being performed without concern, as something null in and for itself that can acquire no importance or essential significance for spirit, these functions—since it is in them that the enemy reveals itself in its distinctive shape—become the object of earnest endeavor, and precisely what matters most. But since this enemy reproduces itself in its defeat, consciousness, by fixing its attention on it, continually lingers over it instead of freeing itself, and constantly sees itself as defiled. At the same time the content of its endeavor, instead of being essential, is the lowest, and instead of being universal, is the most singular. We therefore see only a personality confined to itself and its petty activity, brooding over itself, as unhappy as it is impoverished.

226 But with both its feeling of unhappiness and the poverty of its activity there is [1807 157] likewise linked the consciousness of its unity with the unchangeable. For the attempted immediate annihilation of its actual being is *mediated* by the thought of the unchangeable, and takes place within this *relation*. The *mediated* relation constitutes the essence of the negative movement in which consciousness directs itself against its singularity; but as *relation it is in itself* equally positive, and will bring forth for consciousness itself this *unity* of its own.

227 This mediated relation is therefore a syllogism in which singularity, initially fixing itself as opposed to the *in-itself*, is joined to this other extreme only through a third. Through this middle term, the extreme of unchangeable consciousness is present for inessential consciousness; this also implies that inessential consciousness is likewise present for the former only through this middle term. Thus this middle term presents the two extremes to each other, and is the recip-

rocal servant of each with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious being, for it is an activity mediating consciousness as such; the content of this activity is the eradication that consciousness undertakes against its singularity.

228 In this relation, then, consciousness frees itself from activity and enjoyment as *its own*. As the extreme *being for itself*, it casts away the essence of its *will* and transfers to the middle term, or servant, the [1807 158] personal ownership and freedom of its decision, and with them the *guilt* of its activity. This mediator, as immediately related to the unchangeable essence, serves with his *counsel* concerning what is right. Since the action follows another's decision, it ceases, on the side of activity or *will*, to be its own. But the *objective* side of the action still remains to inessential consciousness, namely the *fruit* of its work and *enjoyment*. It therefore casts this off as well, and renounces, as it does its will, the *actuality* acquired in work and enjoyment: *partly* as the attained truth of its self-conscious *independence*—by engaging in representing and speaking something wholly alien and meaningless to it; partly as *external property*—by giving away some of the possession it has acquired through work; and partly as the *enjoyment* it has had—by wholly denying it to itself again through fasting and mortification.

229 Through these moments of giving up its own decision, then its property and enjoyment, and finally the positive moment of pursuing a task it does not understand, consciousness truly and completely deprives itself of the consciousness of inward and outward freedom, of actuality as its *being-for-itself*. It has the certainty that it has in truth alienated its *I* and made its immediate self-consciousness into a *[1807 159] thing*, an objective being.—It could confirm its renunciation of itself only through this *actual* sacrifice, for only in it does the *deception* disappear that lies in the *inward* recognition expressed by thanks in heart, disposition, and speech. Such recognition does indeed shift all the power of being-for-itself away from itself and attribute it to a gift from above; yet in this very shifting it retains its *outward* selfhood in the possession it does

not surrender, and its *inward* selfhood in the consciousness of the decision it has itself made and in the consciousness of the content determined by itself, which it has not exchanged for an alien content that fills it meaninglessly.

230 But in the sacrifice actually accomplished, *in itself*, just as consciousness has sublated *activity* as its own, so too has its *unhappiness* departed from it. Yet that this departure has occurred *in itself* is an activity of the other extreme of the syllogism, which is the essence *being in itself*. That sacrifice of the inessential extreme, however, was at the same time not a one-sided activity, but contained the activity of the other within it. For giving up one's own will is negative only on one side; *according to its concept*, or *in itself*, it is at the same time positive, namely the positing of the will as the will of *another*, and specifically as a will that is not singular but universal. For this [1807 160] consciousness, this positive significance of the singular will posited negatively is the will of the other extreme. Since that will is precisely something other for it, it comes to consciousness not through itself, but through the third, the mediator, as counsel. Thus *for it* its will does become universal will, a will *being in itself*, but *it itself is not*, for itself, this *in-itself*; giving up its own will as *singular* is not for it, in accordance with the concept, the positive character of universal will. Likewise its giving up possession and enjoyment has only the same negative significance, and the universal that thereby comes to be for it is not for it its *own activity*. This *unity* of objective being and being-for-itself, which lies in the *concept* of activity, and which therefore becomes for consciousness the essence and *object* —just as this unity is not for it the concept of its activity, neither does it recognize that this unity becomes an object *for it* immediately and through itself. Instead, it has the mediating servant pronounce for it this certainty, itself still fractured: that only *in itself* is its unhappiness the reverse, namely activity satisfying itself in its activity, or blessed enjoyment; that likewise its impoverished activity is *in itself* the reverse, namely absolute activity; and that, according to the concept, activity is activity at all only as the activity of the singular being. But *for consciousness* itself, activity, and its actual activity, remains impoverished, and its enjoyment remains pain; their sublatedness, [1807 161] in its pos-

itive significance, remains a *beyond*. Yet in this object, in which the activity and being of this *singular* consciousness are for it being and activity *in themselves*, there has arisen for it the representation of *reason*, of consciousness's certainty that in its singularity it is absolutely *in itself*, or is all reality.

V. Reason



[1807 162]

V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason.

231 In the thought it has grasped, that *singular* consciousness is *in itself* absolute essence, consciousness returns into itself. For unhappy consciousness, *being-in-itself* is the *beyond* of itself. But its movement has accomplished this within it: it has posited singularity in its complete development, or the singularity that is *actual consciousness*, as the *negative* of itself, namely as the *objective* extreme; or it has wrested its being-for-itself out of itself and made it into being. In this, its *unity* with this universal has also come to be for it. For us, since the sublated singular is the universal, this unity no longer falls outside consciousness; and since consciousness preserves itself in this negativity of its own, its essence is present in it as such. Its truth is what appears as the middle term in the syllogism whose extremes appeared held absolutely apart: the middle term that declares to unchangeable consciousness that [1807 163] singular consciousness has renounced itself, and to singular consciousness that the unchangeable is no longer an extreme for it, but is reconciled with it. This middle term is the unity that immediately knows both and relates them, and the consciousness of their unity, which it declares to consciousness and thereby to *itself*: the certainty of being all truth.

232 With self-consciousness's being reason, its previously negative relationship to otherness turns into a positive one. Until now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, with saving and preserving itself for itself at the expense of the *world* or of its own actuality, both of which appeared to it as the negative of its essence. But as reason, assured of itself, it has gained peace in relation to them and can endure them; for it is certain of itself as reality, or certain that all actuality is nothing other than itself. Its thinking is immediately actuality itself; it therefore relates to actuality as idealism. In apprehending itself this way, it is as though the world were only now coming into being for it. Previously it does not understand the world; it desires it and works upon it, withdraws from it into itself, and eradicates it for itself, and itself as consciousness—as consciousness of the world as essence, and as consciousness of its nullity. Only here, after the grave of its truth has been lost, the eradication of its actuality itself [1807 164] eradicated, and the singularity of consciousness has become for it absolute essence in itself, does it discover the world as *its* new actual world, which interests it in its endurance just as previously only in its vanishing. For the world's *subsistence* becomes for it its own *truth* and *presence*; it is certain of experiencing only itself within it.

233 Reason is consciousness's certainty of being all reality: this is how idealism expresses its concept. Just as consciousness, *appearing* as reason, *immediately* has this certainty within it, so *idealism* expresses it *immediately*: I am I, in the sense that the I that is my object is not, as in self-consciousness in general, merely an *empty* object in general, nor, as in free self-consciousness, merely an object withdrawing from the others that still have validity *beside* it. Rather, it is an object accompanied by consciousness of the *nonbeing* of anything else: the sole object, all reality and presence. Yet self-consciousness is all reality not merely *for itself*, but also *in itself*, only by *becoming* this reality, or rather *proving* itself to be such. It proves itself so along *the path* on which, first, in the dialectical movement of meaning, perceiving, and understanding, otherness as *in itself*, and then, in the movement through the independence of consciousness in lordship and bondage, through the thought of freedom, skeptical [1807

165] liberation, and the struggle for absolute liberation of consciousness divided within itself, otherness insofar as it is only *for consciousness*, vanishes *for consciousness itself*. Two sides appeared successively: one in which essence, or the true, had for consciousness the determination of *being*, the other in which it had that of being only *for consciousness*. But both reduced themselves to one truth: that what *is*, or the *in-itself*, is only insofar as it is *for* consciousness, and that what is *for consciousness* is also *in itself*. The consciousness that is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten it, insofar as it appears *immediately* as reason; or this immediately appearing reason appears only as the *certainty* of that truth. It thus merely *asserts* that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this; for that forgotten path is the comprehension of this immediately expressed assertion. Likewise, for someone who has not traveled that path, this assertion, heard in this pure form—although in a concrete shape he certainly makes it himself—is incomprehensible.

234 Idealism that does not exhibit that path, but begins with this assertion, is therefore also a mere *assurance*, which neither comprehends itself nor can make itself comprehensible to others. It expresses an *immediate certainty* confronted by other immediate certainties, which have been lost only along that path. The *assurances* of these other certainties therefore place themselves with equal right *beside* the *[1807 166] assurance* of that certainty. Reason appeals to the *self*-consciousness of every consciousness: *I am I*; my object and essence is *I*; and none will deny it this truth. But in founding this truth on that appeal, it sanctions the truth of the other certainty, namely: *there is something other for me*; something other than *I* is my object and essence; or, insofar as *I* am my own object and essence, I am so only by withdrawing from the other in general and taking my place as an actuality *beside* it.—Only when reason appears as a *reflection* out of this opposed certainty does its assertion about itself appear not merely as certainty and assurance, but as *truth*, and not *beside* others, but as the *only* truth. Its *immediate appearance* is the abstraction of its *presence*, whose *essence* and *being-in-itself* is absolute concept, that is, the *movement of its having become*.—Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness, or its

object, in different ways according to the stage it occupies in world-spirit's becoming conscious of itself. How world-spirit on each occasion *immediately* finds and determines itself and its object, or how it is *for itself*, depends on what it has already *become*, or what it already is *in itself*.
[1807 167]

235 Reason is the certainty of being all *reality*. But this *in-itself*, or this *reality*, is still something entirely universal, the pure *abstraction* of reality. It is the first *positivity* that self-consciousness is *within itself, for itself*; and the I is therefore only the *pure essentiality* of what is, or the simple *category*. The *category*, which otherwise had the meaning of being the essentiality of what is—*indeterminately*, of what is in general, or of what is over against consciousness—is now the *essentiality*, or simple *unity*, of what is only as thinking actuality; or it is this: that self-consciousness and being are *the same* essence; *the same*, not in comparison, but in and for themselves. Only one-sided, defective idealism lets this unity appear again on one side as consciousness, with an *in-itself* confronting it.—But this category, or *simple* unity of self-consciousness and being, contains *difference* within itself; for its essence is precisely to be immediately equal to itself in *otherness*, or in absolute difference. Difference therefore *is*, but is completely transparent, and is a difference that is at the same time no difference. It appears as a *multiplicity* of categories. Since idealism declares the *simple unity* of self-consciousness to be all reality, and makes it essence *immediately*, without having comprehended it as absolutely negative essence—which alone has negation, determinacy, or difference within [1807 168] itself—the second assertion, that the category contains *differences* or *species*, is still more incomprehensible than the first. This assurance in general, like the assurance of any *determinate number* of its species, is a new assurance, but one that contains within itself the demand that we no longer accept it as an assurance. For since *difference* begins within the pure I, within pure understanding itself, this posits that here *immediacy*, *assuring*, and *finding* must be abandoned, and *comprehending* begin. To take up the multiplicity of categories again in any manner as a discov-

ery—for example, from judgments—and accept them in this way must in fact be regarded as a disgrace to science. Where else should understanding be able to demonstrate a necessity, if it cannot do so in itself, in pure necessity?

236 Since, then, both the pure essentiality of things and their difference belong to reason, strictly speaking there could no longer be any talk of *things* at all—that is, of something that would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself. For to say that the many categories are *species* of the pure category means that *it* is still their *genus* or *essence*, not opposed to them. Yet they are already the ambiguous element that also contains, in its *multiplicity*, otherness [1807 169] *over against* the pure category. Through this multiplicity they do in fact contradict it, and pure unity must sublate them within itself, thereby constituting itself as the *negative unity* of differences. But as *negative* unity it excludes from itself both the *differences* as such and that first *immediate* pure unity as such, and is *singularity*: a new category that is exclusive consciousness, that is, this—that *another* is for it. Singularity is the category's transition from its concept to an *external* reality: the pure *schema*, which is consciousness, but which, because it is singularity and an exclusive one, is equally an indication of another. Yet this category's *other* consists only in the *other first categories*, namely *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*; and in it—that is, precisely in the positedness of the other, or in this other itself—consciousness is likewise itself. Each of these distinct moments refers to another; yet in them no otherness comes about. The pure category refers to the *species*, which pass over into the negative category, or singularity; but the latter points back to the former. It is itself pure consciousness, which in each remains this clear unity with itself; but a unity that is equally referred to another, which, in being, has vanished, and in vanishing is also produced again.
[1807 170]

237 Here we see pure consciousness posited in a doubled manner: first as the restless *back-and-forth movement* that runs through all its moments, has otherness hovering before it in them, and sublates this otherness in grasping it; second, rather, as the *resting unity* certain of its truth. For this unity, that movement is

the *other*; but for that movement, the resting unity is the other; and consciousness and object alternate in these reciprocal determinations. Thus at one time consciousness is for itself the searching that moves back and forth, and its object is the *pure in-itself* and essence; at another, consciousness is for itself the simple category, and the object is the movement of differences. But consciousness as essence is this entire course itself: passing from itself as simple category into singularity and the object, intuiting this course in the object, sublating it as distinct, *appropriating* it, and declaring itself to be this certainty of being all reality, both itself and its object.

238 Its first declaration is only this abstract, empty word: everything is *its own*. For the certainty of being all reality is initially only the pure category. Empty idealism expresses this reason that first recognizes itself in the object; it apprehends reason only as reason initially is for itself, and [1807 171] imagines that by demonstrating this pure *mine* of consciousness in all being and declaring things to be sensations or representations, it has demonstrated that mine as completed reality. It must therefore at the same time be absolute empiricism, for to *fill* the empty *mine*—that is, to provide its difference and all its development and configuration—its reason requires an alien impulse in which alone the *manifoldness* of sensation or representation would lie. This idealism therefore becomes a self-contradictory ambiguity like skepticism, except that while skepticism expresses itself negatively, idealism expresses itself positively. But it is equally incapable of bringing together its contradictory thoughts of pure consciousness as all reality, and of an alien impulse, or sensuous sensation and representation, as an equal reality. Instead, it throws itself back and forth between the one and the other, and has fallen into the bad, namely sensuous, infinity. Since reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract *mine*, and the *other* is for it an *indifferent alien*, precisely that knowledge of another is posited within reason which occurred as *meaning, perceiving*, and the *understanding* that apprehends what is meant and perceived. Such knowledge is at the same time declared not to be true knowledge by the concept [1807 172] of this idealism itself, for only the unity of apperception is the truth of knowledge. Thus, to reach this *other*,

which is *essential* to it—that is, its *in-itself*—but which it does not have within itself, this idealism's pure reason is referred back by its own doing to a knowledge that is not knowledge of the true. It thus knowingly and willingly condemns itself to untrue knowledge, and cannot relinquish meaning and perceiving, which have no truth for reason itself. It finds itself in an immediate contradiction, asserting two utterly opposed things as essence: the *unity of apperception* and equally the *thing*, which, even if called *alien impulse*, or *empirical* essence, or *sensibility*, or *the thing in itself*, remains in its concept the same alien to that unity.

239 This idealism is caught in this contradiction because it asserts the *abstract concept* of reason as the true; hence reality immediately arises for it just as much as something that is not, rather, reason's reality, while reason is supposed to be all reality at the same time. Reason remains a restless search that, in searching itself, declares the satisfaction of finding to be utterly impossible.—Actual reason is [1807 173] not so inconsistent. Rather, being at first only the *certainty* of being all reality, in this *concept* it is conscious of itself as *certainty*, as *I*, as not yet being reality in truth, and is driven to raise its certainty to truth and fill the *empty* mine.

[1807 174]

A. Observing Reason.

240 We now indeed see this consciousness, for which *being* has the meaning of *its own*, enter once more into meaning and perceiving, but not as into the certainty of something merely *other*, but with the certainty of itself being this other. Previously it merely *happened* to perceive and *experience* various things about the thing; here it undertakes observations and experience itself. Meaning and perceiving, which previously sublated themselves for us, are now sublated by consciousness for itself; reason seeks to *know* the truth, to find as concept what for meaning and perceiving is a thing—that is, to have in thinghood only consciousness of itself. Reason therefore now has a universal *interest* in the

world, because it is the certainty of having presence within it, or that presence is rational. It seeks its other, knowing that in it it possesses nothing other than itself; it seeks only its own infinity.
[1807 175]

241 At first only sensing itself obscurely in actuality, or knowing actuality merely as *its own* in general, it proceeds in this spirit to take universal possession of the property assured to it, planting the sign of its sovereignty on every height and in every depth. But this superficial mine is not its ultimate interest; the joy of this universal appropriation still finds in its property the alien other that abstract reason does not have within itself. Reason senses itself as an essence deeper than the pure I *is*, and must demand that difference, *manifold being*, become for the I itself its own: that it intuit itself as *actuality* and find itself present as shape and thing. But even if reason rummages through all the entrails of things and opens all their veins so that it may spring out of them to meet itself, it will not attain this happiness; rather, it must first have perfected itself within itself in order then to be able to experience its perfection.

242 Consciousness *observes*: that is, reason wants to find and possess itself as an existent object, in an *actual, sensuously present* mode. The consciousness engaged in this observation does indeed mean and say that it wishes to experience *not itself*, but on the contrary *the essence of things as things*. That this *consciousness* means and says this lies in its *being* reason, while reason [1807 176] is not yet its object as such. If it knew *reason* as the same essence of things and itself, and knew that reason can be present in its distinctive shape only in consciousness, it would descend into its own depths and seek reason there rather than in things. Having found reason in those depths, it would be directed outward again toward actuality, to intuit reason's sensuous expression there, but would immediately take this essentially as *concept*. Reason, as it appears *immediately* as consciousness's certainty of being all reality, takes its reality in the sense of the *immediacy of being*, and likewise the unity of the I with this objective essence in the sense of an *immediate unity* in which it has not yet separated and reunited the moments of being and I, or which it has not yet cognized. Thus, as observing

consciousness, it approaches things in the belief that it truly takes them as sensuous things opposed to the I; yet its actual activity contradicts this belief. For it *cognizes* things; it transforms their sensuousness *into concepts*, that is, precisely into a being that is at the same time I, and thus transforms thinking into an existent thinking, or being into a thought being, and asserts in fact that things have truth only as concepts. In this, for observing consciousness only what *things* [1807 177] are comes to be, but for us what *it itself* is; the result of its movement, however, will be its becoming for itself what it is in itself.

243 *The activity* of observing reason must be considered in the moments of its movement: how it takes up nature, spirit, and finally their relation as sensuous being, and seeks itself as existent actuality.

a. Observation of Nature.

244 When thoughtless consciousness declares observing and experiencing to be the source of truth, its words may well sound as though it were concerned solely with tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing, and seeing. In its zeal for recommending tasting, smelling, and so forth, it forgets to say that in fact it has also, just as essentially, already determined for itself the object of this sensing, and that this determination counts for it at least as much as that sensing. It will also immediately admit that it is not merely concerned with perceiving in general, and will not, for example, let the perception that this penknife lies beside this snuffbox count as an observation. What is perceived must at least have the significance of a *universal*, not of a *sensuous this*.

[1807 178]

245 This universal is thus at first only what *remains equal to itself*; its movement is only the uniform recurrence of the same activity. Consciousness, which to this extent finds in the object only *universality*, or the *abstract mine*, must take the object's actual movement upon *itself*. Since it is not yet the object's understanding, it must at least be its memory, expressing in a universal manner what is present in actuality only in a singular manner. This superficial lifting out of singularity, and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sen-

suous is merely taken up without having become universal in itself—this *describing* of things—does not yet have movement in the object itself; rather, movement is only in the describing. The object, once described, has therefore lost its interest; once one is described, another must be taken up, and continually sought, so that describing does not run out. When new *whole* things are no longer so easy to find, one must return to those already found, divide them further, take them apart, and track down still new aspects of thinghood in them. This restless, unsettled instinct can never lack material. Discovering a new, distinctive genus, or even a new planet—which, although an individual, nevertheless has the nature of a [1807 179] universal—can fall only to the fortunate. But the boundaries of what is *distinctive*, like the elephant, the oak, gold—what is *genus* and *species*—pass through many stages into the infinite *particularization* of the chaotic animals and plants, kinds of rock, or metals, earths, and so forth that must first be produced by force and art. In this realm of the universal's indeterminacy, in which particularization again approaches *singularization*, and here and there descends entirely into it again, an inexhaustible store is opened up for observing and describing. Yet here, where a field beyond survey opens before it, at the boundary of the universal, it may instead have found only the limit of nature and its own activity rather than an immeasurable wealth. It can no longer know whether what appears to be in itself is not a contingency. What bears the stamp of a confused or immature formation, weak and scarcely developing out of elemental indeterminacy, cannot claim even to be described.

246 Although this searching and describing seems concerned only with things, we see that in fact it does not proceed along the course of *sensuous perception*. Rather, what allows things to be *cognized* is more important to it than the remaining range of sensuous properties, which the [1807 180] thing itself admittedly cannot dispense with, but which consciousness dispenses with. Through this distinction between the *essential* and the *inessential*, the concept rises out of sensuous dispersion, and cognition declares that it is concerned at least as essentially *with itself* as with things. Given this doubled essentiality, it

wavers over whether what is essential and necessary *for cognition* is so also *in the things*. On the one hand, *characteristic marks* are supposed merely to serve cognition in distinguishing things from each other; but on the other, what is to be cognized is not the inessential in things, but that through which they themselves *break free* from the universal continuity of being in general, *separate* themselves from the other, and are *for themselves*. Characteristic marks are to have an essential relation not only to cognition, but also to be the essential determinations of things; the artificial system is to accord with nature's own system and express only this. This is necessary from the concept of reason, and reason's instinct—for it behaves only as instinct in this observing—has also attained this unity in its systems where its objects are themselves so constituted that they have an essentiality, or a *being-for-themselves*, within them, and are not merely the contingency of this *moment* or this *here*. The distinguishing marks [1807 181] of animals, for example, are taken from claws and teeth; for in fact cognition not only *distinguishes* one animal from another by these, but the animal *separates itself off* through them. Through these weapons it preserves itself *for itself*, and apart from the universal. The plant, by contrast, does not attain *being-for-itself*, but only touches the boundary of individuality; it has therefore been apprehended and distinguished at this boundary, where it displays the semblance of *division* into sexes. What stands lower still can no longer distinguish itself from others, but is lost when it enters into opposition. *Being at rest* and *being in relationship* come into conflict with each other; in the latter the thing is something different from what it is in the former, whereas the individual consists precisely in preserving itself in relationship to another. But what cannot do this, and *chemically* becomes something other than it *empirically* is, confuses cognition and brings it into the same conflict over whether to hold to one side or the other, since the thing itself is nothing constant, and the two fall apart within it.

247 In such systems of the universal that remains equal to itself, this universal thus has the meaning of being what remains equal to itself both in cognition and in things themselves. Yet this expansion of *constant determinations*, each of [1807

182] which calmly describes the sequence of its progression and receives room to act on its own, passes just as essentially into its opposite, into the confusion of these determinations. For the characteristic mark, the universal determinacy, is the unity of opposites, of the determinate and the intrinsically universal; it must therefore separate into this opposition. Now, if on one side determinacy overcomes the universal in which it has its essence, on the other the universal equally maintains its mastery over determinacy, drives it to its boundary, and there mingles its differences and essential features. Observation, which kept these neatly apart and believed it had something fixed in them, sees the other principles encroach upon one principle, transitions and confusions form, and in these sees joined what it first took to be utterly separated, and separated what it counted together. Thus this clinging to tranquil being that remains equal to itself must, precisely in its most universal determinations—for example, what essential characteristics animals or plants have—find itself teased by instances that rob it of every determination, silence the universality to which it had risen, and cast it back into thoughtless observing and describing.

248 Thus this observation, which confines itself to the simple, or restricts sensuous dispersion through the universal, [1807 183] finds in its object the *confusion of its principle*, because the determinate must by its nature lose itself in its opposite. Reason must therefore proceed instead from the *inert* determinacy that seemed permanent to observing it as it truly is, namely as *relating itself to its opposite*. What are called essential characteristics are determinations *at rest*; expressed and apprehended as *simple*, they do not exhibit what constitutes their nature: to be vanishing *moments* of the movement that takes itself back into itself. Since reason's instinct now comes to seek determinacy in accordance with its nature—essentially not to be for itself, but to pass over into its opposite—it searches for the *law* and its *concept*. It admittedly searches for them equally as *existent* actuality; but this will in fact vanish for it, and the sides of the law will become pure moments, or abstractions, so that the law emerges in the nature of the concept, which has eradicated within itself the indifferent subsistence of sensuous actuality.

249 For observing consciousness, the *truth of the law* is in *experience*, as the manner in which *sensuous being is for it*, not in and for itself. But if the law does not have its truth in the concept, it is something contingent, [1807 184] not a necessity, or in fact not a law. Yet its being essentially as concept not only does not contradict its being present for observation; rather, for that very reason it has necessary *existence* and is for observation. The universal, *in the sense of reason's universality*, is also universal in the sense that the former has within it: that it presents itself *for consciousness* as present and actual, or that the concept exhibits itself in the manner of thinghood and sensuous being—but without thereby losing its nature and falling into inert subsistence or indifferent succession. What is universally valid also holds universally; what *ought to be actually is* as well, and what merely *ought* to be without *being* has no truth. Reason's instinct rightly holds fast to this on its side, and will not be led astray by thought-entities that merely *ought* to be, and are supposed to have truth as an *ought*, although they are encountered in no experience—by hypotheses any more than by all the other invisibilities of a perpetual ought. For reason is precisely this certainty of having reality, and what is not for consciousness as a self-existent essence—that is, what does not appear—is nothing at all for it.

250 That the truth of the law is essentially *reality* does indeed become again, for this consciousness that remains at the level of observation, [1807 185] an *opposition* to the concept and to the intrinsically universal; something such as its law is not for it an essence of reason. It believes that in the law it obtains something *alien*. Yet it refutes this belief through its deed, in which it does not itself take universality to mean that *all singular* sensuous things must have shown it the law's appearance before it can assert its truth. To establish that stones lifted from the earth and released fall, it does not demand that this experiment be made with all stones. It may indeed say that it must at least have been tried with very many, from which one could then infer the rest with the greatest probability, or with full justification *by analogy*. Yet analogy not only provides no full justification; by its nature it refutes itself so often that, inferring by analogy itself, analogy instead permits no inference. The *probability* to which its result

would be reduced loses, when set against *truth*, all distinction between lesser and greater probability; however great it may be, it is nothing against truth. In fact, however, reason's instinct accepts such laws as *truth*, and only in relation to their necessity, which it does not cognize, does it fall into this [1807 186] distinction and lower the truth of the matter itself to probability, in order to designate the imperfect manner in which truth is present for a consciousness that has not yet attained insight into the pure concept. For universality is present only as *simple, immediate* universality. Yet at the same time it is for the sake of this universality that the law has truth for consciousness: that the stone falls is true for it because the stone is *heavy*, that is, because in gravity the stone *in and for itself* has the essential relation *to the earth* that expresses itself as falling. Thus in experience consciousness has the *being* of the law, but equally the law as *concept*, and only *because of both circumstances* together is it true for consciousness. It therefore counts as law because it exhibits itself in appearance and is at the same time concept in itself.

251 Because the law is at the same time *concept in itself*, this consciousness's instinct of reason necessarily aims—though without knowing that this is what it wants—at *purifying* the law and its moments *into concept*. It conducts experiments concerning the law. As the law first appears, it presents itself impure, enveloped in singular sensuous being, the concept that constitutes its nature submerged in empirical material. In its experiments, reason's instinct seeks to find what happens under these or those circumstances. The law [1807 187] seems thereby only to be immersed still further in sensuous being; yet this being instead disappears in the process. The inward meaning of this inquiry is to find the law's *pure conditions*. This means nothing other—even if the consciousness expressing itself this way should believe it means something else—than raising the law entirely into the shape of the concept and *eradicating* every bond of *its moments* to *determinate being*. Negative electricity, for example, which perhaps first announces itself as *resinous* electricity, just as positive electricity does as *vitreous* electricity, loses this significance entirely through experiments and becomes purely *positive* and *negative* electricity, neither of which belongs any

longer to a particular kind of thing. It ceases to be possible to say that some bodies are positively electrical, others negatively electrical. Likewise, the relationship of acid and base and their movement toward each other constitutes a law in which these opposites appear as bodies. Yet these separated things have no actuality; the force that tears them apart cannot prevent them from immediately entering a process again, for they are only this relation. They cannot remain for themselves like a tooth or claw and be pointed out as such. That their essence is to pass immediately into a neutral product makes their *being* a being sublated in itself, or a [1807 188] universal being, and acid and base have truth only as *universals*. Thus, just as glass and resin can be both positively and negatively electrical, acid and base are not bound as properties to this or that *actuality*, but each thing is acidic or basic only *relatively*. What appears to be a decided base or acid acquires the opposite significance in relation to another in the so-called synsomaties.—In this way the result of experiments sublates the moments, or animating principles, as properties of determinate things, and frees predicates from their subjects. These predicates are found, as they truly are, only as universals; because of this independence they therefore receive the name of *forms of matter*, which are neither bodies nor properties, and one takes care not to call oxygen and so forth, positive and negative electricity, heat, and so on, bodies.

252 *Matter*, by contrast, is not an *existent thing*, but being as *universal*, or in the manner of the concept. Reason, still instinct, makes this correct distinction without the consciousness that, in testing the law against all sensuous being, it thereby sublates its merely sensuous being, and that, in apprehending its moments as *forms of matter*, their essentiality has become universal for it, expressed in this term as an unsensuous sensuousness, an incorporeal yet objective being.
[1807 189]

253 We must now see what turn its result takes for this instinct, and what new shape of its observing thereby appears. As the truth of this experimenting consciousness we see pure law, freed from sensuous being; we see it as *concept*,

present in sensuous being yet moving independently and unbound within it, immersed in it yet free of it, and *simple* concept. What is in truth the *result* and *essence* now itself appears for this consciousness, but as *object*; and precisely because for consciousness it is not *result*, and bears no relation to the preceding movement, it appears as a *particular kind* of object, and consciousness's relationship to it as another kind of observing.

254 Such an object, which contains the process within the *simplicity* of the concept, is the *organic*. It is this absolute fluidity in which the determinacy through which it would be only *for another* is dissolved. Whereas the inorganic thing has determinacy as its essence, and therefore constitutes the completeness of the concept's moments only together with another thing, and consequently is lost on entering into movement, in the organic being, by contrast, all determinations through which it is open to another are bound under organic simple unity. None appears as essential that would relate freely [1807 190] to another; and the organic therefore preserves itself within its relation.

255 As follows from this determination, the *sides* of the *law* whose observation reason's instinct seeks here are initially *organic* and *inorganic* nature in their relation to each other. For organic nature, inorganic nature is precisely the freedom, opposed to its *simple concept*, of *unbound* determinations in which individual nature is *at the same time dissolved*, and from whose continuity it *at the same time* separates itself and is *for itself*. Air, water, earth, zones, and climate are such universal elements, constituting the indeterminate simple essence of individualities, in which these are at the same time reflected into themselves. Neither individuality nor the elemental is simply in and for itself; rather, in the independent freedom in which they confront each other for observation, they also behave as *essential relations*, but in such a way that the independence and mutual indifference of both predominate and pass only partly into abstraction. Here, then, the law is present as the relation of an element to the formation of the organic, which at one time has elemental being opposite it, at another exhibits it in its organic reflection. Yet such *laws* as that animals belonging to air have the constitution of birds, those [1807 191] belonging to water the consti-

tution of fish, northern animals a thickly furred hide, and so forth, immediately reveal a poverty that does not correspond to organic diversity. Besides the fact that organic freedom knows how to withdraw its forms again from these determinations, and necessarily offers exceptions everywhere to such laws or rules, as one might call them, even in those beings that fall under them this remains so superficial a determination that the expression of their necessity can be no different, and gets no further than *great influence*, without our knowing what actually belongs to this influence and what does not. Such relations of the organic to the elemental therefore cannot in fact be called *laws*. For, in part, as remarked, such a relation does not by its content remotely exhaust the range of the organic; in part, the moments of the relation themselves also remain indifferent to each other and express no necessity. The *concept* of base lies in the concept of acid, as negative electricity lies in the concept of positive electricity; but however often thick fur may be *found* together with the north, or the structure of fish with water and that of birds with air, the concept of thick fur does not lie in the concept of the north, nor that of the structure of fish in the concept of the sea, [1807 192] nor that of birds' structure in the concept of air. Because of this freedom of the two sides toward each other, there *are* also land animals that have the essential characteristics of a bird, of a fish, and so forth. Since necessity cannot be comprehended as intrinsic to essence, it also ceases to have sensuous existence and can no longer be observed in actuality, but has *stepped outside* it. Not finding itself in the real essence itself, necessity is what is called a teleological relation: a relation *external* to the things related, and therefore rather the opposite of a law. It is thought entirely freed from necessary nature, leaving nature and moving for itself above it.

256 If the relation of the organic to elemental nature touched upon earlier does not express the organic's essence, this essence is, by contrast, contained in the *concept of purpose*. For this observing consciousness, admittedly, that concept is not the organic's own *essence*, but falls outside it, and is then only that external, *teleological* relation. Yet as the organic was determined above, it is in fact real purpose itself. For in *preserving itself* in relation to another, it is precisely the nat-

ural being in which nature reflects itself into the concept, and the moments spread apart in necessity—cause [1807 193] and effect, an active and a passive—are brought together into one. Thus something appears here not merely as the *result* of necessity; rather, because it has returned into itself, the last, or result, is equally the *first*, which begins the movement, and is for itself the *purpose* it actualizes. The organic does not produce something, but only *preserves itself*; or what is produced is just as much already present as it is produced.

257 This determination must be discussed more closely, both as it is in itself and as it is for reason's instinct, in order to see how that instinct finds itself within it, yet does not recognize itself in its discovery. The concept of purpose, then, to which observing reason rises, is, just as it is reason's *conscious concept*, equally present as something *actual*; it is not merely an *external relation* of this actuality, but its *essence*. To say that this actuality, itself a purpose, relates purposively to another means that its relation is contingent *according to what both immediately are*; immediately, both are independent and indifferent to each other. Yet the essence of their relation is other than what they thus appear to be, and their activity has a meaning other than what it *immediately* is for sensuous perception. Necessity is hidden in what happens, and shows itself only *at the end*, but in such a way that this very end shows that necessity was also the first. [1807 194] The end, however, shows this priority of itself by the fact that the alteration brought about by activity yields nothing other than what already was. Or, if we begin with the first, this first merely returns to itself in its end, or in the result of its activity; and precisely thereby it proves to be something that has *itself* as its end, and thus, as first, has already returned to itself, or is *in and for itself*. What it reaches through the movement of its activity is therefore *itself*; and its reaching only itself is its *self-feeling*. There is thus indeed a difference between *what it is* and *what it seeks*, but this is only the *semblance of a difference*, and through this it is concept within itself.

258 *Self-consciousness*, however, is likewise constituted so as to distinguish itself from itself in a manner in which no difference emerges. In observing organic nature, it therefore finds nothing other than this essence; it finds itself as a

thing, *as a life*, but still makes a distinction between what it itself is and what it has found—a distinction that is none. Just as an animal's instinct seeks and consumes food, yet thereby brings forth nothing other than itself, so reason's instinct finds only reason itself in its seeking. The animal ends with self-feeling. Reason's instinct, by contrast, is [1807 195] at the same time self-consciousness; but because it is only instinct, it stands to one side in relation to consciousness and has its opposite in consciousness. Its satisfaction is therefore divided by this opposite; it does indeed find itself, namely *purpose*, and equally finds this purpose as *thing*. But first, purpose falls for it *outside the thing* that presents itself as purpose. Second, this purpose as purpose is at the same time *objective*; it therefore also falls, for reason's instinct, not within itself as consciousness, but within another understanding.

259 Considered more closely, this determination lies equally in the thing's concept: that it is *purpose within itself*. For it preserves *itself*; that is, it is at the same time its nature to conceal necessity and exhibit it in the form of a *contingent* relation. For its freedom, or *being-for-itself*, is precisely this: to behave indifferently toward what is necessary for it. It therefore exhibits itself as something whose concept falls outside its being. Likewise, reason has the necessity of intuiting its own concept as falling outside itself, hence as a *thing*, as something toward which it is *indifferent*, and which is therefore reciprocally indifferent toward reason and toward its own concept. As instinct, reason also remains within this *being*, or *indifference*, and the thing expressing the concept remains for it something other than this concept, the concept [1807 196] something other than the thing. Thus for reason the organic thing is *purpose* within itself only in such a way that the necessity exhibiting itself as hidden in the thing's activity—since what acts behaves in that activity as something indifferent, being for itself—falls outside the organic itself.—But since the organic, as purpose within itself, cannot behave otherwise than as such a purpose, its being purpose within itself is also apparent and sensuously present, and is observed as such. The organic shows itself as *preserving itself*, *returning into itself*, and *having returned into itself*. Yet in this being, observing consciousness does not recognize the concept

of purpose, or recognize that this concept exists not somewhere else in an understanding, but precisely here, and is as a thing. It makes a distinction between the concept of purpose and being-for-itself and self-preservation, a distinction that is none. That it is none is not present for consciousness; instead, an activity that appears contingent and indifferent toward what is accomplished through it, and the unity that nonetheless links the two together—that activity and this purpose—fall apart for consciousness.

260 On this view, what belongs to the organic itself is the activity lying midway between its first and last, insofar as this activity has the character of singularity. But activity insofar as it has the character of universality, and [1807 197] what acts is equated with what is produced through it—purposive activity as such—would not belong to the organic. That singular activity, which is only a means, falls through its singularity under the determination of a wholly singular or contingent necessity. What the organic does to preserve itself as an individual, or itself as a genus, is therefore, according to this immediate content, entirely lawless, for the universal and the concept fall outside it. Its activity would accordingly be empty efficacy without content in itself; it would not even be the efficacy of a machine, for a machine has a purpose, and its efficacy thereby a determinate content. Thus abandoned by the universal, it would be the activity only of an existent *as existent*, that is, an activity not at the same time reflected into itself, like that of an acid or base: an efficacy that could not detach itself from its immediate existence, or give up this existence, which is lost in relation to its opposite, yet preserve itself. But the being whose efficacy is being considered here is posited as a thing that *preserves itself* in its relation to its opposite. *Activity* as such is nothing but the pure, essenceless form of its being-for-itself; and its substance, which is not merely determinate being but the universal—its *purpose*—does not fall outside this activity. In itself, it is activity returning into itself, not [1807 198] activity turned back into itself by something alien.

261 Yet this unity of universality and activity is not present for this *observing* consciousness, because that unity is essentially the inward movement of the organic and can be apprehended only as concept. Observation, however, seeks the

moments in the form of *being* and *permanence*; and because the organic whole is essentially such that it does not have the moments in this form within it and does not allow them to be found there, consciousness, in its view, transforms the opposition into one suited to that view.

262 In this way organic essence arises for consciousness as a relation of two *existent* and *fixed* moments—an opposition whose two sides therefore seem, on the one hand, to be given to it in observation, and on the other, in their content, express the opposition of the organic *concept of purpose* and *actuality*. Yet because the concept as such is effaced in this, they express it in an obscure, superficial manner in which thought has sunk into representation. Thus we see the first roughly intended under the *inner*, the other under the *outer*, and their relation generates the law: *the outer is the expression of the inner*.

263 Closer consideration of this inner, its opposite, and their relation to each other shows [1807 199] that, first, the two sides of the law no longer have the character they had in earlier laws, where they appeared as independent *things*, each as a particular body; nor, second, is the universal supposed to have its existence somewhere else *outside what exists*. Rather, organic essence in general, undivided, is laid down as the foundation, as the content of inner and outer, and is the same for both. The opposition is therefore now only a purely formal one, whose real sides have the same *in-itself* as their essence. Yet at the same time, since inner and outer are also opposed reality and a *being* differentiated for observation, each seems to observation to have a distinctive content. But since this distinctive content is the same substance or organic unity, it can in fact only be a different form of that unity; observing consciousness indicates this in saying that the outer is only the *expression* of the inner.—We have seen the same determinations of the relationship in the concept of purpose: the indifferent independence of the different sides, and within it their unity, in which they vanish.

264 We must now see what *shape* inner and outer have in their being. The inner as such must have an outer being and a shape just as much as the outer as such, for it [1807 200] is object, or is itself posited as existent and present for observation.

265 As *inner*, organic substance is the *simple* soul, the pure *concept of purpose*, or the *universal*, which in its division remains equally universal fluidity, and therefore in its *being* appears as the *activity* or *movement* of *vanishing* actuality. By contrast, the *outer*, opposed to that existent inner, consists in the organic's *being at rest*. The law, as the relation of that inner to this outer, thus expresses its content at one time in the presentation of universal *moments* or *simple essentialities*, at another in the presentation of actualized essentiality, or *shape*. Those first simple organic *properties*, to call them so, are *sensibility, irritability*, and *reproduction*. These properties, at least the first two, admittedly seem to relate not to the organism in general, but only to the animal organism. The vegetable organism does in fact express only the simple concept of the organism, which *does not develop* its moments; therefore, regarding these moments insofar as they are to be for observation, we must keep to the organism that exhibits their developed existence.

266 As for these properties themselves, they follow immediately from the concept of an end in itself. For *sensibility* expresses in general the simple [1807 201] concept of organic reflection into itself, or its universal fluidity; *irritability*, however, expresses organic elasticity, the capacity to behave *reactively* at the same time in reflection, and the actualization opposed to that first tranquil *being-within-itself*, in which that abstract being-for-itself is a being *for another*. *Reproduction*, however, is the action of this *whole* organism reflected into itself, its activity as purpose in itself or as *genus*, in which the individual thus repels itself from itself and repeats itself by generating either its organic parts or the whole individual. Taken in the sense of *self-preservation in general*, reproduction expresses the formal concept of the organic, or sensibility; but properly it

is the real organic concept, or the *whole* that returns into itself as individual through producing its own singular parts, or as genus through producing individuals.

267 The *other meaning* of these organic elements, namely as the *outer*, is their *configured* mode, in which they are present as *actual* but at the same time also *universal* parts, or organic *systems*: sensibility, for instance, as the nervous system; irritability as the muscular system; reproduction as the viscera preserving the individual and the genus.
[1807 202]

268 Distinctive laws of the organic therefore concern a relationship of organic moments in their doubled meaning: at one time being a *part* of the organic *configuration*, at another a *universal, fluid* determinacy passing through all those systems. Thus in the expression of such a law, for example, a determinate *sensibility* as a moment of the *whole* organism would have its expression in a determinately formed nervous system, or would also be linked with a determinate *reproduction* of the individual's organic parts, or propagation of the whole, and so forth.—The two sides of such a law can be *observed*. According to its concept the *outer* is *being for another*; sensibility, for example, has its immediately actualized mode in the sensitive *system*, and as a *universal property* it is equally something objective in its *manifestations*. The side called the *inner* has its *own outer* side, distinct from what is called the *outer* in the whole.

269 The two sides of an organic law could therefore indeed be observed, but not laws of their relation; and observation is inadequate not because, *as observation*, it would be too shortsighted, and one ought not to proceed empirically but to begin from the idea. For such laws, if they were something real, would in fact have to be actually present, and therefore [1807 203] observable. Rather, observation is inadequate because the thought of laws of this kind proves to have no truth.

270 For a law, the relationship emerged in which the universal organic *property* would have made itself into a thing in an organic *system* and have its configured imprint in it, so that both would be the same essence, present at one time as universal moment, at another as thing. But besides this, the inner side is also in itself a relationship of several sides; hence the thought of a law first presents itself as a relation of the universal organic activities or properties to each other. Whether such a law is possible must be decided from the nature of such a property. As universal fluidity, however, it is, in part, not something limited in the manner of a thing, maintaining itself within the distinction of an existence that would constitute its shape; rather, sensibility extends beyond the nervous system and passes through all the organism's other systems. In part, it is a universal *moment*, essentially undivided and inseparable from reaction, or irritability, and reproduction. For as reflection into itself, it simply has reaction within it. Mere reflectedness into itself is passivity, or dead being, not sensibility, just as action—which is the same as reaction—without reflectedness into itself is not irritability. Reflection in action or [1807 204] reaction, and action or reaction in reflection, is precisely that whose unity constitutes the organic, a unity synonymous with organic reproduction. It follows that in every mode of actuality the same *magnitude* of sensibility must be present as of irritability—considering first their relationship to each other—and that an organic appearance can be apprehended and determined, or explained if one wishes, just as much in terms of the one as of the other. The same thing that one person takes, perhaps, as high sensibility, another can equally well regard as high irritability, and irritability *of the same degree*. If they are called *factors*, and this is not to be a meaningless word, it states precisely that they are *moments* of the concept, and that the real object whose essence this concept constitutes therefore has them within itself in the same manner; if it is determined in terms of the one as highly sensitive, it must equally be declared in terms of the other to be just as irritable.

271 If they are distinguished, as they necessarily must be, they are distinguished according to the concept, and their opposition is *qualitative*. But if, beyond this true distinction, they are also posited as existent and different for represen-

tation, as they might be as sides of a law, they appear in *quantitative* difference. Their distinctive qualitative [1807 205] opposition thus enters into *magnitude*, and laws arise of the kind that, for example, sensibility and irritability stand in inverse ratio to their magnitudes, so that as one increases, the other decreases; or, better, taking magnitude itself directly as the content, that the magnitude of something increases as its smallness decreases.—But if this law is given a determinate content, say that the size of a hole *increases* the more what fills it *decreases*, this inverse ratio can equally be transformed into a direct one and expressed by saying that the size of the hole *increases* in direct proportion to the quantity *removed*—a *tautological* proposition, whether expressed as a direct or an inverse ratio, which in its distinctive expression means only that a magnitude increases as this magnitude increases. Just as the hole and what fills it and is removed are qualitatively opposed, but their reality and its determinate magnitude in both are one and the same, and likewise increase of magnitude and decrease of smallness are the same, so that their meaningless opposition ends in a tautology, so the organic moments are equally inseparable in their reality and in their magnitude, which is the magnitude of that same reality. One decreases only with the other, and increases only with it, for one has significance only insofar as the [1807 206] other is present—or rather, it is indifferent whether an organic appearance is considered as irritability or as sensibility, both generally and when its magnitude is discussed. It is equally indifferent whether the increase of a hole is expressed as an increase of it as emptiness or as an increase of the fullness taken out. Or a number, for example *three*, remains equally large whether I take it positively or negatively; and if I enlarge three to four, the positive as well as the negative has become four—just as a magnet's south pole is exactly as strong as its north pole, or a positive electricity, or an acid, exactly as strong as its negative electricity, or the base upon which it acts.—An organic *existence* is a magnitude like that three, or a magnet, and so forth; it is what is increased and diminished, and when it is increased, *both* its factors are increased, just as *both* poles of the magnet, or both electricities, increase when a magnet and so forth is strengthened.—That the two can differ no more in *intensity* and *extension*—that one cannot decrease in extension but increase in

intensity, while the other conversely is supposed to diminish its intensity but increase in extension—falls under the same concept of empty opposition. Real intensity is [1807 207] simply just as great as extension, and conversely.

272 As is clear, what actually happens in this legislation is that irritability and sensibility first constitute the determinate organic opposition; but this content disappears, and the opposition trails off into the formal opposition of increase and decrease of magnitude, or of differing intensity and extension—an opposition that no longer concerns the nature of sensibility and irritability at all, and no longer expresses them. Hence such an empty game of legislating is not bound to organic moments, but can be played everywhere with anything, and rests in general upon unfamiliarity with the logical nature of these oppositions.

273 Finally, if reproduction, instead of sensibility and irritability, is related to either of them, even the occasion for this legislation disappears. For reproduction does not stand opposed to these moments as they do to each other; and since this legislation rests on opposition, even the semblance of its applicability disappears here.

274 The legislation just considered contains the organism's differences in their significance as moments of its *concept*, and was properly intended to be a priori legislation. But [1807 208] it essentially contains within itself the thought that these moments have the significance of *things present*, and merely observing consciousness must in any case adhere only to their existence. Organic actuality necessarily contains an opposition such as its concept expresses, which can be determined as irritability and sensibility, just as both again appear distinct from reproduction.—The *externality* in which the moments of the organic concept are considered here is the inner's *own immediate* externality, not the *outer* that is outer in the whole and is *shape*, and with which the inner is subsequently to be considered in relation.

275 But if the opposition of the moments is apprehended as it is in existence, sensibility, irritability, and reproduction sink to ordinary *properties*, universalities as indifferent toward each other as specific gravity, color, hardness, and so forth.

In this sense one may certainly observe that one organic being is more sensitive or irritable, or has greater reproductive power, than another; likewise that the sensibility and so forth of one differs in *kind* from that of another, that one behaves differently toward determinate stimuli than another—as the horse behaves differently toward oats than toward hay, and the dog differently again toward both, and so forth—just as one can observe that one body is harder than [1807 209] another, and so forth.—Yet these sensuous properties—hardness, color, and so on—as well as the appearances of receptivity to the stimulus of oats, irritability under burdens, or the number and manner of giving birth to young, essentially resist lawfulness when related to and compared with one another. For the determinacy of their *sensuous being* consists precisely in existing completely indifferently toward one another, and in exhibiting nature's freedom released from the concept rather than the unity of a relation: exhibiting its irrational play back and forth on the scale of contingent magnitude between the concept's moments rather than these moments themselves.

276 The *other* side, on which the simple moments of the organic concept are compared with the moments of *configuration*, would first yield the law proper, which would declare the true *outer* as the imprint of the *inner*.—Now, because those simple moments are pervasive, fluid properties, they do not have in the organic thing a segregated real expression such as what is called a singular system of shape. Or, if the organism's abstract idea is truly expressed in those three moments only because they are nothing stationary, but merely moments of the concept and movement, the organism as configuration, by contrast, is not contained within three such determinate systems [1807 210] as anatomy lays out. Insofar as such systems are supposed to be found in their actuality and legitimated by this finding, we must also recall that anatomy displays not merely three such systems, but many more.—Furthermore, quite apart from this, the sensitive *system* must in general mean something entirely different from what is called the *nervous system*; likewise the irritable *system* something different from the *muscular system*, and the reproductive *system* something different from the *viscera* of reproduction. In the systems of *shape* as such, the organism is appre-

hended on the abstract side of dead existence; its moments, taken this way, belong to anatomy and the cadaver, not to cognition and the living organism. As such parts they have, rather, ceased *to be*, for they cease to be processes. Since the organism's *being* is essentially universality, or reflection into itself, the *being* of its whole, like that of its moments, cannot consist in an anatomical system. Rather, their actual expression and externality are present only as a movement running through the various parts of the configuration, in which what is torn out and fixed as a singular system exhibits itself essentially as a fluid moment. Thus not that actuality as anatomy finds it may count as their reality, but only actuality [1807 211] as process, within which alone the anatomical parts also have a meaning.

277 It follows, then, that neither are the moments of the organic *inner*, taken on their own, capable of providing sides of a law of being—since, in such a law, predicated of an existence, they would have to be distinguished from one another, and each could not be named indifferently in place of the other—nor, placed on one side, do they have their realization on the other in a fixed system. For this latter is no more something possessing organic truth in general than it is the expression of those inner moments. Rather, since the essential character of the organic is in itself the universal, it consists in general in having its moments in actuality equally as universal, that is, as processes running through it, not in giving an image of the universal in an isolated thing.

278 In this way the *representation* of a *law* in general disappears in the organic. The law seeks to apprehend and express the opposition as sides at rest, and in them the determinacy that is their relation to each other. The *inner*, to which appearing universality belongs, and the *outer*, to which the parts of shape at rest belong, were to constitute the corresponding sides of the law; yet held apart in this way, they lose their organic significance. The representation of law lays down precisely this as [1807 212] its foundation: that its two sides should have an indifferent subsistence for themselves, and that the relation should be dis-

tributed between them as a doubled, corresponding determinacy. Rather, each side of the organic is within itself this: simple universality in which all determinations are dissolved, and the movement of this dissolution.

279 Insight into the difference between this legislation and earlier forms will fully illuminate its nature.—If we look back at the movement of perceiving and of the understanding that therein reflects itself into itself and thereby determines its object, this understanding does not have before it, in its object, the *relation* of these abstract determinations—universal and singular, essential and external—but is itself the passing-over, for which this passing-over does not become objective. Here, by contrast, organic unity—that is, precisely the relation of those opposites, and this relation is pure passing-over—is itself the *object*. This passing-over in its simplicity is immediately *universality*; and as universality enters into the difference whose relation the law is to express, its moments *as universals* are objects of this consciousness, and the law states that the *outer* is expression of the *inner*. Understanding has here grasped *the thought* of law itself, whereas [1807 213] previously it merely sought laws in general, and their moments hovered before it as a determinate content, not as the thoughts of those moments.—As regards content, then, what are to be obtained here are not laws that merely take up purely *existent* differences at rest into the form of universality, but laws that immediately contain in these differences the concept's unrest, and thereby also the necessity of the sides' relation. Yet precisely because the object, organic unity, immediately unites infinite sublation, or the absolute negation of being, with being at rest, and the moments are essentially *pure passing-over*, no such *existent* sides arise as are required for law.

280 To obtain such sides, understanding must adhere to the other moment of the organic relationship: organic existence's *reflectedness* into itself. But this being is so completely reflected into itself that no determinacy over against another remains to it. *Immediate* sensuous being is immediately one with determinacy as such, and therefore expresses a qualitative difference within itself—for example, blue as opposed to red, acid as opposed to alkaline, and so forth. But organic being, having returned into itself, is completely indifferent toward

another; its existence is simple universality, and denies [1807 214] observation permanent sensuous differences, or, what is the same, displays its essential determinacy only as the *alternation of existent* determinations. Thus difference's expression as existent is precisely its being an *indifferent* difference, that is, as *magnitude*. In this, however, the concept is effaced and necessity has vanished.—But the content and filling of this indifferent being, the alternation of sensuous determinations gathered into the simplicity of an organic determination, then at the same time expresses that it does not have precisely that determinacy of immediate property, and the qualitative falls solely into magnitude, as we saw above.

281 Thus, although what is objective, apprehended as organic determinacy, contains the concept within itself, and thereby differs from the object for understanding that behaves as purely perceptive in apprehending the content of its laws, this apprehension nonetheless falls entirely back into the principle and manner of merely perceiving understanding, because what is apprehended is used as moments of a *law*. For it thereby acquires the mode of a fixed determinacy, the form of an immediate property or an appearance at rest, is further taken up into the determination of magnitude, and the nature of the concept is suppressed.—The exchange of something merely perceived for [1807 215] something reflected into itself, of a merely sensuous determinacy for an organic one, therefore loses its value again, precisely because understanding has not yet sublated legislation.

282 To make the comparison regarding this exchange through a few examples: something that for perception is an animal with strong muscles is determined as an animal organism of high irritability; or what for perception is a state of great weakness is determined as a state of high sensibility—or, if preferred, as an abnormal affection, specifically a potentiation of sensibility: expressions that translate the sensuous not into the concept but into a German-Latin jargon. Understanding can also express the animal's having strong muscles by saying that the animal possesses great *muscular power*, just as great weakness can be expressed as slight *power*. Determination through irritability has an advantage

over determination as *power*: the latter expresses indeterminate reflection into itself, the former determinate reflection, for the muscle's *distinctive* power is precisely irritability. It has an advantage over determination as *strong muscles* in that, as already in power, reflection into itself is also contained within it. Likewise weakness, or slight power, *organic passivity*, is determinately expressed through *sensibility*. But sensibility thus taken and fixed on its own, and further combined with the [1807 216] determination of *magnitude*, and as greater or lesser sensibility opposed to greater or lesser irritability—each is wholly reduced to the sensuous element and the ordinary form of a property, and their relation is not the concept, but, on the contrary, magnitude, into which the opposition now falls and becomes a thoughtless difference. Although the indeterminacy of expressions such as *power*, *strength*, and *weakness* has been removed here, what now arises is an equally empty and indeterminate wandering among the oppositions of higher and lower sensibility and irritability, in their rising and falling in themselves and in relation to each other. Greater or lesser sensibility and irritability are sensuous appearances apprehended and expressed without thought, no less than strength and weakness are wholly sensuous, thoughtless determinations. The concept has not taken the place of those conceptless expressions; rather, strength and weakness have been filled with a determination that, taken on its own, rests upon the concept and has it as its content, but entirely loses this origin and character.—Thus, through the form of simplicity and immediacy in which this content is made one side of a law, and through magnitude, which constitutes the element of difference between such determinations, the essence originally being and posited as concept retains the [1807 217] mode of sensuous perception, and remains as remote from cognition as in determination through strength and weakness of power, or through immediate sensuous properties.

283 It now remains to consider *on its own* what is the *outer* of the organic, and how the opposition of *its* inner and outer determines itself within it, just as first the *inner* of the whole was considered in relation to its *own* outer.

284 The *outer*, considered on its own, is *configuration* in general, the system of life articulating itself in the *element* of *being*, and essentially at the same time the being of organic essence *for another*—objective essence in its *being-for-itself*.—This *other* appears initially as its external inorganic nature. Considered in relation to a law, these two cannot, as we saw above, have inorganic nature constitute one side of a law opposite organic essence, because organic essence is also absolutely for itself and has a universal and free relation to inorganic nature.

285 More closely determined in the organic shape itself, the relationship of these two sides is thus that on one side it is turned toward inorganic nature, while on the other it is *for itself* and reflected into itself. The *actual* organic being is the middle term joining life's *being-for-itself* with the *outer* in general, or *being-in-itself*. [1807 218]—But the extreme of being-for-itself is the inner as infinite one, which takes the moments of shape themselves back into itself out of their subsistence and their connection with the outer; the contentless, which gives itself its content in shape and appears within it as its process. In this extreme, as simple negativity or *pure singularity*, the organic has its absolute freedom, through which it is indifferent and secure against being for another and against the determinacy of the moments of shape. This freedom is at the same time the freedom of the moments themselves: their possibility of appearing and being apprehended as *existent*. In it they are liberated and indifferent not only toward the external but also toward each other, for the *simplicity* of this freedom is *being*, or their simple substance. This concept, or pure freedom, is one and the same life, however variously shape, or being for another, may roam in its play; this stream of life is indifferent to what kind of mills it drives.—First, it must now be noted that this concept is not to be apprehended here, as earlier in the consideration of the inner proper, in its form of *process*, or the development of its moments, but in its form as *simple inner*, constituting the purely universal side over against the *actual* living being, or as the *element* of *subsistence* of the existent members of [1807 219] shape. For it is shape that we are considering here, and within it life's essence is as the simplicity of subsistence. Then *being for another*, or the determinacy of actual configuration, taken up into this sim-

ple universality that is its essence, is an equally simple, universal, unsensuous determinacy, and can only be what is expressed as *number*.—It is the middle term of shape, linking indeterminate life with actual life, simple like the former and determinate like the latter. What would be number in the former, the *inner*, the outer would have to express in its own manner as multiform actuality, mode of life, color, and so forth—in general as the entire multitude of differences developing in appearance.

286 Comparing the two sides of the organic whole—one the *inner*, the other the *outer*, so that each again has an inner and outer within itself—in terms of their respective inner, the inner of the first was the concept as the unrest of *abstraction*; the second, however, has as its inner universality at rest, and within it also determinacy at rest, number. Hence, if the first deceptively promised laws through the semblance of necessity in relation, because the concept develops its moments within it, the second immediately renounces this promise, since number shows itself as the determination of one side of its laws. [1807 220] For number is precisely the wholly resting, dead, indifferent determinacy in which all movement and relation have died out, and which has broken off the bridge to the living reality of drives, mode of life, and other sensuous existence.

287 Yet this consideration of organic *shape* as such, and of the inner as an inner merely of shape, is in fact no longer a consideration of the organic. For the two sides that were to be related are posited only as indifferent to each other, thereby sublating the reflection into itself that constitutes the essence of the organic. Rather, the attempted comparison of inner and outer is here transferred to inorganic nature; the infinite concept is here only the *essence* that is hidden within, or falls outside into self-consciousness, and no longer has its objective presence as in the organic. This relation of inner and outer must therefore still be considered in its proper sphere.

288 First, that inner of shape, as the simple singularity of an inorganic thing, is *specific gravity*. It can be observed as simple being, as can the numerical determinacy of which alone it is capable—or properly, found by comparing observa-

tions—and seems in this way to provide one side of the law. [1807 221] Shape, color, hardness, toughness, and an innumerable multitude of other properties would together constitute the *outer* side and have to express the inner's determinacy, number, so that one would have its counterpart in the other.

289 Now, because negativity is apprehended here not as the movement of process, but as *tranquilized* unity, or *simple being-for-itself*, it appears instead as that through which the thing resists the process and maintains itself within itself as indifferent to it. But because this simple being-for-itself is a calm indifference toward another, specific gravity appears as one *property beside* others; and with this every necessary relation of it to this multiplicity, or all lawfulness, ceases.—As this simple inner, specific gravity does not have difference *within itself*, or has only inessential difference; for its *pure simplicity* sublates every essential distinction. This inessential difference, *magnitude*, would therefore have to have its counterpart or *other* on the other side, which is the multiplicity of properties, since only thereby is it difference at all. If this multiplicity itself is gathered into the simplicity of opposition and determined, perhaps, as *cohesion*, so that cohesion is *being-for-itself in otherness*, while specific gravity is *pure being-for-itself*, then this [1807 222] cohesion is initially this pure determinacy posited in the concept over against that determinacy, and the manner of legislation would be the one considered above in the relation of sensibility to irritability.—Furthermore, as the *concept* of being-for-itself in otherness, it is only the *abstraction* of the side opposed to specific gravity, and as such has no existence. For being-for-itself in otherness is the process in which the inorganic would have to express its being-for-itself as a *self-preservation* that kept it from emerging from the process as a moment of a product. Yet precisely this is contrary to its nature, which does not have purpose or universality within itself. Rather, its process is only the determinate behavior in which its being-for-itself, its specific gravity, *sublates itself*. But this determinate behavior itself, in which its cohesion in its true concept would consist, and the determinate magnitude of its specific gravity, are concepts entirely indifferent to each other. If the manner of behavior were entirely disregarded and restricted to the representation of magnitude,

one might perhaps conceive the determination that greater specific weight, as a higher being-within-itself, would resist entering the process more than lesser specific weight. Yet conversely, the freedom of being-for-itself proves itself only in the ease with which it engages with everything and preserves itself in [1807 223] this manifoldness. That intensity without extension of relations is an abstraction without substance, for extension constitutes intensity's *existence*. But the inorganic's self-preservation in its relation falls, as remarked, outside its nature, since it does not have the principle of movement within itself, or since its being is not absolute negativity and concept.

290 If, by contrast, this other side of the inorganic is considered not as process but as being at rest, it is ordinary cohesion: a *simple* sensuous property that has stepped to one side over against the released moment of *otherness*, which lies dispersed in many indifferent properties; and, like specific gravity, it itself takes its place among these. The multitude of properties together then constitutes the other side over against cohesion. But in it, as in the others, *number* is the sole determinacy, which not only does not express a relation and transition of these properties to one another, but essentially consists precisely in having no necessary relation, and instead exhibiting the eradication of all lawfulness; for number is the expression of determinacy as *inessential*. Thus a series of bodies expressing difference as the numerical difference of their specific gravities runs in no way parallel to a series of differences in the other [1807 224] properties, even if, to make matters easier, only one or a few of them are taken. For in fact only their whole aggregate could constitute the other side in this parallel. In order to order this aggregate within itself and join it into a whole, the quantitative determinations of these various properties are, on the one hand, present for observation, but on the other their differences enter as qualitative. What in this heap would have to be designated positive or negative and cancel reciprocally—in general, the inward configuration and exposition of the formula, which would be highly composite—would belong to the concept, which is excluded precisely by the manner in which the properties lie before us and are to be apprehended as *existent*. In this being, none exhibits the character of a negative

toward another; rather, one *is* just as much as another, nor does it otherwise indicate its place in the arrangement of the whole.—With a series proceeding in parallel differences—whether the relationship is intended as increasing on both sides together, or increasing on one and decreasing on the other—the concern is only with the *final* simple expression of this gathered whole, which was to constitute one side of the law opposite specific gravity. Yet this one side, as an *existent result*, is precisely nothing other than what has already been mentioned: [1807 225] a singular property, such as ordinary cohesion, beside which the others, including specific gravity, are indifferently present; and any other can be chosen with equal right—that is, with equal wrong—as representative of the whole other side. One, like another, would merely represent the essence, or *put it before us*, but would not be the matter itself. Thus the attempt to find series of bodies that proceeded along the simple parallel of two sides and expressed the essential nature of bodies according to a law of these sides must be taken as a thought that does not know its task or the means by which it was to be accomplished.

291 Earlier, the relation of outer and inner in shape that was to present itself to observation was immediately carried over into the inorganic sphere. The determination drawing it there can now be stated more precisely, and from this another form and relation of this relationship emerges. For in the organic, what seems in the inorganic to offer the possibility of such a comparison of inner and outer disappears altogether. The inorganic inner is a simple inner, presenting itself to perception as an *existent* property; its determinacy is [1807 226] therefore essentially magnitude, and as an existent property it appears indifferent to the outer, or the many other sensuous properties. But the being-for-itself of organic life does not thus step to one side over against its outer, but contains the principle of *otherness* within itself. If we determine being-for-itself as a *simple, self-preserving relation to itself*, its otherness is simple *negativity*, and organic unity is the unity of self-equal self-relation and pure negativity. This unity as unity is the inner of the organic; the organic is thereby universal in itself, or is *genus*. But the genus's freedom toward its actuality is different from

the freedom of specific *gravity* toward shape. The latter's freedom is an *existent* freedom, or its stepping to one side as a particular property. But because it is *existent* freedom, it is also only *one determinacy* that belongs *essentially* to this shape, or through which this shape *as essence* is determinate. The genus's freedom, however, is universal and indifferent toward this shape or toward its actuality. The *determinacy* belonging to inorganic *being-for-itself as such* therefore falls in the organic *beneath its* being-for-itself, just as in the inorganic it falls only beneath its *being*. Hence, although in the inorganic this determinacy is at the same time only a *property*, [1807 227] it nevertheless receives the dignity of *essence*, because as the simple negative it confronts existence as being for another; and this simple negative, in its ultimate singular determinacy, is a number. The organic, however, is a singularity that is itself pure negativity, and therefore eradicates within itself the fixed determinacy of number belonging to *indifferent being*. Insofar as it has the moment of indifferent being, and within it number, number can therefore be taken only as a play within it, not as the essence of its livingness.

292 Yet although pure negativity, the principle of process, does not fall outside the organic, and the organic therefore does not have it as a determinacy in its *essence*, but singularity itself is universal in itself, this pure singularity is nevertheless not developed and actual within the organic in its moments as themselves *abstract* or *universal*. Rather, this expression falls outside that universality, which withdraws into *inwardness*; and between actuality or shape—that is, developing singularity—and the organic universal or genus, there enters the *determinate* universal, *species*. The existence that the negativity of the universal or genus attains is only the developed movement of a process running through the *parts of existent shape*. If the genus, [1807 228] as simplicity at rest, contained the differentiated parts within it, and if its *simple negativity* as such were thus at the same time movement running through equally simple parts immediately universal within themselves, which as such moments would be actual here, then organic genus would be consciousness. As it is, however, *simple determinacy*, as the determinacy of species, is present within it in a spiritless

manner; actuality begins from it, or what enters actuality is not genus as such —that is, not thought at all. As an actual organic being, genus is represented only by a representative. Yet this representative, number, which seems to designate the transition from genus into individual configuration and to give observation both sides of necessity—at one time as simple determinacy, at another as configuration developed and born forth into manifoldness—designates instead the indifference and freedom of universal and singular toward each other. The singular is abandoned by genus to the inessential difference of magnitude, yet as living it shows itself equally free from this difference. True universality, as determined, is here only *inner essence*; as *determinacy of species* it is formal universality, and over against this, that true universality steps to the side of singularity, which thereby is living and, through its *inner, rises above its [1807 229] determinacy as species*. But this singularity is not at the same time a universal individual—that is, one in which universality would equally have external actuality; rather, this falls outside organic life. Yet this *universal* individual, as it *immediately* is the individual of natural configurations, is not consciousness itself; if it were to be consciousness, its existence as a *singular organic living individual* would not have to fall outside it.

293 We therefore see a syllogism in which one extreme is *universal life as universal*, or as genus, while the other extreme is *the same life as singular*, or as universal individual; the middle term, however, is composed of both. The first seems to send itself into it as *determinate* universality, or *species*, while the other does so as *proper* or singular *singularity*.—And since this syllogism belongs altogether to the side of *configuration*, what is distinguished as inorganic nature is equally comprehended under it.

294 Now, since universal life as *the simple essence of genus*, for its part, develops the differences of the concept and must exhibit them as a series of simple determinations, this series is a system of indifferently posited differences, or *a numerical series*. Previously the organic in the form of singularity was opposed to this inessential difference, which does not express or contain its [1807 230] living nature—and the same must be said of the inorganic according to its whole exis-

tence developed in the multitude of its properties. Now, however, it is the universal individual that must be considered not only as free of every articulation of genus, but also as its power. Genus, which divides itself into species according to the *universal determinacy* of number, or may also take singular determinations of its existence, for example figure, color, and so forth, as its basis of division, suffers violence in this tranquil business from the universal individual, *the earth*. As universal negativity, the earth asserts against the systematizing of genus the differences as it contains them within itself, whose nature, because of the substance to which they belong, is different from the nature of those of genus. This activity of genus becomes an entirely restricted business, which it may pursue only within those mighty elements, and which their unbridled force everywhere interrupts, leaves incomplete, and stunts.

295 It follows that in configured existence, reason can become present to observation only *as life in general*, which, however, in its differentiation does not actually contain a rational sequence and articulation within itself, and is not a self-grounded system of shapes.—If [1807 231] in the syllogism of organic configuration the middle term, into which species and its actuality as singular individuality fall, contained within itself the extremes of inner universality and universal individuality, this middle term would have in *the movement* of its actuality the expression and nature of universality, and would be self-systematizing development. Thus *consciousness* has, as the middle term between universal spirit and its singularity, or sensuous consciousness, the system of consciousness's configurations as a life of spirit ordering itself into a whole—the system considered here, which has its objective existence as world history. But organic nature has no history; from its universal, life, it falls immediately down into the singularity of existence. The moments united in this actuality, simple determinacy and singular livingness, produce becoming only as the contingent movement in which each is active at its own part and the whole is preserved. Yet this activity is *for itself* restricted to its own point, because the whole is not present within it, and the whole is not present there because it is not here *for itself* as a whole.

296 Thus, beyond observing reason's attaining in organic nature only the intuition of itself as universal life in general, [1807 232] it gains an intuition of life's development and realization only according to systems distinguished in an entirely general way, whose determination has its essence not in the organic as such but in the universal individual; and *under* these differences of the earth, according to sequences that genus attempts.

297 Since, then, in its actuality the *universality of organic life* lets itself fall immediately into the extreme of *singularity*, without true mediation that is for itself, observing consciousness has only *meaning* before it as a thing; and if reason can take an idle interest in observing this meaning, it is restricted to describing and recounting nature's opinions and fancies. This spiritless freedom of meaning will indeed everywhere offer beginnings of laws, traces of necessity, hints of order and sequence, ingenious and plausible relations. Yet in the relation of the organic to the existent differences of the inorganic—the elements, zones, and climates—observation gets no further, regarding law and necessity, than *great influence*. Likewise, on the other side, where individuality has not the meaning of the earth but that of the *one immanent* in organic life, and although this one in immediate unity with the universal constitutes genus, [1807 233] precisely for that reason the genus's simple unity determines itself only as number and therefore leaves qualitative appearance free—observation can get no further than *pleasing remarks, interesting relations, a friendly accommodation to the concept*. But pleasing *remarks* are no *knowledge of necessity*; *interesting* relations stop at *interest*, while interest is still only an opinion about reason; and the *friendliness* with which the individual alludes to a concept is a childlike friendliness, which becomes childish if it claims or is supposed to count for something in and for itself.
[1807 234]
b. Observation of Self-Consciousness in Its Purity and Its Relation to External Actuality; Logical and Psychological Laws.

298 Observation of nature finds the concept realized in inorganic nature: laws whose moments are things that at the same time behave as abstractions; but this concept is not a simplicity reflected into itself. The life of organic nature, by contrast, is only this simplicity reflected into itself; its opposition to itself as universal and singular does not separate within the essence of this life itself. Its essence is not genus dividing and moving within its undifferentiated element, while at the same time remaining undifferentiated for itself in its opposition. Observation finds this free concept, whose universality equally contains developed singularity absolutely within itself, only in the concept itself existing as concept, or in self-consciousness.
[1807 235]

299 Now turning into itself and directing itself toward the concept actual as free concept, observation first finds the *laws of thought*. This singularity, which thinking is within itself, is the abstract movement of the negative, entirely taken back into simplicity, and the laws are outside reality.—To say that they have no *reality* means nothing other than that they are without truth. They are indeed supposed to be, if not *complete*, nevertheless *formal* truth. Yet the purely formal without reality is a thought-entity, or empty abstraction without the division within itself that would be nothing other than content.—On the other hand, since they are laws of pure thinking, and pure thinking is the intrinsically universal, and therefore a knowing that immediately contains being and with it all reality, these laws are absolute concepts and indivisibly the essentialities of form as of things. Since universality moving within itself is the *divided* simple concept, it thus has *content* within itself, and a content that is all content, only not a sensuous being. It is a content neither contradicting form nor separated from it at all, but rather essentially form itself; for form is nothing other than the universal dividing itself into its pure moments.

300 But insofar as this form or content is *for observation* as observation, it receives the [1807 236] determination of a *found*, given—that is, *merely existent*—content. It becomes the *being at rest* of relations, a multitude of isolated necessities that are supposed to have truth as a *fixed* content in and for themselves, *in their*

determinacy, and are thus in fact withdrawn from form.—Yet this absolute truth of fixed determinations, or of many different laws, contradicts the unity of self-consciousness, or of thinking and form in general. What is declared to be a fixed law, abiding in itself, can be only a moment of unity reflecting itself into itself, can appear only as a vanishing magnitude. But torn by consideration out of this movement's context and posited singly, they do not lack content, for they have, rather, a determinate content; what they lack instead is form, which is their essence. These laws are not the truth of thinking, in fact, not because they are supposed to be merely formal and have no content, but for precisely the opposite reason: because in their determinacy, or precisely *as a content* deprived of form, they are supposed to count as something absolute. In their truth, as moments vanishing in the unity of thinking, they would have to be taken as knowing, or thinking movement, not as *laws* of knowing. But observation is not knowing itself, and does not know it; instead, it inverts knowing's nature into the [1807 237] shape of *being*, that is, apprehends its negativity only as its *laws*.—It is sufficient here to have shown the invalidity of the so-called laws of thought from the general nature of the matter. Their more precise development belongs to speculative philosophy, where they show themselves as what they truly are: singular vanishing moments whose truth is only the whole of thinking movement, knowing itself.

301 This negative unity of thinking is for itself, or rather it is *being-for-itself*, the principle of individuality, and in its reality, *active consciousness*. The nature of the matter therefore carries observing consciousness onward to active consciousness as the reality of those laws. Since this connection is not present for it, it believes that on one side thinking remains standing for it within its laws, while on the other it obtains another being in what is now its object: active consciousness, which is for itself in such a way that it sublates otherness and has its actuality in this intuition of itself as the negative.

302 Thus a *new field* opens for *observation* in *the acting actuality of consciousness*. Psychology contains the multitude of laws according to which spirit behaves differently toward the different modes of its actuality as a *[1807 238] preexist-*

ing otherness: partly receiving these into itself and *conforming* to the habits, customs, and way of thinking it finds, as that in which it is its own object as actuality; partly knowing itself as self-active against them, selecting only something particular from them for itself through inclination and passion, and *making the objective conform to itself*. In the former case it behaves negatively toward itself as singularity, in the latter toward itself as universal being.—On the first side, independence gives what it finds only the *form* of conscious individuality in general, and as regards content remains within the universal actuality already present. On the other side, however, it gives that actuality at least a distinctive modification that does not contradict its essential content, or else a modification through which the individual, as particular actuality and distinctive content, opposes it—and becomes criminal insofar as it sublates this actuality in a merely singular manner; or, doing this in a universal manner and thus for all, replaces the existing world, right, law, and customs with another world, another right, law, and customs.

303 Observing psychology, which first states its perceptions of the *universal modes* it encounters in active consciousness, finds various faculties, inclinations, and passions; and since [1807 239] recollection of the unity of self-consciousness cannot be suppressed while this collection is recounted, it must at least proceed to amazement that so many varied and heterogeneous things, contingent to each other, can be together in spirit as in a sack, especially since they show themselves not as dead things at rest, but as restless movements.

304 In recounting these different faculties, observation occupies the universal side; the unity of these manifold capacities is the side opposed to this universality, *actual* individuality.—But to apprehend and recount differentiated actual individualities in turn by saying that one person has more inclination toward this, another toward that, one more understanding than another, is something far less interesting than even enumerating species of insects, mosses, and so forth. For these give observation the right to take them thus singly and without concept, because they belong essentially to the element of contingent singularization. To take conscious individuality spiritlessly as a *singular* existent appear-

ance, by contrast, involves the contradiction that its essence is the universal of spirit. Yet insofar as apprehension also lets individuality enter the form of universality, it finds *its law*, and now seems to have a rational purpose and pursue a necessary business.
[1807 240]

305 The moments constituting the content of the law are, on one side, individuality itself, and on the other, its universal inorganic nature: the preexisting circumstances, situation, habits, customs, religion, and so on. Determinate individuality is to be comprehended from these. They contain the determinate as well as the universal and are at the same time *things present*, offering themselves to observation and expressing themselves on the other side in the form of individuality.

306 The law of this relationship between the two sides would now have to contain the effect and influence that these determinate circumstances exert upon individuality. But individuality is precisely this: *equally* to be the *universal*, and thus in a calm, immediate manner to flow together with the *present* universal—customs, habits, and so forth—and conform to them, *and* to behave in opposition to them and instead overturn them; as well as, in its singularity, to behave wholly indifferently toward them, neither letting them act upon it nor acting against them. *What* is to influence individuality and *what* influence it is to have—which actually amounts to the same thing—therefore depends solely upon individuality itself. To say that *through this* an individuality *has become this determinate individuality* means nothing other than that *it already was this*. Circumstances, situation, customs, and so forth, which are shown on one side [1807 241] as *present*, and on the other *in this determinate individuality*, express only its indeterminate essence, which is not what concerns us. Had these circumstances, way of thinking, customs, and state of the world in general not existed, the individual would indeed not have become what it is; for all those who find themselves in this state of the world are this universal substance. —But as the world has particularized itself in *this* individual—and it is such an individual that is to be comprehended—it would have to have particularized

itself in and for itself and acted upon an individual in this determinacy it had given itself. Only thus would it have made the individual into the determinate one it is. If the outer had constituted itself in and for itself as it appears in individuality, individuality would be comprehended from it. We would have a doubled gallery of pictures, one the reflection of the other: one the gallery of the complete determination and delimitation of external circumstances, the other the same translated into the manner in which they are in the conscious being; the former the surface of the sphere, the latter the center that represents that surface within itself.

307 But the sphere's surface, the individual's world, immediately has the ambiguous meaning of being *a world and situation existing in and for themselves*, and *the individual's world either* insofar as the individual had merely flowed together with it, let it enter into itself as it is, [1807 242] and behaved toward it only as formal consciousness;—*or*, alternatively, of being the individual's world as what is present has been *overturned* by that individual.—Since, because of this freedom, actuality is capable of this doubled meaning, the individual's world can be comprehended only from the individual itself; and the *influence* upon the individual of actuality represented as *existing* in and for itself receives through the individual an absolutely opposed meaning: either it *lets* the stream of incoming actuality *run its course* within it, or it interrupts and overturns it. But thereby *psychological necessity* becomes so empty a word that what is supposed to have had this influence contains the absolute possibility that it might equally not have had it.

308 Thus the *being* that would be *in and for itself*, and was to constitute one side—and specifically the universal side—of a law, disappears. Individuality is what *its* world is as *its own*; individuality itself is the sphere of its activity in which it has exhibited itself as actuality, and is simply only the unity of *preexisting* and *produced being*. The sides of this unity do not fall apart, as in the representation of psychological law, into a world present *in itself* and an individuality existing *for itself*; or, if each is thus considered on its own, no necessity or law of their relation to each other is present.

[1807 243]

c. Observation of the Relation of Self-Consciousness to Its Immediate Actuality; Physiognomy and the Study of the Skull.

309 Psychological observation finds no law of self-consciousness's relationship to actuality, or to the world opposed to it, and through their mutual indifference is driven back upon the *distinctive determinacy* of real individuality, which is itself *in and for itself*, or contains the opposition of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself* effaced in their absolute mediation. This is the object that has now arisen for observation, or to which it passes over.

310 The individual is in and for itself: it is *for itself*, or is a free activity; but it is also *in itself*, or itself has an *original*, determinate *being*—a determinacy that according to the concept is the same as what psychology wished to find outside it. Thus *within the individual itself* there emerges the opposition of being this doubled thing: the movement of [1807 244] consciousness and the fixed being of an appearing actuality, an actuality that is immediately *its own* within it. This *being*, the *body* of determinate individuality, is its *originality*, what it has not done. Yet since the individual is at the same time only what it has done, its body is also the expression of itself *produced* by it; at the same time a *sign* that has not remained the immediate thing, but in which it merely makes known what it *is* in the sense that it puts its original nature into practice.

311 If we consider the moments present here in relation to the preceding view, there is here a universal human shape, or at least the universal shape of a climate, continent, or people, just as previously there were the same universal customs and cultivation. To these are added the particular circumstances and situation within universal actuality; here this particular actuality is present as a particular formation of the individual's shape.—On the other side, just as previously the individual's free activity and actuality as *its own* were set against pre-existing actuality, here stands shape as the expression of *its* actualization posited by itself, the features and forms of its self-active essence. But the actuality, both universal and particular, that observation previously found outside the individ-

ual is here its own actuality, its inborn body; and into this very body [1807 245] falls the expression belonging to its activity. In the psychological consideration, actuality existing in and for itself and determinate individuality were to be related to each other; here, however, the *whole determinate individuality* is the object of observation, and each side of its opposition is itself this whole. Thus the outer whole includes not only *original being*, the inborn body, but equally its formation, which belongs to the activity of the inner. It is the unity of unformed and formed being, and the individual's actuality permeated by being-for-itself. This whole, encompassing the determinate original fixed parts and the features that arise only through activity, *is*, and this *being* is the *expression* of the inner, of the individual posited as consciousness and movement.—This *inner*, likewise, is no longer formal, contentless, or indeterminate self-activity whose content and determinacy would, as previously, lie in external circumstances; rather, it is an original character determinate in itself, whose form alone is activity. The relationship between these two sides is therefore considered here: how it is to be determined, and what is to be understood by this *expression* of the inner in the outer.

312 Initially this outer does not make the inner visible, or into a being for another at all, as an *organ*; for insofar as the inner is in the [1807 246] organ, it is *activity* itself. The speaking mouth, the working hand, and, if desired, the legs as well, are the organs of actualization and accomplishment, containing activity *as activity*, or the inner as such; but the externality the inner acquires through them is the deed, as an actuality separated from the individual. Speech and work are manifestations in which the individual no longer retains and possesses itself within itself, but lets the inner come entirely outside itself and surrenders it to another. One can therefore equally say that these manifestations express the inner too much and too little: *too much*, because the inner itself bursts forth in them, leaving no opposition between them and it; they give not merely an *expression* of the inner, but immediately the inner itself. *Too little*, because in speech and action the inner makes itself into another and thereby surrenders itself to the element of transformation, which overturns the spoken word and

accomplished deed and makes something different of them from what they are in and for themselves as actions of this determinate individual. Through this externality, the works of action not only lose, under the influence of others, the character of being something enduring over against other individualities; but since they relate to the inner they contain as a separated, indifferent outer, [1807 247] they can, as inner, *through the individual itself*, be something other than they appear—either because the individual intentionally makes them appear as something other than they truly are, or because it is too inept to give itself the outward aspect it really wanted, and to fix it so that others cannot distort its work. Thus activity as accomplished work has a doubled, opposed meaning: either to be the *inner* individuality and *not* its *expression*, or, as outer, to be an actuality *free* of the inner and something entirely other than it.—Because of this ambiguity, we must look for the inner as it *still is in the individual itself*, but visibly or externally. In the organ, however, it is only as immediate *activity* itself, acquiring its externality in the deed, which either represents the inner or does not. Considered according to this opposition, the organ therefore does not provide the expression sought.

313 If, then, outward shape could express inward individuality only insofar as it is not organ or *activity*, and hence is a whole *at rest*, it would behave as a subsisting thing that calmly received the inner as something alien into its passive existence and thereby became its *sign*: an external, contingent expression whose *actual* side is in itself [1807 248] meaningless—a language whose sounds and combinations of sounds are not the matter itself, but are linked with it by free choice and are contingent for it.

314 Such an arbitrary connection between things external to each other yields no law. Physiognomy, however, is supposed to distinguish itself from other disreputable arts and pernicious studies by considering determinate individuality in the *necessary* opposition of inner and outer, of character as conscious *essence* and that same character as existent shape, and relating these moments to each other as they are related through their concept, and therefore must constitute the content of a law. In astrology, palmistry, and similar sciences, by contrast,

only outer seems to be related to outer, something to something alien to it. *This* constellation at birth, and, if this outer is brought closer to the body itself, *these* lines of the hand, are *external* moments in relation to the individual's long or short life and fate in general. As externalities they behave indifferently toward each other and do not have the necessity for each other that is supposed to lie in the relation of an *outer* and an *inner*.

315 The hand, admittedly, seems not so much something external to fate, but rather [1807 249] something inward in relation to it. For fate, in turn, is only the appearance of what determinate individuality *in itself* is as inward original determinacy.—The palmist, like the physiognomist, arrives at knowing what individuality is in itself by a shorter route than, for example, Solon, who thought this could be known only from and after the course of the whole life. He considered appearance; they consider the *in-itself*. Yet that the hand must exhibit individuality's *in-itself* regarding its fate is easily seen from the fact that, next to the organ of speech, it is above all that through which the human being brings itself into appearance and actualization. It is the ensouled master craftsman of its fortune; one can say of it that it *is* what a human being *does*. For in the hand, as the active organ of self-accomplishment, the human being is present as animating; and since originally it is its own fate, the hand will therefore express this in-itself.

316 From this determination—that the *organ* of activity is *equally* a *being* and the *activity* within it, or that inward *being-in-itself* is itself *present* within it and has a *being for* others—there follows another view of it than the preceding one. For if organs in general proved incapable of being taken as *expressions* of the inner because in them activity *as activity* [1807 250] is present, while activity *as deed* is merely outer, so that inner and outer thus fall apart and are or can be alien to each other, then, according to the determination considered, the organ must also be taken again as the *middle term* of both. For precisely the fact that activity is *present* in it at the same time constitutes an *externality* of activity, and indeed a different one from the deed: this externality remains with and in the individual.—Now this middle term and unity of inner and outer is, first, itself

also external; but then this externality is at the same time taken up into the inner. As *simple* externality it stands opposed to dispersed externality, which is either only a *singular* work or state contingent for the whole individuality, or, as *whole* externality, fate splintered into a multiplicity of works and states. Thus the *simple lines of the hand*, likewise the *tone* and *range* of the *voice* as the individual determinacy of *speech*—and speech again as it acquires through the hand a firmer existence than through the voice, *writing*, specifically in its particularity as *handwriting*—all this is *expression* of the inner. As *simple externality*, it in turn relates to the *manifold externality* of action and fate as *inner* over against these.—If, then, the individual's determinate nature and inborn peculiarity, [1807 251] together with what these have become through cultivation, are initially taken as the *inner*, as the essence of action and fate, this inner has its *appearance* and externality *first* in its mouth, hand, voice, handwriting, as well as in its other organs and their abiding determinations; and *only then* does it express itself *further* outward in its actuality in the world.

317 Since this middle term is now determined as a manifestation at the same time taken back into the inner, its existence is not confined to the immediate organ of activity; rather, it is the movement and form of the face and of configuration in general that accomplish nothing. According to this concept, these features and their movement are activity held back and remaining in the individual; in relation to actual activity they are its own supervision and observation of that activity, *manifestation* as *reflection upon* actual manifestation.—The individual is not silent concerning and during its external activity, because in that activity it is at the same time reflected into itself, and manifests this reflectedness into itself. This theoretical activity, or the individual's speech with itself about its activity, is also perceptible to others, for it is itself a manifestation.

318 In this inner, then, which remains inner in its manifestation, the individual's reflected*ness* [1807 252] out of its actuality is observed; and we must see how matters stand with the necessity posited in this unity.—This reflectedness is, first, different from the deed itself, and can therefore be something *other*, and taken for something other, than the deed is; one sees in someone's face whether

they are *serious* about what they say or do.—Conversely, however, what is supposed to be expression of the inner is at the same time an *existent* expression, and thus itself sinks to the determination of *being*, which is absolutely contingent for the self-conscious essence. It is therefore indeed expression, but at the same time only like a *sign*, so that the expressed content is completely indifferent to the constitution of that through which it is expressed. In this appearance the inner is indeed *visible* invisibility, but without being bound to it; it can equally be in another appearance, just as another inner can be in the same appearance.—Lichtenberg therefore rightly says: *"Suppose the physiognomist once caught hold of the human being; it would take only a stout resolve to make oneself incomprehensible again for millennia."*—Just as in the preceding relationship the given circumstances were an existent from which individuality took what *it* could and wanted, either submitting to it or overturning it, for which reason it did not contain individuality's necessity and essence, [1807 253] so here individuality's appearing immediate being is something that either expresses its reflectedness out of actuality and its being-within-itself, or is for it merely a sign, indifferent toward what is signified, and therefore in truth signifying nothing. It is equally its face and its mask, which it can lay aside.—Individuality permeates its shape, moves and speaks within it; yet this whole existence equally passes over into an indifferent being over against will and action. Individuality effaces in it the significance it previously had of containing its reflectedness into itself, or its true essence, and conversely places this instead in the will and the deed.

319 Individuality *gives up that reflectedness into itself* which is expressed in its *features*, and *places its essence in the work*. In doing so it contradicts the relationship established, regarding what is to be its *inner* and *outer*, by reason's instinct when it turns to observing self-conscious individuality. This standpoint leads us to the actual thought underlying physiognomic *science*—if one wishes to call it that. Formally, the opposition this observing has reached is that of practical and theoretical, both posited within the practical itself: individuality [1807 254] actualizing itself in action, taken in the most general sense, and the same

individuality insofar as in this action it is at the same time reflected out of it into itself and has it as its object. Observation takes up this opposition according to the same inverted relationship in which it determines itself in appearance. For observation, the *deed* itself and the work, whether of speech or of a more firmly established actuality, count as the *inessential outer*, while individuality's *being-within-itself* counts as the *essential inner*. Of the two sides practical consciousness contains, intention and deed—its *meaning* concerning its action and the *action* itself—observation chooses the former as the true inner. This is supposed to have its more or less *inessential* manifestation in the deed, but its true manifestation in its shape. The latter manifestation is the immediate sensuous presence of individual spirit; the inwardness that is supposed to be true is the particularity of intention and the singularity of being-for-itself: both are spirit as *meant*. Thus what observation has as its objects is existence as *meant*, and it seeks laws between such objects.

320 Immediate meaning concerning spirit's supposed presence is natural physiognomy: the hasty judgment, at first sight of a shape, concerning its inward nature and character. The object of this opinion is of such a [1807 255] kind that its essence lies in being in truth something other than merely sensuous, immediate being. What is present, what is observation's object, is indeed precisely this reflectedness within the sensuous, out of it into itself: visibility as the visibility of the invisible. But this very immediate sensuous presence is spirit's *actuality* as it is only for opinion; and on this side observation busies itself with its supposed existence, with physiognomy, handwriting, tone of voice, and so forth.—It relates such existence to just such a *supposed inner*. It is not the murderer or thief who is to be cognized, but the *capacity to be one*. Fixed abstract determinacy thereby loses itself in the concrete, infinite determinacy of the *singular* individual, which now requires more artful portrayals than those qualifications. Such artful portrayals certainly say more than qualification as murderer, thief, or good-hearted, unspoiled, and so on, but nowhere near enough for their purpose of expressing supposed being, or singular individuality; no more than portrayals of shape that go beyond the flat forehead, long nose, and so

forth. For singular shape, like singular self-consciousness, is inexpressible as supposed being. The science of knowing human beings, directed toward the supposed human being, like [1807 256] physiognomy, directed toward their supposed actuality and wishing to elevate natural physiognomy's unconscious judging into knowledge, is therefore something endless and bottomless, which can never arrive at saying what it means, because it merely means, and its content is merely what is meant.

321 The *laws* this science sets out to find are relations of these two supposed sides, and therefore can themselves be nothing but empty opinion. Moreover, since this supposed knowledge concerning spirit's actuality has precisely this as its object—that spirit reflects itself out of its sensuous existence into itself, and determinate existence is an indifferent contingency for it—it must immediately know, regarding the laws it finds, that nothing is said by them, but that there is actually only pure chatter, or merely *an opinion of oneself* is given. This expression has the truth of stating these as the same thing: saying one's *opinion*, and thereby contributing not the matter itself but merely an opinion *of oneself*. As regards *content*, however, these observations cannot differ from these: "It always rains when we have a fair," says the shopkeeper; "and always when I dry my laundry," says the housewife.

322 Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way, also says: "If someone said, you do act like an honest [1807 257] man, but I see from your figure that you are forcing yourself and are a rogue at heart—truly, until the end of the world every decent fellow will answer such an address with a slap in the face."—This reply is *striking* because it refutes the first presupposition of such a science of opinion: namely, that a person's *actuality* is their face, and so forth.—Rather, a person's *true being* is *their deed*; in it individuality is *actual*, and it is the deed that sublates the *supposed* in both its sides. First, the supposed as a bodily being at rest: individuality instead exhibits itself in action as the *negative* essence that *is* only insofar as it sublates being. Then the deed likewise sublates opinion's inexpressibility regarding self-conscious individuality, which in opinion is infinitely determinate and determinable. In the accomplished

deed this bad infinity is annihilated. The deed is something simply determinate, universal, comprehensible in an abstraction; it is murder, theft, or beneficence, a courageous deed, and so forth, and *what it is* can be *said* of it. It *is* this, and its being is not merely a sign, but the matter itself. It *is* this, and the individual human being *is* what it *is*; in the simplicity of *this being*, the person is for others an existent, universal essence and ceases to be merely supposed. [1807 258] Admittedly the person is not thereby posited as spirit; but since we are speaking of their *being* as being, and *on one side* the doubled being of *shape* and *deed* stands opposed, and both are supposed to be their actuality, it is rather only the deed that must be affirmed as their *genuine being*—not their figure, which was supposed to express what they mean concerning their deeds, or what one supposed they merely could do. Likewise, since *on the other side* their *work* and their inward *possibility*, capacity, or intention are opposed, the work alone is to be regarded as their true actuality, even if they themselves are mistaken about it and, turning from their action into themselves, suppose that in this inwardness they are something other than in the *deed*. Individuality, entrusting itself to the objective element by becoming work, does indeed thereby expose itself to alteration and inversion. But the character of the deed consists precisely in whether it is an actual being that maintains itself, or merely a supposed work that passes away, null within itself. Objectivity does not alter the deed itself, but merely shows *what* it is—that is, whether it *is*, or whether it *is nothing*.—The dissection of this being into intentions and similar subtleties, through which the *actual* human being—that is, their deed—is to be explained back into a supposed being, just as they themselves may also invent particular intentions concerning their actuality, [1807 259] must be left to the idleness of opinion. If this idleness wishes to put its deedless wisdom into practice, deny the character of reason to the acting person, and mistreat them by declaring not the deed but rather figure and features to be their being, it must expect the reply above, which proves to it that figure is not the *in-itself*, but can instead become an object of treatment.

323 If we now survey the full range of relationships in which self-conscious individuality can be observed as standing toward its outer, one will remain that observation must still make its object. In psychology, it is the *external actuality* of *things* that is supposed to have its self-conscious *counterpart* in spirit and make spirit comprehensible. In physiognomy, by contrast, spirit is supposed to be cognized in its *own* outer as in a being that is its *language*—the visible invisibility of its essence. There still remains the determination of the side of actuality according to which individuality expresses its essence in its immediate, fixed, purely existent actuality.—This last relation therefore differs from the physiognomic relation in that the latter is the individual's *speaking* presence; in its *acting* manifestation, the individual also exhibits its presence as *reflecting into itself* and *contemplating* itself: a manifestation [1807 260] that is itself movement, features at rest that are themselves essentially a mediated being. But in the determination still to be considered, the outer is finally an entirely *resting* actuality, which is not in itself a speaking sign but, separated from self-conscious movement, exhibits itself on its own and is as a mere thing.

324 Regarding the inner's relation to this outer of its own, it is initially clear that it seems to have to be comprehended as the relationship of *causal connection*, since the relation of one thing existing in itself to another existing in itself, as a *necessary* relation, is this relationship.

325 Now, for spiritual individuality to have an effect upon the body, it must itself be bodily as cause. But the bodily thing in which it is as cause is the organ—not, however, of activity directed against external actuality, but of the activity of the self-conscious essence within itself, directed outward only against its body. It is not immediately evident what these organs can be. Were one thinking merely of organs in general, the organ of work in general would readily be at hand, likewise the organ of the sexual drive, and so forth. Yet such organs are to be regarded as instruments or parts that spirit, as one extreme, has as middle terms toward the other extreme, which is an external *object*. [1807 261] Here, however, what is meant is an organ in which the self-conscious individual, as an extreme over against its own actuality opposed to it, preserves itself *for itself*,

not at the same time turned outward but reflected in its action, and in which the side of *being* is not a *being for another*. In the physiognomic relation the organ is indeed also considered as an existence reflected into itself and commenting on activity; but this being is objective, and the result of physiognomic observation is that self-consciousness confronts precisely this actuality of its own as something indifferent. This indifference vanishes when this reflectedness into itself is itself *effective*; that existence thereby acquires a necessary relation to it. But for it to act upon existence, it must itself have a being, though not properly an objective one, and it is to be pointed out as this organ.

326 In ordinary life, anger, for example, as such an inward activity, is located in the liver; Plato even grants the liver something higher still, which according to some is even the highest: prophecy, or the gift of expressing the holy and eternal in an irrational manner. Yet the movement the individual has in the liver, heart, and so forth cannot be regarded as its movement wholly reflected into itself; [1807 262] rather, in these it is such that it has already struck into the body and has an animal existence turning outward toward externality.

327 The *nervous system*, by contrast, is the immediate repose of the organic in its movement. The *nerves* themselves are indeed in turn organs of consciousness already immersed in its outward direction; but brain and spinal cord may be regarded as the immediate presence of self-consciousness remaining within itself—not objective, nor going outward. Insofar as this organ's moment of being is a *being for another*, an existence, it is dead being, no longer the presence of self-consciousness. Yet this *being within itself* is according to its concept a fluidity in which the circles cast into it immediately dissolve, and no difference expresses itself as *existent*. Meanwhile, just as spirit itself is not something abstractly simple but a system of movements in which it differentiates itself into moments, yet remains free in this differentiation itself, and just as it articulates its body in general for different functions and assigns a singular part to only one, so one can also imagine that the fluid *being* of its *being-within-itself* is articulated. Indeed it seems it must be imagined this way, because spirit's reflected *being* in the [1807 263] brain is itself again only a middle term

between its pure essence and its bodily articulation—a middle term that must therefore partake of the nature of both and thus, on the side of the latter, also contain *existent* articulation within itself.

328 Spiritual-organic being at the same time has the necessary side of an existence *subsisting at rest*; the former must withdraw as the extreme of being-for-itself and have this side opposite it as the other extreme, which is then the object upon which it acts as cause. Now, if brain and spinal cord are that bodily *being-for-itself* of spirit, skull and vertebral column are the other separated extreme belonging to it, namely the fixed thing at rest.—But since everyone, when thinking of the actual location of spirit's existence, thinks not of the back but only of the head, we can, in investigating a knowledge such as this, content ourselves with this reason—not too poor for it—to restrict this existence to the skull. If someone should think of the back insofar as knowledge and activity are sometimes partly driven *into* a person through it and partly driven *out*, this would prove nothing toward including the spinal cord among spirit's dwelling places and its column as its corresponding existence, because it would prove too much. For one can likewise recall that [1807 264] other external ways of approaching spirit's activity to arouse or restrain it are also favored.—The vertebral column thus disappears, if one wishes, *rightly*; and it is *constructed*, just as well as many other doctrines of natural philosophy, that the skull alone remains, though it does not contain spirit's *organs*. For this was excluded above by the concept of this relationship, and the skull was therefore assigned to the side of existence. Or if we were not permitted to recall the *concept* of the matter, experience surely teaches that, just as one sees with the eye as organ, one does *not* murder, steal, compose poetry, and so forth with the skull.—One must therefore also refrain from the expression *organ* for the *meaning* of the skull still to be discussed. For although people are accustomed to saying that reasonable persons care not about the word but about the *matter*, this does not grant permission to designate a matter by a word that does not belong to it. For this is at once ineptitude and deception, which merely believes and pretends that it lacks the right *word*, concealing from itself that it in fact lacks the matter, that

is, the concept; if this were present, it would also have its right word.—For now, only this has been determined here: that as the brain is the living head, the skull is the caput mortuum.

[1807 265]

329 In this dead being, then, the spiritual movements and determinate modes of the brain would have to give themselves their presentation in external actuality, though still an actuality in the individual itself. For their relationship to the skull, which as dead being does not have spirit dwelling within it, the relationship established above first presents itself: the external, mechanical relationship, in which the actual organs—and these are in the brain—press it out round here, hammer it broad there, or push it flat, or however else this action may be represented. Since the skull itself is part of the organism, a living self-formation must indeed be conceived within it, as in every bone, so that, considered in this way, it for its part instead presses the brain and imposes its external limit; as the harder, it is also more capable of this. Yet the same relationship would still remain in the determination of their reciprocal activity; for whether the skull is determining or determined would alter nothing in the causal connection in general, except that the skull would then be made the immediate organ of self-consciousness, since in it as *cause* the side of *being-for-itself* would be found. Yet insofar as *being-for-itself* as *organic livingness falls equally within both*, their causal connection in fact disappears. This further formation of both would, however, be inwardly connected, [1807 266] and would be an organic preestablished harmony, leaving the two related sides free toward each other and each with its own *shape*, to which the other's shape need not correspond; still more would shape and quality be free toward each other, as are the shape of the grape and the taste of the wine.—But since the determination of *being-for-itself* falls on the brain's side, and that of *existence* on the skull's side, a causal connection between them must *also* be posited within organic unity: a necessary relation of them as external to each other, that is, a relation itself external, through which their *shape* would thus be determined by each other.

330 Regarding the determination, however, in which the organ of self-consciousness would be an active cause upon the opposed side, one can talk back and forth in many ways. For we are speaking of the constitution of a cause considered according to its *indifferent* existence, its shape and magnitude—a cause whose inwardness and being-for-itself are supposed to be precisely such as do not concern immediate existence. The skull's organic self-formation is initially indifferent to mechanical action, and the relationship of these two relationships is, since the former is self-relation, precisely this indeterminacy and [1807 267] boundlessness itself. Furthermore, even if the brain took spirit's differences into itself as existent differences and were a multiplicity of inward organs occupying different spaces—which contradicts nature, which gives the concept's moments an existence of their own and therefore places the *fluid simplicity* of organic life *purely on one side*, and its *articulation* and *division*, likewise in its differences, on the *other side*, so that these, as they are to be apprehended here, show themselves as particular anatomical things—it would remain indeterminate whether a spiritual moment, according as it were originally stronger or weaker, would have to possess a more *expanded* brain-organ in the former case and a more *contracted* one in the latter, or precisely the reverse.—Likewise, whether its *development* enlarged or diminished the organ, made it coarser and thicker, or finer. Because the constitution of the cause remains indeterminate, it is left equally indeterminate how its action upon the skull occurs: whether it expands it or narrows it and lets it collapse. If this action is perhaps determined more *elegantly* as *stimulation*, it remains indeterminate whether this occurs by swelling, like a cantharides plaster, or by shriveling, like vinegar.—Plausible reasons can be offered for all such views, for the organic relation, [1807 268] which intervenes just as much, lets one pass as well as another, and is indifferent to all this understanding.

331 Observing consciousness, however, is not concerned with determining this relationship. For in any case what stands on one side is not the brain as an *animal* part, but as the *being* of *self-conscious* individuality.—As abiding character and moving conscious activity, individuality is *for itself* and *within itself*; opposed

to this being-for-and-within-itself is its actuality and existence for another. Being-for-and-within-itself is the essence and subject that has in the brain a being *subsumed under it*, receiving its value only through the meaning dwelling within it. But the other side of self-conscious individuality, the side of its existence, is *being* as independent and subject, or as a *thing*, namely a bone; *the actuality and existence of the human being is its skull-bone*.—This is the relationship and the meaning these two sides of the relation have within the consciousness observing them.

332 This consciousness is now concerned with the more determinate relation of these sides. The skull-bone does indeed have, in general, the significance of being spirit's immediate actuality. But spirit's many-sidedness gives its existence an equal multiplicity of meanings; what is to be gained is the [1807 269] determinacy of the meaning of the singular locations into which this existence is divided, and we must see how they contain the indication of it within them.

333 The skull-bone is no organ of activity, nor a speaking movement; one neither steals nor murders and so forth with the skull-bone, nor does it alter its expression in the slightest for such deeds, so as to become a speaking gesture.—Nor does this *existent* have the value of a *sign*. Facial expression and gesture, tone, even a pillar or a stake driven into a deserted island, announce at once that something else is meant by them than what they immediately *merely are*. They immediately present themselves as signs, since they contain a determinacy indicating something else by not belonging peculiarly to themselves. One can certainly entertain all kinds of thoughts before a skull, as Hamlet before Yorick's; but the skull-bone in itself is so indifferent and unassuming a thing that immediately nothing else can be seen or meant in it than simply itself. It does indeed recall the brain and its determinacy, skulls of other formations, but not a conscious movement, since it contains neither facial expression nor gesture, nor anything impressed upon it that announces itself as coming from conscious activity. For it is the actuality that was to exhibit in individuality [1807 270] another side no longer being that reflects itself into itself, but purely *immediate being*.

334 Since, further, it does not itself feel, a more determinate meaning for it might still seem attainable if determinate sensations, through proximity, allowed what is meant by it to be cognized; and since a conscious mode of spirit has its feeling at a determinate place in the skull, perhaps this location in its shape would indicate that mode and its particularity. For example, as some people complain of feeling a painful tension somewhere in the head during strenuous thinking, or even during *thinking* in general, so *stealing*, *murdering*, *composing poetry*, and so forth could each be accompanied by a sensation of its own, which would also have to have its particular location. This location in the brain, being more moved and activated in this way, would probably also develop the neighboring part of the bone more; or through sympathy or consensus this part too would not be inert, but would enlarge or diminish itself, or form itself in some manner.—What makes this hypothesis improbable, however, is that feeling in general is something indeterminate, and feeling in the head as center might be the universal sympathetic feeling of all suffering, so that other sensations would mingle with the thief's, murderer's, or poet's [1807 271] tickling or pain in the head and could be distinguished from each other, and from those one can call merely bodily, no more than the disease can be determined from the symptom of headache, if we restrict its meaning to the bodily alone.

335 In fact, from whatever side the matter is considered, every necessary reciprocal relation disappears, along with any self-speaking indication of it. If the relation is nevertheless to take place, what remains and is necessary is a free preestablished harmony, *without concept*, between the corresponding determinations of the two sides; for one side *is supposed to be spiritless actuality, mere thing*.—Thus on one side stands a multitude of skull locations at rest, and on the other a multitude of spiritual properties, whose multiplicity and determination will depend on the state of psychology. The more wretched the representation of spirit, the easier matters become from this side; for the properties become both fewer and more separated, fixed, and bony, hence more like determinations of bone and more comparable with them. Yet although the wretchedness of the representation of spirit makes much easier, a very great multitude still remains

on both sides; for observation, their relation remains entirely contingent. If each of the children of Israel [1807 272] were to take from the sand of the sea, to which they are supposed to correspond, the grain of which they are the sign, the indifference and arbitrariness assigning each their own would be just as great as that which assigns skull locations and bone forms to each faculty of the soul, passion, and—what would equally have to be considered here—the shades of character about which subtler psychology and knowledge of human beings are accustomed to speak.—The murderer's skull has this—not organ, nor sign, but this bump; yet this murderer has a multitude of other properties, as well as other bumps, and depressions along with the bumps: one has a choice among bumps and depressions. And again, his murderous disposition can be related to any bump or depression whatever, and these in turn to any property whatever; for the murderer is neither merely this abstraction of a murderer, nor has he only one prominence and one depression. Observations made about this must therefore sound just as good as the shopkeeper's and housewife's rain during the fair and the laundry. Shopkeeper and housewife could equally observe that it always rains when this neighbor passes by, or when roast pork is eaten. As rain is indifferent toward these circumstances, so for observation is *this* [1807 273] determinacy of spirit toward *this* determinate being of the skull. For of the two objects of this observation, one is a dry *being-for-itself*, a bony property of spirit, just as the other is a dry *being-in-itself*. So bony a thing as either of them is completely indifferent toward everything else; a high bump is just as indifferent to a murderer's being nearby as the murderer is to flatness in his vicinity.

336 The *possibility* certainly remains irrefutable that some property, passion, and so forth is connected with a bump at some location. One *can imagine* the murderer with a high bump here at this location of the skull, the thief with one there. From this side the science of the skull is still capable of great expansion; for at first it seems to restrict itself only to the connection of a bump with a property *in the same individual*, so that this individual possesses both. But natural skull-science already—for there must be such a thing just as much as a nat-

ural physiognomy—goes beyond this limit. It judges not only that a cunning person has a fist-sized bump behind the ears, but also imagines that the unfaithful wife does not herself have bumps on the forehead, but that the other married individual does.—Likewise, [1807 274] one can also *imagine* the person living under the same roof as the murderer, or his neighbor, and further his fellow citizens and so forth, with high bumps somewhere on the skull, just as well as the flying cow that was first caressed by the crab riding on the donkey, and afterward, and so forth.—But if *possibility* is taken not in the sense of the possibility *of imagining*, but of *inner* possibility, or the *concept*, the object is an actuality that is and is supposed to be pure thing, without such meaning, and can therefore have it only in representation.

337 If, despite the two sides' indifference, the observer nevertheless sets to work determining relations—partly encouraged by the universal rational ground that *the outer is the expression of the inner*, partly supporting himself with the analogy of animals' skulls, animals that may indeed have a simpler character than human beings, but whose character will at the same time be all the harder to state, since it cannot be so easy for every person's imagination to enter properly into an animal's nature—then in asserting the laws he claims to have discovered, the observer finds *excellent assistance* in a distinction that must necessarily occur to us here as well.—Spirit's *being* [1807 275] cannot at least be taken as something so utterly fixed and immovable. The human being is free; it is admitted that *original* being consists only in *predispositions* over which the human being has considerable power, or which require favorable circumstances to develop—that is, an *original* being of spirit must equally be declared a being that does not exist as being. If, then, observations contradicted what someone happened to assert as a law—if the weather were fine during the fair or the laundry—the shopkeeper and housewife could say that it *really ought* to rain, and that the *predisposition* was nevertheless *present*. Likewise, skull-observation could say that this individual *really ought* to be as the skull states according to the law, and has an *original predisposition* that has, *however*, not been developed; this quality is not present, but it *ought to be present*.—The *law* and the

ought rest on observation of actual rain and actual disposition in conjunction with this determinacy of the skull; but if *actuality* is not present, *empty possibility* counts for just as much.—This possibility—that is, the nonactuality of the established law, and hence observations contradicting it—must enter precisely because the individual's freedom and the developing circumstances are indifferent toward *being* [1807 276] in general, both as original inner being and as external bony being, and because the individual can also be something other than what it originally is inwardly, and still more than what it is as a bone.

338 Thus we obtain the possibility that this bump or depression of the skull designates both something actual and merely a *predisposition*—indeed, indeterminately to anything whatever—and so something nonactual. We see a poor excuse meet its usual fate: it can itself be used against what it is supposed to help. We see opinion brought by the nature of the matter to say, though *thoughtlessly*, the *opposite* of what it holds fast: to say that this bone indicates something, but just as well *does not*.

339 What hovers before opinion itself in this excuse is the true thought that precisely eradicates it: that *being* as such is not the truth of spirit at all. Just as predisposition is an *original being* that has no share in spirit's activity, so bone, for its part, is precisely such a being. What exists without spiritual activity is a thing for consciousness, and so far from being its essence that it is rather the opposite of it; consciousness is *actual* for itself only through the negation and eradication of such being.—From [1807 277] this side, to pass off a bone as consciousness's *actual existence* must be regarded as a complete denial of reason; and this is how bone is passed off when considered as spirit's outer, for the outer is precisely existent actuality. It does not help to say that one *merely infers* from this outer to the inner, which is *something else*, and that the outer is not the inner itself, but only its *expression*. For in their relationship to each other, precisely the determination of actuality that *thinks itself* and *is thought* falls on the inner side, while that of *existent actuality* falls on the outer.—Thus if a person is told, you—your inner—are this *because* your *bone* is constituted so, this means nothing other than: I regard a bone as *your actuality*. The reply to such a judgment

by a slap in the face, mentioned in connection with physiognomy, initially displaces the *soft* parts from their appearance and position, and proves only that these are no true *in-itself*, not spirit's actuality; here the reply would properly have to go so far as to smash the skull of someone judging in this way, to prove, as palpably as his wisdom is palpable, that a bone is for the human being no *in-itself*, much less *its* true actuality.—
[1807 278]

340 The crude instinct of self-conscious reason will reject such a science of the skull without examination—this other, observing instinct of reason, which, having advanced to an intimation *of cognition*, has grasped it in the spiritless manner that the outer is expression of the inner. But the worse the thought, the less one sometimes notices precisely where its badness lies, and the harder it is to set it out. For a thought is called worse the purer and emptier the abstraction it takes as essence. Yet the opposition at issue here has as its members self-conscious individuality and the abstraction of externality become wholly a *thing*: that inner being of spirit apprehended as fixed, spiritless being, opposed to just such a being.—But thereby observing reason does indeed seem to have reached its summit, from which it must abandon itself and overturn itself; for only what is utterly bad contains the immediate necessity of reversing itself.—Just as one can say of the Jewish people that precisely because it stands immediately before the gate of salvation it is the most rejected, and has been so: what it ought to be in and for itself, this self-essentiality, it is not for itself, but places beyond itself. Through this alienation it makes a higher [1807 279] existence *possible* for itself, if it could take its object back into itself, than if it had remained within the immediacy of being; for spirit is all the greater the greater the opposition out of which it returns into itself. But it makes this opposition for itself in sublating its immediate unity and alienating its being-for-itself. Yet if such a consciousness does not reflect itself, the middle in which it stands is the unhappy void, since what should fill it has become a fixed extreme. Thus this last stage of observing reason is its worst, but for that reason its reversal is necessary.

341 For a survey of the series of relationships considered so far, constituting observation's content and object, shows that in its *first mode*, observation of the relationships of inorganic nature, *sensuous being* already *vanishes* for it. The moments of their relationship exhibit themselves as pure abstractions and simple concepts, which were to be firmly bound to the existence of things; but this existence is lost, so that the moment proves to be pure movement and universal. This free process, complete within itself, retains the significance of something objective, but now appears as a *one*. In the inorganic process the one is the inner that does not exist; but existing as one, the process is the [1807 280] organic.—As being-for-itself or negative essence, the one stands opposed to the universal, withdraws from it, and remains free for itself, so that the concept, realized only in the element of absolute singularization, does not find in organic existence its true expression of being present *as universal*, but remains an outer or, what is the same, an *inner* of organic nature.—The organic process is free only *in itself*, but not *for itself*; in *purpose*, its freedom's being-for-itself enters: it *exists* as another essence, as a self-conscious wisdom outside that process. Observing reason therefore turns toward this wisdom, toward spirit, the concept existing as universality or purpose existing as purpose, and its own essence is now its object.

342 It first turns toward spirit's purity; but since it apprehends the object moving in its differences as an existent, what arise for it are *laws of thought*, relations of what abides to what abides. Yet since the content of these laws consists only in moments, they trail off into the one of self-consciousness.—This new object, likewise taken as *existent*, is *singular, contingent* self-consciousness; observation therefore remains within supposed spirit and the contingent relationship of conscious actuality to unconscious actuality. Spirit alone, within itself, [1807 281] is the necessity of this relation; observation therefore moves closer to its body and compares its willing and acting actuality with its reflected and contemplating actuality, which is itself objective. This outer, although a language

the individual possesses within itself, is at the same time, as sign, something indifferent toward the content it was to signify, just as what posits the sign for itself is indifferent toward it.

343 From this changeable language, observation therefore finally returns to *fixed being* and, according to its concept, declares that externality—not as organ, nor as language and sign, but as *dead thing*—is spirit's outer and immediate actuality. What the very first observation of inorganic nature sublated, namely that the concept should be present as a thing, this final mode restores by making spirit's actuality itself a thing, or, expressed conversely, giving dead being the significance of spirit.—Observation has thereby arrived at expressing what our concept of it was: that reason's certainty seeks itself as objective actuality.—One may indeed not mean thereby that spirit, represented by a skull, is declared a thing; no [1807 282] materialism, as it is called, is supposed to lie in this thought; rather, spirit is still to be something other than these bones. Yet to say it *is* means nothing other than that it is a *thing*. If *being* as such, or thing-being, is predicated of spirit, the true expression of this is therefore that it is something like *a bone*. It must therefore be regarded as highly important that the true expression has been found for purely saying of spirit that *it is*. If one otherwise says of spirit that *it is*, has *a being*, is a *thing*, a singular *actuality*, something one can see or take in one's hand, strike, and so on is not thereby *meant*, but such a thing is *said*. What is truly said thus expresses itself as this: *the being of spirit is a bone*.

344 This result now has a doubled meaning: first its true meaning, insofar as it completes the result of self-consciousness's preceding movement. Unhappy self-consciousness alienated its independence and wrested its *being-for-itself* out into a *thing*. It thereby returned from self-consciousness into consciousness, that is, into consciousness for which the object is a *being*, a *thing*;—but what is a thing is self-consciousness, and thus it is the unity of I and being, the *category*. When the object is thus [1807 283] determined for consciousness, consciousness *has reason*. Consciousness, like self-consciousness, properly *is reason in itself*; but only of consciousness for which the object has determined itself as

the category can it be said that it *has* reason.—From this, however, the knowledge of what reason is remains distinct.—The category, the *immediate* unity of *being* and *its own*, must run through both forms, and observing consciousness is precisely that for which it exhibits itself in the form of *being*. In its result, consciousness expresses as a proposition that of which it is unconscious certainty—the proposition lying in the concept of reason. It is the *infinite judgment* that the self is a thing—a judgment that sublates itself.—Through this result, then, this has determinately been added to the category: that it is this self-sublating opposition. The *pure* category, which is for consciousness in the form of *being* or *immediacy*, is the still *unmediated*, merely *present* object, and consciousness is an equally unmediated relating. The moment of that infinite judgment is the transition of *immediacy* into mediation, or *negativity*. The present object is therefore determined as a negative one, while consciousness is determined as *self*-consciousness over against it; or the category, having run through the form of *being* in observation, is now posited in the form of [1807 284] being-for-itself. Consciousness no longer wants to *find itself immediately*, but to produce itself through its activity. *It itself* is for itself the purpose of its activity, just as in observation it was concerned only with things.

345 The other meaning of the result is that of conceptless observation, already considered. This observation knows no other way of grasping and expressing itself than ingenuously declaring the bone, as found as a sensuous thing that does not at the same time lose its objectivity for consciousness, to be the *actuality* of self-consciousness. Yet it also has no clarity of consciousness about its saying this, and does not grasp its proposition in the determinacy of subject and predicate and their relation, still less in the sense of the infinite self-dissolving judgment and of the concept.—Rather, from a deeper self-consciousness of spirit, which appears here as a natural honesty, it conceals from itself the disgrace of the naked, conceptless thought of taking a bone for self-consciousness's actuality. It whitewashes this thought through thoughtlessness itself, mixing in vari-

ous relationships of cause and effect, sign, organ, and so forth, which have no meaning here, and hiding the proposition's glaring character through distinctions taken from them.

[1807 285]

346 Brain fibers and the like, considered as spirit's being, are already a thought actuality, merely hypothetical—not *existent*, not felt or seen, not true actuality; when they *are there*, when they are seen, they are dead objects and then no longer count as spirit's being. But objectivity proper must be *immediate* and *sensuous*, so that spirit is posited as actual in this objectivity as dead—for bone is the dead insofar as it is in the living itself.—The concept of this representation is that reason is for itself *all thinghood*, even *pure objectivity itself*; but it is this *in the concept*, or the concept alone is its truth. And the purer the concept itself, the sillier the representation into which it sinks when its content is not as concept but as representation—when the self-sublating judgment is taken not with consciousness of this infinity of its own, but as an abiding proposition whose subject and predicate each count on their own, the self fixed as self and the thing as thing, and yet one is supposed to be the other.—Reason, essentially concept, is immediately divided into itself and its opposite, an opposition that for that very reason is equally immediately sublated. But offering itself thus as itself and its opposite, and held fast in the entirely singular moment of this [1807 286] separation, it is apprehended irrationally; and the purer its moments, the more glaring the appearance of this content, which alone is either present for consciousness or ingenuously expressed by it.—The *depth* that spirit drives outward from within, but only as far as its *representing consciousness*, leaving it there—and this consciousness's *ignorance* of what it is saying—is the same conjunction of high and low that nature naively expresses in the living being by joining the organ of its highest perfection, the organ of generation, with the organ of pissing.—The infinite judgment as infinite would be the perfection of life comprehending itself; but consciousness of it remaining in representation behaves as pissing.

B. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Itself.

347 Self-consciousness found the thing as itself and itself as thing; that is, *it is for it* that it *is in itself* objective actuality. It is no longer the *immediate* certainty of being all reality, but a certainty for which the immediate in general has the form of something sublated, so that its *objectivity* counts only as a surface whose inner and essence is *it itself*.—The object to which it relates positively is therefore a self-consciousness; it is in the form of thinghood, that is, it is *independent*. But self-consciousness has the certainty that this independent object is nothing alien for it; it thus knows that *in itself* it is recognized by it. It is *spirit*, which has the certainty of possessing its unity with itself in the doubling of its self-consciousness and in the independence of both. This certainty must now raise itself to truth for it; what it takes itself to be *in itself* and in its *[1807 288] inward* certainty must enter its consciousness and become *for it*.

348 The general stages of this actualization are already indicated in general by comparison with the path so far. Just as observing reason repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*—sense-certainty, perception, and understanding—so this reason will also run once more through the doubled movement of *self-consciousness* and pass from independence into its freedom. At first this active reason is conscious of itself only as an individual, and as such must demand and produce its actuality in the other. But then, as its consciousness rises to universality, it becomes *universal* reason and is conscious of itself as reason, as already recognized in and for itself, uniting all self-consciousness in its pure consciousness. It is simple spiritual essence, which, in also coming to consciousness, is the *real substance* into which the earlier forms return as into their ground, so that in relation to it they are only singular moments of its becoming. They indeed break loose and appear as shapes of their own, but in fact have *existence* and *actuality* only as borne by it, and have their *truth* only insofar as they are and remain within it.
[1807 289]

349 If we take this goal—which is the *concept* that has already emerged *for us*, namely recognized self-consciousness, possessing the certainty of itself, and precisely therein its truth, in the other free self-consciousness—in its reality, or

bring forth this still inward spirit as substance that has already attained its existence, then in this concept *the realm of ethical life* opens up. For ethical life is nothing other than the absolute spiritual *unity* of individuals' essence within their independent *actuality*: a self-consciousness universal in itself, which is so actual to itself in another consciousness that this other has complete independence, or is a thing for it, and precisely therein it is conscious of *unity* with it and is self-consciousness only in this unity with this objective essence. This ethical *substance*, in the *abstraction* of *universality*, is only the *thought* law; but it is just as much immediately actual *self-consciousness*, or is *custom*. Conversely, *singular* consciousness is this existent one only insofar as it is conscious, in its singularity, of universal consciousness as its being, insofar as its activity and existence are universal custom.

350 In the life of a people, the concept of the actualization of self-conscious reason has in fact its completed reality: to intuit, in the independence of the *other*, complete *unity* with it, or to have as object this [1807 290] free *thinghood* of another that I find before me, which is the negative of myself, as *my being-for-me*. Reason is present as fluid universal *substance*, as unchangeable simple *thinghood*, which equally bursts into many completely independent essences, as light into stars as innumerable points shining for themselves. In their absolute being-for-themselves they are dissolved in the simple independent substance not only *in themselves*, but *for themselves*: they are conscious of being these singular independent essences through sacrificing their singularity, and through this universal substance's being their soul and essence; just as this universal is in turn their *activity* as singular beings, or the work produced by them.

351 The individual's *purely singular* activity and pursuits relate to the needs it has as a natural being, that is, as *existent singularity*. That even these most ordinary functions of its own do not come to nothing, but have actuality, is brought about through the universal preserving medium, through the *power* of the whole people.—Yet it has in universal substance not only this *form* of its activity's *subsistence* in general, but equally *its content*: what it does *is* the universal skill and custom of all. Insofar as this content becomes completely [1807 291]

singular, in its actuality it is interwoven with the activity of all. The individual's *work* for its needs is just as much a satisfaction of others' needs as of its own, and it achieves satisfaction of its own only through others' work.—Just as the singular person already *unconsciously* accomplishes *universal* work in their *singular* work, so they also accomplish universal work again as their *conscious* object. The whole *as whole* becomes their work, for which they sacrifice themselves, and precisely thereby receive themselves back from it.—There is nothing here that is not reciprocal, nothing in which the individual's independence does not give itself, in the dissolution of its being-for-itself, in the *negation* of itself, its *positive* significance of being for itself. This unity of being for another, or of making oneself a thing, and being-for-itself—this universal substance speaks its *universal language* in the customs and laws of its people. Yet this existent, unchangeable essence is nothing other than the expression of singular individuality itself, which seems opposed to it. The laws express what every singular person *is* and *does*; the individual recognizes them not only as its *universal* objective thinghood, but equally recognizes itself in that thinghood, or as *singularized* in its own individuality and in each of its fellow citizens. In universal spirit, therefore, each has only the [1807 292] certainty of itself, of finding in existent actuality nothing other than itself; each is as certain of the others as of itself.—I intuit in all that they are for themselves these independent essences only as I am; I intuit free unity with the others in them as existing through the others themselves just as through me. They as me, I as them.

352 In a free people, therefore, reason is actualized in truth; it is present, living spirit, in which the individual not only finds its *determination*, that is, its universal and singular essence, expressed and present as thinghood, but is itself this essence and has also attained its determination. The wisest men of antiquity therefore declared: *wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance with the customs of one's people*.

353 But self-consciousness, which initially is spirit only *immediately* and *according to the concept*, has stepped out of this happiness of having attained its determination and living within it; or, alternatively, it has not yet attained it—for both

can be said in the same way.

354 Reason *must step out of this happiness*; for only *in itself*, or *immediately*, is the life of a free people *real ethical life*, or ethical life is an *existent* one. Thus this universal spirit itself is also a singular one, the whole of [1807 293] customs and laws a *determinate* ethical substance that sheds its limitation only in the higher moment, namely in *consciousness of its essence*, and has its absolute truth only in this cognition, not immediately in its *being*. In this being it is partly limited; partly, the absolute limitation is precisely that spirit is in the form of *being*.

355 Further, therefore, *singular* consciousness, as it immediately has its existence in real ethical life or in the people, is solid trust, for which spirit has not dissolved into its *abstract* moments, and which therefore also does not know itself as pure *singularity being for itself*. But once it has arrived at this thought, as it must, this *immediate* unity with spirit, or its *being* within spirit, its trust, is lost. *Isolated* for itself, it now takes itself as the essence, no longer universal spirit. The *moment of this singularity of self-consciousness* is indeed in universal spirit itself, but only as a vanishing magnitude that, as it appears for itself, dissolves just as immediately within spirit, and comes to consciousness only as trust. In fixing itself thus—and every moment, because it is a moment of essence, must itself attain to exhibiting itself as essence—the individual has confronted laws and customs. They are only a thought without absolute essentiality, an abstract [1807 294] theory without actuality; but as this I, the individual is for itself living truth.

356 Or self-consciousness *has not yet attained this happiness* of being ethical substance, the spirit of a people. For, having returned from observation, spirit is initially not yet actualized as such through itself; it is posited only as *inner* essence, or as abstraction.—Or it *is* at first only *immediately*; but existing immediately, it is *singular*. It is practical consciousness entering its preexisting world with the purpose of doubling itself in this determinacy of a singular being, producing itself as this singular being, as its existent counterpart, and becoming conscious of this unity of its actuality with objective essence. It has

the *certainty* of this unity; for it, this unity is *in itself*, or this agreement of itself and thinghood is already present and has only to become so *for it* through itself, or its making is equally the *finding* of this unity. Since this unity is called *happiness*, this individual is thus sent out into the world by its spirit *to seek its happiness*.

357 If, then, the truth of this rational self-consciousness is for us ethical substance, here for it is the beginning of its ethical experience of the world. From the side that it has not yet become that substance, this movement presses toward it, and what is sublated in the movement are the singular [1807 295] moments that count for consciousness in isolation. They have the form of an immediate willing, or *natural drive*, attaining its satisfaction, which is itself the content of a new drive.—But from the side that self-consciousness has lost the happiness of being in substance, these natural drives are connected with consciousness of their purpose as true determination and essentiality; ethical substance has sunk to a selfless predicate whose living subjects are individuals who must fill their universality through themselves and provide from themselves for their determination.—In the former meaning, then, those shapes are the becoming of ethical substance and precede it; in the latter, they follow it and resolve for self-consciousness what its determination is. On the former side, in the movement that experiences what their truth is, the immediacy or crudity of the drives is lost and their content passes into a higher one; on the latter, consciousness's false representation, which places its determination in them, is lost. On the former, the *goal* they attain is immediate ethical substance; on the latter, consciousness of that substance, specifically a consciousness knowing it as its own essence. In this respect, this movement would be the becoming of morality, a higher shape than the former. Yet these shapes at the same time constitute only one side of its becoming: [1807 296] the side falling within *being-for-itself*, or in which consciousness sublates *its* purposes, not the side according to which morality emerges from substance itself. Since these moments cannot yet have the significance of being made purposes in opposition to lost ethical life, they do indeed count here according to their unselfconscious content, and the goal toward

which they press is ethical substance. But since the form in which they appear after consciousness has lost its ethical life, and, seeking it, repeats those forms, is closer to our own times, they may be presented more in the expression of this mode.

358 Self-consciousness, which is at first only the concept of spirit, begins this path in the determination of being for itself, as singular spirit, the essence; its purpose is therefore to give itself actualization as a singular being, and as this singular being to enjoy itself within that actualization.

359 In taking itself, as *a being-for-itself*, to be the essence, it is the *negativity* of the other. In its consciousness, therefore, it itself appears as the positive over against something that indeed *is*, but has for it the significance of not being in itself. Consciousness appears divided into this preexisting actuality and the *purpose* it accomplishes by sublating that actuality, making the purpose actual in its place. Its [1807 297] first purpose, however, is its *immediate*, abstract *being-for-itself*, or to intuit itself as *this singular being* in another, or another self-consciousness as itself. The experience of what the truth of this purpose is raises self-consciousness higher, and it now becomes purpose for itself insofar as it is also *universal* and has the *law immediately* within it. Yet in carrying out this *law of its heart*, it experiences that the *singular* essence cannot preserve itself here, but that the good can be accomplished only through its sacrifice, and it becomes *virtue*. Virtue's experience can be no other than that its purpose is already accomplished in itself, that happiness is immediately found in activity itself, and that activity itself is the good. The concept of this whole sphere—that thinghood is spirit's own *being-for-itself*—comes to be for self-consciousness in this sphere's movement. Having found it, self-consciousness is thus for itself reality as immediately self-expressing individuality, which finds no further resistance in an opposed actuality and has only this self-expression itself as object and purpose.
[1807 298]
a. Pleasure and Necessity.

360 Self-consciousness, which is for itself *reality* in general, has its object within itself, but as an object it has at first only *for itself*, and which is not yet existent. *Being* confronts it as an actuality other than its own, and it seeks, through accomplishing its being-for-itself, to intuit itself as another independent essence. This *first purpose* is to become conscious of itself as a singular essence in the other self-consciousness, or to make this other into itself; it has the certainty that *in itself* this other already is itself.—Insofar as it has risen out of ethical substance and the tranquil being of thinking to its *being-for-itself*, it has behind it, as a gray shadow even now vanishing, the law of custom and existence, the knowledge of observation, and theory; for these are instead knowledge of something whose being-for-itself and actuality are other than those of self-consciousness. In place of the apparently heavenly spirit of the universality of knowledge and action, in which the feeling and enjoyment of singularity fall silent, the earth-spirit has entered it, for which only the being that is the actuality of singular consciousness counts as true actuality.
[1807 299]
It scorns understanding and science,
humanity's highest gifts—
it has surrendered to the devil
and must come to ruin.

361 Thus it plunges into life and puts into effect the pure individuality in which it appears. It does not so much make its happiness as take and enjoy it immediately. The shadows of science, laws, and principles, which alone stand between it and its own actuality, vanish like a lifeless mist unable to contend with the certainty of its reality. It takes life as one plucks a ripe fruit, which comes toward one just as much as it is taken.

362 Its activity is an activity of *desire* only in one moment; it is directed not toward eradicating the whole objective essence, but only toward the form of its otherness or independence, which is an essenceless semblance. For *in itself* the objective essence counts for consciousness as the same essence, or as its selfhood. The element in which desire and its object subsist indifferently toward each other

and independently is *living existence*; desire's enjoyment sublates this insofar as it belongs to its object. Here, however, this element that gives both a separate actuality is instead the category, [1807 300] a being essentially *represented*; it is therefore the *consciousness* of independence—whether natural consciousness or consciousness developed into a system of laws—which preserves the individuals each for itself. For self-consciousness, which knows the other as *its own* selfhood, this separation does not exist in itself. Thus it attains the enjoyment of *pleasure*, consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness appearing independent, or intuition of the unity of both independent self-consciousnesses. It reaches its purpose, but precisely therein experiences what its truth is. It comprehends itself as *this singular essence being for itself*, but the actualization of this purpose is itself its sublation; for it becomes its own object not as *this singular being*, but rather as *unity* of itself and the other self-consciousness, hence as sublated singular, or *universal*.

363 Enjoyed pleasure indeed has the positive meaning of having become *oneself* as objective self-consciousness, but equally the negative meaning of having sublated *oneself*. And since consciousness comprehended its actualization only in the former meaning, its experience enters its consciousness as a contradiction in which the achieved actuality of its singularity sees itself annihilated by the negative *essence* that, [1807 301] without actuality, stands emptily opposed to it, yet is its consuming power. This essence is nothing other than the *concept* of what this individuality is in itself. But individuality is still the poorest shape of self-actualizing spirit; for it is for itself as yet only the *abstraction* of reason, or the *immediacy* of the *unity* of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself*. Its essence is therefore only the *abstract* category. Yet the category no longer has the form of *immediate, simple* being, as for observing spirit, where it is abstract *being*, or, posited as alien, *thinghood* in general. Here being-for-itself and mediation have entered this thinghood. It therefore appears as a *circle* whose content is the developed pure relation of simple essentialities. The actualization this individuality has attained therefore consists in nothing other than its having cast this circle of abstractions out of the enclosure of simple self-consciousness into the

element of *being-for-it*, or objective expansion. What therefore becomes *object* for self-consciousness in enjoying pleasure, as its essence, is the expansion of those empty essentialities: pure unity, pure difference, and their relation; beyond this, the object individuality experiences as its *essence* has no content. It is what is called *necessity*; for necessity, [1807 302] *fate*, and the like are precisely that of which one does not know how to say *what* it does, what its determinate laws and positive content may be, because it is the absolute pure concept itself intuited as *being*: the simple and empty, but unstoppable and undisturbable, *relation* whose work is only the nothingness of singularity. It is this *fixed connection* because what is connected consists of pure essentialities or empty abstractions. Unity, difference, and relation are categories, each of which is nothing in and for itself, but only in relation to its opposite, and which therefore cannot separate. They are related through their *concept*, for they are the pure concepts themselves; and this *absolute relation* and abstract movement constitutes necessity. Thus merely singular individuality, which has as its content only the pure concept of reason, instead of plunging from dead theory into life, has plunged instead only into consciousness of its own lifelessness, and receives itself only as empty and alien necessity, as *dead* actuality.

364 The transition takes place from the form of the *one* into that of *universality*, from one absolute abstraction into the other; from the purpose of pure *being-for-itself*, which has cast off community with *others*, into its *pure* opposite, [1807 303] *being-in-itself*, thereby equally abstract. This thus appears as though the individual had merely perished, and the absolute brittleness of singularity had shattered against equally hard but continuous actuality.—Since, as consciousness, it is the unity of itself and its opposite, this ruin is still for it: its purpose and actualization, as well as the contradiction between what was essence *for it* and what essence is *in itself*. It experiences the doubled meaning lying in what it did, namely having *taken its life*: it took life, but in doing so grasped death instead.

365 This *transition* of its living being into lifeless necessity therefore appears to it as an inversion mediated by nothing. The mediating term would have to be that in which both sides were one, so that consciousness cognized one moment in the other—its purpose and activity in fate, and its fate in its purpose and activity—*its own essence* in this *necessity*. But for this consciousness this unity is precisely pleasure itself, or *simple, singular* feeling, and the transition from the moment of this purpose into the moment of its true essence is for it a pure leap into the opposite. For these moments are contained and connected not in feeling, but only in the pure self that is a universal, or [1807 304] thinking. Through its experience, in which its truth was to come to be for it, consciousness has therefore instead become a riddle to itself. The consequences of its deeds are not for it its deeds themselves; what befalls it is not *for it* the experience of what it is *in itself*; the transition is not a mere change of form of the same content and essence, represented at one time as consciousness's content and essence, at another as object or *intuited* essence of itself. *Abstract necessity* thus counts as the merely negative, uncomprehended *power of universality* against which individuality is shattered.

366 The appearance of this shape of self-consciousness extends this far; the final moment of its existence is the thought of its loss in necessity, or the thought of itself as an essence absolutely *alien* to itself. Yet self-consciousness *in itself* has survived this loss, for this necessity, or pure universality, is *its own* essence. This reflection of consciousness into itself, knowing necessity as *itself*, is a new shape of consciousness.

[1807 305]

b. The Law of the Heart and the Madness of Self-Conceit.

367 What necessity truly is in self-consciousness, it is for self-consciousness's new shape, in which self-consciousness is for itself the necessary. It knows *immediately* that it has the *universal*, or the *law*, within itself; because of this determination, that the law is *immediately* within consciousness's being-for-itself, it is

called the *law of the heart*. This shape, like the preceding one, is *for itself* essence as *singularity*, but it is richer by this determination: that this *being-for-itself* counts for it as necessary or universal.

368 Thus the law immediately belonging to self-consciousness itself, or a heart that has a law within it, is the *purpose* it sets out to actualize. We must see whether its actualization will correspond to this concept, and whether in that actualization consciousness will experience this law of its own as essence.

369 An actuality stands opposed to this heart; for in the heart the law is at first only *for itself*, not yet actualized, and therefore at the same time something *other* than the concept is. This other thereby determines itself as an actuality that is the opposite of what is to be actualized, hence the *contradiction* of *law* and *singularity*. [1807 306] Thus it is, on the one hand, a law by which singular individuality is oppressed, a violent order of the world contradicting the law of the heart; and on the other, a humanity suffering under it, following not the law of the heart but subject to an alien necessity.—This actuality appearing *opposite* the present shape of consciousness is, as is clear, nothing other than the preceding divided relationship of individuality and its truth, the relationship of a cruel necessity by which individuality is crushed. *For us*, the preceding movement confronts the new shape because this shape has in itself arisen from that movement, so that the moment from which it comes necessarily exists for it; but for the shape itself this moment appears as something *already found*, since it has no consciousness of its *origin*, and its essence is rather to be *for itself*, or the negative over against this positive in-itself.

370 Thus this individuality is directed toward sublating the necessity contradicting the law of the heart, as well as the suffering present through it. It is therefore no longer the frivolity of the previous shape, which wanted only singular pleasure, but the seriousness of a lofty purpose, seeking its pleasure in exhibiting its own *excellent* essence and producing the *welfare of humanity*. What [1807 307] it actualizes is itself the law, and its pleasure therefore at the same time the universal pleasure of all hearts. For it the two are *undivided*: its pleasure is what

accords with law, and actualizing the law of universal humanity is providing its singular pleasure. For within itself individuality and the necessary are *immediately* one: the law is the law of the heart. Individuality has not yet been displaced from its position, and the unity of the two has not come about through their mediating movement, not yet through discipline. Actualizing the immediate, *undisciplined* essence counts as exhibiting excellence and producing humanity's welfare.

371 By contrast, the law standing opposed to the law of the heart is separated from the heart and free for itself. The humanity belonging to it lives not in the happiness-giving unity of law and heart, but either in cruel separation and suffering, or at least deprived of the enjoyment *of itself* in *following* the law, and lacking consciousness of its own excellence in *transgressing* it. Because that powerful divine and human order is separated from the heart, it is for the heart a *semblance* that ought to lose what still accompanies it, namely force and actuality. Its *content* [1807 308] may indeed happen to agree with the law of the heart, and then the heart can accept it; but what accords with law purely as such is not its essence. Rather, its essence is that in this it should have consciousness *of itself*, that *it* should have satisfied itself therein. But where the content of universal necessity does not agree with the heart, necessity is nothing in itself even according to its content, and must give way to the law of the heart.

372 Thus the individual *carries out* the law of its heart; the law becomes *universal order*, and pleasure an actuality lawful in and for itself. Yet in this actualization the law has in fact escaped the individual; what immediately comes to be is only the relationship that was to be sublated. Precisely through its actualization, the law of the heart ceases to be the law of the *heart*. For in actualization it receives the form of *being* and is now *universal power*, indifferent to *this* heart, so that the individual no longer finds *its own* order as its own, precisely because it *establishes* it. Through actualizing its law, therefore, the individual does not produce *its* law; rather, since this order is *in itself* its own but for it an alien one, it produces only its entanglement in the actual order—and indeed in it as an overwhelming power not merely alien but hostile to it.—Through its deed it posits

itself *in*, or rather [1807 309] *as*, the universal element of existent actuality, and its deed itself is to have, according to its own intention, the value of a universal order. Yet thereby it has let itself go *free* from itself; as universality it grows onward for itself and purifies itself of singularity. The individual, which wants to cognize universality only in the form of its immediate being-for-itself, therefore does not recognize itself in this free universality, while at the same time belonging to it, for it is its activity. This activity therefore has the inverted meaning of *contradicting* universal order, for its deed is to be the deed of *its* singular heart, not free universal actuality; and at the same time it has in fact *recognized* that order, for activity has the meaning of positing its essence as *free actuality*, that is, recognizing actuality as its essence.

373 Through the concept of its activity, the individual has determined more precisely the manner in which the actual universality to which it has made itself belong turns against it. Its deed, as *actuality*, belongs to the universal; but its content is its own individuality, which wants to preserve itself as this *singular* individuality opposed to the universal. What is at issue is not the establishment of some determinate law; rather, immediate unity of the singular heart with universality is the thought elevated into law and supposed to hold good: that in what is law, [1807 310] *every heart must recognize itself*. But only the heart of this individual has posited its actuality in its deed, which expresses for it *its being-for-itself* or *its pleasure*. This deed is immediately supposed to count as universal; that is, it is in truth something particular and has only the form of universality: its *particular* content *as such* is to count as universal. Hence others find in this content not the law of their heart accomplished, but rather that *of another*; and precisely according to the universal law that everyone ought to find their heart in what is law, they turn against the actuality *it* established, just as it turned against theirs. Thus the individual now finds not merely the rigid law, as at first, but the hearts of human beings themselves opposed to its excellent intentions and deserving abhorrence.

374 Because this consciousness knows universality only as *immediate*, and necessity as necessity of the *heart*, it does not know the nature of actualization and efficacy: that as *existent*, in their truth they are rather the *intrinsically universal*, in which the singularity of consciousness entrusting itself to them in order *to be* as *this* immediate *singularity* instead perishes. Thus, in being, instead of attaining *this being of its own*, consciousness attains the estrangement *of itself*. Yet that in which it does not recognize itself is [1807 311] no longer dead necessity, but necessity as animated by universal individuality. It took this divine and human order it found in force as a dead actuality in which those belonging to it would have no consciousness of themselves, just as it itself—fixed as this heart being for itself and opposed to the universal—would have none. But it finds this order instead animated by the consciousness of all, and as the law of all hearts. It in fact experiences actuality as animated order precisely through actualizing the law of its heart; for this means nothing other than that individuality becomes its own object as universal, in which, however, it does not recognize itself.

375 Thus what emerges as the true from this shape of self-consciousness's experience *contradicts* what it is *for itself*. Yet what it is for itself has for it the form of absolute universality, and is the law of the heart, immediately one with *self*-consciousness. At the same time, the subsisting and living order is equally its *own essence* and work; it produces nothing other than this order, which is in an equally immediate unity with self-consciousness. Belonging in this way to a doubled, opposed essentiality, self-consciousness contradicts itself within itself and is shattered at its core. The [1807 312] law of *this* heart is alone that in which self-consciousness recognizes itself; but through the actualization of that law, the universally valid order has likewise become for it its own *essence* and its own *actuality*. Thus both things contradicting each other in its consciousness are for it in the form of essence and its own actuality.

376 In expressing this moment of its consciously experienced ruin, and therein the result of its experience, it shows itself as this inward inversion of itself, as the derangement of consciousness for which its essence is immediately nonessence,

its actuality immediately nonactuality.—Derangement cannot be taken to consist simply in regarding something essenceless as essential, something nonactual as actual, so that what is essential or actual for one person would not be so for another, and consciousness of actuality and nonactuality, or essentiality and inessentiality, would fall apart.—If something is in fact actual and essential for consciousness in general, but not for me, then in consciousness of its nullity, since I am at the same time consciousness in general, I have consciousness of its actuality as well; and insofar as both are fixed, this is a unity that is madness in general. In this, however, only [1807 313] an *object* is deranged for consciousness, not consciousness as such in and for itself. But in the result of experience that has emerged here, consciousness is conscious in its law of *itself* as this actual being; and at the same time, since precisely the same essentiality, the same actuality, is *estranged* from it, as self-consciousness, as absolute actuality, it is conscious of its nonactuality. Or both sides, in their contradiction, count for it immediately as *its essence*, which is thus deranged at its core.

377 The heart's beating for humanity's welfare therefore passes into the raging of deranged self-conceit: into consciousness's fury to preserve itself against its destruction, by casting out of itself the perversity it itself is, and striving to regard and express it as something other. Thus it declares universal order to be a perversion of the law of the heart and its happiness, invented by fanatical priests, debauched despots, and their servants, who compensate for their humiliation by humiliating and oppressing those below them, and administered to the nameless misery of deceived humanity.—In this derangement, consciousness declares *individuality* to be what deranges and is deranged, but an *alien* and *contingent* individuality. Yet the heart, or *consciousness's singularity that wants immediately [1807 314] to be universal*, is itself this deranging and deranged element, and its activity only brings it about that this contradiction becomes present to *its* consciousness. For the true is for it the law of the heart—a mere *supposition* that, unlike the subsisting order, has not endured the light of day, but instead perishes as soon as it shows itself to that light. This law of its own was to have *actuality*; in this respect the law as *actuality*, as *valid order*, is

for it purpose and essence, yet immediately *actuality*, precisely the law as *valid order*, is equally for it what is null.—Likewise its *own* actuality, *it itself* as the singularity of consciousness, is its essence for it; but its purpose is to posit this actuality as *existent*. Thus, immediately, its self as nonsingular is instead its essence, or its purpose as law, precisely thereby as a universality that it itself would be for its consciousness.—Through its activity, this concept of its own becomes its object; thus it instead experiences its self as the nonactual and nonactuality as its actuality. It is therefore not a contingent and alien individuality, but precisely this heart that is in every respect within itself the perverse and perverting element.

378 But since immediately universal individuality is the perverse and perverting element, this universal order, as the law of all *hearts*, that is, of the perverse, is [1807 315] no less itself intrinsically perverse, as raging derangement declared. On the one hand, in the resistance the law of one heart encounters in other singular individuals, it proves to be the *law* of all hearts. Existing laws are defended against an individual's law because they are not unconscious, empty, dead necessity, but spiritual universality and substance, in which those in whom it has its actuality live as individuals and are conscious of themselves. Thus, even when they complain about this order as though it ran counter to their inward law and oppose to it the opinions of the heart, they in fact cling to it with their hearts as their essence; and if this order is taken from them, or they place themselves outside it, they lose everything. Since the actuality and power of public order consist precisely in this, this order thus appears as the self-equal, universally animated essence, and individuality as its form.—Yet this order is equally the perverse.

379 For insofar as it is the law of all hearts, and all individuals are immediately this universal, it is an actuality that is only the actuality of individuality *being for itself*, or of the heart. Thus consciousness establishing the law of its heart encounters resistance from others because it contradicts the *equally [1807 316] singular* laws of their hearts, and in resisting they do nothing other than establish and assert their law. The *universal* that is present is therefore only a univer-

sal resistance and struggle of all against one another, in which each asserts its own singularity yet at the same time fails to do so, because that singularity encounters the same resistance and is reciprocally dissolved by the others. What seems public *order* is therefore this universal feud in which everyone snatches what they can, administers justice upon the singularity of others, and establishes their own, which equally vanishes through others. It is the *way of the world*, the semblance of an abiding course, which is only a *supposed universality*, and whose content is rather the essenceless play of establishing singularities and dissolving them.

380 If we consider the two sides of universal order in relation to each other, the latter universality has as its content restless individuality, for which opinion, or singularity, is law, the actual is nonactual, and the nonactual actual. Yet it is at the same time the *side of the order's actuality*, for to it belongs individuality's *being-for-itself*.—The other side is the *universal* as an essence *at rest*, but precisely for that reason only as an *inner*, which is not nothing at all, yet is no actuality, and [1807 317] can itself become actual only through the sublation of individuality, which has arrogated actuality to itself. This shape of consciousness—becoming for itself, in the law, in what is true and good *in itself*, not as singularity but only as *essence*, while knowing individuality as the perverse and perverting element, and therefore having to sacrifice consciousness's singularity —is *virtue*.

c. Virtue and the Way of the World.

381 In active reason's first shape, self-consciousness was for itself pure individuality, and empty universality stood opposed to it. In the second, both parts of the opposition each contained *both* moments, law and individuality; but one, the heart, was their immediate unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relationship of virtue and the way of the world, both members are each unity and opposition of these moments, or a movement of law and individuality against each other, but an opposed movement. For the consciousness of virtue, the *law* is the *essential*, and individuality what must be sublated, both [1807 318] in its own consciousness and in the way of the world. In its consciousness, its own

individuality must be disciplined under the universal, the true and good in itself; but it still remains personal consciousness therein. True discipline is only the sacrifice of the entire personality, as confirmation that in fact it has not remained attached to singular things. In this singular sacrifice, individuality in *the way of the world* is also eradicated, for individuality is also a simple moment common to both.—In the way of the world, individuality behaves in the reverse manner to its positing in virtuous consciousness: it makes itself essence, and subjects to itself the good and true *in themselves*.—Further, for virtue the way of the world is likewise not merely this universal *perverted by individuality*; absolute *order* is also a common moment, present in the way of the world not as *existent actuality* for consciousness, but as its *inner essence*. Thus this order is not properly to be produced by virtue for the first time; for producing, as *activity*, is consciousness of individuality, and individuality is rather to be sublated. Through this sublation, however, room is, as it were, merely made for the *in-itself* of the way of the world to enter into existence in and for itself.

382 The universal *content* of the actual way of the world has already emerged; considered more closely, [1807 319] it is again nothing other than the two preceding movements of self-consciousness. The shape of virtue has arisen from them; since they are its origin, it has them before it, but it seeks to sublate its origin and realize itself, or become *for itself*. Thus on one side the way of the world is singular individuality seeking its pleasure and enjoyment, in which it indeed finds its ruin and thereby satisfies the universal. But this satisfaction itself, like the other moments of this relationship, is an inverted shape and movement of the universal. Actuality is only the singularity of pleasure and enjoyment, while the universal is opposed to it: a necessity that is only the universal's empty shape, a merely negative reaction and contentless activity.—The other moment of the way of the world is individuality that wants to be law in and for itself, and in this conceit disturbs the subsisting order. Universal law does indeed preserve itself against this self-conceit and appears no longer as something opposed to consciousness and empty, not as dead necessity, but as *necessity within consciousness itself*. Yet as it exists as the *conscious* relation of

absolutely contradictory actuality, it is derangement; as it is *objective* actuality, however, it is perversity in general. Thus the universal [1807 320] does indeed exhibit itself on both sides as the power of their movement, but the *existence* of this power is only universal inversion.

383 It is now to receive its true actuality from virtue, through sublating individuality, the principle of perversion. Virtue's purpose is thereby to reverse the perverted way of the world again and bring forth its true essence. This true essence is present in the way of the world at first only as its *in-itself*; it is not yet actual, and virtue therefore only *believes* in it. Virtue sets out to raise this belief to vision, but without enjoying the fruits of its work and sacrifice. For insofar as it is *individuality*, it is the *activity* of the struggle it enters with the way of the world; but its purpose and true essence are the conquest of the way of the world's actuality. The existence of the good thereby brought about is thus the cessation of its *activity*, or of the *consciousness* of individuality.—How this struggle itself is endured, what virtue experiences in it, whether through the sacrifice it takes upon itself the way of the world is defeated and virtue victorious—this must be decided from the nature of the living *weapons* the combatants wield. For the weapons are nothing other than the combatants' *essence* itself, which emerges only for both reciprocally. Their weapons have therefore already emerged from what is present in itself in this struggle.
[1807 321]

384 For virtuous consciousness, the *universal* is true in *belief*, or *in itself*: not yet an actual, but an *abstract* universality. In this consciousness itself it is *as purpose*; in the way of the world, as *inner*. In precisely this determination the universal also presents itself in virtue for the way of the world; for virtue only *wants* to carry out the good and does not itself yet claim it as actuality. This determinacy can also be considered thus: in entering the struggle against the way of the world, the good thereby presents itself as being *for another*, as something that is not *in and for itself*, for otherwise it would not want to acquire its truth only through

overcoming its opposite. That it is at first only *for another* means the same as what showed itself earlier in the opposed consideration: namely, it is as yet an *abstraction*, having reality only within the relationship, not in and for itself.

385 The good or universal, as it appears here, is what is called *gifts, capacities, powers*. It is a mode of spiritual being in which the spiritual is represented as a universal requiring the principle of individuality for its animation and movement, and having its *actuality* in individuality. By this principle, insofar as it is in the consciousness of virtue, this universal is *well applied*, but insofar as it is in the way of the world, it is *misused*: a passive [1807 322] instrument that, governed by the hand of free individuality and indifferent to the use individuality makes of it, can also be misused to produce an actuality that is its destruction; a lifeless matter lacking independence of its own, which can be formed this way or that, even to its own ruin.

386 Since this universal is equally at the disposal of virtuous consciousness and the way of the world, one cannot see whether virtue, thus equipped, will conquer vice. The weapons are the same: these capacities and powers. Virtue has indeed laid its faith in the original unity of its purpose and the essence of the way of the world in ambush, a unity that is to attack the enemy from behind during the struggle and accomplish that struggle *in itself*. Thus, in fact, for the knight of virtue his own *activity* and fighting is properly a mock combat, which he *cannot* take seriously, because he places his true strength in the good's being *in and for itself*, that is, accomplishing itself—a mock combat that he also *must not* allow to become serious. For what he turns against the enemy and finds turned against himself, and whose wearing down and injury he risks in both himself and his enemy, is not supposed to be the good itself, for it is to preserve and accomplish this that he fights. Rather, what [1807 323] is risked is only the indifferent gifts and capacities. Yet these are in fact nothing other than precisely that universal without individuality which is to be preserved and actualized through the struggle.—But at the same time, through the concept of struggle itself, it is immediately *already actualized*: it is the *in-itself*, the *universal*, and its actualization means only that it is *at the same time for another*. The two sides

stated above, according to each of which it became an abstraction, *are no longer separated*; rather, in and through the struggle the good is posited in both ways at once.—Yet virtuous consciousness enters the struggle against the way of the world as against something opposed to the good. What the way of the world offers it here is the universal, not merely as abstract universal, but as animated by individuality and being for another, or the *actual good*. Thus wherever virtue takes hold of the way of the world, it always encounters places that are the existence of the good itself. As the *in-itself* of the way of the world, the good is inseparably interwoven into all its appearance and has its existence in its actuality; the way of the world is therefore invulnerable for virtue. All the moments that virtue itself was to stake and sacrifice are equally existences of the good, and hence inviolable relationships. Fighting can therefore be only a [1807 324] wavering between preserving and sacrificing; or rather, neither sacrificing one's own nor injuring another's can take place. Virtue resembles not only the combatant concerned in battle solely to keep his sword bright; it has also begun the struggle to preserve the weapons. And not only can it not use its own, but it must also keep the enemy's uninjured and protect them against itself, for all are noble parts of the good for which it entered the struggle.

387 For this enemy, by contrast, the essence is not the *in-itself* but *individuality*; its strength is therefore the negative principle for which nothing subsists and is absolutely sacred, but which can risk and endure the loss of each and everything. Through this, victory is as certain to it in itself as through the contradiction in which its opponent becomes entangled. What for virtue is *in itself* is for the way of the world only *for it*; it is free of every moment that is fixed for virtue and binds it. It has such a moment in its power because the moment counts for it merely as something it can equally sublate or let subsist; and thereby it also has in its power the virtuous knight fastened to that moment. He cannot disentangle himself from it as from a cloak thrown around him externally, and free himself by leaving it [1807 325] behind; for it is for him the essence that must not be surrendered.

388 Finally, as for the ambush from which the *good in itself* is cunningly to attack the way of the world from behind, this hope is intrinsically null. The way of the world is wakeful consciousness, certain of itself, which does not let anyone approach from behind but presents its face everywhere; for it is precisely this: that everything is *for it*, that everything stands *before it*. But if the good *in itself* is *for* its enemy, it is in the struggle we have seen; insofar, however, as it is not *for it*, but *in itself*, it is the passive instrument of gifts and capacities, matter without actuality. Represented as existence, it would be a sleeping consciousness remaining somewhere behind, no one knows where.

389 Virtue is therefore conquered by the way of the world because abstract, nonactual *essence* is in fact its purpose, and because with regard to actuality its activity rests upon *distinctions* lying only in *words*. It sought to consist in bringing the good into *actuality* through *sacrificing individuality*, but the side of *actuality* is itself nothing other than the side of *individuality*. The good was supposed to be what is *in itself* and opposed to what *is*; but the *in-itself*, taken according to its reality and truth, is instead *being itself*. The *in-itself* is [1807 326] initially the *abstraction of essence* over against actuality; but abstraction is precisely what is not true, but only *for consciousness*. This means, however, that it is itself what is called *actual*, for the actual is what is essentially *for another*, or is *being*. But the consciousness of virtue rests upon this distinction between *in-itself* and *being*, which has no truth.—The way of the world was supposed to be the perversion of the good because it had *individuality* as its principle; yet individuality is the principle of *actuality*, for it is precisely the consciousness through which what *is in itself* is equally *for another*. The way of the world inverts the unchangeable, but in fact inverts it from the *nothingness of abstraction into the being of reality*.

390 Thus the way of the world triumphs over what constitutes virtue in opposition to it; it triumphs over virtue for which essenceless abstraction is essence. Yet it triumphs not over something real, but over the creation of distinctions that are no distinctions, over these pompous speeches about humanity's highest good and its oppression, about sacrifice for the good and misuse of gifts. Such ideal

essences and purposes collapse as empty words that elevate the heart and leave reason empty; edify, but build nothing; declamations that determinately express only this content: that the individual [1807 327] pretending to act for such noble purposes and uttering such excellent phrases considers itself an excellent being—a swelling that makes its own and others' heads large, but large with empty inflation.—Ancient virtue had its determinate, secure meaning, for it had its *content-filled foundation* in the people's *substance*, and an *actual good already existing* as its purpose. Hence it was not directed against actuality as a *universal perversity* and against a *way of the world*. But the virtue considered here has stepped outside substance: an essenceless virtue, a virtue merely of representation and words lacking that content.—The emptiness of this rhetoric struggling against the way of the world would immediately be exposed if one were required to say what its phrases mean; they are therefore *presupposed as familiar*. The demand to state this familiar meaning would either be met with a fresh torrent of phrases, or opposed by an appeal to the heart, which says *inwardly* what they mean; that is, the inability *actually to say it* would be admitted.—The nullity of that rhetoric also seems unconsciously to have become certain for the cultivation of our age, since all interest has vanished from the whole mass of those phrases and the manner of puffing oneself up with them: a loss [1807 328] expressing itself in their producing only boredom.

391 Thus the result emerging from this opposition consists in consciousness letting go, like an empty cloak, of the representation of a good *in itself* that would not yet have actuality. In its struggle it has experienced that the way of the world is not as bad as it appeared, for its actuality is the actuality of the universal. With this experience the means of producing the good through *sacrificing* individuality disappears, for individuality is precisely the *actualization* of what is in itself; and inversion ceases to be regarded as an inversion of the good, for it is instead precisely the inversion of the good as a mere purpose into actuality. The movement of individuality is the reality of the universal.

392 Yet thereby what confronted consciousness of the in-itself as the *way of the world* has in fact equally been conquered and vanished. In it, individuality's *being-for-itself* was opposed to essence or the universal, and appeared as an actuality separated from *being-in-itself*. But since actuality has shown itself to be in undivided unity with the universal, the *being-for-itself* of the way of the world equally proves no longer to be, just as virtue's *in-itself* is merely a [1807 329] *view*. The individuality of the way of the world may well suppose it acts only *for itself*, or *selfishly*; it is better than it supposes, its activity is at the same time *universal* activity *being in itself*. When it acts selfishly, it merely does not know what it is doing; and when it asserts that all people act selfishly, it asserts only that all people lack consciousness of what activity is.—When it acts *for itself*, this is precisely the bringing into actuality of what is at first only *in itself*. Thus the purpose of *being-for-itself*, which supposes itself opposed to the in-itself—its empty cunning, as well as its subtle explanations that know how to show self-interest everywhere—has vanished just as much as the purpose of the *in-itself* and its rhetoric.

393 Thus *individuality's activity and pursuits are purpose in themselves; the exercise of powers, the play of their manifestations*, is what gives life to powers that would otherwise be the dead in-itself. The in-itself is not an unexecuted, nonexistent, abstract universal; rather, it itself is immediately this presence and actuality of individuality's process.

[1807 330]

C. Individuality That Is Real in and for Itself.

394 Self-consciousness has now grasped the concept of itself that was initially only our concept of it: to be all reality in the certainty of itself. Purpose and essence for it are now the moving interpenetration of the universal—gifts and capacities—and individuality.—The singular moments of this filling and interpenetration *before the unity* into which they have come together are the purposes considered so far. They have vanished as abstractions and chimeras belonging to those first insipid shapes of spiritual self-consciousness, having their truth only in the supposed being of the heart, imagination, and speeches, not in rea-

son. Reason, now certain in and for itself of its reality, no longer seeks first to produce itself as *purpose* in *opposition* to immediately existent actuality, but has the category as such as the object of its consciousness.—For the determination of *self-consciousness being for itself*, [1807 331] or *negative* self-consciousness, in which reason appeared, has been sublated. *It found* an *actuality* that would be its negative, and only through sublating this did it actualize its *purpose* for itself. But since *purpose* and *being-in-itself* have proved to be the same as *being for another* and *preexisting actuality*, truth no longer separates from certainty—whether the posited purpose is taken as certainty of itself and its actualization as truth, or purpose as truth and actuality as certainty. Rather, essence and purpose in and for themselves are the certainty of immediate reality itself, the interpenetration of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*, of the universal and individuality. Activity is in itself its truth and actuality, and the *presentation*, or *expression of individuality*, is its purpose in and for itself.

395 With this concept, then, self-consciousness has returned into itself from the opposed determinations that the category, and its relation to the category, had for it as observing and then as active. It has the pure category itself as its object, or is the category become conscious of itself. Its account with its previous shapes is thereby settled; they lie behind it in [1807 332] oblivion, do not confront it as its preexisting world, but develop only within itself as transparent moments. Yet in its consciousness they still separate as a *movement* of distinct moments that has not yet gathered itself into their substantial unity. But in *all* it holds fast to the simple unity of being and self that is their *genus*.—

396 Consciousness has thereby cast off every opposition and every condition of its activity; it sets out freshly *from itself*, and aims not at *another*, but *at itself*. Since individuality is actuality within itself, the *material* of effective activity and the *purpose* of action lie in activity itself. Activity therefore has the appearance of the movement of a circle moving freely within itself in the void, unhindered now expanding, now contracting, and perfectly content to play only in and with itself. The element in which individuality presents its shape has the significance of purely receiving this shape; it is daylight in general, to which

consciousness wishes to show itself. Activity changes nothing and goes against nothing; it is the pure form of translating from *not being seen* into *being seen*, and the content brought to daylight and presenting itself is nothing other than what this activity already is in itself. It is *in itself*—this is its form as *thought* unity; and it is *actual*—this is its form as [1807 333] *existent* unity. It itself is *content* only in this determination of simplicity over against the determination of its passing-over and movement.

a. The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the Matter Itself.

397 This individuality, real in itself, is initially again *singular* and *determinate*; the absolute reality it knows itself to be is therefore, as it becomes conscious of it, the *abstract universal* reality that, without filling or content, is only the empty thought of this category.—We must see how this concept of individuality real in itself determines itself in its moments, and how individuality's concept of itself enters its consciousness.

398 The concept of this individuality, as it is as such all reality for itself, is initially *result*; individuality has not yet exhibited its movement and reality, and is here posited *immediately* as *simple being-in-itself*. But negativity, the same as what appears as movement, is in the *simple in-itself* as *determinacy*; and *being*, or the simple in-itself, becomes a determinate [1807 334] range. Individuality therefore appears as an original determinate nature—as *original* nature, for it *is in itself*; as originally *determinate*, for the negative is in the *in-itself*, which is thereby a quality. Yet this limitation of being *cannot limit* consciousness's *activity*, for this is here a completed *relation to itself*; the relation to another that would be its limitation is sublated. Nature's original determinacy is therefore only a simple principle—a transparent universal element in which individuality remains equally free and equal to itself, just as it unfolds its differences unhindered within it, and is pure interaction with itself in its actualization. Just as indeterminate animal life breathes its breath, say, into the element of water, air, or earth, and within these into more determinate principles, immerses all its

moments in them, yet despite this limitation of the element keeps them in its power and itself in its oneness, and as this particular organization remains the same universal animal life.

399 This determinate original *nature* of consciousness, which remains free and whole within it, appears as the immediate and sole proper *content* of what is purpose for the individual. It is indeed *determinate* content, but it is *content* at all only insofar as we consider *being-in-itself* in isolation; in [1807 335] truth, however, it is reality permeated by individuality: actuality as consciousness, as singular, has it within itself, and is initially posited *as existent*, not yet as active. For activity, however, this determinacy is, on the one hand, no limitation beyond which it would want to go, because, considered as existent quality, it is the simple color of the element in which activity moves; on the other hand, negativity is *determinacy* only in being, whereas *activity* itself is nothing other than negativity. Thus in acting individuality, determinacy is dissolved into negativity in general, or the totality of all determinacy.

400 Now, in *activity* and the consciousness of activity, simple original nature enters into the difference belonging to activity. *First*, it is present as object—specifically as *object* still belonging to *consciousness*—as *purpose*, and thus opposed to a present actuality. The *second* moment is the *movement* of purpose represented as at rest: actualization, as the relation of purpose to wholly formal actuality, hence the representation of the *transition* itself, or the *means*. Finally, the *third* is the object as no longer purpose, of which active consciousness is immediately conscious as *its own*, but as outside it and *for it* as an *other*.—Yet according to the concept of this sphere, these different [1807 336] sides must be held fast so that the content remains the same within them and no difference enters: neither between individuality and being in general, nor between *purpose* and *individuality* as *original nature*, nor between purpose and present actuality; likewise neither between the *means* and original nature as absolute *purpose*, nor between *effected actuality* and purpose, original nature, or means.

401 First, then, individuality's originally determinate nature, its immediate essence, is not yet posited as active, and is thus called *particular* capacity, talent, character, and so forth. This distinctive tincture of spirit is to be regarded as the sole content of purpose itself, and alone as reality. If one imagined consciousness as going beyond it and wanting to bring another content into actuality, one would imagine consciousness working as *a nothing* into *nothing*.—Further, this original essence is not merely the content of purpose, but in itself also the *actuality* that otherwise appears as the *given* material of activity, as *preexisting* actuality to be formed in activity. For activity is only the pure translation from the form of being not yet presented into that of presented being; the being-in-itself of that actuality opposed to consciousness has sunk to mere empty semblance. [1807 337] Thus, in determining itself to act, this consciousness does not let the semblance of present actuality lead it astray, and equally must gather itself away from wandering among empty thoughts and purposes and hold to the original content of its essence.—Admittedly, this original content is *for* consciousness only *when it has actualized it*; but the distinction between something that is *for consciousness* only *within it* and an actuality existing in itself outside it has disappeared.—It must act solely so that what it is *in itself* may be *for it*; or acting is precisely the becoming of spirit *as consciousness*. Thus it knows what it is *in itself* from its actuality. The individual therefore cannot know *what it is* before bringing itself into actuality through activity.—Yet it thereby seems unable to determine the *purpose* of its activity before it has acted; but at the same time, since it is consciousness, it must have the action before it in advance as *wholly its own*, that is, as *purpose*. The individual setting out to act thus seems to be in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the other, and therefore unable to find a beginning, because it learns its original essence, which must be its purpose, *only from the deed*, but to act must *first have the purpose*. But precisely for that reason it must begin *immediately*, and whatever the [1807 338] circumstances, proceed to activity without further reflection about *beginning, means*, and *end*; for its essence and nature *in itself* are beginning, means, and end all in one. As *beginning*, this nature is present in the *circumstances* of action, and the *interest* the individual finds in something is

the already given answer to the question of whether and what is to be done here. For what seems a preexisting actuality is in itself the individual's original nature, which has only the semblance of a *being*—a semblance lying in the concept of activity dividing itself—but expresses itself as *its* original nature in the *interest* it finds in that actuality.—Likewise the *how*, or the *means*, are determined in and for themselves. *Talent* is equally nothing other than determinate original individuality considered as an *inner means*, or *transition* of purpose into actuality. But the *actual* means and real transition are the unity of talent and the nature of the matter present in interest; talent represents the side of activity in the means, the nature of the matter the side of content. Both are individuality itself, as the interpenetration of being and activity. What is present, then, is preexisting *circumstances*, which *in themselves* are the individual's original nature; then interest, which posits them precisely as *its own*, or as *purpose*; and finally the connection and sublation of this opposition in the *means*. This connection [1807 339] itself still falls within consciousness, and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition. This remaining semblance of opposition is sublated through the *transition* itself, or the *means*; for the means is the *unity* of outer and inner, the opposite of the determinacy it has as *inner* means. It therefore sublates that determinacy and posits itself, this unity of activity and being, equally as *outer*, as actualized individuality itself—that is, individuality posited *for itself* as *existent*. In this way the whole action does not step outside itself, whether as *circumstances*, *purpose*, *means*, or *work*.

402 Yet with the work the difference of original natures seems to enter; like the original nature it expresses, the work is *determinate*, for, freely released from activity as *existent actuality*, it contains negativity as quality. But consciousness determines itself over against the work as that which contains determinacy as negativity *in general*, as activity. It is therefore the universal over against that determinacy of the work, and can thus *compare* it with others and from this apprehend the individualities themselves as *different*: the individual reaching

further in its work as either a stronger energy of will or a richer nature, that is, one whose original determinacy is less limited; another, by contrast, as a weaker and [1807 340] poorer nature.

403 In contrast to this inessential difference of *magnitude*, *good* and *bad* would express an absolute difference; but this does not occur here. What would be taken in one way or the other is equally an activity and pursuit, a self-presentation and self-expression of an individuality, and therefore all is good; one could not properly say what the bad would be. What would be called a bad work is the individual life of a determinate nature actualizing itself within it; it would be spoiled into a bad work only through comparative thought, which, however, is something empty, since it goes beyond the essence of the work—to be an expression of individuality—and seeks and demands in it something else, no one knows what.—This thought could concern only the difference mentioned earlier; but this, as a difference of magnitude, is intrinsically inessential, and is determinate here because different works or individualities would be compared with one another; yet these do not concern each other, each relates only to itself. Original nature alone is the *in-itself*, or what could be laid down as the standard for judging the work, and conversely; but both correspond to each other. Nothing is *for* individuality that is not *through* it, or there is no *actuality* that is not its nature and [1807 341] activity, and no activity or in-itself belonging to it that is not actual; and only these moments are to be compared.

404 Hence there is in general neither *exultation*, nor *complaint*, nor repentance; for all such things come from thought imagining another *content* and another *in-itself* than the individual's original nature and its execution present in actuality. Whatever it does and whatever befalls it, it has done this and is this itself. It can have only the consciousness of the pure translation *of itself* from the night of possibility into the day of presence, of the *abstract in-itself* into the significance of *actual* being, and the certainty that what it encounters in the latter is nothing other than what slept in the former. Consciousness of this unity is indeed also a comparison, but what is compared has precisely only the *semblance* of opposition: a semblance of form that, for reason's self-consciousness that indi-

viduality is actuality within itself, is nothing more than semblance. Thus, knowing that in its actuality it can find nothing other than actuality's unity with itself, or only the certainty of itself in its truth, and that it therefore always attains its purpose, the individual *can experience only joy in itself*.
[1807 342]

405 This is the concept formed of itself by consciousness certain of itself as the absolute interpenetration of individuality and being; let us see whether experience confirms this concept for consciousness and whether its reality agrees with it. The work is the reality consciousness gives itself; it is that in which the individual is for itself what it is *in itself*, and in such a way that the consciousness *for which* it comes to be in the work is not particular, but *universal* consciousness. In the work it has placed itself outside itself in general, in the element of universality, in the space of being devoid of determinacy. Consciousness stepping back from its work is in fact universal in relation to its work, which is *determinate*, because in this opposition consciousness becomes *absolute negativity*, or activity. It therefore goes beyond itself as work and is itself the space devoid of determinacy that does not find itself filled by its work. If earlier their unity was nevertheless preserved in the concept, this occurred precisely through the work's being sublated as *existent* work. But it is supposed *to be*, and we must see how, in its *being*, individuality will preserve its universality and know how to satisfy itself.—Initially the completed work must be considered on its own. It has received individuality's whole nature along with it; its *being* is therefore itself an activity in which all differences [1807 343] interpenetrate and dissolve. The work is thus cast out into a *subsistence* in which the *determinacy* of original nature in fact turns outward against other determinate natures, intervenes in them as these others intervene in it, and loses itself as a vanishing moment in this universal movement. If *within the concept* of individuality real in and for itself all moments—circumstances, purpose, means, and actualization—are equal to each other, and originally determinate nature counts only as a universal element, then, by contrast, when this element becomes objective being, its *determinacy* as such comes to light in the work and receives its truth in its disso-

lution. More closely, this dissolution presents itself thus: in this determinacy the individual has become actual for itself as *this* individual; yet determinacy is not merely actuality's content, but equally its form, or actuality as such in general is precisely this determinacy of being opposed to self-consciousness. From this side actuality shows itself as the merely *preexisting, alien* actuality that had vanished from the concept. The work *is*, that is, it is for other individualities, and for them an alien actuality in whose place *they* must set their own, in order through *their* activity to give themselves consciousness of *their* unity with actuality. Or *their* interest in [1807 344] that work, posited through *their* original nature, is other than the work's *own* interest, whereby the work is made into something else. Thus the work is in general something transient, effaced by the counterplay of other powers and interests, exhibiting individuality's reality as vanishing rather than as accomplished.

406 Thus in its work there arises for consciousness the opposition of activity and being, which in consciousness's earlier shapes was also the *beginning* of activity, but here is only *result*. Yet it has in fact equally lain at the foundation, insofar as consciousness set out to act as individuality real *in itself*. For *determinate original nature* was presupposed for acting as the *in-itself*, and pure accomplishment for the sake of accomplishment had it as *content*. Pure activity, however, is the form *equal to itself*, to which the *determinacy* of original nature is therefore unequal. Here, as elsewhere, it is indifferent which is called *concept* and which *reality*. Original nature is the *thought*, or the *in-itself*, over against activity, in which alone it has its reality; or original nature is the *being* both of individuality as such and of individuality as work, while activity is the original *concept*, as absolute transition, or as *becoming*. This *inadequacy* of concept and reality, lying in its essence, is experienced by [1807 345] consciousness in its work; in the work, therefore, consciousness becomes for itself what it is in truth, and its empty concept of itself vanishes.

407 Thus in this fundamental contradiction of the work, which is the truth of this individuality real in itself, all its sides emerge again as contradictory. Or the work, as the content of the whole individuality, placed out of *activity*, which is

negative unity and holds all moments captive, into *being*, now lets those moments go free; and in the element of subsistence they become indifferent to one another. Concept and reality therefore separate as purpose and as what is the *original essentiality*. It is contingent that purpose should have true essence, or that the in-itself should be made purpose. Likewise concept and reality separate again as *transition* into actuality and as *purpose*; or it is contingent that the *means* expressing purpose should be chosen. And finally these inward moments together, whether or not they possess unity within themselves—the individual's *activity* is again contingent in relation to *actuality* in general; *luck* decides, as much for a badly determined purpose and badly chosen means as against them.

408 If, then, in its work there arises for consciousness the *opposition* of willing and accomplishing, of purpose and means, and again of this inward totality and actuality itself, [1807 346] which in general contains the *contingency of its activity within itself*, then equally the *unity* and *necessity* of that activity are also present. This side reaches beyond the other, and the *experience* of the *contingency of activity* is itself only a *contingent experience*. The *necessity* of activity consists in *purpose* being absolutely related to *actuality*, and this unity is the concept of activity; action occurs because activity in and for itself is the essence of actuality. In the work, admittedly, there emerges the contingency that *having been accomplished* possesses in relation to *willing* and *accomplishing*, and this experience, which seems bound to count as truth, contradicts that concept of action. Yet if we consider the content of this experience in its completeness, it is the *vanishing work*. What *preserves itself* is not *vanishing*; rather, vanishing is itself actual and bound to the work, and itself vanishes along with it; the *negative itself perishes* with the *positive whose negation* it is.

409 This vanishing of vanishing lies in the concept of individuality real in itself. For that in which the work vanishes, or what vanishes in it, and what was to give what has been called experience its superiority over the concept individuality has of itself, is *objective actuality*. Yet [1807 347] objective actuality is a moment that, even in this consciousness itself, no longer has truth on its own; that truth

consists only in its unity with activity, and the *true work* is only that unity of *activity and being*, of *willing* and *accomplishing*. Thus, because of the certainty underlying its action, actuality *opposed* to consciousness is itself something that is only *for it*. For consciousness as self-consciousness returned into itself, for which all opposition has vanished, opposition can no longer arise in this form of its *being-for-itself* over against *actuality*. Rather, the opposition and negativity appearing in the work thereby affect not merely the content of the work or even of consciousness, but actuality as such, and with it the opposition and vanishing of the work that are present only through and within actuality. Thus consciousness reflects itself into itself out of its transient work, and asserts its concept and certainty as what *is* and *abides* against the experience of the *contingency* of activity. In fact it experiences its concept, in which actuality is merely a moment, something *for it*, not the in-and-for-itself; it experiences actuality as a vanishing moment, and actuality therefore counts for it only as *being* in general, whose universality is the same as activity. This unity is the true work; it is *the matter itself*, which absolutely maintains itself and [1807 348] is experienced as abiding, independently of the affair that is the *contingency* of individual activity as such, of circumstances, means, and actuality.

410 *The matter itself* is opposed to these moments only insofar as they are supposed to count in isolation; but essentially, as the interpenetration of actuality and individuality, it is their unity. It is equally an activity, and as activity *pure activity* in general, *thereby just as much the activity of this individual*; and this activity as still belonging to the individual, in opposition to actuality, is *purpose*. Equally, the matter itself is the *transition* from this determinacy into the opposite; and finally an *actuality* present *for consciousness*. *The matter itself* thus expresses the *spiritual* essentiality in which all these moments are sublated as valid for themselves, and therefore count only as universal, and in which consciousness's certainty of itself is for it objective essence, *a matter*: the object born out of self-consciousness as *its own*, without ceasing to be a free, genuine object.—The *thing* of sense-certainty and perception now has its meaning for

self-consciousness solely through self-consciousness; on this rests the distinction between a *thing* and a *matter*.—A movement corresponding to sense-certainty and perception will be traversed in it.
[1807 349]

411 Thus in *the matter itself*, as the interpenetration of individuality and objectivity itself become objective, self-consciousness has gained its true concept of itself, or has come to consciousness of its substance. At the same time, as it is here, it is a consciousness of substance that has just come to be and is therefore *immediate*; this is the determinate manner in which spiritual essence is present here, not yet having developed into truly real substance. In this immediate consciousness of it, *the matter itself* has the form of *simple essence*, which as universal contains all its different moments within itself and belongs to them, yet is again indifferent toward them as determinate moments and free for itself; as this free, *simple, abstract* matter itself, it *counts as essence*. The different moments of original determinacy, or of *this* individual's *matter*, its purpose, means, activity itself, and actuality, are for this consciousness, on the one hand, singular moments it can leave and surrender in favor of *the matter itself*. On the other hand, however, they all have the matter itself as essence only in such a way that, as their *abstract* universal, it is found *in* each of these different moments and can be their *predicate*. It itself is not yet the subject; rather, those moments count as subject, because they fall on the side of *singularity* in general, while the matter itself is still [1807 350] only the simple universal. It is the *genus* found in all these moments as its *species*, and equally free of them.

412 Consciousness is called *honest* when it has, on the one hand, arrived at this idealism expressed by *the matter itself*, and on the other has its truth in the matter itself as this formal universality; when it is always concerned only with the matter itself, and therefore moves among its different moments or species, and, insofar as it does not attain the matter itself in one of them or in one meaning, precisely thereby takes possession of it in another. It thus in fact always gains

the satisfaction that, according to its concept, was to fall to this consciousness. However things turn out, it has accomplished and attained *the matter itself*, for as this *universal* genus of those moments, it is the predicate of all.

413 If consciousness does not bring a *purpose* into *actuality*, it has nevertheless *willed* it; that is, it makes *purpose* as purpose, *pure activity* that does nothing, into *the matter itself*, and can therefore express and console itself by saying that something has nevertheless been *done* and *pursued*. Since the universal itself contains the negative, or vanishing, under it, the work's annihilation is also itself *its* activity; it has provoked others to it, and still finds satisfaction in the *vanishing* of its actuality, just as naughty boys [1807 351] enjoy *themselves* in the slap they receive, namely as its cause. Or it has *not even tried* to carry out the matter itself and has *done nothing at all*: then it did not *care to*; *the matter itself* is for it precisely the *unity* of its *decision* and *reality*. It asserts that *actuality* would be nothing other than its *liking*.—Finally, something of interest to it has come about in general without its intervention: then this *actuality* is for it the matter itself precisely in the interest it finds in it, although it was not produced by it. If it is a piece of good fortune befalling it personally, it insists upon it as its *deed* and *merit*; if instead it is an event in the world that does not otherwise concern it, it equally makes this its own, and *inactive interest* counts for it as the *side* it has taken for or against it, and has *fought* or *upheld*.

414 The *honesty* of this consciousness, like the satisfaction it experiences everywhere, consists, as is clear, in fact in its *not bringing together the thoughts* it has of the matter itself. *The matter itself* is for it equally *its own* affair and *no work at all*, or *pure activity* and *empty purpose*, or again an *actuality without deed*. It makes one meaning after another the subject of this predicate and forgets one after another. Now, in merely *having willed*, or even in *not having cared to*, the matter itself has the [1807 352] meaning of *empty purpose* and the *thought* unity of willing and accomplishing. Consolation for the annihilation of purpose—that one has nevertheless *willed*, or nevertheless *purely acted*—like satisfaction in having given others something to do, makes *pure activity*, or the

utterly bad work, essence; for a work that is none at all must be called bad. Finally, in the fortunate accident of *finding* actuality before one, this being without deed becomes the matter itself.

415 But the truth of this honesty is not to be as honest as it appears. For it cannot be so thoughtless as actually to let these different moments fall apart in this way; rather, it must have immediate consciousness of their opposition, because they relate absolutely to one another. *Pure* activity is essentially the activity *of this* individual, and this activity is equally essentially an *actuality*, or a matter. Conversely, *actuality* is essentially only as *its* activity, and as *activity in general*; and *its* activity is at the same time, just as activity in general, also actuality. Thus, while it seems concerned only with *the matter itself* as *abstract actuality*, it is also concerned with it as *its own* activity. Yet equally, while it is concerned only with *activity* and *pursuit*, it is not serious about this, but is concerned with *a matter*, and with the matter as *its own*. Finally, while it seems to want only *its own* [1807 353] matter and *its own* activity, it is again concerned with *the matter in general*, or actuality abiding in and for itself.

416 Just as the matter itself and its moments appear here as *content*, they are equally necessarily present in consciousness *as forms*. They appear as content only to disappear, each giving way to the other. They must therefore be present with the determination of being *sublated*; but as such they are aspects of consciousness itself. The *matter itself* is present as its *in-itself*, or its *reflection into itself*; but the *displacement* of the moments by one another is expressed in consciousness in this way: they are posited in it not in themselves, but only *for another*. Consciousness brings one moment of the content into the light of day and presents it *for others*; yet at the same time it has reflected out of this moment into itself, and the opposite is equally present within it; it keeps this to itself as its own. Nor is it always one particular moment that is *only* put forward, and another that is kept only within; rather, consciousness alternates between them, since it must make each essential both for itself and for others. *The whole* is the moving interpenetration of individuality and the universal; but because this whole is present for this consciousness only as the *simple* essence, and thus

as the abstraction of *the matter itself*, its moments fall [1807 354] separately outside it and apart from one another; and *as a whole* it is exhausted and presented only through the divisive alternation of displaying and keeping to oneself. Since in this alternation consciousness has one moment for itself and as essential within its reflection, but another only externally attached to *it*, or for *others*, a play of individualities with one another thus arises, in which they find themselves both deceiving and deceived, both by themselves and by one another.

417 An individuality thus sets out to accomplish something; it seems thereby to have made something *its concern*. It acts, becomes through its action something for others, and seems concerned with *actuality*. Others therefore take its action to express an interest in the matter as such, and the purpose *that the matter should itself be accomplished*, regardless of whether by the first individuality or by them. Accordingly, they show that they have already accomplished it themselves, or, if not, offer and provide their help; but this consciousness has instead already left the place where they think it is. What interests it in the matter is *its own* activity and enterprise; and when they realize that this was *the matter itself*, they find themselves deceived.—But in fact their own rush to help was itself nothing other than a wish to see and display *their own* activity, not *the matter itself*; that is, they wished to deceive the other in precisely the way in which they complain of having been [1807 355] deceived.—Now that it has emerged that *one's own activity* and *enterprise*, the play of *one's powers*, passes for the matter itself, consciousness seems to pursue its essence *for itself*, not for others, and to be concerned only with action as *its own*, not as the action of *others*, thus leaving others equally free in *their* affairs. But they are mistaken again; it has already left the place where they thought it was. Its concern is not with the matter as *this particular affair of its own*, but with it as a *matter*, as something universal that is for everyone. It therefore interferes in their action and work; and if it can no longer take this out of their hands, it at least takes an interest by busying itself with judgments about it. If it stamps the work with its approval and praise, the implication is that in the work it praises not only the work itself, but

also *its own* magnanimity and restraint in not having spoiled the work as a work, or even spoiled it through its criticism. In showing an interest in the *work*, it enjoys *itself* in it; equally, a *work* it criticizes is welcome as an occasion for the same enjoyment of *its own* activity. But those who consider themselves deceived by this interference, or claim to do so, actually wished to deceive in the same way themselves. They represent their activity and enterprise as something that is only for themselves, in which they aimed only at [1807 356] *themselves* and *their own* essence. Yet by doing something, and thus presenting themselves and coming into the light of day, they directly contradict in deed their claim to wish to exclude the daylight itself, universal consciousness, and everyone's participation. Actualization is, rather, a display of what is one's own within the universal element, through which it becomes, and is meant to become, the *concern* of all.

418 It is therefore equally a deception of oneself and of others to pretend that one's concern is only with the *pure matter*. A consciousness that opens up a matter instead experiences others hurrying to it like flies to freshly set-out milk, eager to feel busy about it; and they experience in it that its concern, likewise, is not with the matter as an object, but as *its own*. Conversely, if *action itself* alone, the exercise of powers and capacities or the expression of this individuality, is supposed to be essential, the reciprocal experience is again that *everyone* bestirs themselves and considers themselves invited, and that, instead of a *pure* action, or a distinctive action of a *single individual*, what has been opened up is something that is just as much *for others*, or a *matter itself*. The same thing happens in both cases, but has a different meaning from the one assumed and intended to hold. Consciousness experiences both sides as equally essential [1807 357] moments, and in this experiences the *nature of the matter itself*: it is neither merely a matter opposed to action in general and to individual action, nor action opposed to subsistence, a *genus* free of these moments as its *species*. Rather, it is an essence whose *being* is the *action* of the *single* individual and of all individuals, and whose action is immediately *for others*, or a *matter*, and is a matter only as the *action of each and all*: the essence that is the essence of all

essences, the *spiritual essence*. Consciousness experiences that none of those moments is *subject*; each instead dissolves in the *universal matter itself*. The moments of individuality, which the thoughtlessness of this consciousness successively took for the subject, gather into the simple individuality that, as *this* individuality, is equally immediately universal. The matter itself thereby loses the relation of a predicate and the determination of lifeless abstract universality; it is instead substance permeated by individuality: the subject in which individuality exists equally as itself, or as *this* individual, and as *all* individuals; and the universal that has *being* only as this action of each and all, an actuality in that *this* consciousness knows it as its own individual actuality and as the actuality of all. The pure *matter itself* is what was determined above as the *category*: being that is I, or I that is being, but as *thinking*, which is still distinguished from [1807 358] *actual self-consciousness*. Here, however, the moments of actual self-consciousness—whether we call them its content, purpose, action, and actuality, or its form, being-for-itself and being-for-another—are posited as one with the simple category itself, and the category is thereby also all content.
b. Lawgiving Reason.

419 In its simple being, spiritual essence is *pure consciousness* and *this self*-consciousness. The individual's *originally determinate nature* has lost its positive significance of being *in itself* the element and purpose of the individual's activity; it is only a sublated moment, and the individual is a *self*, as a universal self. Conversely, the *formal matter itself* finds its fulfillment in active individuality differentiating itself within itself, since the differences of this individuality constitute the *content* of that universal. The category is *in itself* as the universal of *pure consciousness*; it is equally *for itself*, since the *self* of consciousness is equally its moment. It is absolute *being*, since that universality is the simple *self-equality of being*.

420 What is the object for consciousness therefore has the significance of being *the true*; *it is* and *holds good* [1807 359] in the sense of *being* and *holding good in and for itself*. It is the *absolute matter*, which no longer suffers from the opposition between certainty and its truth, the universal and the individual, purpose

and its reality; rather, its existence is the *actuality* and *action* of self-consciousness. This matter is therefore *ethical substance*, and consciousness of it is *ethical* consciousness. Its object counts for it equally as *the true*, since it unites self-consciousness and being in a single unity; it counts as *the absolute*, since self-consciousness can no longer, and no longer wishes to, go beyond this object, for in it self-consciousness is at home with itself. It *cannot*, since the object is all being and power;—it does not *wish* to, since the object is the *self*, or the will of this self. It is in its own self the *real* object as object, since it contains the difference belonging to consciousness; it divides into spheres that are the *determinate laws* of absolute essence. But these spheres do not cloud the concept, since the moments of being, pure consciousness, and the self remain enclosed within it —a unity that constitutes the essence of these spheres and, within this difference, no longer lets these moments fall apart.

421 These laws, or spheres of ethical substance, are immediately acknowledged; one cannot ask after their origin and justification or seek something else, since anything other than [1807 360] the essence that is *in and for itself* would be only self-consciousness itself. But self-consciousness is nothing other than this essence, since it is itself the being-for-itself of this essence, which is the truth precisely because it is just as much the *self* of consciousness as its *in-itself*, or pure consciousness.

422 Since self-consciousness knows itself as a moment of the *being-for-itself* of this substance, it expresses the existence of the law within it by saying that *sound reason* immediately knows what is *right* and *good*. As *immediately* as it *knows* this, so immediately does it *hold good* for it, and it says immediately: this *is* right and good. And specifically *this*: they are *determinate* laws; it is the matter itself, fulfilled and full of content.

423 What presents itself so immediately must be taken up and considered just as immediately. As with what sense-certainty immediately pronounces to be, so too with the being pronounced by this immediate ethical certainty, or with the immediately existing spheres of ethical essence, we must see what their constitu-

tion is. Examples of some such laws will show this; and by taking them in the form of pronouncements of *knowing*, sound reason, we need not first introduce the moment that must be brought to bear on them when they are considered as *immediate* sensory laws.

424 "*Everyone should speak the truth.*"—With this duty, pronounced as unconditional, [1807 361] a condition will immediately be conceded: *if* one knows the truth. The commandment will now therefore run: *everyone should speak the truth according to their knowledge and conviction of it at the time*. Sound reason, this very ethical consciousness that immediately knows what is right and good, will also declare that this condition was already so bound up with its universal pronouncement that this was what it *meant* by the commandment. But it thereby actually admits that it had already violated the commandment in the very act of pronouncing it. It *said*: everyone should speak the truth; but it *meant* that one should speak it according to one's knowledge and conviction of it; that is, it *said something other than it meant*, and to say something other than one means is not to speak the truth. The corrected untruth or clumsiness now expresses itself thus: *everyone should speak the truth according to their knowledge and conviction of it at the time*.—But the *universal necessity valid in itself*, which the proposition intended to express, has thereby turned instead into complete *contingency*. For whether the truth is spoken is left to the chance of whether I know it and can convince myself of it; and nothing more is said than that truth and falsehood should be spoken indiscriminately, just as someone happens to know, suppose, and comprehend them. This *contingency of content* has *universality* only in the [1807 362] *form of a proposition* in which it is expressed; but as an ethical proposition it promises a universal and necessary *content*, and so contradicts itself through the contingency of that content.—If, finally, the proposition is corrected so that the contingency of knowing and being convinced of the truth should fall away, and the truth *should* also be *known*, this would be a commandment directly contradicting the starting point. Sound reason was initially supposed to possess *immediately* the capacity to pronounce the truth; but now it is said that it *ought to know* the truth—that

is, that it does not know how to pronounce it *immediately*.—Considered from the side of *content*, this has fallen away in the demand that one should *know* the truth; for this demand concerns *knowing in general*: one should know. What is demanded is therefore, rather, something free of all determinate content. But what was at issue here was a *determinate* content, a *difference* within ethical substance. Yet this *immediate* determination of substance is a content that showed itself instead to be completely contingent; and, raised to universality and necessity so that *knowing* is pronounced to be the law, it instead disappears.

425 Another famous commandment is: *Love your neighbor as yourself*. It is addressed to the individual in relation to individuals, and *asserts this as a relation of individual* to *individual*, [1807 363] or as a relation of feeling. Active love—for inactive love has no being, and is therefore presumably not intended—aims to remove evil from a person and bring that person good. To this end one must distinguish what constitutes evil for that person, what good is appropriate against this evil, and what their welfare consists in generally; that is, I must love them with *understanding*. Uncomprehending love will harm them, perhaps more than hatred. But beneficence that understands and is substantial, in its richest and most important form, is the intelligent universal action of the state—an action compared with which the action of the individual as an individual becomes something altogether so insignificant that it is scarcely worth speaking of. Moreover, that action is so powerful that if individual action wished to oppose it, either by being directly criminal on its own account or, out of love for another, by defrauding the universal of its right and its share in that individual, it would be entirely futile and irresistibly destroyed. Beneficence that is feeling retains only the significance of an entirely individual action, an emergency assistance as contingent as it is momentary. Chance determines not only its occasion, but also whether it is a *work* at all, whether it is not immediately dissolved again and even turned instead into evil [1807 364]. This action for the welfare of others, therefore, which is pronounced to be *necessary*, is such that it may exist or may not; that, if the occasion happens to arise, it may be a work and may be good, or may not. This law thus has no more universal

content than the first one considered, and does not express something that is *in and for itself*, as it ought to do as an absolute ethical law. Or such laws remain at the level of *ought*, but have no *actuality*; they are not *laws*, but merely *commandments*.

426 In fact, however, the nature of the matter itself makes clear that any universal absolute *content* must be renounced; for every *determinacy* posited in simple substance is *inadequate* to it, whose essence is precisely to be this simplicity. In its simple absoluteness, the commandment itself expresses *immediate ethical being*; the difference appearing in it is a determinacy, and hence a content standing *below* the absolute universality of this simple being. Since an absolute content must thus be renounced, the commandment can possess only *formal universality*, or the property of not contradicting itself; for universality without content is formal, and absolute content itself means a difference that is no difference, or absence of content.
[1807 365]

427 What remains for lawgiving, therefore, is the *pure form* of *universality*, or in fact the *tautology* of consciousness, which confronts the content and is a *knowing*, not of the *existing* or actual *content*, but of its *essence*, or self-equality.

428 Ethical essence is thus not itself immediately a content, but only a standard for whether a content is capable of being law or not, insofar as it does not contradict itself. Lawgiving reason has been reduced to a reason that merely *tests*.
c. Law-Testing Reason.

429 A difference within simple ethical substance is a contingency for it, which we saw emerge in the determinate commandment as the contingency of knowing, actuality, and action. The *comparison* between that simple being and the determinacy that does not correspond to it fell to us; and simple substance has shown itself in this to be formal universality, or pure *consciousness*, which, free of the content, confronts it and is a *knowing* of it as determinate. In this way this universality remains what *the matter itself* was. But in consciousness it is something else: it is no longer the thoughtless, inert [1807 366] genus, but is

related to the particular and counts as its power and truth.—This consciousness initially seems to be the same testing that we ourselves previously were, and its action seems capable of being nothing other than what has already occurred: a comparison of the universal with the determinate, from which their inadequacy to one another would emerge as before. But the relation of content to the universal is different here, since the latter has acquired a different meaning. It is *formal* universality, of which the determinate content is capable, since in it this content is considered only in relation to itself. In our testing, universal, solid substance stood opposed to determinacy, which developed as the contingency of the consciousness into which substance entered. Here one member of the comparison has disappeared; the universal is no longer the substance that *is* and *holds good*, or what is right in and for itself, but simple knowing or form, which compares a content only with itself and considers whether it is a tautology. Laws are no longer given, but *tested*; and for the testing consciousness the laws are *already* given. It takes up their *content* in its simplicity, without entering, as we did, into consideration of the individuality and contingency adhering to its actuality; rather, it stops at the commandment as commandment and relates to it as simply as its standard is simple.

[1807 367]

430 But for this very reason this testing does not reach far: precisely because the standard is tautology and indifferent to content, it admits this content just as readily as its opposite.—The question is whether it should be a law in and for itself that *property* should exist; *in and for itself*, not from usefulness for other purposes. Ethical essentiality consists precisely in the law being equal only to itself and thus grounded through this self-equality in its own essence, not being conditional. Property in and for itself does not contradict itself; it is an *isolated* determinacy, or one posited as equal only to itself. Non-property, things belonging to no one, or community of goods, contradicts itself just as little. That something belongs to no one, or to the first person who takes possession of it, or to everyone together, and to each according to their need or in equal shares, is a *simple determinacy*, a *formal thought*, just like its opposite, property.

—If, to be sure, the ownerless thing is considered as a *necessary object* of *need*, it is necessary that it become the possession of some individual; and it would be contradictory to make the thing's freedom the law instead. But the thing's being ownerless is not meant as absolute ownerlessness either; rather, it is to *come into possession* according to the individual's *need*, not indeed to be stored away, but to be [1807 368] used immediately. Yet providing for need entirely according to chance in this way contradicts the nature of the conscious being that alone is under discussion; for this being must represent its need in the form of *universality*, provide for its whole existence, and acquire lasting goods. Thus the thought that a thing should fall by chance to the next self-conscious living being according to its need would not agree with itself.—In community of goods, where provision would be made in a universal and lasting way, each receives either as much *as they need*, in which case this inequality contradicts the essence of consciousness, for which the *equality* of individuals is the principle; or distribution is *equal*, according to the latter principle, in which case the share does not have the relation to need that is, after all, its sole concept.

431 Yet if non-property appears contradictory in this way, this happens only because it has not been left as a *simple* determinacy. Property fares just the same when it is resolved into moments. The individual thing that is my property thereby counts as something *universal, secured, and lasting*; but this contradicts its nature, which consists in being used and *disappearing*. At the same time it counts as *mine*, which all others acknowledge, excluding [1807 369] themselves from it. But my being acknowledged implies instead my equality with everyone, the opposite of exclusion.—What I possess is a *thing*, that is, a being for others in general, wholly universal and without the determination of being only for me; that *I* possess it contradicts its universal thinghood. Property therefore contradicts itself in every respect just as much as non-property; each contains these two opposed, self-contradictory moments of individuality and universality.—But each of these determinacies, represented *simply* as property or non-property without further development, is as *simple* as the other—that is, not self-contradictory.—The standard of law that reason has in

itself therefore fits everything equally well, and is thus in fact no standard at all. —It would indeed be strange if tautology, the principle of contradiction, which is conceded to be only a formal criterion for the cognition of theoretical truth —that is, something entirely indifferent to truth and untruth—*were supposed to be more* for the cognition of practical *truth*.

432 In the two moments just considered of the fulfillment of the previously empty spiritual essence, both the positing of immediate determinacies in ethical substance and then the knowing of whether they are laws have been sublated. The [1807 370] result thus seems to be that neither determinate laws nor a knowledge of them can exist. But substance is *consciousness* of itself as absolute *essentiality*, and therefore can relinquish neither the *difference* within it nor the *knowledge* of this difference. That lawgiving and law-testing proved null means that both, taken singly and in isolation, are merely unsupported *moments* of ethical consciousness; and the movement in which they appear has the formal meaning that ethical substance thereby presents itself as consciousness.

433 Insofar as these two moments are more precise determinations of consciousness of *the matter itself*, they can be regarded as forms of *honesty*. Just as honesty previously busied itself with the formal moments of the matter itself, so now it busies itself with a supposedly obligatory content of the good and right and with testing such fixed truth, imagining that sound reason and intelligent insight possess the force and validity of the commandments.

434 Without this honesty, however, the laws do not count as the *essence* of *consciousness*, nor does testing count as an action *within* it. Rather, as each of these moments appears *immediately* on its own as an *actuality*, one expresses an invalid establishment and existence of actual laws, and the other an equally invalid liberation from them. As a determinate [1807 371] law, the law has a contingent content—here this means that it is the law of an individual consciousness, with an arbitrary content. That immediate lawgiving is therefore the tyrannical outrage that makes arbitrary will into law and ethical life into obedience to it—to laws that are *only* laws, not also *commandments*. Likewise,

the second moment, insofar as it is isolated, means testing laws, moving the immovable, and the outrage of a knowing that reasons itself free of absolute laws and takes them for an arbitrary will alien to itself.

435 In both forms these moments are a negative relation to substance, or to real spiritual essence; or, in them, substance does not yet have its reality. Rather, consciousness still contains substance in the form of its own immediacy, and substance is as yet only a *will* and a *knowing* of this individual, or the *ought* of an unactual commandment and a knowing of formal universality. But as these modes sublated themselves, consciousness returned into the universal and those oppositions disappeared. Spiritual essence is actual substance through these modes being valid not separately, but only as sublated; and the unity in which they are merely moments is the self of consciousness, which, now posited within spiritual essence, [1807 372] makes it actual, fulfilled, and self-conscious.

436 Spiritual essence is thus, in the first place, law *existing in itself* for self-consciousness; the universality of testing, which was formal and did not exist *in itself*, is sublated. It is equally an eternal law, grounded not in the *will of this individual*, but existing in and for itself: the absolute *pure will of all*, which has the form of immediate *being*. Nor is it a *commandment* that merely *ought* to be; rather, it *is* and *holds good*. It is the universal I of the category, which is immediately actuality, and the world is only this actuality. But since this *existing law* holds good absolutely, the obedience of self-consciousness is not service to a master whose commands would be arbitrary and in whom it would not recognize itself. Rather, the laws are thoughts of its own absolute consciousness, which it itself immediately *has*. Nor does it *believe* in them, for belief indeed intuits essence, but an alien essence. Ethical *self*-consciousness is *immediately* one with essence through the *universality* of its *self*; belief, by contrast, begins with *individual* consciousness and is its movement of continually approaching this unity without attaining the presence of its essence.—The former con-

sciousness, however, has sublated itself as individual; this mediation is [1807 373] accomplished, and only because it is accomplished is consciousness immediate self-consciousness of ethical substance.

437 The difference between self-consciousness and essence is therefore perfectly transparent. Consequently, the *differences within essence* itself are not contingent determinacies. Rather, because of the unity of essence with self-consciousness—the latter alone could be the source of inequality—they are the spheres of their articulation, permeated by their life: spirits clear to themselves and undivided, spotless heavenly figures that preserve, in their differences, the unprofaned innocence and unanimity of their essence.—Self-consciousness is likewise a simple, clear *relation* to them. They *are*, and nothing more—this constitutes the consciousness of its relation. Thus, for Sophocles' Antigone, they hold good as the gods' *unwritten* and *unfailing* law: it lives not merely now and yesterday, but forever, and no one knows from where it appeared. They *are*. If I ask after their genesis and confine them to the point of their origin, I have gone beyond them; for I am now the universal, while they are conditioned and limited. If they are to legitimate themselves before my insight, I have already shaken their unwavering being-in-itself and regard them as something that may be true or may not be true for me [1807 374]. The ethical disposition consists precisely in steadfastly holding to what is right and refraining from any movement, shaking, or reduction of it.—A deposit is entrusted to me; it *is* another's property, and I acknowledge it *because this is so*, while wavering in this relation. If I keep the deposit for myself, I commit no contradiction whatever according to the principle of my testing, tautology; for then I no longer regard it as another's property. Keeping something that I do not regard as another's property is perfectly consistent. The change *of view* is no contradiction, since what is at issue is not the view as a view, but the object and content that is supposed not to contradict itself. Just as I can change the view that something is my property into the view that it is another's property—as I do when I give something away—without thereby becoming guilty of contradiction, so I can equally take the opposite course.—Something is therefore not right because I

find it noncontradictory; rather, it is right because it is what is right. That something *is* another's property is *the ground*. I have no business reasoning about this, or seeking out or devising all sorts of thoughts, connections, and considerations; [1807 375] I am to think neither of lawgiving nor of testing. Through such movements of my thought I would unsettle that relation, since I could in fact, as I pleased, find the opposite equally in conformity with my indeterminate tautological knowing, and thus make it law. Rather, whether this determination or its opposite is right is determined *in and for itself*. I, for my part, could make whichever I pleased into law, or just as well neither; and as soon as I begin to test, I am already on an unethical path. Through what is right being *in and for itself* for me, I am within ethical substance; thus it is the *essence* of self-consciousness, while self-consciousness is *its actuality* and *existence*, its *self* and *will*.

VI. Spirit

[1807 376]
VI. *Spirit*.

438 Reason is spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world and of the world as itself.—The movement immediately preceding this showed the becoming of spirit, in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the concept of reason. In *observing* reason, this pure unity of *I* and *being*, of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself*, is determined as the *in-itself*, or as *being*, and rational consciousness *finds* itself. But the truth of observation is, rather, the sublation of this immediate instinct of finding, of this unconscious existence of reason. The *intuited category*, the *thing found*, enters consciousness as the *being-for-itself* of the I, which now knows itself in objective essence as the *self*. But this determination of the category as being-for-itself opposed to being-in-itself is equally one-sided and a moment that sublates itself. The category is therefore determined for consciousness as it is in its universal truth, [1807 377] as essence *existing in and for itself*. This still *abstract* determination, which constitutes *the matter itself*, is as yet only *spiritual essence*, and consciousness of it is a formal knowing of it that busies itself with its various contents. This consciousness is in fact still distinguished from substance as an individual; it either gives arbitrary laws or supposes that in its knowing as such it possesses the laws as they are in and for

themselves, and takes itself to be the power that judges them.—Or, considered from the side of substance, substance is spiritual essence *existing in and for itself*, which is not yet *consciousness* of itself.—But essence *existing in and for itself*, which is at the same time actual as consciousness and represents itself to itself, is *spirit*.

439 Its spiritual *essence* has already been designated as *ethical substance*; but spirit is *ethical actuality*. It is the *self* of actual consciousness; spirit—or rather, this self—stands over against consciousness as an objective actual *world*. Yet this world has equally lost for the self all significance of something alien, just as the self has lost all significance of a being-for-itself separated from that world, whether dependent or independent. As *substance* and the universal, self-equal, enduring essence, spirit is the immovable and indissoluble *ground* and *starting point* of everyone's action—and its *purpose* and *goal*, as the conceived *in-itself* of all self-consciousness.—This substance is equally the universal *work* that [1807 378] produces itself through the *action* of each and all as their unity and equality, for it is *being-for-itself*, the self, action. As *substance*, spirit is unwavering, just *self-equality*; but as *being-for-itself*, substance is the dissolved, self-sacrificing, benevolent essence in which each accomplishes their own work, tears universal being apart, and takes their share of it. This dissolution and individuation of essence is precisely the *moment* of the action and self of all; it is the movement and soul of substance and the universal essence brought into being. Precisely in being the being dissolved in the self, substance is not a dead essence, but *actual* and *living*.

440 Spirit is thus the self-sustaining, absolute, real essence. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions of it; they are its analysis of itself, its differentiation of its moments, and its lingering over particular ones. This isolation of such moments *presupposes* spirit itself and has its *subsistence* in spirit; or, it exists only in spirit, which is existence. Thus isolated, they have the appearance of *being* as such; but their onward movement and return into their ground and essence showed that they are only moments, or vanishing magnitudes; and this essence is precisely this movement and dissolution of these moments. Here,

where spirit, or their reflection into themselves, is posited, our reflection may briefly [1807 379] recall them in this respect: they were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit is therefore *consciousness* in general, which includes sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, insofar as, in analyzing itself, it holds fast to the moment of being for itself an *objective, existing* actuality and abstracts from this actuality's being its own being-for-itself. If, conversely, it holds fast to the other moment of the analysis, that its object is its *being-for-itself*, it is self-consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of *being-in-and-for-itself*, as the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, it is consciousness that *has reason*, which, as the *having* indicates, has the object as determined to be rational *in itself*, or to have the standing of the category, but in such a way that for its consciousness the object does not yet have the standing of the category. It is the consciousness from whose examination we have just emerged. Finally, when this reason that spirit *has* is intuited by spirit as reason that *is*, or as reason that is *actual* within it and is its world, spirit is in its truth: it *is* spirit; it is *actual ethical* essence.

441 Spirit is the *ethical life* of a *people* insofar as it is *immediate truth*: the individual that is a world. It must advance to consciousness of what it immediately is, sublate beautiful ethical life, and [1807 380] attain knowledge of itself through a series of shapes. These differ from the preceding shapes, however, in being real spirits, actualities in the full sense, and, instead of shapes of consciousness alone, shapes of a world.

442 The *living ethical* world is spirit in its *truth*; as spirit first attains abstract *knowledge* of its essence, ethical life perishes in the formal universality of right. Spirit, now divided within itself, traces out one of its worlds in its objective element as a harsh actuality: the *realm of cultivation*; and, opposed to this in the element of thought, the *world of faith*, the *realm of essence*. But both worlds, grasped by the spirit that turns inward from this loss of itself—grasped by the *concept*—are thrown into confusion and revolutionized by *insight* and its spread, the *Enlightenment*. The realm divided and extended across *this world* and the *beyond* returns into self-consciousness, which now in *morality* grasps itself as

essentiality and essence as actual self. It no longer sets its *world* and that world's *ground* outside itself, but lets everything fade within itself and, as *conscience*, is spirit *certain of itself*.
[1807 381]

443 The ethical world, the world torn between this world and the beyond, and the moral worldview are therefore the spirits whose movement and return into spirit's simple self existing for itself will unfold, and as whose goal and result the actual self-consciousness of absolute spirit will emerge.
[1807 382]
A. *True Spirit*: Ethical Life.

444 In its simple truth, spirit is consciousness and separates its moments from one another. *Action* divides it into substance and consciousness of substance, and divides both substance and consciousness themselves. As universal *essence* and *purpose*, substance confronts itself as *individualized* actuality; the infinite middle is self-consciousness, which, *in itself* the unity of itself and substance, now becomes this *for itself*, unites universal essence with its individualized actuality, raises the latter to the former, and acts ethically—and brings the former down to the latter, accomplishing the purpose, the substance that is only thought. It produces the unity of its self and substance as *its work*, and thereby as *actuality*.

445 In this separation of consciousness, simple substance has, on the one hand, acquired an opposition to self-consciousness; on the other, it thereby equally presents within itself the nature of consciousness, [1807 383] which is to differentiate itself within itself, as a world articulated into its spheres. It therefore splits into a differentiated ethical essence, into a human and a divine law. Likewise, the self-consciousness confronting it assigns itself, according to its essence, to one of these powers, and as knowing divides into ignorance of what it does and knowledge of it, which is for that very reason a deceived knowing. In its deed it therefore experiences both the contradiction between *those powers* into which substance divided, and their mutual destruction, as well as the contradiction between its knowledge of the ethical character of its action and what

is ethical in and for itself; and it finds *its own* downfall. But in fact, through this movement ethical substance has become *actual self-consciousness*, or *this* self has become something *existing in and for itself*; yet precisely in this, ethical life has perished.

a. *The Ethical World*: Human and Divine Law, Man and Woman.

446 The simple substance of spirit divides itself as consciousness. Or, just as consciousness of abstract, sensuous being passes into perception, [1807 384] so too does the immediate certainty of real, ethical being; and just as for sense-perception simple being becomes a thing of many properties, so for ethical perception the occasion of action is an actuality of many ethical relations. For the former, however, the useless multiplicity of properties contracts into the essential opposition of individuality and universality; and still more, for the latter, which is purified, substantial consciousness, the multiplicity of ethical moments becomes the duality of a law of individuality and a law of universality. Yet each of these spheres of substance remains the whole spirit; whereas in sense-perception things have no substance other than the two determinations of individuality and universality, here these express only the superficial opposition of the two sides to one another.

447 In the essence we are considering here, individuality has the significance of *self-consciousness* in general, not of a contingent individual consciousness. Ethical substance in this determination is therefore *actual* substance, absolute spirit *realized* in the multiplicity of existing *consciousness*. It is the *community*, which *for us*, on entering the practical configuration of reason in general, was absolute essence, and has here emerged in its truth *for itself* as conscious ethical essence, and as the *essence for the* consciousness [1807 385] we have as our object. It is spirit that is *for itself* insofar as it sees itself in the *mutual reflection of individuals*, and is *in itself*, or substance, insofar as it preserves them within itself. As *actual substance*, it is a *people*; as *actual consciousness*, a *citizen* of the people. This consciousness has its *essence* in simple spirit, and its certainty of itself in the *actuality* of this spirit, the entire people, and immediately therein its *truth* —thus not in something unactual, but in a spirit that *exists* and *holds good*.

448 This spirit can be called human law, because it exists essentially in the form of *actuality conscious of itself*. In the form of universality it is the *known* law and the *prevailing* custom; in the form of individuality it is actual certainty of itself in the *individual* in general, and as government it is certainty of itself as *simple individuality*. Its truth is an open *validity* lying in the light of day: an *existence* that, for immediate certainty, takes the form of an existence freely released.

449 But another power, *divine law*, confronts this ethical power and its openness. For ethical *state power*, as the *movement* of *self-conscious action*, has its opposite in the *simple* and *immediate essence* of ethical life; as *actual universality*, it is a force directed against individual being-for-itself; and as [1807 386] actuality in general, it also has in *inner* essence something other than itself.

450 It has already been recalled that each of the opposed modes in which ethical substance exists contains the whole substance and all the moments of its content. If, therefore, the community is substance as actual action conscious of itself, the other side has the form of immediate or existing substance. On the one hand, this is thus the inner concept, or the universal possibility of ethical life in general; but on the other hand, it equally contains the moment of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness expressing ethical life in this element of *immediacy* or *being*, or an *immediate* consciousness of itself, both as essence and as this self, in another—that is, a *natural ethical* community—is the *family*. As the *unconscious*, still inward concept, it confronts its self-conscious actuality; as the *element* of the people's actuality, it confronts the people itself; as *immediate ethical being*, it confronts ethical life that forms and sustains itself through *labor* for the universal: the Penates, the household gods, confront universal spirit.

451 But although the family's *ethical being* is determined as *immediate*, within itself the family is an *ethical* essence not *insofar* as it is the relation of its members *by nature*, or their relationship is the *immediate* relationship of *actual individuals*. For [1807 387] the ethical is *universal* in itself, and this natural relationship is essentially just as much a spirit, and ethical only as spiritual

essence. We must see in what its distinctive ethical character consists.—First, because the ethical is what is universal in itself, the ethical relationship of family members is not a relationship of feeling or the relation of love. The ethical would now seem to have to be placed in the relation of the *individual* family member to the *whole* family as substance, so that the individual's action and actuality have only the family as their purpose and content. But the conscious purpose of the *action* of this whole, insofar as it is directed toward itself, is itself the individual. The acquisition and preservation of power and wealth is partly directed only toward need and belongs to desire; partly, in its higher determination, it becomes merely a means. This determination does not fall within the family itself, but is directed toward the truly universal, the community; it is instead negative toward the family, and consists in taking the individual out of it, subjugating the individual's natural character and individuality, and drawing the individual toward *virtue*, toward life in and for the universal. The *positive* purpose peculiar to the family is the individual as such. For this relationship to be ethical, the individual—whether the one acting or the one toward whom the action is directed—cannot appear according to [1807 388] some *contingency*, as happens, for instance, in some act of assistance or service. The content of ethical action must be substantial, or whole and universal; it can therefore relate only to the *whole* individual, or to the individual as universal. Nor, again, can this mean that a *service* is merely *imagined* to advance the individual's entire happiness, while, as immediate and actual action, it does only something particular for the individual;—nor that, as education, in a *series* of efforts, it actually takes the individual as a whole as its object and produces that individual as its work, where, apart from the purpose negative toward the family, the *actual action* has only a limited content;—nor, finally, that it is emergency assistance through which the whole individual is in truth saved; for this is itself an entirely contingent deed, whose occasion is an ordinary actuality that may or may not be. The action, therefore, that embraces the blood relative's entire existence and takes as its object and content not the citizen, who does not belong to the family, nor the one who is to become a citizen and *cease* to count as *this individual*, but *this* individual belonging to the family, as a *universal* essence elevated above

sensuous, that is, individual actuality, no longer concerns the *living*, but the *dead*, who has gathered himself from the long succession of his dispersed existence [1807 389] into a single completed shape and risen from the unrest of contingent life into the repose of simple universality.—Because the individual is *actual* and *substantial* only as a citizen, insofar as he is not a citizen and belongs to the family he is only the *unactual*, powerless shade.

452 This universality attained by the individual *as such* is *pure being, death*; it is *immediate natural having-become*, not the *action* of a *consciousness*. The duty of the family member is therefore to add this side, so that the individual's final *being* too, this *universal* being, may not belong to nature alone and remain something irrational, but may be something *done*, and the right of consciousness may be upheld in it. Or rather, the meaning of the action is that, since in truth the repose and universality of self-conscious essence do not belong to nature, the semblance of such an action that nature has arrogated to itself should fall away and the truth be established.—What nature did to the individual is the side on which his becoming universal presents itself as the movement of *a being*. This movement does indeed itself fall within the ethical community and has that community as its purpose; death is the completion and highest labor that the individual as such undertakes for it. But insofar as the individual is essentially *single*, it is contingent that his death [1807 390] should have been immediately connected with his labor for the universal and have resulted from it; and even if it was, death is *natural* negativity and the movement of the individual as *a being*, in which consciousness does not return into itself and become self-consciousness. Or, since the movement of *a being* is its being sublated and attaining *being-for-itself*, death is the side of division in which the being-for-itself attained is something other than the being that entered the movement.—Because ethical life is spirit in its *immediate* truth, the sides into which its consciousness separates also fall into this form of *immediacy*, and individuality passes over into this *abstract* negativity, which, without consolation or reconciliation *within itself*, must *essentially* receive these through an *actual* and *external action*.—Blood kinship therefore supplements the abstract

natural movement by adding the movement of consciousness, interrupting nature's work, and rescuing the blood relative from destruction—or rather, because destruction, his becoming pure being, is necessary, taking upon itself the deed of destruction.—This brings it about that *dead*, universal *being* too becomes a being returned into itself, a *being-for-itself*, or that powerless, purely *single* individuality is raised to *universal individuality*. Since the dead man has released his *being* from his [1807 391] *action*, or negative one, he is empty individuality, only a passive *being-for-another*, surrendered to every low, irrational individuality and to the powers of abstract materials, of which the former, by virtue of the life it has, and the latter, by virtue of their negative nature, are now more powerful than he. The family keeps from him this dishonoring action of unconscious desire and abstract entities, puts its own action in their place, and weds the relative to the bosom of the earth, to elemental, imperishable individuality. It thereby makes him a member of a community that instead overcomes and binds the powers of the separate materials and the low forms of life that sought to break free against him and destroy him.

453 This last duty thus constitutes the complete *divine* law, or the positive *ethical* action toward the individual. Every other relation toward him that does not remain at the level of love but is ethical belongs to human law and has the negative significance of raising the individual above confinement within the natural community to which he belongs as *actual*. Now although human right has for its content and power actual, self-conscious ethical substance, the entire people, whereas divine right and law have the individual who is beyond actuality, he is not without power; [1807 392] his power is the *abstract*, purely *universal*: the *elemental* individual, which tears back into pure abstraction as into its essence the individuality that tears itself away from the element and constitutes the people's self-conscious actuality, just as it is that individuality's ground.—How this power presents itself in the people itself will unfold further.

454 Now in each of the laws there are also *differences* and *gradations*. For since both essences contain the moment of consciousness, difference unfolds within them; this constitutes their movement and distinctive life. Considering these differ-

ences shows the manner of *activity* and *self-consciousness* of the two *universal essences* of the ethical world, as well as their *connection* and *transition* into one another.

455 The *community*, the higher law whose validity stands openly in the sunlight, has its actual vitality in the *government*, in which it is an individual. Government is *actual* spirit *reflected into itself*, the simple *self* of the whole ethical substance. This simple force does indeed allow essence to expand into its articulation and give each part subsistence and a being-for-itself of its own. In this, spirit has its *reality*, or its *existence*, and the family is the *element* of this reality. But spirit is at the same time the force of the whole, which gathers these parts [1807 393] back into the negative one, makes them feel their lack of independence, and keeps them conscious of having their life only in the whole. The community may thus, on the one hand, organize itself into systems of personal independence and property, of the right of persons and of things; and likewise articulate and establish as independent associations the modes of labor for initially individual purposes—acquisition and enjoyment. The spirit of universal association is the *simplicity* and *negative* essence of these self-isolating systems. To prevent them from rooting themselves and hardening in this isolation, thereby letting the whole fall apart and spirit evaporate, the government must from time to time shake them to their core through wars, thereby violating and disrupting their established order and right to independence. In the labor thus imposed, it must make the individuals who, absorbed in these systems, tear themselves away from the whole and strive for inviolable *being-for-itself* and personal security, feel their master, death. Through this dissolution of the form of subsistence, spirit wards off the sinking of ethical into natural existence, and preserves and raises the self of its consciousness into *freedom* and into its *force*. —Negative essence shows itself as the community's true *power* and the *force* [1807 394] of its self-preservation; the community therefore has the truth and confirmation of its power in the essence of *divine law* and the *underworld*.

456 Divine law, which governs the family, likewise has within it differences whose relationship constitutes the living movement of its actuality. Of the three relationships—husband and wife, parents and children, siblings as brother and sister—the *relationship* of *husband* and *wife* is, first, the *immediate* recognition of one consciousness in the other, and the recognition that each is recognized by the other. Because it is *natural*, not ethical, self-recognition, it is only the *representation* and *image* of spirit, not actual spirit itself.—But representation or image has its actuality in something other than itself; this relationship therefore has its actuality not in itself but in the child—another being whose becoming it is and in whom it itself disappears; and this succession of generations, rolling onward, has its enduring basis in the people.—The piety of husband and wife toward one another is therefore mixed with natural relation and feeling, and their relationship does not have its return into itself within itself; nor does the second relationship, the *piety* of *parents* and *children* toward one another. The piety of parents [1807 395] toward their children is affected by this very emotion of having consciousness of their actuality in another and seeing being-for-itself come to be in that other without receiving it back; instead, it remains an alien actuality of its own. Conversely, the piety of children toward parents is affected by the emotion of having their own becoming, or their in-itself, in another who is passing away, and attaining being-for-itself and their own self-consciousness only through separation from their origin—a separation in which that origin dries up.

457 These two relationships remain within the transition and inequality of the sides distributed between them.—The unmixed relationship, however, exists between *brother* and *sister*. They are the same blood, which has, however, come to *rest* and *equilibrium* in them. They therefore do not desire one another, nor have they given or received this being-for-itself from one another; rather, they are free individualities toward one another. As sister, the feminine therefore has the highest *intimation* of ethical essence; it does not attain *consciousness* and actuality of this essence, because the law of the family is essence *existing in itself*, *inward* essence, which does not lie in the daylight of consciousness but

remains inward feeling and the divine elevated above actuality. The feminine is bound to these Penates, these household gods, [1807 396] in which it intuits partly its universal substance, but partly also its individuality, yet so that this relation of individuality is not at the same time the natural relation of pleasure. —As *daughter*, the woman must now see her parents pass away with natural emotion and ethical composure, for only at the cost of this relationship does she attain the *being-for-itself* of which she is capable; she therefore does not intuit her being-for-itself positively in her parents.—But the relationships of *mother* and *wife* contain individuality partly as something natural belonging to pleasure, partly as something negative that sees only its own disappearance in them; partly, for that very reason, individuality is something contingent that can be replaced by another. In the house of ethical life, it is not *this* husband, not *this* child, but *a husband, children in general*—not feeling, but the universal—on which these relationships of the woman are founded. The difference between her ethical character and the man's consists precisely in her remaining immediately universal in her determination for individuality and in her pleasure, and alien to the individuality of desire. In the man, by contrast, these two sides separate; and since as a citizen he possesses the *self-conscious* force of *universality*, he thereby purchases the right of *desire* and at the same time preserves his freedom from it. Thus, insofar as individuality [1807 397] is mixed into this relationship of the woman, its ethical character is not pure; but insofar as it is pure, individuality is *indifferent*, and the woman lacks the moment of recognizing herself as *this* self in the other.—For the sister, however, the brother is the tranquil, equal essence in general; her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with natural relation. The indifference of individuality and its ethical contingency are therefore absent from this relationship; rather, the moment of the recognizing and recognized *individual self* may here assert its right, because it is bound to the equilibrium of blood and a relation without desire. The loss of a brother is therefore irreplaceable for the sister, and her duty toward him the highest.

458 This relationship is at the same time the boundary at which the family, enclosed within itself, dissolves and goes outside itself. The brother is the side through which its spirit becomes individuality that turns toward something else and passes into consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this *immediate, elemental*, and therefore properly *negative* ethical life of the family in order to acquire and bring forth actual ethical life conscious of itself.

459 He passes from divine law, in whose sphere he lived, to human law. The sister, however, becomes—or the wife remains—the head of the household and guardian of divine [1807 398] law. In this way the two sexes overcome their natural essence and appear in their ethical significance, as differences that divide between them the two distinctions ethical substance gives itself. These two *universal* essences of the ethical world have their determinate *individuality* in *naturally* distinct self-consciousnesses because ethical spirit is the *immediate* unity of substance with self-consciousness—an *immediacy* that thus appears, on the side of reality and difference, also as the existence of a natural difference.—This is the side that, in the shape of individuality real to itself, in the concept of spiritual essence, showed itself as *originally determinate nature*. This moment loses the indeterminacy it still has there, and the contingent diversity of dispositions and capacities. It is now the determinate opposition of the two sexes, whose natural character at the same time acquires the significance of their ethical determination.

460 Yet the difference between the sexes and their ethical content remains within the unity of substance, and its movement is precisely the substance's enduring becoming. The man is sent out by the family spirit into the community and finds in it his self-conscious essence; just as the family thereby has in him its universal substance and subsistence, so, conversely, the community [1807 399] has in the family the formal element of its actuality and in divine law its force and confirmation. Neither alone is in and for itself; in its living movement human law proceeds from divine law, the law valid on earth from the subter-

ranean, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy, and equally returns to where it began. The subterranean power, conversely, has its *actuality* on earth; through consciousness it becomes existence and activity.

461 The universal ethical essences are therefore substance as universal consciousness and substance as individual consciousness; they have the people and the family as their universal actuality, but man and woman as their natural self and active individuality. In this content of the ethical world we see achieved the purposes the preceding, substanceless shapes of consciousness set themselves. What reason grasped only as an object has become self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness had only within itself is present as true actuality.—What observation knew as something *found*, in which the self had no part, is here a custom found already existing, but an actuality that is at the same time the deed and work of the finder.—The individual seeking the pleasure *of enjoying their individuality* finds it in the family, and the necessity in which pleasure perishes is their own [1807 400] self-consciousness as a citizen of their people;—or it is this: knowing the *law of the heart* as the law of all hearts, consciousness of the *self* as the acknowledged universal order;—it is *virtue* enjoying the fruits of its sacrifice. Virtue accomplishes its aim, namely, to raise essence into actual presence, and its enjoyment is this universal life.—Finally, consciousness *of the matter itself* is satisfied in real substance, which positively contains and preserves the abstract moments of that empty category. In the ethical powers substance has a true content that has taken the place of the substanceless commandments sound reason wished to give and know;—and thereby also a content-filled standard, determined within itself, for testing not laws but what is done.

462 The whole is a tranquil equilibrium of all its parts, and each part a spirit at home, seeking its satisfaction not beyond itself but possessing it within itself precisely because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole.—This equilibrium can indeed be living only through inequality arising within it and being brought back to equality by *justice*. Yet justice is neither an alien essence situated beyond, nor the actuality, unworthy of it, of mutual malice, treachery, [1807 401] ingratitude, and so forth, which would execute judgment through

thoughtless chance, as an uncomprehended connection and an unconscious doing and leaving undone. Rather, as the justice of *human* right, which brings back into the universal the being-for-itself that steps out of equilibrium—the independence of estates and individuals—it is the government of the people, which is the self-present individuality of universal essence and the self-conscious will of all themselves.—But the justice that restores to equilibrium the universal becoming overpowerful against the individual is equally the simple spirit of the one who has suffered wrong—not divided into the sufferer and an essence beyond. He himself is the subterranean power, and it is *his* Fury that pursues vengeance; for his individuality, his blood, lives on in the household; his substance has an enduring actuality. The wrong that can be inflicted on the individual in the realm of ethical life is only this: that something merely *happens* to him. The power that perpetrates this wrong against consciousness, making it a mere thing, is nature; it is the universality not of the *community*, but the *abstract* universality of *being*. In undoing the wrong suffered, individuality turns not against the former, since it has not suffered from it, but against the latter. The consciousness belonging to the individual's blood undoes this [1807 402] wrong, as we have seen, by making what has *happened* instead into a *work*, so that *being*, the *last* thing, may also be something *willed*, and thus a source of joy.

463 In this way, in its *subsistence*, the ethical realm is a spotless world, unpolluted by any division. Its movement is likewise a tranquil becoming of one of its powers into the other, so that each itself preserves and produces the other. We do indeed see it divide into two essences and their actuality; but their opposition is, rather, the confirmation of one by the other, and where they immediately touch as actual, their middle and element is their immediate interpenetration. One extreme, universal self-conscious spirit, is joined to its other extreme, its force and its element, *unconscious* spirit, through the *individuality* of the *man*. Conversely, *divine* law has its individualization, or the *unconscious* spirit of the individual has its existence, in the woman, through whom, as the *middle*, it rises from its unactuality into actuality, from the unknowing and unknown

into the conscious realm. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle of the whole and the element that, divided into these extremes of divine and human law, is equally their immediate union. This makes those first two syllogisms into the same syllogism [1807 403] and unites into one the opposed movements: of actuality downward into unactuality—of human law, which organizes itself into independent members, down into the danger and trial of death—and of subterranean law upward into the actuality of daylight and conscious existence, the former belonging to the man, the latter to the woman.

b. Ethical Action: Human and Divine Knowledge, Guilt and Fate.

464 Given the constitution of opposition in this realm, self-consciousness has not yet appeared in its right as *single individuality*. On one side it counts in this realm only as *universal will*, on the other as the family's *blood*; *this individual* counts only as an *unactual shade*.—*No deed has yet* been committed; but the deed is the *actual self*.—It disturbs the tranquil organization and movement of the ethical world. What appears in this world as the order and accord of its two essences, each confirming and completing the other, becomes through the deed a transition of *opposites* in which each proves itself instead to be the nullity of itself [1807 404] and the other, rather than their confirmation. It becomes the negative movement, or the eternal necessity of terrible *fate*, which swallows divine and human law, together with the two self-consciousnesses in which these powers have their existence, into the abyss of its *simplicity*—and for us passes over into the *absolute being-for-itself* of purely individual self-consciousness.

465 The *ground* from which this movement proceeds and on which it advances is the realm of ethical life; but the *activity* of this movement is self-consciousness. As *ethical* consciousness, it is the *simple, pure orientation* toward ethical essentiality, or duty. There is no arbitrariness in it, and equally no struggle or indecision, since giving and testing laws have been relinquished; rather, ethical essentiality is for it immediate, unwavering, and without contradiction. It therefore offers neither the poor spectacle of finding itself in a collision between passion and duty, nor the comic spectacle of a collision between duty and duty—a colli-

sion that in content is the same as that between passion and duty. For passion is just as capable of being represented as duty, because duty, when consciousness withdraws into itself from duty's immediate substantial essentiality, becomes the formal universal into which every content fits equally well, as was shown above. But the collision [1807 405] of duties is comic because it expresses the contradiction of an *opposed absolute*, thus the absolute and immediately the nullity of this so-called absolute, or duty.—Ethical consciousness, however, knows what it has to do and is resolved to belong to either divine or human law. This immediacy of its resolve is a *being-in-itself*, and therefore at the same time has the significance of a natural being, as we have seen; nature, not the contingency of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other—or, conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves their individual existence and actualization in the two sexes.

466 Now because, on the one hand, ethical life consists essentially in this immediate *resolve*, and therefore only one law is essence for consciousness, and, on the other hand, the ethical powers are actual in the *self* of consciousness, they acquire the significance of *excluding* and being *opposed* to one another. In self-consciousness they are *for themselves*, whereas in the *realm* of ethical life they are only *in themselves*. Because ethical consciousness is *resolved* for one of them, it is essentially *character*; for it, the two do not have equal *essentiality*. The opposition therefore appears as an *unhappy* collision of duty only with an *actuality* devoid of right. Ethical [1807 406] consciousness, as self-consciousness, is within this opposition, and as such at the same time aims to subject this opposed actuality by force to the law to which it belongs, or to deceive it. Since it sees right only on its own side and wrong on the other, of the two consciousnesses the one belonging to divine law sees on the other side human, contingent *violence*; but the one assigned to human law sees on the other side the obstinacy and *disobedience* of inward being-for-itself. For the commands of the government are the universal, public meaning lying in the light of day; but the

will of the other law is the subterranean meaning enclosed within, which in its existence appears as the will of individuality and, in contradiction to the first, is an outrage.

467 There thus arises in consciousness the opposition of the *known* and the *unknown*, as in substance that of the *conscious* and the *unconscious*; and the absolute *right* of ethical *self-consciousness* comes into conflict with the divine *right* of *essence*. For self-consciousness as consciousness, objective actuality as such has essentiality; but according to its substance it is the unity of itself and this opposite, and ethical self-consciousness is consciousness of substance. The object as opposed to self-consciousness has therefore entirely lost [1807 407] the significance of having essentiality for itself. Just as the spheres in which the object is only a *thing* have long since disappeared, so too have those spheres in which consciousness establishes something out of itself and makes a single moment into essence. Against such one-sidedness actuality has a force of its own; it is allied with truth against consciousness and first presents to consciousness what the truth is. But ethical consciousness has drunk from the cup of absolute substance forgetfulness of every one-sidedness of being-for-itself, of its purposes and distinctive concepts, and has therefore at the same time drowned in this Stygian water all the independent essentiality and significance of objective actuality. Its absolute right is therefore that, acting according to ethical law, it should find in this actualization nothing other than the accomplishment of this law itself, and that the deed should show nothing other than what ethical action is.—The ethical, as both absolute *essence* and absolute *power*, can suffer no perversion of its content. Were it only absolute *essence* without power, it could be perverted by individuality; but individuality, as ethical consciousness, has renounced perversion in relinquishing one-sided being-for-itself, just as mere power, conversely, would be perverted by essence if it were still such a being-for-itself. Because of this unity [1807 408] individuality is the pure form of substance, which is the content, and action is the passage from thought into actuality only as the movement of an opposition without essence, whose

moments have no particular content and essentiality distinct from one another. The absolute right of ethical consciousness is therefore that the *deed*, the *shape* of its *actuality*, should be nothing other than what it *knows*.

468 But ethical essence has split itself into two laws, and consciousness, as an undivided relation to law, is assigned to only one. Just as this *simple* consciousness insists on its absolute right that, to it as ethical, essence should have *appeared* as it is *in itself*, so this essence insists on the right of its *reality*, or on being twofold. Yet this right of essence does not at the same time confront self-consciousness as something situated elsewhere; rather, it is self-consciousness's own essence. It has its existence and power in self-consciousness alone, and its opposition is the *deed* of *the latter*. For self-consciousness, precisely in being a self for itself and proceeding to the deed, rises out of *simple immediacy* and itself posits *division*. Through the deed it relinquishes the determination of ethical life as the simple certainty of immediate truth, and posits the separation of itself into itself as active and the confronting actuality that is negative for it [1807 409]. Through the deed it therefore becomes *guilt*. For the deed is its *action*, and action its ownmost essence; and *guilt* also acquires the significance of *crime*, since, as simple ethical consciousness, it has turned toward one law but renounced the other, and violates the latter through its deed.—*Guilt* is not the indifferent, ambiguous essence by which the deed, as it *actually* lies in daylight, might or might not be the *action* of its self, as though something external and contingent, not belonging to the action, could be connected with it, from which side the action would therefore be innocent. Rather, action is itself this division: positing itself for itself and, opposed to this, an alien external actuality. That such an actuality exists belongs to action itself and comes about through it. Only non-action is therefore innocent, like the being of a stone, not even that of a child.—In content, however, ethical *action* contains the moment of crime because it does not sublate the *natural* distribution of the two laws between the two sexes, but instead, as an *undivided* orientation toward law, remains within *natural immediacy*. As action, it makes this one-sidedness into the guilt of grasping only one side of essence and relating negatively toward the

other—that is, violating it. Where in universal ethical life [1807 410] guilt and crime, doing and acting, fall will be expressed more precisely later. This much is immediately clear: it is not *this individual* who acts and is guilty; for as *this* self the individual is only the unactual shade, or exists only as universal self, and individuality is purely the *formal* moment of *action* in general. The content is laws and customs, and, specifically for the individual, those of their estate; the individual is substance as genus, which through its determinacy indeed becomes species, but the species at the same time remains the universal of the genus. Within the people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only as far as particularity, not to single individuality, which posits in its action an exclusive self, an actuality negative to itself. Rather, its action is grounded in secure trust in the whole, unmixed with anything alien, with fear or hostility.

469 Ethical self-consciousness now experiences in its deed the developed nature of *actual* action, whether it devoted itself to divine or to human law. The law manifest to it is essentially bound to the opposed law; essence is the unity of both, but the deed has carried out only one against the other. Yet, essentially connected with the other, the fulfillment of one calls forth the other—and calls it forth as what the deed has made it: a violated [1807 411] and now hostile essence demanding vengeance. For action, only one side of the decision as such lies in daylight; but the decision *in itself* is the negative, which confronts itself with something other than itself, something alien to it as knowing. Actuality therefore keeps hidden within itself the other side, alien to knowing, and does not show itself to consciousness as it is in and for itself—not to the son the father in the offender he kills, nor the mother in the queen he takes as his wife. In this way a power that shuns the light lies in wait for ethical self-consciousness, bursting forth only when the deed is done and seizing it in the deed. For the accomplished deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it. The agent cannot deny the crime and its guilt;—the deed is this: moving the unmoved and bringing forth what was initially enclosed only in possibility, thereby joining the unconscious to the conscious, nonbeing to being. In this truth, then, the deed comes into the sunlight—as

something in which a conscious element is joined to an unconscious one, what is one's own to something alien, as the divided essence whose other side consciousness experiences, and experiences also as its own, but as the power it has violated and aroused to hostility.
[1807 412]

470 It may be that the right lying in ambush is present not in its distinctive shape for the acting *consciousness*, but only *in itself*, in the inner guilt of the decision and action. Yet ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, when it *knows beforehand* the law and power it confronts, takes them for violence and wrong, for an ethical contingency, and knowingly, like Antigone, commits the crime. The accomplished deed reverses its view; *accomplishment* itself declares that what is *ethical* must be *actual*, for the *actuality* of the purpose is the purpose of action. Action expresses precisely the *unity* of *actuality* and *substance*; it declares that actuality is not contingent for essence but, allied with it, is granted to nothing that is not true right. For the sake of this actuality, and for the sake of its own action, ethical consciousness must acknowledge its opposite as its own; it must acknowledge its guilt: "*because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred*"—

471 This acknowledgment expresses the sublated division between ethical *purpose* and *actuality*; it expresses the return to the ethical *disposition* that knows that nothing holds good but what is right. But the agent thereby relinquishes its *character* and the *actuality* of its self, and has perished [1807 413]. Its *being* consists in belonging to its ethical law as its substance; but in acknowledging the opposite, this law has ceased to be substance for it, and instead of its actuality it has attained unactuality, disposition.—Substance does indeed appear *in* individuality as its *pathos*, and individuality as what animates substance and therefore stands above it; but substance is a pathos that is at the same time individuality's character. Ethical individuality is immediately and in itself one with this universal of its own; it has its existence only in that universal and cannot survive the destruction this ethical power suffers through its opposite.

472 Yet it also has the certainty that the individuality whose pathos is this opposed power *suffers no more evil than it has inflicted*. The movement of the ethical powers against one another, and of the individualities that bring them into life and action, has reached its *true end* only when both sides experience the same destruction. For neither power has an advantage over the other that would make it a *more essential* moment of substance. Their equal essentiality and indifferent subsistence alongside one another are their being without a self; in the *deed* they exist as selves, but different selves, which contradicts the unity of the self and constitutes their lack of right [1807 414] and necessary destruction. Likewise, *character*, in respect of its pathos or substance, belongs only to one power; and in respect of knowing, each character alike is divided into a conscious and an unconscious element. Since each itself calls forth this opposition, and through the deed even its ignorance is its own work, it places itself in the guilt that consumes it. The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other side, would therefore be only a part and an unfinished work, which advances irresistibly toward the equilibrium of both. Only in the equal subjection of both sides is absolute right accomplished, and ethical substance appears as the negative power that swallows both sides, or as almighty and just *fate*.

473 If both powers are taken according to their determinate content and its individualization, the image of their conflict in concrete shape presents itself, formally, as the conflict of ethical life and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and a contingency present through nature. This contingency has a right against self-consciousness because the latter is only *true* spirit, only in *immediate* unity with its substance. In content, the image presents itself as the division between divine and human law.—The young man leaves unconscious essence, the family spirit, and becomes the individuality of the community; but that [1807 415] he still belongs to the nature from which he tore himself is proved by his emerging in the contingency of two brothers who seize the community with equal right. The inequality of earlier and later birth has *for them*, who enter ethical essence, no significance as a natural difference. But government, as the simple

soul or self of the spirit of the people, tolerates no duality of individuality; and nature, as the contingency of plurality, confronts the ethical necessity of this unity. The two therefore fall into discord, and their equal right to state power shatters both, who have equal wrong. Viewed humanly, the one who, not *in possession*, attacks the community at whose head the other stood has committed the crime; by contrast, the one who knew how to seize the other only as an *individual* detached from the community and expelled him in this powerlessness has right on his side. He has attacked only the individual as such, not the community, not the essence of human right. The community attacked and defended by empty individuality preserves itself, and the brothers each find their mutual destruction through one another; for the individuality that ties the danger of the whole to *its own being-for-itself* has expelled itself from the community and dissolves within itself. The [1807 416] one who was found on its side, however, the community will honor; but the other, who already on its walls proclaimed its devastation, will be punished by the government, the restored simplicity of the community's self, through deprivation of the final honor. Whoever came to assail the highest spirit of consciousness, the community, must be deprived of the honor of his whole completed essence, the honor of the departed spirit.

474 But although the universal thus easily strikes off the pure apex of its pyramid and indeed carries off the *victory* over the rebellious principle of individuality, the family, it has thereby only entered into *combat* with divine law, self-conscious spirit with unconscious spirit. For the latter is the other essential power and is therefore not destroyed by the former, but merely offended. Against the powerful law lying in daylight, however, it has only the bloodless shade to help it carry its purpose *actually* into effect. As the law of weakness and darkness, it therefore initially succumbs to the law of daylight and strength, for that power holds good below, not on earth. Yet the actual that has robbed the inward of its honor and power has thereby consumed its own essence. Manifest spirit has the root of its force in the underworld; the people's self-assured and self-confirming *certainty* has the *truth* of its oath binding all into one only in the [1807 417]

unconscious and mute substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. Through this, the accomplishment of manifest spirit turns into its opposite, and spirit experiences that its highest right is the highest wrong, its victory instead its own downfall. The dead man whose right has been violated therefore knows how to find instruments for his vengeance that have the same actuality and force as the power that injured him. These powers are other communities whose altars dogs or birds have defiled with the corpse. Not raised into unconscious universality through the return owed it to the elemental individual, the corpse has instead remained above ground in the realm of actuality and, as the force of divine law, now receives a self-conscious, actual universality. These communities rise in hostility and destroy the community that has dishonored and shattered its force, the piety of the family.

475 In this representation the necessity of the movement of human and divine law is expressed through individuals in whom the universal appears as a *pathos* and the activity of the movement as *individual* action, which gives its necessity the semblance of contingency. But individuality and action constitute the principle of individuality in general, which in its pure universality was called inward [1807 418] divine law. As a moment of the manifest community, this principle has not only that subterranean efficacy—or an efficacy external in its mode of existence—but an equally manifest existence and movement, actual in the actual people. Taken in this form, what was represented as the simple movement of individualized pathos acquires another appearance, and the crime and the destruction of the community grounded in it acquire the proper form of their existence.—Human law, therefore—as community in its universal existence, as masculinity in its activity generally, and as government in its actual activity—*is, moves*, and *preserves* itself by consuming within itself the separation of the Penates, or the independent individuation into families over which femininity presides, and maintaining them dissolved in the continuity of its fluidity. Yet the family is at the same time its element in general, individual consciousness its universal active ground. Since the community gives itself subsistence only by disturbing family happiness and dissolving self-consciousness

into the universal, it creates in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it—in femininity in general—its internal enemy. Femininity—the eternal irony of the community—changes through intrigue the government's universal purpose [1807 419] into a private purpose, transforms its universal activity into a work of this particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a family possession and adornment. It thereby makes the grave wisdom of mature age—which, dead to individuality, to pleasure and enjoyment as well as actual activity, thinks of and cares for only the universal—an object of mockery for the caprice of immature youth and of contempt for its enthusiasm. It raises the force of youth generally to authority: of the son, in whom the mother has borne her master; of the brother, in whom the sister has the man as her equal; of the young man, through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence, attains the enjoyment and dignity of wifehood.—But the community can preserve itself only by suppressing this spirit of individuality; and because this is an essential moment, it equally produces it, and specifically, through its suppressive attitude toward it, as a hostile principle. Yet this principle, which in separating itself from the universal purpose is only evil and intrinsically null, could accomplish nothing unless the community itself acknowledged the force of youth, masculinity that is not mature and still stands within individuality, as the *force* of the whole. For the community is a people; it is itself individuality and essentially exists *for itself* only because *other individualities* [1807 420] *exist for it*, because it *excludes* them from itself and knows itself independent of them. The negative side of the community, suppressing *internally* the isolation of individuals but *outwardly active on its own account*, has its weapons in individuality. War is the spirit and form in which the essential moment of ethical substance, the absolute *freedom* of the ethical *self* from all existence, is present in its actuality and confirmation. While, on the one hand, war makes the particular *systems* of property and personal independence, as well as the individual *personality* itself, feel the force of the negative, on the other hand this very negative essence rises within war as what preserves the whole. The brave young man in whom femininity takes pleasure, the suppressed principle of ruin, comes into daylight and is what holds sway. Now it is

natural force, and what appears as the contingency of fortune, that decide the existence of ethical essence and spiritual necessity. Because the existence of ethical essence rests on strength and fortune, it is *already decided* that it has perished.—Just as previously only the Penates perished in the spirit of the people, so now the *living* spirits of peoples perish through their individuality in a *universal* community whose *simple universality* is spiritless and dead, and whose vitality is the *single* individual as individual. The ethical shape of spirit [1807 421] has disappeared, and another takes its place.

476 This downfall of ethical substance and its transition into another shape is therefore determined by ethical consciousness being essentially *immediately* directed toward law. This determination of immediacy entails that nature in general enters ethical action. Its actuality reveals only the contradiction and seed of ruin that the beautiful unanimity and tranquil equilibrium of ethical spirit contain precisely in this tranquility and beauty themselves; for immediacy has the contradictory significance of being the unconscious repose of nature and the self-conscious, restless repose of spirit.—Because of this natural character, this ethical people is in general an individuality determined by nature and therefore limited, and thus finds its sublation in another. But as this determinacy—which, posited in existence, is limitation, yet equally the negative in general and the self of individuality—disappears, the life of spirit and this substance conscious of itself in everyone are lost. Substance emerges in them as a *formal universality*; it no longer dwells within them as living spirit, but the simple solidity of their individuality has shattered into many points.
[1807 422]
c. *The Condition of Right*.

477 The universal unity into which the living, immediate unity of individuality and substance returns is the spiritless community, which has ceased to be the non-self-conscious substance of individuals, and in which they now count as selves and substances according to their individual being-for-themselves. The universal splintered into the atoms of absolutely many individuals, this dead spirit, is an *equality* in which *all* count as *each*, as *persons*.—What in the world of ethical

life was called hidden divine law has in fact stepped out of its inwardness into actuality; in that world the *individual* counted and was actual only as the universal *blood* of the *family*. As *this* individual he was the *departed* spirit *without a self*; but now he has emerged from his unactuality. Because ethical substance is only *true* spirit, spirit returns into *certainty* of itself; it is that substance as the *positive* universal, but its actuality is to be the *negative* universal *self*.—We saw the powers and shapes of the ethical world sink into the simple necessity of empty *fate*. This power of theirs is substance reflecting itself into its simplicity; but absolute essence reflecting into itself, precisely that necessity of empty [1807 423] fate, is nothing other than the *I* of self-consciousness.

478 This I now thereby counts as essence existing *in and for itself*; this *being-recognized* is its substantiality. But this is *abstract universality*, because its content is *this unyielding self*, not the self dissolved in substance.

479 Personality has therefore here emerged from the life of ethical substance; it is the *actually valid* independence of consciousness. The *unactual thought* of this independence, which comes about through *renouncing actuality*, appeared earlier as *Stoic* self-consciousness. Just as Stoic self-consciousness emerged from lordship and bondage as the immediate existence of *self-consciousness*, so personality has emerged from immediate *spirit*, which is the universal ruling will of all and equally their serving obedience. What for Stoicism was the *in-itself* only in *abstraction* is now an *actual world*. Stoicism is nothing other than the consciousness that reduces the principle of the condition of right, spiritless independence, to its abstract form. Through its flight from *actuality*, it attained only the thought of independence; it is absolutely *for itself* by binding its essence to no existence, but relinquishing every existence and placing its essence solely in the unity of pure thought. In the same way the right of the person is bound neither to a [1807 424] richer or more powerful existence of the individual as such nor to a universal living spirit, but rather to the pure one of the individual's abstract actuality, or to the individual as self-consciousness in general.

480 Now just as the *abstract* independence of Stoicism presented its actualization, this latter actualization will also repeat the movement of the former. Stoic independence passes into the skeptical confusion of consciousness, into a rambling of the negative that wanders shapelessly from one contingency of being and thought to another, indeed dissolves them in absolute independence but just as much produces them anew, and is in fact only the contradiction of the independence and dependence of consciousness.—Likewise, the personal independence of *right* is instead this same universal confusion and mutual dissolution. For what counts as absolute essence is self-consciousness as the pure *empty one* of the person. Over against this empty universality, substance has the form of *fulfillment* and *content*, and this content is now left completely free and disordered; for the spirit that subjugated it and held it together in its unity is no longer present.—In its *reality*, this empty one of the person is therefore a contingent existence and an essenceless movement and action that attains no stability. Like skepticism, the formalism of right [1807 425] is thus by its concept without a content of its own; it finds a manifold subsistence, possession, and, like skepticism, stamps it with the same abstract universality through which it is called *property*. But whereas in skepticism actuality so determined is called *semblance* in general and has only a negative value, in right it has a positive value. The negative value consists in the actual having the significance of the self as thinking, as the universal *in itself*; the positive value consists in its being *mine* in the significance of the category, as an *acknowledged* and *actual* validity.—Both are the same *abstract universal*; the actual content, or *determinacy*, of what is mine—whether an external possession or the inner wealth or poverty of spirit and character—is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. It therefore belongs to a *power of its own*, which is other than the formally universal: chance and arbitrary will.—In its actual validity itself, the consciousness of right therefore experiences instead the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality, and to designate an individual as a *person* is an expression of contempt.

481 The free power of content determines itself in this way: by the nature of this determinacy, the dispersion into the absolute *multiplicity* of personal atoms is at the same time gathered into *one* point, alien to them and equally [1807 426] spiritless. This point is, on one side, purely individual actuality, like the unyielding rigidity of their personality; but in opposition to their empty individuality, it also has for them the significance of all content, and hence of real essence. Against their supposedly absolute, but intrinsically essenceless, actuality, it is universal power and absolute actuality. In this way this lord of the world is for himself the absolute person who at the same time encompasses all existence, for whose consciousness no higher spirit exists. He is a person, but the solitary person confronting *all*. These all constitute the valid universality of the person, for the individual as such is true only as the universal multiplicity of individuality; detached from this, the solitary self is in fact the unactual, powerless self.—At the same time it is consciousness of the content that has confronted that universal personality. But this content, freed from its negative power, is the chaos of spiritual powers that, unchained as elemental essences, move madly and destructively against one another in wild excess; their powerless self-consciousness is the impotent enclosure and ground of their tumult. Knowing himself thus as the sum of all actual powers, this lord of the world is the monstrous self-consciousness that knows itself as the actual God; but since he is only the [1807 427] formal self unable to tame these powers, his movement and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous excess.

482 The lord of the world has actual consciousness of what he is—the universal power of actuality—in the destructive force he exercises against the confronting self of his subjects. For his power is not the *unity* of spirit in which persons would recognize their own self-consciousness; rather, as persons they are for themselves, and exclude continuity with others from the absolute rigidity of their pointlike existence. They therefore stand in a merely negative relation both to one another and to him, who is their relation or continuity. As this continuity he is the essence and content of their formalism, but a content alien to them and a hostile essence that instead sublates precisely what counts for

them as their essence, contentless being-for-itself—and, as the continuity of their personality, destroys that very personality. Thus, as the content alien to it asserts itself within it—and it asserts itself within them because it is their reality—legal personality experiences instead its lack of substance. Destructive burrowing in this essenceless ground, conversely, gives itself consciousness of its universal dominion; but this self is mere devastation and therefore only outside itself, and is instead the casting away of its self-consciousness.
[1807 428]

483 Such is the side on which self-consciousness as absolute essence is *actual*. But *consciousness driven back into itself* from this actuality thinks this its own lack of essence. We saw earlier the Stoic independence of pure thought pass through skepticism and find its truth in unhappy consciousness—the truth about its being-in-and-for-itself. Whereas this knowledge then appeared only as the one-sided view of consciousness as such, here its *actual* truth has appeared. This truth consists in this *universal validity* of self-consciousness being reality alienated from it. This *validity* is the universal actuality of the self, but is immediately just as much its inversion: it is the loss of its essence.—The actuality of the self, absent from the ethical world, has been gained through that world's return into the *person*; what was united there now appears developed, but alienated from itself.
[1807 429]

B. *Spirit Alienated from Itself: Cultivation*.

484 Ethical substance kept opposition enclosed within its simple consciousness, and this consciousness in immediate unity with its essence. Essence therefore has the simple determinacy of *being* for consciousness, which is immediately directed toward it and whose custom it is. Consciousness neither counts for itself as *this exclusive self*, nor does substance have the significance of an existence excluded from consciousness, with which consciousness would have to unite itself only through alienating itself, and which it would simultaneously have to produce. But the spirit whose self is absolutely discrete has its content confronting it as an equally hard actuality, and the world here has the determi-

nation of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness. Yet this world is spiritual essence; in itself it is the interpenetration of being and individuality. This existence of the world is the *work* of self-consciousness, but equally an immediately present actuality alien to it, which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself. It is [1807 430] external essence and the free content of right; but this external actuality, which the lord of the world of right encompasses within himself, is not merely this elemental essence contingently present for the self, but is the self's labor—though not its positive labor, but rather its negative labor. It receives its existence through self-consciousness's *own* externalization and divestment of essence, which, in the devastation prevailing in the world of right, the external force of unbound elements seems to inflict on it. These elements, taken for themselves, are only pure devastation and their own dissolution; but this dissolution, this negative essence of theirs, is precisely the self. It is their subject, their action and becoming. Yet this action and becoming, through which substance becomes actual, is the alienation of personality; for the self that holds good in and for itself *immediately*, that is, *without alienation*, is without substance and the plaything of those raging elements. *Its* substance is therefore its externalization itself, and externalization is substance, or the spiritual powers ordering themselves into a world and thereby preserving themselves.

485 In this way substance is *spirit*, the self-conscious *unity* of self and essence; but both also have the significance of alienation from one another. Spirit is *consciousness* of an objective actuality free for itself; but this consciousness is confronted by that unity of self and [1807 431] essence, *actual* consciousness by *pure consciousness*. On the one hand, actual self-consciousness passes through its externalization into the actual world, and the actual world back into self-consciousness; on the other hand, however, precisely this actuality, both the person and objectivity, is sublated: they are purely universal. This alienation of theirs is *pure consciousness*, or *essence*. The present immediately has its opposite in its *beyond*, which is its thinking and being-thought, just as this beyond has its opposite in this world, which is its actuality alienated from it.

486 This spirit therefore develops not merely *one* world, but a doubled world, separated and opposed.—The world of ethical spirit is its own *present*, and therefore each of its powers is within this unity and, insofar as the two differ, in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing has the significance of the negative of self-consciousness; even the departed spirit is present in the *blood* of kinship, in the *self* of the family, and the universal *power* of government is the *will*, the self of the people. Here, however, what is present means only objective *actuality*, whose consciousness lies beyond it; each individual moment as *essence* receives this essence, and with it actuality, from another, and insofar as it is actual, its essence is other than its actuality. Nothing has a spirit grounded and dwelling within itself, [1807 432] but is outside itself in an alien spirit; the equilibrium of the whole is not a unity remaining with itself and a repose returned into itself, but rests on the alienation of the opposed. The whole, like each individual moment, is therefore a reality alienated from itself. It divides into a realm in which *self-consciousness* is *actually* both itself and its object, and another, the realm of *pure* consciousness, which, beyond the first, has no actual presence but exists in *faith*. Now just as the ethical world, out of the division of divine and human law and their shapes, and its consciousness, out of the division into knowing and unconsciousness, return into their fate, into the *self* as the *negative power* of this opposition, so too these two realms of self-alienated spirit will return into the *self*. But whereas the former was the first, immediately valid *self*, the individual *person*, this second self, returning into itself from its externalization, will be the *universal self*, consciousness grasping the *concept*; and these spiritual worlds, all of whose moments claim for themselves a fixed actuality and unspiritual subsistence, will dissolve in *pure insight*. As the self *grasping* itself, pure insight completes cultivation. It grasps nothing but the self, and everything as the self; that is, it *comprehends* everything, erases all objectivity, and [1807 433] transforms all *being-in-itself* into *being-for-itself*. Turned against faith as the alien realm of *essence* lying beyond, it is the *Enlightenment*. Enlightenment completes alienation even in this realm, into which alienated spirit takes refuge, as into consciousness of self-equal repose. It disrupts the household that spirit maintains here by bringing in the furnishings of this

world, which spirit cannot deny as its property because its consciousness belongs to this world as well.—In this negative occupation, pure insight at the same time realizes itself and produces its own object, unknowable *absolute essence*, and the *useful*. Since in this way actuality has lost all substantiality, and nothing in it is any longer *in itself*, the realm of faith as well as that of the real world is overthrown; and this revolution produces *absolute freedom*, with which previously alienated spirit has returned completely into itself, leaves this land of cultivation, and passes into another land, the land of *moral consciousness*.

[1807 434]

I. The World of Self-Alienated Spirit.

487 The world of this spirit divides into a doubled world: the first is the world of actuality, or of its alienation itself; the other is the world it builds for itself, rising above the first, in the ether of pure consciousness. This second world, *opposed* to that alienation, is for that very reason not free of it, but is instead only the other form of alienation, which consists precisely in having consciousness in two worlds and encompasses both. What is considered here is therefore not the self-consciousness of absolute essence as it is *in and for itself*, not religion, but *faith*, insofar as it is the *flight* from the actual world and thus is not *in and for itself*. This flight from the realm of the present is therefore immediately itself twofold. Pure consciousness is the element into which spirit rises; but it is not only the element of *faith*, but equally that of the *concept*. Both therefore enter together, and faith is considered only in opposition to the concept.

[1807 435]

a. *Cultivation* and Its Realm of Actuality.

488 The spirit of this world is spiritual *essence* permeated by a *self*-consciousness that knows itself to be immediately present as *this being-for-itself*, and knows *essence* as an actuality confronting it. But the existence of this world, like the actuality of self-consciousness, rests on the movement by which self-consciousness externalizes its personality, thereby produces its world, and relates to this as to an alien world of which it must now take possession. Yet renouncing its

being-for-itself is itself the production of actuality, and through this renunciation it therefore immediately takes possession of actuality.—Or, self-consciousness is *something*, has *reality*, only insofar as it alienates itself; through this it posits itself as universal, and this universality of its is its validity and actuality. This *equality* with all is therefore not the equality of right, not that immediate recognition and validity of self-consciousness simply because it *is*; rather, its validity comes through the alienating mediation of having made itself conform to the universal. The spiritless universality of right takes into itself every natural mode of character and [1807 436] existence and legitimates it. But the universality that holds good here is one that *has come to be*, and for that reason it is *actual*.

489 What therefore gives the individual validity and actuality here is *cultivation*. The individual's true *original nature* and substance is the spirit of the *alienation* of *natural* being. This externalization is therefore as much the individual's *purpose* as its *existence*; it is at the same time the *means*, or *transition*, both of *substance in thought* into *actuality* and, conversely, of *determinate individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality *cultivates* itself into what it is *in itself*, and only through this *is* it *in itself* and has actual existence. As much cultivation as it has, so much actuality and power. Although the self here knows itself to be actual as *this* self, its actuality nevertheless consists solely in sublating the natural self; originally *determinate* nature therefore reduces to the *inessential* difference of magnitude, to a greater or lesser energy of will. The will's purpose and content, however, belong solely to universal substance itself and can only be universal. The particularity of a nature that becomes purpose and content is something *powerless* and *unactual*; it is a *sort* that labors vainly and ridiculously to put itself into effect; it is the contradiction of giving the particular an actuality that is immediately the universal. If individuality is therefore wrongly placed in the *[1807 437] particularity* of nature and character, then there are no individualities and characters in the real world; rather, individuals have an equal existence for one another. That supposed individuality is only *intended* existence, which has no permanence in this world, where only what externalizes

itself, and thus only the universal, attains actuality.—The *intended* therefore counts for what it is: a sort. Art, "sort," is not quite the same as *espèce*, "the most dreadful of all nicknames, for it designates mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt." But *Art* and being *good of one's sort* are German expressions that add to this meaning the honest appearance of not meaning anything so bad, or indeed do not yet contain consciousness of what a sort is, and what cultivation and actuality are.

490 What appears in relation to the single *individual* as its cultivation is the essential moment of *substance* itself: the immediate passage of its universality in thought into actuality, or its simple soul, through which the *in-itself* is something *recognized* and *existent*. The movement of self-cultivating individuality is therefore immediately its becoming, as universal objective essence—that is, the becoming of the actual world. Although this world has come to be through individuality, it is for self-consciousness something [1807 438] immediately alienated and has for it the form of an immovable actuality. Yet certain at the same time that this world is its substance, self-consciousness sets out to take possession of it. It attains this power over it through cultivation, which from this side appears as its conforming itself to actuality, to the extent that the energy of its original character and talent permits. What appears here as the force of the individual, under which substance would come and thereby be sublated, is the same as the actualization of substance. For the individual's power consists in conforming itself to substance—that is, externalizing its self and thus positing itself as objectively existing substance. Its cultivation and its own actuality are therefore the actualization of substance itself.

491 The self is actual to itself only as *sublated*. For it, therefore, the self does not constitute the unity of *consciousness* of itself and of the object; rather, the object is for it the negative of itself.—Through the self as soul, substance is thus developed in its moments in such a way that each opposed element animates the other, each through its alienation gives the other subsistence and equally receives subsistence from it. At the same time each moment has its determinacy as an invincible validity and a fixed actuality against the other. Thought fixes

this difference in the most universal [1807 439] way through the absolute opposition of *good* and *bad*, which flee one another and can in no way become the same. But this fixed being has as its soul the immediate transition into its opposite; existence is instead the inversion of every determinacy into its opposite, and only this alienation is the essence and preservation of the whole. We must now consider this movement that actualizes and animates the moments; alienation will alienate itself, and through it the whole will take itself back into its concept.

492 First, simple substance itself must be considered in the immediate organization of its existing moments, which are not yet animated.—Just as nature unfolds into universal elements, among which *air* is the *enduring*, purely universal, transparent essence; water the essence that is continually *sacrificed*; *fire* their *animating* unity, which continually dissolves their opposition as much as it divides their simplicity into it; and *earth*, finally, the *firm knot* of this articulation and the *subject* of these essences and their process, their departure and return—so inward *essence*, or the simple spirit of self-conscious actuality, unfolds as a world into just such universal, but spiritual, masses: into the *first* mass, spiritual essence *universal in itself* and *equal to itself*; into the other, essence *existing for itself*, [1807 440] become *unequal* within itself, *sacrificing* and *surrendering* itself; and into the *third*, which as self-consciousness is subject and immediately has within itself the force of fire. In the first essence it is conscious of itself as *being-in-itself*; but in the second it has the becoming of *being-for-itself* through the sacrifice of the universal. Spirit itself, however, is the *being-in-and-for-itself* of the whole, which *divides* into substance as enduring and substance as self-sacrificing, and equally *takes them back* into its unity, both as the erupting flame that consumes them and as their enduring shape.—We see that these essences correspond to the community and family of the ethical world, but without possessing their spirit of being at home; conversely, whereas fate is alien to that spirit, here self-consciousness is and knows itself as the actual power of these essences.

493 These members must be considered both as they are initially represented within pure consciousness as *thoughts*, or as *existing in themselves*, and as they are represented in actual consciousness as *objective* essences.—In that form of simplicity, the first, as the *self-equal*, immediate, and unchangeable *essence* of all consciousness, is the *good*: the independent spiritual power of the *in-itself*, beside which the movement of consciousness existing for itself plays only an incidental role. The other, by contrast, [1807 441] is *passive* spiritual essence, or the universal insofar as it surrenders itself and lets individuals take from it consciousness of their individuality; it is the null essence, the *bad*.—This absolute dissolution of essence is itself enduring. Just as the first essence is the ground, starting point, and result of individuals, and they are purely universal within it, so, conversely, the second is on the one hand self-sacrificing *being-for-another*, and on the other, for that very reason, their constant return into themselves as the *individual* and their enduring *becoming-for-themselves*.

494 But these simple *thoughts* of good and bad are equally immediately alienated from themselves; they are *actual* and present in actual consciousness as *objective* moments. Thus the first essence is *state power*, the other *wealth*.—State power is both simple *substance* and the universal *work*: the absolute *matter itself*, in which individuals find their *essence* expressed and their individuality is absolutely only consciousness of their *universality*. It is equally the work and simple *result* from which the fact that it comes from their *action* disappears; it remains the absolute ground and subsistence of all their action.—Through this determination of its unchanging self-equality, this *simple* ethereal substance of their life is *being*, and thus only *being-for-another*. It is therefore immediately in itself the opposite [1807 442] of itself: *wealth*. Although wealth is the passive or null essence, it too is universal spiritual essence, equally the constantly *becoming result* of the *labor* and *action of all*, just as it dissolves again into the *enjoyment* of all. In enjoyment, individuality indeed becomes *for itself*, or *individual*, but this enjoyment itself is the result of universal action, just as it reciprocally produces universal labor and the enjoyment of all. The *actual* has absolutely the spiritual significance of being immediately universal. In this moment each indi-

vidual indeed supposes that they act *selfishly*, for this is the moment in which they give themselves consciousness of being for themselves, and they therefore do not take it as something spiritual. Yet even viewed only externally, it is evident that in their enjoyment each gives everyone something to enjoy, and in their labor works for everyone as much as for themselves, while everyone works for them. Their *being-for-themselves* is therefore intrinsically *universal*, and selfishness is something merely intended, which cannot manage to actualize what it intends, namely, doing something that would not benefit everyone.

495 In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose; it intuits its double essence in them: in one its *being-in-itself*, in the other its *being-for-itself*.—But as spirit it is at the same time the negative *unity* of their subsistence and of the separation of individuality and the universal, or of [1807 443] actuality and the self. Dominion and wealth are therefore present for the individual as objects—that is, as things from which it knows itself *free*, and between which it supposes it can choose, even choosing neither. As this free and *pure* consciousness, it confronts essence as something that is only *for it*. It then has essence as *essence* within itself.—In this pure consciousness, the moments of substance are for it not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of *good* and *bad*.—But self-consciousness is further the relation of its pure consciousness to its actual consciousness, of thought to objective essence; it is essentially *judgment*.—The immediate determinations of the two sides of actual essence have indeed already shown which is good and which bad: state power the former, wealth the latter. But this first judgment cannot be regarded as a spiritual judgment, for in it one side has been determined only as *existing in itself*, or positive, the other only as *existing for itself* and negative. But as spiritual essences, each is the interpenetration of both moments, and they are therefore not exhausted in those determinations. And the self-consciousness relating to them is *in and for itself*; it must therefore relate to each in the doubled manner through which their nature as determinations alienated from themselves will emerge.
[1807 444]

496 Now for self-consciousness, the object in which it finds itself is *good* and *in itself*, while the object in which it finds the opposite of itself is bad. The *good* is the *equality* of objective reality with it; the *bad*, its *inequality*. At the same time, what is good and bad *for it* is good and bad *in itself*, for self-consciousness is precisely that in which these two moments, being *in itself* and being *for it*, are the same. It is the actual spirit of objective essences, and judgment is the demonstration of its power over them, which *makes* them what they are *in themselves*. Their criterion and truth are not how they immediately are in themselves, as the *equal* or *unequal*, that is, abstract being-in-itself or being-for-itself, but what they are in spirit's relation to them: their equality or inequality with spirit. Its *relation* to them—which, initially posited as *objects*, become the *in-itself through spirit*—becomes at the same time their *reflection into themselves*, through which they attain actual spiritual being and what *their spirit* is emerges. But just as their first *immediate determination* differs from spirit's *relation* to them, so the third, their own spirit, will differ from the second.—To begin with, their *second in-itself*, which emerges through spirit's relation to them, must already turn out differently from the *immediate* one; for this *mediation* of spirit instead moves *immediate* determinacy and makes it something else.

[1807 445]

497 Accordingly, consciousness *existing in and for itself* does indeed find in *state power* its *simple essence* and *subsistence* in general, but not its *individuality* as such; its *in-itself*, but not its *being-for-itself*. Rather, it finds action as individual action denied and subjugated to obedience. The individual therefore reflects into itself before this power; to it, state power is the oppressive essence and the *bad*, for instead of being equal it is absolutely unequal to individuality.—*Wealth*, conversely, is the *good*: it aims at universal enjoyment, gives itself away, and provides everyone with consciousness of their self. *In itself* it is universal beneficence; if it withholds some benefit and does not accommodate every need, this is a contingency that does not detract from its universal, necessary essence of imparting itself to all individuals and being a thousand-handed giver.

498 These two judgments give the thoughts of good and bad a content opposite to the one they had for us.—But self-consciousness has as yet related to its objects only incompletely, namely, only by the standard of *being-for-itself*. Yet consciousness is equally essence *existing in itself*, and must likewise make this side its standard; only through this is spiritual judgment completed. From this side *state* [1807 446] *power* expresses its *essence* for it. State power is partly law at rest, partly government and command, which orders the individual movements of universal action; the one is simple substance itself, the other its action animating and preserving itself and everyone. The individual therefore finds its ground and essence expressed, organized, and activated in state power.—Conversely, through the enjoyment of *wealth* it does not experience its universal essence, but receives only the *transient* consciousness and enjoyment of itself as an *individuality* existing for itself and of its *inequality* with its essence.—The concepts of good and bad therefore receive here the opposite content to the preceding one.

499 Each of these two ways of judging finds an *equality* and an *inequality*: the first judging consciousness finds state power *unequal* to itself and the enjoyment of wealth *equal*; the second, conversely, finds the former equal and the latter *unequal*. There is a twofold *finding equal* and a twofold *finding unequal*, an opposed relation to the two real essentialities.—We must judge this different judging itself, applying the standard already established. Accordingly, the relation of consciousness that *finds equality* is the *good*, and that which finds inequality is the *bad*; and these two ways of relating must now themselves be retained as *different shapes of consciousness* [1807 447]. By relating in different ways, consciousness itself comes under the determination of the difference between good and bad—not according to whether it has *being-for-itself* or pure *being-in-itself* as its principle, for both are equally essential moments. The doubled judging considered above represented the principles separately and therefore contains only *abstract* ways of *judging*. Actual consciousness contains both principles, and the difference falls solely within its *essence*, namely, in its *relation* to the real.

500 This relation takes opposed forms: one relates to state power and wealth as to something *equal*, the other as to something *unequal*.—The consciousness of the relation that finds equality is *noble-minded*. In public power it sees what is equal to itself, since in it it has its *simple essence* and the activity of that essence, and stands in service both of actual obedience and of inward respect toward it. Likewise in wealth it sees what provides consciousness of its other essential side, *being-for-itself*. It therefore also regards wealth as *essence* in relation to itself, acknowledges the one from whom it receives enjoyment as a benefactor, and holds itself bound to gratitude.

501 The consciousness of the other relation, conversely, is *base*, holding fast to *inequality* with [1807 448] both essentialities. In sovereign power it therefore sees a fetter and oppression of *being-for-itself*, and consequently hates the ruler, obeys only with concealed malice, and is always poised for revolt. In wealth, through which it attains enjoyment of its being-for-itself, it likewise sees only inequality, namely with enduring *essence*; since through wealth it attains only consciousness of individuality and transient enjoyment, it loves but despises wealth, and with the disappearance of enjoyment, which is intrinsically vanishing, regards its relation to the rich person as having disappeared as well.

502 These relations initially express only *judgment*, the determination of what the two essences are as *objects* for consciousness, not yet what they are *in and for themselves*. On the one hand, the reflection represented in judgment is as yet only *for us* a positing of either determination, and therefore an equal sublation of both; it is not yet their reflection for consciousness itself. On the other hand, they as yet *are* essences only immediately, having neither *become* this nor possessing *self*-consciousness within themselves; the consciousness for which they are is not yet their animation. They are predicates that are not yet themselves subject. Because of this separation, the whole of spiritual judging also still falls apart into two consciousnesses, each subject to a one-sided determination.—Now just as, initially, the *indifference* [1807 449] of the two sides of alienation —one, the *in-itself* of pure consciousness, namely the determinate *thoughts* of good and bad; the other, their *existence* as state power and wealth—rose to the

relation of the two, to *judgment*, so this external relation must rise to inner unity, or to the relation of thought to actuality, and the spirit of the two shapes of judgment must emerge. This occurs when *judgment* becomes *syllogism*, the mediating movement in which the necessity and middle of the two sides of judgment emerge.

503 In judgment, therefore, noble consciousness finds itself confronting state power as something that is not yet a self, but only universal substance, of which, however, it is conscious as its *essence*, its purpose and absolute content. Relating positively to state power in this way, it relates negatively to its own purposes, its particular content and existence, and lets them disappear. It is the heroism of *service*: *virtue*, which sacrifices individual being to the universal and thereby brings the universal into existence; the *person* who of their own accord renounces possession and enjoyment, and acts and is actual for the existing power.

504 Through this movement the universal is joined with existence in general, just as existing consciousness cultivates itself through this externalization into essentiality. What it alienates from itself in [1807 450] service is its consciousness immersed in existence; but alienated *being* is the *in-itself*. Through this cultivation it therefore gains respect for itself and among others.—State power, however, which was at first only the universal in *thought*, the *in-itself*, becomes through this same movement the *existing* universal, actual power. It is actual power only in the actual obedience it attains through self-consciousness's *judgment* that it is *essence*, and through self-consciousness's free self-sacrifice. This action, joining essence with the self, produces a *doubled* actuality: itself as what has *true* actuality, and state power as the *true* that *holds good*.

505 Yet through this alienation state power is not yet a self-consciousness knowing itself as state power; only its *law*, or its *in-itself*, holds good. It does not yet have a *particular will*, for serving self-consciousness has not yet externalized its pure self and thereby animated state power, but has done so only with its being: it has sacrificed only its *existence* to state power, not its *being-in-itself*.—This self-

consciousness counts as conforming to *essence*; it is recognized for the sake of its *being-in-itself*. Others find their *essence* activated in it, but not their being-for-themselves; their thought, or pure consciousness, fulfilled, but not their individuality. It therefore holds good in their *thoughts* and [1807 451] enjoys *honor*. It is the *proud* vassal active for state power insofar as this is not a will of its own, but an *essential* will; and it counts for itself only in this *honor*, only in the *essential* representation of universal opinion, not in the *grateful* representation of individuality, for it has not helped individuality attain its *being-for-itself*. Its *language*, if it related to state power's own will, which has not yet come to be, would be the *counsel* it offers for the universal good.

506 State power therefore still has no will in the face of counsel and makes no decision between the different opinions concerning the universal good. It is not yet *government*, and thus not yet truly actual state power.—*Being-for-itself*, the *will* not yet sacrificed as will, is the inward, secluded spirit of the estates, which, in contrast to its talk of the *universal* good, reserves its *particular* good for itself and is inclined to make this chatter about the universal good a substitute for action. The sacrifice of existence that occurs in service is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death; but the very danger of death that is endured and survived leaves a determinate existence, and with it a *particular being-for-itself*, remaining, which makes counsel for the universal good ambiguous and suspect and in fact reserves its own opinion and particular will against [1807 452] state power. It therefore still relates unequally to state power and falls under the determination of base consciousness: always poised for rebellion.

507 This contradiction, which it must sublate, contains, in this form of standing in the inequality of *being-for-itself* toward the universality of state power, at the same time the form that the externalization of existence, when it completes itself, namely in death, is itself an existing externalization, not one returning into consciousness: consciousness does not survive it and exist *in and for itself*, but only passes into the unreconciled opposite. The true sacrifice of *being-for-itself* is therefore only that in which it surrenders itself as completely as in death, yet preserves itself just as much in this externalization. It thereby

becomes actual as what it is in itself, as the identical unity of itself and itself as the opposite. Because the secluded inward spirit, the self as such, emerges and alienates itself, state power is at the same time raised to a self of its own. Without this alienation, the acts of honor, of noble consciousness, and the counsels of its insight would remain ambiguous, still retaining that secluded reserve of particular intention and self-will.

508 But this alienation occurs only in *language*, which appears here in its distinctive [1807 453] significance.—As *law* and *command* in the world of ethical life, and initially as *counsel* in the world of actuality, language has *essence* as its content and is its form; here, however, it receives the form that it is as its content itself, and counts as *language*. It is the power of speaking as such that accomplishes what must be accomplished. For language is the *existence* of the pure self as self; in it the *individuality existing for itself* of self-consciousness comes as such into existence, so that it is *for others*. *I* as this *pure* I otherwise does not *exist*; in every other expression it is immersed in an actuality and in a shape from which it can withdraw. It is reflected into itself out of its action, as out of its physiognomic expression, and leaves such incomplete existence, which always contains as much too much as too little, lying soulless. But language contains the I in its purity; language alone speaks *I*, the I itself. This *existence* of the I, as *existence*, is an objectivity that contains its true nature. *I* is *this* I—but equally *universal*. Its appearing is equally immediately the externalization and disappearance of *this* I, and thereby its remaining in its universality. The *I* that expresses itself is *heard*; it is a contagion in which it has immediately passed into unity with those for whom it exists, and is universal self-consciousness.—In being *heard*, its [1807 454] *existence* itself has immediately *died away*; this otherness of its is taken back into itself. And precisely this is its existence as a self-conscious *now*: not to exist as soon as it exists, and to exist through this disappearance. This disappearance is therefore itself immediately its remaining; it is its own knowing of itself and its knowing of itself as something that has passed into another self, has been heard, and is universal.

509 Spirit here receives this actuality because the extremes whose *unity* it is equally immediately have the determination of being actualities of their own for themselves. Their unity is dissolved into rigid sides, each of which is for the other an actual object excluded from it. Unity therefore emerges as a *middle* excluded and distinguished from the separate actuality of the sides; it therefore itself has an actual objectivity distinct from its sides and is *for them*—that is, it exists. *Spiritual substance* enters existence as such only when it has acquired as its sides self-consciousnesses that know this pure self as an *immediately valid* actuality, and therein equally immediately know that it is this only through alienating *mediation*. Through the former, the moments are purified into the self-knowing category and thus to the point of being moments of spirit; through the latter, spirit enters [1807 455] existence as spirituality.—It is thus the middle that presupposes those extremes and is produced through their existence—but equally the spiritual whole breaking forth between them, dividing itself into them and first producing each, through this contact, as a whole in its principle. —That the two extremes are already *in themselves* sublated and dissolved brings forth their unity, and this unity is the movement that joins both together, exchanges their determinations, and joins these determinations together—indeed, *in each extreme*. This mediation thus posits the *concept* of each of the two extremes in its actuality, or makes what each is *in itself* into its *spirit*.

510 Through this, the two extremes, state power and noble consciousness, are dissolved: the former into the abstract universal that is obeyed and the will existing for itself, which, however, does not yet itself belong to that universal;—the latter into the obedience of sublated existence, or into the *being-in-itself* of self-respect and honor, and into pure being-for-itself not yet sublated, the will still held in reserve. The two moments into which both sides are purified, and which are therefore moments of language, are the *abstract universal* called the universal good, and the *pure self* that in service renounced its consciousness immersed in manifold existence. In the concept the two are the same, for the pure [1807 456] self is precisely the abstract universal, and their unity is therefore posited as their middle. But the *self* is as yet actual only at the extreme of

consciousness, while the *in-itself* is as yet actual only at the extreme of state power. Consciousness lacks the passage of state power into it not merely as *honor*, but actually; state power lacks being obeyed not merely as the so-called *universal good*, but as will, or being the deciding self. The unity of the concept, in which state power still stands and into which consciousness has purified itself, becomes actual in this *mediating movement*, whose simple existence, as *middle*, is language.—Yet language does not yet have on its sides two selves present as *selves*, for state power is only now being animated into a self. This language is therefore not yet spirit as it perfectly knows and expresses itself.

511 Because noble consciousness is the extreme of the self, it appears as that from which the *language* proceeds through which the sides of the relationship take shape as animated wholes.—The heroism of silent service becomes the *heroism* of *flattery*. This speaking reflection of service constitutes the spiritual middle that dissolves itself; it reflects not only its own extreme into itself, but also the extreme of universal power back into that extreme itself, and makes [1807 457] this power, which initially is only *in itself*, into *being-for-itself* and the individuality of self-consciousness. Through this the spirit of this power becomes that of being an *absolute monarch—absolute*: the language of flattery raises power into its purified *universality*. As the product of language, of existence purified into spirit, this moment is a purified self-equality.—*Monarch*: language equally raises *individuality* to its pinnacle. What noble consciousness externalizes on this side of simple spiritual unity is the pure *in-itself of its thinking*, its I itself. More precisely, language raises individuality, otherwise only something *intended*, into its existing purity by giving the monarch the proper *name*. For it is only in the name that the *difference* of the individual from all others is not merely *intended*, but is made actual by all; in the name, the individual *counts* as purely individual no longer only in their own consciousness, but in the consciousness of all. Through the name the monarch is thus absolutely separated from everyone, singled out and solitary; in it he is the atom that can impart nothing of its essence and has no equal.—This name is thus the reflection into itself, or the *actuality*, that universal power has *within itself*; through it, it is the *monarch*.

Conversely, he, *this individual*, knows *himself, this individual*, [1807 458] as universal power through the nobles' placing themselves around the throne not merely as ready to serve state power, but as *ornaments*, and through their continually *telling* its occupant what he *is*.

512 In this way the language of their praise is the spirit that joins the two extremes within *state power itself*. It reflects abstract power into itself and gives it the moment of the other extreme, willing and deciding *being-for-itself*, and thereby self-conscious existence; or, through this, this *individual actual* self-consciousness comes to *know itself with certainty* as power. It is the point of the self into which the many points have flowed through the externalization of *inner certainty*.—But since this own spirit of state power consists in having its actuality and sustenance in the sacrifice of the action and thinking of noble consciousness, it is *independence alienated from itself*. Noble consciousness, the extreme of *being-for-itself*, receives back the extreme of *actual universality* in exchange for the universality of thought it externalized; the power of the state has *passed over* to it. Only in noble consciousness is state power truly activated; in its *being-for-itself* state power ceases to be the *inert essence* it appeared as at the extreme of abstract being-in-itself.—Considered *in itself*, *state power reflected into itself*, or its having become spirit, means nothing other [1807 459] than its having become a *moment* of *self-consciousness*, that is, its existing only as *sublated*. It is now therefore essence whose spirit is to be sacrificed and surrendered, or it exists as *wealth*.—It does indeed at the same time continue to subsist as an actuality opposed to the wealth into which, according to its concept, it is always becoming; but its concept is precisely this movement: through the service and veneration by which it comes to be, passing into its opposite, into the externalization of power. For itself, therefore, the distinctive *self* that is its will becomes, through noble consciousness's casting itself away, a self-externalizing universality, a complete individuality and contingency surrendered to every more powerful will. What remains to it of *universally* recognized and incommunicable independence is the empty name.

513 If, then, noble consciousness determined itself as relating to universal power in an *equal* manner, its truth is instead to retain its own being-for-itself in its service, but in the actual renunciation of its personality to be the actual sublation and tearing apart of universal substance. Its spirit is the relationship of complete inequality: on the one hand retaining its will in its honor; on the other, in giving up that will, partly alienating itself from its inwardness [1807 460] and becoming supremely unequal to itself, partly subjecting universal substance to itself in this process and making substance completely unequal to itself.—It is clear that its determinacy in *judgment* as opposed to what was called base consciousness has thereby vanished, and with it base consciousness as well. The latter has achieved its purpose: bringing universal power under being-for-itself.

514 Thus enriched by universal power, self-consciousness exists as *universal beneficence*, or this is *wealth*, which is itself again an object for consciousness. For wealth is for consciousness the universal that has indeed been subjected, but through this first sublation has not yet returned absolutely into the self.—The *self* does not yet have *itself as self* as its object, but *sublated universal essence*. Since this object has only just come to be, the *immediate* relation of consciousness to it is posited; consciousness has therefore not yet displayed its inequality with it. It is noble consciousness, which receives its being-for-itself from the universal that has become inessential, and therefore acknowledges wealth and is grateful toward the benefactor.

515 Wealth already contains within itself the moment of being-for-itself. It is not the universal of state power, devoid of a self, or the untroubled inorganic nature of spirit, but that nature [1807 461] as it holds fast to itself through will against whoever wishes to seize it for enjoyment. But since wealth has only the form of essence, this is a one-sided being-for-itself that is not *in itself*, but instead the sublated in-itself: the essenceless return of the individual into itself in its enjoyment. Wealth itself therefore requires animation; and the movement of its reflection consists in its becoming *being-in-and-for-itself* from being

merely for itself, in its becoming essence from being sublated essence. In this way it receives its own spirit within itself.—Since the form of this movement has been set out above, it is sufficient here to determine its content.

516 Here, then, noble consciousness relates to the object not as essence in general; rather, *being-for-itself* itself is what is alien to it. It *finds* its self as such already alienated, as an objective, fixed actuality that it must receive from another fixed being-for-itself. Its object is being-for-itself, thus *its own*; but because this is an object, it is at the same time immediately an alien actuality, which is a being-for-itself of its own, a will of its own. That is, it sees its self in the power of an alien will, on which it depends whether that will wishes to surrender this self to it.
[1807 462]

517 Self-consciousness can abstract from every particular side and therefore retains, in an obligation concerning such a side, its recognition and *validity in itself* as an essence existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself, on the side of its pure, ownmost *actuality*, or its I, outside itself and belonging to another; it sees its *personality* as such dependent on the contingent personality of another, on the chance of a moment, an arbitrary whim, or some otherwise utterly indifferent circumstance.—In the condition of right, what is in the power of objective essence appears as a *contingent content* from which one can abstract; power does not concern the *self as such*, which is instead recognized. But here it sees its certainty of itself as such to be utterly inessential, pure personality to be absolute impersonality. The spirit of its gratitude is therefore the feeling of both this deepest degradation and the deepest rebellion. As the pure I intuits itself outside itself and torn apart, in this dismemberment everything possessing continuity and universality, everything called law, good, and right, has likewise fallen apart and perished. Everything equal is dissolved, for the *purest inequality* is present: the absolute inessentiality of the absolutely essential, the being-outside-itself of being-for-itself. The pure I itself is absolutely dissolved.
[1807 463]

518 Thus, although this consciousness receives back from wealth the objectivity of being-for-itself and sublates it, it is not merely incomplete according to its concept, like the preceding reflection, but unsatisfied for itself. In the reflection in which the self receives itself as an object, immediate contradiction is posited within the pure I itself. Yet as self it also immediately stands above this contradiction; it is the absolute elasticity that again sublates this sublation of the self, rejects this degradation in which its being-for-itself comes to it as something alien, and, rebelling against this reception of itself, is *for itself* in the very act of *receiving*.

519 Since the relationship of this consciousness is thus bound up with this absolute dismemberment, its distinction as noble against *base* consciousness falls away in its spirit, and the two are the same.—The spirit of beneficent wealth can further be distinguished from the spirit of the consciousness receiving the benefit, and must be considered separately.—It was essenceless being-for-itself, surrendered essence. But through imparting itself it becomes the *in-itself*; in fulfilling its determination to sacrifice itself, it sublates the individuality of enjoying only for itself, and as sublated individuality it is *universality*, or *essence*.—What it imparts, what it gives to others, is *being-for-itself*. Yet it [1807 464] does not surrender itself as nature without a self, as the condition of life giving itself away without reserve, but as self-conscious essence holding itself for itself. It is not the inorganic power of the element, which the receiving consciousness knows as intrinsically transient, but power over the self, knowing itself to be *independent* and *arbitrary*, and knowing at the same time that what it dispenses is another's self.—Wealth therefore shares degradation with its client, but arrogance takes the place of rebellion. For on one side, like the client, it knows *being-for-itself* as a contingent *thing*; but it is itself this contingency in whose power personality stands. In this arrogance, which supposes that by a meal it has maintained another's very I and thereby acquired the submission of that person's innermost essence, it overlooks the other's inward rebellion. It overlooks the complete casting off of every fetter, this pure dismemberment for which, since the *self-equality* of being-for-itself has become utterly unequal to

it, everything equal, everything subsistent, has been torn apart—and which therefore tears apart the benefactor's opinion and view most of all. Wealth stands directly before this innermost abyss, this bottomless depth in which all support and substance have disappeared; and in this depth it sees nothing but a common thing, a plaything of its [1807 465] mood, a contingency of its arbitrary will. Its spirit is the utterly essenceless opinion of being the surface forsaken by spirit.

520 Just as self-consciousness had its language toward state power, or spirit emerged between these extremes as an actual middle, so it also has language toward wealth; still more, its rebellion has its language. The language that gives wealth consciousness of its essentiality and thereby takes possession of it is likewise the language of flattery, but ignoble flattery;—for what it pronounces as essence, it knows as surrendered essence, essence not existing *in itself*. Yet the language of flattery, as already remarked, is spirit that is still one-sided. For its moments are indeed the *self* purified through the cultivation of service into pure existence, and the *being-in-itself* of power. But the pure concept in which the simple *self* and the *in-itself*, that pure I and this pure essence or thought, are the same—this unity of the two sides between which the interaction occurs—is not within the consciousness of this language. For it, the object is still the *in-itself* opposed to the self; or the *object* is not for it also its own *self* as such.—But the language of dismemberment is the complete language and the true existing spirit of this whole world of cultivation. This self-consciousness, to which [1807 466] belongs the rebellion that rejects its degradation, is immediately absolute self-equality in absolute dismemberment, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the equality of the identical judgment in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this identical judgment is at the same time infinite, for this personality is absolutely divided, and subject and predicate are utterly *indifferent beings* that have nothing to do with one another, without necessary unity—even to the point that each is the power of a personality of its own. *Being-for-itself* has *its being-for-itself* as its object, as an utterly *other* and at the same time just as immediately as *itself*: itself as anoth-

er, not that this other has a different content, but the content is the same self in the form of absolute opposition and completely its own, indifferent existence. —Here, then, the spirit of this real world of cultivation is present, *conscious* of itself in its truth and of its *concept*.

521 It is this absolute and universal inversion and alienation of actuality and thought: *pure cultivation*. What is experienced in this world is that neither the *actual essences* of power and wealth, nor their determinate *concepts*, good and bad, nor consciousness of good and bad, noble and base consciousness, have truth. Rather, all these [1807 467] moments invert themselves into one another, and each is the opposite of itself.—Universal power, which is *substance*, on attaining a spirituality of its own through the principle of individuality, receives its own self within it only as the name, and, in being *actual* power, is instead the powerless essence that sacrifices itself.—But this surrendered essence without a self, or the self become a thing, is instead essence's return into itself: it is *being-for-itself existing for itself*, the existence of spirit.—The *thoughts* of these essences, of *good* and *bad*, likewise invert themselves in this movement: what is determined as good is bad; what as bad, good. The consciousness of each of these moments, judged as noble and base consciousness, is in its truth just as much the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to be: noble consciousness is just as base and degraded as degradation turns into the nobility of the most highly cultivated freedom of self-consciousness.—Likewise, considered formally, everything is *outwardly* the reverse of what it is *for itself*; and again, what it is for itself it is not in truth, but is something other than it wishes to be. Being-for-itself is instead the loss of itself, and its alienation instead self-preservation.—What is present, then, is that all moments exercise a universal justice [1807 468] against one another, each alienating itself within itself just as much as it forms itself into its opposite and thus inverts that opposite.—But true spirit is precisely this unity of the absolutely separated; indeed, it comes into existence itself as their middle precisely through the *free actuality* of these extremes *without a self*. Its existence is universal *speaking* and rending *judging*, in which all those moments meant to count as essences and actual members of

the whole dissolve, and which is equally this self-dissolving play with itself. This judging and speaking is therefore the true and invincible, while it overpowers everything: that which *alone truly* matters in this real world. In it every part of this world reaches the point where its spirit is expressed, or where it is spoken of with spirit and said to be what it is.—Honest consciousness takes each moment as an enduring essentiality and is the uncultivated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it equally does the reverse. Dismembered consciousness, however, is consciousness of inversion, and indeed of absolute inversion. The concept rules within it, bringing together thoughts that lie far apart for honesty, and its language is therefore spirited and witty.

522 The content of spirit's discourse of and about itself is therefore the inversion of all concepts and [1807 469] realities, the universal deception of itself and others; and the shamelessness of speaking this deception is for that very reason the greatest truth. This discourse is the madness of the musician "who heaped together and mingled thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every kind of character; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then contracted his throat and with a falsetto tore through the heights of the air, by turns raging, soothed, commanding, and mocking."—To tranquil consciousness, which honestly places the melody of the good and true in the equality of tones, that is, in a single note, this discourse appears as "a rambling of wisdom and madness, a mixture of as much skill as baseness, of ideas as correct as they are false, of such complete perversion of feeling, such perfect infamy, as utter openness and truth. It will not be able to refrain from entering into all these tones and running up and down the whole scale of feelings, from the deepest contempt and rejection to the highest admiration and emotion; a ridiculous trait will be fused into the latter, depriving them of their nature." The former will have, in their very openness, a reconciling trait, and in their shattering depth the all-powerful trait that gives spirit to itself.
[1807 470]

523 If, against the discourse of this confusion clear to itself, we consider the discourse of that *simple consciousness* of the true and good, it can only be monosyllabic before the open and self-conscious eloquence of the spirit of cultivation; for it can tell this spirit nothing that spirit does not itself know and say. If it goes beyond its monosyllables, it therefore says the same thing spirit expresses, but commits the additional folly of supposing it says something new and different. Even its syllables, *infamous, base*, are already this folly, for spirit says them of itself. In its discourse this spirit inverts everything monotonous, because this self-equal element is only an abstraction and in its actuality is inversion within itself. If, in opposition, upright consciousness defends the good and noble, that is, what maintains equality with itself in its expression, in the only way possible here—namely, that it does not lose its value by being *connected* or *mixed* with the bad, for this is its *condition* and *necessity*, and herein lies nature's *wisdom*—then this consciousness, while supposing it contradicts, has only summed up the content of spirit's discourse in a trivial manner. Thoughtlessly making the *opposite* of the noble and good into the *condition* and *necessity* of the noble and good, it supposes it says something other than that what is called noble and [1807 471] good is in its essence the inversion of itself, just as the bad is conversely the excellent.

524 If simple consciousness replaces this spiritless *thought* with the *actuality* of excellence, presenting it in the *example* of an invented case or even a true anecdote, and thus showing that it is no empty name but *exists*, then the *universal* actuality of the inverted action of the entire real world stands opposed to it. In this world that example therefore constitutes only something entirely isolated, an *espèce*; and to present the existence of the good and noble as an isolated anecdote, whether invented or true, is the bitterest thing that can be said of it.—If, finally, simple consciousness demands the dissolution of this whole world of inversion, it cannot demand of the *individual* a withdrawal from it, for Diogenes in his barrel is conditioned by this world, and the demand addressed to the individual is precisely what counts as bad: caring *for oneself* as an *individual*. But addressed to universal *individuality*, the demand for this withdrawal

cannot mean that reason should again relinquish the spiritually cultivated consciousness it has attained, sink the unfolded wealth of its moments back into the simplicity of the natural heart, and relapse into the wilderness and proximity to animal consciousness that [1807 472] is called nature, also innocence. Rather, the demand for this dissolution can be addressed only to the *spirit* of cultivation itself: that out of its confusion it should return to itself as *spirit* and attain a still higher consciousness.

525 In fact, however, spirit has already accomplished this in itself. The dismemberment of consciousness, conscious of itself and expressing itself, is mocking laughter at existence, at the confusion of the whole, and at itself; it is at the same time the dying away of this entire confusion, still hearing itself.—This vanity of all actuality and every determinate concept, hearing itself, is the doubled reflection of the real world into itself: once into *this self* of consciousness as *this* self, and again into its pure *universality*, or into thought. On the former side, spirit that has come to itself has directed its gaze into the world of actuality and still has this world as its purpose and immediate content; on the other side, however, its gaze is partly directed only into itself and negatively toward the world, partly turned away from it toward heaven, and the world's beyond is its object.

526 On that side of the return into the self, the *vanity* of all *things* is its *own vanity*, or it *is* vain. It is the self existing for itself that knows not merely how to judge and chatter about everything, but how to express with wit the fixed essences of actuality [1807 473] and the fixed determinations posited by judgment in their *contradiction*, and this contradiction is their truth.—Considered formally, it knows everything as alienated from itself: *being-for-itself* separated from *being-in-itself*; what is intended and the purpose from the truth; and *being-for-another*, the pretended, separated in turn from both—from the actual opinion and the true matter and intention.—It thus knows how to express correctly each moment against the other, and generally the inversion of them all; it knows better what each is than that thing is, however it may be determined. Since it knows the substantial from the side of the *discord* and *conflict* it unites within

itself, but not from the side of this unity, it understands very well how to *judge* the substantial, but has lost the capacity to *grasp* it.—This vanity also needs the vanity of all things to give itself consciousness of the self through them; it therefore produces this vanity itself and is the soul sustaining it. Power and wealth are the highest purposes of its exertion; it knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it cultivates itself into the universal, attains possession of it, and in this possession has universal validity. These are the actual, acknowledged powers. But this validity of its is itself vain, and precisely in taking possession of them it knows them not to be essential selves, but rather knows itself as their power and them as vain. That it is thus, in [1807 474] possessing them, itself outside them, it presents in witty language, which is therefore its highest interest and the truth of the whole. In this language *this* self, as the pure self belonging neither to actual nor to thought determinations, becomes for itself spiritual, truly universally valid. It *is* the self-rending nature of all relationships and the conscious rending of them; but only as rebellious self-consciousness does it know its own dismemberment, and in this knowledge it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity all content becomes negative and can no longer be grasped positively; the positive object is only the *pure I itself*, and dismembered consciousness is *in itself* this pure self-equality of self-consciousness returned into itself.

b. Faith and Pure Insight.

527 The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of cultivation; but since this whole has become alienated from itself, beyond it stands the unactual world *of pure consciousness*, or of *thought*. Its content is what is purely thought, and thought its absolute element. But since thought is initially the *element* of this world, consciousness only *has* these thoughts, but [1807 475] does not yet *think* them, or know that they are thoughts; rather, they are for it in the form of *representation*. For it steps out of actuality into pure consciousness, but is itself generally still in the sphere and determinacy of actuality. Dismembered consciousness is initially the *self-equality* of pure consciousness only *in itself*, for us, not for itself. It is therefore only the *immediate* elevation, not yet com-

pleted within itself, and still contains its opposed principle, by which it is conditioned, without having mastered it through the mediating movement. Hence the essence of its thought counts for it not as *essence* merely in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of something *ordinarily actual*, an actuality that has merely been raised into another element without losing in it the determinacy of an actuality not grasped in thought.—It must essentially be distinguished from the *in-itself* that is the essence of *Stoic* consciousness. For the latter only the *form of thought* as such held good, with some content alien to it and taken from actuality; but for the consciousness under consideration it is not the *form of thought* that holds good. It must equally be distinguished from the *in-itself* of virtuous consciousness, for which essence indeed stands in relation to actuality and is the essence of actuality itself, but is as yet only unactual essence;—for the consciousness under consideration, it counts, although beyond [1807 476] actuality, as actual essence. Likewise, what is right and good in itself for lawgiving reason, and the universal of law-testing consciousness, do not have the determination of actuality.—If, therefore, within the world of cultivation itself pure thought fell on one side of alienation, namely as the standard of abstract good and bad in judging, then, having passed through the movement of the whole, it has been enriched by the moment of actuality and thereby of content. Yet this actuality of essence is at the same time only an actuality of *pure*, not of *actual*, consciousness. Though raised into the element of thought, it does not yet count for this consciousness as a thought; rather, it lies for consciousness beyond its own actuality, for it is the flight from this actuality.

528 As *religion*—for it is evident that religion is what is being discussed—appears here as the faith of the world of cultivation, it does not yet appear as it is *in and for itself*.—It has already appeared to us in other determinations, namely as *unhappy consciousness*, as a shape of the substanceless movement of consciousness itself.—It also appeared in ethical substance as faith in the underworld; but consciousness of the departed spirit is not properly *faith*, not essence posited in the element of pure consciousness beyond actual consciousness;

rather, this spirit itself has [1807 477] immediate presence, and its element is the family.—Here, however, religion has partly emerged from *substance* and is pure consciousness of it; partly, this pure consciousness is alienated from its actual consciousness, *essence* from its *existence*. Thus, though it is no longer the substanceless movement of consciousness, it still has the determinacy of opposition to actuality as *this* actuality in general, and to the actuality of self-consciousness in particular; it is therefore essentially only a *faith*.

529 This *pure consciousness* of absolute essence is *alienated*. We must see more closely how that of which it is the other determines itself, and consider it only in connection with this. Initially, this pure consciousness seems to have only the *world* of actuality opposed to it; but since it is the flight from this world and thereby the *determinacy* of *opposition*, it contains this opposition within itself. Pure consciousness is therefore essentially alienated from itself within itself, and faith constitutes only one side of it. The other side has already arisen for us as well. For pure consciousness is reflection out of the world of cultivation in such a way that this world's substance, like the spheres into which it articulates itself, showed itself as what it is in itself: as *spiritual* essentialities, as absolutely restless movements or determinations that immediately sublate themselves in their opposite. Their essence, simple [1807 478] consciousness, is therefore the simplicity of *absolute difference*, which is immediately no difference. It is thus pure *being-for-itself*, not as *this individual*, but the self *universal* within itself as restless movement, which attacks and penetrates the *tranquil essence* of the *matter*. In it, therefore, there is present the certainty that immediately knows itself as truth, pure thought as the *absolute concept* in the power of its *negativity*, which annihilates every objective essence supposed to confront consciousness and makes it a being of consciousness.—This pure consciousness is at the same time equally *simple*, precisely because its difference is no difference. But as this form of simple reflection into itself, it is the element of faith, in which spirit has the determination of *positive universality*, of *being-in-itself*, against that being-for-itself of self-consciousness.—Driven back into itself from the essenceless world that merely dissolves itself, spirit is, in truth and in undi-

vided unity, both the *absolute movement* and *negativity* of its appearing, and the essence *satisfied* within itself and its positive *repose*. But subject generally to the determinacy of *alienation*, these two moments fall apart as a doubled consciousness. The former is *pure insight*, as the spiritual *process* gathering itself into *self*-consciousness, which confronts and directs itself against consciousness of the positive, the form of objectivity [1807 479] or representation; its own object, however, is only the *pure I*.—Simple consciousness of the positive, or of tranquil self-equality, conversely has inward *essence* as essence for its object. Pure insight therefore initially has no content within itself, because it is negative being-for-itself; to faith, conversely, belongs content without insight. Whereas insight does not step out of self-consciousness, faith indeed likewise has its content in the element of pure self-consciousness, but in *thought*, not in *concepts, in pure consciousness, not in pure self-consciousness*. It is thus indeed pure consciousness of *essence*, that is, of the *simple inward*, and *is* therefore thought —the chief moment in the nature of faith, which is usually overlooked. The *immediacy* with which essence exists in faith consists in its object being *essence*, that is, *pure thought*. But insofar as *thought* enters *consciousness*, or pure consciousness enters self-consciousness, this *immediacy* acquires the significance of an objective *being* lying beyond consciousness of the self. Through this significance, which the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thought* acquire in *consciousness*, the *essence* of faith falls from thought into *representation* and becomes a supersensible world that is essentially an *other* of self-consciousness [1807 480]. —In pure insight, conversely, the passage of pure thought into consciousness has the opposite determination: objectivity has the significance of a merely negative content that sublates itself and returns into the self. That is, only the self is properly its own object, or the object has truth only insofar as it has the form of the self.

530 Just as faith and pure insight belong together to the element of pure consciousness, so together they are the return from the actual world of cultivation. They therefore present themselves from three sides. First, each is *in and for itself*, out-

side every relation; second, each relates to the *actual* world opposed to pure consciousness; and third, each relates to the other within pure consciousness.

531 The side of *being-in-and-for-itself* in *believing* consciousness is its absolute object, whose content and determination have emerged. For according to the concept of faith, this object is nothing other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The articulation of the latter world therefore also constitutes the organization of the former, except that in the former the parts do not alienate themselves in their animation, but are essences existing in and for themselves, spirits returned into themselves and remaining with themselves.—The movement [1807 481] of their transition is therefore only for us an alienation of the determinacy in which they exist in their difference, and only for us a *necessary* series; for faith, however, their difference is a tranquil diversity, and their movement an *occurrence*.

532 To name them briefly according to the external determination of their form: just as in the world of cultivation state power, or the good, was first, so here too the first is *absolute essence*, spirit existing in and for itself insofar as it is simple eternal *substance*. But in realizing its concept of being spirit, substance passes into *being-for-another*; its self-equality becomes *actual, self-sacrificing* absolute essence; it becomes *self*, but a transient self. The third is therefore the return of this alienated self and abased substance into their first simplicity; only in this way is substance represented as spirit.—

533 These differentiated essences, taken back into themselves through thought from the change of the actual world, are changeless eternal spirits whose being is to think the unity they constitute. Though thus removed from self-consciousness, these essences nevertheless intervene in it; were essence fixed in the form of the first simple substance, it would remain alien to self-consciousness. But the externalization of this substance, and then its spirit, contain the moment of actuality and thereby participate in [1807 482] believing self-consciousness, or believing consciousness belongs to the real world.

534 According to this second relationship, believing consciousness partly has its own actuality in the real world of cultivation and constitutes the spirit and existence of that world already considered; partly, however, it confronts this its actuality as something vain, and is the movement of sublating it. This movement does not consist in its having a witty consciousness of the world's inversion; for it is simple consciousness, which counts wit among vain things because wit still has the real world as its purpose. Rather, actuality confronts the tranquil realm of its thought as a spiritless existence that must therefore be overcome externally. Through sublating sensuous knowing and action, this obedience of service and praise produces consciousness of unity with essence existing in and for itself, but not as an intuited actual unity. Rather, this service is only a continual production that does not completely attain its goal in the present. The congregation does indeed attain it, for it is universal self-consciousness; but for individual self-consciousness the realm of pure thought necessarily remains a beyond of its actuality. Or, when this realm has entered actuality through the externalization of eternal essence, it is an uncomprehended [1807 483] sensuous actuality; but one sensuous actuality remains indifferent to the other, and the beyond has merely acquired the additional determination of remoteness in space and time.—The concept, however, spirit's actuality present to itself, remains in believing consciousness the *inward* element that is and effects everything, but does not itself emerge.

535 In *pure insight*, however, the concept is the sole actuality; and this third side of faith, being an object for pure insight, is the essential relation in which faith appears here.—Pure insight itself must likewise be considered partly in and for itself, partly in relation to the actual world insofar as it still exists positively, namely as vain consciousness, and finally in that relationship to faith.

536 We have seen what pure insight is in and for itself. Just as faith is the tranquil, pure *consciousness* of spirit as *essence*, so insight is spirit's *self*-consciousness; it therefore knows essence not as *essence*, but as absolute *self*. It thus aims to sub-

late every independence *other* than self-consciousness, whether of the actual or of what *exists in itself*, and to make it the *concept*. It is not merely the certainty of self-conscious reason that it is all truth; it *knows* that it is this.
[1807 484]

537 But as its concept appears, it is not yet *realized*. Its consciousness accordingly still appears as a *contingent, individual* consciousness, and what is essence for it appears as a *purpose* it must actualize. It initially has only the *intention* of making *pure insight universal*, that is, making everything actual into the concept, and into a concept in all self-consciousnesses. The intention is *pure*, for its content is pure insight; and this insight is likewise *pure*, for its content is only the absolute concept, which has no opposition in an object and is not limited within itself. The unlimited concept immediately contains both sides: that everything objective should have only the significance of *being-for-itself*, of self-consciousness, and that self-consciousness should have the significance of a *universal*, that pure insight should become the property of all self-consciousnesses. This second side of the intention is the result of cultivation insofar as in cultivation not only the differences of objective spirit, the parts and determinations of judgment of its world, but also the differences appearing as originally determinate natures have perished. Genius, talent, particular capacities generally belong to the world of actuality insofar as it still has the side of being a spiritual animal kingdom, which in mutual violence and confusion fights and deceives over the essences of the real world.—Differences [1807 485] indeed have no place in it as honest specimens; individuality neither contents itself with the unactual *matter itself*, nor has a *particular* content and purposes of its own. Rather, it counts only as something universally valid, namely as cultivated, and difference reduces to greater or lesser energy—a difference of *magnitude*, that is, an inessential one. But this last diversity has perished, because in the complete dismemberment of consciousness difference turned into an absolutely qualitative one. What is other to the I in this is only the I itself. In this infinite judgment every one-sidedness and peculiarity of original being-for-itself is erased; the self knows itself as pure self to be its object, and this absolute equal-

ity of the two sides is the element of pure insight.—Pure insight is therefore the simple *essence* undifferentiated within itself, and equally the universal *work* and universal possession. In this *simple* spiritual substance, self-consciousness gives and preserves for itself in every object consciousness of *this* individuality of its own, or of *action*, just as, conversely, its individuality is therein *equal to itself* and universal.—This pure insight is therefore the spirit that calls to *every* consciousness: *be for yourselves* what you all are *in yourselves—rational*.
[1807 486]
II. *The Enlightenment*.

538 The distinctive object against which pure insight directs the force of the concept is faith, as the form of pure consciousness confronting it in the same element. But it also has a relation to the actual world, for, like faith, it is the return from this world into pure consciousness. We must first see the nature of its activity against the world's impure intentions and perverted insights.

539 We have already mentioned the tranquil consciousness that confronts this whirlpool dissolving and reproducing itself within itself; it constitutes the side of pure insight and intention. But as we saw, this tranquil consciousness contains no *particular insight* into the world of cultivation. Rather, that world itself has the most painful feeling and truest insight concerning itself—the feeling of being the dissolution of everything establishing itself, broken on the wheel through all the moments of its existence and shattered in every bone. It is equally the language of this feeling and the judging, [1807 487] witty discourse concerning every side of its condition. Pure insight can therefore have no activity and content of its own here, and can thus relate only as the formal, faithful *apprehension* of this world's own witty insight and its language. Since this language is dispersed, its judgment a momentary rambling that immediately forgets itself again and is a whole only for a third consciousness, this third consciousness can distinguish itself as *pure* insight only by gathering those scattered traits into a universal picture and then making them an insight shared by all.

540 Through this simple means it will bring the confusion of this world to dissolution. For it has emerged that neither the spheres, nor the determinate concepts and individualities, are the essence of this actuality, but that it has its substance and support solely in spirit existing as judging and discussing, and that the interest in having a content for this reasoning and chatter alone preserves the whole and the spheres of its articulation. In this language of insight its self-consciousness is still for itself *this individual existing for itself*; but the vanity of the content is at the same time the vanity of the self that knows it as vain. Now when the tranquilly apprehending consciousness brings into a collection the most incisive formulations from this whole witty chatter of vanity, those that cut to the heart of the matter, then, along with the [1807 488] remaining vanity of existence, the soul still preserving the whole—the vanity of witty judgment—perishes. The collection shows most people a better wit, or everyone at least a more varied wit, than their own, and superior knowledge and judging generally as something universal and now universally known. The only remaining interest is thereby erased, and individual insight dissolves into universal insight. Yet above vain knowing, knowledge of essence still stands firm, and pure insight first appears in its proper activity insofar as it acts against faith.

a. *The Struggle* of Enlightenment with Superstition.

541 The various modes of consciousness's negative relation—skepticism, on the one hand, and theoretical and practical idealism, on the other—are subordinate shapes compared with this shape of *pure insight* and its dissemination, the *Enlightenment*. For pure insight is born from substance, knows the pure *self* of consciousness as absolute, and takes its stand together with pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all actuality.—Since faith and [1807 489] insight are the same pure consciousness but opposed in form—essence being for faith *thought*, not *concept*, and therefore something utterly opposed to *self*-consciousness, while for pure insight essence is the *self*—each is for the other its absolute negative.—As the two confront one another, all *content* belongs to faith, since in its tranquil element of thought every moment gains subsistence; pure

insight, however, is initially without content and is instead its pure disappearance. Yet through its negative movement against what is negative to it, insight will realize itself and give itself a content.

542 It knows faith as opposed to itself, to reason and truth. Just as faith is for it generally a fabric of superstition, prejudices, and errors, so, further, consciousness of this content organizes itself for insight into a realm of error. In this realm false insight exists, on the one hand, as the *universal mass* of consciousness, immediate, unsuspecting, and without reflection into itself; but it also contains the moment of reflection into itself, or self-consciousness, separated from that unsuspectingness, as an insight remaining for itself in the background and an evil intention by which the mass is deluded. This mass is the victim of deception by a *priesthood* that pursues both its jealous vanity of remaining alone in possession of insight [1807 490] and its other self-interest. At the same time this priesthood conspires with *despotism*, which, as the synthetic, conceptless unity of the real and this ideal realm—a strangely inconsistent essence—stands above the bad insight of the multitude and the bad intention of the priests, and also unites both within itself. Through the means of the deceiving priesthood, and despising both, it draws from the people's stupidity and confusion the advantage of tranquil domination and the fulfillment of its desires and arbitrary will, while at the same time itself being this same dullness of insight, this same superstition and error.

543 Enlightenment does not engage these three sides of the enemy without distinction. Since its essence is pure insight, the *universal in and for itself*, its true relation to the other extreme is the one in which it addresses what is *common* and *equal* in both. The side of *individuality* isolating itself from universal, unsuspecting consciousness is what is opposed to insight, which cannot touch it immediately. The will of the deceiving priesthood and oppressive despot is therefore not the immediate object of its action, but rather the insight that has no will and does not individuate itself into being-for-itself: the *concept* of rational self-consciousness, which has its existence in the mass but is not yet present in it as concept. But [1807 491] by rescuing this honest insight and its unsus-

pecting essence from prejudices and errors, pure insight wrests from evil intention the reality and power of its deception. That intention's realm has its *ground* and *material* in the conceptless consciousness of the universal mass, just as *being-for-itself* has its *substance* in *simple* consciousness generally.

544 The relation of pure insight to unsuspecting consciousness of absolute essence now has a doubled side: on the one hand, pure insight is *in itself* the same as this consciousness; on the other, this consciousness, in the simple element of its thought, lets absolute essence and its parts have their way and give themselves subsistence, and lets them count only as its *in-itself*, and thus objectively, while denying its *being-for-itself* in this in-itself.—Insofar as, on the first side, this faith is *in itself* pure *self*-consciousness for pure insight, and needs only to become this *for itself*, insight has in this concept of faith the element in which it realizes itself in place of false insight.

545 From this side, since both are essentially the same and the relation of pure insight occurs through and in the same element, its communication is *immediate*, and its giving and receiving an undisturbed flowing into one another. Whatever other stakes may have been driven into consciousness, it is *in itself* this simplicity [1807 492] in which everything is dissolved, forgotten, and without reserve, and which is therefore utterly receptive to the concept. The communication of pure insight is therefore comparable to a tranquil expansion, or a *spreading* like that of a fragrance in the unresisting atmosphere. It is a penetrating contagion that does not beforehand announce itself as opposed to the indifferent element into which it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot be warded off. Only when the contagion has spread does *it exist for consciousness*, which surrendered itself to it without concern. For what consciousness received into itself was indeed the simple essence equal to itself and to consciousness, but also the simplicity of *negativity* reflected into itself, which afterward unfolds according to its nature as something opposed, thereby reminding consciousness of its previous mode. It is the concept, the simple knowing that knows itself and also its opposite, but knows this opposite within it as sublated. Thus, as soon as pure insight exists for consciousness, it has already spread; the

struggle against it betrays the infection that has occurred. The struggle is too late, and every remedy only worsens the sickness, for it has seized the marrow of spiritual life, namely consciousness in its concept, or its pure essence itself. Hence there is no force within consciousness superior to it. Because it is in essence itself, its still [1807 493] isolated expressions can be driven back and its superficial symptoms subdued. This is highly advantageous to it; for it now neither wastes its force uselessly nor shows itself unworthy of its essence, as happens when it erupts in symptoms and isolated outbreaks against the content of faith and the connected structure of its external actuality. Instead, now an invisible and unnoticed spirit, it creeps through and through the vital parts and has soon taken thorough possession of all the entrails and limbs of the unconscious idol; and "on *one fine morning* it gives its companion a nudge with its elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the ground."—On *one fine morning*, whose noon is not bloody, if the contagion has penetrated all the organs of spiritual life. Only memory then still preserves, as a history that has passed away one knows not how, the dead mode of spirit's previous shape; and in this way the new serpent of wisdom raised up for worship has merely shed a withered skin without pain.

546 But this silent weaving onward of spirit in the simple interior of its substance, concealing its action from itself, is only one side of the realization of pure insight. Its dissemination does not consist merely in like joining with like, and its actualization is not merely an expansion without opposition. Rather, the action of [1807 494] negative essence is just as essentially a developed movement differentiating itself within itself, which, as conscious action, must set forth its moments in determinate, manifest existence and must be present as a loud uproar and violent struggle with the opposed as such.

547 We must therefore see how *pure insight* and *intention* relate *negatively* to the other, opposed to them, that they find already present.—Since its concept is all essentiality and nothing is outside it, pure insight and intention in their nega-

tive relation can only be the negative of themselves. As insight, it therefore becomes the negative of pure insight: it becomes untruth and unreason; and as intention, the negative of pure intention: lying and impurity of purpose.

548 It entangles itself in this contradiction by entering into conflict and supposing itself to be combating something *other*.—It merely supposes this, for its essence as absolute negativity is to contain otherness within itself. The absolute concept is the category; it consists in knowing and the *object* of knowing being the same. Thus what pure insight pronounces as its other, as error or lie, can be nothing other than itself; it can condemn only what it is. What is not rational has no *truth*, or what is not comprehended *is* not; thus when reason speaks of an *other* [1807 495] than itself, it in fact speaks only of itself and does not step outside itself.—This struggle with the opposed therefore also contains the significance of being its *actualization*. For this actualization consists precisely in the movement of developing the moments and taking them back into itself. Part of this movement is the differentiation in which comprehending insight confronts itself as *object*; as long as it lingers in this moment, it is alienated from itself. As pure insight it is without all *content*; the movement of its realization consists in *its own* becoming content for itself, for no other content can become its content, since it is the self-consciousness of the category. But since it initially knows this content, in the opposition, only as *content* and not yet as itself, it fails to recognize itself in it. Its completion therefore means recognizing as its own the content that was initially objective to it. Its result will therefore be neither the restoration of the errors it combats nor merely its first concept, but an insight recognizing the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, as itself—or its concept recognizing itself.—This nature of Enlightenment's struggle with errors, of combating itself in them and condemning in them what it affirms, is *for us*, or is what it and its struggle are *in themselves*. But the first side [1807 496] of this struggle, its contamination through admitting the negative relation into its self-equal *purity*, is how it is an *object for faith*. Faith therefore experiences it as lying, unreason, and evil intention, just as faith is for insight error and prejudice.—With regard to its content, pure insight is initially empty

insight, to which its content appears as an other. It therefore *finds* this content in faith, in the shape of something not yet its own, as an existence entirely independent of it.

549 Enlightenment thus initially and generally apprehends its object by taking it as *pure insight* and, failing to recognize itself in it, declaring it error. In *insight* as such, consciousness grasps an object so that it becomes for it the essence of consciousness, or an object that it penetrates, in which it preserves itself, remains with itself and present to itself, and which it produces by thus being its movement. Enlightenment correctly expresses faith as precisely this when it says that what is absolute essence for faith is a being of its own consciousness, its own thought, something produced by consciousness. It thereby declares faith to be error and invention concerning the very thing that Enlightenment itself is.—Wishing to teach faith this new wisdom, it thereby tells faith nothing new; for faith's object is for faith precisely [1807 497] this: the pure essence of its own consciousness, so that consciousness does not posit itself as lost and negated in it, but instead trusts it—that is, finds itself *in it as this* consciousness, or as *self*-consciousness. The *certainty of himself* of the one I trust is for me *certainty of myself*; I recognize my being-for-myself in him, recognize that he acknowledges it and that it is his purpose and essence. But trust is faith because its consciousness *relates immediately* to its object and thus also intuits that it is *one* with it, within it.—Further, since that in which I recognize myself is an object for me, I am therein at the same time generally an *other* self-consciousness for myself—that is, one alienated therein from its particular individuality, namely its natural character and contingency, yet partly remaining self-consciousness therein, partly being precisely therein *essential* consciousness, like pure insight.—The concept of insight entails not merely that consciousness recognizes itself in the object it has insight into, and has itself *immediately* therein without leaving what is thought and only then returning from it into itself; it is also conscious of itself as the *mediating* movement, or of itself as *action* or production. Through this, the unity of itself as *self* and of the object is present *for it* in thought.—Faith too is precisely this consciousness: *obedience* [1807 498] *and*

action are a necessary moment through which certainty of being in absolute essence comes about. This action of faith does not indeed appear as producing absolute essence itself. But faith's absolute essence is essentially not the *abstract* essence lying beyond believing consciousness; rather, it is the spirit of the congregation, the unity of abstract essence and self-consciousness. The action of the congregation is an essential moment in its being this spirit of the congregation; it is this *only through consciousness's production*—or rather, *not without* being produced by consciousness. For as essential as production is, it is just as essentially not the sole ground of essence, but only a moment. Essence is also in and for itself.

550 From the other side, the concept of pure insight is an *other* to itself as its object, for precisely this negative determination constitutes the object. From the other side it therefore also expresses the essence of faith as something *alien* to self-consciousness, something that is not *its* essence but has been foisted upon it like a changeling. Here, however, Enlightenment is utterly foolish; faith experiences it as speech that does not know what it says and does not understand the matter when it talks of priestly fraud and the deception of the people. [1807 499] It speaks as though the hocus-pocus of conjuring priests foisted something absolutely *alien* and *other* upon consciousness as its essence; and at the same time it says that this is an essence of consciousness, that consciousness believes in it, trusts it, and seeks to win its favor—that is, that it intuits therein *its pure* essence just as much as *its* individual and universal *individuality*, and through its action produces this unity of itself with its essence. What it pronounces as something *alien* to consciousness it immediately pronounces as consciousness's *ownmost*.—How, then, can it speak of fraud and deception? By itself *immediately* saying of faith the opposite of what it asserts about it, it instead shows itself to faith as the conscious *lie*. How could deception and fraud occur where consciousness immediately has in its truth the *certainty of itself*, where it possesses *itself* in its object, finding itself therein as much as producing itself? The difference is no longer present even in the words.—If the general question has been posed, *whether it is permissible to deceive a people*, the

answer would in fact have to be that the question is worthless, because it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter.—Brass instead of gold, counterfeit bills of exchange instead of genuine ones, may indeed be sold to individuals; a lost battle palmed off on [1807 500] many as a victory; and other lies about sensuous things and particular events made credible for a time. But in knowledge of essence, in which consciousness has immediate *certainty of itself*, the thought of deception falls away entirely.

551 Let us see further how faith experiences Enlightenment in the *different* moments of its consciousness, to which the view exhibited above initially applied only generally. These moments are pure thought, or, as object, *absolute essence* in and for itself; then faith's *relation* to it as a *knowing*, the *ground of its faith*; and finally its relation to it in its action, or *its service*. Just as pure insight has failed to recognize and has denied itself in faith generally, so it will conduct itself perversely in these moments as well.

552 Pure insight relates negatively to *the absolute essence* of believing consciousness. This essence is pure *thought*, and pure thought posited within itself as object, or as *essence*. In believing consciousness this *in-itself* of thought acquires at the same time, for consciousness existing for itself, the form—but also only the empty form—of objectivity; it has the determination of something *represented*. But to pure insight, since it is pure consciousness on the side of the *self existing for itself*, the *other* appears as a *negative* of [1807 501] *self-consciousness*. This could still be taken either as the pure *in-itself* of thought or as the *being* of sense-certainty. But since it is at the same time for the *self*, and this self as a *self* having an object is actual consciousness, insight's distinctive object as such is an *existing ordinary thing* of *sense-certainty*. This object of its own appears to it in faith's *representation*. It condemns this representation and, in it, its own object. But it already wrongs faith by apprehending faith's object in such a way that it is its own. It accordingly says of faith that its absolute essence is a piece of stone, a block of wood that has eyes and does not see, or some bread dough grown in

the field, transformed by human beings and sent back there—or in whatever other ways faith anthropomorphizes essence, making it an object and representing it to itself.

553 Enlightenment, which claims to be pure, here makes what for spirit is eternal life and holy spirit into an actual *transient thing* and soils it with the intrinsically null view of sense-certainty—a view entirely absent from worshiping faith, so that Enlightenment simply lies to faith in imputing it. What faith reveres is for it by no means stone, or wood, or bread dough, or any other temporal, sensuous thing. If it occurs to Enlightenment to say that faith's object [1807 502] is *also* this, or even that it is this in itself and in truth, then, on the one hand, faith knows *that Also* just as well, but it lies outside its worship; on the other, for faith nothing like a stone and so forth exists *in itself* at all, but only the essence of pure thought is in itself for it.

554 The *second moment* is the relation of faith as *knowing* consciousness to this essence. As thinking, pure consciousness, faith has this essence immediately; but pure consciousness is equally the *mediated* relation of certainty to truth—a relation constituting the *ground* of *faith*. For Enlightenment this ground likewise becomes a contingent *knowledge of contingent* events. But the ground of knowing is the *knowing* universal, and in its truth absolute *spirit*, which in abstract pure consciousness, or thought as such, is only absolute *essence*, but as self-consciousness is *knowledge* of itself. Pure insight likewise posits this knowing universal, *simple spirit knowing itself*, as the negative of self-consciousness. It is indeed itself *pure mediated* thought, that is, thought mediating itself with itself; it is pure knowing. But since it is *pure insight, pure knowing*, that does not yet know itself—that is, for which it is not yet the case that it is this pure mediating movement—this movement, like everything it itself is, appears to it as another. Thus, engaged in its actualization, it develops this essential [1807 503] moment of its own, but this appears to it as belonging to faith and, in its determinacy of being external to insight, as contingent knowledge of just such ordinarily actual histories. It therefore invents the charge against religious faith that its certainty rests on a few *individual historical testimonies* which, consid-

ered as historical testimonies, would admittedly not afford the degree of certainty about their content that newspaper reports give us about some event;—that its certainty further rests on the chance of the *preservation* of these testimonies, preservation through paper on the one hand, and on the other through the skill and honesty of transferring them from one paper to another, and finally on correctly apprehending the meaning of dead words and letters. In fact, however, it does not occur to faith to tie its certainty to such testimonies and contingencies. In its certainty it is an ingenuous relation to its absolute object, a pure knowledge of it that mixes no letters, paper, or copyists into its consciousness of absolute essence, and does not mediate itself with essence through such things. Rather, this consciousness is the self-mediating ground of its knowing; it is spirit itself that is its own testimony, both within the *inwardness* of *individual* consciousness and through the *universal presence* of the faith of all in it. If faith also wishes to supply itself from history with that kind of [1807 504] grounding, or at least confirmation, of its content of which Enlightenment speaks, and seriously thinks and acts as though this mattered, it has already let Enlightenment seduce it; and its efforts to ground or secure itself in this way are only testimonies it gives of its infection.

555 There remains the third side: *the relation of consciousness to absolute essence* as an *action*. This action is the sublation of the individual's particularity, or of the natural mode of its being-for-itself, from which arises for it the certainty of being pure self-consciousness, of being, according to its action—that is, as individual consciousness *existing for itself*—one with essence.—Since in action *purposiveness* and *purpose* are distinguished, and pure insight likewise *relates negatively* to this action and, as in the other moments, denies itself, it must show itself, in regard to *purposiveness*, as a lack of understanding. For insight joined with intention, the agreement of purpose and means, appears to it as another, indeed as the opposite. In regard to *purpose*, however, it must make the bad, enjoyment and possession, its purpose, and thus prove itself the most impure intention, since pure intention likewise, as another, is impure intention.

556 Accordingly, with regard to *purposiveness*, we see Enlightenment finding it foolish when the believing individual gives itself the higher consciousness of not [1807 505] being fettered to natural enjoyment and pleasure by *actually* denying itself natural enjoyment and pleasure, and demonstrating *through the deed* that it does not *lie* about its contempt for them, but that this contempt is *true*. —It likewise finds it foolish that the individual absolves itself of its determination to be absolutely individual, excluding all others and possessing property, by relinquishing its property itself. Through this the individual shows *in truth* that it is not serious about its isolation, but is raised above the natural necessity of individuating itself and, in this absolute individuation of being-for-itself, denying others as the same *as itself*.—Pure insight finds both acts unpurposive as well as wrong: *unpurposive* to deny oneself pleasure and give away a possession in order to prove oneself free of pleasure and possession. It will therefore, conversely, declare a person a *fool* who, in order to eat, adopts the means of actually eating.—It also finds it *wrong* to deny oneself a meal, and to give away butter and eggs not for money, or money not for butter and eggs, but outright, without receiving anything in return. It declares a meal or the possession of such things to be an end in itself, and thereby in fact declares itself a very impure intention, for which such enjoyment and possession are utterly essential concerns. As pure intention it also again asserts the necessity of rising [1807 506] above natural existence and above greed for its means; it merely finds it foolish and wrong that this elevation should be demonstrated *through the deed*. Or, this pure intention is in truth fraud, which professes and demands an *inward* elevation, but declares it superfluous, foolish, and even wrong to take this seriously, to *actually put it into effect* and *prove its truth*.—It therefore denies itself both as pure insight, since it denies immediately purposive action, and as pure intention, since it denies the intention of proving oneself freed from the purposes of individuality.

557 This is how Enlightenment offers itself to faith's experience. It appears in this bad guise because, precisely through its relation to another, it gives itself a *negative reality*, or presents itself as the opposite of itself; but pure insight and

intention must give themselves this relation, for it is their actualization.—This initially appeared as negative reality. Perhaps its *positive reality* is better constituted; let us see how matters stand with it.—When all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises: *what next? What is the truth Enlightenment has spread in their place?*—It has already expressed this positive content in its eradication of error, for that alienation of itself is equally its positive reality.—In what for faith is absolute [1807 507] spirit, it apprehends whatever *determination* it discovers as wood, stone, and so forth, as individual actual things. Since it generally comprehends *every determinacy*, that is, all spirit's content and fulfillment, in this way as a *finitude*, as *human essence and representation*, *absolute essence* becomes for it a *vacuum* to which no determinations, no predicates, can be ascribed. Such a coupling would in itself be culpable, and it is precisely the coupling in which the monsters of superstition have been begotten. Reason, *pure insight*, is indeed not itself empty, since the negative of itself exists *for it* and is its content; rather, it is rich, but only in individuality and limitation. To let nothing of this kind belong to absolute essence, or be ascribed to it, is its insightful good breeding, which knows how to put itself and its wealth of finitude in their proper place and treat the absolute worthily.

558 Confronting this empty essence as the *second moment* of Enlightenment's positive truth stands *individuality* in general, of consciousness and all being, excluded from absolute essence, as *absolute being-in-and-for-itself*. Consciousness, which in its very first actuality is *sense-certainty* and *meaning*, returns here from the whole course of its experience to this point, and is again knowledge of *what is purely negative to itself*, or of *sensuous things*, that is, *beings* standing indifferently opposed to its *being-for-itself*. Here, however, it is not [1807 508] *immediate* natural consciousness; rather, it has *become* this for itself. Initially surrendered to every entanglement into which its unfolding plunged it, now brought back by pure insight to its first shape, it has *experienced* that shape as the *result*. *Grounded* on insight into the nullity of all other shapes of consciousness, and thus of everything beyond sense-certainty, this sense-certainty is no longer meaning, but is instead absolute truth. This nullity

of everything going beyond sense-certainty is admittedly only a negative proof of this truth; but it is capable of no other, for the positive truth of sense-certainty within itself is precisely the *unmediated* being-for-itself of the concept itself as object, and indeed in the form of otherness: that every consciousness is *absolutely certain* that it *is*, and that *other actual things* exist outside it, and that in its *natural* being it, like these things, is *in and for itself*, or *absolute*.

559 Finally, *the third moment of Enlightenment's truth* is the relation of individual essences to absolute essence, the relation of the first two moments. As pure insight into the *equal* or *unlimited*, insight also *goes beyond* the *unequal*, namely finite actuality, or beyond itself as mere otherness. As the beyond of this it has *the void*, to which it therefore relates sensuous [1807 509] actuality. The two sides do not enter the determination of this *relation* as *content*, since one is the void, and content is therefore present only through the other, sensuous actuality. But the *form* of the relation, in whose determination the side of the *in-itself* participates, can be made as one pleases; for form is the *intrinsically negative*, and therefore what is opposed to itself: being as well as nothing; *in-itself* as well as its *opposite*. Or, what is the same, the relation of *actuality* to the *in-itself* as the *beyond* is as much a *negating* as a *positing* of actuality. Finite actuality can therefore actually be taken just as one happens to need it. The sensuous is thus now related *positively* to the absolute as to the *in-itself*, and sensuous actuality is itself *in itself*; the absolute makes, shelters, and nurtures it. Again, it is also related to the absolute as to the opposite, as to its *nonbeing*; according to this relation it is not in itself, but only *for another*. Whereas in the previous shape of consciousness the *concepts* of the opposition determined themselves as *good* and *bad*, for pure insight they instead become the purer abstractions of being *in itself* and being *for another*.

560 But both ways of considering the finite, in its positive and its negative relation to the in-itself, are in fact equally necessary, and everything is therefore as much *in itself* as it is *for another*; or everything is *[1807 510] useful*.—Everything surrenders itself to others, now allows others to use it and is *for them*, and now, so to speak, rears up on its hind legs again, acts unyieldingly toward another, is for

itself, and uses the other in turn.—For the human being, as the thing *conscious* of this relation, its essence and position follow from this. As immediately existing, as natural consciousness, the human being is *in itself, good*, as individual *absolute*, and other things are *for it*. Indeed, since for it as the animal conscious of itself the moments have the significance of universality, *everything* is for its pleasure and delight, and, just as it came from God's hand, it walks about the world as a garden planted for it.—It must also have plucked from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; in this it possesses a benefit distinguishing it from everything else, for its intrinsically good nature happens *also* to be so constituted that an excess of delight harms it. Or rather, its individuality *also has its beyond* within it, can go beyond itself and destroy itself. Against this, reason is a useful means for properly limiting this going beyond, or rather for preserving itself in going beyond the determinate; for this is the force of consciousness. The enjoyment of the conscious essence, *universal* in itself, must itself be not determinate but universal in variety and duration. Measure therefore has the determination of [1807 511] preventing pleasure from being cut short in its variety and duration; that is, the determination of measure is immoderation.—Just as everything is useful to the human being, so it too is useful, and its determination is just as much to make itself a publicly useful and universally serviceable member of the troop. As much as it cares for itself, so much must it also give itself for others, and as much as it gives itself, so much does it care for itself: one hand washes the other. But wherever it finds itself, it is in the right place; it benefits others and is used.

561 Different things are useful to one another in different ways; but all things have this useful reciprocity through their essence, namely, through being related to the absolute in the doubled way: positively, thereby being *in and for themselves*; negatively, thereby being *for others*. The *relation* to absolute essence, or religion, is therefore the most useful of all useful things; for it is *pure utility itself*, this subsistence of all things, or their *being-in-and-for-themselves*, and the falling of all things, or their *being-for-another*.

562 To faith, of course, this positive result of Enlightenment is as much an abomination as its negative conduct toward faith. This *insight* into absolute essence, seeing in it nothing but *absolute* essence itself, *the être suprême, or the void*; this *intention* that everything in its immediate existence is *in itself*, or [1807 512] good; and finally that the concept of utility exhaustively expresses the *relation* of individual conscious being to absolute essence, *religion*—all this is utterly *abhorrent* to faith. This *wisdom* of Enlightenment's own necessarily appears to it at the same time as *banality* itself and the *confession* of banality; for it consists in knowing nothing of absolute essence, or, what is the same, knowing this utterly flat truth of it, that it is simply *absolute essence*, while knowing only finitude, and indeed knowing it as the true, and this knowledge of it as the true, as the highest.

563 Against Enlightenment, faith has divine right, the right of absolute *self-equality*, or pure thought, and experiences nothing but wrong from it; for Enlightenment distorts faith in all its moments and makes them something other than what they are in faith. Enlightenment, however, has only human right against faith and for its truth; for the wrong it commits is the right of *inequality* and consists in inverting and altering, a right belonging to the nature of *self-consciousness* as opposed to simple essence or *thought*. But since its right is the right of self-consciousness, it will not merely *also* retain its right, leaving two equal rights of spirit confronting one another, neither able to satisfy the other. Rather, it will assert absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negativity [1807 513] of the concept, which is not only *for itself* but also reaches over its opposite; and faith itself, because it is consciousness, will not be able to deny Enlightenment its right.

564 For Enlightenment confronts believing consciousness not with principles of its own, but with principles this consciousness itself contains. It merely brings together for faith its *own thoughts*, which fall apart unconsciously for faith; at *one* of its modes it merely reminds faith of the *others* it *also* has, but of which it always forgets one in the presence of another. Enlightenment proves itself pure insight against faith precisely by seeing the whole in a *determinate* moment,

thus bringing forward the *opposite* related to that moment and, inverting one in the other, driving forth the negative essence of both thoughts, the *concept*. It therefore appears to faith as distortion and lie, because it exhibits the *otherness* of faith's moments; it thereby seems to faith immediately to make them something other than what they are in their individuality. But this *other* is equally essential, and is in truth present in believing consciousness itself; it is simply that this consciousness does not think of it, but has it somewhere else. It is therefore neither alien to faith nor something faith can deny.

565 But Enlightenment itself, which reminds faith of the opposite of its isolated moments, [1807 514] is equally unenlightened about itself. It relates purely *negatively* to faith insofar as it excludes its content from its own purity and takes it as the *negative* of itself. It therefore neither recognizes itself in this negative, in faith's content, nor, for this reason, brings together the two thoughts—the one it brings forward and the one against which it brings it forward. Since it does not recognize that what it condemns in faith is immediately its own thought, it is itself within the opposition of the two moments, acknowledging only one of them, namely whichever is opposed to faith, while separating the other from it, just as faith does. It therefore does not produce the unity of the two as their unity, that is, the concept; rather, the concept *arises* for it on its own, or it merely finds it *already present*. For in itself this is precisely the realization of pure insight: that insight, whose essence is the concept, first becomes for itself an absolute *other* and denies itself—for the opposition of the concept is absolute—and from this otherness comes to itself, or to its concept.—But Enlightenment merely *is* this movement; it is the still unconscious activity of the pure concept, which indeed comes to itself as object, but takes this object for an *other*, and also does not know the nature of the concept: that what is undifferentiated is what absolutely divides itself.—Against faith, then, insight [1807 515] is the *power* of the concept insofar as it is the movement and relating of the moments lying apart in faith's consciousness, a relating in which their contradiction comes to light. Here lies the absolute *right* of the force it exercises over faith; but the *actuality* to which it brings this force lies precisely

in believing consciousness itself being the concept, and thus itself acknowledging the opposite that insight brings before it. Insight therefore retains its right against faith because it asserts in faith what is necessary to faith itself and what faith contains within itself.

566 First, Enlightenment asserts the moment of the concept as an *action* of *consciousness*. It asserts *against* faith that faith's absolute essence is the essence *of its* consciousness as a self, or that it is *produced* by consciousness. For believing consciousness, its absolute essence, just as it is its *in-itself*, is also not like an alien thing *standing* within it, no one knows how or from where. Rather, its trust consists precisely in *finding* itself within it as *this* personal consciousness, and its obedience and service in producing essence as *its* absolute essence through its *action*. Enlightenment properly only reminds faith of this when faith pronounces purely the *in-itself* of absolute essence *beyond* the *action* of consciousness.—But while it does bring the [1807 516] opposed moment of faith's *action* against faith's one-sidedness, against the *being* of which faith alone thinks here, it equally fails to bring its own thoughts together. It isolates the pure moment of *action* and pronounces faith's *in-itself* to be *only* something *produced* by consciousness. But isolated action opposed to the *in-itself* is contingent action and, as representing, a production of fictions—representations that are not *in themselves*; and this is how it regards faith's content.—Conversely, however, pure insight equally says the opposite. In asserting the moment of *otherness* contained in the concept, it pronounces faith's essence to be something that has *nothing to do with* consciousness, lies *beyond* it, and is alien and unknown to it. For faith, just as on one side it trusts essence and has within it the *certainty of itself*, so on the other side essence is inscrutable in its ways and unattainable in its being.

567 Further, Enlightenment asserts against believing consciousness a right that this consciousness itself concedes when it considers the object of faith's worship as stone and wood, or otherwise as a finite anthropomorphic determinacy. For since faith is this divided consciousness, having a *beyond* of *actuality* and a pure *this world* apart from that beyond, there is in it in fact *also* this view of the sen-

suous thing [1807 517] according to which it *holds good in and for itself*. But faith does not bring together these two thoughts *of what exists in and for itself*, which for it is at one time *pure essence*, at another an ordinary *sensuous thing*.—Even its pure consciousness is affected by the latter view; for, lacking the concept, the differences of its supersensible realm are a series of independent *shapes*, and their movement an *occurrence*; that is, they exist only in *representation* and have within them the mode of sensuous being.—Enlightenment, for its part, likewise isolates *actuality* as an essence abandoned by spirit, and determinacy as an immovable finitude that would not be a *moment* in the spiritual movement of essence itself—not nothing, nor something *existing in and for itself*, but something vanishing.

568 It is clear that the same holds for the *ground* of *knowing*. Believing consciousness itself acknowledges a contingent *knowing*, for it has a relation to contingencies, and absolute essence itself exists for it in the form of a represented ordinary actuality. Believing consciousness is thus *also* a certainty that does not contain truth within itself, and it confesses itself to be such an inessential consciousness, on this side of spirit that assures and confirms itself.—But it forgets this moment in its spiritual, immediate knowledge of absolute [1807 518] essence.—Enlightenment, however, in reminding it of this, thinks again *only* of contingent knowing and forgets the other kind; it thinks only of mediation occurring through an *alien* third, not of mediation in which the immediate is itself the third through which it mediates itself with the other, namely with *itself*.

569 Finally, in its view of faith's *action*, Enlightenment finds the casting away of enjoyment and possessions wrong and unpurposive.—As regards the wrong, it obtains believing consciousness's agreement, since this consciousness itself acknowledges the actuality of possessing, holding fast to, and enjoying property. It conducts itself all the more in isolation, and all the more obstinately, in asserting property, and abandons itself all the more crudely to its enjoyment, because its religious action—*relinquishing* possession and enjoyment—lies beyond this actuality and purchases for it freedom on that side. Through this

opposition, this service of sacrificing natural pursuits and enjoyment in fact has no truth; retention takes place *alongside* sacrifice. Sacrifice is only a *sign* that accomplishes actual sacrifice only in a small part and therefore in fact merely *represents* it.

570 With regard to *purposiveness*, Enlightenment finds it inept to cast away *a* possession in order to know and prove oneself freed from *possessions*, and to deny oneself *an* enjoyment in order to know and prove oneself freed from *[1807 519] enjoyment*. Believing consciousness itself grasps absolute action as *universal* action; not only is the action of its absolute essence as its object universal for it, but individual consciousness too ought to prove itself entirely and universally freed from its sensuous essence. Yet casting away an *individual* possession or renouncing an *individual* enjoyment is not this *universal* action. And since in the action the *purpose*, which is universal, and the *execution*, which is individual, should essentially confront consciousness in their inadequacy to one another, this action proves to be an activity in which consciousness has no part, and thus the activity is properly too *naive* to be an action. It is too naive to fast in order to prove oneself freed from the pleasure of a meal—too naive to remove other pleasure *from one's body*, like Origen, in order to prove it abolished. The action itself proves an *external* and *individual* activity, but desire is inwardly rooted and *universal*; its pleasure disappears neither with the instrument nor through individual abstention.

571 Enlightenment, however, for its part isolates here the *inward, unactual* against actuality, just as against faith's inwardness in its intuition and devotion it held fast to the externality of [1807 520] thinghood. It places the essential in *intention*, in *thought*, and thereby spares itself the actual accomplishment of liberation from natural purposes. On the contrary, this inwardness is itself the formal element that finds its fulfillment in natural impulses, which are justified precisely by being inward, by belonging to *universal* being, to nature.

572 Enlightenment thus has irresistible force over faith because the moments it asserts are found within faith's own consciousness. Considered more closely, the effect of this force seems to be that its conduct toward faith tears apart the *beautiful* unity of *trust* and immediate *certainty*, contaminates faith's *spiritual* consciousness with low thoughts of *sensuous* actuality, and destroys its heart, *tranquil* and *secure* in submission, through the *vanity* of understanding and of its own will and accomplishment. But in fact Enlightenment instead initiates the sublation of the *thoughtless*, or rather *conceptless separation* present in faith. Believing consciousness uses double measures and weights; it has two kinds of eyes, ears, tongue, and language; it has doubled all its representations without comparing this ambiguity. Or, faith lives in two kinds of perception: one, the perception of *sleeping* consciousness living purely in [1807 521] conceptless thoughts; the other, that of waking consciousness living purely in sensuous actuality; and in each it maintains a household of its own.—Enlightenment illuminates that heavenly world with the representations of the sensuous world, and has shown the former this finitude, which faith cannot deny because it is self-consciousness and hence the unity to which both modes of representation belong and in which they do not fall apart. For they belong to the same inseparable *simple* self into which faith has passed.

573 Faith has thereby lost the content that filled its element and collapses into a dull weaving of spirit within itself. It is driven from its realm, or this realm is plundered, since waking consciousness seized all its differentiation and extension and claimed and returned all its parts to the earth as the earth's property. But faith is not thereby satisfied, for through this illumination only individual essence has everywhere arisen, so that nothing speaks to spirit but essenceless actuality and finitude abandoned by it.—Since faith is without content and cannot remain in this emptiness, or since, going beyond the finite, which is the only content, it finds only the void, it is a *pure longing*. Its truth is an empty *beyond* for which no fitting content can any longer be found, [1807 522] since everything has been put to another use.—Faith has thereby in fact become the same as Enlightenment, namely consciousness of the relation of the finite exist-

ing in itself to the absolute without predicates, unknown and unknowable; only *Enlightenment* is *satisfied* Enlightenment, while *faith* is *unsatisfied* Enlightenment. Yet it will become apparent whether Enlightenment can remain in its satisfaction; that longing of troubled spirit, mourning the loss of its spiritual world, lies in ambush. Enlightenment itself bears this stain of unsatisfied longing: as *pure object*, in its *empty* absolute essence; as *action* and *movement*, in its *going beyond* its individual essence toward the unfulfilled beyond; as *fulfilled object*, in the *absence of a self* in the useful. It will sublate this stain; a closer consideration of the positive result that is its truth will show that the stain is already sublated within it in itself.

b. The Truth of Enlightenment.

574 The dull weaving of spirit that no longer differentiates anything within itself has thus passed inwardly beyond consciousness, which, by contrast, has become clear to itself.—The first moment of this clarity is determined in its necessity and condition by [1807 523] pure insight—or insight that is *in itself* concept—actualizing itself. It does so by positing otherness, or determinacy, within itself. In this way it is negative pure insight, that is, negation of the concept; this negation is equally pure, and thus the *pure thing*, absolute essence with no further determination, has come to be. More precisely, as absolute concept insight is a differentiating of differences that are no longer differences, of abstractions or pure concepts that no longer sustain themselves but have support and distinction only through *the whole of the movement*. This differentiating of the undifferentiated consists precisely in the absolute concept making itself its *object* and positing itself as *essence* over against that *movement*. Essence thereby lacks the side on which the abstractions or differences are *held apart*, and therefore becomes *pure thought* as *pure thing*.—This, then, is precisely that dull, unconscious weaving of spirit within itself to which faith sank when it lost its differentiated content;—it is also that *movement* of pure self-consciousness to which it is supposed to be the utterly alien beyond. For because this pure self-consciousness is movement in pure concepts, in differences that are no differences, it in fact collapses into unconscious weaving, that is, into pure

feeling or pure *thinghood*.—But the concept alienated from [1807 524] itself—for it still stands here at this stage of alienation—does not recognize this *same essence* of both sides, the movement of self-consciousness and its absolute essence; it does not recognize their *same essence*, which is in fact their substance and subsistence. Since it does not recognize this unity, essence counts for it only in the form of the objective beyond, while differentiating consciousness, which thus has the in-itself outside itself, counts as a finite consciousness.

575 Over that absolute essence Enlightenment itself enters into the conflict with itself that it previously had with faith, and divides into two parties. A party proves itself *victorious* only by splitting into two parties; for in this it shows that it possesses within itself the principle it combated, and has thus sublated the one-sidedness in which it previously appeared. The interest divided between it and the other party now falls wholly within it and forgets the other, because it finds within this party itself the opposition that occupies it. At the same time, however, this opposition has been raised into the higher, victorious element in which it presents itself purified. Thus the discord arising within a party, which seems a misfortune, proves instead its good fortune.

576 Pure essence itself contains no difference; difference therefore comes to it through two such pure essences emerging for consciousness, or [1807 525] a twofold consciousness of essence.—Pure absolute essence exists only in pure thought, or rather is pure thought itself, thus absolutely *beyond* finite consciousness, beyond *self*-consciousness, and only negative essence. But in this way it is precisely *being*, the negative of self-consciousness. As self-consciousness's *negative*, it is *also* related to self-consciousness: it is *external being*, which, related to self-consciousness, within which differences and determinations fall, acquires within itself the differences of being tasted, seen, and so forth; and the relation is *sense*-certainty and perception.

577 If the starting point is this *sensuous* being, into which that negative beyond necessarily passes, but abstraction is made from these determinate modes of consciousness's relation, then pure *matter* remains as the dull weaving and move-

ment within itself. Here it is essential to consider that *pure matter* is only what *remains* when we *abstract* from seeing, feeling, tasting, and so forth; that is, it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so forth. It is not *matter* that is seen, felt, and tasted, but color, a stone, a salt, and so forth. Matter is instead *pure abstraction*; and thereby the *pure essence* of *thought*, or pure thought itself, is present as the absolute undifferentiated within itself, indeterminate, and without predicates. [1807 526]

578 One Enlightenment calls absolute essence that absolute without predicates, existing in thought beyond actual consciousness, which was the starting point; —the other calls it *matter*. If they were distinguished as *nature* and spirit or *God*, then the unconscious weaving within itself would lack the wealth of unfolded life needed to be nature, while spirit or God would lack consciousness differentiating itself within itself. As we have seen, both are utterly the same concept; the difference lies not in the matter itself, but purely in the different starting points of the two formations, and in each stopping at a particular point in the movement of thought. If they went beyond this, they would meet and recognize as the same what one professes to find an abomination, the other a folly. For one has absolute essence in its pure thought, or immediately for pure consciousness, outside finite consciousness, as its *negative* beyond. If it reflected that, on the one hand, that simple immediacy of thought is nothing other than *pure being*, and, on the other, what is *negative* for consciousness is also related to it, that in the negative judgment the *is* (copula) equally holds the two separated terms together, then the relation of this beyond to consciousness would emerge in the determination of an *external being*, [1807 527] and thereby as the same as what is called *pure matter*; the missing moment of *presence* would have been gained.—The other Enlightenment starts from sensuous being, then *abstracts* from the sensuous relation of tasting, seeing, and so forth, and makes this being the pure *in-itself*, *absolute matter*, what is neither felt nor tasted. This being has in this way become the simple, predicateless essence of *pure consciousness*; it is the pure concept as *existing in itself*, or *pure thought within itself*. This insight does not make in its consciousness the opposite step from *being* that is

pure being to what is thought, which is the same as *pure* being, or from the purely positive to the purely negative. Yet the positive is *pure* only through negation, while the *purely* negative, as pure, is equal to itself within itself and precisely thereby positive.—Or, neither has arrived at the concept of Cartesian metaphysics that *being-in-itself* and *thought* are the same; neither at the thought that *being, pure being*, is not something *concretely actual* but *pure abstraction*; and conversely that pure thought, self-equality, or essence is partly the *negative* of self-consciousness and hence *being*, and partly, as immediate simplicity, equally nothing other than *being*: *thought* is *thinghood*, or *thinghood* is *thought*. [1807 528]

579 Essence here initially contains *division* only in belonging to two kinds of consideration. On the one hand, essence must contain difference within itself; on the other, precisely in this the two ways of considering it come together into one, for the abstract moments of pure being and the negative through which they differ are then united in the object of these ways of considering it.—The universal common to both is the abstraction of pure trembling within itself, or of purely thinking itself. This simple movement rotating on its axis must cast itself apart, because it is itself movement only by differentiating its moments. This differentiation of the moments leaves behind the unmoved as the empty shell of pure *being*, which is no longer actual thought or life within itself; for differentiation, as difference, is all content. But in positing itself *outside* that *unity*, it is thereby the alternation of the moments—*being-in-itself*, *being-for-another*, and *being-for-itself*—that *does not return into itself*: actuality as it is the object for the actual consciousness of pure insight—*utility*.

580 However bad utility may look to faith, or to sentimentality, or even to the abstraction calling itself speculation that fixes the *in-itself* for itself, utility is where pure insight completes its realization and is itself its *[1807 529] object*, which it now no longer denies, and which no longer has for it the value of the void or the pure beyond. For pure insight, as we saw, is the existing concept itself, or self-equal pure personality, differentiating itself within itself so that each differentiated element is itself pure concept, that is, immediately undiffer-

entiated. It is simple pure self-consciousness, which is as much *for itself* as *in itself* in an immediate unity. Its *being-in-itself* is therefore not enduring *being*, but immediately ceases to be something in its difference. But such being, which immediately has no support, is not *in itself*, but essentially *for another*, which is the power absorbing it. Yet this second moment, opposed to the first, *being-in-itself*, vanishes just as immediately as the first; or as *being only for another*, it is instead *vanishing* itself, and *being-returned-into-itself*, *being-for-itself*, is posited. But as self-equality this simple being-for-itself is instead *a being*, or thereby *for another*.—The useful expresses this nature of pure insight in *the unfolding of its moments*, or insight as *object*. It is something subsisting *in itself*, or a thing; this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment, and it is thus absolutely *for another*. Yet it is only for another just as much as it is in itself; these opposed moments have returned into the inseparable unity of [1807 530] being-for-itself. But although the useful expresses the concept of pure insight, it is not insight as such, but insight as *representation*, or as its *object*. It is only the restless alternation of those moments, one of which is indeed being-returned-into-itself, though only as *being-for-itself*—that is, as an abstract moment stepping to one side over against the others. The useful is not itself the negative essence containing these moments in their opposition at the same time *undivided* in *one and the same respect*, or as a *thinking*, as they exist as pure insight. The moment of *being-for-itself* is indeed present in the useful, but not in such a way that it *reaches over* the other moments, the *in-itself* and *being-for-another*, and thus would be the *self*. In the useful, therefore, pure insight has its own concept in its *pure* moments as its *object*. It is consciousness of this *metaphysics*, but not yet its comprehension; it has not yet reached the *unity* of *being* and the *concept* itself. Because the useful still has for it the form of an object, it has a *world* which, though no longer existing in and for itself, it still distinguishes from itself. But since the oppositions have emerged at the pinnacle of the concept, the next stage will be their collapse into one another, and Enlightenment's experience of the fruits of its deeds.
[1807 531]

581 Considering the object attained in relation to this entire sphere, the actual world of cultivation had gathered itself into the *vanity* of self-consciousness—into *being-for-itself*, which still has the world's confusion as its content and is still the *individual* concept, not yet the concept *universal* for itself. But returned into itself it is *pure insight*: pure consciousness as the pure *self*, or negativity, just as faith is this same consciousness as *pure thought*, or positivity. In that self faith has the moment that completes it;—but since faith perishes through this completion, it is now in pure insight that we see the two moments: as absolute essence, which is purely *thought*, or negative, and as *matter*, which is positive *being*.—This completeness still lacks that *actuality* of self-consciousness belonging to *vain* consciousness—the world from which thought rose into itself. This missing element is attained in utility insofar as pure insight gained positive objectivity in it; it is thereby actual consciousness satisfied within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its *world*; it has become the truth of the whole preceding world, both ideal and real. The first world of spirit is the extended realm of its dispersed existence and of its individualized *certainty* of itself, just as nature disperses its life into [1807 532] infinitely manifold shapes without their *genus* being present. The second contains the *genus* and is the realm of *being-in-itself*, or of *truth* opposed to that certainty. The third, however, the useful, is *truth* that is equally *certainty* of itself. The realm of the truth of *faith* lacks the principle of *actuality*, or certainty of itself as *this individual*. But actuality, or certainty of itself as this individual, lacks the *in-itself*. In the object of pure insight the two worlds are united. The useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness sees through it and has in it *individual certainty* of itself, its enjoyment (its *being-for-itself*); in this way it has *insight* into the object, and this insight contains the object's *true* essence: being something seen through, or *for another*. Insight is therefore itself *true knowledge*, and in this relation self-consciousness equally immediately has universal certainty of itself, its *pure consciousness*. In this relation, therefore, *truth*, presence, and *actuality* are united. Both worlds are reconciled, and heaven is transplanted down to earth.
[1807 533]

III. *Absolute Freedom and Terror*.

582 In utility consciousness has found its concept. But the concept is partly still *object*, and partly, for that very reason, still *purpose*, of which consciousness is not yet immediately in possession. Utility is still a predicate of the object, not subject itself, or consciousness's immediate and sole *actuality*. This is the same as what appeared earlier: *being-for-itself* had not yet proved itself the substance of the remaining moments, through which the useful would immediately be nothing other than the self of consciousness, and consciousness would thereby possess it.—But this taking back of the useful's form of objectivity has already occurred *in itself*, and from this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of actuality, the new shape of consciousness: *absolute freedom*.

583 For in fact no more than an empty semblance of objectivity remains to separate [1807 534] self-consciousness from possession. On the one hand, all subsistence and validity of the determinate members of the organization of the actual world and the world of faith have generally returned into this simple determination as into their ground and spirit. On the other hand, however, this determination no longer has anything of its own for itself, but is instead pure metaphysics, pure concept or knowing of self-consciousness. For regarding the *being-in-and-for-itself* of the useful as object, consciousness recognizes that *its being-in-itself* is essentially *being-for-another*; being-in-itself, as what is *without a self*, is in truth the passive, or what is for another self. But the object exists for consciousness in this abstract form of *pure being-in-itself*, for consciousness is pure *insight*, whose differences have the pure form of concepts.—But the *being-for-itself* into which being-for-another returns, the self, is not a self peculiar to what is called the object and different from the I. For consciousness as pure insight is not an *individual* self confronting an object likewise as a *self of its own*; rather, it is the pure concept, the self's looking into the self, the absolute seeing of *itself* doubled. Its certainty of itself is the universal subject, and its knowing concept the essence of all actuality. Thus, if the useful was only the alternation of moments not returning into its own *unity*, and was therefore still an object for knowing, it ceases to be this; for knowing [1807 535] is itself the

movement of those abstract moments. It is the universal self, the self both of itself and of the object, and, as universal, the unity of this movement returning into itself.

584 Spirit is thereby present as *absolute freedom*. It is self-consciousness grasping that its certainty of itself is the essence of all the spiritual spheres of the real and supersensible worlds; or conversely, that essence and actuality are consciousness's knowledge of *itself*.—It is conscious of its pure personality and therein of all spiritual reality, and all reality is only spiritual. The world is for it absolutely its will, and this is universal will. Indeed, it is not the empty thought of will posited in tacit or represented consent, but really universal will, the will of all *individuals* as such. For will is in itself consciousness of personality, or of each person, and it ought to exist as this true actual will, as the *self*-conscious essence of all and every personality, so that each always does everything undividedly, and what appears as the action of the whole is the immediate and conscious action of *each*.

585 This undivided substance of absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world without any power being able to resist it. For since in truth consciousness alone is the element in which spiritual essences or [1807 536] powers have their substance, their entire system, which organized and maintained itself through division into spheres, has collapsed once individual consciousness has grasped the object as having no other essence than self-consciousness itself, or as being absolutely the concept. What made the concept an existing *object* was its differentiation into separate *subsisting* spheres; but since the object becomes the concept, nothing subsistent remains in it: negativity has penetrated all its moments. The concept enters existence in this way: every individual consciousness rises from the sphere assigned to it and no longer finds its essence and work in this particularized sphere, but grasps its self as the *concept* of will and all spheres as the essence of this will, and can therefore actualize itself only in a labor that is entire labor. In this absolute freedom all estates—the spiritual essences into which the whole articulates itself—are therefore erased.

Individual consciousness, which belonged to such a member and willed and accomplished within it, has sublated its limit; its purpose is the universal purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work.

586 Here the object and *difference* have lost the significance of *utility*, which was the predicate of all real being. Consciousness does not begin its movement with the object as *something alien* from which it [1807 537] would only then return into itself; rather, its object is consciousness itself. The opposition thus consists solely in the difference between *individual* and *universal* consciousness; but individual consciousness is immediately for itself that which had only *the semblance* of opposition: it is universal consciousness and will. The *beyond* of this its actuality floats over the corpse of the vanished independence of real being or the being of faith only as the exhalation of an insipid gas, the empty être suprême.

587 After the sublation of the differentiated spiritual spheres and the limited life of individuals, as well as of its two worlds, there is therefore only the movement of universal self-consciousness within itself, as an interaction of itself in the forms of *universality* and *personal* consciousness. Universal will goes *into itself* and is *individual* will, confronted by universal law and work. But this *individual* consciousness is just as immediately conscious of itself as universal will; it is conscious that its object is law given by itself and work accomplished by itself. Passing into activity and creating objectivity, it therefore makes nothing individual, but only laws and actions of state.

588 This movement is thus the interaction of consciousness with itself, in which it releases nothing in the shape of a *free object* confronting [1807 538] it. It follows that it can arrive at no positive work, neither universal works of language nor of actuality, neither laws and universal institutions of *conscious* freedom nor deeds and works *of willing* freedom.—The work into which freedom giving itself *consciousness* could make itself would consist in making itself, as *universal* substance, an *object* and *enduring being*. This otherness would be the difference within it through which it divided into subsisting spiritual spheres and into the

members of different powers: partly these spheres would be the *thought-things* of separate legislative, judicial, and executive *powers*; partly, however, the *real essences* that emerged in the real world of cultivation and, if the content of universal action were more closely considered, the particular spheres of labor further distinguished as more specific *estates*.—Universal freedom that had thus separated itself into its members, and precisely thereby made itself *existing* substance, would thereby be free of single individuality and would distribute the *multitude* of *individuals* among its different members. But the action and being of personality would thereby find itself limited to a branch of the whole, to one kind of action and being; placed in the element of *being*, personality would acquire the significance of a *determinate* personality and cease in truth to be universal self-consciousness. This self-consciousness does not [1807 539] let itself be cheated of *actuality* either by the *representation* of obedience under *self-given* laws assigning it a part, or by its *representation* in lawgiving and universal action—not of the actuality of giving the law *itself* and accomplishing not an individual work but the universal work *itself*. For where the self is merely *represented* and *presented in thought*, it is not *actual*; where it is *represented by another*, it is not.

589 Just as individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this *universal work* of absolute freedom as existing substance, so neither does it find itself in the proper *deeds* and *individual* actions of its will. For the universal to achieve a deed, it must gather itself into the one of individuality and place an individual self-consciousness at its head; for universal will is *actual* will only in a self that is one. But thereby *all other individuals* are excluded from the *whole* of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be the deed of *actual universal* self-consciousness.—Universal freedom can therefore produce no positive work or deed; only *negative action* remains to it. It is only the *Fury* of vanishing.

590 But the highest actuality, most opposed to universal freedom—or rather the only object that still comes to be for it—is the [1807 540] freedom and individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For that universality, which does not

let itself attain the reality of organic articulation and aims to preserve itself in undivided continuity, at the same time differentiates itself within itself, because it is movement, or consciousness generally. Indeed, because of its own abstraction, it separates into equally abstract extremes: simple, inflexible, cold universality, and the discrete, absolutely hard rigidity and obstinate pointlikeness of actual self-consciousness. Once it has finished eradicating real organization and now subsists for itself, this is its sole object—an object that no longer has any other content, possession, existence, or external extension, but is only this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self. The only place where it can be seized is its *abstract* existence in general.—Since these two are indivisibly and absolutely for themselves and therefore can send no part into the middle through which they might connect, their relation is entirely *unmediated* pure negation: specifically, the negation of the individual as *existing* within the universal. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore *death*, and indeed a *death* having no inner scope or fulfillment, for what is negated is the unfulfilled point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the [1807 541] coldest, flattest death, with no more significance than cutting through a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water.

591 In the flatness of this syllable consists the wisdom of the government, the understanding of universal will concerning its accomplishment of itself. Government is itself nothing other than the point establishing itself, or the individuality of universal will. As a willing and accomplishing that proceeds from one point, it at the same time wills and accomplishes a determinate order and action. It thereby excludes the remaining individuals from its deed, on the one hand, and on the other constitutes itself as a determinate will, and thus as opposed to universal will. It can therefore absolutely not present itself otherwise than as a *faction*. Only the *victorious* faction is called government, and precisely in its being a faction lies the immediate necessity of its downfall; conversely, its being government makes it a faction and guilty. Whereas universal will holds to the government's actual action as the crime it commits against universal will, the government, by contrast, has nothing determinate and exter-

nal through which the guilt of the will opposed to it would present itself. For it, as *actual* universal will, is confronted only by unactual pure will, *intention*. *Coming under suspicion* therefore takes the place of, or has the significance and effect [1807 542] of, *being guilty*. The external reaction against this actuality lying in the simple interior of intention consists in the bare eradication of this existing self, from which nothing else can be taken away but its being itself.

592 In this distinctive *work* of its own, absolute freedom becomes its own object, and self-consciousness experiences what freedom *is*. *In itself*, freedom is precisely this *abstract self-consciousness* that eradicates within itself every difference and every subsistence of difference. As this, it is its own object; the *terror* of death is the intuition of this its negative essence. But absolutely free self-consciousness finds this reality of its own quite different from its concept of itself: that universal will is only the *positive* essence of personality, and personality knows itself in universal will only positively, or as preserved. Rather, for self-consciousness—which as pure insight absolutely separates its positive and negative essence, the absolute without predicates as pure *thought* and as pure *matter* —the absolute *transition* from one into the other is here present in its actuality. —Universal will, as absolutely *positive* actual self-consciousness, turns into *negative* essence because it is this self-conscious actuality *raised* to *pure* thought or *abstract* matter, and proves itself equally to be the *sublation* of *thinking itself*, or of self-consciousness.
[1807 543]

593 Thus absolute freedom, as the *pure* self-equality of universal will, contains *negation*, and thereby *difference* in general, and develops this again as *actual* difference. For in self-equal universal will, pure *negativity* has the *element* of subsistence, or the *substance* in which its moments realize themselves; it has the matter it can employ in its determinacy. And insofar as this substance has shown itself as the negative for individual consciousness, the organization of spiritual spheres to which the multitude of individual consciousnesses is assigned therefore forms itself again. These consciousnesses, which have felt the

fear of their absolute master, death, again submit to negation and differences, order themselves under the spheres, and return to a divided and limited work, but thereby to their substantial actuality.

594 From this tumult spirit would have been hurled back to its starting point, the ethical and real world of cultivation, which would only have been refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the master returning into people's hearts. Spirit would have to traverse this cycle of necessity anew and repeat it continually if the result were only the complete interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance—an interpenetration in which self-consciousness, having experienced the force of its universal essence as negative against [1807 544] itself, wished to know and find itself not as this particular, but only as universal, and could therefore also endure the objective actuality of universal spirit excluding it as a particular.—But in absolute freedom it was not consciousness immersed in manifold existence, or fixing determinate purposes and thoughts for itself, and an *external* valid world, whether of actuality or of thought, that stood in interaction with each other. Rather, it was the world absolutely in the form of consciousness, as universal will, and likewise self-consciousness contracted from all extended existence or manifold purpose and judgment into the simple self, that stood in interaction. The cultivation it attains in interaction with that essence is therefore the most sublime and final: to see its pure simple actuality vanish immediately and pass into empty nothingness. In the world of cultivation itself, self-consciousness does not reach the point of intuiting its negation or alienation in this form of pure abstraction; rather, its negation is fulfilled: either the honor or wealth it gains in place of the self it alienated, or the language of spirit and insight attained by dismembered consciousness, or the heaven of faith, or the useful of Enlightenment. All these determinations are lost in the loss the self experiences in absolute [1807 545] freedom; its negation is meaningless death, the pure terror of the negative that contains nothing positive, nothing fulfilling.—Yet at the same time this negation in its actuality is not something *alien*: it is neither the universal *necessity* lying beyond, in which the ethical world perishes, nor the individual contingency of one's own possession

or of the possessor's mood, on which dismembered consciousness sees itself dependent. Rather, it is *universal will*, which in this final abstraction has nothing positive and therefore can give nothing back for sacrifice—but for that very reason is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness, or is the purely positive because it is the purely negative. And meaningless death, the unfulfilled negativity of the self, turns within the inner concept into absolute positivity. For consciousness, its immediate unity with universal will, its demand to know itself as this determinate point within universal will, turns into the utterly opposite experience. What vanishes for it therein is abstract *being*, or the immediacy of the substanceless point; and this vanished immediacy is universal will itself, as which consciousness now knows itself, insofar as it is *sublated immediacy*, insofar as it is pure knowing or pure will. Through this it knows universal will as itself, and itself as essence, but not [1807 546] as *immediately existing* essence: neither universal will as revolutionary government or as the anarchy striving to constitute anarchy, nor itself as the center of this faction or its opposite. Rather, *universal will* is its *pure knowing and willing*, and *it* is universal will as this pure knowing and willing. It does not lose *itself* therein, for pure knowing and willing is more truly itself than the atomic point of consciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowing with itself: pure *knowing* as *essence* is universal will, but this *essence* is absolutely only pure knowing. Self-consciousness is therefore pure knowledge of essence as pure knowing. Further, as *individual self*, it is only the form of the subject, or actual action, which it knows as *form*; likewise, *objective* actuality, *being*, is for it form absolutely without a self, for such actuality would be what is not known, whereas this knowing knows knowing as essence.

595 Absolute freedom has thus reconciled with itself the opposition of universal and individual will. Self-alienated spirit, driven to the pinnacle of its opposition, in which pure willing and what purely wills are still distinguished, reduces this opposition to transparent form and finds itself within it.—Just as the realm of the actual world passes into the realm of faith and insight, so absolute freedom passes from its [1807 547] self-destroying actuality into another land of

self-conscious spirit, where in this unactuality it counts as the true, in the thought of which spirit refreshes itself insofar as *it is and remains thought*, and knows this being enclosed within self-consciousness as perfect and complete essence. The new shape of *moral spirit* has arisen.
[1807 548]
C. *Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality*.

596 The ethical world showed the spirit merely departed within it, *the individual self*, as its fate and truth. But this *person* of *right* has its substance and fulfillment outside itself. The movement of the world of cultivation and faith sublates this abstraction of the person, and through completed alienation, through the highest abstraction, substance becomes for spirit's self first *universal will* and finally its property. Here, therefore, knowing seems at last to have become perfectly equal to its truth; for its truth is this knowing itself, and all opposition between the two sides has vanished—not *for us*, or *in itself*, but for self-consciousness itself. For it has mastered the opposition of consciousness itself. Consciousness rests on the opposition of certainty of itself and the object; but now the object is for it itself certainty of itself, knowing—just as certainty of itself [1807 549] as such no longer has purposes of its own, and thus no longer exists in determinacy, but is pure knowing.

597 Self-consciousness's knowing is therefore for it *substance* itself. Substance is for it equally *immediate* and absolutely *mediated* in an undivided unity. *Immediate*: like ethical consciousness, it itself knows and performs duty and belongs to duty as its nature; but it is not *character*, like ethical consciousness, which because of its immediacy is a determinate spirit, belongs to only one of the ethical essentialities, and has the side of *not knowing*.—It is *absolute mediation*, like self-cultivating and believing consciousness; for it is essentially the movement of the self that sublates the abstraction of *immediate existence* and becomes universal for itself—but neither through pure alienation and dismemberment of its self and actuality, nor through flight. Rather, it is *immediately present* to itself in its substance, for substance is its knowing, its intuited pure

certainty of itself; and precisely *this immediacy*, which is its own actuality, is all actuality. For the immediate is *being* itself, and as pure immediacy purified through absolute negativity, it is pure being, *being* in general, or *all* being.

598 Absolute essence is therefore not exhausted in the determination of being the simple *essence* of *thought* [1807 550]; rather, it is all *actuality*, and this actuality exists only as knowing. What consciousness did not know would have no sense and could be no power for it; all objectivity and world have withdrawn into its knowing will. It is absolutely free in knowing its freedom, and precisely this knowledge of its freedom is its substance and purpose and sole content.

a. The Moral Worldview.

599 Self-consciousness knows duty as absolute essence; it is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness. Duty cannot acquire for it the form of something alien. Yet, enclosed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet posited and considered as *consciousness*. The object is immediate knowing, and so purely permeated by the self it is not an object. But essentially mediation and negativity, self-consciousness contains in its concept the relation to an *otherness* and is consciousness. On the one hand, because duty constitutes its sole essential purpose and object, this otherness is for it an entirely *meaningless* actuality. Yet because this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, it relates to this otherness with complete freedom and [1807 551] indifference; on the other hand, existence is therefore an existence completely released by self-consciousness, likewise relating only to itself. The freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer too the negative object of its consciousness. This object is thereby a world completed within itself into its own individuality, an independent whole of laws of its own, as well as an independent course and free actualization of those laws—a *nature* in general whose laws and action belong to itself as an essence as unconcerned with moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is with it.

600 From this determination a *moral worldview* develops, consisting in the *relation* of *moral* being-in-and-for-itself and *natural* being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is grounded both in the complete mutual *indifference* and separate *independence* of *nature* and *moral* purposes and activity, and, on the other side, in consciousness of duty's being the one and only essentiality and of nature's complete lack of independence and essentiality. The moral worldview contains the development of the moments contained in this relation of such wholly conflicting presuppositions.

601 First, then, moral consciousness in general is presupposed. For this consciousness, which is *actual* and *active* and fulfills duty in its actuality and deed, duty counts as essence. But for this [1807 552] moral consciousness there is also the presupposed freedom of nature; or it *experiences* that nature is unconcerned with giving it consciousness of the unity of its actuality with nature's, and thus *perhaps* lets it become *happy*, and *perhaps not*. Immoral consciousness, by contrast, perhaps happens to find its actualization where moral consciousness sees only an *occasion* for action, but through its action sees neither the happiness of execution nor the enjoyment of accomplishment fall to its share. Moral consciousness therefore instead finds reason to complain of this condition of inadequacy between itself and existence, and of the injustice that limits it to having its object only as *pure duty*, but denies it the sight of that object, and of *itself*, actualized.

602 Moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness and omit this moment from its absolute purpose. The purpose expressed as *pure duty* essentially contains this *individual* self-consciousness; *individual conviction* and the knowledge of it constituted an absolute moment of morality. This moment in the *purpose* that has become *objective*, in *fulfilled* duty, is *individual* consciousness intuiting itself as actualized, or *enjoyment*, which is thus contained not immediately in the concept of morality considered as *disposition* [1807 553], but in the concept of its *actualization*. Yet through this it is also contained in morality as *disposition*, for disposition aims not to remain disposition opposed to action, but to *act*, or actualize itself. The purpose, expressed as the whole with conscious-

ness of its moments, is therefore this: fulfilled duty should be as much a purely moral action as realized *individuality*, and *nature*, as the side of *individuality* opposed to the abstract purpose, should be *one* with this purpose.—As necessary as the experience of disharmony between both sides is, because nature is free, equally duty alone is essential and nature, opposed to duty, without a self. That whole *purpose*, constituted by harmony, contains actuality itself within it. It is at the same time the *thought* of *actuality*. The harmony of morality and nature—or, since nature is considered only insofar as consciousness experiences nature's unity with it, the harmony of morality and happiness—is *thought* as necessarily *existing*, or is *postulated*. For *demanding* expresses that something not yet actual is thought as *existing*: a necessity not of the *concept* as concept, but of *being*. Yet necessity is at the same time essentially relation through the concept. The demanded *being* therefore does not belong to the representation of contingent consciousness, but lies in the concept of morality itself, whose [1807 554] true content is the *unity* of *pure* and *individual* consciousness. To the latter belongs this: that this unity should exist *for it* as an actuality, which in the *content* of the purpose is happiness, but in its *form* is existence generally.—This demanded existence, or unity of the two, is therefore not a wish, nor, considered as a purpose, one whose attainment would still be uncertain; rather, it is a demand of reason, or reason's immediate certainty and presupposition.

603 That first experience and this postulate are not the only ones; rather, a whole circle of postulates opens up. For nature is not merely this entirely free *external* mode in which, as in a pure object, consciousness would have to realize its purpose. Consciousness is essentially *within itself* something *for which* this other free actuality exists; that is, it is itself contingent and natural. This nature, which is its own for it, is *sensibility*, which in the *shape* of willing, as *drives* and *inclinations*, has for itself a *determinate* essentiality of its own, or *individual purposes*, and is thus opposed to pure will and its pure purpose. Against this opposition, however, for pure consciousness the essential is instead the relation of sensibility to it, sensibility's absolute unity with it. The two, pure thought and consciousness's sensibility, are *in themselves one consciousness*, and pure

thought is precisely that for [1807 555] which and in which this pure unity exists; but for it as consciousness there is the opposition between itself and the drives. In this conflict between reason and sensibility, the essential for reason is that the conflict should dissolve and the unity of the two emerge as the *result*: not their *original* unity, that both exist in one individual, but a unity arising from the *known* opposition between them. Only such unity is *actual* morality, for it contains the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or first becomes actual and in fact self, and at the same time universal; or it expresses that *mediation* which, as we see, is essential to morality.—Since, of the two moments of the opposition, sensibility is simply *otherness*, or the negative, whereas pure thought of duty is the essence of which nothing can be relinquished, the unity produced seems achievable only through sublating sensibility. But since sensibility is itself a moment of this becoming, the moment of *actuality*, we must initially content ourselves with expressing the unity as sensibility's *conformity* to morality.—This unity too is a *postulated being*; it does not *exist*, for what *exists* is consciousness, or the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness. Yet it is also not an in-itself like [1807 556] the first postulate, in which free nature constitutes one side and its harmony with moral consciousness therefore falls outside this consciousness. Rather, nature here is the nature within consciousness itself, and what is at issue is morality as such, a harmony that belongs to the acting self itself. Consciousness must therefore itself bring this harmony about and continually advance in morality. But morality's *completion* must be *deferred to infinity*, for if it actually occurred, moral consciousness would sublate itself. For *morality* is *moral consciousness* only as negative essence, for whose pure duty sensibility has only a *negative* significance, is only *nonconforming*. In harmony, however, *morality* as *consciousness*, or its *actuality*, disappears, just as in moral *consciousness*, or actuality, its *harmony* disappears. Completion is therefore not actually to be attained, but only to be thought as an *absolute task*, that is, one that remains absolutely a task. Yet at the same time its content must be thought as something that absolutely *must be*, and does not remain a task—whether one represents consciousness as wholly sublated in this goal, or not. How this is properly to be understood can no longer be [1807

557] clearly distinguished in the dark distance of infinity, into which the attainment of the goal must for that very reason be pushed. Properly speaking, it will have to be said that the determinate representation ought neither to interest us nor be sought, because this leads to contradictions: of a task that should remain a task yet be fulfilled; of a morality that should no longer be consciousness, no longer actual. But the consideration that completed morality would contain a contradiction would injure the holiness of moral essentiality and make absolute duty appear something unactual.

604 The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature, the final purpose of the *world*; the other, the harmony of morality and sensuous will, the final purpose of *self-consciousness* as such. The first, then, was harmony in the form of the *in-itself*, the other in the form of *being-for-itself*. But what connects these two thought extremes of final purpose as their middle is the movement of *actual* action itself. They are harmonies whose moments, in their abstract differentiation, have not yet become objects; this happens in actuality, where the sides appear in consciousness proper, each as the *other* of the other. The postulates thereby arising now contain harmonies *existing in and for themselves*, where previously they contained only the separate harmonies *existing in themselves* and *for themselves*.

605 As the *simple knowing* and *willing* of pure *duty*, moral consciousness in action [1807 558] is related to the object opposed to its simplicity—to the actuality of the *manifold case*—and thereby has a manifold moral *relation*. Here there arise, in content, the *many* laws generally, and, in form, the contradictory powers of knowing consciousness and the unconscious.—As regards, first, the *many duties*, only *pure duty* in them counts for moral consciousness generally; the *many duties* as many are *determinate*, and therefore as such are nothing holy for moral consciousness. Yet at the same time, being *necessary* through the concept of *action*, which encompasses a manifold actuality and therefore a manifold moral relation, they must be regarded as existing in and for themselves.

Further, since they can exist only in a moral *consciousness*, they exist at the same time in a consciousness other than the one for which only pure duty as pure exists in and for itself and is holy.

606 It is therefore postulated that there should be an *other* consciousness that sanctifies them, or knows and wills them as duties. The first keeps pure duty *indifferent* to all *determinate content*, and duty is only this indifference to content. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to action and the *necessity* of *determinate* content. Since duties count for it as *determinate* duties, content as [1807 559] such is thereby just as essential for it as the form through which content is duty. This consciousness is thus one in which the universal and particular are absolutely one, and its concept is therefore the same as the concept of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition likewise expresses the separation of *self-equal* moral consciousness from actuality, which, as *manifold being*, conflicts with the simple essence of duty. But whereas the first postulate expresses only the *existing* harmony of morality and nature, because nature therein is this negative of self-consciousness, the moment of *being*, this *in-itself* is now, by contrast, essentially posited as consciousness. For what exists now has the form of the *content* of *duty*, or is *determinacy* in *determinate duty*. The in-itself is therefore the unity of elements that, as *simple essentialities*, are essentialities of thought and hence exist only in a consciousness. This consciousness is now therefore a lord and ruler of the world who produces the harmony of morality and happiness and at the same time sanctifies duties as *many*. The latter means that determinate duty cannot be immediately holy for consciousness of *pure duty*; yet because determinate duty is likewise *necessary* for actual action, which is determinate, its necessity falls outside that consciousness into another, which is thus the mediator of determinate and pure duty and the ground of determinate duty's also holding good.
[1807 560]

607 In actual action, however, consciousness conducts itself as this self, as a completely individual self; it is directed toward actuality as such and has actuality as its purpose, for it wishes to accomplish. *Duty in general* therefore falls outside it into another essence, which is consciousness and the holy lawgiver of pure duty. For the acting consciousness, precisely because it acts, the other of pure duty holds good immediately; pure duty is therefore the content of another consciousness, and is holy for the acting consciousness only mediately, namely in this other consciousness.

608 Since it is thereby posited that the validity of duty as holy *in and for itself* falls outside actual consciousness, this consciousness thus stands generally on one side as *imperfect* moral consciousness. In its *knowing*, it therefore knows itself as a consciousness whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and contingent; equally, in its *willing*, as one whose purposes are affected by sensibility. Because of its unworthiness, it can therefore regard happiness not as necessary but as something contingent, and expect it only from grace.

609 Yet although its actuality is imperfect, duty nevertheless counts as essence for its *pure* will and knowing; in the concept, insofar as this is opposed to reality, or in thought, consciousness is therefore perfect. But absolute essence is precisely this thought essence postulated beyond actuality [1807 561]; it is therefore the thought in which morally imperfect knowing and willing count as perfect, and which thus, taking them at their full value, also grants happiness according to worthiness, namely according to the *merit ascribed* to consciousness.

610 In this the worldview is completed; for in the concept of moral self-consciousness the two sides, pure duty and actuality, are posited in one unity, and thereby neither is posited as existing in and for itself, but as a *moment*, or as sublated. In the final part of the moral worldview this comes to be for consciousness. For consciousness places pure duty in another essence than itself; that is, it posits duty partly as something *represented*, partly as something that is not what holds good in and for itself, while the nonmoral instead counts as per-

fect. Likewise, it posits itself as a consciousness whose actuality, inadequate to duty, is sublated, and as *sublated*, or in the *representation* of absolute essence, no longer contradicts morality.

611 For moral consciousness itself, however, its moral worldview does not mean that in it consciousness develops its own concept and makes this its object. It is conscious neither of this opposition of form nor of the opposition in content, [1807 562] whose parts it does not relate and compare with one another, but rolls onward in its development without being the *concept* holding the moments together. For it knows only *pure essence*, or the object insofar as it is *duty*, insofar as it is the *abstract* object of its pure consciousness, as pure knowing or as itself. It therefore relates only in thought, not in comprehension. Hence the object of its *actual* consciousness is not yet transparent to it; it is not the absolute concept, which alone grasps *otherness* as such, or its absolute opposite, as itself. Its own actuality, like all objective actuality, indeed counts for it as the *inessential*; but its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, over against which nature has therefore at the same time arisen as something equally free. Because both are equally present in consciousness—the *freedom of being* and being's enclosure within consciousness—its object comes to be as something *existing* that is *at the same time* only *thought*. In the final part of its view, the content is essentially posited so that its *being* is *represented* being, and this connection of being and thought is expressed as what it in fact is: *representation*.

612 If we consider the moral worldview in such a way that this objective mode is nothing other than the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, which it makes objective to itself, [1807 563] then through this consciousness of the form of its origin another shape of its presentation emerges.—The first starting point is *actual* moral self-consciousness, or that *such a consciousness exists*. For the concept posits it with the determination that all actuality in general has essence for it only insofar as actuality conforms to duty, and the concept posits this essence as knowing, that is, in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual: it *is* an actual moral consciousness.—Now, as consciousness, it represents its content to itself as an object, namely as the *final*

purpose of the world, as the harmony of morality and all actuality. But since it represents this unity as *object* and is not yet the concept having power over the object as such, this unity is for it a negative of self-consciousness, or falls outside it as a beyond of its actuality, yet at the same time as something *also* thought as *existing*, but only thought.

613 What remains for it, then, as a self-consciousness that is *other* than the object, is the disharmony between consciousness of duty and actuality—indeed, its own actuality. The proposition now reads: *there is no actual self-consciousness that is morally perfect*; and since the moral exists at all only insofar as it is perfect—for duty is the *pure*, unmixed *in-itself*, and morality consists solely in conformity to [1807 564] this purity—the second proposition means, in general, that there is *nothing morally actual*.

614 But since, third, it is one self, it is *in itself* the unity of duty and actuality. This unity therefore becomes its object as perfected morality—but as a *beyond* of its actuality, which nevertheless is to be actual.

615 In this goal, the synthetic unity of the first two propositions, self-conscious actuality as well as duty is posited only as a sublated moment. Neither exists separately; yet since their essential determination is to be *free of the other*, in their unity each is no longer free of the other, and thus each is sublated. Accordingly, in terms of content, they become objects as things of which *each counts as the other*; in terms of form, this exchange between them is at the same time only *represented*.—Or what is *not actually* moral, because it is equally pure thought and elevated above its actuality, is nevertheless moral in representation and is accepted as fully valid. The first proposition, that there *is* a moral self-consciousness, is thereby restored, but joined to the second, that there *is* none: namely, there *is* one, but only in representation; or there is indeed none, but another nevertheless allows it to count as one.
[1807 565]
b. *Dissemblance*.

616 In the moral worldview we see, on the one hand, consciousness *itself consciously producing* its object. We see it neither finding this object as something alien nor having it arise for it unconsciously; instead, it proceeds everywhere on a ground from which it *posits the objective essence*. It therefore knows this essence as itself, for it knows itself as the *active agent* that produces it. Here, then, it seems to arrive at rest and satisfaction, for it can find these only where it no longer needs to go beyond its object, because the object no longer goes beyond it. On the other hand, however, consciousness itself instead posits the object *outside itself*, as something beyond it. Yet this being-in-and-for-itself is equally posited as something that is not free of self-consciousness but exists for its sake and through it.

617 The moral worldview is therefore in fact nothing but the development of this underlying contradiction in its various aspects. To use a Kantian expression here, where it is most appropriate, it is a *whole nest* of thoughtless contradictions. In this development consciousness behaves by fixing one moment and [1807 566] passing immediately from it to the other, sublating the first; but once it has *set up* this second moment, it *also displaces* it again, making its opposite the essence instead. At the same time it is conscious of its contradiction and *dissemblance*, for it passes from one moment *immediately, in relation to that very moment*, into its opposite. *Because* a moment has no reality for it, it posits precisely that moment as *real*; or, what is the same, in order to maintain *one moment* as being in itself, it maintains the *opposite* as being in itself. It thereby admits that in fact it is serious about neither. We must examine this more closely in the moments of this dizzying movement.

618 Let us initially leave aside the presupposition that an actual moral consciousness exists, since it is not immediately made in relation to anything preceding it, and turn to the harmony of morality and nature, the first postulate. This harmony is to exist *in itself*, not for actual consciousness, not in the present; rather, the present is only the contradiction between the two. In the present, *morality* is assumed to be *there*, while actuality is placed in a position of disharmony with it. But *actual* moral consciousness is an *acting* consciousness; precisely in

this consists the actuality of its morality. In *action* itself, however, that position is immediately displaced; for action is nothing [1807 567] other than the actualization of the inner moral purpose, nothing other than the production of an *actuality determined by the purpose*, or of the harmony of moral purpose and actuality itself. At the same time, the accomplishment of the action exists for consciousness: it is the *presence* of this unity of actuality and purpose. And because in the accomplished action consciousness intuits itself as actualized as this individual, or intuits existence as having returned into itself, and enjoyment consists in this, the actuality of the moral purpose also contains that form of actuality called enjoyment and happiness.—In fact, then, action immediately fulfills what had been declared not to take place, what was supposed to be only a postulate, only a beyond. Through its deed, consciousness thus declares that it is not serious about postulating, because the meaning of action is rather to make present what was not supposed to be in the present. And since harmony is postulated for the sake of action—namely, what is to become *actual* through action must be so *in itself*, otherwise its actuality would not be *possible*—the connection between action and the postulate is such that, for the sake of action, that is, for the sake of the *actual* harmony of purpose and actuality, this harmony is posited as *not actual*, as *beyond*.
[1807 568]

619 Insofar as one *acts*, then, one is not at all serious about the *inadequacy* of actuality to the purpose; instead, one seems serious about *action* itself. But in fact actual action is only the action of an *individual* consciousness, and so is itself only something individual, its work contingent. The purpose of reason, however, as the universal, all-embracing purpose, is nothing less than the whole world: a final purpose extending far beyond the content of this individual action, and therefore to be placed altogether beyond all actual action. Because the universal good is to be accomplished, nothing good is done. In fact, however, the *nullity* of actual action and the *reality* of the *whole* purpose alone, which have now been set up, are in every respect displaced once again. Moral action is not something contingent and limited, for its essence is pure *duty*. This consti-

tutes the *one whole* purpose; and thus action, as its actualization, is the accomplishment of the whole absolute purpose, however limited its content may otherwise be. Or if actuality is again taken as nature, which has its *own* laws and is opposed to pure duty, so that duty cannot realize its law within it, then, since duty as such is the essence, what matters is in fact *not the accomplishment* of pure duty, which is the whole [1807 569] purpose. For accomplishment would have as its purpose not pure duty but its opposite, *actuality*. Yet the claim that actuality is not at issue is again dissemblance; for according to the concept of moral action, pure duty is essentially *active* consciousness. Action is therefore indeed to take place, absolute duty is to be expressed in all of nature, and the moral law is to become the law of nature.

620 If, then, we accept this *highest good* as the essence, consciousness is not serious about morality at all. For in this highest good nature has no law other than morality's. Moral action itself thus falls away, for action exists only on the presupposition of something negative that is to be sublated through action. But if nature conforms to the moral law, this law would be violated by action, by the sublation of what is.—That assumption therefore acknowledges as the essential condition one in which moral action is superfluous and does not take place at all. The postulate of the harmony of morality and actuality—a harmony posited through the concept of moral action, which is to bring the two into agreement—thus also expresses itself from this side as follows: because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is that moral action should not exist at all.
[1807 570]

621 If we gather together these moments through which consciousness rolled onward in its moral representation, it becomes clear that it sublates each in its opposite. It begins from the claim that *for it* morality and actuality are not in harmony; but it is not serious about this, since in action this harmony is present *for it*. Nor is it serious about this *action*, however, since action is something individual, whereas it has so lofty a purpose, *the highest good*. Yet this again merely disguises the matter, for in that good all action and all morality would

fall away. Or, what it is not really serious about is *moral* action; rather, what is absolutely most desirable is that the highest good should be accomplished and moral action become superfluous.

622 From this result consciousness must roll further onward in its contradictory movement, and must necessarily disguise once again the *sublation* of moral action. Morality is the in-itself; for morality to take place, the world's final purpose cannot have been accomplished. Rather, moral consciousness must be *for itself* and find a *nature opposed* to it. But in its own self it must be perfect. This leads to the second postulate, the harmony between consciousness and the nature immediately present in it: sensibility. Moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure, as independent of inclinations and drives, so that it [1807 571] has eradicated the purposes of sensibility within itself.—Yet it again disguises this proposed sublation of the sensuous essence. It acts, brings its purpose into actuality, and self-conscious sensibility, which is supposed to be sublated, is precisely this middle term between pure consciousness and actuality: it is the instrument or organ of the former's actualization, and is what is called drive or inclination. There is therefore no seriousness in sublating inclinations and drives, for these are precisely *self-consciousness actualizing itself*. But they are not to be *suppressed*, either, only made *conformable* to reason. They do conform to it, too, for moral *action* is nothing other than consciousness actualizing itself, and thus giving itself the shape of a *drive*; that is, it is immediately the present harmony of drive and morality. In fact, however, drive is not merely this empty shape, capable of containing a spring other than itself and being impelled by it. For sensibility is a nature that has its own laws and motive springs within itself. Morality therefore cannot seriously mean to be the driving force of drives, the angle of inclination of inclinations. For since these have their own fixed determinacy and distinctive content, the consciousness to which they conformed would, rather, conform to them—a conformity that moral self-consciousness refuses to accept. The [1807 572] harmony of the two thus exists only *in itself* and is *postulated*.—In moral action, the *present* harmony of morality and sensibility had just been set up, but *now* this is displaced:

harmony lies beyond consciousness in a misty distance, where nothing can any longer be precisely distinguished or comprehended; for the attempt we just made to comprehend this unity did not succeed.—But in this in-itself consciousness gives itself up altogether. This in-itself is its moral perfection, in which the struggle between morality and sensibility has ceased, and the latter conforms to the former in a way that cannot be grasped.—This perfection is therefore again merely a disguise of the matter, for in it *morality* itself would in fact give itself up. Morality is only consciousness of the absolute purpose as *pure*, and therefore in *opposition* to all other purposes; it is equally the *activity* of this pure purpose insofar as it is conscious of rising above sensibility, of sensibility's interference, and of its opposition to and struggle with sensibility.—Consciousness itself directly declares that it is not serious about moral perfection by displacing it into *infinity*, that is, by asserting that it is never perfected.

623 What alone has validity for it, then, is rather this intermediate condition of imperfection—a condition that is at least supposed to be a *progression* toward perfection. Yet it cannot be this either, for [1807 573] progress in morality would instead be an advance toward its destruction. The goal would be the nothingness mentioned above, or the sublation of morality and consciousness itself; but to come closer and closer to nothingness means to *diminish*. Moreover, *progression* in general, like *diminution*, would assume differences of *magnitude* in morality; yet there can be no question of these within it. In morality, as the consciousness for which the ethical purpose is *pure* duty, no difference at all is conceivable, least of all the superficial difference of magnitude. There is only one virtue, only one pure duty, only one morality.

624 Since, then, it is not moral perfection that is taken seriously, but rather the intermediate condition—that is, as just discussed, nonmorality—we return from another side to the content of the first postulate. For it is impossible to see how happiness can be demanded for this moral consciousness on account of its *worthiness*. It is conscious of its imperfection and therefore cannot in fact demand happiness as a merit, as something of which it is worthy, but only through a freely bestowed grace. That is, it can demand happiness *as such*, in

and for itself, and expect it not on that absolute ground but according to chance and caprice.—In precisely this, nonmorality declares what it is: that what matters is not morality but [1807 574] happiness in and for itself, without reference to morality.

625 This second side of the moral worldview also sublates the other assertion of the first side, in which the disharmony of morality and happiness is presupposed. —The claim is that experience shows how, in this present world, things often go badly for the moral person, while the immoral person often prospers. Yet the intermediate condition of imperfect morality, which has emerged as essential, plainly shows that this perception and supposed experience merely disguise the matter. For since morality is imperfect—that is, since morality in fact does *not* exist—what substance can there be in the experience that it fares badly?—Since it has also emerged that happiness in and for itself is what matters, it becomes clear that the judgment that the immoral person prospers did not mean that an injustice takes place here. The designation of an individual as immoral falls away *in itself*, since morality is imperfect altogether, and therefore has only an arbitrary ground. The meaning and content of the judgment of experience is thus solely this: that some people ought not to receive happiness in and for itself. That is, it is *envy* taking morality for its cloak. The ground for supposing that others ought to receive so-called good fortune, however, is [1807 575] good friendship, which *wishes* this grace—that is, this chance—for them and itself, and *gladly sees it bestowed*.

626 Morality in moral consciousness is therefore imperfect: this is what is now set up. Yet its essence is solely to be *perfect and pure*; imperfect morality is therefore impure, or it is immorality. Morality itself thus resides in a being other than actual consciousness: a holy moral legislator.—The *imperfect* morality in consciousness, which is the ground of this postulating, means *in the first instance* that morality, insofar as it is posited as *actual* in consciousness, stands in relation to an *other*, to an existence, and therefore itself acquires otherness or difference. Through this, a manifold multitude of moral commandments arises. Yet moral self-consciousness at the same time regards these *many* duties as inessen-

tial, for what matters is only the *one* pure duty, and *for it* they have no truth insofar as they are *determinate*. They can therefore have their truth only in an other, and are holy through a holy legislator—which they are not for moral self-consciousness.—Yet this itself is again merely a disguise of the matter. For moral self-consciousness is the absolute to itself, and duty is simply and solely what *it knows* as duty. But it knows only pure duty as duty. What is not holy to it is not holy in itself; and what is not holy in itself cannot be [1807 576] sanctified by the holy being. Nor, in general, is moral consciousness serious about allowing something to be sanctified *by a consciousness other* than itself; for only what is holy to it *through itself and within it* is holy to it at all.—It is therefore just as little serious in asserting that this other being is holy, for in that being something was supposed to attain essential status which has no essential status for moral consciousness—that is, in itself.

627 If the holy being was postulated so that duty might have validity in it not as pure duty but as a plurality of *determinate* duties, this too must therefore be displaced again: the other being is to be holy only insofar as *pure duty alone* has validity in it. Pure duty does in fact have validity only in another being, not in moral consciousness. Although pure morality alone seems to count within moral consciousness, this must nevertheless be presented differently, for it is at the same time natural consciousness. In it, morality is affected and conditioned by sensibility, and thus is not in and for itself, but a contingency of free *will*; while in consciousness as pure *will*, it is a contingency of *knowledge*. Morality *in and for itself* therefore resides in another being.

628 This being is therefore pure, perfected morality here because in it morality does not stand in [1807 577] relation to nature and sensibility. Yet the *reality* of pure duty is its *actualization* in nature and sensibility. Moral consciousness locates its imperfection in morality's having a *positive* relation to nature and sensibility within it, since it regards it as an essential moment of morality that its relation to them should be exclusively *negative*. Pure moral being, by contrast, because it is elevated above the *struggle* with nature and sensibility, does not stand in a *negative* relation to them. In fact, then, only the *positive* relation

to them remains for it—that is, precisely what was just counted as imperfect, as immoral. But *pure morality* entirely separated from actuality, so that it would equally have no positive relation to actuality, would be an unconscious, nonactual abstraction in which the concept of morality—being the thought of pure duty, and a willing and doing—would be utterly sublated. This purely moral being is therefore once again a disguise of the matter, and must be abandoned.

629 In this purely moral being, however, the moments of the contradiction in which this synthetic representation moves about draw so close together—as do the opposed *alsos* which it allows to follow one another, always replacing one opposite with the other without bringing these thoughts together—that [1807 578] consciousness must here abandon its moral worldview and flee back into itself.

630 It recognizes its morality as imperfect because it is affected by a sensibility and nature opposed to morality. These partly cloud morality itself as such, and partly give rise to a multitude of duties that leave consciousness perplexed in the concrete case of actual action. For each case is the concretion of many moral relations, just as an object of perception in general is a thing of many properties; and since *determinate* duty is the purpose, it has a content, and its *content* is part of the purpose, so morality is not pure.—Morality therefore has its *reality* in another being. But this reality means nothing other than that morality here exists *in and for itself*: *for itself*, that is, as the morality of a *consciousness*; *in itself*, that is, possessing *existence* and *actuality*.—In that first, imperfect consciousness, morality is not carried out; there it is the *in-itself* in the sense of a *thing of thought*. For it is associated with nature and sensibility, with the actuality of being and consciousness, which constitutes its content; and nature and sensibility are morally null.—In the second, morality exists as *perfected*, and not as an unexecuted thing of thought. But this perfection consists precisely in morality's having *actuality* in a *consciousness*, as well as *free [1807 579] actuality*, existence in general: in its being not empty but fulfilled and full of content. —That is, the perfection of morality is located in the presence within it and as part of it of what was just defined as morally null. At one moment morality is

to have validity solely as the nonactual thing of thought of pure abstraction, yet equally it is to have no validity in this form. Its truth is to consist in being opposed to actuality and entirely free and empty of it, and then again in being actuality.

631 The syncretism of these contradictions, spread out in the moral worldview, collapses into itself when the distinction on which it rests—between what must necessarily be thought and posited and yet is at the same time inessential—becomes a distinction that no longer exists even in the words. What is ultimately posited as different, both as the null and as the real, is one and the same: existence and actuality. And what is supposed to exist absolutely only as the *beyond* of actual being and consciousness, yet equally only within it and to be null as a beyond, is pure duty and the knowledge of it as the essence. The consciousness that makes this distinction, which is no distinction, declaring actuality both null and real, and pure morality both the true [1807 580] essence and the essenceless, pronounces together the thoughts it previously separated. It itself declares that it is not serious about this determination and separation of the moments of the *self* and the *in-itself*. Rather, what it declares to be the absolute *being* outside consciousness it keeps enclosed within the self of self-consciousness; and what it declares to be the absolutely *thought*, or the absolute *in-itself*, it takes for that very reason to possess no truth.—Consciousness comes to see that separating these moments is a dissemblance, and that it would be *hypocrisy* to retain it nevertheless. But as morally pure self-consciousness it recoils in abhorrence into itself from this inequality between its *representation* and its *essence*, from this untruth that declares true what it regards as untrue. It is *pure conscience*, which scorns such a moral representation of the world; *within itself* it is the simple spirit certain of itself, acting conscientiously and immediately, without the mediation of those representations, and having its truth in this immediacy.—But if this world of dissemblance is nothing other than the development of moral self-consciousness in its moments, and thus its *reality*, then by returning into itself it will not become anything different in its essence. Its return into itself is instead merely the *consciousness it has attained*

that [1807 581] its truth is a pretense. It *would still have to pass this off* as *its* truth, for it would have to express and present itself as an objective representation, but it *would know* that this was only dissemblance. It would therefore in fact be hypocrisy, and that *scorn* for dissemblance would already be hypocrisy's first utterance.

c. *Conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness*.

632 The antinomy of the moral worldview—that there is a moral consciousness and that there is none, or that duty's validity lies beyond consciousness and, conversely, takes place only within it—had been gathered into the representation in which the nonmoral consciousness counts as moral, its contingent knowing and willing is accepted as fully valid, and happiness is granted it through grace. Moral self-consciousness did not take this self-contradictory representation upon itself, but transferred it to a being other than itself. Yet this placing outside itself of what it must think as necessary is just as much a contradiction in form as the former is in content [1807 582]. But because, in itself, precisely what appears contradictory, and in whose separation and repeated dissolution the moral worldview moves about, is the same—namely, pure duty as *pure knowledge* is nothing other than the *self* of consciousness, and the self of consciousness is *being* and *actuality*; and likewise what is supposed to be beyond *actual* consciousness is nothing other than pure thought, thus in fact the self—self-consciousness, *for us* or *in itself*, returns into itself and knows as itself that essence in which the *actual* is at the same time *pure knowledge* and *pure duty*. It is to itself what is fully valid in its contingency, knowing its immediate singularity as pure knowing and acting, as true actuality and harmony.

633 This *self of conscience*, spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and being, is the *third self* to have emerged for us from the third world of spirit, and must be briefly compared with the preceding selves. The totality or actuality that presents itself as the truth of the ethical world is the self of the *person*; its existence is *being-recognized*. Just as the person is the self empty of substance, so this existence of the person is likewise abstract actuality. The person *counts*, and does so immediately; the self is the point immediately at rest in the element of

its being. It is not severed from its universality, so the two are not [1807 583] in movement or relation to one another. The universal is undifferentiated within it, and is neither the content of the self, nor is the self filled through itself.—The *second self* is the world of cultivation that has arrived at its truth, or the spirit of estrangement restored to itself: absolute freedom. In this self that first immediate unity of singularity and universality separates. The universal, which likewise remains purely spiritual essence, being-recognized, or universal will and knowledge, is the *object* and content of the self and its universal actuality. But it does not have the form of existence free of the self; hence in this self it reaches no fulfillment and no positive content, no world. Moral self-consciousness does indeed let its universality go free, so that it becomes a nature of its own, and equally holds it fast within itself as sublated. But it is only the dissembling play of alternation between these two determinations. Only as conscience does it have, in its *self-certainty*, the *content* for previously empty duty, as also for empty right and the empty universal will; and because this self-certainty is equally *immediate*, it has existence itself.

634 Having reached this truth of itself, moral self-consciousness thus abandons—or rather sublates within itself—the separation from which dissemblance arose: the separation of the *in-itself* and the *self*, of pure duty as pure *purpose* [1807 584] and *actuality* as a nature and sensibility opposed to pure purpose. Thus returned into itself, it is *concrete* moral spirit, which does not give itself, in the consciousness of pure duty, an empty standard opposed to actual consciousness. Rather, pure duty as well as the nature opposed to it are sublated moments. It is *moral* essence *actualizing* itself in immediate unity, and its action is immediately a *concrete* moral shape.

635 A case for action is at hand; it is an objective actuality for knowing consciousness. As conscience, consciousness knows it in an immediately concrete way, and at the same time it is only as consciousness knows it. Knowledge is contingent insofar as it is other than its object; but spirit certain of itself is no longer such contingent knowledge, no longer a creation of thoughts within itself from which actuality differs. Rather, since the separation of the *in-itself* and the *self* is

sublated, the case is immediately in the sensuous *certainty* of knowledge as it is *in itself*, and it is *in itself* only as it is in this knowledge.—Action as actualization is thereby the pure form of will: the mere conversion of actuality as a case that *is* into an actuality that is *done*, of the mere mode of *objective* knowledge into the mode of knowledge [1807 585] of *actuality* as something produced by consciousness. Just as sensuous certainty is immediately taken up into, or rather converted into, the in-itself of spirit, so this conversion too is simple and unmediated: a transition through the pure concept without alteration of the content, which is determined by the interest of the consciousness that knows it. —Furthermore, conscience does not separate the circumstances of the case into different duties. It does not behave as a *positive universal medium* in which the many duties, each for itself, would acquire an immovable substantiality, so that *either* no action could take place at all—because every concrete case contains opposition in general, and as a moral case contains the opposition of duties, so that in determining an action one side, one duty, would always be *violated—or*, if action took place, one of the opposed duties would actually be violated. Conscience is rather the negative one, or absolute self, which eradicates these different moral substances. It is simple action in accordance with duty, which does not fulfill this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right. It is therefore the first instance of moral *action* as action, into which the preceding inactive consciousness of morality has passed.—The concrete shape of the deed may be analyzed by a distinguishing consciousness into different properties—that is, here [1807 586], into different moral relations—and these may either each be declared absolutely valid, as they must be if they are to be duties, or be compared and examined. In the simple moral action of conscience, duties are so buried that all these individual essences are immediately *encroached upon*, and the testing and shaking of duty has no place at all in the unshakable certainty of conscience.

636 Just as little does conscience contain that wavering uncertainty of consciousness which now places so-called pure morality outside itself in another, holy being and regards itself as unholy, but then again places moral purity within

itself and the linkage of the sensuous with the moral within the other being.

637 It renounces all these positions and displacements of the moral worldview by renouncing the consciousness that conceives duty and actuality as contradictory. According to the latter, I act morally insofar as I am *conscious* of accomplishing pure duty alone, not *anything else*—which in fact means *insofar as I do not* act. But insofar as I actually act, I am conscious of an *other*, of an *actuality* already present and one I intend to produce; I have a *determinate* purpose and fulfill a *determinate* duty. There [1807 587] is something *other* in this than pure duty, which alone was supposed to be intended.—Conscience, by contrast, is the consciousness that when moral consciousness declares *pure duty* to be the essence of its action, this pure purpose disguises the matter. For the matter itself is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought and has its reality and content only in a determinate actuality—an actuality that is the actuality of consciousness itself, not as a thing of thought but as an individual. *For itself*, conscience has its truth in the *immediate certainty* of itself. This *immediate*, concrete certainty of itself is the essence; considered in terms of the opposition belonging to consciousness, its own immediate *singularity* is the content of moral doing, while its *form* is this very self as pure movement: namely, as *knowledge* or *its own conviction*.

638 To consider this more closely in its unity and in the meaning of its moments: moral consciousness grasped itself only as the *in-itself* or *essence*; as conscience, however, it grasps its *being-for-itself*, or its *self*.—The contradiction of the moral worldview *dissolves*: that is, the difference underlying it proves to be no difference, and it converges into pure negativity. But this is precisely the *self*: a simple *self* [1807 588] that is both *pure* knowledge and knowledge of itself as *this individual* consciousness. This self therefore constitutes the content of the previously empty essence, for it is the *actual*, which no longer means a nature alien to essence and independent in its own laws. As the negative, it is the *difference* of pure essence—a content, and indeed one valid in and for itself.

639 Furthermore, as pure knowledge equal to itself, this self is the *absolutely universal*, so that precisely this knowledge *as its own* knowledge, as conviction, is *duty*. Duty is no longer the universal confronting the self; rather, it is known to have no validity in this separation. The law now exists for the sake of the self, not the self for the sake of the law. Yet law and duty therefore have not only the meaning of *being-for-itself*, but also that of *being-in-itself*, for this knowledge, by virtue of its equality with itself, is precisely the *in-itself*. In consciousness, this *in-itself* also separates itself from that immediate unity with being-for-itself; confronting it in this way, it is *being, being-for-another*.—Duty, precisely as duty abandoned by the self, is now known to be only a *moment*. From its significance as *absolute essence*, it has sunk to being that is not self, not *for itself*, and thus is *being-for-another*. But this *being-for-another* remains an essential moment for that very reason: because the self as consciousness constitutes the opposition between being-for-itself and [1807 589] being-for-another, and duty is now immediately *actual* consciousness in itself, no longer merely abstract pure consciousness.

640 This *being-for-another* is therefore the substance that *is in itself*, distinct from the self. Conscience has not abandoned pure duty or the *abstract in-itself*; rather, duty is the essential moment of relating to others as *universality*. It is the common element of self-consciousnesses, and this is the substance in which the deed has *subsistence* and *actuality*: the moment of *being recognized* by others. Moral self-consciousness does not possess this moment of being-recognized, of *pure consciousness* that *exists*, and consequently is not an acting, actualizing consciousness at all. Its *in-itself* is for it either the abstract, *nonactual* essence, or *being* as an *actuality* that is not spiritual. The *existent actuality* of conscience, however, is one that is *self*: that is, self-conscious existence, the spiritual element of being recognized. Doing is therefore only the transposition of its *individual* content into the *objective* element, in which that content is universal and recognized; and precisely its being recognized makes the action actual. The action is recognized and thereby actual because existent actuality is immediately linked with conviction or knowledge, or because knowledge of its purpose is immedi-

ately the element of existence, universal recognition. For [1807 590] the *essence* of the action, duty, consists in conscience's *conviction* about it; this conviction is precisely the *in-itself* itself. It is *self-consciousness universal in itself*, or *being-recognized*, and thus actuality. What is done with the conviction of duty is therefore immediately something possessing subsistence and existence. There can therefore no longer be any question here of good intentions failing to come about, or of the good faring badly. Rather, what is known as duty is accomplished and attains actuality, because what accords with duty is precisely what is universal to all self-consciousnesses, what is recognized and therefore exists. But taken separately and alone, without the content of the self, this duty is *being-for-another*, the transparent element that has only the significance of an essence devoid of content in general.

641 If we look back to the sphere with which *spiritual reality* first entered, its concept was that the expression of individuality is *being-in-and-for-itself*. But the shape that immediately expressed this concept was *honest consciousness*, which busied itself with the *abstract matter itself*. There this *matter itself* was *predicate*; only in conscience, however, is it *subject*, which has posited all the moments of consciousness within itself, and for which all these moments—substantiality in general, external existence, and the essence of thought—are contained in this certainty of itself. The *matter itself* has substantiality in general in ethical life, external existence in [1807 591] cultivation, and the self-knowing essence of thought in morality; and in conscience it is the *subject* that knows these moments within itself. Whereas honest consciousness always grasps only *the empty matter itself*, conscience, by contrast, attains it in the fulfillment it gives to it through itself. It is this power because it knows the moments of consciousness as *moments* and, as their negative essence, masters them.

642 Considered in relation to the individual determinations of the opposition that appears in action, and in terms of its consciousness of their nature, conscience first relates as *knowing* to the *actuality* of the *case* in which action is required. Insofar as this knowledge contains the moment of *universality*, knowledge

belonging to conscientious action must embrace the actuality before it without restriction, and thus know precisely and take into consideration the circumstances of the case. But because this knowledge *knows* universality as a *moment*, it is therefore a knowledge of these circumstances conscious of not embracing them, or of not being conscientious in this regard. The truly universal and pure relation of knowledge would be a relation to something not *opposed* to it, to itself; but *action*, through the opposition essential to it, relates to a negative of consciousness, to an *actuality that is in itself*. As against the simplicity of [1807 592] pure consciousness, this actuality is the absolutely *other*, or manifoldness *in itself*: an absolute multiplicity of circumstances dividing and extending infinitely backward into their conditions, sideways in their coexistence, and forward in their consequences.—Conscientious consciousness is aware of this nature of the matter and of its relation to it. It knows that it does not know the case in which it acts according to this required universality, and that its claim to a conscientious consideration of all the circumstances is null. Yet this knowledge and consideration of all the circumstances is not entirely absent; it is present only as a *moment*, as something that is only for *others*. And its incomplete knowledge, because it is *its* knowledge, counts for it as sufficient and complete knowledge.

643 The same holds for the universality of *essence*, or the determination of content through pure consciousness.—Conscience proceeding to action relates to the many aspects of the case. The case divides, as does pure consciousness's relation to it, through which the manifoldness of the case becomes a manifoldness of *duties*.—Conscience knows that it must choose and decide among them; for none is absolute in its determinacy or content, but only *pure duty*. Yet in its reality this abstraction has acquired the significance of the self-conscious I. Spirit [1807 593] certain of itself rests within itself as conscience, and its *real* universality, or its duty, lies in its pure *conviction* of duty. This *pure* conviction is as such as empty as pure *duty*: pure in the sense that nothing within it, no determinate content, is duty. Yet action is to take place; the individual must *determine*. And spirit certain of itself, in which the in-itself has acquired the

significance of the self-conscious I, knows that it possesses this determination and content in the immediate *certainty* of itself. As determination and content, this is *natural* consciousness, that is, drives and inclinations.—Conscience recognizes no content as absolute for it, for it is the absolute negativity of everything determinate. It determines *from itself*; but the sphere of the self within which determinacy as such falls is so-called sensibility. When a content is to be had from the immediate certainty of itself, nothing but sensibility lies ready to hand.—Everything that in earlier shapes presented itself as good or bad, as law and right, is an *other* than the immediate certainty of itself. It is a *universal*, which is now a being-for-another; or, viewed differently, an object that, mediating consciousness with itself, comes between it and its own truth, and separates it from itself rather than being its immediacy.—For conscience, however, certainty of itself is pure, immediate [1807 594] truth; and this truth is therefore its immediate certainty of itself represented as *content*: that is, in general, the individual's caprice and the contingency of its unconscious natural being.

644 At the same time this content counts as moral *essence*, or *duty*. For pure duty, as already emerged in the examination of laws, is utterly indifferent to every content and accommodates every content. Here it also has the essential form of *being-for-itself*, and this form of individual conviction is nothing other than consciousness of the emptiness of pure duty, of its being only a moment, and of its substantiality being a predicate whose subject is the individual. The individual's caprice gives duty its content, can attach any content to this form and fasten its conscientiousness upon it.—An individual increases his property in a certain way. It is a duty that everyone provide for his own preservation and that of his family, and no less for the *possibility* of becoming useful to his fellow human beings and doing good to those in need. The individual is conscious that this is duty, for this content is immediately contained in his certainty of himself; he further sees that he fulfills this duty in this case. Others perhaps regard this particular manner of proceeding as fraud; *they* hold to other aspects of the concrete case, while *he* [1807 595] holds fast to this aspect by being conscious of the increase of property as pure duty.—Thus what others call violence

and injustice fulfills the duty of asserting one's independence against others; what they call cowardice fulfills the duty of preserving one's life and the possibility of being useful to one's fellow human beings. What they call courage, however, violates both duties. But cowardice must not be so inept as not to know that preserving life and the possibility of being useful to others are duties, not to be *convinced* that its action accords with duty, and not to know that conformity to duty consists in *knowing*; otherwise it would commit the ineptitude of being immoral. Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled duty, this consciousness will be lacking no more in the action called cowardice than in that called courage. The abstraction called duty is capable of this content as of any other; the individual therefore knows what he does as duty, and since he knows this, and conviction of duty is conformity to duty itself, he is recognized by others. The action thereby has validity and actual existence.

645 Against this freedom, which places any content it pleases into the universal passive medium of pure duty and knowledge just as readily as any other, it is no help to assert that another [1807 596] content ought to be placed there. For whatever the content, each bears the *stain of determinacy*, from which pure knowledge is free, and which it can disdain just as it can accept any content. Every content, in being determinate, stands on the same footing as every other, even if it seems to have precisely the character of having sublated the particular within it. It may seem that, since in an actual case duty divides into *opposition* in general, and thereby into the opposition of *singularity* and *universality*, the duty whose content is the universal itself immediately possesses the nature of pure duty, and form and content thus become wholly conformable to one another; so that, for example, action for the universal good ought to be preferred to action for the individual's good. Yet this universal duty is in general what *exists* as substance being in and for itself, as right and law, and has validity *independently* of the individual's knowledge and conviction as well as his immediate interest. It is therefore precisely that against whose *form* morality in general is directed. As for its *content*, this too is *determinate*, insofar as the universal good is *opposed* to the individual's good; hence its law is one from which

conscience knows itself to be utterly free, granting itself absolute authority to add to it and subtract from it, to omit it as well as to fulfill it.—Furthermore, that [1807 597] distinction between duty toward the individual and duty toward the universal is, by the nature of opposition in general, nothing fixed. Rather, what the individual does for himself also benefits the universal. The more he has provided for himself, the greater not only is his *possibility of benefiting others*; his *actuality* itself consists solely in being and living in connection with others. His individual enjoyment essentially means giving up what is his to others and helping them acquire their enjoyment. Thus in fulfilling duty toward the individual, and so toward oneself, duty toward the universal is also fulfilled.—The *consideration* and *comparison* of duties that would enter here would amount to calculating the advantage that the universal would derive from an action. But on the one hand morality would thereby fall prey to the necessary *contingency* of *insight*; on the other, it is precisely the essence of conscience to *cut off* this *calculation* and deliberation, and decide from itself without such grounds.

646 In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*, in the unity of pure thought and individuality, and is spirit certain of itself, possessing its truth within itself, in its self, in its knowledge, and in this as knowledge of duty. It maintains itself precisely through the fact that whatever is *positive* in the action—both its [1807 598] content and the form of duty and knowledge of it—belongs to the self, to certainty of itself; whereas whatever seeks to *confront the self as an in-itself of its own* counts as untrue, only as sublated, only as a moment. Hence what counts is not *universal knowledge* in general but *its acquaintance* with the circumstances. Into duty as universal *being-in-itself* it places the content it takes from its natural individuality, for this is the content present within itself. Through the universal medium in which it exists, this content becomes the *duty* it performs, and empty pure duty is thereby posited as sublated, or as a moment. This content is duty's sublated emptiness, or its fulfillment.—But conscience is equally free of any content whatsoever. It absolves itself from every determinate duty that is supposed

to count as law; in the force of its certainty of itself it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, to bind and to loose.—This *self-determination* is therefore immediately what absolutely accords with duty. Duty is knowledge itself; but this simple selfhood is the in-itself, for the *in-itself* is pure equality with itself, and this is present in this consciousness.—

647 This pure knowledge is immediately *being-for-another*; for as pure equality with itself it is *immediacy*, or being. But this being is at the same time the purely universal, the selfhood of all; or, action is recognized and therefore actual. [1807 599] This being is the element through which conscience immediately stands in a relation of equality with all self-consciousnesses; and the meaning of this relation is not selfless law, but the self of conscience.

648 Yet because this right that conscience does is at the same time *being-for-another*, an inequality seems to enter it. The duty it accomplishes is a *determinate* content; this is indeed the *self* of consciousness, and therein its *knowledge* of itself, its *equality* with itself. But accomplished, placed in the universal medium *of being*, this equality is no longer *knowledge*, no longer this distinguishing that equally sublates its differences immediately. Rather, in *being*, difference is posited as subsisting, and the action is *determinate*, unequal to the element of the self-consciousness of all, and thus not necessarily recognized. Both sides—the acting conscience and the universal consciousness recognizing this action as duty—are equally *free* of the determinacy of this deed. Because of this freedom, their relation in the common medium of connection is instead a relation of complete inequality; hence the consciousness for which the action exists finds itself in complete uncertainty about the acting spirit certain of itself. Spirit acts; it posits a determinacy as being. The others hold to this *being* as its [1807 600] truth and are certain of it therein: in it, spirit has declared *what* counts as duty for it. Yet it is free of any *determinate* duty. It has left the place where they suppose it actually to be; and this medium of being itself, and duty as being *in itself*, count for it only as a moment. What it thus sets before them, it displaces

again—or rather, it has immediately displaced it. For its *actuality* is not this duty and determination set outside itself, but the actuality it possesses in absolute certainty of itself.

649 They therefore do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil; or rather, not only can they not know, they must also take it to be evil. For just as it is free of the *determinacy* of duty and of duty as being *in itself*, so are they. They themselves know how to displace what it sets before them: it is something through which only the *self* of another is expressed, not their own. They not only know themselves to be free of it, but must dissolve it within their own consciousness, nullify it through judgment and explanation, in order to preserve their self.

650 Yet the action of conscience is not merely this *determination* of being abandoned by the pure self. What is to count and be recognized as duty is so solely through knowledge and conviction of it as duty, through the [1807 601] knowledge of oneself in the deed. If the deed ceases to have this self within it, it ceases to be what alone is its essence. Its existence, abandoned by this consciousness, would be an ordinary actuality, and the action would appear to us as a fulfillment of pleasure and desire. What is to *exist* here is essential only through being *known* as individuality expressing itself; and this *being-known* is what is recognized, and what is to have *existence as such*.

651 The self enters existence *as self*; spirit certain of itself exists as such for others. Its *immediate* action is not what has validity and actuality; not the *determinate*, not what *is in itself*, is recognized, but solely the self-knowing *self* as such. The element of subsistence is universal self-consciousness. What enters this element cannot be the *effect* of the action, which does not endure in it or gain permanence. Rather, self-consciousness alone is recognized and attains actuality.

652 Here we see *language* once again as the existence of spirit. It is self-consciousness existing *for others*, immediately *present as such* and, as *this* self-consciousness, universal. It is the self separating itself from itself, becoming objective to itself as pure I—I, and in this objectivity preserving itself as *this* self just as

immediately as it flows together with the others and is *their* [1807 602] self-consciousness. It hears itself just as it is heard by the others, and this hearing is precisely *existence that has become self*.

653 The content language has acquired here is no longer the inverted, inverting, and torn self of the world of cultivation, but spirit returned into itself, certain of itself and, in its self, of its truth or recognition, and recognized as this knowledge. The language of ethical spirit is law and simple command, and lament, which is more a tear shed over necessity; moral consciousness, by contrast, is still *mute*, shut up within its own inwardness. For in it the self does not yet have existence; existence and the *self* stand as yet only in an external relation to one another. Language, however, emerges only as the middle term between independent and recognized self-consciousnesses, and the *existent self* is immediately universal, manifold being-recognized, simple in this manifoldness. The content of the language of conscience is *the self knowing itself as essence*. This alone it expresses, and this expression is the true actuality of doing and the validity of the action. Consciousness expresses its *conviction*; only in this conviction is the action duty, and it *counts* as duty only through the conviction's being *expressed*. For universal self-consciousness is free of the *determinate* action that *merely exists*; the action as *existence* [1807 603] counts for nothing to it, but rather the *conviction* that it is duty; and this conviction is actual in language.—To actualize the action here means not to transpose its content from the form of *purpose* or *being-for-itself* into the form of *abstract* actuality, but from the form of immediate *certainty* of itself, which knows its knowledge or being-for-itself as the essence, into the form of the *assurance* that consciousness is convinced of duty and, as conscience, knows duty *from itself*. This assurance thus assures us that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence.

654 Whether the assurance of acting from conviction of duty is *true*, whether what is done is *actually duty*—these questions or doubts have no meaning against conscience.—The question whether the *assurance is true* would presuppose that the inner intention differs from the professed intention: that is, that the willing of the individual self can separate itself from duty, from the will of uni-

versal and pure consciousness. The latter would be placed in the speech, while the former would really be the true mainspring of the action. Yet precisely this difference between universal consciousness and the individual self has sublated itself, and conscience is its sublation. The immediate knowledge of the self certain of itself is law and duty; its intention is right because it is its intention. All that is required [1807 604] is that it know this and say that it is convinced its knowing and willing is right. The expression of this assurance in itself sublates the form of its particularity; in it, consciousness acknowledges the *necessary universality of the self*. By calling itself *conscience*, it calls itself pure self-knowledge and pure abstract willing; that is, it calls itself a universal knowing and willing that recognizes the others and is *equal* to them—for they are precisely this pure self-knowing and willing—and is therefore also recognized by them. In the willing of the self certain of itself, in this knowledge that the self is the essence, lies the essence of right.—Anyone, therefore, who says he acts in this way from conscience speaks truly, for his conscience is the knowing and willing self. But he must essentially *say* this, for this self must at the same time be a *universal* self. It is not universal in the *content* of the action, for because of its *determinacy* that content is in itself indifferent; rather, universality lies in the action's form. This form is what must be posited as actual: it is the *self*, which as such is actual in language, declares itself the true, and precisely therein recognizes all selves and is recognized by them.

655 Thus conscience, in the majesty of its elevation above determinate law and every content of duty, places whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing. It is moral genius [1807 605], which knows the inner voice of its immediate knowledge as the divine voice; and since in this knowledge it equally immediately knows existence, it is the divine creative power that has living force in its concept. It is equally worship within itself, for its action is the intuition of this divinity of its own.

656 This solitary worship is at the same time essentially the worship of a *community*, and pure inner self-*knowing* and self-hearing advances to the moment of *consciousness*. Its intuition of itself is its *objective* existence, and this objective ele-

ment is the expression of its knowing and willing as something *universal*. Through this expression the self becomes valid and the action becomes an effective deed. The actuality and subsistence of its doing is universal self-consciousness; but the expression of conscience posits certainty of itself as pure, and thereby as universal, self. The others accept the action on account of this speech, in which the self is expressed and recognized as the essence. The spirit and substance of their association is therefore their mutual assurance of their conscientiousness and good intentions, their delight in this reciprocal purity, and their refreshment in the glory of knowing and expressing, of cherishing and fostering such excellence.—Insofar as this conscience still distinguishes its *abstract* [1807 606] consciousness from its *self-consciousness*, its life is only *hidden* in God. God is indeed *immediately* present to its spirit and heart, to its self; but what is manifest—its actual consciousness and the mediating movement of that consciousness—is for it other than that hidden interior and the immediacy of the present essence. Yet in the perfection of conscience the distinction between its abstract consciousness and its self-consciousness is sublated. It knows that *abstract* consciousness is precisely *this self*, this being-for-itself certain of itself; that in the *immediacy* of the *relation* of the self to the in-itself—which, posited outside the self, is abstract essence and what is hidden from it—precisely the *difference is sublated*. For a *mediating* relation is one in which the related terms are not one and the same, but are an *other* for one another and are one only in a third; an *immediate* relation, however, in fact means nothing other than unity. Consciousness, raised above the thoughtlessness of still taking these distinctions that are none to be distinctions, knows the immediate presence of essence within it as the unity of essence and its self, and thus knows its self as the living in-itself, and this knowledge of its own as religion. As intuited or existent knowledge, religion is the community's speaking about its spirit. [1807 607]

657 Here, then, we see self-consciousness returned into its innermost depths, where all externality as such vanishes for it—into the intuition of I = I, in which this I is all essence and existence. It founders in this concept of itself, for it has been

driven to the utmost point of its extremes, and in such a way that the distinct moments through which it is real, or is still *consciousness*, are these pure extremes not merely for us. Rather, what it is for itself, what for it is *in itself*, and what for it is *existence*, have evaporated into abstractions that no longer have any support, any substance, for this consciousness itself; and everything that hitherto was essence for consciousness has returned into these abstractions.—Refined to this purity, consciousness is its poorest shape, and the poverty constituting its sole possession is itself a vanishing. This absolute *certainty* into which substance has dissolved is absolute *untruth*, collapsing into itself; it is absolute *self-consciousness*, in which *consciousness* founders.

658 Considered within itself, this foundering means that for consciousness the *substance* that *is in itself* is *knowledge* as *its* knowledge. As consciousness, it is divided into the opposition of itself and the object that is the essence for it; but this very object is perfectly transparent: it is *its self*, and its consciousness is only knowledge of itself. All life and all spiritual essence have returned into this [1807 608] self and lost their difference from the I itself. The moments of consciousness are therefore these extreme abstractions, none of which stands, but loses itself in the other and produces it. It is the interchange of unhappy consciousness with itself, but an interchange that for this consciousness itself takes place within it and is conscious of being the concept of reason, which unhappy consciousness is only *in itself*. As consciousness, then, its absolute certainty of itself immediately turns into a sounding-out, into the objectivity of its being-for-itself; but this created world is its *speech*, which it has equally immediately heard, and whose echo alone returns to it. This return therefore does not mean that it is *in and for itself* therein; for the essence is for it not an *in-itself* but itself. Just as little does it have *existence*, for the objective does not attain the status of a negative of the actual self, just as the self does not attain actuality. It lacks the power of externalization, the power to make itself a thing and endure being. It lives in dread of staining the glory of its inwardness through action and existence; and to preserve the purity of its heart it flees contact with actuality and persists in its obstinate inability to renounce its self, sharpened to the

ultimate abstraction, and give itself substantiality, or turn its thought into being and entrust itself to absolute difference. The hollow [1807 609] object it produces for itself therefore now fills it with the consciousness of emptiness. Its doing is a yearning that merely loses itself in its becoming an essenceless object and, falling back to itself beyond this loss, finds itself only as lost.—In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy so-called *beautiful soul*, it burns itself out within itself and vanishes like a shapeless vapor dissolving into air.

659 But this silent confluence of the marrowless essences of evaporated life must also be taken in the other meaning of the *actuality* of conscience and in the *appearance* of its movement, and conscience must be considered as acting.—The *objective* moment in this consciousness was determined above as universal consciousness. Self-knowing knowledge, as *this* self, is distinct from other selves. The language in which all reciprocally recognize one another as acting conscientiously, this universal *equality*, breaks apart into the inequality of individual being-for-itself; each consciousness is equally reflected completely out of its universality into itself. Through this, the opposition of singularity to other individuals and to the universal necessarily enters, and this relation and its movement must be considered.—Or, this universality and duty has the directly opposite meaning of determinate *singularity* exempting [1807 610] itself from the universal, for which pure duty is only the universality that has come to the *surface* and turned outward. Duty lies only in the words and counts as a being-for-another. Conscience, initially directed only *negatively* against duty as *this determinate, given* duty, knows itself to be free of it; but in filling empty duty with a *determinate* content *from itself*, it has the positive consciousness that as *this* self it makes the content for itself. Its pure self, as empty knowledge, is without content and determination; the content it gives this self is taken from its self *as this* determinate self, from itself as natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is indeed conscious of its pure self; but in the *purpose* of its action as actual content, it is conscious of itself as this par-

ticular individual and of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, the opposition of universality or duty and its reflectedness out of universality.

660 If the opposition into which conscience enters as *acting* thus expresses itself within it, it is at the same time outward inequality in the element of existence: the inequality of its particular singularity with another individual.—Its particularity consists in the fact that the two moments constituting its consciousness, the self and the in-itself, have *unequal value* within it, with the determination that certainty of its [1807 611] self is the essence *as against the in-itself* or the *universal*, which counts only as a moment. This inner determination is therefore confronted by the element of existence, or universal consciousness, for which universality, duty, is instead the essence, while singularity that is for itself against the universal counts only as a sublated moment. For this adherence to duty, the first consciousness counts as *evil*, because it is the inequality of its *being-within-itself* with the universal; and since at the same time it declares its doing to be equality with itself, duty and conscientiousness, it counts as *hypocrisy*.

661 The *movement* of this opposition is initially the formal establishment of equality between what evil is within itself and what it expresses. It must become apparent that it is evil, and its existence must thus become equal to its essence: *hypocrisy* must be *unmasked*.—This return of the inequality present in it into equality is not already accomplished by hypocrisy's demonstrating, as people commonly say, its respect for duty and virtue precisely by adopting their *semblance* and using it as a mask for its own consciousness no less than for another's, as though equality and agreement were implicitly contained in this recognition of the opposite.—Rather, hypocrisy is at the same time just as much withdrawn from this recognition in language [1807 612] and reflected into itself. And in using what *is in itself* only as a *being-for-another*, it instead contains its own contempt for it and the display of its essencelessness for all. For what allows itself to be used as an external instrument proves to be a thing possessing no weight of its own.

662 Nor does this equality come about either through evil consciousness's one-sided persistence in itself or through the judgment of universal consciousness. —If the former disavows itself before the consciousness of duty, maintaining that what the latter declares to be badness, absolute inequality with the universal, is an action according to inner law and conscience, then in this one-sided assurance of equality its inequality with the other remains, since the other neither believes nor recognizes that equality.—Or, since one-sided persistence in *one* extreme dissolves itself, evil would indeed thereby admit itself to be evil, but in doing so would *immediately* sublate itself, and would neither be hypocrisy nor unmask itself as such. In fact, it admits itself to be evil by maintaining that, opposed to the recognized universal, it acts according to *its* inner law and conscience. For if this law and conscience were not the law of its *singularity* and *caprice*, it would not be something inward and its own, but the universally recognized. Anyone, therefore, who says he acts against others according to *his* law and [1807 613] conscience in fact says that he mistreats them. But *actual* conscience is not this persistence in a knowledge and will that opposes itself to the universal. Rather, the universal is the element of its *existence*, and its language declares its doing to be *recognized* duty.

663 Just as little is universal consciousness's persistence in its judgment an unmasking and dissolution of hypocrisy.—By crying out against it, "Bad! Base!" and the like, it appeals in such a judgment to *its* law, just as *evil* consciousness appeals to *its own*. For the former law emerges in opposition to the latter, and thereby as a particular law. Universal consciousness thus has no advantage over the other, but rather legitimizes it; and this zeal does precisely the opposite of what it thinks it does—namely, it shows what it calls true duty, which is supposed to be *universally* recognized, to be something *unrecognized*, and thereby grants the other an equal right to being-for-itself.

664 Yet this judgment also has another side, from which it becomes the introduction to the dissolution of the existing opposition.—The consciousness *of the universal* does not behave toward the first consciousness as *actual* and *acting*, for it is rather the first that is actual. Instead, it opposes the first as that which is

not caught in the opposition of singularity and universality that enters into [1807 614] action. It remains in the universality of *thought*, behaves as *apprehending*, and its first action is only judgment.—Through this judgment it now places itself, as just noted, *alongside* the first consciousness; and *through this equality* the first comes to intuit itself in this other consciousness. For the consciousness of duty behaves *receptively, passively*; but it thereby contradicts itself as the absolute will of duty, as that which determines wholly from itself. It has an easy time preserving itself in purity, for it *does not act*. It is the hypocrisy that wants its judging to be taken for an *actual* deed and proves its rectitude not through action but through the expression of excellent sentiments. It is therefore constituted exactly like the consciousness it reproaches for placing duty only in its speech. In both, the side of actuality is equally distinct from speech: in the one through the *self-interested purpose* of the action, in the other through the *absence of action* altogether, whose necessity lies in the very speaking of duty, for duty has no meaning at all without the deed.

665 But judging must also be considered as a positive action of thought, and has a positive content. From this side, the contradiction present in apprehending consciousness, and its equality with the first consciousness, becomes still [1807 615] more complete.—Acting consciousness declares this determinate doing of its to be duty, and judging consciousness cannot deny it this; for duty itself is the contentless form capable of every content. Or, the concrete action, differentiated within itself in its many aspects, has the universal side that is taken as duty just as much as the particular side constituting the individual's share and interest. Judging consciousness now does not stop at that side of duty and at the agent's knowledge that this is his duty, the relation and station of his actuality. Rather, it holds to the other side, shifts the action into inwardness, and explains it from an *intention* distinct from the action itself and a self-interested *motive*. Every action admits of this other consideration of *particularity* just as it admits of consideration in terms of its conformity to duty; for as action it is the actuality of the individual.—This judging thus removes the action from its existence and reflects it into inwardness, or into the form of its own particulari-

ty.—If it is accompanied by fame, judgment knows this inwardness as the *craving* for fame; if it conforms to the individual's station in general without going beyond it, and is so constituted that individuality does not have its station attached to it as an external determination but fills this universality through [1807 616] itself, thereby showing itself capable of a higher station, judgment knows its inwardness as ambition, and so on. Since in action generally the agent attains the intuition *of himself* in objectivity, or a feeling of himself in his existence, and thus enjoyment, judgment knows the inwardness as a drive toward one's own happiness, even if this consists only in inner moral vanity, enjoyment of the consciousness of one's own excellence, and the foretaste of the hope of future happiness.—No action can escape such judging, for duty for duty's sake, this pure purpose, is the nonactual. It has its actuality in the doing of individuality, and the action thereby possesses the side of particularity.—There is no hero for his valet—not, however, because the former is not a hero, but because the latter is the valet, with whom the hero deals not as a hero but as someone eating, drinking, dressing, and in general in the singularity of need and representation. Similarly, for judging there is no action in which it could not oppose the side of individuality's singularity to the action's universal side and play the moral valet to the agent.

666 This judging consciousness is therefore itself *base*, because it divides the action and produces and holds fast its [1807 617] inequality with itself. It is further *hypocrisy*, because it passes off such judging not as *another manner* of being evil but as the *correct consciousness* of the action; in this nonactuality and vanity of knowing well and knowing better, it raises itself above the deeds it disparages and wants its deedless talk to be taken for an excellent *actuality*.—Thus making itself equal to the agent it judges, it is recognized by him as the same as himself. He finds himself not merely apprehended by it as something alien and unequal to it, but finds that the other, by its own constitution, is equal to him. Intuiting this equality and *expressing* it, he *confesses* himself to the other and likewise expects that, just as the other has in fact placed itself on an equal footing with him, it will also reciprocate his *speech*, express its equality in it, and bring about

the existence of mutual recognition. His confession is not an abasement, humiliation, or self-degradation in relation to the other; for this expression is not the one-sided expression that would posit his *inequality* with the other. Rather, he expresses himself solely because he intuits *the equality* of the other with himself. In his confession he expresses *their equality* from his side, and does so because language is the *existence* of spirit as immediate self. He therefore expects the other to contribute its part to this existence.
[1807 618]

667 Yet the confession of evil, *"I am so,"* receives no reciprocal, equal confession. That was not what the other's judgment meant—on the contrary! It rejects this community and is the hard heart that is for itself and repudiates continuity with the other.—Here the scene reverses. The one who confessed sees himself repulsed and the other in the wrong: the other refuses to let its inwardness emerge into the existence of speech, and opposes the beauty of its soul to evil, while opposing to confession the stiff neck of a character remaining equal to itself and the silence of keeping itself within itself and not abasing itself before another. Here spirit certain of itself is brought to its highest revolt. For it intuits itself as this *simple knowledge of the self* in the other, and indeed in such a way that even the external shape of this other is not something essenceless, as wealth is, not a thing. Rather, it is thought, knowledge itself, that is held up against it; it is this absolutely fluid continuity of pure *knowledge* that refuses to establish its communication with it—with the one who, already in his confession, renounced *isolated being-for-itself* and posited himself as sublated particularity and thereby as continuity with the other, as universal. The other, however, reserves *within itself* its uncommunicative being-for-itself; in the confessing consciousness it retains [1807 619] precisely the same thing, although the latter has already cast it off. It thereby shows itself to be a consciousness abandoned by spirit and denying spirit, for it does not recognize that, in the absolute certainty of itself, spirit is master of every deed and actuality and can cast them off and make them undone. At the same time, it does not recognize the contradiction it commits in refusing to accept the casting-off accomplished *in speech* as a

true casting-off, while it itself has the certainty of its spirit not in an actual action but in its inwardness and the existence of that inwardness in the *speech* of its judgment. It is therefore itself what obstructs the other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence of speech and into the equality of spirit, and through this hardness produces the inequality that still remains.

668 Now insofar as spirit certain of itself, as a beautiful soul, does not possess the power to externalize its self-knowledge that holds fast to itself, it cannot attain equality with the repulsed consciousness, and therefore cannot attain the intuited unity of itself in the other, cannot attain existence. Equality therefore comes about only negatively, as a spiritless being. The beautiful soul devoid of actuality, caught in the contradiction of its pure self and that self's necessity of externalizing itself into being and turning into actuality, in the *immediacy* of this opposition held fast—an immediacy that alone is the middle term and [1807 620] reconciliation of the opposition raised to its pure abstraction, and that is pure being or empty nothingness—is thus, as consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, shattered into madness and melts away in yearning consumption. It thereby in fact gives up its hard adherence to *its being-for-itself*, but produces only the spiritless unity of being.

669 The true reconciliation, namely the *self-conscious* and *existent* one, is already contained in its necessity in what precedes. The breaking of the hard heart and its elevation to universality is the same movement that was expressed in the consciousness that confessed itself. The wounds of spirit heal without leaving scars; the deed is not imperishable, but is taken back by spirit into itself, and the side of singularity present in it—whether as intention or as its existent negativity and limitation—is what immediately vanishes. The actualizing *self*, the form of its action, is only a *moment* of the whole; and so too is the knowledge that determines through judgment and fixes the difference between the individual and universal sides of action. That evil consciousness posits this externalization of itself, or posits itself as a moment, drawn into confessing existence by the intuition of itself in the other. But just as its one-sided, unrecognized existence of particular [1807 621] being-for-itself must break, so must this other's one-

sided, unrecognized judgment break; and just as the former displays the power of spirit over its actuality, so the latter displays its power over its determinate concept.

670 The latter renounces divisive thought and the hardness of the being-for-itself that holds fast to it, because in fact it intuits itself in the first consciousness. By casting away its actuality and making itself a *sublated this*, the first in fact presents itself as universal; it returns out of its external actuality into itself as essence. Universal consciousness therefore recognizes itself in it.—The forgiveness it grants the first consciousness is a renunciation of itself, of its *nonactual* essence, to which it equates that other consciousness which was *actual* action. It recognizes as good what was called evil on account of the determination that action received in thought; or rather, it lets go of this distinction of determinate thought and of its determining judgment existing for itself, just as the other lets go of its determination of action existing for itself.—The word of reconciliation is *existent* spirit, which intuits pure knowledge of itself as *universal* essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself as *singularity* absolutely within itself—a reciprocal recognition that is *absolute spirit*.

671 Spirit enters existence only at the summit where its pure knowledge of itself is opposition to and interchange with itself. Knowing that its [1807 622] *pure knowledge* is abstract *essence*, it is this knowing duty in absolute opposition to the knowledge that knows itself, as absolute *singularity* of the self, to be the essence. The former is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows the singularity that knows itself as essence to be null in itself, to be *evil*. The latter, however, is absolute discreteness, which knows itself in its pure oneness to be absolute, and that universal to be the nonactual, existing only *for others*. Both sides are refined to this purity, in which they no longer contain any selfless existence, any negative of consciousness. Rather, that *duty* is the self-identical character of its self-knowing, and this evil equally has its purpose in its *being-within-itself* and its actuality in its speech. The content of this speech is the substance of its subsistence; it is the assurance of spirit's certainty within itself.—Both spirits certain of themselves have no other purpose than their pure self

and no other reality and existence than precisely this pure self. Yet they are still different, and the difference is absolute because it is posited in this element of the pure concept. Nor is it so only for us, but for the concepts themselves standing in this opposition. For although these concepts are *determinate* against one another, they are at the same time universal in themselves, so that they fill the self's entire compass, and this self has no content other than this [1807 623] determinacy of its, which neither extends beyond it nor is more limited than it. For the one, the absolutely universal, is just as much pure self-knowledge as the other, the absolute discreteness of singularity, and both are only this pure self-knowledge. Both determinations are therefore knowing pure concepts whose determinacy is itself immediately knowledge, or whose *relation* and opposition is the I. Through this they are *for one another* these absolute opposites. It is the completely *inward* that has thus confronted itself and entered existence; they constitute *pure knowledge*, which through this opposition is posited as *consciousness*. But it is not yet *self-consciousness*. It has this actualization in the movement of this opposition. For this opposition is rather itself the *indiscrete continuity* and *equality* of I = I; and each *for itself*, precisely through the contradiction of its pure universality—which at the same time still resists its equality with the other and separates itself from it—sublates itself within itself. Through this externalization, this knowledge divided in its *existence* returns into the unity of the *self*. It is the *actual* I, the universal *knowledge of itself* in its *absolute opposite*, in the knowledge *being within itself* which, because of the purity of its isolated being-within-itself, is itself completely universal. The reconciling *Yes*, in which both I's relinquish their opposed *[1807 624] existence*, is the *existence* of the *I* extended into duality, which therein remains equal to itself and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses certainty of itself. It is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge.

VII. Religion

[1807 625]
VII. *Religion*.

672 In the shapes considered hitherto, distinguished in general as *consciousness, self-consciousness, reason*, and *spirit*, *religion* has indeed also occurred as consciousness of *absolute essence* in general, but from the *standpoint of the consciousness* that is conscious of absolute essence. Absolute essence *in and for itself*, however, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.

673 Even *consciousness*, insofar as it is *understanding*, becomes consciousness of the *supersensible*, or the *interior* of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is *selfless*. It is as yet only the *universal*, still far from being spirit knowing itself as spirit.—Then *self-consciousness*, which reaches its completion in the shape of *unhappy* consciousness, was only the *pain* of spirit struggling to rise again to objectivity but failing to attain it. The unity of *individual* self-consciousness and [1807 626] its unchangeable *essence*, to which it brings itself, therefore remains a *beyond* for it.—The immediate existence of *reason*, which for us emerged from that pain, and its distinctive shapes have no religion, because their self-consciousness knows or seeks *itself* in the *immediate* present.

674 In the ethical world, by contrast, we saw a religion, specifically the *religion* of the *underworld*. It is faith in the terrible, unknown night of *fate* and in the Eumenid of the *departed spirit*: the former, pure negativity in the form of universality; the latter, the same negativity in the form of singularity. In the latter form absolute essence is therefore indeed the *self*, and a *present* self, as the self can be nothing else. Yet the *individual* self is *this* individual shade, with the universality that is fate separated from it. It is indeed a shade, a *sublated this*, and thus a universal self; but that negative meaning has not yet turned into this positive one, and therefore the sublated *self* still immediately means this particular and essenceless self.—Fate without the self, however, remains the unconscious night that attains neither distinction within itself nor the clarity of self-knowledge.

675 This faith in the nothingness of necessity and in the underworld becomes *faith* in *heaven*, because the departed self must unite with its [1807 627] universality, unfold within it what it contains, and thus become clear to itself. Yet we saw this *realm* of faith unfold its content only in the element of thought, without the concept, and therefore perish in its fate, namely the *religion* of *enlightenment*. In this, the supersensible beyond of understanding is restored, but in such a way that self-consciousness stands satisfied on this side and knows the supersensible—the *empty* beyond, neither to be known nor feared—neither as self nor as power.

676 Finally, in the religion of morality, absolute essence is restored as a positive content, but united with the negativity of enlightenment. It is a *being* that equally remains taken back into the self and enclosed within it, and a *differentiated content* whose parts are negated as immediately as they are posited. But the fate in which this contradictory movement founders is the self conscious of itself as the fate of *essence* and *actuality*.

677 In religion, self-knowing spirit is immediately its own pure *self-consciousness*. The shapes of spirit that have been considered—true spirit, self-alienated spirit, and spirit certain of itself—together constitute spirit in its *consciousness*, which

confronts its *world* and does not recognize itself in it. But in conscience spirit subjugates not only its objective world [1807 628] in general but also its representation and its determinate concepts, and is now self-consciousness at home with itself. In this self-consciousness, *represented as an object* for itself, it has the meaning of being universal spirit, containing all essence and all actuality within itself; yet it does not exist in the form of free actuality, or of nature appearing independently. It indeed has *shape*, or the form of being, insofar as it is the *object* of its consciousness; but because in religion this consciousness is posited in the essential determination of being *self*-consciousness, the shape is perfectly transparent to itself. And the actuality spirit contains is enclosed or sublated within it, precisely as when we say *all actuality*: it is *thought*, universal actuality.

678 Since, then, in religion the determination of spirit's consciousness proper does not have the form of free *otherness*, its *existence* is distinct from its *self-consciousness*, and its actuality proper falls outside religion. The spirit of both is indeed one, but its consciousness does not embrace both at once, and religion appears as one part of its existence, doing, and activity, the other part being life in its actual world. Now just as we know that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, or spirit in religion, are the same, so the perfection of religion consists in [1807 629] the two becoming equal to one another: not only in its actuality being embraced by religion, but conversely in its becoming actual to itself as self-conscious spirit and becoming the *object of its consciousness*.— Insofar as spirit *represents* itself to itself in religion, it is indeed consciousness, and the actuality enclosed within religion is the shape and clothing of its representation. But in this representation actuality does not receive its full due, namely to be not merely clothing but independent, free existence. Conversely, because it lacks completion within itself, it is a *determinate* shape that does not attain what it is supposed to present, namely self-conscious spirit. For its shape to express spirit itself, the shape would itself have to be nothing other than spirit, and spirit would have to appear to itself, or be actual, as it is in its essence. Only thereby would what may seem to be the opposite demand also be

attained: namely, that the *object* of its consciousness at the same time have the form of free actuality. But only spirit that is its own object as absolute spirit is for itself an actuality as free as it remains self-conscious within it.

679 When self-consciousness and consciousness proper, *religion* and spirit in its world, or the *existence* of spirit, are initially distinguished, the latter consists in the whole of spirit [1807 630] insofar as its moments present themselves as separating and each existing for itself. These moments, however, are *consciousness*, *self-consciousness*, *reason*, and *spirit*—spirit, namely, as immediate spirit that is not yet consciousness of spirit. Their *collected* totality constitutes spirit in its worldly existence in general. Spirit as such contains the preceding shapes in the universal determinations, the moments just named. Religion presupposes their entire course and is their *simple* totality, or absolute self.—Their course, moreover, must not be represented in time in relation to religion. Only the whole spirit is in time, and the shapes that are shapes of the whole *spirit* as such present themselves in a succession. For only the whole has actuality proper, and therefore the form of pure freedom in relation to another that expresses itself as time. But its *moments*—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—have, because they are moments, no existence distinct from one another.—Just as spirit was distinguished from its moments, so, third, the isolated determination of these moments must be distinguished from the moments themselves. For we saw each of those moments again differentiate itself within itself in a course of its own and assume different shapes, as, for example, within consciousness sensuous certainty [1807 631] and perception were distinguished. These latter aspects separate in time and belong to a *particular whole*.—For spirit descends from its *universality*, through *determination*, to *singularity*. The determination or middle term is *consciousness, self-consciousness*, and so on. *Singularity*, however, is constituted by the shapes of these moments. These therefore present spirit in its singularity or *actuality*, and are distinguished in time, yet so that the succeeding shape retains the preceding ones within it.

680 If, therefore, religion is the perfection of spirit, in which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—*return* and *have returned into their ground*, then together they constitute the *existent actuality* of the whole spirit, which *is* only as the movement of differentiating these aspects of itself and returning into itself. The becoming *of religion in general* is contained in the movement of the universal moments. But since each of these attributes was presented not merely as it determines itself in general, but as it is *in and for itself*—that is, as it runs its course within itself as a whole—not only has the becoming of religion *in general* thereby emerged: those complete courses of the *individual* aspects also contain the *determinations of religion* itself. The whole spirit, the spirit of religion, is again the movement [1807 632] of attaining, from its immediacy, *knowledge* of what it is *in itself* or immediately, and of achieving a perfect equality between the *shape* in which it appears for its consciousness and its essence, so that it intuits itself as it is.—In this becoming, therefore, spirit itself exists in *determinate* shapes constituting the differences of this movement; at the same time, determinate religion thereby also has a *determinate actual* spirit. If, then, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-knowing spirit in general, the *determinate* shapes of self-knowing spirit have belonging to them the *determinate* forms that developed separately within consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. For its actual spirit, the *determinate* shape of religion selects from the shapes of each of its moments the one corresponding to it. The *one* determinacy of religion penetrates all aspects of its actual existence and stamps them with this common character.

681 In this way the shapes that have appeared up to this point now arrange themselves differently from the sequence in which they appeared; a brief preliminary remark on this is still necessary.—In the sequence considered, each moment, deepening itself within itself, developed into a whole in its distinctive principle; and cognition was the depth, or [1807 633] spirit, in which these moments, which have no subsistence for themselves, had their substance. This substance, however, has now emerged. It is the depth of spirit certain of itself, which does

not permit the individual principle to isolate itself and make itself a whole within itself. Instead, gathering and holding all these moments together within itself, it advances in this entire wealth of its actual spirit, and all its particular moments jointly take up and receive the same determinacy of the whole.—This spirit certain of itself and its movement are their true actuality and the *being-in-and-for-itself* belonging to each individual moment.—If, therefore, the previous single sequence marked its returns into itself by nodes as it advanced, but continued from them again in a single line, it is now, as it were, broken at these nodes, the universal moments, and divided into many lines. Gathered into one bundle, these at the same time unite symmetrically, so that the same distinctions into which each particular line shaped itself within itself coincide.—Moreover, the entire presentation makes clear of itself how this coordination of universal directions presented here is to be understood, so that it becomes superfluous to remark that these distinctions are essentially to be grasped only as moments of becoming, not as parts. [1807 634] In actual spirit they are attributes of its substance; in religion, rather, only predicates of the subject.—Likewise, *in themselves* or *for us*, all forms are indeed contained in spirit in general and in each spirit; but as regards its actuality, the sole issue is which determinacy exists for it in its *consciousness*, in which it has expressed its self, or in which shape it knows its essence.

682 The distinction made between *actual* spirit and spirit knowing itself as spirit, or between itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is sublated in spirit knowing itself in its truth: its consciousness and self-consciousness are reconciled. But since religion here is initially *immediate*, this distinction has not yet returned into spirit. Only the *concept* of religion is posited; in this, the essence is *self-consciousness*, which is all truth to itself and contains all actuality within this truth. As consciousness, this self-consciousness has itself as its object. Spirit initially knowing itself only *immediately* is therefore spirit to itself in the *form* of *immediacy*, and the determinacy of the shape in which it appears to itself is that of *being*. This being is indeed *filled* neither with sensation or manifold material nor with other one-sided moments, purposes, and determinations, but

with spirit, and is known by itself [1807 635] as all truth and actuality. In this way, this *filling* is not equal to its *shape*, nor spirit as essence to its consciousness. Spirit is actual as absolute spirit only insofar as it is for itself in its *truth* as it is in its *certainty of itself*, or insofar as the extremes into which it divides itself as consciousness exist for one another in the shape of spirit. The shape that spirit assumes as the object of its consciousness remains filled with the certainty of spirit as its substance. Through this content, the possibility of the object sinking to pure objectivity, to the form of the negativity of self-consciousness, disappears. Spirit's immediate unity with itself is the foundation, or pure consciousness, *within* which consciousness separates. Thus enclosed within its pure self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in religion as the creator of a *nature* in general. Rather, what it produces in this movement are its shapes as spirits, which together constitute the completeness of its appearance; and this movement itself is the becoming of its perfect actuality through its individual aspects, or its imperfect actualities.

683 Its first actuality is the concept of religion itself, or religion as *immediate* and thus *natural religion*: in this, spirit knows itself as its object in natural or immediate [1807 636] shape. The *second*, however, is necessarily that of knowing itself in the shape of *sublated naturalness*, or of the *self*. It is therefore the *religion of art*; for the shape rises to the form of the *self* through consciousness's *production*, by which consciousness intuits its doing, or the self, in its object. Finally, the *third* sublates the one-sidedness of the first two: the *self* is just as much *immediate* as *immediacy is self*. If in the first spirit is in the form of consciousness in general, and in the second in that of self-consciousness, in the third it is in the form of the unity of both. It has the shape of *being-in-and-for-itself*; and since it is thus represented as it is in and for itself, this is *revealed religion*. Yet although in this it attains its true *shape*, precisely *shape* itself and *representation* remain the unsurmounted aspect from which it must pass over into the *concept*, in order entirely to dissolve the form of objectivity in the concept,

which equally encloses this opposite of itself. Spirit has then grasped the concept of itself as we have so far alone grasped it, and its shape, or the element of its existence, being the concept, is spirit itself.

[1807 637]

A. *Natural religion*.

684 Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself and exists for itself in the form of the objective: it *is*. And it is at the same time *being-for-itself. It is for itself*: it is the side of *self*-consciousness, indeed as against the side of its consciousness, or its relating to itself as *object*. Its consciousness contains opposition, and thereby the *determinacy* of the shape in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This alone concerns us in this consideration of religion, for its unshaped essence, or pure concept, has already emerged. Yet the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness falls at the same time within the latter. The shape of religion contains the existence of spirit neither as nature free of thought nor as thought free of existence; rather, it is existence preserved in thought, as well as something thought that exists for itself.—One [1807 638] religion differs from another according to the *determinacy* of this shape in which spirit knows itself. But it must also be remarked that presenting its knowledge of itself according to this *individual determinacy* does not in fact exhaust the whole of an actual religion. The sequence of different religions that will emerge equally presents, once again, only the different aspects of a single religion—and indeed of *each individual* religion—and the representations that seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in each. Yet at the same time the difference must also be considered as a difference of religion. For since spirit finds itself in the distinction between its consciousness and its self-consciousness, the movement has as its goal to sublate this principal distinction and give the shape that is the object of consciousness the form of self-consciousness. But this distinction is not already sublated by the fact that the shapes contained in consciousness also possess the moment of the self, and that God is *represented as self-consciousness*. The *represented* self is not the *actual* self. For it, like any other closer determination of the shape, truly to belong to the shape, it must partly be

posited within it through the doing of self-consciousness, and partly the lower determination must show itself to have been sublated and comprehended by the higher. For what is represented ceases to be represented and alien to its knowledge only through the self's having produced it, and thus intuiting the [1807 639] determination of the object as *its own*, and hence itself in the object. —Through this activity the lower determination has at the same time disappeared; for doing is the negative that carries itself out at the expense of an other. Insofar as the lower determination still occurs, it has receded into inessentiality; conversely, where the lower still rules but the higher also occurs, one has a selfless place alongside the other. Thus, although the different representations within a single religion present the entire movement of its forms, the character of each religion is determined by the particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness: that is, by self-consciousness having grasped within itself the determination of the object of consciousness, having completely appropriated it through its doing, and knowing it as essential as against the others.—The truth of faith in a determination of religious spirit shows itself in *actual* spirit's being constituted like the shape in which it intuits itself in religion. Thus, for example, the incarnation of God that occurs in Eastern religion has no truth, because its actual spirit lacks this reconciliation.—It is not appropriate here to return from the totality of determinations to an individual one and show in what shape the completeness of the others is contained within it and its particular religion. The higher form, set back under a lower one, [1807 640] lacks its significance for self-conscious spirit and belongs to it only superficially and in its representation. It must be considered in its distinctive significance and where it is the principle of this particular religion and is borne out by its actual spirit.

a, *The being of light*.

685 Spirit as the *essence* that is *self-consciousness*—or the self-conscious essence that is all truth and knows all actuality as itself—is as yet, in comparison with the reality it gives itself in the movement of its consciousness, only *its concept*. Compared with the day of this unfolding, this concept is the night of its

essence; compared with the existence of its moments as independent shapes, it is the creative mystery of its birth. This mystery has its revelation within itself; for existence has its necessity in this concept, because the concept is self-knowing spirit and thus has in its essence the moment of being consciousness and representing itself objectively.—It is the pure I that possesses certainty of itself in its externalization, in itself as *universal object*; or this object is for it the interpenetration of all thought and all actuality.
[1807 641]

686 In the immediate first division of self-knowing absolute spirit, its shape has the determination belonging to *immediate consciousness*, or *sensuous* certainty. It intuits itself in the form of *being*, yet not the spiritless *being*, filled with contingent determinations of sensation, that belongs to sensuous certainty, but being filled with spirit. This equally contains the form that occurred in immediate *self-consciousness*: the form of the *lord* confronting spirit's self-consciousness as it retreats from its object.—This *being* filled with the concept of spirit is therefore the *shape* of spirit's *simple* relation to itself, or the shape of shapelessness. By virtue of this determination, it is the pure *being of light* of the dawn, containing and filling everything, preserving itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, *darkness*. The movements of its own externalization, its creations in the unresisting element of its otherness, are outpourings of light; in their simplicity they are at the same time its becoming-for-itself and return from its existence, streams of fire consuming shape. The difference it gives itself does indeed proliferate in the substance of existence and shape itself into the forms of nature; but the essential simplicity of its thought ranges restlessly and without understanding through them, [1807 642] extends their bounds beyond measure, and dissolves their beauty, heightened into splendor, in its sublimity.

687 The content this pure *being* develops, or its perceiving, is therefore an insubstantial play alongside this substance, which only *rises* without *descending* into itself, becoming subject, and stabilizing its differences through the self. Its determinations are only attributes that do not mature into independence but

remain merely names of the many-named One. This One is clothed with the manifold powers of existence and the shapes of actuality as with a selfless adornment. They are only messengers of its might, lacking a will of their own, intuitions of its glory and voices of its praise.

688 But this reeling life must determine itself as *being-for-itself* and give its vanishing shapes subsistence. The *immediate being* in which it confronts its consciousness is itself the *negative* power that dissolves its differences. In truth, therefore, it is the *self*; and spirit accordingly passes over to knowing itself in the form of the self. Pure light scatters its simplicity into an infinity of forms and offers itself as a sacrifice to being-for-itself, so that the individual may take subsistence for itself from its substance.

[1807 643]

b. *The plant and the animal*.

689 Self-conscious spirit, which has withdrawn from shapeless essence into itself, or raised its immediacy to self in general, determines its simplicity as a manifoldness of being-for-itself and is the religion of spiritual *perception*, in which it breaks apart into the countless multiplicity of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits. This pantheism, initially the *tranquil* subsistence of these atoms of spirit, becomes *hostile* movement within itself. The innocence of the *religion of flowers*, which is only a selfless representation of the self, passes over into the seriousness of embattled life, into the guilt of the *religion of animals*; the repose and powerlessness of intuiting individuality passes into destructive being-for-itself.—It is no help to have taken the *death of abstraction* away from the things of perception and raised them to beings of spiritual perception: the animating life of this realm of spirits contains death through its determinacy and negativity, which encroaches upon their innocent indifference. Through this negativity, dispersion into the manifoldness of tranquil plant shapes becomes a hostile movement in which the hatred of their being-for-itself consumes them.—The *actual* self-consciousness of this dispersed spirit [1807 644] is a multitude of isolated, unsociable national spirits that in their hatred fight one another to the

death and become conscious of determinate animal shapes as their essence. For they are nothing other than animal spirits, self-isolating animal lives conscious of themselves without universality.

690 In this hatred, however, the determinacy of purely negative being-for-itself wears itself away, and through this movement of the concept spirit enters another shape. *Sublated being-for-itself* is the *form* of the *object* produced through the self, or rather is the self produced and wearing itself away—that is, becoming a thing. The worker, whose doing is not merely negative but pacified and positive, therefore gains the upper hand over animal spirits that merely tear one another apart. The consciousness of spirit is thus now the movement that has gone beyond immediate *being-in-itself* as well as abstract *being-for-itself*. Since the in-itself has been reduced through opposition to a determinacy, it is no longer the proper form of absolute spirit, but an actuality that spirit's consciousness finds confronting it as ordinary existence and sublates. Consciousness is equally not merely this sublating being-for-itself, but also produces its representation, being-for-itself set outside itself in the form of an object. Yet this production is not yet perfect production, but a conditioned activity and the forming of something given.
[1807 645]
c. *The master craftsman*.

691 Spirit thus appears here as the *master craftsman*, and its doing, through which it produces itself as object without yet having grasped the thought of itself, is an instinctive working, like bees building their cells.

692 The first form, because it is immediate, is the abstract form of understanding, and the work is not yet filled with spirit in itself. The crystals of pyramids and obelisks—simple combinations of straight lines, with flat surfaces and equal proportions among their parts, in which the incommensurability of the round has been eradicated—are the works of this master craftsman of strict form. Because of the form's merely intellectual character, it does not possess its meaning within itself, is not the spiritual self. The works therefore either merely

receive spirit within them as an alien, departed spirit that has abandoned its living interpenetration with actuality and, itself dead, enters these lifeless crystals; or they relate externally to spirit as something itself external, not existing as spirit—as the rising light that casts its meaning upon them.

693 The separation from which working spirit begins—between *being-in-itself*, which becomes the material it [1807 646] works upon, and *being-for-itself*, which is *the side* of working self-consciousness—has become objective to it in its work. Its further effort must aim to sublate this separation of soul and body, to clothe and shape the soul in itself and to animate the body. As the two sides are brought closer together, they retain against one another the determinacy of represented spirit and of its surrounding shell; spirit's unity with itself contains this opposition of singularity and universality. As the work draws nearer to itself in its sides, the other result also comes about: it draws nearer to working self-consciousness, and self-consciousness attains in the work knowledge of itself as it is in and for itself. Yet in this way it initially constitutes only the abstract side of spirit's *activity*, which does not yet know its content within itself, but in its work, which is a thing. The master craftsman himself, the whole spirit, has not yet appeared, but is the still inward, hidden essence that exists as a whole only divided into active self-consciousness and its produced object.

694 The surrounding habitation, then, the external actuality initially raised only to the abstract form of understanding, is worked by the master craftsman into a more animated form. For this he uses plant life, which is no longer holy as it was for the earlier powerless [1807 647] pantheism, but is taken by him, who grasps himself as the essence being-for-itself, as something usable, and reduced to an exterior and an ornament. Yet it is not used unchanged: the worker in self-conscious form at the same time eradicates the transience belonging to this life's immediate existence and brings its organic forms closer to the stricter and more universal forms of thought. Organic form, which when left free prolifer-

ates in particularity, is for its part subjugated by the form of thought, while on the other hand raising these straight-lined and flat shapes into more animated curves—a blending that becomes the root of free architecture.

695 This dwelling, the side of the *universal element* or spirit's inorganic nature, now also encloses a shape of *singularity* that brings spirit—previously separated from existence, inward or external to it—closer to actuality, and thereby makes the work more like active self-consciousness. The worker first reaches for the form of *being-for-itself* in general, the *animal shape*. He proves that he is no longer immediately conscious of himself in animal life by constituting himself against it as the productive power and knowing himself in it as *his* work; through this, the animal shape at the same time becomes sublated and the hieroglyph of another meaning, a [1807 648] thought. Accordingly, the worker no longer uses it alone and entire, but blends it with the shape of thought, the human shape. Yet the work still lacks the shape and existence in which the self exists as self. It still lacks the ability to express in itself that it encloses an inward meaning; it lacks language, the element in which the informing sense itself is present. Thus even when the work has purified itself entirely of the animal and bears only the shape of self-consciousness, it is the still soundless shape that needs the ray of the rising sun to have a tone—a tone which, produced by light, is also only sound and not language, showing only an external self, not the inward one.

696 Opposed to this external self of the shape stands the other shape, which indicates that it has an *inwardness* within it. Nature returning into its essence reduces its living manifoldness, which individuates itself and becomes entangled in its movement, to an inessential casing, the *covering of the inward*; and this inwardness is initially still simple darkness, the motionless, black, formless stone.

697 Both presentations contain *inwardness* and *existence*, the two moments of spirit; and both contain both at once in an opposite relation, the self as both [1807 649] inward and outward. The two must be united.—The soul of the human-

shaped statue does not yet emerge from within; it is not yet language, the existence that is inward in itself. And the inwardness of multiform existence is still soundless, not differentiating itself within itself, and still separated from its exterior, to which all differences belong.—The master craftsman therefore unites the two in the blending of natural and self-conscious shape; and these ambiguous beings, riddles to themselves, in which the conscious wrestles with the unconscious, pairing simple inwardness with the multiform exterior, the darkness of thought with the clarity of expression, break into the language of profound, scarcely intelligible wisdom.

698 In this work the instinctive labor that produced the unconscious work confronting self-consciousness comes to an end; for in it an equally self-conscious, self-expressing inwardness comes to meet the master craftsman's activity that constitutes self-consciousness. He has worked his way up within it to the division of his consciousness in which spirit encounters spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it is to itself the shape and object of its consciousness, its mixtures with the unconscious mode of immediate natural shape are therefore purified away. These monstrosities of shape, [1807 650] speech, and deed dissolve into spiritual shape—an exterior that has gone into itself, an inwardness expressing itself out of itself and in itself—into thought that is self-engendering, clear existence, preserving its shape in conformity with itself. Spirit is *artist*.

[1807 651]

B. *The religion of art*.

699 Spirit has raised the shape in which it exists for its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself, and produces such a shape for itself. The master craftsman has given up *synthetic* working, the *blending* of the heterogeneous forms of thought and nature. As the shape has acquired the form of self-conscious activity, he has become a spiritual worker.

700 If we ask which *actual* spirit has in the religion of art the consciousness of its absolute essence, it emerges that this is *ethical*, or *true*, spirit. It is not merely the universal substance of all individuals; rather, because this substance has the shape of consciousness for actual consciousness, this means that, possessing individualization, it is known by them as their own essence and work. Thus for them it is neither the being of light, in whose unity the being-for-itself of self-consciousness is contained only negatively, only [1807 652] as passing away, and intuits the lord of its actuality; nor the restless mutual devouring of peoples who hate one another; nor their subjugation into castes that together make up the semblance of the organization of a perfected whole, but a whole lacking the universal freedom of individuals. Rather, it is the free people among whom ethical custom constitutes the substance of all, whose actuality and existence everyone, and each individual, knows as his will and deed.

701 The religion of ethical spirit, however, is its elevation above its actuality, its return *from its truth* into pure *knowledge of itself*. Since the ethical people lives in immediate unity with its substance and does not contain the principle of the pure singularity of self-consciousness, its religion appears in its perfection only in its *departure* from its *subsistence*. For the *actuality* of ethical substance rests partly on its tranquil *unchangeability* against the absolute movement of self-consciousness, and thus on self-consciousness's not yet having withdrawn from its tranquil custom and firm trust into itself; partly on its organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, as well as its distribution among the bodies of the estates and their particular activities that work together toward the whole; and thus on the individual's being satisfied with the limitation of his existence and not yet having grasped the unbounded [1807 653] thought of his free self. But that tranquil *immediate* trust in substance returns into trust *in oneself* and into *certainty of oneself*; and the multiplicity of rights and duties, like limited activity, is the same dialectical movement of the ethical as is the multiplicity of things and their determinations—a movement finding its rest and stability only in the simplicity of spirit certain of itself.—The perfection of ethical life into free self-consciousness, and the fate of the ethical world, is therefore individual-

ity withdrawn into itself, the absolute lightheartedness of ethical spirit, which has dissolved within itself all the fixed distinctions of its subsistence and the bodies of its organic articulation, and, perfectly secure in itself, attained unbounded joy and the freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of spirit within itself has the ambiguous character of being tranquil subsistence and firm truth, as well as absolute unrest and the passing away of ethical life. But it turns into the latter, for the truth of ethical spirit is still only this substantial essence and trust in which the self does not know itself as free singularity, and which therefore perishes in this inwardness, or in the self's becoming free. Thus, when trust is broken and the substance of the people is fractured within itself, spirit, which was the middle term of unstable extremes, has now [1807 654] emerged into the extreme of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence. This is spirit certain within itself, mourning the loss of its world and now producing its essence, elevated above actuality, from the purity of the self.

702 In such an epoch absolute art emerges. Earlier, it is the instinctive working that, immersed in existence, works out of existence and into it, not having its substance in free ethical life and therefore not having free spiritual activity as its working self. Later, spirit has gone beyond art to attain its higher presentation: namely, to be in its presentation as object not only the *substance* born from the self, but *this self*; not merely to engender itself out of its concept, but to have its concept itself as its shape, so that the concept and the artwork produced know one another as one and the same.

703 Since, then, ethical substance has withdrawn from its existence into its pure self-consciousness, this self-consciousness is the side of the concept, or of the *activity* through which spirit produces itself as object. It is pure form because, in ethical obedience and service, the individual has worked away all unconscious existence and fixed determination within himself, just as substance itself has become this fluid essence. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed and made itself subject. From [1807 655] this night of pure certainty of itself, ethical spirit rises again as the shape freed from nature and its immediate existence.

704 The *existence* of the pure concept into which spirit has fled from its body is an individual whom it chooses as the vessel of its sorrow. Spirit is present in this individual as his universal and his power, from which he suffers violence—as his pathos, surrendered to which his self-consciousness loses its freedom. But that positive power of universality is subdued by the pure self of the individual as the negative power. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable force, wrestles with unshaped essence; mastering it, the activity has made pathos its material and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work: universal spirit individualized and represented.

a. *The abstract artwork*.

705 The first artwork, as immediate, is abstract and individual. On its side, it must move out of its immediate and objective mode toward self-consciousness, just as, on the other side, self-consciousness for itself works in worship to sublate the [1807 656] distinction it initially gives itself from its spirit, and thereby to produce the artwork animated within itself.

706 The first mode, in which artistic spirit sets its shape and its active consciousness farthest apart, is the immediate mode in which the shape *exists* as a *thing* in general.—Within it, this divides into the distinction between singularity, which has the shape of the self within it, and universality, which presents inorganic essence in relation to the shape, as its surroundings and habitation. Through the elevation of the whole into the pure concept, this habitation acquires its pure form belonging to spirit. It is neither the crystal of understanding that houses the dead or is illuminated by an external soul, nor the mixture of the forms of nature and thought that first emerges from the plant, in which thought's activity is still an *imitation*. Rather, the concept strips away what still clings to the forms from roots, branches, and foliage, and purifies them into structures in which the straight lines and flat planes of the crystal are raised into incommensurable proportions, so that the animation of the organic is taken up into the abstract form of understanding, while its essence, incommensurability for the understanding, is at the same time preserved.

707 The indwelling god, however, is the black stone drawn out of its animal casing and penetrated with the [1807 657] light of consciousness. The human shape strips off the animal with which it was mixed; for the god, the animal is only a contingent disguise. It takes its place beside his true shape and no longer counts for anything in itself, but has sunk to meaning an other, to a mere sign. Precisely thereby, the god's shape also strips away within itself dependence on the natural conditions of animal existence, and indicates the internal arrangements of organic life as fused into its surface and belonging only to it.—The *essence* of the god, however, is the unity of nature's universal existence and self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality appears confronting nature. Initially also an *individual* shape, his existence is one of the elements of nature, just as his self-conscious actuality is an individual national spirit. But in this unity the former is the element reflected into spirit, nature transfigured through thought and united with self-conscious life. The divine shape therefore has its natural element within it as sublated, as a dim memory. The savage essence and confused struggle of the elements' free existence, the unethical realm of the Titans, is vanquished and banished to the edge of actuality that has become clear to itself, to the murky borders of the world that has found and pacified itself in spirit. These [1807 658] ancient gods into which the being of light, begetting with darkness, first particularizes itself—heaven, earth, ocean, sun, the blind Typhonic fire of the earth, and so on—are replaced by shapes that retain only a dimly reminiscent echo of those Titans and are no longer natural beings but the clear ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.

708 This simple shape has thus eradicated within itself the unrest of infinite individuation and gathered it into tranquil individuality: both its individuation as the natural element, which is necessary only as universal essence but contingent in its existence and movement, and its individuation as the people, which, dispersed into the particular bodies of activity and the individual points of self-consciousness, has an existence of manifold meaning and doing. The moment of unrest therefore confronts it: *self-consciousness* confronts it, the *essence*, self-consciousness that, as the birthplace of this shape, retained nothing for itself

but being *pure activity*. Everything belonging to substance the artist gave entirely to his work, but gave no actuality in the work to himself as a determinate individuality. He could bestow perfection upon it only by externalizing his particularity, disembodying himself and raising himself to the abstraction of pure doing.—In this first immediate production, the separation of the work and his [1807 659] self-conscious activity has not yet been reunited; the work is therefore not for itself actually animated, but is a *whole* only together with its *becoming*. What is commonplace about the artwork—that it is produced in consciousness and made by human hands—is the moment of the concept existing as concept, which confronts the work. And if this concept, as artist or spectator, is selfless enough to declare the artwork absolutely animated in itself and to forget itself as the one doing or looking, then against this we must hold fast to the concept of spirit, which cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of itself. This moment, however, stands opposed to the work, because in this first division spirit gives both sides their abstract determinations of *doing* and being a *thing* against one another, and their return into the unity from which they proceeded has not yet come about.

709 In his work, then, the artist experiences that he has produced *no essence equal to himself*. A consciousness does indeed return to him from it, in that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit that is their essence. Yet because this animation returns his self-consciousness to him only as admiration, it is rather a confession that this animation makes to the artist of not being his equal. As it returns to him as joy in general, [1807 660] he does not find in it the pain of his forming and begetting, nor the effort of his labor. They may also judge the work, or bring it sacrifices, or place their consciousness in it in whatever way: if they set themselves above it with their knowledge, he knows how much more his *deed* is than their understanding and talk; if they place themselves *beneath it* and recognize in it the *essence* that rules them, he knows himself as its master.

710 The artwork therefore requires another element of existence, the god another emergence than this one in which, out of the depths of his creative night, he falls into the opposite, into externality, the determination of the *thing* devoid of

self-consciousness. This higher element is *language*: an existence that is immediately self-conscious existence. Just as *individual* self-consciousness exists in it, so it is immediately present as a *universal* contagion. The complete particularization of being-for-itself is at the same time the fluidity and universally communicated unity of the many selves; language is the soul existing as soul. The god, then, who has language as the element of his shape is the artwork animated in itself, possessing immediately in its existence the pure activity that stood opposed to it when it existed as a thing. Or, in the becoming-objective of its essence, self-consciousness remains immediately at home with itself. Thus [1807 661] at home with itself in its essence, it is *pure thought*, or devotion, whose *inwardness* at the same time has *existence* in the hymn. The hymn retains within itself the singularity of self-consciousness, and, when heard, this singularity is at the same time present as universal. Devotion, kindled in all, is the spiritual stream that, in the multiplicity of self-consciousness, is conscious of itself as the same *doing* of all and as *simple being*. As this universal self-consciousness of all, spirit possesses its pure inwardness, as well as being-for-others and the being-for-itself of individuals, in a single unity.

711 This language differs from another language of the god that is not the language of universal self-consciousness. The *oracle*, of the god of the religion of art as well as of earlier religions, is his necessary first language. For his *concept* contains equally that he is the essence of nature and of spirit, and therefore has not only natural but also spiritual existence. Insofar as this moment initially lies only in his *concept* and is not yet realized in religion, the language is for religious self-consciousness the language of an *alien* self-consciousness. The self-consciousness still alien to its community does *not yet exist in the way* its concept demands. The self is simple and thereby absolutely *universal* being-for-itself; but the self-consciousness separated from that of the community is as yet only an *individual*.—The content of this particular and [1807 662] individual language results from the universal determinacy in which absolute spirit is posited in its religion generally.—The universal spirit of the dawn, which has not yet particularized its existence, therefore utters equally simple and universal propo-

sitions about essence, whose substantial content is sublime in its simple truth, yet because of this universality at the same time appears trivial to self-consciousness developing further.

712 The further cultivated self, which rises to *being-for-itself*, masters the pure pathos of substance, the objectivity of the dawning being of light, and knows that simplicity of truth as what *is in itself*, which does not have the form of contingent existence through an alien language, but is *the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives forever, and no one knows from where it appeared*.—Just as the universal truth revealed by the being of light has here withdrawn into the inward or lower realm, and thereby been freed of the form of contingent appearance, so, conversely, in the religion of art, because the shape of the god has assumed consciousness and thereby singularity in general, the god's own language—the god who is the spirit of the ethical people—is the oracle that knows its particular affairs and declares what is useful concerning them. Universal truths, however, because they are known as what *is in itself*, are claimed by *knowing thought*, and their language is [1807 663] no longer alien to it but its own. Just as that sage of antiquity sought what is good and beautiful in his own thought, while leaving to his daemon knowledge of the paltry, contingent content—whether it was good for him to associate with this or that person, or good for an acquaintance to undertake this journey, and similarly insignificant things—so universal consciousness obtains knowledge of the contingent from birds, or trees, or the fermenting earth whose vapor deprives self-consciousness of its composure. For the contingent is what lacks reflection and is alien, and ethical consciousness accordingly lets itself be determined about it in an unreflective and alien way, as by a throw of dice. If the individual determines himself through his understanding and deliberately chooses what is useful to him, this self-determination is grounded in the determinacy of his particular character; this is itself contingent. Hence that knowledge of understanding concerning what is useful to the individual is a knowledge just like that of those oracles or of the lot, except that the one consulting the oracle or lot thereby expresses the ethical disposition of indifference toward the contingent, whereas

the former treats what is in itself contingent as an essential interest of his thought and knowledge. Higher than both, however, is indeed to make deliberation the oracle of contingent doing, but to know this deliberate action itself, because of its relation to the [1807 664] particular and its usefulness, as something contingent.

713 The true self-conscious existence that spirit receives in language which is not the language of an alien, and thus contingent, nonuniversal self-consciousness is the artwork we saw above. It stands opposed to the thinglike artwork of the statue. Just as the latter is existence at rest, the former is vanishing existence; just as in the latter objectivity, set free, lacks its own immediate self, so in the former it remains too enclosed within the self, attains too little shape, and, like time, immediately no longer exists in the very act of existing.

714 *Worship* constitutes the movement of both sides in which the divine shape *moving* in the pure feeling element of self-consciousness and the divine shape *resting* in the element of thinghood reciprocally give up their different determinations, and the unity that is the concept of their essence comes into existence. In worship, the self gives itself the consciousness of divine essence descending to it from its beyond; and this essence, previously nonactual and merely objective, thereby receives the actuality proper to self-consciousness.

715 This concept of worship is already implicitly contained and present in the stream of hymnal song. This devotion is the immediate pure satisfaction of the self through and within itself. It [1807 665] is the purified soul, which in this purity is immediately only essence and one with essence. Because of its abstraction, it is not consciousness distinguishing its object from itself, and thus is only the night of the object's existence and the *prepared place* for its shape. *Abstract worship* therefore raises the self to being this pure *divine element*. The soul accomplishes this purification consciously; yet it is not the self that, having descended into its depths, knows itself as evil, but is a self that *is*: a soul that cleanses its exterior by washing, clothes it in white garments, and leads its

inwardness along the represented path of labors, punishments, and rewards, the path of cultivation externalizing particularity in general, through which it attains the dwellings and community of the blessed.

716 This worship is as yet only *a secret*—that is, merely represented, nonactual—accomplishment. It must be *actual* action; a nonactual action contradicts itself. Through this, *consciousness proper* rises into its *pure* self-consciousness. Within it, essence has the meaning of a free object; through actual worship this object returns into the self. And insofar as in pure consciousness it has the meaning of pure essence dwelling beyond actuality, this essence descends from its universality through this [1807 666] mediation to singularity and thus joins itself with actuality.

717 The way both sides enter action is determined as follows: for the self-conscious side, insofar as it is *actual* consciousness, essence presents itself as *actual nature*. On the one hand, nature belongs to it as possession and property and counts as existence that is not *in itself*; on the other, nature is *its own* immediate actuality and singularity, likewise regarded by it as nonessence and sublated. At the same time, however, for its *pure* consciousness that external nature has the *opposite* meaning, namely of being the essence *that is in itself*, before which the self sacrifices its inessentiality, just as, conversely, it sacrifices nature's inessential side to itself. The action is spiritual movement because it is this twofold movement: to sublate the abstraction of *essence*, as devotion determines the object, and make it actual; and to sublate the *actual*, as the agent determines the object and itself, and elevate it into universality.

718 The action of worship itself therefore begins with the pure *surrender* of a possession, which the owner pours out or lets rise in smoke, apparently to no use for himself. In this he renounces, before the essence of his pure consciousness, possession and the right of property and its enjoyment, personality and the return of doing [1807 667] into the self, and reflects the action into the universal, or into essence, rather than into himself.—Conversely, however, *existent essence* equally perishes in this. The animal sacrificed is the *sign* of a god; the

fruits consumed are the *living* Ceres and Bacchus *themselves*. In the former die the powers of the upper right, which has blood and actual life; in the latter die the powers of the lower right, which, bloodless, possesses secret, cunning power.—Insofar as the sacrifice of divine substance is *doing*, it belongs to the self-conscious side; for this actual doing to be possible, essence must already have sacrificed itself *in itself*. It has done so by giving itself *existence* and making itself the *individual animal* and the *fruit*. This renunciation, already accomplished *in itself* by essence, is presented by the acting self in existence and for its consciousness; and it replaces that *immediate* actuality of essence with the higher actuality, namely *its own*. For the unity that has arisen as the result of the sublation of the singularity and separation of both sides is not merely negative fate, but has positive meaning. Only to abstract subterranean essence is what is sacrificed wholly surrendered, thereby marking the reflection of possession and being-for-itself into the universal as distinct from the self as such. At the same time, however, this is only [1807 668] a small *part*, and the other sacrificing is merely the destruction of the unusable, and rather the preparation of the sacrifice for a meal whose feast cheats the action of its negative meaning. In that first sacrifice, the sacrificer reserves the greater part, and in this one the useful part, *for his enjoyment*. This enjoyment is the negative power that sublates *essence* as well as *singularity*, and at the same time it is the positive actuality in which the *objective* existence of essence is transformed into *self-conscious* existence, and the self has consciousness of its unity with essence.

719 This worship is indeed an actual action, yet its meaning lies more in devotion alone; what belongs to devotion is not objectively produced, just as the result deprives itself of existence in *enjoyment*. Worship therefore goes further and initially remedies this deficiency by giving its devotion an *objective subsistence*, as the common labor, or individual labor possible for everyone, that produces the dwelling and adornment of the god in his honor.—Through this the objectivity of the statue is partly sublated, for by this consecration of his gifts and labors the worker makes the god favorable to him and intuits his self as belonging to the god; partly, too, this doing is not the individual labor of the artist, but this

particularity is dissolved in universality. Yet it is not only the [1807 669] god's honor that is brought about, nor does the blessing of his favor flow to the worker only in *representation*; rather, labor also has the reverse meaning to its first meaning of externalization and the honor of another. The god's dwellings and halls are for human use, the treasures preserved in them belong in times of need to human beings; the honor the god enjoys in his adornment is the honor of the people skilled in art and generous in spirit. At the festival this people likewise adorns its own dwellings and clothing, as well as its activities, with elegant equipment. In this way, for its gifts it receives recompense from the grateful god and proofs of his favor, in which it joined itself with him through labor—not in hope and a distant actuality, but in the honoring and offering of gifts it immediately enjoys its own wealth and adornment.

b. *The living artwork*.

720 The people that approaches its god in the worship of the religion of art is the ethical people, which knows its state and the state's actions as the will and accomplishment of itself. This spirit, confronting the self-conscious people, [1807 670] is therefore not the being of light, which, selfless, does not contain the certainty of individuals within itself, but is rather only their universal essence and the imperious power in which they vanish... The worship of the religion of this simple, shapeless essence therefore returns to its adherents only this in general: that they are the people of their god. It obtains for them only their subsistence and simple substance in general, not their actual self, which is instead rejected. For they revere their god as empty depth, not as spirit. Yet the worship of the religion of art, on the other hand, lacks that abstract *simplicity* of essence, and therefore its *depth*. But the *essence* that is *immediately united with the self* is *in itself* spirit and *knowing truth*, although not yet truth known, or knowing itself in its depths. Because essence here thus contains the self, its appearance is friendly to consciousness; and in worship consciousness receives not only the universal warrant for its subsistence but also its self-conscious exis-

tence within essence. Conversely, essence has its actuality not as a selfless actuality in a rejected people whose substance alone is recognized, but in the people whose *self* is recognized in its substance.

721 From worship, then, self-consciousness emerges satisfied in its essence, and the god has entered it as his dwelling. This *dwelling* is for itself the night of substance, or its pure individuality, [1807 671] but no longer the strained individuality of the artist, not yet reconciled with his essence becoming *objective*. Rather, it is the satisfied night that has its pathos within it without need, because it returns from intuition, from sublated objectivity.—This *pathos* is for itself the essence of *dawn*, but an essence that has now *set* within itself and has its setting—self-consciousness, and thereby existence and actuality—within itself.—Here it has traversed the movement of its actualization. Lowering itself from its pure essentiality to an objective power of nature and that power's manifestations, it is an existence for the other, for the self by which it is consumed. The silent essence of selfless nature attains in its fruit the stage at which, preparing and digesting itself, it offers itself to self-endowed life. In its usefulness, its capacity to be eaten and drunk, it reaches its highest perfection; for therein it is the possibility of a higher existence and touches spiritual existence. Partly as quietly potent substance, partly as spiritual fermentation, the spirit of earth has developed in its metamorphosis, in the former case into the feminine principle of nourishment, in the latter into the masculine principle of the self-impelling force of self-conscious existence.

722 In this enjoyment, then, that dawning being of light is disclosed for what it is; enjoyment is its mystery [1807 672]. For the mystical is not the concealment of a secret, or ignorance, but consists in the self's knowing itself as one with essence, which is thus revealed. Only the self is manifest to itself, or what is manifest is so only in the immediate certainty of itself. But through worship simple essence has been posited in this certainty. As a useful thing it has not merely the existence that is seen, felt, smelled, and tasted, but is also the object of desire; through actual enjoyment it becomes one with the self and thereby wholly disclosed and manifest to it.—What is said to be manifest to reason or

to the heart is in fact still secret, for it still lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both objective certainty and the certainty of enjoyment, which in religion is not merely thoughtless immediate certainty but at the same time the purely knowing certainty of the self.

723 What has thus become manifest within self-conscious spirit itself through worship is *simple* essence as the movement partly of emerging from its nocturnal concealment into consciousness, to be consciousness's quietly nourishing substance, and partly of losing itself again in the subterranean night, in the self, and lingering above only with a mother's silent yearning.—The more clamorous impulse, however, is the many-named being of light of the dawn [1807 673] and its reeling life, which likewise relinquishes its abstract being, first gathers itself into the objective existence of the fruit, then surrenders itself to self-consciousness and attains actuality proper within it—now roaming about as a throng of frenzied women, the unbridled revel of nature in self-conscious shape.

724 Yet what has been disclosed to consciousness is still only absolute spirit as this simple essence, not spirit as it is in itself as spirit: only *immediate* spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious life is therefore only the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, properly higher gods, whose individuality contains self-consciousness as such as an essential moment. Spirit has therefore not yet sacrificed itself to consciousness as *self-conscious* spirit, and the mystery of bread and wine is not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.

725 This unsettled revel of the god must quiet itself into an *object*, and the inspiration that did not attain consciousness must produce a work confronting it—as the statue confronted the inspiration of the preceding artist—as an equally perfected work, but not as something lifeless within itself, rather as a *living* self.—Such a worship is the festival that the human being gives in his own honor, though [1807 674] he does not yet invest such a human being with the meaning of absolute essence. For *essence* alone is manifest to him as yet, not spirit—not as something that *essentially* assumes human shape. Yet this worship lays

the ground for that revelation and lays out its moments separately: here the *abstract* moment of essence's living *bodiliness*, as previously the unity of both in unconscious frenzy. The human being therefore places himself in the position of the statue, as a shape trained and worked into perfectly free *movement*, just as the statue is perfectly free *repose*. While every individual knows how to present himself at least as a torchbearer, one among them stands out who is movement given shape, the polished finish and fluid strength of every limb—an animated living artwork that couples strength with its beauty and receives, as the prize of its strength, the adornment with which the statue was honored, and the honor among its people of being, in place of the stone god, the highest bodily presentation of their essence.

726 In the two presentations just encountered, the unity of self-consciousness and spiritual essence is present, but they still lack their equilibrium. In Bacchic inspiration the self is outside itself, while in beautiful bodiliness spiritual essence is outside itself. The former's stupor of consciousness and wild stammering must be taken up into the [1807 675] clear existence of the latter, and the latter's spiritless clarity into the inwardness of the former. The perfect element in which inwardness is as much outward as outwardness is inward is once again language—but neither the language of the oracle, wholly contingent and individual in content, nor the feeling hymn praising only the individual god, nor the contentless stammering of Bacchic frenzy. Rather, language has acquired its clear and universal content: its *clear* content, because the artist has worked his way out of the first wholly substantial inspiration into a shape that is an existence of its own, penetrated in all its movements by the self-conscious soul and living along with it; its *universal* content, because in this festival, which honors the human being, the one-sidedness of statues containing only one national spirit, one determinate character of divinity, disappears. The beautiful athlete is indeed the honor of his particular people, but he is a bodily singularity in which the fullness and seriousness of meaning, and the inward character of spirit bearing the particular life, concerns, needs, and customs of his people, have perished. In this externalization into complete bodiliness, spirit

has laid aside the particular impressions and echoes of nature that it contained as the actual spirit of the people. Its people is [1807 676] therefore no longer conscious in him of its particularity, but rather of the laying aside of that particularity and of the universality of its human existence.

c. *The spiritual artwork*.

727 The national spirits that become conscious of the shape of their essence in a particular animal merge into one; so the particular beautiful national spirits unite into one pantheon whose element and dwelling is language. The pure intuition of itself as *universal humanity* takes, in the actuality of the national spirit, the form of its joining with the others, with whom it constitutes one nation by nature, in a common enterprise, and forming for this work a collective people and thereby a collective heaven. Yet this universality attained by spirit in its existence is only this first universality, which initially proceeds from the individuality of ethical life, has not yet overcome its immediacy, and has not formed one state out of these peoples. The ethical life of the actual national spirit rests partly on the immediate trust of individuals in the whole of their people, partly on the immediate share that all, regardless of differences of estate, take in the [1807 677] decisions and actions of government. In the union, initially not into a permanent order but merely for a common action, that freedom of participation of each and all is *temporarily* set aside. This first commonality is therefore more an assembly of individualities than the rule of abstract thought that would deprive individuals of their self-conscious share in the will and deed of the whole.

728 The assembly of national spirits constitutes a circle of shapes now embracing the whole of nature as well as the whole ethical world. They too stand more under the *supreme command* of one than under his *sovereignty*. For themselves they are the universal substances of what the *self-conscious* essence is and does *in itself*. This essence, however, constitutes the power and initially at least the center about which those universal beings busy themselves, a center that as yet seems to connect their affairs only contingently. Yet the return of divine essence into self-consciousness already contains the ground for self-consciousness's

constituting the center for those divine powers, and initially conceals the essential unity beneath the form of a friendly external relation between the two worlds.

729 The same universality belonging to this content necessarily also belongs to the form of [1807 678] consciousness in which it appears. It is no longer the actual doing of worship, but a doing raised, though not yet into the concept, at least into *representation*, into the synthetic connection of self-conscious and external existence. The existence of this representation, *language*, is the first language, the *epic* as such, containing the universal content at least as the *completeness* of the world, though not as the *universality* of *thought*. The *singer* is the individual and actual being from whom, as the subject of this world, it is produced and sustained. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but Mnemosyne, recollection and inwardness that has come to be, the remembrance of the previously immediate essence. He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, his universal song. Yet what is in fact present is the syllogism in which the extreme of universality, the world of the gods, is linked through the middle term of particularity with singularity, the singer. The middle term is the people in its heroes, who are individual human beings like the singer, but only *represented* and thereby at the same time *universal*, like the free extreme of universality, the gods.

730 In this epic, then, what comes about *in itself* in worship is in general *presented* to consciousness: the relation of the divine to the human. The content is an *action* of self-conscious essence. *Acting* disturbs the repose of [1807 679] substance and stirs essence, through which its simplicity is divided and opened into the manifold world of natural and ethical powers. Action is the violation of the tranquil earth, the pit that, animated by blood, summons the departed spirits, which, thirsting for life, receive it in the doing of self-consciousness. The undertaking about which the universal effort turns acquires two sides: the *self-endowed* side of being accomplished by a totality of actual peoples and the individualities standing at their head, and the *universal* side of being accomplished by their substantial powers. But the *relation* between the two was determined

above as the *synthetic* connection of universal and individual, or as *representation*. The judgment of this world depends on this determinacy.—The relation between the two is consequently a mixture that inconsistently divides the unity of doing and needlessly tosses the action from one side to the other. The universal powers possess the shape of individuality and thereby the principle of action; their operation therefore appears as a doing as free and wholly originating from themselves as human doing. One and the same thing has therefore been done by gods and human beings alike. The seriousness of those powers is a ridiculous excess, since human beings are in fact the force of acting individuality; and the exertion and [1807 680] labor of the latter is an equally useless effort, since the former instead direct everything.—The mortals of a day, who are nothing, are at the same time the mighty *self* that subjects universal beings to itself, wounds the gods, and in general provides them with actuality and an interest in doing. Conversely, these powerless universalities, which feed on human gifts and only thereby receive something to do, are the natural essence and material of all events, and likewise the ethical material and pathos of doing. If their elemental natures are first brought into actuality and active relation through the free self of individuality, they are just as much the universal withdrawing from this connection, remaining unlimited in its determination, and through the invincible elasticity of its unity effacing the punctuality of the agent and its configurations, maintaining itself in purity, and dissolving everything individual in its fluidity.

731 Just as they fall into this contradictory relation with the opposing self-endowed nature, so their universality comes into conflict with their own determination and its relation to others. They are the eternal, beautiful individuals that, resting in their own existence, are removed from transience and alien violence.—Yet at the same time they are *determinate* elements, *particular* [1807 681] gods, and thus relate to others. But relation to others, which in its opposition is a conflict with them, is a comic self-forgetting of their eternal nature.—Determinacy is rooted in divine subsistence and has, in its limitation, the independence of the whole individuality; through this their characters at the same

time lose the sharpness of their distinctive traits and mingle in their ambiguity. —A purpose of their activity, and their activity itself, since it is directed against an other and thus against an invincible divine power, is a contingent, empty swagger that equally dissolves, turning the apparent seriousness of the action into a harmless, self-assured play without result or success. Yet if, in the nature of their divinity, the negative or their determinacy appears only as the inconsistency of their activity and the contradiction of purpose and outcome, and that independent security retains the upper hand over determinacy, then precisely thereby the *pure force* of the *negative* confronts them as their ultimate power, over which they have no power. They are the universal and positive against the *individual self* of mortals, which cannot withstand their might; but the *universal self* therefore hovers over them and over this entire world of representation to which the whole content belongs, as the *conceptless emptiness* of *necessity*: an event before [1807 682] which they behave selflessly and mournfully, for these *determinate* natures do not find themselves in this purity.

732 This necessity, however, is the *unity of the concept* to which the contradictory substantiality of individual moments is subject, in which the inconsistency and contingency of their doing is ordered and the play of their actions receives its seriousness and worth within those actions themselves. The content of the world of representation plays out its movement, released and for itself, in the *middle*, gathered about the individuality of a hero who, however, in his strength and beauty feels his life broken and mourns as he looks toward an early death. For *singularity stable within itself and actual* is excluded to the extremity and divided into its moments, which have not yet found and united with one another. The one individual, the *abstract*, nonactual individual, is necessity, which has no share in the life of the middle, any more than the other, the *actual* individual, the singer, who keeps himself outside it and disappears in his representation. Both extremes must approach the content: the one, necessity, must fill itself with the content; the other, the singer's language, must share in it; and the content, previously left to itself, must acquire within itself the certainty and firm determination of the negative.

[1807 683]

733 This higher language, *tragedy*, thus draws closer together the dispersion of the moments of the essential and acting world. The *substance* of the divine separates into its shapes *according to the nature of the concept*, and its *movement* likewise conforms to the concept. As regards form, language, by entering into the content, ceases to be narrative, just as the content ceases to be represented. The hero is himself the speaker, and the representation shows the listener, who is at the same time a spectator, *self-conscious* human beings who *know* their right and their purpose, the power and will of their determinacy, and know how to *say* it. They are artists who do not, like the language accompanying ordinary doing in actual life, unconsciously, naturally, and naively express the *exterior* of their decision and enterprise. Rather, they utter the inner essence, demonstrate the right of their action, and thoughtfully maintain and determinately express the pathos to which they belong in its universal individuality, free of contingent circumstances and the particularity of personalities. Finally, the *existence* of these characters is *actual* human beings who assume the persons of the heroes and present them in actual speech that is not narrative but their own. Just as it is essential to the statue to be made by human hands, so the actor is essential to his mask—not as an external condition from which the contemplation of art must abstract; or, insofar [1807 684] as it must indeed abstract from it, this says precisely that art does not yet contain within itself the true, proper self.

734 The *universal ground* on which the movement of these shapes produced from the concept takes place is the consciousness of the first representational language and its selfless content left dispersed. It is the common people in general, whose wisdom finds speech in the *chorus* of *old age*. The people has its representative in the chorus's powerlessness, because it itself constitutes only the positive and passive material of the individuality of government confronting it. Lacking the power of the negative, it cannot hold together and tame the wealth and colorful fullness of divine life, but lets it scatter, praising each individual moment as an independent god, now this one, now another, in its reverent hymns. But where it senses the seriousness of the concept striding over these

shapes and shattering them, and sees how badly its praised gods fare when they venture onto this ground where the concept rules, it is not itself the negative power intervening in action. Rather, it remains in the selfless thought of that power, in the consciousness of *alien fate*, and contributes the empty wish for peace and the weak speech of appeasement. In *fear* before the higher powers, the immediate arms of [1807 685] substance, before their conflict with one another and before the simple self of necessity that crushes them too, like the living beings bound to them; in *pity* for these beings, whom it knows at the same time to be the same as itself, there is for it only inactive terror at this movement, equally helpless lament, and, as the end, the empty repose of resignation to necessity. Necessity's work is grasped neither as the necessary action of character nor as the doing of absolute essence within itself.

735 Upon this observing consciousness, as upon the indifferent ground of representation, spirit appears not in its dispersed manifoldness but in the simple division of the concept. Its substance therefore shows itself torn apart only into its two extreme powers. These elemental *universal* essences are at the same time self-conscious *individualities*: heroes who place their consciousness in one of these powers, have in it the determinacy of their character, and constitute its activity and actuality.—This universal individualization, as noted, descends still further to the immediate actuality of existence proper and presents itself to a crowd of spectators that has in the chorus its counterpart, or rather its own self-expressing representation.

736 The content and movement of spirit that is here its own object have already been considered as the nature and [1807 686] realization of ethical substance. In its religion spirit attains consciousness of itself, or presents itself to its consciousness in its purer form and simpler shape. Thus, if ethical substance divided through its concept, according to its *content*, into the two powers determined as *divine* and *human*, or subterranean and upper right—the former the *family*, the latter *state power*, the first having the *female*, the other the *male character*—then the circle of gods, previously multiform and wavering in its determinations, is restricted to these powers, which through this determination

have been brought nearer to individuality proper. For the earlier dispersion of the whole into manifold, abstract powers appearing as substantialized is the *dissolution* of the *subject*, which comprehends them only as *moments* within its self, and individuality is therefore merely the superficial form of those beings. Conversely, any further distinction of *characters* beyond the one named must be reckoned as contingent personality, external in itself.

737 At the same time, essence divides according to its *form*, or *knowledge*. *Acting* spirit, as consciousness, confronts the object upon which it acts and which is thus determined as the *negative* of the knower. The agent thereby finds himself in the opposition of knowing and not-knowing. He takes his purpose from his character and knows it [1807 687] as ethical essence; but through the determinacy of his character he knows only the one power of substance, while the other is hidden from him. Present actuality is therefore one thing *in itself* and another for consciousness. In this relation upper and lower right acquire the meaning of the power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness and the power that conceals itself and lies in ambush. The one is the *side of light*, the god of the oracle who, in his natural moment sprung from the sun that illuminates everything, knows and reveals all—*Phoebus*, and *Zeus*, his father. Yet the commands of this truth-speaking god and his announcements of what *is* are, rather, deceptive. For in its concept this knowledge is immediately not-knowing, because *consciousness* in action is this opposition within itself. The one who could himself solve the riddle of the enigmatic Sphinx, as well as the one who trusts with a child's confidence, is therefore sent to ruin by what the god reveals to him. This priestess through whom the beautiful god speaks is nothing other than the equivocal sisters of fate, who drive to crime through their promises and, through the double meaning of what they offered as security, deceive whoever relied on the obvious sense. Thus the consciousness purer than the latter, which believes the witches, and more reflective [1807 688] and thorough than the former, which trusts the priestess and the beautiful god, hesitates over

revenge after the revelation made by his father's spirit itself concerning the crime that murdered him, and arranges for further proofs—on the ground that this revealing spirit might also be the devil.

738 This mistrust is grounded because knowing consciousness places itself in the opposition between certainty of itself and objective essence. The right asserted by ethical consciousness—that actuality is nothing *in itself* as opposed to absolute law—meets with the experience that its knowledge is one-sided, its law only the law of its character, and that it has grasped only one power of substance. Action itself is this inversion of the *known* into its *opposite*, *being*; it is the overturning of the right of character and knowledge into the right of the opposite, with which the former is linked in the essence of substance—into the Erinys of the other power and character, stirred to hostility. This *lower* right sits on the throne with *Zeus* and enjoys equal standing with manifest right and the knowing god.

739 Acting individuality restricts the chorus's world of gods to these three essences. The one is *substance*, equally the power of the hearth and the spirit of familial piety and the universal power of state and [1807 689] government. Since this distinction belongs to substance as such, it does not individualize itself for representation into two distinct shapes, but has in actuality the two persons of its characters. By contrast, the distinction between knowing and not-knowing falls within *each actual self-consciousness*, and only in abstraction, in the element of universality, is it distributed between two individual shapes. For the self of the hero has existence only as whole consciousness and is therefore essentially the *whole* distinction belonging to form; but his substance is determinate, and only one side of the distinction of content belongs to him. Thus the two sides of consciousness, which in actuality have no separate individuality of their own, each receive their particular shape *in representation*: the one that of the revealing god, the other of the Erinys who keeps herself hidden. The two partly enjoy equal honor; partly, the *shape* of *substance*, Zeus, is the necessity of their *relation* to one another. Substance is the relation in which knowledge is for itself

but has its truth in the simple; the difference through which actual consciousness exists has its ground in the inner essence that effaces it; and the self-clear *assurance* of *certainty* has its confirmation in *forgetfulness*.

740 Consciousness opened up this opposition through action. Acting according to manifest knowledge, [1807 690] it experiences that knowledge's deception; and, devoted in content to one attribute of substance, it violated the other and thereby gave it a right against itself. Following the knowing god, it grasped instead the unmanifest, and pays for having trusted knowledge, whose ambiguity, since it is knowledge's nature, had also to be present *for it* as a *warning*. The priestess's frenzy, the witches' inhuman shape, the voice of the tree or bird, the dream, and so on, are not the modes in which truth appears but warning signs of deception, thoughtlessness, the singularity and contingency of knowledge. Or, what is the same, the opposing power it violates is present as expressed law and valid right, whether the law of the family or of the state; against this, consciousness followed its own knowledge and concealed the manifest from itself. But the truth of the powers of content and consciousness confronting one another is the result that both have equal right and therefore, in their opposition produced by action, equal wrong. The movement of doing demonstrates their unity in the mutual downfall of both powers and of the self-conscious characters. The opposition's reconciliation with itself is the *Lethe* of the *underworld* in death, or the *Lethe* of the *upper world* as acquittal—not from guilt, for consciousness, because it [1807 691] acted, cannot deny this, but from crime—and its atoning peace. Both are *forgetfulness*, the vanishedness of the actuality and doing of the powers of substance, of their individualities, and of the powers of the abstract thought of good and evil. For neither power for itself is the essence; rather, essence is the repose of the whole within itself, the motionless unity of fate, tranquil existence and thereby the inactivity and lifelessness of family and government, the equal honor and thereby indifferent nonactuality of Apollo and the Erinys, and the return of their inspiration and activity into simple Zeus.

741 This fate completes the depopulation of heaven—the thoughtless mixture of individuality and essence, a mixture through which the doing of essence appears inconsistent, contingent, and unworthy of it; for individuality, attached to essence only superficially, is inessential. The expulsion of such essenceless representations demanded by philosophers of antiquity therefore begins already in tragedy in general, insofar as the division of substance is governed by the concept, individuality is thus essential, and the determinations are absolute characters. The self-consciousness represented in tragedy therefore knows and recognizes [1807 692] only one highest power, and this Zeus only as the power of state or hearth, and, in the opposition of knowledge, only as the father of the knowledge of the *particular* taking shape, and as the Zeus of the oath and of the Erinys, of the *universal*, inwardness dwelling in concealment. By contrast, the moments that disperse further out of the concept into representation and that the chorus successively accepts are not the hero's pathos but sink for him into passion—into contingent, essenceless moments that the selfless chorus indeed praises, but that are incapable of constituting the heroes' character or of being expressed and esteemed by them as their essence.

742 Yet the persons of divine essence itself, like the characters of its substance, also converge into the simplicity of the unconscious. In relation to self-consciousness, this necessity has the determination of being the negative power of all appearing shapes, in which self-consciousness does not recognize itself but instead perishes. The self appears only as allotted to the *characters*, not as the middle term of the movement. But self-consciousness, the simple *certainty* of itself, is in fact the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the *substantial* essence, and *abstract* necessity; it is the spiritual unity into which everything returns. Because actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from substance and fate, it is *partly* the chorus [1807 693], or rather the observing crowd, which this movement of divine life fills with fear as something *alien*, or in which, as something close at hand, it produces only the emotion of inactive *pity*. Partly, insofar as consciousness participates in action and belongs to the characters, this union

—because the true union of self, fate, and substance is not yet present—is external, a *playacting*. The hero appearing before the spectator divides into his mask and the actor, into the person and the actual self.

743 The self-consciousness of the heroes must emerge from its mask and present itself as it knows itself to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers themselves, and as no longer separated from the chorus, universal consciousness.

744 *Comedy*, then, has first of all the aspect that actual self-consciousness presents itself as the fate of the gods. As *universal* moments, these elemental essences are neither self nor actual. They are indeed equipped with the form of individuality, but this is only imagined for them and does not belong to them in and for themselves. The actual self does not have such an abstract moment as its substance and content. It, the subject, is therefore raised above such a moment as above an individual property; and, wearing this mask, it expresses the irony of that property which wants to be something [1807 694] for itself. The pretensions of universal essence are exposed to the self: it shows itself caught in an actuality and drops its mask precisely when it wants to be something proper. Appearing here in its meaning as actual, the self plays with the mask it once puts on to be its person—but just as quickly emerges again from this semblance in its own nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be indistinguishable from the proper self, the actor, as well as from the spectator.

745 This universal dissolution of shaped essence in general in its individuality becomes more serious in its content, and thereby more mischievous and bitter, insofar as the content has its more serious and necessary meaning. Divine substance unites within itself the meaning of natural and ethical essence. As regards the natural, actual self-consciousness already shows itself, in using nature for its adornment, dwelling, and so on, and in the feast of its sacrifice, to be the fate to which the secret of nature's selfhood has been disclosed. In the mystery of bread and wine, self-consciousness appropriates nature together with the meaning of inner essence, and in comedy it is conscious of the irony of

this meaning in general.—Now insofar as this meaning contains ethical essence, it is partly the people in its [1807 695] two aspects, the state or demos proper and familial singularity; partly, however, self-conscious pure knowledge, or rational thought of the universal.—That *demos*, the universal mass that knows itself as lord and ruler and as the understanding and insight to be respected, constrains and deludes itself through the particularity of its actuality, presenting the ridiculous contrast between its opinion of itself and its immediate existence, its necessity and contingency, its universality and vulgarity. When the principle of its singularity separated from the universal emerges in actuality's proper shape and openly lays claim to and organizes the commonwealth whose secret injury it is, the contrast is more immediately disclosed between the universal as a theory and what matters in practice: the complete liberation of the purposes of immediate singularity from universal order and the mockery of the latter by the former.

746 Rational *thought* frees divine essence from its contingent shape and, opposed to the chorus's conceptless wisdom, which brings forth various moral sayings and accepts a multitude of laws and determinate concepts of duty and right, raises them to the simple ideas of the *beautiful* and the *good*.—The movement of this [1807 696] abstraction is consciousness of the dialectic these maxims and laws have within themselves, and thereby of the disappearance of the absolute validity in which they previously appeared. As the contingent determination and superficial individuality that representation lent divine essences disappears, on their *natural* side they retain only the nakedness of their immediate existence: they are clouds, a vanishing vapor, like those representations. In their *thought* essentiality, having become the *simple* thoughts of the *beautiful* and the *good*, they permit themselves to be filled with any content at will. The force of dialectical knowledge hands determinate laws and maxims of action over to the pleasure and frivolity of youth, which is thereby led astray, and places weapons of deception in the hands of the anxiety and care of old age, confined to life's singularity. The pure thoughts of the beautiful and the good thus offer the comic spectacle of becoming empty through liberation from opinion—which con-

tains both their determinacy as content and their absolute determinacy, consciousness's holding fast—and thereby becoming the plaything of opinion and the caprice of contingent individuality.

747 Here, then, the previously unconscious fate, which consists in empty repose and forgetfulness [1807 697] and is separated from self-consciousness, is united with it. The *individual self* is the negative power through and in which the gods and their moments, existent nature and the thoughts of its determinations, disappear. At the same time it is not the emptiness of vanishing, but preserves itself in this nullity, is at home with itself, and is the sole actuality. The religion of art has perfected itself in this self and returned completely into itself. Because it is individual consciousness in its certainty of itself that presents itself as this absolute power, this power has lost the form of something *represented*, *separated* from *consciousness* in general and alien to it, as were the statue, the living beautiful body, the content of the epic, and the powers and persons of tragedy. Nor is the unity the *unconscious* unity of worship and the mysteries; rather, the actor's proper self coincides with his person, as does the spectator, who is completely at home in what is presented to him and sees himself playing. What this self-consciousness intuits is that whatever assumes the form of essence against it instead dissolves and is surrendered within its thinking, existence, and doing. It is the return of everything universal into certainty of itself, which is thereby complete fearlessness, the [1807 698] essencelessness of everything alien, and a well-being and ease of consciousness unlike any to be found outside this comedy.

[1807 699]

C. *Revealed religion*.

748 Through the religion of art spirit has passed from the form of *substance* into that of the *subject*, for this religion *produces* its shape and thus posits within it *doing*, or *self-consciousness*, which merely vanishes in the terrible substance and does not grasp itself in trust. This incarnation of divine essence begins with the statue, which has only the *external* shape of the self, while the *inward*, its activity, falls outside it. In worship, however, both sides have become one; in the

result of the religion of art, this unity in its perfection has also passed over to the extreme of the self. In spirit perfectly certain of itself in the singularity of consciousness, all essence has submerged. The proposition expressing this lightheartedness reads: *the self is absolute essence*. The essence that was substance, and in [1807 700] which the self was accidentality, has sunk to a predicate; and in *this self-consciousness*, confronted by nothing in the form of essence, spirit has lost its *consciousness*.

749 This proposition, *the self is absolute essence*, belongs, as is evident, to nonreligious, actual spirit, and we must recall the shape of spirit that expresses it. This shape will also contain the movement and reversal of the proposition, which lowers the self to a predicate and elevates substance to subject. This occurs in such a way that the reversed proposition does not make substance into subject *in itself* or *for us*—or, what is the same, restore substance so that spirit's consciousness is led back to its beginning, natural religion—but brings about this reversal *for and through self-consciousness* itself. By giving itself up consciously, self-consciousness is preserved in its externalization and remains the subject of substance; but, as equally externalized, it has at the same time consciousness of substance. Or, by *producing* substance as subject through its sacrifice, this subject remains its own self. Thus, whereas in the two propositions—in the first, that of substantiality, the subject merely vanishes, and in the second substance is only a predicate, so that both sides are present in each with an opposite inequality of value—the [1807 701] union and interpenetration of both natures emerges, in which both, with equal value, are equally *essential* and yet only *moments*. Spirit is thereby equally *consciousness* of itself as its *objective* substance and simple *self-consciousness* remaining within itself.

750 The religion of art belongs to ethical spirit, which we earlier saw perish in the *condition of right*: that is, in the proposition that *the self as such*, the *abstract person, is absolute essence*. In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people; it is *fulfilled* universality. But *simple singularity* rises out of this content, and its lightheartedness purifies it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this, the *reality* of ethical spirit is lost; the contentless spir-

its of individual peoples are assembled into one pantheon—not a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form lets each have its way, but the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembodies them and bestows being-in-and-for-itself upon the spiritless self, the individual person.

751 Yet through its emptiness this self has let the content go free. Consciousness is the essence only *within itself*; its own *existence*, the legal recognition of the person, is unfulfilled abstraction. It therefore possesses rather only the thought of itself; or, as it *exists* and knows itself as object, it is the *nonactual*. It is therefore only the Stoic *[1807 702] independence* of *thought*; and this, passing through the movement of skeptical consciousness, finds its truth in the shape called *unhappy self-consciousness*.

752 This consciousness knows what the actual validity of the abstract person amounts to, and likewise its validity in pure thought. It knows such validity, rather, as complete loss; it is itself this loss conscious of itself and the externalization of its knowledge of itself.—We see that this unhappy consciousness constitutes the counterpart and completion of comic consciousness, which is perfectly happy within itself. Into the latter all divine essence returns, or it is the complete *externalization* of *substance*. The former, conversely, is the tragic fate of the *certainty of itself* that is supposed to be in and for itself. It is the consciousness of the loss of all *essence* in *this certainty* of itself, and of the loss of this very knowledge of itself—of substance as well as self. It is the pain that expresses itself in the harsh words, *God has died*.

753 In the condition of right, then, the ethical world and its religion have sunk into comic consciousness, and unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this *entire* loss. It has lost the intrinsic worth both of its immediate personality and of its mediated, *thought* personality. Likewise [1807 703] trust in the eternal laws of the gods has fallen silent, as have the oracles that claimed to know the particular. The statues are now corpses from which the animating soul has fled, just as the hymn is words from which faith has fled. The tables of the gods lack spiritual food and drink, and from its games and festivals consciousness no

longer receives the joyful unity of itself with essence. The works of the Muse lack the power of spirit for which certainty of itself emerged from the crushing of gods and human beings. They are now what they are for us—beautiful fruits broken from the tree; a friendly fate offered them to us as a girl presents those fruits. It does not give the actual life of their existence, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements that constituted their substance, nor the climate that constituted their determinacy, or the change of seasons that governed the process of their becoming.—So, with the works of that art, fate gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened, but only the veiled remembrance of that actuality.—Our doing in enjoying them is therefore not worship, through which our consciousness would attain its perfect truth filling it completely. Rather, it is external doing that perhaps wipes [1807 704] raindrops or specks of dust from these fruits and, in place of the inner elements of the ethical actuality that surrounded, produced, and inspired them, erects the elaborate scaffolding of the dead elements of their external existence—language, history, and so on—not to live its way into them, but merely to represent them within itself. Yet just as the girl offering the plucked fruits is more than their nature spread out into its conditions and elements—the tree, air, light, and so on—which immediately offered them, because in a higher manner she gathers all this into the ray of the self-conscious eye and the offering gesture, so the spirit of fate offering us those artworks is more than the ethical life and actuality of that people. For it is the *inward re-collection* of spirit still *externalized* in them; it is the spirit of tragic fate gathering all those individual gods and attributes of substance into the one pantheon, into spirit conscious of itself as spirit.

754 All the conditions of its emergence are present, and this totality of its conditions constitutes its *becoming*, its *concept*, or its emergence *in itself*.—The circle of art's productions embraces the forms of the externalizations of absolute substance. Substance exists in the form of individuality as a thing, as an *existent* object [1807 705] of sensuous consciousness; as pure language, or the becoming of the shape whose existence does not step outside the self and which is a

purely *vanishing* object; as immediate *unity* with universal *self-consciousness* in its inspiration and as mediated unity in the doing of worship; as beautiful *self-endowed bodiliness*; and finally as existence raised into *representation* and expanded into a world that ultimately gathers itself into universality, which is equally *pure certainty of itself*.—These forms, and on the other side the *world* of the *person* and of right, the devastating savagery of the elements of content set free, likewise the *thought* person of Stoicism and the unstable unrest of skeptical consciousness, constitute the circumference of shapes that stand expectantly and urgently about the birthplace of spirit becoming self-consciousness. The all-pervading pain and yearning of unhappy self-consciousness is their center and the common birth pang of spirit's emergence—the simplicity of the pure concept containing those shapes as its moments.

755 Spirit has within it the two sides presented above as the two reversed propositions. One is that *substance* externalizes itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other, conversely, that *self-consciousness* externalizes [1807 706] itself and makes itself thinghood, or universal self. Both sides have thus approached one another, and their true union has thereby arisen. Substance's externalization, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses the transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of *necessity*, or the fact that substance is self-consciousness *in itself*. Conversely, self-consciousness's externalization expresses its being universal essence *in itself*; or, because the self is pure being-for-itself that remains at home with itself in its opposite, it expresses that *for it* substance is self-consciousness, and precisely thereby spirit. Of this spirit, therefore, which has left the form of substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, it may be said—if one wishes to use relations taken from natural generation—that it has an *actual* mother but a father *being in himself*. For *actuality*, or self-consciousness, and the *in-itself* as substance are its two moments, through whose reciprocal externalization, each becoming the other, spirit enters existence as their unity.

756 Insofar as self-consciousness one-sidedly grasps only *its own* externalization, even though its object is thus being as well as self and it knows all existence as spiritual essence, true spirit has nevertheless not yet come to be for it: namely, insofar as being in general, or [1807 707] substance, has not equally for its part externalized itself *in itself* and become self-consciousness. For then all existence is spiritual essence only *from the standpoint of consciousness*, not in itself. Spirit is in this way merely *imagined into* existence. This imagining is the *enthusiasm* that supplies nature and history, the world and the mythical representations of preceding religions, with an inner sense other than what they immediately offer to consciousness in their appearance, and, as regards religions, other than what the self-consciousness whose religions they were knew in them. Yet this meaning is borrowed, a garment that does not cover the nakedness of appearance or win faith and reverence, but remains the murky night and private ecstasy of consciousness.

757 For this meaning of the objective not to be mere imagination, it must be *in itself*: that is, *first*, it must spring for consciousness from the *concept* and emerge in its necessity. Thus, through cognition of *immediate consciousness*, or consciousness of the *existent* object, self-knowing *spirit* has arisen for us through consciousness's necessary movement. *Second*, this concept, which as immediate also had the shape of *immediacy* for its consciousness, has given itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*: that is, according to precisely the [1807 708] necessity of the concept by which *being* or *immediacy*, the contentless object of sensuous consciousness, externalizes itself and becomes I for consciousness.—But the *thinking in-itself*, or the *cognition* of *necessity*, differs from the *immediate in-itself*, or *existent necessity* itself—a distinction that nevertheless does not lie outside the concept, for the *simple unity* of the concept is *immediate being* itself. The concept is just as much self-externalization, or the becoming of *intuited necessity*, as it is at home with itself in that necessity, knowing and comprehending it.—The *immediate in-itself* of spirit giving itself the shape of self-con-

sciousness means nothing other than that the actual world-spirit has attained this knowledge of itself; only then does this knowledge also enter its consciousness, and enter as truth. How that happened has emerged above.

758 That absolute spirit has given itself the shape of self-consciousness *in itself*, and thereby also for its *consciousness*, now appears as the *faith of the world* that spirit *exists* as a self-consciousness, that is, as an actual human being; that it is present for immediate certainty; that believing consciousness *sees* and *feels* and *hears* this divinity. Thus it is not imagination, but *actually so*. Consciousness then does not proceed from *its* inwardness, from thought, and join *within itself* the thought of God with [1807 709] existence, but proceeds from immediate, present existence and recognizes God in it.—The moment of *immediate being* is present in the content of the concept in such a way that religious spirit, in the return of all essence into consciousness, has become a *simple* positive self, just as actual spirit as such in unhappy consciousness is precisely this *simple*, self-conscious negativity. The self of existent spirit thereby has the form of complete immediacy. It is posited neither as thought or represented nor as produced, as is the case with the immediate self partly in natural religion, partly in the religion of art. Rather, this God is immediately sensuously intuited as self, as an actual individual human being; only thus *is* he self-consciousness.

759 This incarnation of divine essence, or its essentially and immediately having the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of absolute religion. In it essence is known as spirit, or religion is spirit's consciousness of itself as spirit. For spirit is knowledge of itself in its externalization, the essence that is the movement of retaining equality with itself in its otherness. This, however, is substance insofar as in its accidentality it is equally reflected into itself, not indifferent toward accidentality as something inessential and thus finding itself in something alien, [1807 710] but *within itself* therein—that is, insofar as it is *subject* or *self*.—In this religion divine essence is therefore *revealed*. Its being manifest evidently consists in its being known for what it is. But it is known precisely by being known as spirit, as essence that is essentially *self-consciousness*. —For *consciousness*, something in its object is secret when the object is an *other*

or *alien* to it, and when it does not know the object as *itself*. This secrecy ceases when absolute essence as spirit is the object of consciousness; for in this way spirit is *self* in its relation to consciousness. That is, consciousness immediately knows itself in spirit, or is manifest to itself in it. Consciousness is manifest to itself only in its own certainty of itself. Its object is the *self*, but the self is nothing alien; it is inseparable unity with itself, the immediately universal. It is the pure concept, pure thought or *being-for-itself*, which is immediately *being* and thereby *being-for-another* and, as this *being-for-another*, is immediately returned into itself and at home with itself. It is therefore what is truly and solely manifest. The good, the just, the holy, creator of heaven and earth, and so on, are *predicates* of a subject—universal moments that find their support at this point and exist initially only in consciousness's return into thought.—When *they* are known, their ground and essence, the *subject* itself, is not yet manifest [1807 711]; and likewise they are the *determinations* of the universal, not *this universal* itself. The *subject* itself, and thereby also *this pure universal*, is manifest, however, as *self*. For the self is precisely this inwardness reflected into itself that immediately exists and is the very certainty of the self for which it exists. This—to be manifest according to its *concept*—is therefore the true shape of spirit; and this shape of its, the concept, is equally its sole essence and substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness and is immediately manifest to self-consciousness, for it is self-consciousness itself. Divine nature is the same as human nature, and it is this unity that is intuited.

760 Here, then, consciousness—or the way essence is for itself, its shape—is in fact equal to its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness; it is thereby at the same time an *existent* object, and this *being* equally immediately has the meaning of *pure thought*, of absolute essence.—Absolute essence existing as an actual self-consciousness seems to have *descended* from its eternal simplicity, but in fact it has only thereby attained its *highest* essence. For the concept of essence, only when it has attained its simple purity, is absolute *abstraction*, which is *pure thought* and thereby the pure singularity of the self, and, because of its simplicity, the *immediate*, or *being*.—What is called sensuous

consciousness is precisely this pure *abstraction*: [1807 712] it is this thought for which *being* is the *immediate*. The lowest is therefore at the same time the highest; the manifest, which has emerged entirely onto the *surface*, is precisely therein the *deepest*. That the highest essence is seen, heard, and so on as an existent self-consciousness is therefore in fact the perfection of its concept; and through this perfection essence *exists* as immediately as it is essence.

761 This immediate existence is at the same time not solely and merely immediate consciousness, but religious consciousness. Immediacy inseparably has the meaning not only of an *existent* self-consciousness but of purely thought, or absolute, *essence*. Religious consciousness is conscious of what we are conscious of in our concept: that *being is essence*. This *unity* of being and essence, of *thought* that is immediately *existence*, is as much its *immediate* knowledge as it is the *thought* of this religious consciousness, or its *mediated* knowledge. For this unity of being and thought is *self*-consciousness and itself *exists*, or the *thought* unity has at the same time this shape of what it is. God is therefore *manifest* here as *he is; he exists* as he is *in himself*: he exists as spirit. God is attainable only in pure speculative knowledge, exists only in it, and is only this knowledge itself, for he is spirit; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of revealed religion. The former knows him as *thought* or pure essence, and this thought as being and as [1807 713] existence, and existence as the negativity of itself, hence as self, *this* self and universal self; revealed religion knows precisely this.—The hopes and expectations of the preceding world pressed solely toward this revelation: to intuit what absolute essence is and to find oneself in it. This joy comes to self-consciousness and seizes the whole world—the joy of seeing itself in absolute essence. For absolute essence is spirit, the simple movement of those pure moments which itself expresses precisely this: that essence is known as spirit only through being intuited as *immediate* self-consciousness.

762 This concept of spirit itself knowing itself as spirit is itself immediate and not yet developed. Essence is spirit, or it has appeared, it is manifest; this first manifestation is itself *immediate*. But immediacy is equally pure mediation, or

thought; it must therefore display this within itself as such.—More determinately considered, spirit in the immediacy of self-consciousness is *this individual* self-consciousness opposed to the *universal*. It is an exclusive one that, for the consciousness *for which* it exists, still has the unresolved form of a *sensuous other*. This consciousness does not yet know spirit as its own, or spirit does not yet exist equally as universal self, as the self of all, as it exists as *individual* self. Or the shape does not yet have the form of the *concept*: that is, of the [1807 714] universal self, the self that in its immediate actuality is equally sublated, thought, universality, without losing that actuality in universality.—Yet the next and itself immediate form of this universality is not already the form *of thought* itself, *of the concept as concept*, but the universality of actuality, the totality of selves, and the elevation of existence into representation. Thus everywhere—and to give a determinate example—the sublated *sensuous this* is initially the thing of *perception*, not yet the *universal* of understanding.

763 This individual human being, then, as whom absolute essence is manifest, carries out within himself as an individual the movement of *sensuous being*. He is the *immediately* present God; thereby his *being* passes into *having-been*. The consciousness for which he has this sensuous presence ceases to see and hear him; it *has* seen and heard him. And only through its merely *having* seen and heard him does it itself become spiritual consciousness; or, as he previously arose for it as *sensuous existence*, he has now arisen *in spirit*.—For as something that sees and hears him sensuously, it is itself merely immediate consciousness, which has not sublated the inequality of objectivity or taken it back into pure thought, but knows this objective individual, not itself, as spirit. In the vanishing of the immediate existence of what is known as [1807 715] absolute essence, the immediate acquires its negative moment. Spirit remains the immediate self of actuality, but as *the universal self-consciousness* of the community, resting in its own substance, just as this substance is universal subject within it. Not the individual for himself, but the individual together with the consciousness of the community, and what he is for this community, is his complete whole.

764 Yet *pastness* and *distance* are only the imperfect form in which the immediate mode is mediated or posited as universal. This mode is only superficially immersed in the element of thought, preserved in it *as* sensuous mode, and not united with the nature of thought itself. It is raised only into *representation*, for representation is the synthetic connection of sensuous immediacy and its universality, or thought.

765 This *form of representation* constitutes the determinacy in which spirit becomes conscious of itself in this community of its. It is not yet spirit's self-consciousness that has matured to its concept as concept; mediation is still incomplete. This connection of being and thought therefore contains the defect that spiritual essence is still burdened with an unreconciled division into a here and a beyond. The *content* is true, but all its moments, posited in the element of representation, have the character of not being comprehended, but appearing as [1807 716] completely independent sides relating *externally* to one another. For the true content also to receive its true form for consciousness, consciousness requires the higher cultivation of raising its intuition of absolute substance into the concept and reconciling *for itself* its consciousness with its self-consciousness, as has happened for us or *in itself*.

766 This content must be considered in the way it exists in its consciousness.—Absolute spirit is *content*; thus it is in the shape of its *truth*. But its truth is not merely to be the substance of the community, or its *in-itself*, nor merely to emerge from this inwardness into the objectivity of representation, but to become actual self, to reflect itself into itself and be subject. This, then, is the movement it carries out in its community, or this is its life. What this self-revealing spirit is *in and for itself* is therefore not brought out by, as it were, unwinding its rich life in the community and tracing it back to its first thread—perhaps to the representations of the first imperfect community, or even to what the actual human being said. This reduction is grounded in the instinct to reach the concept; but it confuses the *origin* as the *immediate existence* of the first appearance with the *simplicity* of the *[1807 717] concept*. Through this impoverishment of the life of spirit, through removing the community's repre-

sentation and its doing in relation to that representation, what arises instead of the concept is therefore rather mere externality and singularity, the historical mode of immediate appearance and the spiritless recollection of an individual shape merely meant, and of its past.

767 Spirit is first the content of its consciousness in the form *of pure substance*, or is the content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the movement of descending into existence, or singularity. The middle term between them is their synthetic connection, consciousness of becoming-other, or representation as such. The third is the return from representation and otherness, or the element of self-consciousness itself.—These three moments constitute spirit; its separation in representation consists in being in a *determinate* way, but this determinacy is nothing other than one of its moments. Its fully unfolded movement is thus to spread out its nature in each of its moments as in an element. As each of these circles completes itself within itself, this reflection into itself is at the same time the transition into the other. *Representation* constitutes the middle term between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only *one* of the determinations; yet at the same time, [1807 718] as has been shown, its character of being the synthetic connection extends over all these elements and is their common determinacy.

768 The content itself that must be considered has already appeared in part as the representation of *unhappy* and *believing* consciousness: in the former, however, as a content *produced from consciousness* and *yearned for*, in which spirit can neither find satisfaction nor rest because it is not yet its content *in itself*, or as its *substance*; in the latter, by contrast, it was considered as the selfless *essence* of the world, or as the essentially *objective* content of representation—a representation that flees actuality altogether and therefore lacks the *certainty of self-consciousness*, which separates itself from representation partly as the vanity of knowledge, partly as pure insight.—The consciousness of the community, by contrast, has this content as its *substance*, just as it is the community's *certainty* of its own spirit.

769 Spirit, first represented as substance in the *element of pure thought*, is thereby immediately simple, self-identical, eternal *essence*, having, however, not this abstract *meaning* of essence but the meaning of absolute spirit. Yet spirit is precisely this: to be not meaning, not inwardness, but actuality. Simple eternal essence would therefore be spirit only as an empty word if it remained at the representation and expression of [1807 719] simple eternal essence. But because simple essence is abstraction, it is in fact *the negative within itself*, specifically the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in *essence* in itself. That is, it is absolute *difference* from itself, or its pure becoming-other. As *essence* it is only *in itself*, or for us; but because this purity is precisely abstraction, or negativity, it is *for itself*, or the *self*, the *concept*.—It is therefore *objective*; and since representation apprehends and expresses the *necessity* of the concept just stated as an *event*, it will be said that eternal essence *begets* an other for itself. Yet in this otherness it has equally immediately returned into itself. For the difference is difference *in itself*: that is, it is immediately distinguished only from itself; it is therefore unity returned into itself.

770 Thus the three moments are distinguished: *essence*; *being-for-itself*, which is essence's otherness and for which essence is; and *being-for-itself*, or self-knowing, *in the other*. Essence intuits only itself in its being-for-itself; in this externalization it is only at home with itself. The being-for-itself that excludes itself from essence is the *knowledge* of *essence about itself*. It is the word that, when spoken, leaves the speaker externalized and emptied, but is equally immediately heard; and only this hearing of [1807 720] itself is the word's existence. Thus the differences made are as immediately dissolved as they are made, and as immediately made as they are dissolved; and the true and actual is precisely this movement circling within itself.

771 This movement within itself expresses absolute essence as *spirit*. Absolute essence not grasped as spirit is only the abstract void, just as spirit not grasped as this movement is only an empty word. When its *moments* are grasped in their purity, they are the restless concepts that exist only in being their opposite within themselves and having their rest in the whole. But the community's *rep-*

resentation is not this *comprehending* thought; rather, it has the content without its necessity, and instead of the form of the concept introduces the natural relations of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Because it thus behaves *representationally* in thought itself, essence is indeed manifest to it, but on account of this synthetic representation the moments of essence partly separate from one another, so that they do not relate through their own concept; partly representation retreats from this pure object of its and relates to it only externally. The object is revealed to it by an alien being, and in this thought of spirit it recognizes neither itself nor the nature of pure self-consciousness. [1807 721] Insofar as one must go beyond the form of representation and those relations taken from nature—and thus especially beyond taking the moments of the movement that spirit is for isolated, unshakable substances or subjects instead of passing moments—this going-beyond, as remarked above in another connection, must be seen as an urging of the concept. Yet because it is only instinct, it misunderstands itself, rejects the content along with the form, and, what is the same, reduces it to a historical representation and an inheritance of tradition. Here only the purely external aspect of faith is retained, as something dead and without cognition; its *inward* aspect, however, has disappeared, because this would be the concept knowing itself as concept.

772 Absolute spirit, represented in *pure essence*, is indeed not *abstract* pure essence; rather, precisely because pure essence is only a moment in spirit, it has sunk to an *element*. Yet the presentation of spirit in this element has the same formal deficiency that *essence* has as essence. Essence is the abstract, and therefore the negative of its simplicity, an other; likewise, *spirit* in the element of essence is the *form* of *simple unity*, which is therefore equally essentially a becoming-other.—Or, what is the same, the relation of eternal essence to its being-for-itself is [1807 722] the immediately simple relation of pure thought. In this *simple* intuition of itself in the other, *otherness* is therefore not posited as such; it is difference as it is immediately *no difference* in pure thought—a recognition *of love*, in which the two did not *oppose* one another in their essence.—Spirit expressed

in the element of pure thought is itself essentially this: to exist not only in pure thought but to be *actual*, for its concept itself contains *otherness*, that is, the sublation of the pure, merely thought concept.

773 Because the element of pure thought is abstract, it is itself, rather, the *other* of its simplicity and therefore passes over into the proper element of *representation*: the element in which the moments of the pure concept acquire a *substantial* existence against one another, while equally being *subjects* that do not possess for a third party the indifference of being toward one another, but, reflected into themselves, separate themselves from one another and stand opposed.

774 Spirit that is thus merely eternal, or abstract, becomes *an other* to itself, or enters existence, and immediately *immediate existence*. It therefore *creates* a *world*. This *creating* is representation's word for the *concept* itself in its absolute movement, or for the fact that the simple, or pure thought, pronounced as absolute, because it is abstract, is rather the negative and hence what is opposed to itself, the *other*; or, to say the same in yet another [1807 723] form, because what is posited as *essence* is simple *immediacy*, or *being*, but as immediacy or being lacks the self, and thus, lacking inwardness, is *passive*, or *being-for-another*.—This *being-for-another* is at the same time *a world*. Spirit in the determination of *being-for-another* is the tranquil subsistence of the moments previously enclosed in pure thought, thus the dissolution of their simple universality and their separation into their own particularity.

775 But the world is not merely this spirit scattered into completeness and its external order. Rather, because spirit is essentially the simple self, this self is equally present in the world: *existent* spirit, the individual self that has consciousness and distinguishes itself from itself as an other, or as world.—As this individual self is initially posited so immediately, it is not yet *spirit for itself*; it therefore does not *exist as* spirit. It may be called *innocent*, but hardly *good*. For it actually to be self and spirit, just as eternal essence presents itself as the movement of being equal to itself in its otherness, it must first become an *other* to itself. Since

this spirit is determined as initially existing immediately, or as dispersed into the manifoldness of its consciousness, its becoming-other is the *withdrawal into itself* of knowledge in general. Immediate existence turns into thought, or [1807 724] merely sensuous consciousness into consciousness of thought; and because this is thought emerging from immediacy, or *conditioned* thought, it is not pure knowledge but thought containing otherness, and thus the self-opposed thought of *good* and *evil*. The human being is represented as having lost the form of equality with himself by plucking from the tree of the knowledge of *good* and *evil*, and as having been driven out of the state of innocent consciousness, out of nature offering itself without labor and out of paradise, the garden of animals; this is represented as something that *happened*, as something not necessary.

776 Since this withdrawal into itself of existent consciousness is immediately determined as becoming *unequal* to itself, *evil* appears as the first existence of consciousness that has withdrawn into itself; and because the thoughts of *good* and *evil* are absolutely opposed and this opposition is not yet resolved, this consciousness is essentially only evil. Yet at the same time, precisely because of this opposition, *good* consciousness also exists against it, along with their relation to one another.—Insofar as immediate existence turns into *thought*, and *being-within-itself* is thereby more closely determined partly as thought itself, partly as the moment of essence's *becoming-other*, becoming evil can be transferred farther backward, out of the existent world and already into the first realm of thought. Thus it may [1807 725] be said that the firstborn son of light himself, by withdrawing into himself, fell away, but another was at once begotten in his place. Such a form belonging only to representation, not to the concept, as *falling away*, like *son*, conversely lowers the moments of the concept into representation, or carries representation over into the realm of thought.—It is equally indifferent whether one places a manifoldness of other shapes beside the simple thought of *otherness* in eternal essence and transfers the *withdrawal into itself* to these. This addition must at the same time be approved, because the moment of *otherness* thereby also expresses diversity, as it should—not multi-

plicity in general, but determinate diversity as well. Thus one part, the son, is the simple being knowing itself as essence, while the other part is the externalization of being-for-itself that lives only in praise of essence; in this part, the taking back of externalized being-for-itself and the withdrawal of evil into itself can then also be placed. Insofar as otherness divides into two, spirit would be more determinate in its moments and, if they were counted, expressed as a quaternity, or, because the multitude itself again divides into two parts, those that remained good and those that became evil, even as a quintinity.—But *counting* the moments may in general be regarded as useless, partly because what is distinguished [1807 726] is itself just as much only *one*, namely the *thought* of difference, which is only one thought, as it is *this* distinguished term, the second against the first; partly because the thought that gathers the many into one must be dissolved out of its universality and distinguished into more than three or four distinct terms. Against the absolute determinacy of the abstract one, the principle of number, this universality appears as indeterminacy in relation to number itself, so that one could speak only of *numbers* in general, that is, not of a *number* of differences. Thus thinking here of number and counting at all is entirely superfluous, just as elsewhere the mere difference of magnitude and multitude is conceptless and says nothing.

777 *Good* and *evil* were the determinate differences of thought that emerged. Since their opposition has not yet resolved itself and they are represented as essences of thought, each independent for itself, the human being is the essenceless self and the synthetic ground of their existence and struggle. Yet these universal powers belong just as much to the self, or the self is their actuality. According to this moment, then, just as evil is nothing other than the withdrawal into itself of spirit's natural existence, conversely good enters actuality and appears as an existent self-consciousness.—What in purely thought spirit is merely indicated as the divine essence's *becoming-other* [1807 727] in general here approaches its realization for representation; for representation, this consists in divine essence's self-abasement, its renunciation of its abstraction and nonactuality.—Representation takes the other side, evil, as an event alien to divine

essence. To grasp it in divine essence itself, *as its wrath*, is the highest and hardest effort of representation wrestling with itself, an effort that remains fruitless because it lacks the concept.

778 The alienation of divine essence is thus posited in its twofold manner. The self of spirit and its simple thought are the two moments whose absolute unity is spirit itself; its alienation consists in their separating and one having an unequal value in relation to the other. This inequality is therefore twofold, and two connections arise whose common moments are those stated. In the one, *divine essence* counts as essential, natural existence and the self as inessential and to be sublated; in the other, conversely, *being-for-itself* counts as essential and the simple divine as inessential. Their still empty middle term is *existence* in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.

779 The dissolution of this opposition occurs not so much through the struggle of the two represented as [1807 728] separate and independent essences. Their *independence* entails that *in itself*, through its concept, each must dissolve itself within itself. Struggle occurs only where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence and stand opposed merely as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they exist essentially only in their opposed relation; as independent, by contrast, they have their essentiality outside the opposition. Their movement is therefore their own free movement. Thus, just as the movement of both is movement *in itself*, because it must be considered in the terms themselves, so the one determined as being-in-itself against the other also begins it. This is represented as a voluntary doing; but the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept that what is in itself, being so determined only in opposition, precisely for that reason has no true subsistence. Thus the one for which not being-for-itself but the simple counts as essence is what externalizes itself, goes into death, and thereby reconciles absolute essence with itself. For in this movement it presents itself as *spirit*. Abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and self-endowed actuality. This otherness of its, or its sensuous presence, is taken back through the second becoming-other and posited as sublated, as *universal*. Essence has thereby become itself in this other-

ness [1807 729]; the immediate existence of actuality has ceased to be alien or external to essence, since it is sublated, universal. This death is therefore essence's arising as spirit.

780 The sublated immediate presence of self-conscious essence is that essence as universal self-consciousness. This concept of the sublated individual self that is absolute essence therefore immediately expresses the constitution of a community, which, hitherto remaining in representation, now returns into itself as into the self; and spirit thus passes from the second element of its determination, representation, into the *third*, self-consciousness as such.—If we consider further how that representation behaves in its advance, we see first the expression that divine essence assumes human nature. In this it is already *expressed* that *in themselves* the two are not separate; just as, in divine essence's externalizing itself *from the beginning*, its existence withdrawing into itself and becoming evil, it is not expressed but *contained* that *in itself* this evil existence is not alien to divine essence. Absolute essence would have only this empty name if there were in truth an *other* to it, if there were a *falling away* from it; rather, the moment of *being-within-itself* constitutes the essential moment of the *self* of spirit.—That *being-within-itself*, and only thereby *actuality*, belongs to essence itself—what for us is *concept*, and insofar as it is concept—[1807 730] appears to representational consciousness as an incomprehensible *event*; the *in-itself* assumes for it the form of *indifferent being*. Yet the thought that those apparently mutually fleeing moments, absolute essence and the self being-for-itself, are not separate *also* appears to this representation—for it possesses the true content—but afterward, in the externalization of divine essence becoming flesh. This representation, which in this way is still *immediate* and therefore not spiritual, or knows essence's human shape only as particular, not yet universal, becomes spiritual for this consciousness in the movement of the shaped essence sacrificing its immediate existence again and returning to essence. Essence as *reflected into itself* is first spirit.—The *reconciliation* of divine essence with the *other* in general, and specifically with the *thought* of the other, *evil*, is thus represented here.—If this reconciliation is expressed according to *its con-*

cept by saying it consists in *evil* being *in itself the same* as *good*, or divine essence being *the same* as nature in its entire compass, while nature separated from divine essence is only *nothing*, this must be regarded as an unspiritual manner of expression that must necessarily provoke misunderstandings.—When evil is *the same* as good, precisely evil is not evil, and good is not good either, but both are instead sublated: evil in general is [1807 731] being-for-itself that is within itself, and good the selfless simple. Expressed thus according to their concept, their unity becomes clear at once; for being-for-itself that is within itself is simple knowledge, and the selfless simple is equally pure being-for-itself within itself.—Thus, however much it must be said that according to this concept of them good and evil—that is, insofar as they are not good and evil—are *the same*, it must just as much be said that they are *not* the same, but absolutely *different*. For simple being-for-itself, or pure knowledge, are equally pure negativity, or absolute difference within themselves.—Only these two propositions complete the whole, and the assertion and assurance of the first must be confronted with invincible obstinacy by adherence to the other. Since both have equal right, both have equal wrong; and their wrong consists in taking such abstract forms as *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *nonidentity*, for something true, fixed, and actual, and resting upon them. Neither the one nor the other has truth; rather, their movement does: the simple same is abstraction and thereby absolute difference, while difference, as difference in itself, is distinguished from itself and is therefore equality with itself. Precisely the same holds of the *sameness* of divine essence and nature in general and [1807 732] human nature in particular. The former is nature insofar as it is not essence; the latter is divine according to its essence. But it is spirit in which both abstract sides are posited as they are in truth, namely as *sublated*—a positing that cannot be expressed through the judgment and its spiritless *is*, its copula.—Likewise nature is *nothing outside* its essence; but this nothing itself equally *is*. It is absolute abstraction, hence pure thought or being-within-itself, and, with the moment of its opposition to spiritual unity, it is *evil*. The difficulty in these concepts consists solely in holding fast to the *is* and forgetting the thinking in which the moments both *are* and *are not*—are only the movement that spirit is.

—This spiritual unity, or the unity in which the differences exist only as moments, or as sublated, is what has come to be for representational consciousness in that reconciliation; and since it is the universality of self-consciousness, this consciousness has ceased to be representational. The movement has returned into it.

781 Spirit is therefore posited in the third element, in *universal self-consciousness*: it is its *community*. The movement of the community as self-consciousness distinguishing itself from its representation is to *produce* what has come to be *in itself*. The divine human being, or human God, who has died is *in himself* universal [1807 733] self-consciousness; he must become this *for this self-consciousness*. Or, since self-consciousness constitutes one side of the opposition of representation, namely the evil side for which natural existence and individual being-for-itself count as essence, this side, represented as independent and not yet as a moment, must because of its independence raise itself in and for itself to spirit, or display spirit's movement within itself.

782 It *is natural spirit*. The self must withdraw from this naturalness and go into itself, which would mean becoming *evil*. But it is already evil *in itself*; withdrawing into itself therefore consists in *convincing itself* that natural existence is evil. The *existent* becoming-evil and being-evil of the world, as well as the *existent* reconciliation of absolute essence, falls within representational consciousness. Within *self-consciousness* as such, however, what is represented falls, in form, only as a sublated moment; for the *self* is the negative, hence *knowledge*—a knowledge that is a pure doing of consciousness within itself.—This moment of the *negative* must likewise express itself in the content. Since essence is already reconciled with itself *in itself* and is spiritual unity in which the parts of representation are *sublated*, or *moments*, this presents itself in each part of representation receiving here the *opposite* meaning from the one it had before. Each meaning thereby completes itself in the other, and only thereby is the [1807 734] content spiritual. Because determinacy is just as much its opposite,

unity in otherness, the spiritual, is perfected—just as for us or *in itself* the opposite meanings united above and sublated even the abstract forms of *the same* and *not the same*, *identity* and *nonidentity*.

783 If, therefore, in representational consciousness the *inwardizing* of natural self-consciousness was *existent evil*, then *inwardizing* in the element of self-consciousness is *knowledge of evil* as something that is *in itself* in existence. This knowledge is therefore indeed a becoming-evil, but only a becoming of the *thought* of *evil*, and is consequently recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For as a return into itself out of the immediacy of nature, which is determined as evil, it is an abandonment of nature and the dying away of sin. Consciousness abandons not natural existence as such, but natural existence at the same time as something known as evil. The immediate movement of *withdrawing into itself* is equally mediated: it presupposes itself, or is its own ground. For the ground of withdrawal into itself is that nature has already withdrawn into itself in itself; the human being must withdraw into himself on account of evil, but *evil* is itself this withdrawal into oneself.—This first movement is therefore itself only immediate, or its *simple concept*, because it is the same as its [1807 735] ground. Movement, or becoming-other, must therefore still enter in its more proper form.

784 Besides this immediacy, therefore, the *mediation* of representation is necessary. *In itself*, *knowledge* of nature as spirit's untrue existence, and this universality of the self that has come to be within itself, is spirit's reconciliation with itself. For self-consciousness that does not comprehend, this *in-itself* receives the form of something *existent and represented to it*. Comprehension for it is therefore not the grasping of this concept, which knows sublated naturalness as universal and thus reconciled with itself, but the grasping of that *representation* according to which, through the *event* of divine essence's own externalization, through its incarnation and death that have occurred, divine essence is reconciled with its existence.—The grasping of this representation now expresses more determinately what was previously called spiritual resurrection within it, or the becoming of its individual self-consciousness into universal self-consciousness, or the

community.—The *death* of the divine human being *as death* is *abstract* negativity, the immediate result of the movement ending only in *natural* universality. In spiritual self-consciousness, death loses this natural meaning, or becomes its concept just given. From what it immediately means, the nonbeing of *this individual*, [1807 736] death is transfigured into the *universality* of spirit, which lives in its community and daily dies and rises again within it.

785 What belongs to the element *of representation*—that absolute spirit, as *an individual*, or rather as *a particular*, presents the nature of spirit in its existence—is therefore here transferred into self-consciousness itself, into knowledge preserving itself in its *otherness*. This knowledge therefore does not actually *die*, as the *particular is represented* as having *actually* died; rather, its particularity dies away in its universality, that is, in its *knowledge*, which is essence reconciling itself with itself. The immediately preceding *element of representation* is thus posited here as sublated, or has returned into the self, into its concept; what was merely existent in that element has become subject.—Precisely thereby the *first element, pure thought*, and spirit eternal within it, is no longer beyond representational consciousness or the self; rather, the return of the whole into itself is precisely its containing all moments within itself.—The death of the mediator grasped by the self is the sublation of his *objectivity*, or his *particular being-for-itself*; this *particular* being-for-itself has become universal self-consciousness.—On the other side, precisely thereby the *universal* has become self-consciousness, and the pure or nonactual spirit of mere thought has become *actual*.—The death of the mediator is the death not only of his *natural side*, or his [1807 737] particular being-for-itself; not only does the already dead shell withdrawn from essence die, but also the *abstraction* of divine essence. For insofar as his death has not yet completed reconciliation, he is the one-sided being that knows the simplicity of thought as *essence* in opposition to actuality. This extreme of the self does not yet have equal worth with essence; the self has this only in spirit. The death of this representation therefore contains at the same time the death of the *abstraction of divine essence*, which is not posited as self. It is the painful feeling of unhappy consciousness that *God himself has died*. This

harsh expression expresses the innermost simple self-knowing, the return of consciousness into the depths of the night of I = I, which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. This feeling is thus in fact the loss of *substance* and of its confronting consciousness; yet at the same time it is the pure *subjectivity* of substance, or pure certainty of itself, which substance lacked as object, or the immediate, or pure essence. This knowledge is therefore the *inspiration* through which substance has become subject, its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and it has thus become *actual*, simple and universal self-consciousness.

786 Thus spirit is spirit knowing *itself*: it knows *itself*; what is its object—or its [1807 738] representation—is the true absolute *content*. As we saw, this content expresses spirit itself. At the same time spirit is not merely *content* of self-consciousness and not merely an object *for it*, but is also *actual spirit*. It is this by traversing the three elements of its nature; this movement through itself constitutes its actuality. What moves is spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and equally it is *the moving* itself, or the substance through which the subject passes. When we entered religion, the concept of spirit had emerged for us as the movement of spirit certain of itself, forgiving evil and therein relinquishing at the same time its own simplicity and hard immutability; or as the movement in which the absolutely *opposed* recognizes itself as *the same*, and this recognition breaks forth as the *Yes* between these extremes. Religious consciousness, to which absolute essence is manifest, *intuits* this concept and sublates the *distinction* between its *self* and *what it intuits*. Just as it is the subject, so it is also the substance, and thus itself *is* spirit, precisely because and insofar as it is this movement.

787 Yet this community is not perfected in this self-consciousness of its. Its content is in general in the form of *representation* for it, and its *actual spirituality* too, its return from its representation, still contains this division, just as the element of pure thought itself was burdened with it [1807 739]. The community does not also possess consciousness of what it is. It is spiritual self-consciousness that is not its own object as such, or does not open itself into consciousness of itself;

rather, insofar as it is consciousness, it has the representations considered above.—We see self-consciousness at its final turning point become *inward* and attain *knowledge* of *being-within-itself*; we see it externalize its natural existence and gain pure negativity. But the *positive* meaning—that this negativity, or pure *inwardness* of *knowledge*, is just as much *self-identical essence*, or that substance herein attains being absolute self-consciousness—is an *other* for devout consciousness. It grasps this side, that knowledge's pure inwardizing is *in itself* absolute simplicity or substance, as the representation of something that is so not according to the *concept*, but as an act of atonement performed by an *other*. Or, it is not for it that this depth of the pure self is the power by which *abstract essence* is drawn down from its abstraction and raised to self through the force of this pure devotion.—The doing of the self thereby retains this negative meaning for it, because substance's externalization on its own side is an *in-itself* for the self, which the self does not equally grasp and comprehend, or does not find in *its* doing as such.—Since *in itself* this [1807 740] unity of essence and self has come about, consciousness also still has this *representation* of its reconciliation, but as representation. It attains satisfaction by *externally* adding to its pure negativity the positive meaning of its unity with essence; its satisfaction thus itself remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something *distant*, distant in the *future*, just as the reconciliation accomplished by the other *self* appears as distant in the *past*. Just as the *individual* divine human being has a father *being in himself* and only an *actual* mother, so the universal divine human being, the community, has its *own doing* and *knowing* as its father, but *eternal love* as its mother—a love it only *feels*, but does not intuit in its consciousness as an actual immediate *object*. Its reconciliation is therefore in its heart, but still divided from its consciousness, and its actuality still fractured. What enters its consciousness as the *in-itself*, or the side of *pure mediation*, is reconciliation lying beyond; but what exists as *present*, as the side of *immediacy* and *existence*, is the world that still awaits its transfiguration. The world is indeed reconciled with essence *in itself*; and *essence* is indeed known no longer to recognize the object as alienated from itself, but as equal to itself in its love. Yet [1807 741] for self-

consciousness this immediate present does not yet have the shape of spirit. The spirit of the community is thus, in its immediate consciousness, separated from its religious consciousness, which indeed declares that *in themselves* they are not separate, but this is an *in-itself* not realized, or not yet equally become absolute being-for-itself.

VIII. Absolute knowing

[1807 742]

VIII. *Absolute knowing*.

788 The spirit of revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such, or, what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness. Spirit itself in general, and the moments distinguishing themselves within it, fall within representation and the form of objectivity. The *content* of representation is absolute spirit, and all that remains is to sublate this mere form—or rather, because it belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have emerged in the shapes of consciousness.—This overcoming of the object of consciousness must not be taken one-sidedly, as though the object showed itself returning into the self. Rather, more determinately, the object as such both presented itself to consciousness as vanishing, and, still more, the externalization of [1807 743] self-consciousness is what posits thinghood, and this externalization has not only a negative but a positive meaning, not only for us or in itself, but for self-consciousness itself. *For it*, the negative of the object, or the object's self-sublation, has a positive meaning—or it *knows* this nullity of the object—on the one hand because it externalizes itself; for in this externalization it posits *itself* as object, or, because of the inseparable unity of *being-for-itself*, posits the object as itself. On the other hand, this also contains the further moment that it has equally sublated this externalization and objectivity

and taken them back into itself, and is thus at home with itself in *its* otherness as such.—This is the movement of *consciousness*, and in it consciousness is the totality of its moments.—Consciousness must equally relate to the object according to the totality of its determinations and have grasped it in this way according to each of them. This totality of its determinations makes the object a spiritual essence *in itself*; and for consciousness it becomes this in truth through the apprehension of each individual determination as the self, or through the spiritual relation to them just mentioned.

789 The object is thus partly *immediate* being, or a thing in general, corresponding to immediate consciousness; partly its own becoming-other, its relation, or *being-for-another*, and [1807 744] *being-for-itself*, determinacy, corresponding to *perception*; partly *essence*, or as universal, corresponding to understanding. As a whole it is the syllogism, or the movement of the universal through determination to singularity, as well as the reverse movement from singularity through singularity as sublated, or through determination, to the universal.—According to these three determinations, then, consciousness must know the object as itself. Yet what is at issue here is not knowledge as pure comprehension of the object. Rather, this knowledge must be exhibited only in its becoming, or in its moments, on the side belonging to consciousness as such, and the moments of the concept proper, or pure knowledge, in the form of shapes of consciousness. For this reason, in consciousness as such the object does not yet appear as the spiritual essence we have just expressed, and consciousness's relation to it is not the consideration of it in this totality as such or in its pure conceptual form. Rather, it is partly a shape of consciousness in general, partly a number of such shapes that *we* gather together, and in which the totality of the object's moments and of consciousness's relation can be exhibited only as dissolved into its moments.

790 Thus, for this side of grasping the object as it exists in the shape of consciousness, [1807 745] we need only recall the earlier shapes of consciousness that have already appeared.—Regarding the object, then, insofar as it is immediate, an *indifferent being*, we saw observing reason *seek* and *find* itself in this indiffer-

ent thing: that is, be conscious of its doing as something just as external as it is conscious of the object only as something immediate.—We also saw it at its summit express its determination in the infinite judgment that *the being of the I is a thing*—indeed, a sensuous, immediate thing. If the I is called *soul*, it is indeed also represented as a thing, but as invisible, intangible, and so on, thus in fact not as immediate being and not as what is meant by a thing.—Taken just as it immediately reads, that judgment is spiritless, or rather spiritlessness itself. According to its *concept*, however, it is in fact the most spiritual judgment; and this *inwardness* of it, which is not yet *present* within it, is what the other two moments to be considered express.

791 *The thing is I*: in fact, in this infinite judgment the thing is sublated. It is nothing in itself; it has meaning only in relation, only *through the I* and *its relation* to the thing.—This moment emerged for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment. Things are absolutely *useful* and must be considered solely according to their [1807 746] usefulness.—*Cultivated* self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of self-alienated spirit, has through its externalization produced the thing as itself, therefore still retains itself in it, and knows its lack of independence, or that the thing is *essentially* only *being-for-another*. Or, to express fully the *relation*, that is, what alone constitutes the nature of the object here: the thing counts for consciousness as something *being-for-itself*; consciousness declares sensuous certainty absolute truth, but declares this *being-for-itself* itself a moment that merely vanishes and passes into its opposite, into being-for-another that has been surrendered.

792 Yet knowledge of the thing is not completed in this. The thing must be known as the self not only according to the immediacy of being and according to determinacy, but also as *essence* or *inwardness*. This is present in *moral self-consciousness*. It knows its knowledge as *absolute essence*, or *being* absolutely as pure will or knowledge. Nothing *is* but this will and knowledge; to anything else belongs only inessential being, that is, being not *in itself*, only its empty husk. Insofar as moral consciousness lets *existence* go free from the self in its representation of the world, it equally takes it back into itself. Finally, as conscience it is no longer

this still alternating positing and displacing of existence and self, but knows that its [1807 747] *existence* as such is this pure certainty of itself. The objective element into which it steps as acting is nothing other than the self's pure knowledge of itself.

793 These are the moments composing spirit's reconciliation with its consciousness proper. For themselves they are individual, and their spiritual unity alone constitutes the force of this reconciliation. Yet the last of these moments is necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, in fact combines them all within itself. Spirit certain of itself in its existence has no element of *existence* other than this knowledge of itself. The declaration that what it does it does from conviction of duty—this language of its—is the *validity* of its action.—Action is the first separation, *in itself*, of the concept's simplicity and the return from this separation. This first movement turns into the second when the element of recognition, as *simple* knowledge of duty, sets itself against the *difference* and *division* lying in action as such, and in this way forms an iron actuality against action. In forgiveness, however, we saw how this hardness relinquishes itself and externalizes itself. Here, therefore, for self-consciousness actuality as *immediate existence* has no meaning other than being pure knowledge; likewise as *determinate* existence, or as [1807 748] relation, what stands opposed to itself is a knowledge partly of this pure individual self, partly of knowledge as universal. At the same time, it is posited herein that the *third* moment, *universality* or *essence*, counts for each of the two opposed sides only as *knowledge*. Finally they equally sublate the empty opposition still remaining, and are the knowledge of I—I: this *individual* self that is immediately pure, or universal, knowledge.

794 This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus shows itself accomplished from a twofold side: once in religious spirit, and again in consciousness itself as such. The two differ in that the former is this reconciliation in the form of *being-in-itself*, the latter in the form of *being-for-itself*. As they have been considered, they initially fall apart. In the order in which its shapes appeared to us, consciousness had long since arrived partly at their individual moments, partly at their union, before religion too gave its object the shape of

actual self-consciousness. The union of the two sides has not yet been exhibited; it is what concludes this sequence of the shapes of spirit. For in it spirit comes to know itself not only as it is *in itself*, or according to its absolute *content*, nor merely as it is *for itself*, according to its contentless form or the side of self-consciousness, but as it is *in and for itself*.
[1807 749]

795 Yet this union has already occurred *in itself*, indeed also in religion, in representation's return into self-consciousness, but not according to its proper form; for the religious side is the side of the *in-itself*, confronting the movement of self-consciousness. The union therefore belongs to this other side, which in the opposition is the side of reflection into itself, and thus contains itself and its opposite, not merely *in itself*, or in a universal manner, but *for itself*, or developed and differentiated. The content, like the other side of self-conscious spirit insofar as it is the *other* side, is present in its completeness and has been exhibited; the union still lacking is the simple unity of the concept. This is also already present on the side of self-consciousness itself; but as it occurred above, it has, like all the other moments, the form of being a *particular shape* of *consciousness*. —It is therefore that part of the shape of spirit certain of itself which remains within its concept and was called the *beautiful soul*. It is spirit's knowledge of itself in its pure, transparent unity: self-consciousness knowing this pure knowledge of *pure being-within-itself* as spirit—not merely the intuition of the divine, but the divine's intuition of itself.—Insofar as this concept holds itself fast in opposition to its realization, it is the one-sided shape [1807 750] whose vanishing into empty vapor, but also whose positive externalization and forward movement, we saw. Through this realization, the persistence in itself of this objectless self-consciousness, the *determinacy* of the concept against its *fulfillment*, is sublated. Its self-consciousness acquires the form of universality, and what remains to it is its true concept, or the concept that has attained its realization. It is the concept in its truth, namely in unity with its externaliza-

tion: knowledge of pure knowledge, not as abstract *essence*, which is duty, but of it as essence that is *this* knowledge, *this* pure self-consciousness, and thus at the same time a true *object*, for the object is the self being-for-itself.

796 This concept gave itself its fulfillment partly in *acting* spirit certain of itself, partly in *religion*. In the latter it attained absolute *content as content*, or in the form of *representation*, of otherness for consciousness; in the former shape, by contrast, the form is the self itself, for it contains *acting* spirit certain of itself: the self lives through the life of absolute spirit. This shape, as we see, is that simple concept, which, however, gives up its eternal *essence*, *exists*, or acts. It possesses *division*, or emergence, in the *purity* of the concept, for this purity is absolute abstraction, or negativity. It equally has within itself the element of its actuality [1807 751] or being, in pure knowledge itself; for pure knowledge is simple *immediacy*, which is *being* and *existence* just as much as *essence*: the former negative thought, the latter positive thought itself. Finally, this existence is equally being reflected out of it—both as existence and as duty—into itself, or being *evil*. This withdrawal into itself constitutes the *opposition* of the *concept*, and is thereby the appearance of the *nonacting, nonactual* pure knowledge of essence. Yet its appearance in this opposition is participation in it; pure knowledge of essence has *in itself* externalized its simplicity, for it is the *division*, or negativity, that the concept is. Insofar as this division is *becoming-for-itself*, it is evil; insofar as it is the *in-itself*, it is what remains good.—Now what first happens *in itself* is at the same time *for consciousness*, and itself equally doubled, both *for it* and as its *being-for-itself*, or its own doing. Thus the same thing already posited *in itself* now repeats itself as consciousness's knowledge of it and as conscious doing. Each relinquishes for the other the independence of the determinacy in which it appears against the other. This relinquishing is the same renunciation of the one-sidedness of the concept that *in itself* constituted the beginning, but it is now *its* renunciation, just as the concept it renounces is its own.—That *in-itself* of the beginning, as negativity, is in truth equally *mediated*; it now therefore *posits* itself as it is in truth, and the *[1807 752] negative*, as the *determinacy* of each for the other and in itself, is self-sublating. One of

the two parts of the opposition is the inequality of *being within itself*, in its *singularity*, with universality; the other is the inequality of its abstract universality with the self. The former dies to its being-for-itself and externalizes, confesses itself; the latter renounces the hardness of its abstract universality and thereby dies to its lifeless self and motionless universality. Thus the former has completed itself through the moment of universality that is essence, and the latter through the universality that is self. Through this movement of action, spirit—which is spirit only by *existing*, raising its existence into *thought* and thereby into absolute *opposition*, and returning from this opposition precisely through it and within it—has emerged as the pure universality of knowledge that is self-consciousness, as self-consciousness that is the simple unity of knowledge.

797 Thus what in religion was *content*, or the form of representing an *other*, is here the *self's* own *doing*. The concept unites the two: that the *content* is the *self's* own *doing*. For this concept, as we see, is knowledge of the self's doing within itself as all essence and all existence, knowledge of *this subject* as *substance*, and of substance as this knowledge of its doing.—What we have added here is solely, partly, the *gathering* [1807 753] of the individual moments, each of which in its principle presents the life of the whole spirit; partly, holding fast the concept in the form of the concept, whose content would already have emerged in those moments, and which would already have emerged itself in the form of a *shape of consciousness*.

798 This final shape of spirit—spirit that at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the self, and thereby realizes its concept just as much as it remains within its concept in this realization—is absolute knowing. It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, or *comprehending knowledge*. *Truth* is not only *in itself* perfectly equal to *certainty*, but also has the *shape* of certainty of itself; or, in its existence—that is, for knowing spirit—it is in the *form* of knowledge of itself. Truth is the *content* that in religion is still unequal to its certainty. But this equality consists in the content's having received the shape of the self. What essence itself is—namely, the *concept*—has thereby become the

element of existence, or the *form of objectivity* for consciousness. Spirit *appearing* to consciousness in this element, or, what is the same here, produced in it by consciousness, *is science*.

799 The nature, moments, and movement of this knowledge have thus emerged as its being the pure [1807 754] *being-for-itself* of self-consciousness. It is I, which is *this* and no other *I*, and which is equally immediately *mediated*, or a sublated, *universal* I.—It has a *content* that it *distinguishes* from itself; for it is pure negativity, or self-division: it is *consciousness*. In its distinction, this content is itself the I, for it is the movement of sublating itself, or the same pure negativity that the I is. In this distinguished content the I is reflected into itself; the content is *comprehended* only through the I's being at home with itself in its otherness. More determinately stated, this content is nothing other than the movement itself just expressed; for it is spirit traversing itself, indeed *for itself* as spirit, through having the shape of the concept in its objectivity.

800 As regards the *existence* of this concept, however, *science* appears in time and actuality no earlier than when spirit has attained this consciousness of itself. As spirit knowing what it is, it does not exist earlier or anywhere else than after completing the labor of subduing its imperfect shape, obtaining for its consciousness the shape of its essence, and in this way reconciling its *self-consciousness* with its *consciousness*.—Spirit being in and for itself, distinguished in its moments, is knowledge *being-for-itself*, *comprehension* in general, which as such has not yet [1807 755] attained *substance*, or is not absolute knowledge in itself.

801 In actuality, knowing substance is present earlier than its form, or conceptual shape. For substance is the still undeveloped *in-itself*, or the ground and concept in its still motionless simplicity, thus the *inwardness* or self of spirit that does not yet *exist*. What *exists* is present as the still undeveloped simple and immediate, or the object of *representational* consciousness in general. Because cognition is spiritual consciousness, for which what is *in itself* exists only insofar as it is *being for the self* and *being of the self*, or concept, it has for this reason initially only a poor object, compared with which substance and consciousness

of it are richer. The manifestation substance possesses in this consciousness is in fact concealment, for it is still *selfless being*, and only certainty of itself is manifest to itself. Initially, therefore, only the *abstract moments* of substance belong to *self*-consciousness. Yet as these, as pure movements, drive themselves further, self-consciousness enriches itself until it has wrested the whole substance from consciousness, absorbed the whole structure of its essences into itself, and—since this negative relation to objectivity is equally positive, a positing—produced substance from itself and thereby at the same time restored it for consciousness. Thus in the *concept* that knows itself as concept, [1807 756] the *moments* appear earlier than the *fulfilled whole*, whose becoming is the movement of those moments. In *consciousness*, by contrast, the whole, though uncomprehended, is earlier than the moments.—*Time* is the *concept* itself that *exists* and presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition. Spirit therefore necessarily appears in time, and appears in time so long as it does not *grasp* its pure concept—that is, does not efface time. Time is the pure self, *externally* intuited and *not grasped* by the self, the merely intuited concept. When the concept grasps itself, it sublates its temporal form, comprehends intuiting, and is intuition comprehended and comprehending.—Time therefore appears as the fate and necessity of spirit not completed within itself: the necessity of enriching self-consciousness's share in consciousness, setting in motion the *immediacy* of the *in-itself*—the form in which substance exists in consciousness—or, conversely, taking the in-itself as the *inward*, of realizing and revealing what is initially only *inward*; that is, claiming it for certainty of itself.

802 For this reason it must be said that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*, or, as the same thing is also expressed, that is not present as *felt truth*, as the *inwardly revealed* eternal, as the holy *believed in*, or whatever other expressions are used. For [1807 757] experience is precisely the content—and it is spirit—being *in itself*, substance, and thus the *object* of *consciousness*. Yet this substance that spirit is is its *becoming* what it is *in itself*; and only as this becoming reflecting itself into itself is spirit in itself truly *spirit*. In itself it is the movement that cognition is: the transformation of that *in-itself* into *being-for-itself*, of *sub-*

stance into *subject*, of the object of *consciousness* into the object of *self-consciousness*, that is, into an equally sublated object, or into the *concept*. This movement is the circle returning into itself, which presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end.—Since spirit is thus necessarily this differentiation within itself, its whole, intuited, confronts its simple self-consciousness; and because that whole is thus differentiated, it is distinguished into its intuited pure concept, *time*, and into the content, or the *in-itself*. As subject, substance contains the necessity, *initially only inward*, of presenting itself within itself as what it *is in itself*, *as spirit*. Only the completed objective presentation is at the same time substance's reflection, or its becoming self.—Before spirit has therefore perfected itself *in itself*, as world-spirit, it cannot attain its perfection as *self-conscious* spirit. The content of religion thus expresses in time, earlier than science, what *spirit is*; but science alone is spirit's true knowledge of itself.
[1807 758]

803 The movement of bringing forth the form of its knowledge of itself is the labor spirit accomplishes as *actual history*. Insofar as the religious community is initially the substance of absolute spirit, it is crude consciousness, whose existence is all the more barbaric and harsh the deeper its inner spirit is; and its dull self has all the harder a labor with its essence, the content of its consciousness alien to it. Only after it has given up the hope of sublating alienation in an external —that is, alien—manner does it turn toward itself, toward its own world and present, because the sublated alien manner is the return into self-consciousness. It discovers this world as its property and has thus taken the first step toward descending from the *intellectual world*, or rather toward animating that world's abstract element with the actual self. Through observation, on the one hand, it finds existence as thought and comprehends it, and conversely finds existence in its thought. Having thus initially expressed the immediate *unity* of thought *and being*, of abstract essence and self, itself abstractly, and reawakened the first being of light *more purely*—namely, as the unity of extension and being, for extension is a simplicity more equal to pure thought than light is—and thereby reawakened in thought the *substance* of the dawn, spirit at the same time recoils

in horror from this abstract unity, this *selfless* substantiality, and [1807 759] asserts individuality against it. Yet only after it has externalized individuality in cultivation, thereby made it existence and established it throughout all existence, arrived at the thought of usefulness, and grasped existence as its will in absolute freedom, does it thus turn outward the thought of its innermost depths and express essence as I = I. But this I = I is movement reflecting itself into itself. For since this equality as absolute negativity is absolute difference, the I's equality with itself confronts this pure difference, which, as pure and at the same time objective to the self knowing itself, must be expressed as *time*. Thus, just as essence was previously expressed as the unity of thought and extension, it would have to be grasped as the unity of thought and time. Yet difference left to itself, restless and unstable time, instead collapses into itself; it is the objective repose of *extension*, while extension is pure equality with itself, the I.—Or the I is not merely the self, but the *self's equality with itself*; and this equality is complete and immediate unity with itself, or *this subject* is just as much *substance*. Substance for itself alone would be contentless intuition, or intuition of a content that, as determinate, would have only accidentality and be without necessity. Substance would count as the [1807 760] absolute only insofar as it were thought or intuited as *absolute unity*, and all content in its diversity would have to fall outside it into reflection not belonging to it, because substance would not be comprehended as subject, as reflecting upon itself and into itself, or as spirit. If a content were nevertheless to be spoken of, this would be partly only to cast it into the empty abyss of the absolute; partly, however, it would be gathered externally from sensuous perception. Knowledge would seem to have arrived at things, at their difference from knowledge itself and the difference among manifold things, without anyone comprehending how or from where.

804 Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness nor its mere immersion in substance and the nonbeing of its difference. Rather, it is *this movement* of the self, which externalizes itself and immerses itself in its substance, and has equally, as sub-

ject, gone out of substance into itself and makes substance its object and content, just as it sublates this difference of objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's distinguishing itself from its substance, or the self-dividing concept, the withdrawal into itself and becoming of the pure I. Since this difference is the pure doing of I = I, the concept is the necessity and the arising of *existence* that has substance as its [1807 761] essence and subsists for itself. Yet existence's subsistence for itself is the concept posited in determinacy, and thereby equally its movement *within itself* of descending into simple substance, which is subject only as this negativity and movement. —Neither must the I hold fast to itself in the *form* of *self-consciousness* against the form of substantiality and objectivity, as though afraid of its externalization —the power of spirit consists rather in remaining equal to itself in its externalization and, as what is *in and for itself*, positing *being-for-itself* as only a moment just as much as being-in-itself—nor is it a third thing that throws the differences back into the abyss of the absolute and pronounces their equality therein. Knowledge consists rather in this apparent inactivity that merely considers how what is distinguished moves within itself and returns into its unity.

805 In knowledge, then, spirit has concluded the movement of its shaping insofar as that movement is burdened with the unsurmounted difference of consciousness. It has attained the pure element of its existence, the concept. According to the *freedom* of its *being*, the content is the self externalizing itself, or the *immediate* unity of self-knowing. The pure movement of this externalization, considered in the content, constitutes its *necessity*. As *determinate*, the differentiated content exists in relation, not in itself, and is its unrest of sublating itself, [1807 762] or *negativity*. Thus necessity, or diversity, like free being, is equally the self; and in this self-endowed *form*, in which existence is immediately thought, the content is *concept*. Having attained the concept, spirit therefore unfolds existence and movement in this ether of its life, and is *science*. In science the moments of its movement no longer present themselves as determinate *shapes* of *consciousness*, but, because consciousness's difference has returned into the self, as *determinate concepts* and as their organic movement grounded

within itself. Whereas in the phenomenology of spirit each moment is the difference between knowledge and truth and the movement in which that difference sublates itself, science, by contrast, contains neither this difference nor its sublation; rather, because the moment has the form of the concept, it unites the objective form of truth and of the knowing self in immediate unity. The moment does not appear as this movement of passing back and forth from consciousness or representation into self-consciousness and conversely, but as its pure shape freed from its appearance in consciousness, the pure concept, whose advance depends solely on its pure *determinacy*. Conversely, to every abstract moment of science there corresponds a shape of appearing spirit in general. Just as existent spirit is not richer than science, so in its [1807 763] content it is not poorer either. To recognize the pure concepts of science in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of their reality, according to which their essence—the concept, posited in science as *thought* in its *simple* mediation—unfolds the moments of this mediation and presents itself according to its inner opposition.

806 Science contains within itself this necessity of externalizing itself from the form of the pure concept, and the transition of the concept into *consciousness*. For precisely because self-knowing spirit grasps its concept, it is immediate equality with itself, which in its difference is *certainty of the immediate*, or *sensuous consciousness*—the beginning from which we started. This release of itself from the form of its self is the highest freedom and security of its knowledge of itself.

807 Yet this externalization is still imperfect; it expresses the *relation* of certainty of itself to the object, which, precisely because it is in relation, has not attained its complete freedom. Knowledge knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit. To know one's limit means to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *self* as *time* outside itself, and equally its *being* as space. This latter becoming of spirit, *nature*, is its

[1807 764] living immediate becoming; nature, externalized spirit, is in its existence nothing but this eternal externalization of its *subsistence* and the movement that establishes the *subject*.

808 The other side of spirit's becoming, *history*, is *knowing*, *self-mediating* becoming—spirit externalized into time; yet this externalization is equally the externalization of itself: the negative is the negative of itself. This becoming presents a sluggish movement and succession of spirits, a gallery of images, each endowed with the complete wealth of spirit and moving so sluggishly precisely because the self must penetrate and digest this whole wealth of its substance. Since spirit's perfection consists in completely *knowing* what *it is*, its substance, this knowledge is its *withdrawal into itself*, in which it abandons its existence and entrusts its shape to remembrance. In withdrawing into itself, it is submerged in the night of its self-consciousness; yet its vanished existence is preserved in this night, and this sublated existence—the previous existence, but reborn from knowledge—is the new existence, a new world and shape of spirit. In this world it must just as ingenuously begin again from the start with its immediacy and rear itself anew from there, as though everything preceding were lost to it and it had learned nothing from the experience of earlier spirits. Yet *recollection into inwardness* has preserved them and is the inward and in fact higher form [1807 765] of substance. Thus, when this spirit begins its cultivation again from the start, seemingly proceeding only from itself, it begins at the same time on a higher stage. The realm of spirits formed in existence in this manner constitutes a succession in which one displaced another and each took over the kingdom of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of depth, and this depth is *the absolute concept*. This revelation is therefore the sublation of its depth, or its *extension*, the negativity of this I being within itself, which is its externalization or substance—and its *time*: that this externalization externalizes itself within itself and thus, in its extension, is equally in its depth, the self. *The goal*, absolute knowing, or spirit knowing itself as spirit, has as its path the remembrance of spirits as they are within themselves and accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation on the side of their free

existence appearing in the form of contingency is history; on the side of their comprehended organization, however, it is the *science* of *appearing knowledge*. Together, the two—comprehended history—form the remembrance and the place of skulls of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it would be lifeless and solitary; only—

from the chalice of this realm of spirits
its infinity foams up to it.