---
type: article
status: Published
slug: "thoughts-on-government"
title: "Thoughts on Government"
author: "John Adams"
tradition: "american"
language: "en-18c"
genre: "political essay"
period: "April 1776"
source_url: "https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0026-0004"
certainty: observed
source: "https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0026-0004"
unknowns: none known
---
# Thoughts on Government

## Original

My dear Sir,

If I was equal to the task of forming a plan for the government of a colony, I should be flattered with your request, and very happy to comply with it; because as the divine science of politicks is the science of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on the constitutions of government, which are generally institutions that last for many generations, there can be no employment more agreeable to a benevolent mind, than a research after the best.

Pope flattered tyrants too much when he said, “For forms of government let fools contest, That which is best administered is best.”

We ought to consider, what is the end of government, before we determine which is the best form. Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree, that the happiness of society is the end of government, as all Divines and moral Philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow, that the form of government, which communicates ease, comfort, security, or in one word happiness to the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best.

All sober enquiries after truth, ancient and modern, Pagan and Christian, have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Mahomet, not to mention authorities really sacred, have agreed in this.

If there is a form of government then, whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general happiness than any other form?

Fear is the foundation of most governments; but is so sordid and brutal a passion, and renders men, in whose breasts it predominates, so stupid, and miserable, that Americans will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it.

Honor is truly sacred, but holds a lower rank in the scale of moral excellence than virtue. Indeed the former is but a part of the latter, and consequently has not equal pretensions to support a frame of government productive of human happiness.

The foundation of every government is some principle or passion in the minds of the people. The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature then, have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of government.

A man must be indifferent to the sneers of modern Englishmen to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley. No small fortitude is necessary to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years past, has frequently reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any candid mind, that there is no good government but what is Republican. That the only valuable part of the British constitution is so; because the very definition of a Republic, is “an Empire of Laws, and not of men.” That, as a Republic is the best of governments, so that particular arrangement of the powers of society, or in other words that form of government, which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of Republics.

Of Republics, there is an inexhaustable variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations.

As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made? In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible that the whole should assemble, to make laws: The first necessary step then, is, to depute power from the many, to a few of the most wise and good. But by what rules shall you chuse your Representatives? Agree upon the number and qualifications of persons, who shall have the benefit of choosing, or annex this priviledge to the inhabitants of a certain extent of ground.

The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it. Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be better made in times of greater tranquility than the present, and they will spring up of themselves naturally, when all the powers of government come to be in the hands of the people’s friends. At present it will be safest to proceed in all established modes to which the people have been familiarised by habit.

A representation of the people in one assembly being obtained, a question arises whether all the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be left in this body? I think a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whose government is in one Assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follow.

1. A single Assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of an individual. Subject to fits of humour, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments: And all these errors ought to be corrected and defects supplied by some controuling power.

2. A single Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burthens which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents.

3. A single Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the long parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose Assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a course of years, that all vacancies happening by death, or otherwise, should be filled by themselves, without any application to constituents at all.

4. A Representative Assembly, altho’ extremely well qualified, and absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise the executive power, for want of two essential properties, secrecy and dispatch.

5. A Representative Assembly is still less qualified for the judicial power; because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws.

6. Because a single Assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favour.

But shall the whole power of legislation rest in one Assembly? Most of the foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to be more complex—to which we may add, that if the legislative power is wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in another, or in a single person, these two powers will oppose and enervate upon each other, until the contest shall end in war, and the whole power, legislative and executive, be usurped by the strongest.

The judicial power, in such case, could not mediate, or hold the balance between the two contending powers, because the legislative would undermine it. And this shews the necessity too, of giving the executive power a negative upon the legislative, otherwise this will be continually encroaching upon that.

To avoid these dangers let a distant Assembly be constituted, as a mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature, that which represents the people and that which is vested with the executive power.

Let the Representative Assembly then elect by ballot, from among themselves or their constituents, or both, a distinct Assembly, which for the sake of perspicuity we will call a Council. It may consist of any number you please, say twenty or thirty, and should have a free and independent exercise of its judgment, and consequently a negative voice in the legislature.

These two bodies thus constituted, and made integral parts of the legislature, let them unite, and by joint ballot choose a Governor, who, after being stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives, should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be made also an integral part of the legislature. This I know is liable to objections, and if you please you may make him only President of the Council, as in Connecticut: But as the Governor is to be invested with the executive power, with consent of Council, I think he ought to have a negative upon the legislative. If he is annually elective, as he ought to be, he will always have so much reverence and affection for the People, their Representatives and Councillors, that although you give him an independent exercise of his judgment, he will seldom use it in opposition to the two Houses, except in cases the public utility of which would be conspicuous, and some such cases would happen.

In the present exigency of American affairs, when by an act of Parliament we are put out of the royal protection, and consequently discharged from our allegiance; and it has become necessary to assume government for our immediate security, the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, Attorney-General, should be chosen by joint Ballot, of both Houses. And these and all other elections, especially of Representatives, and Councillors, should be annual, there not being in the whole circle of the sciences, a maxim more infallible than this, “Where annual elections end, there slavery begins.”

These great men, in this respect, should be, once a year

“Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne, They rise, they break, and to that sea return.”

This mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very well for the present, but if, by experiment, it should be found inconvenient, the legislature may at its leisure devise other methods of creating them, by elections of the people at large, as in Connecticut, or it may enlarge the term for which they shall be chosen to seven years, or three years, or for life, or make any other alterations which the society shall find productive of its ease, its safety, its freedom, or in one word, its happiness.

A rotation of all offices, as well as of Representatives and Councillors, has many advocates, and is contended for with many plausible arguments. It would be attended no doubt with many advantages, and if the society has a sufficient number of suitable characters to supply the great number of vacancies which would be made by such a rotation, I can see no objection to it. These persons may be allowed to serve for three years, and then excluded three years, or for any longer or shorter term.

Any seven or nine of the legislative Council may be made a Quorum, for doing business as a Privy Council, to advise the Governor in the exercise of the executive branch of power, and in all acts of state.

The Governor should have the command of the militia, and of all your armies. The power of pardons should be with the Governor and Council.

Judges, Justices and all other officers, civil and military, should be nominated and appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of Council, unless you choose to have a government more popular; if you do, all officers, civil and military, may be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses, or in order to preserve the independence and importance of each House, by ballot of one House, concurred by the other. Sheriffs should be chosen by the freeholders of counties—so should Registers of Deeds and Clerks of Counties.

All officers should have commissions, under the hand of the Governor and seal of the Colony.

The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people and every blessing of society, depends so much upon an upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that. The Judges therefore should always be men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness and attention. Their minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependant upon any man or body of men. To these ends they should hold estates for life in their offices, or in other words their commissions should be during good behaviour, and their salaries ascertained and established by law. For misbehaviour the grand inquest of the Colony, the House of Representatives, should impeach them before the Governor and Council, where they should have time and opportunity to make their defence, but if convicted should be removed from their offices, and subjected to such other punishment as shall be thought proper.

A Militia Law requiring all men, or with very few exceptions, besides cases of conscience, to be provided with arms and ammunition, to be trained at certain seasons, and requiring counties, towns, or other small districts to be provided with public stocks of ammunition and entrenching utensils, and with some settled plans for transporting provisions after the militia, when marched to defend their country against sudden invasions, and requiring certain districts to be provided with field-pieces, companies of matrosses and perhaps some regiments of light horse, is always a wise institution, and in the present circumstances of our country indispensible.

Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that to a humane and generous mind, no expence for this purpose would be thought extravagant.

The very mention of sumptuary laws will excite a smile. Whether our countrymen have wisdom and virtue enough to submit to them I know not. But the happiness of the people might be greatly promoted by them, and a revenue saved sufficient to carry on this war forever. Frugality is a great revenue, besides curing us of vanities, levities and fopperies which are real antidotes to all great, manly and warlike virtues.

But must not all commissions run in the name of a king? No. Why may they not as well run thus, “The Colony of to A. B. greeting,” and be tested by the Governor?

Why may not writs, instead of running in the name of a King, run thus, “The Colony of to the Sheriff, &c.” and be tested by the Chief Justice.

Why may not indictments conclude, “against the peace of the Colony of and the dignity of the same?”

A Constitution, founded on these principles, introduces knowledge among the People, and inspires them with a conscious dignity, becoming Freemen. A general emulation takes place, which causes good humour, sociability, good manners, and good morals to be general. That elevation of sentiment, inspired by such a government, makes the common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which is inspired by it makes them sober, industrious and frugal. You will find among them some elegance, perhaps, but more solidity; a little pleasure, but a great deal of business—some politeness, but more civility. If you compare such a country with the regions of domination, whether Monarchial or Aristocratical, you will fancy yourself in Arcadia or Elisium.

If the Colonies should assume governments separately, they should be left entirely to their own choice of the forms, and if a Continental Constitution should be formed, it should be a Congress, containing a fair and adequate Representation of the Colonies, and its authority should sacredly be confined to these cases, viz. war, trade, disputes between Colony and Colony, the Post-Office, and the unappropriated lands of the Crown, as they used to be called.

These Colonies, under such forms of government, and in such a union, would be unconquerable by all the Monarchies of Europe.

You and I, my dear Friend, have been sent into life, at a time when the greatest law-givers of antiquity would have wished to have lived. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children. When! Before the present epocha, had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive? I hope you will avail yourself and your country of that extensive learning and indefatigable industry which you possess, to assist her in the formations of the happiest governments, and the best character of a great People. For myself, I must beg you to keep my name out of sight, for this feeble attempt, if it should be known to be mine, would oblige me to apply to myself those lines of the immortal John Milton, in one of his sonnets,

“I did but teach the age to quit their cloggs
By the plain rules of ancient Liberty,
When lo! a barbarous noise surrounded me,
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes and dogs.”

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the authoritative historical English source for fidelity, modern clarity, rhetorical force, and structure.

My dear Sir,

If I were equal to the task of forming a plan for the government of a colony, I would be flattered by your request, and very happy to comply with it; because, as the divine science of politics is the science of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on constitutions of government—which are generally institutions that last for many generations—there can be no employment more agreeable to a benevolent mind than a search for the best.

Pope flattered tyrants too much when he said, “For forms of government let fools contend, That which is best administered is best.”

We ought to consider the purpose of government before we determine which form is best. On this point, all theoretical politicians will agree that the happiness of society is the purpose of government, just as all theologians and moral philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the purpose of man. From this principle it follows that the form of government which gives ease, comfort, security—or, in one word, happiness—to the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best.

All sober inquiries after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, and Mohammed—not to mention authorities truly sacred—have agreed on this.

If, then, there is a form of government whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge that it is better designed to promote the general happiness than any other form?

Fear is the foundation of most governments; but it is so sordid and brutal a passion, and makes the men in whose hearts it predominates so stupid and miserable, that Americans are not likely to approve of any political institution founded upon it.

Honor is truly sacred, but it holds a lower rank in the scale of moral excellence than virtue. Indeed, the former is only a part of the latter, and consequently has no equal claim to support a system of government productive of human happiness.

The foundation of every government is some principle or passion in the minds of the people. The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature, then, have the best chance of supporting the noblest and most generous models of government.

A man must be indifferent to the sneers of modern Englishmen to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley. No small degree of fortitude is required to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition of this country during the past ten or fifteen years, however, has frequently reminded me of their principles and arguments. They will convince any candid mind that there is no good government except a republican one; that the only valuable part of the British constitution is republican, because the very definition of a republic is “an empire of laws, and not of men”; and that, as a republic is the best of governments, so that particular arrangement of the powers of society—or, in other words, that form of government—which is best designed to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws is the best of republics.

There is an inexhaustible variety of republics, because the possible combinations of the powers of society are capable of innumerable variations.

Since good government is an empire of laws, how are your laws to be made? In a large society inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible for the whole population to assemble to make laws. The first necessary step, then, is to delegate power from the many to a few of the wisest and best. But by what rules will you choose your representatives? Agree upon the number and qualifications of the persons who will have the right to vote, or attach this privilege to the inhabitants of a specified extent of land.

The principal difficulty lies—and the greatest care should be taken—in constituting this representative assembly. In miniature, it should be an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. So that it may be in the interest of this assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should provide equal representation; or, in other words, equal interests among the people should have equal influence within it. Great care should be taken to accomplish this and to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be made more effectively in times of greater tranquility than the present, and they will arise naturally of themselves when all the powers of government come into the hands of the people’s friends. At present, it will be safest to proceed according to all established methods with which habit has made the people familiar.

Once representation of the people in a single assembly has been obtained, a question arises: should all the powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—be left in that body? I think a people cannot remain free for long, nor ever be happy, when their government is lodged in one assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follows.

1. A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual. It is subject to fits of temper, sudden passions, flights of enthusiasm, prejudiced partialities, and consequently produces hasty conclusions and absurd judgments. All these errors ought to be corrected, and all these defects supplied, by some controlling power.

2. A single assembly is apt to become greedy and, in time, will not hesitate to exempt itself from burdens which it will impose without compunction upon its constituents.

3. A single assembly is apt to grow ambitious and, after a time, will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the Long Parliament, but it was even more remarkable in Holland, where the assembly first voted to change its term from annual to seven-year terms, then to life terms, and, after a number of years, voted that all vacancies arising through death or otherwise should be filled by the assembly itself, without any appeal to constituents at all.

4. A representative assembly, although exceptionally well qualified and absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise executive power because it lacks two essential qualities: secrecy and dispatch.

5. A representative assembly is still less qualified to exercise judicial power, because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws.

6. A single assembly possessing all the powers of government would make arbitrary laws in its own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily in its own interest, and decide all controversies in its own favor.

But should the whole legislative power rest in one assembly? Most of the preceding reasons apply equally to prove that legislative power ought to be more complex. To these we may add that, if legislative power is wholly vested in one assembly and executive power in another assembly, or in a single person, these two powers will oppose and weaken each other until the contest ends in war and the whole power, legislative and executive, is usurped by the stronger.

In such a case, the judicial power could not mediate or hold the balance between the two contending powers, because the legislative power would undermine it. This also demonstrates the necessity of giving the executive power a veto over the legislative; otherwise, the legislative power will continually encroach upon the executive.

To avoid these dangers, let a separate assembly be constituted as a mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature: the branch that represents the people and the branch vested with executive power.

Let the representative assembly, then, elect by ballot—from among its own members, its constituents, or both—a separate assembly, which, for the sake of clarity, we will call a Council. It may consist of any number you please, say twenty or thirty, and should have the free and independent exercise of its judgment and, consequently, a veto in the legislature.

Once these two bodies have been constituted in this way and made integral parts of the legislature, let them unite and, by joint ballot, choose a Governor who, after being stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives, should have the free and independent exercise of his judgment and should also be made an integral part of the legislature. I know this is open to objections, and, if you please, you may make him only President of the Council, as in Connecticut. But since the Governor is to be invested with executive power, with the consent of the Council, I think he ought to have a veto over the legislature. If he is elected annually, as he ought to be, he will always have so much reverence and affection for the people, their representatives, and their councillors that, although you give him the independent exercise of his judgment, he will seldom use it in opposition to the two Houses, except in cases where the public benefit of doing so would be conspicuous—and some such cases would occur.

In the present crisis of American affairs, when, by an act of Parliament, we have been placed outside royal protection and consequently released from our allegiance, and it has become necessary to assume the powers of government for our immediate security, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, and Attorney General should be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses. And these and all other elections—especially those of representatives and councillors—should be annual, for in the whole range of the sciences there is no maxim more infallible than this: “Where annual elections end, there slavery begins.”

In this respect, these great men should be, once a year,

“Like bubbles borne upon the sea of matter, They rise, they break, and to that sea return.”

This method of filling the great offices of state will serve very well for the present; but if experience should prove it inconvenient, the legislature may, at its leisure, devise other methods of filling them—by elections of the people at large, as in Connecticut—or it may extend the term for which they are chosen to seven years, three years, or life, or make any other alterations which society finds productive of its ease, its safety, its freedom—or, in one word, its happiness.

A rotation in all offices, as well as among representatives and councillors, has many advocates and is supported by many plausible arguments. It would undoubtedly bring many advantages; and if society has a sufficient number of suitable persons to fill the great number of vacancies that such a rotation would create, I can see no objection to it. These persons may be permitted to serve for three years and then excluded for three years, or for any longer or shorter term.

Any seven or nine members of the legislative Council may constitute a quorum for conducting business as a Privy Council, advising the Governor in the exercise of executive power and in all acts of state.

The Governor should command the militia and all your armies. The power to grant pardons should rest with the Governor and Council.

Judges, justices, and all other officers, civil and military, should be nominated and appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Council, unless you choose to have a more popular government. If you do, all civil and military officers may be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses, or, in order to preserve the independence and importance of each House, by ballot of one House with the concurrence of the other. Sheriffs should be chosen by the freeholders of the counties—and so should Registers of Deeds and County Clerks.

All officers should hold commissions bearing the signature of the Governor and the seal of the Colony.

The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people, and every blessing of society depend so greatly upon an upright and skillful administration of justice that the judicial power ought to be separate from both the legislative and executive powers and independent of both, so that it may serve as a check upon both, just as both should serve as checks upon it. The judges, therefore, should always be men learned and experienced in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, composure, and attentiveness. Their minds should not be distracted by conflicting interests; they should not be dependent upon any man or body of men. To achieve these ends, they should hold their offices for life—or, in other words, their commissions should continue during good behavior—and their salaries should be fixed and established by law. For misconduct, the grand inquest of the Colony, the House of Representatives, should impeach them before the Governor and Council, where they should have time and opportunity to make their defense; but, if convicted, they should be removed from office and subjected to whatever other punishment is thought proper.

A Militia Law requiring all men—with very few exceptions apart from cases of conscience—to provide themselves with arms and ammunition and to be trained at specified times; requiring counties, towns, or other small districts to maintain public stores of ammunition and entrenching tools, together with settled plans for transporting provisions after the militia when it marches to defend the country against sudden invasions; and requiring specified districts to provide fieldpieces, companies of artillerymen, and perhaps some regiments of light cavalry, is always a wise institution and, in the present circumstances of our country, indispensable.

Laws providing for the liberal education of the young, especially those belonging to the lower class of the people, are so exceptionally wise and useful that, to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this purpose would be considered extravagant.

The mere mention of sumptuary laws will provoke a smile. Whether our countrymen possess enough wisdom and virtue to submit to them, I do not know. But the happiness of the people might be greatly advanced by such laws, and enough revenue saved to carry on this war forever. Frugality is a great source of revenue, besides curing us of vanities, frivolities, and affectations, which are true antidotes to all great, manly, and warlike virtues.

But must not all commissions be issued in the name of a king? No. Why may they not just as well read, “The Colony of to A. B., greetings,” and be attested by the Governor?

Why may not writs, instead of being issued in the name of a king, read, “The Colony of to the Sheriff, etc.,” and be attested by the Chief Justice?

Why may not indictments conclude, “against the peace of the Colony of and the dignity of the same”?

A constitution founded upon these principles spreads knowledge among the people and inspires them with the conscious dignity appropriate to free men. A general spirit of emulation arises, causing good humor, sociability, good manners, and good morals to become widespread. The elevation of sentiment inspired by such a government makes the common people brave and enterprising. The ambition it inspires makes them sober, industrious, and frugal. Among them you will find some elegance, perhaps, but more solidity; a little pleasure, but a great deal of business—some politeness, but more civility. If you compare such a country with regions ruled by domination, whether monarchical or aristocratic, you will imagine yourself in Arcadia or Elysium.

If the Colonies should establish governments separately, they should be left entirely free to choose their own forms; and if a Continental Constitution should be formed, it should consist of a Congress containing a fair and adequate representation of the Colonies, and its authority should be scrupulously confined to the following matters: war, trade, disputes between one Colony and another, the Post Office, and the unappropriated lands of the Crown, as they used to be called.

These Colonies, under such forms of government and joined in such a union, would be unconquerable by all the monarchies of Europe.

You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time in which the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few members of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity to choose a government for themselves or their children, any more than they could choose their air, soil, or climate. When, before the present epoch, have three million people possessed full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can devise? I hope you will employ, for your own benefit and your country’s, that extensive learning and indefatigable industry which you possess, and assist her in forming the happiest governments and the finest character of a great people. As for myself, I must ask you to keep my name out of sight; for if this feeble attempt should become known as mine, I would be obliged to apply to myself those lines of the immortal John Milton, in one of his sonnets:

“I merely taught the age to cast off its shackles
By the plain rules of ancient Liberty,
When, behold! a barbarous noise surrounded me,
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes, and dogs.”

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the authoritative historical English source.

My dear Sir,

If I were capable of the task of designing a plan for the government of a colony, I would be flattered by your request and very happy to fulfill it; because, since the divine science of politics is the science of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on systems of government, which are generally institutions that last for many generations, there can be no work more pleasing to a benevolent mind than a search for the best one.

Pope flattered tyrants too much when he said, “Let fools argue over forms of government; the one that is best administered is best.”

We ought to consider the purpose of government before we decide which form is best. On this point, all theoretical political thinkers will agree that the happiness of society is the purpose of government, just as all theologians and moral philosophers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the purpose of humanity. It follows from this principle that the best form of government is the one that provides ease, comfort, security—or, in one word, happiness—to the greatest number of people and to the greatest degree.

All serious inquiries into truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, have declared that human happiness, as well as human dignity, consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, and Muhammad, not to mention genuinely sacred authorities, have agreed on this.

If, then, there is a form of government whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sensible person acknowledge that it is better designed to promote the general happiness than any other form?

Fear is the foundation of most governments; but it is such a degrading and brutal passion, and makes those people in whom it dominates so stupid and miserable, that Americans are unlikely to approve of any political institution founded on it.

Honor is truly sacred, but it ranks lower on the scale of moral excellence than virtue. Indeed, honor is only one part of virtue and therefore has no equal claim to support a system of government that produces human happiness.

The foundation of every government is some principle or passion in the minds of the people. The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature, then, have the best chance of supporting the noblest and most generous models of government.

A person must be indifferent to the mockery of modern Englishmen to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley. Considerable courage is needed to admit that one has read them. The miserable condition of this country during the past ten or fifteen years, however, has often reminded me of their principles and arguments. They will convince any fair-minded person that there is no good government except a republican one. They will show that the only valuable part of the British constitution is republican, because the very definition of a republic is “a government of laws, and not of men.” They will also show that, as a republic is the best kind of government, the best kind of republic is that particular arrangement of society’s powers—or, in other words, that form of government—which is best designed to secure an impartial and exact enforcement of the laws.

There is an endless variety of republics because the possible combinations of society’s powers can take innumerable forms.

Since good government is a government of laws, how should your laws be made? In a large society occupying an extensive country, it is impossible for the whole population to assemble to make laws. The first necessary step, then, is to delegate power from the many to a few of the wisest and best people. But by what rules should you choose your representatives? Agree on the number and qualifications of the people who will have the right to vote, or attach this privilege to the inhabitants of a particular area of land.

The main difficulty lies in forming this Representative Assembly, and the greatest care should be devoted to it. In miniature, it should be an exact portrait of the people as a whole. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. To make it in this Assembly’s interest to do strict justice at all times, it should provide equal representation—or, in other words, equal interests among the people should have equal influence in it. Great care should be taken to achieve this and to prevent unfair, biased, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be made more effectively in calmer times than the present, and they will naturally arise on their own when all the powers of government come into the hands of the people’s friends. At present, it will be safest to proceed according to all established methods with which the people have become familiar through habit.

Once representation of the people in one assembly has been achieved, a question arises: Should all the powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—be left in this body? I think a people whose government is in one Assembly cannot remain free for long or ever be happy. My reasons for this opinion are as follows.

1. A single Assembly is subject to all the vices, foolishness, and weaknesses of an individual. It is vulnerable to changes of mood, sudden bursts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, and prejudiced favoritism, and therefore it produces hasty decisions and absurd judgments. All these errors should be corrected and all these defects remedied by some restraining power.

2. A single Assembly is likely to become greedy, and in time it will not hesitate to exempt itself from burdens that it will impose on its constituents without remorse.

3. A single Assembly is likely to become ambitious, and after a time it will not hesitate to vote itself permanent. This was one fault of the Long Parliament, but it was even more notable in Holland, whose Assembly first voted to change its members’ terms from annual to seven-year terms, then to terms for life, and, after a number of years, voted that all vacancies caused by death or anything else should be filled by the members themselves, without consulting their constituents at all.

4. A Representative Assembly, although extremely well qualified and absolutely necessary as one branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise executive power because it lacks two essential qualities: secrecy and speed.

5. A Representative Assembly is even less qualified to exercise judicial power because it is too large, too slow, and too unskilled in the laws.

6. A single Assembly possessing all the powers of government would make arbitrary laws for its own benefit, enforce all laws arbitrarily for its own benefit, and decide all disputes in its own favor.

But should the entire legislative power rest in one Assembly? Most of the preceding reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to be more complex. We may add that if the legislative power is entirely in one Assembly and the executive power is in another Assembly or in a single person, these two powers will oppose and weaken one another until the conflict ends in war and the stronger side seizes the whole legislative and executive power.

In such a case, the judicial power could not mediate or maintain the balance between the two competing powers because the legislative power would undermine it. This also shows the need to give the executive power a veto over the legislative power; otherwise, the legislative power will continually encroach on the executive.

To avoid these dangers, establish a separate Assembly as a mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature: the branch that represents the people and the branch that holds executive power.

Let the Representative Assembly then elect by ballot, from among its own members, its constituents, or both, a separate Assembly, which for clarity we will call a Council. It may consist of any number you please—say, twenty or thirty—and should be free and independent in exercising its judgment and therefore have a veto in the legislature.

Once these two bodies have been established in this way and made integral parts of the legislature, let them unite and, by joint ballot, choose a Governor. After being stripped of most of those symbols of domination called prerogatives, the Governor should be free and independent in exercising his judgment and should also be made an integral part of the legislature. I know this is open to objections, and, if you prefer, you may make him only President of the Council, as in Connecticut. But because the Governor is to be entrusted with executive power, with the consent of the Council, I think he ought to have a veto over the legislature. If he is elected annually, as he ought to be, he will always have so much respect and affection for the People, their Representatives, and their Councillors that, although you give him independent use of his judgment, he will seldom use it in opposition to the two Houses except in cases where the public benefit would be obvious, and some such cases would occur.

In the present crisis in American affairs, when an act of Parliament has placed us outside royal protection and therefore released us from our allegiance, and it has become necessary to take up government for our immediate security, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, and Attorney General should be chosen by a joint ballot of both Houses. These and all other elections, especially those of Representatives and Councillors, should be annual, because in the entire range of the sciences there is no more certain principle than this: “Where annual elections end, slavery begins.”

In this respect, these great men should, once a year, be

“Like bubbles carried on the sea of matter, they rise, they burst, and return to that sea.”

This method of filling the great offices of state will work very well for the present. But if experience shows that it is inconvenient, the legislature may, at its leisure, devise other methods of filling them through elections by the people as a whole, as in Connecticut; or it may lengthen the terms for which they are chosen to seven years, three years, or life; or it may make any other changes that society finds will produce its ease, safety, freedom—or, in one word, happiness.

The rotation of all officeholders, as well as Representatives and Councillors, has many supporters and is defended with many plausible arguments. It would undoubtedly bring many advantages, and if society has enough suitable people to fill the large number of vacancies that such rotation would create, I can see no objection to it. These people may be allowed to serve for three years and then be excluded for three years, or they may serve and be excluded for any longer or shorter period.

Any seven or nine members of the legislative Council may constitute a quorum for conducting business as a Privy Council, advising the Governor in exercising the executive branch of power and in all acts of state.

The Governor should command the militia and all your armies. The power to grant pardons should belong to the Governor and Council.

Judges, Justices, and all other civil and military officers should be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Council, unless you choose to have a more democratic government. If you do, all civil and military officers may be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses or, to preserve the independence and importance of each House, by a ballot of one House approved by the other. Sheriffs should be chosen by the freeholders of the counties—and so should Registers of Deeds and County Clerks.

All officers should have commissions bearing the Governor’s signature and the Colony’s seal.

The dignity and stability of every branch of government, the morals of the people, and every blessing of society depend so greatly on an honest and skillful administration of justice that the judicial power ought to be separate from both the legislative and executive powers and independent of both, so that it may check both, just as both should check it. The Judges should therefore always be people with learning and experience in the laws, exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, composure, and attentiveness. Their minds should not be distracted by conflicting interests. They should not depend on any person or group of people. To achieve these goals, they should hold their offices for life—or, in other words, their commissions should continue during good behavior—and their salaries should be fixed and established by law. For misconduct, the Colony’s grand inquest, the House of Representatives, should impeach them before the Governor and Council, where they should have time and opportunity to defend themselves. But if convicted, they should be removed from office and subjected to any other punishment considered proper.

A Militia Law requiring all men, with very few exceptions apart from cases of conscience, to have arms and ammunition and to be trained at particular times; requiring counties, towns, or other small districts to maintain public supplies of ammunition and entrenching tools, along with established plans for transporting provisions after the militia when it marches to defend the country against sudden invasions; and requiring certain districts to have field guns, companies of artillery soldiers, and perhaps some regiments of light cavalry, is always a wise institution and, in the present circumstances of our country, indispensable.

Laws providing for the broad education of young people, especially those from the lower class, are so extremely wise and useful that a humane and generous mind would consider no expense for this purpose excessive.

The mere mention of laws regulating personal expenditure will cause a smile. I do not know whether our countrymen have enough wisdom and virtue to submit to them. But such laws could greatly promote the happiness of the people and save enough revenue to continue this war forever. Frugality is a great source of revenue, besides curing us of vanities, frivolities, and showy foolishness, which are genuine antidotes to all great, manly, and warlike virtues.

But must not all commissions be issued in the name of a king? No. Why could they not just as well be issued in this form: “The Colony of to A. B., greetings,” and be formally certified by the Governor?

Why could not writs, instead of being issued in the name of a King, be issued in this form: “The Colony of to the Sheriff, etc.,” and be formally certified by the Chief Justice?

Why could not indictments conclude, “against the peace of the Colony of and its dignity?”

A Constitution founded on these principles spreads knowledge among the People and inspires them with a conscious dignity appropriate to Free People. A general spirit of emulation arises, causing good humor, sociability, good manners, and good morals to become widespread. The elevated spirit inspired by such a government makes ordinary people brave and enterprising. The ambition it inspires makes them sober, hardworking, and frugal. Among them you will perhaps find some elegance, but more substance; a little pleasure, but a great deal of business; some politeness, but more civility. If you compare such a country with regions ruled by domination, whether monarchical or aristocratic, you will imagine yourself in Arcadia or Elysium.

If the Colonies establish governments separately, they should be left entirely free to choose their own forms. If a Continental Constitution is established, it should be a Congress containing a fair and adequate Representation of the Colonies, and its authority should be strictly limited to these matters: war, trade, disputes between one Colony and another, the Post Office, and the unallocated Crown lands, as they used to be called.

Under such forms of government and in such a union, these Colonies would be unconquerable by all the Monarchies of Europe.

You and I, my dear Friend, have been brought into life at a time when the greatest lawmakers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few members of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity to choose a government for themselves or their children any more than they could choose the air, soil, or climate. When, before the present era, have three million people had full power and a fair opportunity to design and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can devise? I hope you will use your extensive learning and tireless diligence for your own benefit and your country’s, helping her to form the happiest governments and the finest character of a great People. As for me, I must ask you to keep my name out of sight, because if this weak attempt became known as mine, it would force me to apply to myself these lines by the immortal John Milton, in one of his sonnets:

“I only taught the age to cast off its restraints
By the plain rules of ancient Liberty,
When suddenly a barbarous noise surrounded me,
From owls and cuckoos, donkeys, apes, and dogs.”