{"schema_version":1,"access":"public","rights":"Public-domain or compatibly licensed source editions; provenance is retained per record.","work":{"slug":"cicero-officiis-1","title":"On Duties, Book I","author":"Cicero","tradition":"roman","language":"la","genre":"moral philosophy","period":"44 BCE","source_url":"https://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/off1.shtml","original":{"text":"1. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum idque Athenis abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad dicendum et ad iudicandum.\n\n2. Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum et disces quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te quantum proficias non paenitebit. Sed tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio – nihil enim impedio – orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem. Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.\n\n3. Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt, studiose legas, – vis enim maior in illis dicendi sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere elaboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus.\n\n4. Equidem et Platonem existimo si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere et Demosthenem si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum et auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitudo.\n\n5. Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum. Quis est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.\n\n6. Quae quamquam ita sint in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt, nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est, qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus.\n\n7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium, quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id de quo disputetur.... Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio. Unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huiusmodi sunt exempla, omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum.\n\n8. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci katorthoma, hoc autem commune officium kathekon vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.\n\n9. Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contrarias sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt aut consultant ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse utile. Cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.\n\n10. Hac divisione, cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo sit, duo praetermissa sunt. Nec enim solum, utrum honestum an turpe sit, deliberari solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius, itemque duobus propositis utilibus utrum utilius. Ita quam ille triplicem putavit esse rationem in quinque partes distribui debere reperitur. Primum igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter, tum pari ratione de utili, post de comparatione eorum disserendum.\n\n11. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se, vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque, quae sint ad vivendum necessaria anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint. Sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est se accommodat, paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum. Homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.\n\n12. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque inprimis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt impellitque, ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis, ceterisque quos caros habeat tuerique debeat, quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit.\n\n13. Inprimisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum contemptio.\n\n14. Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.\n\n15. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, \"quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae\". Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte, quae prima discripta est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium.\n\n16. Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque verissimum sit quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur, subiecta est veritas.\n\n17. Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et societas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo autem et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia, versantur in eo genere ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum mentis agitatio. Is enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam et ordinem adhibentes, honestatem et decus conservabimus.\n\n18. Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus. In hoc genere et naturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus hisque temere assentiamur, quod vitium effugere qui volet – omnes autem velle debent – adhibebit ad considerandas res et tempus et diligentiam.\n\n19. Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias. Quibus vitiis declinatis quod in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis operae curaeque ponetur, id iure laudabitur, ut in astrologia C. Sulpicium audimus, in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus, multos in dialecticis, plures in iure civili, quae omnes artes in veri investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit, a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; tum agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit, potest nos in studiis cognitionis etiam sine opera nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur. Ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.\n\n20. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius partes duae: iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.\n\n21. Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum possessionum discriptio. Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique optigit, id quisque teneat; e quo si quis [quaevis] sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.\n\n22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.\n\n23. Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum est appellatam fidem. Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum, qui inferunt, alterum eorum, qui ab is, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam. Nam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua perturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus afferre videtur socio; qui autem non defendit nec obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserat.\n\n24. Atque illae quidem iniuriae, quae nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, saepe a metu proficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet, ne, nisi id fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea, quae concupiverunt; in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.\n\n25. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in is pecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum elegantia et copia, quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est.\n\n26. Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt. Quod enim est apud Ennium: \"Nulla sancta societas Nec fides regni est\", id latius patet. Nam quidquid eiusmodi est, in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare sanctam societatem. Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum. Est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque existunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis cavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur.\n\n27. Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur. Ac de inferenda quidem iniuria satis dictum est.\n\n28. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures solent esse causae. Nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. Itaque videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique vehementer expetant, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemnant et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum [iustitiae genus] assequuntur, ut inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam quidem accessuros putant nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium.\n\n29. Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendae aut odio quodam hominum suum se negotium agere dicant nec facere cuiquam videantur iniuriam. Qui altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt; deserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam studii, nihil operae, nihil facultatum.\n\n30. Quando igitur duobus generibus iniustitiae propositis adiunximus causas utriusque generis easque res ante constituimus, quibus iustitia contineretur, facile quod cuiusque temporis officium sit poterimus, nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare. Est enim difficilis cura rerum alienarum. Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes \"humani nihil a se alienum putat\"; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus, aliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae.\n\n31. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine, eoque quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque contraria, ut reddere depositum, [etiamne furioso?] facere promissum quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem; ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum. Referri enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio fundamenta iustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur. Ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper est idem.\n\n32. Potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum, ut id effici sit inutile vel ei, cui promissum sit, vel ei, qui promiserit. Nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus, quod Theseo promiserat, non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto filio non esset orbatus. Ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium, quod de Hippolyti interitu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus incidit. Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint is, quibus promiseris inutilia, nec si plus tibi ea noceant, quam illi prosint, cui promiseris, contra officium est, maius anteponi minori, ut si constitueris, cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non facere, quod dixeris, magisque ille, cui promissum sit, ab officio discedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis standum non esse quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo promiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, nonnulla legibus.\n\n33. Existunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud \"summum ius summa iniuria\" factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium. Quo in genere etiam in re publica multa peccantur, ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent cum hoste indutiae factae, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, non noctium indutiae. Ne noster quidem probandus, si verum est Q. Fabium Labeonem seu quem alium – nihil enim habeo praeter auditum – arbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus a senatu datum, cum ad locum venisset, cum utrisque separatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, ne appetenter, atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent. Id cum utrique fecissent, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum finis sic, ut ipsi dixerant, terminavit; in medio relictum quod erat, populo Romano adiudicavit. Decipere hoc quidem est, non iudicare. Quocirca in omni est re fugienda talis sollertia.\n\n34. Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque haud scio an satis sit eum, qui lacessierit iniuriae suae paenitere, ut et ipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores. Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.\n\n35. Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem victoria conservandi i, qui non crudeles in bello, non inmanes fuerunt, ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Karthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, oportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset obtemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus. Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.\n\n36. Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. [Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius tiro militabat. Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem, Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut, si eum patitur in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.\n\n37. Adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.] M. quidem Catonis senis est epistula ad M. filium, in qua scribit se audisse eum missum factum esse a consule cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet igitur ut caveat, ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit cum hoste pugnare. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui proprio nomine perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam mitigatam. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc peregrinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: aut status dies cum hoste, itemque adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas. Quid ad hanc mansuetudinem addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli nomine appellare? Quamquam id nomen durius effecit iam vetustas; a peregrino enim recessit et proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret, remansit.\n\n38. Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur gloria, causas omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, minus acerbe gerenda sunt. Ut enim cum civi aliter contendimus, si est inimicus, aliter si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae) sic cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur. Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores. Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara: Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis, Nec cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes Ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique. Vosne velit an me regnare era, quidve ferat Fors, Virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum: Quorum virtuti belli Fortuna pepercit, Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est. Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis.\n\n39. Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda, ut primo Punico bello Regulus captus a Poenis, cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu non censuit, deinde, cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad supplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere. \n\n40. Secundo autem Punico bello post Cannensem pugnam quos decem Hannibal Romam misit astrictos iure iurando se redituros esse nisi de redimendis is, qui capti erant, impetrassent, eos omnes censores, quoad quisque eorum vixit, quod peierassent in aerariis reliquerunt, nec minus illum, qui iure iurando fraude culpam invenerat. Cum enim permissu Hannibalis exisset e castris, rediit paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret; deinde egressus e castris iure iurando se solutum putabat, et erat verbis, re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum est. Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris constitutum, cum a Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi daturum et eum necaturum. Senatus et C. Fabricius eum Pyrrho dedit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro inferentis interitum cum scelere approbavit.]\n\n41. Ac de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est. Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. Est autem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt, qui ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis, operam exigendam, iusta praebenda. Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam eorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur. De iustitia satis dictum.\n\n42. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit, quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena convertant.\n\n43. Sunt autem multi et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, ique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur. quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum.\n\n44. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates, quod qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui eas transferunt ad alienos. Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.\n\n45. Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia, optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.\n\n46. Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, colendum autem esse ita quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua multa iam dicta sunt, iustitia. Nam fortis animus et magnus in homine non perfecto nec sapiente ferventior plerumque est, illae virtutes bonum virum videntur potius attingere. Atque haec in moribus.\n\n47. De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud est in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligamur, sed benivolentiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, ut non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est; nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est.\n\n48. Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, si modo possis, iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? An imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt, quam acceperunt? Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus, officia conferre, quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi, demus necne in nostra potestate est, non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine iniuria.\n\n49. Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium, quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen inprimis, quo quisque animo, studio, benivolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio, vel morbo in omnes vel repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque delata sunt. Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum sperant, etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt.\n\n50. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur. Sed quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius. Est enim primum quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate, neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.\n\n51. Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est. In qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum e quibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium autem communia hominum videntur ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri in permultas potest: Homo, qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit. Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit. Una ex re satis praecipit, ut quidquid sine detrimento commodari possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto.\n\n52. Ex quo sunt illa communia: non prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit, consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem \"nihilominus ipsi lucet\", ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.\n\n53. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa infinita discedatur, proprior est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur. Interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim inmensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur.\n\n54. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates ex quibus etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines [et] caritate.\n\n55. Magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum, eisdem uti sacris, sepulchra habere communia. Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti; illud enim honestum, quod saepe dicimus, etiam si in alio cernimus, [tamen] nos movet atque illi in quo id inesse videtur amicos facit.]\n\n56. Et quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur, tamen iustitia et liberalitas id maxime efficit. Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius, quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit, ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt firma devinciuntur societate.\n\n57. Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt.\n\n58. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. Quamobrem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur his maxime quos ante dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes, consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime, estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit.\n\n59. Sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis videndum erit, quid cuique maxime necesse sit et quid quisque vel sine nobis aut possit consequi aut non possit. Ita non idem erunt necessitudinum gradus qui temporum, suntque officia, quae aliis magis quam aliis debeantur, ut vicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut familiarem, at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam vicinum defenderis. Haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio [et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda], ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo quantum cuique debeatur intellegas.\n\n60. Sed ut nec medici nec imperatores nec oratores quamvis artis praecepta perceperint, quicquam magna laude dignum sine usu et exercitatione consequi possunt, sic officii conservandi praecepta traduntur illa quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Atque ab iis rebus, quae sunt in iure societatis humanae, quemadmodum ducatur honestum, ex quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus.\n\n61. Intellegendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor, e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri, quod animo magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in probris maxime in promptu est, si quid tale dici potest: \"Vos enim, iuvenes, animum geritis muliebrem, illa\" virgo \"viri\" et si quid eiusmodi: Salmacida, spolia sine sudore et sanguine. Contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescio quomodo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, hinc noster Cocles, hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari.\n\n62. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate. Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus: nihil enim honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat.\n\n63. Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: \"Non,\" inquit, \"solum scientia, quae est remota ab iustitia calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat, quam fortitudinis.\" Itaque viros fortes et magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae.\n\n64. Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellet, ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse. Difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. Ex quo fit ut neque disceptatione vinci se nec ullo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur, existuntque in re publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam maximas consequantur et sint vi potius superiores quam iustitia pares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius; nullum enim est tempus, quod iustitia vacare debeat.\n\n65. Fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri. Etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.\n\n66. Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur, quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum est nihil hominem nisi quod honestum decorumque sit aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere, nullique neque homini neque perturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut cum ita sis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas quidem et maxime utiles, sed ut vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent.\n\n67. Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos viros in priore. In eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam et ea, quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis. robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae.\n\n68. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate, nec qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda et pecuniae fugienda cupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare divitias, nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre. Cavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra dixi; eripit enim libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec vero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda non numquam.\n\n69. Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque perfugerint, in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et quidam homines severi et graves, nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari.\n\n70. His idem propositum fuit quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum his, quos dixi, otiosis, alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant, alteri si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilior et tutior et minus aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum generi et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accomodaverunt.\n\n71. Quapropter et iis forsitan concedendum sit rem publicam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et iis, qui aut valitudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a re publica recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis laudemque concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere se dicant ea, quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto. Quorum iudicium in eo, quod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non probare, sed videntur labores et molestias, tum offensionum et repulsarum quasi quandam ignominiam timere et infamiam. Sunt enim qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint molliores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur infamia atque ea quidem non satis constanter.\n\n72. Sed iis qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum gerendarum, abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus et gerenda res publica est; nec enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest. Capessentibus autem rem publicam nihilominus quam philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam, et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est rerum humanarum, quam saepe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque securitas, si quidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque victuri.\n\n73. Quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in eorum vita, quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus egent, et quia si quid adversi eveniat, tam graviter cadere non possunt. Quocirca non sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur maioraque studia efficiendi rem publicam gerentibus quam quietis, quo magis iis et magnitudo est animi adhibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus. Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat, ne id modo consideret, quam illa res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; in quo ipso considerandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatem. In omnibus autem negotiis priusquam adgrediare, adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.\n\n74. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et cupidi bellorum gerendorum; vere autem si volumus iudicare multae res extiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae.\n\n75. Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit eius nomen quam Solonis illustrius citeturque Salamis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas, non minus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc maiorum instituta servantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at ille vere [a] se adiutum Themistoclem; est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus.\n\n76. Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis partum putatur, tamen ne minima quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi sunt; quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habuerunt exercitus et fortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum versaremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur; parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi. Nec plus Africanus, singularis et vir et imperator in exscindenda Numantia rei publicae profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. Gracchum interemit; quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione – attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est – sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu.\n\n77. Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio \"cedant arma togae concedat laurea laudi\". Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubernantibus nonne togae arma cesserunt? Neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quae res igitur gesta umquam in bello tanta? qui triumphus conferendus?\n\n78. Licet enim mihi, M. fili, apud te gloriari, ad quem et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet. Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus, hoc tribuit, ut diceret frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in rem publicam beneficio ubi triumpharet esset habiturus. Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est.\n\n79. Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo excelso magnificoque quaerimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen corpus et ita afficiendum est, ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. Honestum autem id, quod exquirimus, totum est positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non minorem utilitatem afferunt, qui togati rei publicae praesunt, quam qui bellum gerunt. Itaque eorum consilio saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta bella sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas.\n\n80. Qua re expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nec a ratione discedere.\n\n81. Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit \"non putaram\". Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda.\n\n82. [De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est, ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. Idque est viri magni rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere.] Ut enim sunt, quemadmodum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperias multos, quibus periculosa et calida consilia quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur.\n\n83. Numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut inbelles timidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quare in tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipiscare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali. Periculosae autem rerum actiones partim iis sunt, qui eas suscipiunt, partim rei publicae.\n\n84. Itemque alii de vita, alii de gloria et benivolentia civium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore et gloria quam de ceteris commodis. Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam profundere pro patria parati essent, idem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante, ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque haec quidem Lacedaemoniis plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt. Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius: Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. Noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem. Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret. Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant dicere.\n\n85. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum.\n\n86. Hinc apud Athenienses magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et fortis civis et in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit tradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur totamque eam sic tuebitur, ut omnibus consulat. Nec vero criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque ita iustitiae honestatique adhaerescet, ut, dum ea conservet, quamvis graviter offendat mortemque oppetat potius, quam deserat illa, quae dixi.\n\n87. Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare apud eundem est Platonem \"similiter facere eos, qui inter se contenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret\". Idemque praecipit, \"ut eos adversarios existimemus, qui arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint\", qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio.\n\n88. Nec vero audiendi qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magnanimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et altitudo animi quae dicitur, ne si irascamur aut intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque clementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest. omnis autem et animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, qui punitur aliquem aut verbis castigat, sed ad rei publicae utilitatem referri.\n\n89. Cavendum est etiam ne maior poena quam culpa sit et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. prohibenda autem maxime est ira puniendo; numquam enim iratus qui accedet ad poenam mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent utiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est optandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate ducuntur.\n\n90. Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. nam ut adversas res, sic secundas inmoderate ferre levitatis est praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque de C. Laelio accepimus. Philippum quidem Macedonum regem rebus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse. Itaque alter semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus, ut recte praecipere videantur, qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius. Panaetius quidem Africanum auditorem et familiarem suum solitum ait dicere, \"ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate exultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos sibique praefidentes tamquam in gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque fortunae\".\n\n91. Atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio amicorum isque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas. Isdemque temporibus cavendum est ne assentatoribus patefaciamus aures neve adulari nos sinamus, in quo falli facile est. tales enim nos esse putamus, ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur et in maximis versantur erroribus.\n\n92. sed haec quidem hactenus. Illud autem sic est iudicandum, maximas geri res et maximi animi ab iis, qui res publicas regant, quod earum administratio latissime pateat ad plurimosque pertineat; esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam seseque suarum rerum finibus continerent aut interiecti inter philosophos et eos, qui rem publicam administrarent, delectarentur re sua familiari, non eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes ab eius usu suos potiusque et amicis impertientes et rei publicae, si quando usus esset. quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso, tum quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat] deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia, parsimonia [nec libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat. Haec praescripta servantem licet magnifice, graviter animoseque vivere atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter, + vere hominum amice.\n\n93. Sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur. hoc loco continetur id, quod dici latine decorum potest; Graece enim prepon dicitur.\n\n94. Huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari; nam et quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet. qualis autem differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intellegi quam explanari potest. quicquid est enim, quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum antegressa est honestas. Itaque non solum in hac parte honestatis, de qua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus quid deceat apparet. Nam et ratione uti atque oratione prudenter et agere quod agas considerate omnique in re quid sit veri videre et tueri decet, contraque falli, errare, labi, decipi tam dedecet quam delirare et mente esse captum; et iusta omnia decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut turpia, sic indecora. Similis est ratio fortitudinis. quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit, id dignum viro et decorum videtur, quod contra, id ut turpe sic indecorum.\n\n95. Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum, et ita pertinet, ut non recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in promptu. est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod deceat; quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari. ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valitudine, sic hoc, de quo loquimur, decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.\n\n96. Est autem eius discriptio duplex; nam et generale quoddam decorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atque illud superius sic fere definiri solet, decorum id esse, quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat. quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, ut id decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.\n\n97. Haec ita intellegi, possumus existimare ex eo decoro, quod poetae sequuntur, de quo alio loco plura dici solent. Sed tum servare illud poetas, quod deceat, dicimus, cum id quod quaque persona dignum est, et fit et dicitur, ut si Aeacus aut Minos diceret: oderint, dum metuant, aut: natis sepulchro ipse est parens, indecorum videretur, quod eos fuisse iustos accepimus; at Atreo dicente plausus excitantur, est enim digna persona oratio; sed poetae quid quemque deceat, ex persona iudicabunt; nobis autem personam imposuit ipsa natura magna cum excellentia praestantiaque animantium reliquarum.\n\n98. Quocirca poetae in magna varietate personarum etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat videbunt, nobis autem cum a natura constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit appareat et hoc, quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.\n\n99. adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. nam neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est sed etiam omnino dissoluti. est autem quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere, in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori. His igitur eitis quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum puto.\n\n100. Officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae; quam si sequemur ducem, nunquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax natura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum, et id, quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt.\n\n101. Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura; una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est orme Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere discriptio officii.\n\n102. Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi oboediant eamque neque praecurrant nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant sintque tranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo elucebit omnis constantia omnisque moderatio. nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt. relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae; a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam corpora. licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium vultus, voces, motus statusque mutantur.\n\n103. Ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam revertamur, appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse excitandamque animadversionem et diligentiam, ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus. neque enim ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, ad severitatem potius et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora. ludo autem et ioco uti illo quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus ceteris tum, cum gravibus seriisque rebus satis fecerimus. ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet. ut enim pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam, quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit aliena, sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat.\n\n104. Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete dicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae vocantur apophthegmata. Facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci. alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, [severissimo] homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudo adhibetur et verborum obscenitas. Ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis omnia profundamus elatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. Suppeditant autem et campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi.\n\n105. Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat; illae nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu, hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. quin etiam, si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed nomine) sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecundiam.\n\n106. Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia eamque contemni et reici oportere, sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valitudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam, si considerare volumus, quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere, quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie.\n\n107. Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem, sic in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates.\n\n108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare, L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. de Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem eirona Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt, in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit.\n\n109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum quod velint consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidan, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit. Itemque in sermonibus alium [quemque], quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur, quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, idemque in Q. Mucio, + Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu, hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis, [ne Xenocratem quidem severissimum philosophorum,] ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum.\n\n110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius, decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. ex quo magis emergit quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura.\n\n111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas [cum] universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans, omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus.\n\n112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius [in eadem causa] non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores; Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem, eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit.\n\n113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem [et iocundum] esse se vellet! Domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nec velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum.\n\n114. [Suum] quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optumas, sed sibi accomodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu Melanippam, Clytemestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. ergo histrio hoc videbit in scena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus. sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea, si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus, nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus.\n\n115. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit, quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsis iudicio nostro accommodamus. nam regna, imperia, nobilitatem, honores, divitiae, opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubernantur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius mavult excellere.\n\n116. quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. In iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. quidam autem ad eas laudes quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam, quod idem fecit Timotheus, Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. fit autem interdum, ut nonnulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii, qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus.\n\n117. Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus quid deceat, complecti animo et cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima inbecillitas consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod maxime adamavit. Itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare.\n\n118. Nam quod Herculem Prodicus dicit, ut est apud Xenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum, quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius esset, hoc Herculi, \"Iovis satu edito\" potuit fortasse contingere, nobis non item, qui imitamur quos cuique visum est atque ad eorum studia institutaque impellimur. Plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime exoptant; nonnulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae sine parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.\n\n119. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut excellenti ingenii magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque doctrina aut utraque re ornati spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem potissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus quae aguntur, ex eo, quomodo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid deceat, exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est ei rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare.\n\n120. Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna nonunquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet) nisi forte se intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit (potest autem accidere) facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere.\n\n121. Commutato autem genere vitae omni ratione curandum est ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur. Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud exceptum sit ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut quaedam imitari possit (ut superioris filius Africani, qui hunc Paulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem valetudinis non tam potuit patris similis esse, quam ille fuerat sui) si igitur non poterit sive causas defensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella gerere, illa tamen praestare debebit, quae erunt in ipsius potestate, iustitiam, fidem, liberalitatem, modestiam, temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod desit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas et vitium iudicandum est.\n\n122. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus aetatibus tribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seniorum, aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendum est. Est igitur adulescentis maiores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis enim aetatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. Maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore patientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in civilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et dare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, meminerint verecundiae, quod erit facilius, si in eiusmodi quidem rebus maiores natu nolent interesse.\n\n123. Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi etiam augendae videntur, danda vero opera, ut et amicos et iuventutem et maxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuvent. Nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat; luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est. Sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, duplex malum est, quod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adulescentium impudentiorem intemperantiam.\n\n124. Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum, [de civium], de peregrinorum officiis dicere. Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges, iura discribere, ea fidei suae commissa meminisse. Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque summissum et abiectum neque se efferentem, tum in re publica ea velle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem et dicere.\n\n125. Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena re publica curiosum. Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur quid deceat et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus. Nihil est autem quod tam deceat, quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam.\n\n126. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis, dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cernitur idque positum est in tribus rebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto, difficilibus ad eloquendum, sed satis erit intellegi, in his autem tribus continetur cura etiam illa, ut probemur iis, quibuscum apud quosque vivamus, his quoque de rebus pauca dicantur. Principio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa videatur habuisse rationem, quae formam nostram reliquamque figuram, in qua esset species honesta, eam posuit in promptu, quae partes autem corporis ad naturae necessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque foedum, eas contexit atque abdidit.\n\n127. Hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam imitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura occultavit, eadem omnes, qui sana mente sunt, removent ab oculis ipsique necessitati dant operam ut quam occultissime pareant; quarumque partium corporis usus sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus appellant, quodque facere turpe non est, modo occulte, id dicere obscenum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat nec orationis obscenitas.\n\n128. Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici aut se qui fuerunt Stoici paene cynici qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sunt, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum; pluraque in eam sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus; status, incessus, sessio, accubitio, vultus, oculi, manuum motus teneat illud decorum.\n\n129. Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est, ut is haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta. Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casu evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore. Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce.\n\n130. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Nam et palaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores et histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non vacant, et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et simplicia laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis. Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam neglegentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.\n\n131. Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur [in] ingressu mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt, anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant, quod assequemur, si cavebimus ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus et si attentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus.\n\n132. Motus autem animorum duplices sunt; alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est eaque duplex, altera contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, contionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia. Contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio an possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur magistri, huic autem qui studeant sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta omnia; quamquam, quae verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.\n\n133. Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, utrumque omnino a natura petundum est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse loquentium et leniter. Nihil fuit in Catulis, ut eos exquisito iudicio putares uti litterarum, quamquam erant litterati; sed et alii; hi autem optime uti lingua Latina putabantur. Sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque expressae, neque oppressae, ne aut obscurum esset aut putidum, sine contentione vox nec languens nec canora. Uberior oratio L. Crassi nec minus faceta, sed bene loquendi de Catulis opinio non minor. Sale vero et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris frater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones aliorum sermone vinceret. In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omni re quid deceat exquirimus.\n\n134. Sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos. Nec vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus tum in sermone communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet. Ac videat in primis, quibus de rebus loquatur, si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis leporem. In primisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus; quod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per ridiculum aut severe, maledice contumelioseque dicitur.\n\n135. Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de domesticis negotiis aut de re publica aut de artium studiis atque doctrina. Danda igitur opera est, ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio, sed utcumque aderunt; neque enim isdem de rebus nec omni tempore nec similiter delectamur. Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo delectationem habeat, et ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi modus.\n\n136. Sed quomodo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non obtemperantes, sic eiusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira existat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam nonnumquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus, nec unquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina, sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest.\n\n137. Magnam autem partem clementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen adiuncta, ut et severitas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur, atque etiam illud ipsum, quod acerbitatis habet obiurgatio, significandum est ipsius id causa, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum. Rectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, quae cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere, iracundiam pellere; quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec constanter fieri possunt neque is, qui adsunt, probari. Deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa praesertim, et cum inrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.\n\n138. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volumus quidem certe, dicendum est etiam, qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat esse, cuius finis est usus, ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi descriptio et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia. Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse accepimus, quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis domum, quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad consulatum putabatur. Hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit aedibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, summi et clarissimi viri filius, in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum rettulit, sed ignominiam etiam et calamitatem.\n\n139. Ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est, et, ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sua solum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo, adhibenda cura est laxitatis. Aliter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino fit, si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando alio domino solita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur: o domus antiqua, heu quam dispari dominare domino quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.\n\n140. Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum sumptu et magnificentia prodeas, quo in genere multum mali etiam in exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem facta principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, virtutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificentiam imitati! Quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque revocandus. Eademque mediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae transferenda est. Sed haec hactenus.\n\n141. In omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut appetitus rationi pareat, quo nihil est ad officia conservanda accommodatius, deinde ut animadvertatur, quanta illa res sit, quam efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur, quam causa postulet. Tertium est, ut caveamus, ut ea, quae pertinent ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem, moderata sint. Modus autem est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nec progredi longius. Horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi.\n\n142. Deinceps de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum dicendum est. Haec autem scientia continentur ea, quam Graeci eutaxin nominant, non hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed illa est eutaxia, in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio. Itaque, ut eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia sit scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo collocandarum. Ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et collocationis fore; nam et ordinem sic definiunt, compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis. Locum autem actionis opportunitatem temporis esse dicunt; tempus autem actionis opportunum Graece eukairia, Latine appellatur occasio. Sic fit, ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur, ut dixi, scientia sit opportunitatis idoneorum ad agendum temporum.\n\n143. Sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio diximus, hoc autem loco de moderatione et temperantia et harum similibus virtutibus quaerimus. Itaque quae erant prudentiae propria suo loco dicta sunt; quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae pertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem, quibuscum vivimus, nunc dicenda sunt.\n\n144. Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, quemadmodum in oratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia; turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa convivio digna aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem. Bene Pericles, cum haberet collegam in praetura Sophoclem poetam iique de communi officio convenissent et casu formosus puer praeteriret dixissetque Sophocles: \"O puerum pulchrum, Pericle!\" \"At enim praetorem, Sophocle, decet non solum manus sed etiam oculos abstinentes habere.\" Atqui hoc idem Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione caruisset. Tanta vis est et loci et temporis. Ut si qui, cum causam sit acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio faciat, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.\n\n145. Sed ea, quae multum ab humanitate discrepant, ut si qui in foro cantet aut si qua est alia magna perversitas, facile apparet nec magnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat; quae autem parva videntur esse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis est diligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis quamvis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet, sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.\n\n146. Itaque ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt, sic nos, si acres ac diligentes iudices esse volumus animadversores[que] vitiorum, magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis. Ex oculorum optutu, superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis, ex summissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte fiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrepet. Quo in genere non est incommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudicare, ut, si quid dedeceat in illis, vitemus ipsi; fit enim nescio quomodo ut magis in aliis cernamus, quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Itaque facillume corriguntur in discendo, quorum vitia imitantur emendandi causa magistri.\n\n147. Nec vero alienum est ad ea deligenda, quae dubitationem afferunt, adhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos et, quid iis de quoque officii genere placeat exquirere. Maior enim pars eo fere deferri solet, quo a natura ipsa deducitur. In quibus videndum est, non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat atque etiam de qua causa quisque sentiat. Ut enim pictores et ii qui signa fabricantur et vero etiam poetae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut si quid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ab aliis, quid in eo peccatum sit exquirunt, sic aliorum iudicio permulta nobis et facienda et non facienda et mutanda et corrigenda sunt.\n\n148. Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de his nihil est praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut siquid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur. Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.\n\n149. Eos autem, quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magnis est, bene de re publica sentientes ac bene meritos aut merentes sic ut aliquo honore aut imperio affectos observare et colere debemus, tribuere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistratum habebunt, habere dilectum civis et peregrini in ipsoque peregrino privatimne an publice venerit. Ad summam, ne agam de singulis, totius generis hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus.\n\n150. Iam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberales habendi, qui sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut feneratorum. Illiberales autem et sordidi quaestus mercennariorum omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus, quod statim vendant; nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur; nec vero est quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantur; nec enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque artes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum: Cetarii, lanii, coqui, fartores, piscatores, ut ait Terentius; adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque ludum talarium.\n\n151. Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans multisque sine vanitate inpertiens, non est admodum vituperanda; atque etiam si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso se portu in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid adquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius. De qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim assumes quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt.\n\n152. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum officia ducerentur, satis eitum videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae honesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus honestis utrum honestius, qui locus a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam cum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta moderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se comparentur necesse est.\n\n153. Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum affluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia, quae cognitione digna sint, summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen si solitudo tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sophian Graeci vocant – prudentiam enim, quam Graeci phronesin dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est, certe necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque [naturae] manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognitioni anteponenda est.\n\n154. Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa ostendit et iudicat. Quis enim est tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit allatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui subvenire opitularique possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.\n\n155. Quibus rebus intellegitur, studiis officiisque scientiae praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum utilitatem, qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius. Atque illi ipsi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in rerum cognitione versata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus et commodis non recesserunt. Nam et erudierunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus, Syracosium Dionem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad rem publicam attulimus, si modo aliquid attulimus, a doctoribus atque doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus.\n\n156. Neque solum vivi atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam intelligentiam prudentiamque potissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus.\n\n157. Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur, sed cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo etiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis, id est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga cognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi remota communitate coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et immanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum atque communitas.\n\n158. Nec verum est quod dicitur a quibusdam propter necessitatem vitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque efficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et societatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent, quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque ingenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia collocaret. Non est ita. Nam et solitudinem fugeret et socium studii quaereret, tum docere, tum discere vellet, tum audire, tum dicere. Ergo omne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia continetur.\n\n159. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae maxime est apta naturae ea sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper anteponenda. non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.\n\n160. Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. [Etenim cognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter. Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non difficile sit in exquirendo officio quid cuique sit praeponendum videre. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus quid cuique praestet intellegi possit, ut prima diis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur.\n\n161. Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi potest non solum id homines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio est, ut supra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus. Cicero## Mouseia translation","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-officiis-1/original.txt"},"translations":[{"id":"trn_cicero_officiis_1_mouseia","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"curated","note":"Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 160 sections of Book I of the Latin for fidelity, Ciceronian balance, moral clarity, and cadence.","text":"1. Though you, my Marcus, have now spent a year listening to Cratippus, and that at Athens, where you ought to be overflowing with the teachings and institutions of philosophy, such is the authority of the teacher and of the city — the one able to enlarge you by knowledge, the other by example — yet I have always joined Latin learning to Greek for my own benefit, and not only in philosophy but also in the practice of speaking; and I think you should do the same, so that you may be equal in the power of both tongues. In this, indeed, we seem to have brought great help to our countrymen, so that even those untrained in Greek letters, and even the learned, believe they have gained something both for speaking and for judging.\n\n2. And so you will learn from the foremost philosopher of this age, and learn as long as you wish; but you ought to wish that long only while it does not displease you how much you advance. Yet in reading our books, which differ little from the Peripatetics — for we both want to be Socratics and Platonics — use your own judgment about the matters themselves; I put no obstacle in the way. But the Latin speech you will make richer, certainly, by reading ours. Nor would I wish this said to be thought arrogant. For while I concede the science of philosophy to many, what belongs to the orator — to speak aptly, clearly, with ornament — since I spent my life in that pursuit, if I claim it for myself, I seem in some way to claim it as my right.\n\n3. Wherefore I urge you strongly, my Cicero, to read not only my speeches, but these books of philosophy too, which have now come nearly equal to them; greater force lies in the speeches, but this too is a style worth cultivating, even and tempered. And indeed I see that no Greek has yet attained this, to labor in both kinds and follow both the forensic kind of speaking and this quiet kind of discussion — unless Demetrius of Phalerum can be counted in that number, a subtle discusser, an orator of little force, yet sweet, so that you might recognize him as a pupil of Theophrastus. But how far we have profited in each, let others judge; both we have surely followed.\n\n4. For I think that if Plato had wished to handle the forensic kind of speaking, he could have spoken most weightily and richly; and that Demosthenes, had he kept what he learned from Plato and wished to pronounce it, could have done it with ornament and splendor; and in the same way I judge of Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom delighted in his own pursuit and despised the other. But since I had resolved to write something to you at this season, and much hereafter, I wished to begin with what was most suited to your age and to my authority. For while many things in philosophy are weighty and useful, treated by the philosophers with accuracy and richness, the broadest field seems to lie open in what they have handed down about duties and taught. For no part of life — in public or private, in the courts or at home, whether you act alone or transact with another — can be free of duty; and in the cultivation of it lies all that is honorable in life, in the neglect of it, all that is shameful.\n\n5. Now this inquiry is common to all philosophers. For who would dare to call himself a philosopher without handing down precepts of duty? But there are certain schools which, by setting the ends of goods and evils, pervert all duty. For he who sets the highest good so that it has nothing joined with virtue, and measures it by his own advantage, not by honorableness — if he keeps consistent with himself and is not sometimes overcome by the goodness of nature — can cultivate neither friendship, nor justice, nor liberality; but one who judges the greatest pain the greatest evil, or who holds pleasure the highest good, certainly cannot be brave or temperate.\n\n6. And though these things are so plain that they need no disputation, they have been treated by us in another place. If these schools wish to be consistent with themselves, they can say nothing about duty; nor can any precepts of duty be firm, stable, joined to nature, unless handed down by those who say the honorable is to be sought for itself alone, or chiefly. So that teaching belongs properly to the Stoics, the Academics, the Peripatetics, since the opinion of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus was long ago exploded; yet they would have their right to dispute about duty if they had left some choice of things, so that there might be a way to the discovery of duty. We follow, then, at this time and in this question chiefly the Stoics — not as interpreters, but, as is our custom, from their fountains we shall draw by our own judgment and choice, as far and in whatever manner seems best.\n\n7. It pleases me, therefore — since all this discourse is to be about duty — to define first what duty is; which I marvel that Panaetius passed over. For every reasoned treatise on any subject ought to begin from a definition, so that it may be understood what is being discussed.... Every inquiry about duty is twofold. One kind belongs to the end of goods; the other is placed in precepts, by which the use of life may be conformed in all its parts. Examples of the higher kind are such as these: whether all duties are perfect; whether any duty is greater than another, and the questions of the same sort. But the duties whose precepts are handed down, though they belong to the end of goods, yet that appears less clearly, because they seem to look more to the ordering of common life: of these we are to speak in these books.\n\n8. And there is also another division of duty. For a certain middle duty is spoken of, and a perfect one. The perfect duty, I think, we may call the right — since the Greeks call it katorthoma; but this common duty they call kathekon. And they so define them, that what is right they define as a perfect duty; but a middle duty they say is one for which a plausible reason can be rendered why it was done.\n\n9. There are, then, as Panaetius thought, three deliberations in taking counsel. For what falls into deliberation is either doubted whether it be honorable or shameful to do; in considering which the mind is often torn into contrary opinions. Then again they ask or consult whether a thing conduces to the convenience and pleasure of life, to the means and abundance of things, to power, by which they can aid themselves and their own — whether what they deliberate is profitable or not; which whole deliberation falls into the reason of utility. The third kind of doubting is when that which seems useful seems to fight with the honorable. For when utility seems to snatch one away, and honorableness to call one back the other way, it comes to pass that the mind is torn in deliberating, and bears an anxious, two-sided care of thinking.\n\n10. With this division — since to pass over anything great is the greatest fault in dividing — two things were passed over. For not only is it usually deliberated whether a thing is honorable or shameful, but also, between two honorable things proposed, which is more honorable, and likewise, between two profitable things, which is more profitable. So the scheme he thought threefold is found to need division into five parts. First, then, of the honorable, but in a twofold way; then on the same plan of the useful; last, of the comparison of the two.\n\n11. From the beginning nature has given to every race of animals the impulse to guard itself, its life, and its body; to turn away from what seems harmful; to seek and provide all things necessary for living — food, shelter, and the rest of its kind. Common too to all animals is the appetite for union, for the sake of offspring, and a certain care of those things that are born. But between man and beast this is the greatest difference: that the beast, so far as it is moved by sense, adjusts itself only to what is present and at hand, little sensing past or future. Man, however, because he shares in reason, by which he sees consequences, sees the causes of things, and their precedents, and, as it were, their advance-stages; he compares likenesses, and joins and binds present things to future ones, and easily sees the whole course of life, and prepares the things necessary for living it.\n\n12. The same nature, by the force of reason, joins man to man, both for speech and for the fellowship of life; and above all implants in him a certain special love for those who are born of him, and moves him to desire that there be gatherings and assemblies of men, and that he himself provide the things that supply culture and life — not for himself alone, but for his wife, his children, and the rest whom he holds dear and ought to guard. That care rouses the spirits too, and makes them greater for action.\n\n13. Above all it is proper to man to seek and investigate truth. And so, when we are free from necessary business and cares, we long to see, to hear, to learn something, and we count the knowledge of things hidden or marvelous necessary for the blessed life. From this it is understood, that what is true, simple, and sincere is most fitted to man's nature. To this desire of seeing truth is joined a certain appetite for primacy, so that a mind well formed by nature wishes to obey no one except one who gives precept, or teaches, or commands justly and lawfully for the sake of utility. From this comes greatness of soul, and contempt of human things.\n\n14. Nor is that a small force of nature and reason, that this one animal senses what order is, what decorum is, what measure in deeds and words. And so none of the other animals senses the beauty, grace, and fittingness of the things perceived by sight; but nature and reason, transferring that likeness from the eyes to the mind, think far more that beauty, constancy, and order must be preserved in counsels and deeds, and take care that nothing be done indecorously or unmanly; then, in all opinions and deeds, that nothing be done or thought wantonly. From these things is woven and made what we seek — the honorable — which, though it be not ennobled, is yet honorable; and which we truly say is praiseworthy by nature, even if praised by no one.\n\n15. You see, indeed, my Marcus, the very form, as it were the face, of the honorable — \"which, if it could be seen by the eyes, would wake, as Plato says, wondrous loves for wisdom.\" But everything that is honorable arises from one of four parts. For it either dwells in the discernment of truth and in quickness of mind, or in the keeping of the society of men, with the giving to each his own, and the keeping of the faith of contracts; or in the greatness and strength of a soul lofty and unconquered; or in the order and measure of all things done and said, in which dwell modesty and temperance. And though these four are bound and interwoven with one another, yet from each one certain kinds of duty are born — as from that part first set out, in which we place wisdom and prudence, lies the search and discovery of truth, and that is the proper work of this virtue.\n\n16. For whoever most clearly perceives what in each matter is most true, and can see and explain the reason most sharply and quickly, is wont rightly to be held the most prudent and wisest. Wherefore to this virtue, as a material that it handles and works in, is subjected truth.\n\n17. To the remaining three virtues, necessity attaches to the preparing and keeping of those things in which the action of life is contained, so that the society and fellowship of men is kept, and the excellence and greatness of soul shines — both in increasing wealth and in preparing utilities for oneself and one's own, and far more in despising those very things. But order, constancy, and moderation, and the things like them, move in the kind to which a certain action is to be applied, not only a stirring of the mind. For those who bring a certain measure and order to the things handled in life, we shall preserve honorableness and decorum.\n\n18. Of the four places, then, into which we divided the nature and force of the honorable, the first — which consists in the knowledge of truth — touches human nature most. For all of us are drawn and led to the desire of knowledge and learning, in which we think it beautiful to excel, and to slip, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, we count both evil and shameful. In this kind, natural and honorable, two faults are to be avoided: one, that we take unknown things for known, and rashly assent to them — which fault he who wishes to escape (and all ought to wish it) will apply to the considering of things both time and diligence.\n\n19. The other fault is that certain men devote too great study and much labor to things obscure and difficult, and the same not necessary. With these faults declined, whatever labor and care is placed in honorable things and worthy of knowledge will rightly be praised — as we hear of C. Sulpicius in astronomy, and we ourselves know of Sextus Pompeius in geometry, of many in dialectic, of more in the civil law: all which arts busy themselves in the investigation of truth; but to be drawn away from action by the love of that study is against duty. For the praise of virtue consists wholly in action, from which, however, there is often an interruption, and many returns are given to study; then the stirring of the mind, which never rests, can keep us in studies of knowledge even without our own work. And all thought and motion of mind will busy itself either in taking counsel about honorable things and those pertaining to the good and blessed life, or in the studies of science and knowledge. Of the first fountain of duty, then, we have spoken.\n\n20. Of the three remaining, the plan is broadest by which the society of men with one another and the quasi-communion of life is held. Of this, two parts: justice, in which is the greatest splendor of virtue, from which men are called good; and beneficence joined with it, which may be called the same as kindness or liberality. But the first office of justice is, that no one harm another unless provoked by injury; next, that one use common things for common, private for one's own.\n\n21. Private property, however, is none by nature, but either by old occupancy — as those who came long ago into empty lands — or by victory, as those who gained it in war, or by law, pact, condition, lot; from which it comes that the land of Arpinum is said to belong to the Arpinates, that of Tusculum to the Tusculans; and the like is the division of private possessions. From this, since each one's own becomes of things that were by nature common, let each hold what has fallen to him; and if anyone grasps any of it for himself, he violates the right of human society.\n\n22. But since, as is most beautifully written by Plato, we are not born for ourselves alone, and our country claims a part of our birth, and our friends another part; and since, as the Stoics please, whatever is born on earth is created for the use of men, and men were generated for the sake of men, that they might benefit one another the one from the other — in this we ought to follow nature as our leader, to bring common utilities into the common stock, by an exchange of duties — giving, receiving — and then by arts, by labor, by resources, to bind the society of men to men.\n\n23. The foundation of justice, however, is faith — that is, the constancy and truth of words and agreements. From which — though it will perhaps seem hard to someone — let us dare to imitate the Stoics, who diligently inquire from what words are derived: and believe that faith is so called because what is said is done. But of injustice there are two kinds: one of those who inflict it; the other of those who, when it is inflicted, do not ward it off from those on whom it is inflicted, if they can. For he who unjustly makes an attack on anyone, stirred by anger or some passion, seems as if to lay hands on a comrade; but he who does not defend, and does not withstand the injury, if he can, is as much in fault as if he deserted his parents, or friends, or country.\n\n24. And indeed those injuries that are deliberately inflicted for the sake of harming often spring from fear — when he who thinks of harming another fears, that unless he does it, he himself may suffer some hurt. But by far the greater part set upon doing injury to gain what they have coveted: in which fault greed lies spread out widest.\n\n25. Riches are sought both for the necessary uses of life and for the enjoyment of pleasures. In those, however, in whom there is greater mind, the desire of money looks to power and the faculty of gratification — as lately M. Crassus used to say that no money was great enough for him who wanted to be first in the republic, from whose profits he could not feed an army. And magnificent apparatus and the culture of life, with elegance and abundance, delight — by which things it came to pass that the desire of money was boundless. Nor indeed is the enlargement of one's estate to be blamed when no one is harmed: but injury is always to be fled.\n\n26. But most of all men are led into the forgetfulness of justice when they have fallen into the desire of commands, honors, and glory. For what Ennius says — \"No holy society, nor faith, is there in kingship\" — is broad indeed. For whatever such a thing is, in which many cannot excel, in that there is usually such contention that it is hardest to keep a holy society. That was declared just now by the recklessness of C. Caesar, who overthrew all laws, divine and human, for the sake of that principate which he had framed for himself by an error of opinion. It is troublesome in this kind, that in the greatest souls and most brilliant wits there usually arise the desires of honor, command, power, and glory. So much the more must we guard against any fault in that kind.\n\n27. But in all injustice there is much difference whether it is done by some passion of soul, which is usually brief and for a time, or deliberately and with thought. For those things are lighter which happen by some sudden motion, than those which are prepared and contrived. Of inflicting injury, then, enough has been said.\n\n28. But there are usually more causes of passing over defense and deserting duty. For men are unwilling to take up enmities, or labor, or expense; or even by carelessness, laziness, and inertia, or held fast by certain studies and occupations of their own, they suffer those whom they ought to guard to be deserted. And so we must see whether it is not too little — what is said in Plato about the philosophers — that they are busy in the investigation of truth, and that they despise and count as nothing those things which most men vehemently seek, about which they are wont to fight together; and for that reason are just. For they attain the one kind of justice — that they inflict injury on no one — but they fall into the other: hindered by the love of learning, they desert those whom they ought to guard. And so they think they will not even approach the republic unless compelled. But it were fairer that it be done willingly; for this very thing is just, which is rightly done, if it is voluntary.\n\n29. There are also those who, either by the care of guarding their estate, or from a certain hatred of men, say they manage their own business and appear to do injury to no one. While free from the one kind of injustice, they fall into the other: they desert the society of life, because they bring nothing into it of zeal, nothing of labor, nothing of resources.\n\n30. When, therefore, to the two kinds of injustice proposed we have joined the causes of each kind, and have set before the things in which justice is contained, we shall easily be able to judge what the duty of each time is — unless we shall love ourselves too much. For the care of things belonging to others is hard. And yet that Terentian Chremes thinks \"nothing human alien to himself\"; but nevertheless, because we perceive and feel more those things that happen to ourselves, whether prosperous or adverse, than those that happen to others, which we see as it were across a long interval, we judge of them otherwise than of ourselves. Wherefore they give good precepts who forbid a man to do anything about which he doubts whether it be fair or unfair. Fairness shines by itself; doubt signifies a thought of injury.\n\n31. But times often occur when those things which seem most worthy of a just man, and of him whom we call a good man, are changed and become the opposite — as to restore a deposit, to make good a promise, and whatever belongs to truth and faith: it sometimes becomes just to migrate from these and not keep them. For the return ought to be made to those foundations of justice which I set at the beginning: first, that no one be harmed; next, that the common good be served. When these are changed by time, the duty is changed, and it is not always the same.\n\n32. For it can happen that a certain promise and agreement would be useless to fulfill, either to him to whom it was promised, or to him who promised. For if, as in the fables, Neptune had not done what he promised Theseus, Theseus would not have been bereft of his son Hippolytus. For of three wishes, as it is written, this was the third, which he wished in anger, for the death of Hippolytus; and when it was granted, he fell into the greatest griefs. Therefore those promises are not to be kept which are useless to those to whom you promised; nor, if they hurt you more than they benefit him to whom you promised, is it against duty to put the greater before the lesser — as if you should resolve to be present for someone as an advocate at a set time, and meanwhile your son should begin to be gravely ill: it is not against duty not to do what you said; rather he to whom it was promised departs from duty, if he complains he was forsaken. And who does not see that one is not bound by promises that were made under fear, or deceived by fraud? Which indeed are mostly freed by the praetor's law, some by statutes.\n\n33. Injuries also often arise from a certain calumny and an over-clever but wicked interpretation of the law. From which that saying — \"the highest right, the highest injury\" — has become a proverb worn with use. In this kind, too, many wrongs are done in the republic: as he who, when a truce of thirty days had been made with the enemy, plundered the fields by night, because the truce had been agreed for days, not for nights. Nor would even ours be approvable, if it is true that Q. Fabius Labeo — or whoever else (I have nothing but hearsay) — appointed arbiter between Nola and Naples about boundaries by the senate, when he had come to the place, spoke with each side separately, that they should act neither greedily nor graspingly, and that they would rather go back than go forward. When both had done so, some land was left in the middle. And so he fixed their boundary as they themselves had said; and what was left in the middle, he adjudged to the Roman people. That indeed is to deceive, not to judge. Wherefore in every matter such cleverness is to be fled.\n\n34. And certain duties are to be kept even toward those from whom you have received injury. For there is a measure of avenging and punishing; and I am not sure whether it is enough that he who has provoked be sorry for his injury, so that both he may do nothing such hereafter, and others be slower to injury. But in the republic the rights of war are above all to be kept. For since there are two kinds of contending — one by discussion, the other by force — and since the one belongs to man, the other to beasts, we must fly to the latter if we may not use the former.\n\n35. Wherefore wars are indeed to be undertaken for this cause, that without injury one may live in peace; but victory won, they who were not cruel in war, not savage, are to be kept — as our ancestors received the Tusculans, the Aequi, the Volscians, the Sabines, the Hernici even into citizenship; but Carthage and Numantia they utterly destroyed: I could have wished Corinth had not been — but I believe they followed something, chiefly the opportuneness of the place, lest that place could ever hereafter incite to war. In my opinion, peace, which will hold no treachery, must always be consulted for. In which, had it been obeyed by me, we should have — not the best, but some republic, which now there is none. And with those whom you have conquered by force there is care to be had, and those too who, laying down arms, flee to the good faith of the commanders — even though the battering ram has struck the wall — are to be received. In which so greatly was justice cultivated among our fathers, that those who had received in trust conquered cities or nations conquered in war were their patrons by the custom of the fathers.\n\n36. And indeed the fairness of war is most holily written in the fetial law of the Roman people. From which it can be understood that no war is just, unless it is waged after demand for restitution, or announced beforehand and declared. Popilius the commander held the province, in whose army the son of Cato served as a young soldier. And when it seemed good to Popilius to dismiss one legion, he dismissed the son of Cato also, who served in the same legion. But since he had remained in the army for the love of fighting, Cato wrote to Popilius that, if he allowed him to remain in the army, he should bind him again with a second military oath: for, the first having lapsed, he could not fight with the enemy by right.\n\n37. So great was the observance in beginning a war. M. Cato the elder has an epistle to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he heard that he had been discharged by the consul when he served as a soldier in the war in Macedonia against Perses. He warns him, therefore, to take care that he not enter battle; for he says it is not right that one who is not a soldier fight with the enemy. And indeed I also notice this, that he who was by his own name a \"lost-foe\" (perduellis) was called \"enemy\" (hostis) — the harshness of the thing was softened by the mildness of the word. For \"enemy\" among our fathers was he whom we now call a stranger. The twelve tables show it: \"or a set day with a stranger,\" and likewise \"against a stranger, authority everlasting.\" What can be added to this gentleness, to call by so soft a name him with whom you wage war? Though age has since made that name harder; it receded from \"stranger\" and remained proper to him who bears arms against you.\n\n38. But when the contest is for empire, and glory is sought in war, still the causes ought entirely to underlie those same which I said a little before are just causes of wars. But those wars in which the glory of empire is proposed are to be waged less bitterly. For as we contend otherwise with a citizen if he is an enemy, otherwise if a competitor (with the one the contest is of honor and dignity, with the other of head and fame), so with the Celtiberians, with the Cimbrians, war was waged as with enemies, which of the two should be, not which should command; with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites, Carthaginians, with Pyrrhus, about empire they fought. The Carthaginians broke treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the rest were more just. Of Pyrrhus indeed, about giving back captives, that famous word: \"Gold I ask not of thee, nor wilt thou give me a price; not as traffickers in war, but as warriors, with iron, not with gold, let us contend for life together. Whether thou or I reign, or what Fortune brings, let us try with valor. And take this word withal: those whose valor the fortune of war has spared, it is my resolve to spare their liberty. Give them up; lead them away; I give them freely to the great gods.\"\n\n39. Truly a royal judgment, worthy of the race of the Aeacidae. And even if individuals, driven by times, have promised anything to an enemy, faith is to be kept in that very thing — as in the first Punic war, Regulus, taken captive by the Carthaginians, when he was sent to Rome to exchange the captives, having sworn that he would return: first, as he came, he gave it as his counsel in the senate that the captives should not be given back; then, when he was held by his kin and friends, he preferred to return to punishment than to deceive the faith given to the enemy.\n\n40. But in the second Punic war, after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent to Rome ten men bound by oath that they would return unless they obtained the ransom of those who were captives: all of them the censors left in the treasuries so long as each of them lived, because they had sworn falsely — and no less that man who found fault in the fraud of the oath. For when he had gone out of the camp by permission of Hannibal, he returned a little after, because he said he had forgotten something; then, gone out of the camp again, he thought himself absolved by his oath — and he was so in words, not in reality. But in faith, what you have SENSED, not what you have SAID, is always to be considered. The greatest example of justice toward an enemy was set by our fathers, when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate that he would give the king poison and kill him. The senate and C. Fabricius delivered him to Pyrrhus. Thus they approved not even the death of an enemy, powerful and waging war unprovoked, when it was joined with crime.\n\n41. Of military duties, enough has been said. Let us remember, too, that justice is to be kept even toward the lowest. The lowest condition and fortune is that of slaves, for whom we are not badly taught to give the commands we give hired laborers — work to be demanded, justice to be given. But since injury is done in two ways — by force or by fraud — fraud seems like a little fox, force like a lion; both are most alien to man, but fraud is worthy of the greater hatred. And of all injustice none is more deadly than that of those who, when they most deceive, contrive to seem good men. Of justice, enough.\n\n42. Next, as was proposed, let beneficence and liberality be treated, than which nothing is more in harmony with man's nature; but it has many cautions. We must see, first, that our kindness does not harm those to whom it seems to be kindly done, and others; then, that the kindness be not greater than our means; and that it be given to each according to his worth — for that is the foundation of justice, to which all these are to be referred. For those who gratify anyone with what will harm him, when they seem to wish to help him, must be judged not beneficent nor liberal, but mischievous flatterers; and those who harm some that they may be liberal to others are in the same injustice, as if they converted another's goods into their own.\n\n43. There are many, indeed, covetous of splendor and glory, who snatch from some what they give to others, and think they will be seen beneficent to their friends if they enrich them by any means whatever. But that is so far from duty that nothing can be more contrary to duty. We must take care, then, to use that liberality which profits friends and harms no one. Wherefore the transfer of moneys by L. Sulla and C. Caesar from their rightful owners to strangers ought not to be thought liberal; for nothing is liberal that is not at the same time just.\n\n44. The second ground of caution was, that the kindness be not greater than our means. Those who wish to be more generous than their property allows sin first in that they wrong their kin — for such supplies as ought more justly to be provided for these, and left to them, they transfer to strangers. There is in such liberality, too, usually a desire for seizing and taking away by wrong, that supplies may suffice for giving. One may see, too, that most are not so much liberal by nature as led by a kind of glory, to do many things that they may seem beneficent — things that seem to proceed from ostentation more than from will. Such simulation is joined rather to vanity than to liberality or honesty.\n\n45. The third aim is that in beneficence there be a choice of worthiness: in which both the character of him to whom the benefit is given must be considered, and his spirit toward us, and the commonness and partnership of life, and benefits before conferred on our own needs; that all these meet is desirable; if not, the more numerous and weightier causes will have the more weight.\n\n46. But since we live not with perfect and thoroughly wise men, but with those in whom things go well if they have images of virtue, this also must be understood: no one at all is to be neglected in whom some mark of virtue appears; but each is to be cultivated most, in whose character those gentler virtues are most adorned — modesty, temperance, and this very justice, of which much has been said. For the brave and great soul in a man not yet perfect or wise is usually more ardent; those virtues seem rather to touch the good man. And so much of character.\n\n47. But of the goodwill that anyone has toward us, it is first a duty to give most to him by whom we are most loved; but let us judge goodwill not in the manner of young men, by a certain heat of passion, but rather by stability and constancy. But if the merits are such that gratitude is not to be begun but to be repaid, the greater care must be applied: no duty is more necessary than repayment of a benefit.\n\n48. But if Hesiod bids you return with larger measure what you have received on loan, if only you can — what ought we to do, challenged by a benefit? Shall we imitate the fertile fields, which yield far more than they received? For if we doubt not to confer duties on those whom we hope will profit us, how ought we to be toward those who have already profited? For since there are two kinds of liberality — one of giving, one of repaying a benefit — whether we give is in our own power; but not to repay is not permitted to a good man, provided he can do it without wrong.\n\n49. There must be a choice, also, among the benefits received, and there is no doubt that most is owed to each according to his greatness. Yet in this especially one must weigh with what mind, with what zeal, with what goodwill he did it. Many do much with a certain rashness and without judgment, driven by a morbid distemper toward all, or by a sudden gust of passion, like a wind: such benefits are not to be counted as great as those given with judgment, deliberately and constantly. But in bestowing a benefit and in repaying gratitude, if other things are equal, it is most a duty to help chiefly the one who most needs help — which is contrary to what most do: on him from whom they hope most, even if he needs nothing of them, they wait most eagerly.\n\n50. But the society and union of men will be kept best if, as each is most closely joined to us, so to him most of kindness is bestowed. But what the principles of the communion and human society of nature are, seems to be sought from a deeper source. There is first that which is seen in the fellowship of the whole human race. Its bond is reason and speech, which, by teaching, learning, communicating, disputing, judging, reconcile men to one another and join them in a certain natural society; nor are we farther removed from the nature of the beasts in anything than that we say there is often fortitude in horses and lions, but justice, fairness, goodness we do not say: for they lack reason and speech.\n\n51. And indeed most wide-reaching among men, of all among all, is this society. In it the communion of all things that nature has produced for the common use of men is to be kept; and those things which are assigned by statutes and civil law are to be so held as it is constituted — from which themselves, the rest are to be so observed, as in the Greek proverb, that the goods of friends are all common. All things seem common to men of that kind which Ennius set in one place, to be transferred to very many: \"The man who kindly points the way to one astray / lights, as it were, his lantern with his own: / no less does it shine for him, having lit the other.\" By one example he sufficiently teaches that whatever can be supplied without loss to oneself should be given even to a stranger.\n\n52. From which come those commons: not to forbid running water; to suffer fire to be taken from fire, if one wishes; to give faithful counsel to one deliberating — which are useful to those who receive, and not burdensome to the giver. Wherefore both these are to be used, and something must ever be added to the common utility. But since the means of individuals are small, and the multitude of those in need is infinite, common liberality must be referred to that limit of Ennius — \"no less does it shine for him\" — that there may be means by which we may be liberal to our own.\n\n53. There are many degrees of the society of men. That, indeed, infinite one may be let go: nearer is that of the same race, nation, tongue, by which men are most joined. Nearer still is that of the same city; for many things are common among citizens: the forum, temples, porticoes, roads, laws, rights, courts, votes; besides, customs and intimacies, and many things and business contracted with many. A closer bond is the society of kindred: from that immense society of the human race it is concluded into a small and narrow circle.\n\n54. For since it is a common property of living things to have the desire of begetting, the first society is in marriage itself; the next, in children; then one house, all things common: and that is the beginning of a city, and, as it were, the seedbed of the republic. Then follow the unions of brothers, then of cousins; who, when one house can no longer contain them, go out into other houses, as into colonies. Then follow marriages and affinities, from which come more kindred: which propagation and offspring is the origin of republics. But the bond of blood joins men by goodwill and charity.\n\n55. Great it is to have the same monuments of ancestors, to use the same sacred rites, to have common tombs. But of all societies none is more excellent, none firmer, than when good men, alike in character, are joined in intimacy. For that honorable thing which we often speak of shines even if seen in another, yet moves us, and makes us friends with him in whom we see it to be.\n\n56. And although every virtue draws us to itself and makes us love those in whom it seems to dwell, yet justice and liberality do this most. And nothing is more lovable, nothing more uniting, than the likeness of character of good men: in whom, when the same pursuits and the same wills are, it comes to pass that each delights in the other as in himself — and that comes to pass which Pythagoras wills in friendship: that one be made of many. Great, too, is that communion which is made of benefits given and received to and fro, which, while they are mutual and pleasing, bind those between whom they are with a firm bond of society.\n\n57. But when with reason and spirit you survey all things, of all societies none is more weighty, none more dear than that which each of us has with the republic. Dear are parents, dear children, kindred, friends — but one fatherland embraces all the loves of all: for which, if it should profit her, who is a good man doubts to lay down life? So much the more detestable is the monstrousness of those who have torn their fatherland with every crime, and are and have been occupied in utterly destroying her.\n\n58. But if some contention and comparison be made, to whom most of duty should be given: first are the country and the parents, by whose benefits we are most deeply bound; next, children and the whole house, which looks to us alone and can have no other refuge; then the well-matched kindred, with whom the fortune is usually common. Wherefore the necessary defenses of life are owed chiefly to those I named before; but the communion of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, consolation, sometimes even reproach, flourish most in friendships: and that friendship is the most pleasant which is joined by likeness of character.\n\n59. But in all these duties of giving, it must be seen what each most needs, and what each could or could not attain without us. So the degrees of necessity will not be the same as those of circumstances, and there are duties owed to some more than to others: thus you would sooner help a neighbor to gather his fruits than a brother or a friend; but, if the case were in court, you would rather defend a kinsman and a friend than a neighbor. These and such things are to be watched in every duty, and habit and exercise to be taken, so that we may be good reckoners of duties, and, by adding and subtracting, see what remains of the sum, whence you may understand how much is owed to each.\n\n60. But as neither physicians nor commanders nor orators, however much they have grasped the precepts of their arts, can accomplish anything worthy of great praise without use and exercise, so the precepts of keeping duty are handed down — as I do myself — but the greatness of the matter requires use and exercise too. And about those things that lie in the law of human society, how the honorable is drawn, from which a duty is fit, we have said enough, nearly.\n\n61. It must be understood, though four kinds have been set forth, from which honorableness and duty flow, that that seems most splendid which is done with a great and lofty soul, and in contempt of human things. And so in reproaches it is most in view, if anything of the kind can be said: \"You, young men, bear a woman's spirit; that maiden, a man's\" — and anything of the sort: \"Salmacis has spoils without sweat and blood.\" And on the contrary, in praises, what has been done with great spirit and bravely and excellently, we somehow praise with fuller mouth. Hence the training-ground of the rhetoricians about Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, Leuctra; hence our Cocles, hence the Decii, hence Cn. and P. Scipiones, hence M. Marcellus, and innumerable others; and above all the Roman people itself excels in greatness of soul. The zeal for military glory is declared also, because we see statues adorned for the most part in military dress.\n\n62. But that elation of soul which is seen in dangers and labors, if it lacks justice and fights not for the common safety but for its own conveniences, is in fault; for not only is that not virtue, but it is rather savage inhumanity, repelling all humaneness. Wherefore fortitude is well defined by the Stoics, when they say it is a virtue fighting for fairness. Wherefore no one who has won the glory of fortitude by treachery and malice has attained praise: for nothing can be honorable that lacks justice.\n\n63. Glorious, then, is that saying of Plato: \"Not only,\" he says, \"should knowledge that is severed from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom; but even a spirit ready for danger, if it is driven by its own cupidity, not by the common good, should have the name of audacity rather than fortitude.\" Wherefore we will that brave and great-souled men be the same good and simple men, friends of truth, and in no way deceivers — which things flow from the middle place of justice.\n\n64. But that thing is odious, that in this elation and greatness of soul, stubbornness and an excessive lust for leadership is most easily born inborn. As it is said in Plato that the whole manner of the Spartans was inflamed with the desire of winning: so, whoever excels most in greatness of soul, wants most to be first of all — or rather alone. But it is hard, when you have longed to excel all, to keep equity, which is most proper to justice. From which it comes that they suffer not themselves to be conquered in discussion nor by any public and lawful right, and there arise in the republic usually donors and faction-makers, that they may attain the greatest power, and be superior by force rather than equal by justice. But the harder, the more glorious: for no time is that which ought to lack justice.\n\n65. Brave and great-souled, then, are to be held, not those who do, but those who drive back injury. But the true and wise greatness of soul judges that honorable thing, which nature chiefly follows, to lie in deeds, not in glory, and prefers to BE first rather than to SEEM first. For he who hangs upon the error of an ignorant multitude is not to be held among great men. And he is most easily driven to unjust things, whoever is of the highest soul, by the desire of glory: which place is indeed slippery, for scarcely is he found who, having undertaken labors and approached dangers, does not desire glory as a kind of payment for his deeds.\n\n66. Altogether the brave and great soul is seen chiefly in two things: of which one lies in the contempt of outward things, when it is believed that nothing ought to be admired, or wished, or desired by man except what is honorable and seemly, and to yield to no man, to no passion of mind, nor to fortune. The other is that, when you are so affected in soul as I said, you perform things great indeed, and most useful, but exceedingly hard, full of labors and dangers — both of life and of many things that pertain to life.\n\n67. All the splendor of these two things, and their amplitude — I add even utility — is in the latter; but the cause and efficient reason of great men is in the former. For in that is that which makes excellent minds and despisers of human things. And this very thing is seen in two things: if you judge only that which is honorable to be a good, and are free from all perturbation of soul. For it must be held the mark of a brave and great soul to count small those things that seem to most men eminent and glorious, and to despise them with a settled and firm reason; and to bear so those things which seem bitter, which are many and various in the life of men and in fortune, that you depart nothing from the state of nature, nothing from the dignity of the wise: which is of a robust soul and great constancy.\n\n68. Nor is it consistent that he who is not broken by fear be broken by desire, nor that he who has shown himself unconquered by labor be conquered by pleasure. Wherefore both these are to be shunned, and the desire of money fled; for nothing is so narrow-souled and so small as to love riches; nothing more honorable, more magnificent than to despise money if you have it not — if you have it, to confer it on beneficence and liberality. The desire of glory also is to be shunned, as I said before: for it strips away liberty, for which great-souled men ought to strive with all contention. Nor indeed are commands to be sought; and rather, sometimes not to be accepted, and sometimes to be laid down.\n\n69. But one must be vacant of every perturbation of soul — both of desire and fear, and also of grief and of excessive pleasure and of anger — so that tranquility of soul and security be present, which bring with them both constancy and dignity. There are, however, many who are and have been, seeking that tranquility of which I speak, who have withdrawn from public business and fled into leisure — among these the most noble philosophers, far the chief, and certain men severe and grave, who could not bear the ways of peoples or princes, and lived some in the fields, delighted with their own family.\n\n70. These had the same purpose as kings: to want nothing, to obey no one, to use liberty, whose property is to live as you will. Wherefore since this is common to the desirers of power and to those I have called at leisure — the one think they can attain it if they have great resources, the others if they are content with their own and with little: in which the judgment of neither is altogether to be despised. But easier, safer, and less grave or troublesome to others is the life of the at leisure; more fruitful, however, for the race of men, and apter for glory and amplitude, that of those who have fitted themselves for the republic and for doing great things.\n\n71. Wherefore perhaps it should be conceded to those who have given themselves to learning of excellent genius, that they do not undertake the republic; and to those who have withdrawn from it either by weakness of health or by some graver cause, when they conceded the administration of it and the glory to others. But to those in whom there is no such cause, if they say they despise those things which most admire — commands and magistracies — to them I think not only no praise but even fault must be given. Their judgment in this — that they despise glory and count it as nothing — is hard not to approve; but they seem to fear labors and troubles, then the offense and repulses as a kind of ignominy and infamy. For there are who in contrary things do not keep themselves consistent: they contemn pleasure most severely, in grief are softer; glory they neglect, but are broken by infamy — and that not too constantly.\n\n72. But they who have from nature the helps for doing things, all hesitation cast aside, must undertake magistracies and administer the republic; for otherwise neither can the city be governed nor the greatness of soul be declared. To those undertaking the republic, no less than to the philosophers — I know not whether even more — magnificence and contempt of human things must be applied, of which I often speak, and tranquility of soul and security: if indeed they will be neither anxious, and will live with gravity and constancy.\n\n73. Which things are easier for philosophers, since less lies open in their life that fortune may strike, and since they need fewer things, and because if anything adverse happen, they cannot fall so gravely. Wherefore not without cause greater motions of soul are stirred, and greater zeal is required of those administering the republic than of those at rest — by so much the more must greatness of soul be applied to them and freedom from cares. But he who comes to the administration, let him beware lest he consider only how honorable that thing is, but also that he have the faculty of effecting it: in which very thing it must be considered, lest he despair rashly through sloth, or trust too much through desire. In all business, before you set upon it, careful preparation must be applied.\n\n74. But since most think military things greater than civil ones, this opinion must be lessened. For many have often sought wars for the desire of glory, and that usually happens in great souls and wits — and the more so if they are apt for the military business and desirous of waging wars. But truly, if we wish to judge rightly, many civil things have arisen greater and more glorious than military.\n\n75. For although Themistocles is justly praised, and his name is more illustrious than Solon's, and Salamis is cited, the witness of the most famous victory, which is preferred to the counsel of Solon, by which he first constituted the Areopagites — no less glorious must this be judged than that. For that profited the city once, this will always profit; by this counsel the laws of the Athenians, the institutions of the ancestors, are kept. And indeed Themistocles would say nothing in which he himself helped the Areopagus; but he was truly helped by it: for that war was carried on by the counsel of that senate which was constituted by Solon.\n\n76. One may say the same of Pausanias and Lysander, by whose deeds empire is thought to have been won for the Spartans; yet they are not to be compared in the least part with the laws and discipline of Lycurgus: in fact by these very causes they had armies more obedient and braver. To me indeed, when we were boys, M. Scaurus seemed not to yield to C. Marius; nor, when we were engaged in the republic, did Q. Catulus seem to yield to Cn. Pompeius; for the arms abroad are small, unless there is counsel at home. Nor did Africanus, a singular man and commander, profit the republic more in destroying Numantia than at the same time P. Nasica, a private citizen, when he killed Ti. Gracchus; although that deed indeed is not only from a civil reason — it touches even the military, since it was done by force and hand — but yet that very thing was done by urban counsel, without an army.\n\n77. But that thing is best, against which I hear the wicked and envious are wont to rush — \"let arms yield to the toga, let the laurel yield to praise.\" For, to omit others, with us governing the republic, did not arms yield to the toga? For never was there in the republic a graver danger, nor a greater peace. So by our counsels and diligence the arms quickly slipped from the hands of the most daring citizens, and themselves fell. What deed was ever done in war so great? What triumph is to be compared?\n\n78. For it is permitted me, my Marcus, to boast before you, to whom both the inheritance of this glory and the imitation of my deeds belongs. For to me indeed — a man abounding in military praises, Cn. Pompeius — with many listening, gave this tribute: that he said he would have carried his third triumph in vain, unless by my benefit to the republic he had a place where he might triumph. There are, therefore, domestic fortitudes not inferior to the military ones; in which even more than in those, labor and study must be placed.\n\n79. Altogether that honorable thing which we seek from a lofty and magnificent soul is made by the strength of the mind, not of the body. Yet the body must be exercised, and so affected that it can obey counsel and reason in carrying out business and enduring labor. But that honorable thing which we seek lies wholly in the care and thought of the mind; in which those who preside over the republic, in the toga, bring no less utility than those who wage war. Wherefore by their counsel often wars are either not undertaken or finished, sometimes even such are brought on: as the third Punic war by M. Cato, in which even dead his authority prevailed.\n\n80. Wherefore the reason of deciding is indeed rather to be desired than the fortitude of fighting — but care must be taken, lest we do that more from flight of war than from the reason of utility. But war must be so undertaken, that nothing else may seem sought but peace. And it is the mark of a brave soul and a constant one not to be disturbed in hard things, nor, as it is said, to be thrown from one's station into tumult, but to use a present mind and counsel, and not depart from reason.\n\n81. But this, too, belongs to a great soul: to foresee the future in thought, and to settle somewhat beforehand what can happen on either side, and what must be done when something has happened, and never let it be that one must say \"I had not foreseen.\" These are the works of a great and lofty mind, trusting in prudence and counsel. To rush into the battle-line and fight hand to hand with the enemy is something monstrous and like beasts; but when time and necessity demand, one must fight hand to hand, and death must be set before slavery and disgrace.\n\n82. But in overthrowing and plundering cities great care must be taken, that nothing be done rashly, nothing cruelly. That is the work of a great man — in troubled things to punish the guilty, to keep the multitude, to hold in every fortune what is right and honorable. For as there are those, as I said before, who prefer military to civil things, so you will find many to whom perilous and hot counsels seem more splendid and greater than the quiet and the thoughtful.\n\n83. Never at all should the flight of danger be so committed that we seem idle and timid; but that also is to be fled — that we offer ourselves to dangers without cause, than which nothing can be more foolish. Wherefore in entering dangers the custom of physicians is to be imitated, who cure the lightly sick gently, but are forced to apply dangerous and doubtful treatments to graver diseases. Wherefore in calm weather to wish for an adverse storm is madness; but to aid in a storm by any means is wisdom — and the more so if, with the matter made plain, you gain more good than you doubted of the evil. Perilous actions of things are partly so for those who undertake them, partly for the republic.\n\n84. And some are called into the peril of life, others into the peril of glory and the goodwill of citizens. We ought, then, to be more ready to fight for our own dangers than for the common, and more prepared to fight for honor and glory than for the other conveniences. Many have been found, indeed, who were ready to pour out not only money but life for their country, who yet would not give up even the least of glory, not even with the republic demanding — as Callicratidas, who, when he had been leader of the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnesian war and had done many things excellently, turned everything at the end, when he did not obey the counsel of those who thought the fleet ought to be removed from Arginusae and battle avoided with the Athenians. To them he answered that the Lacedaemonians could prepare another fleet if that one were lost, but that he could not flee without his own disgrace. And that blow indeed was moderate to the Lacedaemonians; the other was pestilential — by which, when Cleombrotus, fearing envy, rashly joined battle with Epaminondas, the power of the Lacedaemonians collapsed. How much better Q. Maximus! of whom Ennius: \"One man by delay restored the state to us. He put no rumor before safety. Therefore now and more and more the glory of the man shines.\" This kind of fault is to be avoided even in civil things. For there are those who, though what they think is best, do not dare to say it for fear of envy.\n\n85. Altogether those who are about to preside over the republic should hold the two precepts of Plato: one, that they so guard the utility of the citizens that whatever they do they refer to it, forgetting their own conveniences; the other, that they care for the whole body of the republic, that, while they guard some part, they desert not the rest. For as guardianship, so the administration of the republic is to be carried on for the utility of those entrusted, not of those to whom it is entrusted. And they who consult the part of the citizens neglect a part, bring most ruinous things into the city — sedition and discord; from which it comes to pass that some seem popular, others keen for the best men, and few care for all.\n\n86. Hence among the Athenians great discords; in our republic not only seditions but pestilential civil wars — which a grave and strong citizen, worthy of principate in the republic, will flee and hate, and will give himself wholly to the republic, and will pursue neither wealth nor power, and will guard the whole of it so as to consult for all. Nor will he at all call anyone to hatred or envy by false crimes, and he will so cleave to justice and honorableness, that, while he keeps them, though he offend gravely he will rather meet death than desert those things I have spoken.\n\n87. Most wretched of all is the ambition of the contention of honors, of which beautifully in the same Plato: \"that they act alike who contend with each other which should rather administer the republic, as if sailors contended which of them should rather steer.\" And he commands \"that we think those our adversaries who bear arms against us, not those who by their own judgment wish to guard the republic\" — such as was the dissension without bitterness between P. Africanus and Q. Metellus.\n\n88. Nor are they to be heard who think one must be gravely angry with enemies, and that that belongs to a great and brave man: nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing more worthy of a great and illustrious man than placability and clemency. But in free peoples and in the equality of rights there must also be exercised that facility and loftiness of soul which is called, lest, if we grow angry at untimely comers or shameless askers, we fall into an useless moroseness that is odious. And yet that mildness and clemency is to be approved so, that for the cause of the republic severity be applied, without which a city cannot be administered. And all animadversion and castigation ought to be free of insult, and be referred not to the man who punishes or rebukes with words, but to the utility of the republic.\n\n89. It must be guarded, too, lest the punishment be greater than the fault, and lest for the same causes some are punished, others not even called. In punishing, above all, anger must be forbidden; for he who comes to punishment angry will never keep that moderation which is between too much and too little — which pleases the Peripatetics, and rightly, provided they did not praise anger and say it was usefully given by nature. That, in all things, is to be rejected, and it is to be prayed that those who preside over the republic be like the laws, which are led to punishment not by anger but by fairness.\n\n90. And even in prosperous things, and those flowing to our wish, we must greatly flee pride, disdain, and arrogance. For to bear adverse things, so also to bear prosperous ones immoderately, is lightness; and splendid is that evenness in the whole of life, and always the same countenance and the same front, as we have heard of Socrates and of C. Laelius. Philip, the king of the Macedonians, surpassed in deeds and glory by his son, I see was superior in facility and humanity. And so the one was always great, the other often most shameful — so that rightly seem to counsel those who warn, that the more we are superior, so much the more modestly we bear ourselves. Panaetius indeed used to say of Africanus, his hearer and familiar, that he was wont to say, \"as horses, for their frequent contentions in battles, exulting in fierceness, are wont to be given over to tamers, that they may use them more easily, so men, unbridled in prosperity and confident in themselves, ought to be led, as it were, in a ring of reason and doctrine, that they may see the weakness and variety of human things.\"\n\n91. And even in the most prosperous things, the counsel of friends is most to be used, and even greater authority is to be given than before. And at the same times we must guard lest we open our ears to flatterers, nor let us be flattered, in which it is easy to be deceived. For they think themselves such as rightly to be praised; from which innumerable faults arise, when men, inflated with opinions, are basely mocked and remain in the greatest errors.\n\n92. But these things indeed hitherto. That, however, must be so judged, that the greatest things and of the greatest soul are done by those who rule republics, since their administration lies open most widely and extends to the very many. But many are great of soul and have been even in a life of leisure, who either investigated or attempted certain great things, and contained themselves within the bounds of their own things, or, placed between the philosophers and those who administer the republic, delighted in their own estate — not indeed exaggerating it by every device, nor excluding their own people from its use, rather imparting it to friends and to the republic, if ever there were need. First let it be gotten well — by no shameful trade, nor odious; then let it offer itself useful to the very many, provided they are worthy; then let it grow by reason, diligence, parsimony; and let it obey liberality and beneficence rather than lust and luxury. Keeping these precepts, one may live magnificently, gravely, bravely, and even simply, faithfully — and kindly to men.\n\n93. It follows that of the one remaining part of honorableness we must speak, in which are seen modesty and a certain ornament of life, temperance and modesty, and all the settling of the disturbances of the soul, and the measure of things. In this place is contained that which can be called in Latin decorum — in Greek prepon.\n\n94. Its force is such, that it cannot be separated from the honorable: for what is fitting is honorable, and what is honorable is fitting. What the difference is between the honorable and the decorous can be understood more easily than explained. For whatever it is that is fitting, that appears then, when honorableness has gone before. And so not only in this part of honorableness, of which we must speak here, but also in the three former ones, what is fitting appears. For it is fitting to use reason and speech prudently, and to do what you do with consideration, and in everything to see and guard what is true; and, on the contrary, to be deceived, to err, to slip, to be cheated, is as unbecoming as to rave and be of unsound mind; and all just things are decorous, unjust things on the contrary — as shameful, so unbecoming. Like is the reason of fortitude: for what is done manfully and with great soul seems worthy of a man and decorous; what is contrary, as it is shameful, so it is unbecoming.\n\n95. Wherefore that which I say — decorum — pertains indeed to the whole of honorableness, and pertains so, that it is not discerned by some hidden reason, but is at hand. For there is a certain thing, and it is understood in every virtue, that is fitting; which can be separated from virtue more in thought than in reality. As beauty and comeliness of body cannot be separated from health, so this decorum of which we speak is indeed all confused with virtue, but is distinguished in mind and thought.\n\n96. And its division is twofold: for we understand a certain general decorum, which is engaged in the whole of honorableness, and another subjected to this, which pertains to the single parts of honorableness. That former is usually so defined: decorum is that which is consonant with the excellence of man, in that in which his nature differs from the rest of the animals. But that part which is subjected to the general, they define so, that they wish that to be decorum which is so consonant with nature that in it moderation and temperance appear, with a certain liberal grace.\n\n97. This can be thought understood from that decorum which the poets follow, about which in another place more is usually said. But then we say poets keep that which is fitting, when that which is worthy of each person is both done and said — as if Aeacus or Minos should say: \"Let them hate, so they fear\"; or: \"The father himself is a tomb to his sons\" — it would seem unbecoming, since we have heard they were just; but when Atreus speaks, applause is roused: for the speech is worthy of the person. But the poets will judge from the person what becomes each; but to us the very nature has assigned the person, with great excellence and preeminence above the rest of animals.\n\n98. Wherefore the poets, in a great variety of persons, will see what agrees even with the vicious and what becomes them; but to us, since the parts of constancy, moderation, temperance, modesty have been given by nature, and since the same nature teaches not to neglect how we carry ourselves toward men, it is brought about that both that decorum which pertains to the whole of honorableness appears spread as wide as it is, and this which is looked at in each particular kind of virtue. For as the beauty of the body, apt in the composition of limbs, moves the eyes and delights by this very thing, that all the parts agree with a certain grace, so this decorum, which shines out in life, moves the approbation of those with whom we live, by order and constancy and moderation of all sayings and doings.\n\n99. A certain reverence, then, is to be applied toward men, both toward the best and toward the rest. For to neglect what each thinks of himself is not only arrogant but altogether dissolute. And there is a difference in the consideration of men between justice and modesty. The parts of justice are not to violate men; of modesty, not to offend: in which the force of decorum is most plainly seen. These things set forth, I think it understood what that is which we say is fitting.\n\n100. But the office which is drawn from it has this first road, which leads to the keeping of the fitting; which, if we follow as a leader, we shall never wander, and shall follow both that which is keen and perspicacious by nature, and that which is accommodated to the society of men, and that which is vehement and strong. But the greatest force of decorum is in this part of which we dispute: for not only the motions of the body, which are apt to nature, are to be approved, but much more also the motions of the soul, which are likewise accommodated to nature.\n\n101. For the force and nature of souls is twofold: one part is placed in appetite, which is called horme in Greek, which seizes man hither and thither; the other in reason, which teaches and explains what is to be done and fled. So it comes to pass that reason is first, appetite obeys. And every action ought to be free of rashness and negligence, nor to do anything for which one cannot render a probable cause: this is almost the description of duty.\n\n102. It must be brought about that the appetites obey reason, and neither outrun it, nor, through sluggishness or cowardice, desert it; and that they be tranquil and free from every disturbance of soul; from which will shine out all constancy and all moderation. For they whose appetites wander too far, and, as it were, exulting, whether desiring or fleeing, are not sufficiently restrained by reason, pass without doubt the end and limit. For they leave and cast off obedience, and obey not reason, to which they are subject by the law of nature; by which not only souls are disturbed, but bodies too. You may see the very faces of the angry, or of those moved by some lust, or fear, or exulting in too much pleasure: of all of whom the countenances, voices, motions, and posture are changed.\n\n103. From which it is understood — to return to the form of duty — that all appetites must be drawn in and calmed, and watchfulness and diligence aroused, that we do nothing rashly and by chance, inconsiderately and negligently. For we are not so generated by nature as to seem made for play and jest — rather for severity and for certain heavier and greater studies. But we may use play and jest, in that kind indeed, as sleep and other rest — then, when we have done enough for grave and serious things. And the very kind of jesting ought not to be profuse nor immodest, but noble and witty. For as we do not give boys all license in play, but that which is not alien to the actions of honorableness, so in the very jest there should shine out some light of an honest nature.\n\n104. Altogether there are two kinds of jesting: one illiberal, wanton, disgraceful, obscene; the other elegant, urbane, ingenious, witty — with which kind not only our Plautus and the old comedy of the Athenians are filled, but also the books of the Socratic philosophers, and many witty sayings of many, such as those collected by the elder Cato, which are called apophthegms. Easy, then, is the distinction of the noble and the illiberal jest. One kind is such if made in season — with a relaxed mind, worthy of even a most severe man; the other not even in a free man, if the vileness of things and the obscenity of words are added. A certain measure also is to be kept in jesting, so that we do not pour out everything, and, carried away by pleasure, slip into some vileness. But our own campus and the studies of hunting supply honest examples of jesting.\n\n105. But it pertains to the whole inquiry of duty always to have at hand, how much the nature of man surpasses cattle and the rest of beasts. Those feel nothing but pleasure, and to it they are carried with all their might; but the mind of man is nourished by learning and thinking, always seeks or does something, and is led by the delight of seeing and hearing. Nay more, if anyone is somewhat more inclined to pleasures — provided he is not of the kind of cattle (for there are certain men not in fact but in name) — if anyone is somewhat more upright, though he be seized by pleasure, he hides and conceals the appetite of pleasure for the sake of modesty.\n\n106. From which it is understood that the pleasure of the body is not dignified enough for the excellence of man, and that it ought to be despised and rejected; but if there is anyone who gives something to pleasure, he must carefully keep the measure of enjoying it. And so the food and culture of the body should be referred to health and strength, not to pleasure. And also, if we wish to consider what excellence and dignity there is in nature, we shall understand how shameful it is to dissolve in luxury and live delicately and softly, and how honorable to live thriftily, temperately, severely, soberly.\n\n107. It must be understood also that we are dressed, as it were, by nature with two persons, of which one is common, from this — that we are all partakers of reason and of that excellence by which we surpass the beasts, from which is drawn all that is honorable and decorous, and from which is sought the reason of finding duty; the other, however, which is given especially to each individually. For as in bodies there are great dissimilarities — we see some strong in speed for running, others in strength for wrestling, and likewise in forms some have dignity, others grace — so in souls there exist greater varieties.\n\n108. In L. Crassus, in L. Philippus there was much grace; greater even, and more by design, in C. Caesar, the son; at the same times in M. Scaurus and in M. Druso the young man there was singular severity; in C. Laelius much cheerfulness, in his familiar Scipio greater ambition, a graver life. Of the Greeks indeed we have received that Socrates was sweet and witty and of festive speech and in all speech a dissembler, whom the Greeks called eiron; on the contrary, Pythagoras and Pericles attained the greatest authority without any cheerfulness. Hannibal we have received as clever of the Carthaginians; of our leaders, Q. Maximus, good at hiding, being silent, dissembling, laying snares, forestalling the counsels of the enemy. In this kind the Greeks set Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above the rest, and above all the shrewd and clever deed of Solon, who, that his life might be safer and that he might profit the republic somewhat more, feigned madness.\n\n109. There are others very unlike these — simple and open, who think nothing must be done from concealment, nothing from snares: cultivators of truth, enemies of fraud; and likewise others who will endure anything, serve anyone, so long as they attain what they wish — as we saw Sulla and M. Crassus. In this kind we have received as most shrewd and most patient the Spartan Lysander, and on the contrary Callicratidas, who was commander of the fleet next after Lysander. Likewise in speech [each] is made, however powerful he be, to seem as one out of many — as we saw in Catulo, and in father and son, and the same in Q. Mucio, Mancia. I have heard from the elders that this same was in P. Scipio Nasica; on the contrary, his father, he who avenged the lost attempts of Ti. Gracchus, had no charm of speech — not even Xenocrates, the most severe of philosophers — and for that very thing was great and famous. Innumerable other dissimilarities of natures and characters exist, yet not at all to be blamed.\n\n110. But each is to hold his own, not vicious, but yet his own, so that the more easily that decorum which we seek may be kept. For it must be so done, that we contend with the universal nature in nothing, yet, it kept, we follow our own — so that, though there be others graver and better, yet we measure our pursuits by the rule of our own nature. For it does not pertain to contend with nature, nor to follow anything you cannot attain. From this the more emerges what that decorum is, for that nothing is fitting, as they say, with Minerva unwilling — that is, with nature opposing and resisting.\n\n111. Altogether, if there is anything decorous, there is certainly nothing more so than evenness of the whole of life, and of single actions, which you cannot keep, if, imitating the nature of others, you abandon your own. For as we ought to use that speech which is inborn in us, lest, as certain men, inculcating Greek words, be rightly laughed at, so in actions and in the whole of life we ought to bring no discrepancy.\n\n112. And this difference of natures has such force, that sometimes one man ought to take death to himself, another in the same cause ought not. For was M. Cato in another cause than the rest, who surrendered themselves in Africa to Caesar? Yet to the rest perhaps fault might have been given, if they had destroyed themselves, because their life was milder and their morals easier; but to Cato, since nature had granted an incredible gravity, and he himself had strengthened it with perpetual constancy, and had always remained in his purpose and in the counsel he had taken, death must be chosen rather than the face of the tyrant be looked upon.\n\n113. How much did Ulysses suffer in that long wandering, when he served women — if Circe and Calypso are to be called women — and wished to be affable and pleasant in all speech! At home too he bore the insults of slaves and maids, that he might at last come to that which he desired. But Ajax, of the spirit handed down to us, would rather have met death a thousand times than bear those things. Considering these things, each will have to weigh what he has of his own, and moderate those, and not wish to try how things alien become him: for that is most becoming to each which is most his own.\n\n114. Let each, then, know his own genius, and show himself a keen judge both of his own goods and faults, lest the actors seem to have more prudence than we. For they do not choose the best plays, but those most accommodated to themselves: those who trust in their voice choose Epigonus and Medus; those who trust in gesture, Melanippa, Clytemestra — always Rupilius, whom I remember, Antiope, and not often Aesopus, Ajax. So will the actor see this on the stage, and the wise man not see it in life? Therefore on those things to which we shall be most apt, let us chiefly labor. But if at any time necessity thrusts us into things that are not of our genius, all care, meditation, diligence must be applied, that we can do those, if not decorously, at least as little unbecomingly as we can — nor is it so much to be striven that we pursue goods not given us, as that we flee vices.\n\n115. And to those two persons, which I spoke of before, a third is joined, which some chance or time imposes; and a fourth even, which we accommodate to ourselves by our own judgment. For kingdoms, commands, nobility, honors, wealth, powers, and those things contrary to these, lie in chance and are ruled by times; but to carry ourselves what person we wish comes from our own will. And so some apply themselves to philosophy, some to civil law, some to eloquence, and of the virtues themselves one man in one, another in another, prefers to excel.\n\n116. But those whose fathers or ancestors have excelled in some glory, they usually strive to excel in the same kind of praise — as Q. Mucius, son of Publius, in civil law; Africanus, son of Paulus, in war. Certain however add some of their own to those praises which they received from their fathers — as the same Africanus heaped eloquence on his military glory; which the same Timotheus, son of Conon, did, who, though not inferior to his father in the praise of war, added to that praise the glory of learning and genius. It sometimes comes to pass that certain, having put off the imitation of ancestors, follow a certain institute of their own, and chiefly in that usually labor hard who, born of obscure fathers, propose great things to themselves.\n\n117. All these things, then, when we seek what is fitting, we must embrace in mind and thought; but chiefly it must be settled whom we wish and what kind we wish to be, and in what kind of life — which deliberation is the most difficult of all. For at the entering of youth, when the weakness of counsel is greatest, each constitutes for himself that kind of age to be spent which he has chiefly loved. And so he is entangled in some sure kind and course of living before he could judge what was best.\n\n118. For what Prodicus says of Hercules — as it is in Xenophon — that when he first came of age, which time nature gave for choosing what road of life each was going to enter, he went out into solitude, and there, sitting long and doubting much with himself, when he saw two roads, one of Pleasure, the other of Virtue, which it was better to enter — this could perhaps have happened to Hercules, \"begotten of the seed of Jove,\" but not to us, who imitate whom each has seen fit, and are driven to their studies and institutions. Usually, imbued with the precepts of parents, we are led to their habit and manner; others are carried by the judgment of the multitude, and those things which seem most beautiful to the greater part, those they chiefly desire. Some however, either by a certain felicity or by goodness of nature, without the discipline of parents, have followed the right road of life.\n\n119. But that is the most rare kind of men — those who, either by excellent greatness of genius, or by splendid learning and doctrine, or by both adorned, have had even the space of deliberating which course of life they would chiefly follow; in which deliberation the whole counsel is to be called back to each one's own nature. For since in all things that are done, from how each is born, as was said before, we seek what is fitting, so in the constituting of the whole life much greater care is to be applied, that we can stand in the perpetuity of life consistent with ourselves, and limp in no duty.\n\n120. But since nature has the greatest force for this reason, and fortune the next, the reason of both is altogether to be had in choosing the kind of life, but more of nature; for much firmer and more constant is that, so that fortune sometimes, as if mortal herself, seems to fight with the immortal nature. Whoever, therefore, has carried the whole counsel of living to the kind of his own nature, not vicious, let him keep constancy (for that is most becoming) — unless perchance he understands he has erred in choosing the kind of life. Which if it has happened (it can happen, however), a change of morals and institutions must be made. Which change, if the times will help, we shall make more easily and more conveniently; if not, it must be made gradually and step by step — so that friendships which please less and are approved less, the wise think it more becoming to dissolve gradually than suddenly to cut off.\n\n121. But when a change of life has been made, it must be cared for with all reason that we seem to have done it with good counsel. But since it was said a little before that the ancestors are to be imitated, first let that be excepted, that vices are not to be imitated; then, if nature will not suffer, that certain things can be imitated — as the son of the former Africanus, who adopted this Paullus born of him, because of the weakness of his health could not be so like his father as he had been like his own — therefore, if you cannot defend causes, or hold the people with assemblies, or wage wars, those things must still stand out which are in his own power: justice, faith, liberality, modesty, temperance — so that the less is required from him of what is wanting. But the best inheritance is handed down by fathers to children, and more excellent than all patrimony, the glory of virtue and of deeds done — to be a disgrace to which must be judged crime and vice.\n\n122. And since duties are not given the same to unequal ages, and some are of the young, others of the old, something must also be said of this distinction. It belongs, then, to the younger to revere the elders, and to choose from them the best and most approved, on whose counsel and authority he leans; for the ignorance of entering age is to be constituted and governed by the prudence of the old. Most of all this age is to be kept from appetites, and exercised in labor and patience of both mind and body, that their industry may flourish both in military and in civil duties. And also when they wish to relax their minds and give themselves to pleasure, let them beware intemperance, let them remember modesty — which will be easier if in such things indeed the elders do not wish to be present.\n\n123. But to the old the labors of the body seem to be lessened, the exercises of the mind even increased; and care must be given, that they help friends, youth, and especially the republic with counsel and prudence as much as possible. But nothing must old age guard against more than that it give itself to languor and sloth; for luxury, though shameful to every age, is foulest in old age. But if the intemperance of appetites is also added, the evil is double: that old age itself conceives disgrace, and makes the intemperance of the young more shameless.\n\n124. And not foreign to that is it to speak of the duties of magistrates, of private men, of citizens, of strangers. It is, then, the proper duty of a magistrate to understand that he carries the person of the city, and that he must sustain its dignity and honor, keep the laws, define rights, and remember those things committed to his faith. A private man, however, ought to live with citizens on an equal and fair right, neither abject and degraded, nor carrying himself above them; and in the republic to will those things that are tranquil and honorable — for such we are wont to feel and call a good citizen.\n\n125. But the duty of the stranger and the resident is to attend to nothing beyond his own business, to inquire nothing of another, and to be by no means curious in a republic not his own. Thus, usually, duties will be found when it is asked what becomes and what is apt to persons, times, ages. But nothing is so becoming as in every undertaking and in taking counsel to keep constancy.\n\n126. But since that decorum is seen in all deeds and sayings, and finally in the motion and posture of the body, and is placed in three things: comeliness, order, ornament apt for action — things hard to express in words, but enough to be understood — and in these three also is contained that care, that we be approved by those with whom and among whom we live — a few things must be said about these too. In the beginning, nature herself seems to have had great reason about our body: which set in view our face and the rest of our figure, in which was honorable beauty; but the parts of the body given to the necessity of nature, which would have had a deformed and foul aspect, those she covered and hid away.\n\n127. The modesty of men imitated this so diligent a work of nature. For what nature hid, the same all who are of sane mind remove from the eyes, and themselves give care to the necessity, that they obey it most hiddenly; and the uses of whose parts of the body are necessary, neither those parts nor their uses they call by their own names; and to do that which is not shameful to do, only hiddenly, to say is obscene. And so neither the open action of those things is free of petulance, nor the obscenity of speech.\n\n128. Nor indeed are the Cynics to be heard, nor those who were nearly Cynic Stoics, who reproach and ridicule that we judge shameful in words those things that are not shameful in fact, and call those that are shameful in fact by their own names. To rob, to defraud, to commit adultery is shameful in fact, but is said not obscenely; to attend to free boys is honorable in fact, obscene in name; and more things in this opinion are disputed by the same against modesty. But let us follow nature, and flee everything that abhors the approbation of eyes and ears; let that decorum hold in posture, in walking, in sitting, in leaning, in countenance, in eyes, in the motion of hands.\n\n129. In which things two things are chiefly to be fled: that nothing be effeminate or soft, and nothing hard or rustic. Nor must it be conceded to actors and orators that these be apt in them, and loose in us. The manner of the stage indeed has such modesty from the old discipline that no one comes upon the stage without a subligaculum; for they fear lest, if by any chance it should happen that certain parts of the body be opened, they be seen not decorously. In our custom indeed grown sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with their fathers-in-law. This kind of modesty, then, must be kept, especially nature herself being the teacher and leader.\n\n130. But since there are two kinds of beauty, of which in the one is venustas, in the other dignitas, we ought to hold venustas womanly, dignitas manly. Therefore all ornament unworthy of a man must be removed from his form, and the like vice in gesture and motion must be guarded against. For the motions of the palaestra are often more odious, and some gestures of actors have no ineptitude; and in both kinds those things that are straight and simple are praised. But the dignity of form must be guarded by the goodness of color, color by the exercises of the body. Modest cleanliness must also be applied, not odious nor too exquisite, only such as flees rustic and inhuman neglect. The same reason must be had of dress, in which, as in most things, the middle way is best.\n\n131. Care must be taken, too, lest we use slownesses in walking softer, so that we seem like the carriages of processions, or take up too-great quicknesses in hastenings — which, when they happen, breaths are stirred, countenances changed, faces contorted: from which a great sign arises that constancy is absent. But much more must we labor that the motions of the mind recede not from nature — which we shall attain if we guard against falling into perturbations and exanimations, and if we hold attentive minds to the conservation of decorum.\n\n132. But the motions of souls are double: some of thought, others of appetite. Thought turns itself chiefly in seeking the true; appetite urges to action. Care must be taken, then, that in thought we use the best matters, and show appetite obedient to reason. And since the force of speech is great, and double — one of contention, one of conversation — let contention be given to the disquisitions of courts, assemblies, senate; let conversation be exercised in circles, discussions, meetings of familiars, and follow dinner-parties too. The precepts of contention belong to the rhetors; of conversation there are none — though I know not whether they too could be. But teachers are found by the studies of learners; of this kind there are none who study — everything is stuffed with a crowd of rhetors — although the precepts of words and thoughts are the same, they will pertain to conversation.\n\n133. But since we hold voice as the index of speech, and in voice we follow two things — that it be clear, that it be sweet — both must altogether be sought from nature, but one exercise will enlarge, the other imitation of the concise and gentle speakers. There was nothing in the Catuli, that you would think they used letters with exquisite judgment, though they were lettered; but also others; and yet they were thought to use the Latin tongue best. The sound was sweet, the letters neither too expressed nor too oppressed, lest it be obscure or insipid; a voice without contention, neither languishing nor canorous. Fuller was the speech of L. Crassus, not less witty — but the opinion of the Catuli for speaking well was not less. In salt and wit indeed Caesar, brother of the elder Catulus, conquered all, so that in that very forensic kind of speaking he conquered the contentions of others by conversation.\n\n134. In all these, then, we must labor, if in everything we seek what becomes. Let this conversation, then, in which the Socratics chiefly excel, be gentle and by no means obstinate; let there be wit in it. Nor, as if he had come into his own possession, let him exclude others, but in the rest of things, and then in common conversation, let him think a not unfair alternation belongs. And let him see above all about what things he speaks: if serious, let him apply gravity; if witty, wit. Above all let him provide, lest the conversation point out some fault in the manners — which most usually happens when studiously, for the sake of detracting from the absent, either wittily or seriously, slanderous and contumelious things are said.\n\n135. But conversations are usually held either about domestic businesses, or about the republic, or about the studies and doctrine of arts. Care must be given, then, that even if the speech begins to wander to other things, it be recalled to these; but as they come about; for we are not delighted by the same things, nor at all times, nor similarly. Notice must be given, too, how far the conversation has pleasure, and as there was the manner of beginning, so there be a mode of ending.\n\n136. But as in all life it is most rightly prescribed that we flee perturbations — that is, motions of mind too great, not obeying reason — so conversation ought to be vacant of such motions, lest anger arise, or some desire, or laziness, or inactivity, or anything of that sort appear; and care must be chiefly given, that we seem both to revere and to love those with whom we shall hold conversation. Rebukes also sometimes fall in that are necessary, in which perhaps greater contention of voice and sharper gravity of words must be used, and it must even be done that we seem angry when we do them. But as to burning and cutting, so to this kind of castigation we shall come rarely and unwillingly, and never unless necessary, if no other medicine is found — but still anger be far away, with which nothing can be done rightly, nothing considerately.\n\n137. But a great part of mild castigation may be used, gravity nevertheless joined, so that both severity be applied and contumely repelled — and even that which rebuke has of bitterness must be signified to be undertaken for the cause of the man himself who is rebuked. It is right, too, even in those contentions which happen with the most inimical, even if we hear things unworthy of us, still to keep gravity, to drive away anger. For things done with some perturbation can neither be done constantly nor be approved by those present. It is deformed, too, to praise oneself, especially falsely, and with the mockery of hearers to imitate the glorious soldier.\n\n138. And since we pursue all things — we certainly wish, at least — it must be said also what kind of house seems pleasing to belong to an honorable man and a leader, whose end is use, to which the design of building is to be accommodated; and yet the care of convenience and dignity must be applied. To Cn. Octavius, who was first made consul from that family, we have heard it was an honor, that he had built a splendid house on the Palatine and full of dignity — which, when it was viewed by the crowd, was thought to have canvassed the consulship for its master, a new man. This one Scaurus demolished, and added the acquisition to his own house. And so the one first brought the consulship into his own house, this one, the son of a most illustrious man, brought into a multiplied house not only a rejection but ignominy and calamity too.\n\n139. For the dignity of the house is to be adorned by the house, not the whole house sought from the house; nor the master from the house, but the house from the master to be honored; and, as in the rest, reason must be had not of our own only but of others', so in the house of a famous man, into which many guests are to be received and a crowd of every kind of men admitted, care of spaciousness must be applied. Otherwise a spacious house often becomes a disgrace to the master, if there is solitude in it — and most of all if it has been used to be frequented by another master. It is odious when by passersby it is said: \"O ancient house, alas, how unlike a master do you rule\" — which indeed in these times may be said of many.\n\n140. Care must be given, too, especially if you build yourself, lest you go forth beyond measure in expense and magnificence — in which kind much evil lies even in the example. For most, studiously, chiefly imitate the deeds of the princes in this part: the virtue, say, of L. Lucullus, a great man — what of it? But how many imitate the magnificence of villas! In which certainly a measure must be applied and recalled to mediocrity. And the same mediocrity must be transferred to every use and culture of life. But this much of these things.\n\n141. In every undertaking that is taken up, three things are to be held: first, that appetite obey reason — than which nothing is more accommodated to keeping duties; then, that it be observed how great that thing is which we wish to effect, so that neither greater nor lesser care and labor be undertaken than the cause demands. The third is, that we take care that those things which pertain to the liberal appearance and dignity be moderate. But the best measure is to hold the decorum itself, of which we spoke before, and to go forth no further. Of these three, however, the most excellent is that appetite obey reason.\n\n142. Next, of the order of things and the opportunity of times it must be said. This knowledge is contained in that which the Greeks call eutaxia — not this which we translate modestia, in which word modus is contained — but that is eutaxia, in which the conservation of order is understood. And so, though we should call the same thing modestia, it is so defined by the Stoics, that modestia is the science of placing in their own place the things that are done or said. So it seems the same force will be of order and collocation; for they so define order: the collocation of things in apt and accommodated places. But the place of action they say is the opportunity of times; the time of action opportune is called in Greek eukairia, in Latin occasio. So it comes to pass that this modestia, which we so interpret, as I said, is the science of the opportunity of times fit for acting.\n\n143. But the same can be the definition of prudence, of which we spoke at the beginning; but in this place we inquire about moderation and temperance and the virtues like these. And so the things that were proper to prudence were said in their own place; but the things of those virtues of which we have long spoken, which pertain to modesty and to the approbation of those with whom we live, must now be said.\n\n144. Such order, then, of actions is to be applied, that, as in a constant speech, so in life all things be apt to one another and congruent; for it is foul and greatly vicious to bring into a grave matter a conversation worthy of a dinner-party, or some delicate speech. Well did Pericles, when he had for colleague in the praetura Sophocles the poet, and they had agreed about their common duty, and by chance a beautiful boy passed by, and Sophocles said: \"O the beautiful boy, Pericles!\" — \"But it befits a praetor, Sophocles, to hold not only hands but eyes abstinent.\" And yet this same thing, if Sophocles had said in the approval of athletes, he would not have been without just reproach. So great is the force of place and time. As if anyone, when he is about to plead a cause, meditates with himself on the road or in a walk, or thinks over something else more attentively, is not reproached — but this same thing, if he does it at a dinner-party, would seem inhuman, ignorant of the time.\n\n145. But those things that differ much from humaneness — as if anyone sing in the forum, or there is any other great perversity — are easily seen and do not much want admonition and precepts; but those errors that seem small and cannot be understood by the many, from these one must decline more carefully. As in strings or pipes, though they differ ever so little, yet that is usually noticed by the knowing — so we must see in life that nothing differ, much more even, by how much greater and better is the concord of actions than of sounds.\n\n146. And so as the ears of the musicians feel the very least on strings, so we, if we wish to be sharp and diligent judges and noticers of vices, shall often understand much from small things. From the look of the eyes, from the relaxation or contraction of brows, from sadness, from cheerfulness, from laughter, from speech, from silence, from the raising of the voice, from the lowering, from other like things we shall easily judge which of these be done aptly, what departs from duty and nature. In which kind it is not inconvenient to judge what each of these is from others — that if anything be unbecoming in them, we avoid it ourselves; for it happens somehow that we see more in others than in ourselves, if anything is offended. And so most easily are corrected in learning those whose vices the teachers imitate for the sake of correcting.\n\n147. Nor is it foreign, to the choosing of those things that bring doubt, to apply learned men, or even those experienced by use, and to seek what they please about each kind of duty. For the greater part is usually followed in that to which nature herself draws. In which it must be seen, not only what each says, but also what each thinks, and even for what cause each thinks. For as painters, and those who fashion statues, and even poets want their work to be considered by the crowd — that if anything be reproved by more, it be corrected — and they both inquire of themselves and of others what has been sinned in it: so much must be done by us by the judgment of others — many things to be done and not done, and to be changed and corrected.\n\n148. But those things that are done by the custom and institutions of civil things, of these nothing must be prescribed; for those very things are the precepts, nor must anyone be led into this error, that if Socrates or Aristippus did or spoke anything against the custom and usage of civil things, the same may be thought permitted to himself: those attained that license with great and divine goods. But the whole reason of the Cynics is to be cast out; for it is inimical to modesty, without which nothing can be right, nothing honorable.\n\n149. But those whose life has been surveyed in honorable and great things, thinking well of the republic and well deserving, or deserving it, so as to be touched with some honor or command, we ought to observe and cultivate; to give much also to old age, to yield to those who will hold a magistracy, to have a distinction of citizen and stranger — and in the stranger himself, whether he came privately or publicly. In sum, not to speak of each singly, we ought to cultivate, guard, keep the conciliation and consociation of the whole race of men.\n\n150. Now of the arts and profits, which are to be held liberal, which sordid, we have received thus much, more or less. First those profits are disapproved which run into the hatred of men: as those of toll-takers, of moneylenders. Illiberal and sordid are the profits of all hired laborers, whose works, not whose arts, are bought; for in them the very wage is the payment of slavery. Those too are to be judged sordid who buy from merchants what they immediately sell; for they profit nothing unless they lie exceedingly; nor is anything fouler than vanity. And all workmen are busy in a sordid art; for nothing can be ingenuous in a workshop. And least are those arts to be approved that are the ministers of pleasures: fishmongers, butchers, cooks, poulterers, fishermen, as Terence says. Add hither, if you please, perfumers, dancers, and the whole talarian game.\n\n151. But those arts in which greater prudence is contained, or not mean utility is sought — as medicine, as architecture, as the teaching of honorable things — those are honorable for those to whose order they befit. But merchandise, if it is small, must be judged sordid; but if great and rich, bringing much from everywhere and distributing to many without vanity, it is not to be very reproved; and even if, sated with profit — or rather content — it has carried itself, as often from the deep into the harbor, from the very harbor into the lands and possessions, it seems to be able to be praised with the best right. But of all things from which anything is acquired, nothing is better than agriculture, nothing more abundant, nothing sweeter, nothing more worthy of a free man. Of which, since we have said enough in Cato the Elder, there you may take what will pertain to this place.\n\n152. But from those parts which are of honorableness, how duties would be drawn, enough has been said, it seems. But of those very things that are honorable, contention and comparison can often fall in — of two honorable things, which is more honorable — which place Panaetius passed over. For since all honorableness proceeds from four parts, of which one is of cognition, another of community, a third of magnanimity, a fourth of moderation, these in the choosing of duty are often compared with one another of necessity.\n\n153. It pleases, therefore, that those duties are apter to nature which are drawn from community than those which are drawn from cognition; and this can be confirmed by this argument: that if the life of the wise should so fall, that with the resources of all things overflowing, whatever things are worthy of cognition he might consider and contemplate himself in the greatest leisure — nevertheless if so great a solitude should fall, that he could not see a man, he would go out of life. That wisdom, the princess of all virtues, which the Greeks call sophia — for prudence, which the Greeks call phronesis, we understand as a certain other thing, which is the science of things to be sought and fled; but that wisdom which I called princess is the science of things divine and human, in which is contained the community of gods and men, and the society between themselves. If that is the greatest, as it is, certainly it is necessary that the duty which is drawn from community be the greatest. For the cognition and contemplation of nature is in some way maimed and unstarted, if no action of things follows. But that action is seen chiefly in the guarding of the utilities of men; it pertains, therefore, to the society of the human race; therefore this is to be preferred to cognition.\n\n154. And this every best man shows in the fact itself and judges. For who is so greedy in beholding and knowing the nature of things, that, if to him, handling and contemplating the things most worthy of cognition, the peril and crisis of his country should suddenly be brought, to which he might come to aid — he would not leave all those things and cast them away, even if he thought he could number the stars or measure the magnitude of the world? And the same he would do in the danger or business of a parent or friend.\n\n155. By which things it is understood that the duties of justice are to be preferred to the studies and duties of science, which pertain to the utility of men, than which nothing ought to be more ancient to man. And those very men whose study and whole life was spent in the cognition of things did not yet withdraw from increasing the utilities and conveniences of men. For they instructed many, that they might be better citizens and more useful to their own public things — as the Theban Epaminondas by the Pythagorean Lysis, the Syracusan Dion by Plato, and many, many by many; and we ourselves, whatever we brought to the republic — if we brought anything — instructed by teachers and doctrine, approached it adorned.\n\n156. Nor do the living and present alone teach and instruct the students of learning; but this same thing they attain even after death by the monuments of letters. For no place has been passed over by those who might pertain to laws, to morals, to the discipline of the republic, so that they seem to have brought their leisure to our business. So those very men, devoted to the studies of doctrine and wisdom, carry their understanding and prudence chiefly to the utility of men; and for that reason also it is better to speak copiously, provided prudently, than to think even most sharply without eloquence — for thought turns in itself, eloquence embraces those with whom we are joined in community.\n\n157. And as the swarms of bees are not gathered for the sake of making honeycombs, but since they are by nature gathered, they make honeycombs; so men, and much more, gathered by nature, apply the shrewdness of acting and thinking. And so unless that virtue, which consists in guarding men — that is, in the society of the human race — touch the cognition of things, solitary cognition seems empty and starving; and likewise magnanimity, remote from community and human conjunction, is a certain savageness and monstrousness. So it comes to pass that the consociation and community of men conquers the study of cognition.\n\n158. Nor is it true which is said by certain men — on account of the necessity of life, because we could not attain and effect the things that nature desired without others, therefore was the community and society with men begun; as if, if all things that pertain to food and culture were supplied to us, as it were by a divine wand, as they say, then every best genius, all business laid aside, would place his whole self in cognition and science. It is not so. For he would flee solitude and seek a partner of study; then he would wish to teach, then to learn; then to hear, then to speak. Therefore every duty that avails to the conjunction of men and to guarding society is to be preferred to that duty which is contained in cognition and science.\n\n159. That, perhaps, must be asked — whether this community, which is most apt to nature, is also always to be preferred to moderation and modesty. I do not think so. For there are certain things partly so foul, partly so flagitious, that even for the sake of conserving his country the wise man will not do them. Posidonius collected very many of these, but so foul certain things, so obscene, that they even seem to be shameful to say. These, then, he will not undertake for the cause of the republic, nor will the republic even for its own sake wish them undertaken. But this thing has itself more conveniently, that no time can happen in which it might befit the interest of the republic that the wise man do anything of those things.\n\n160. Wherefore this thing at least has been effected, that in the choosing of duties that kind of duties excel which is held by the society of men. For cognition and prudence will follow the considered action; so it comes to pass that to act considerately is worth more than to think prudently. And this much, indeed, hitherto. The place itself has been laid open, so that in seeking duty it is not difficult to see what is to be preferred to each. In the very community, however, are the degrees of duties, from which it can be understood what is to be preferred to each: that first to the immortal gods, second to the country, third to parents, and then by degrees the rest are owed.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-officiis-1/translations/trn_cicero_officiis_1_mouseia.txt"},{"id":"trn_cicero_officiis_1_plain","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"plain","note":"Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 160 sections of Book I of the Latin.","text":"1. Though you have now spent a year listening to Cratippus, and at Athens — where you ought to be steeped in the teachings and institutions of philosophy, given the authority of both the teacher and the city, one able to grow you by knowledge, the other by example — I have always joined Latin learning to Greek for my own benefit, not only in philosophy but in the practice of speaking too, and I urge you to do the same, so you may be equally powerful in both tongues. In this we seem to have helped our countrymen greatly, so that even those without Greek — and even the learned — feel they have gained something both for speaking and for judging.\n2. So you will learn from the foremost philosopher of this age, and learn as long as you wish — though you should wish it only while you're pleased with your progress. But in reading our books, which differ little from the Peripatetics' (we both want to be Socratics and Platonics), use your own judgment on the substance; I raise no obstacle. The Latin language, though, you will make richer by reading ours. Nor should that sound arrogant: while I concede the science of philosophy to many, the orator's own skill — to speak aptly, clearly, with style — is what I've spent my life pursuing, and if I claim it, I claim it as fairly mine.\n3. So I urge you, my Cicero, to read not only my speeches but these philosophical books too, which now come close to them. The speeches have more force, but this style also deserves cultivation — even, level-tempered. I see no Greek has yet managed both kinds — courtroom oratory and this quiet kind of discussion — unless Demetrius of Phalerum counts: subtle as a writer, an orator of modest force but sweet, so you'd recognize Theophrastus in him. How far I've come in each, let others judge; I've certainly pursued both.\n4. I believe that if Plato had wanted to handle courtroom oratory, he could have spoken with the greatest weight and richness; that Demosthenes, keeping what he learned from Plato, could have delivered it with style and brilliance; and the same of Aristotle and Isocrates, each devoted to his own art and despising the other's. But since I resolved to write something for you now, and more later, I wanted to begin with what best fits your age and my authority. For while philosophy treats many weighty and useful subjects carefully and richly, the broadest field opens in what they have said about duties: no part of life — public or private, in court or at home, acting alone or dealing with others — is free of duty, and in keeping it lies everything honorable in life; in neglecting it, everything shameful.\n5. This question belongs to all philosophers. Who would dare call himself a philosopher without teaching about duties? But some schools, by fixing the ends of good and evil, twist every duty. Whoever sets the highest good so that it has no connection with virtue, and measures it by advantage instead of honor — if he stayed consistent, he could practice neither friendship, nor justice, nor generosity. And someone who holds the greatest pain the greatest evil, or pleasure the highest good, plainly cannot be brave or self-controlled.\n6. Though this is plain enough to need no argument, it's treated elsewhere. If these schools want to be consistent, they can say nothing about duty; no firm, stable precepts of duty tied to nature can come from anyone except those who hold that the honorable is to be sought for itself alone, or above all. So that teaching belongs to the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics; the views of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus collapsed long ago — though even they would have the right to argue about duty if they had left any room for choice among things. We follow, in this question, chiefly the Stoics — not as their interpreters but, as is my habit, drawing by our own judgment and choice from their fountains, as far and however we see fit.\n7. Since all this discourse is about duty, I want first to define what duty is — and I'm amazed Panaetius skipped that. Any reasoned treatise should start from a definition, so readers know what's being discussed. Every inquiry about duty has two parts. One concerns the highest good; the other consists of practical guidance covering every part of life. Questions of the higher kind: whether all duties are perfect; whether one duty can outrank another; and so on. But the duties with practical guidance, though they belong to the highest good, show it less clearly, because they look more to the ordering of everyday life. These books treat those.\n8. There is also another division of duty: a common kind and a perfect kind. The perfect kind we may call the right — the Greeks call it katorthoma; the common kind they call kathekon. They define them this way: the right is a perfect duty; a common duty is one for which a plausible reason can be given for doing it.\n9. Panaetius thought there are three questions in deciding what to do. First, we wonder whether an act would be honorable or shameful — and over this the mind is often pulled in opposite directions. Second, we ask whether it serves the comfort and pleasure of life, the means and abundance of goods, power and influence — whether it's profitable or not. The third question comes when what seems profitable seems to conflict with what is honorable: when advantage pulls one way and honor pulls the other, the mind is torn and carries an anxious, divided worry.\n10. This division skipped two things — and skipping anything important is the worst fault in a classification. We don't only ask whether an act is honorable or shameful; we also ask, between two honorable options, which is MORE honorable — and likewise, between two profitable options, which is MORE profitable. So his three-part scheme really needs five parts: first the honorable, treated two ways; then the useful, the same way; last, the comparison of the two.\n11. From the beginning nature has given every living creature the drive to protect itself, its life, and its body; to avoid what seems harmful; to seek and secure what it needs to live — food, shelter, and so on. All animals also share the urge to mate and reproduce, and some care for their offspring. But the greatest difference between man and beast is this: the beast, moved only by its senses, adapts to whatever is right in front of it, barely aware of past or future. Man, sharing in reason, can see consequences, causes, and how things lead up to each other; he compares patterns, connects present to future, sees the whole course of life, and prepares whatever it needs.\n12. That same nature, by the force of reason, binds man to man — for speech and for the fellowship of life — and above all plants in him a special love for his children, and moves him to want gatherings and assemblies of people, and to provide what culture and life need — not for himself alone but for his wife, his children, and everyone he cares for and ought to protect. That concern rouses the spirit and makes it greater for action.\n13. Above all, it belongs to man to seek and investigate truth. When we're free of necessary business, we long to see, hear, and learn something; we count the knowledge of hidden and marvelous things necessary for a happy life. From this we see that what is true, simple, and sincere fits man's nature best. Joined to the love of truth is a desire for primacy: a well-formed mind wants to obey no one except a teacher, a guide, or someone who commands justly and lawfully for the common good. From this come greatness of spirit and contempt for human affairs.\n14. Nor is that a small power of nature and reason — that this one creature grasps what order is, what propriety is, what measure in deeds and words. No other animal senses the beauty, grace, and harmony of what it sees. Nature and reason carry that sense from the eyes to the mind, and judge far more that beauty, consistency, and order must be kept in thought and action — that nothing be done unseemly or unmanly, and in every thought and deed nothing be done wantonly. From these is woven what we seek: the honorable — honorable even if no one praises it.\n15. You see, my Marcus, the very form, as it were the face, of the honorable — \"which, if it could be seen by the eyes,\" as Plato says, \"would awaken the deepest love of wisdom.\" Everything honorable arises from one of four parts: either in the grasp of truth and quickness of mind; or in keeping human society, giving each his due, and keeping faith in agreements; or in the greatness and strength of a lofty, unconquered soul; or in the order and measure of everything said and done, where modesty and self-control dwell. Though these four are bound together, each produces its own kind of duty — from the first, the search and discovery of truth, which is that virtue's proper work.\n16. Whoever sees most clearly what is truest in each matter, and can explain it most sharply and quickly, is rightly counted the most prudent and wise. So truth itself is the material this virtue handles.\n17. The other three virtues attend to providing and keeping the things life's action requires — so human society is kept, and greatness of spirit shines — both in growing wealth and in providing what one's family needs, and even more in despising those things. But order, consistency, and self-control move in the kind of virtue that involves action, not just thought. Those who bring measure and order to daily life keep the honorable and the becoming.\n18. Of the four sources of the honorable, the first — knowledge of truth — is closest to human nature. We are all drawn toward learning and knowledge, in which we think it fine to excel; to slip, err, be ignorant, or be deceived seems both bad and shameful. In this natural and honorable field, two faults must be avoided: one, taking unknown things for known and assenting rashly — whoever wants to avoid that (everyone should) will give both time and care to thinking things through.\n19. The other fault: some pour too much study into obscure and difficult questions that aren't necessary. Avoiding these, whatever effort goes into worthy and useful knowledge is rightly praised — as we hear of C. Sulpicius in astronomy, Sextus Pompeius in geometry, many in logic, more in civil law: all such arts pursue truth. But to be pulled away from action by love of that study is against duty, for the worth of virtue lies in action — though study often interrupts it, and we return to study in between, while the restless mind keeps working even without us. All mental activity goes either to planning honorable things for a good and happy life, or to learning and knowledge.\n20. Of the three remaining virtues, the broadest plan is the one by which human society and a kind of common life is held. It has two parts: justice, in which virtue's greatest glory shines (the good get their name from it), and generosity joined with it. But the first office of justice is to harm no one unless provoked by wrong; the next, to use common things for the common good and private things for one's own.\n21. No property is private by nature: it comes by long settlement — as those who reached empty lands long ago — or by conquest, or by law, agreement, or lot. So the Arpinates own Arpinum, the Tusculans Tusculum; private property works the same way. Since things once common became each person's own, let each keep what fell to him; whoever grabs any of it violates the right of human society.\n22. But since, as Plato beautifully writes, we are not born for ourselves alone — our country claims a share of us, our friends another — and since, as the Stoics hold, whatever is born on earth is made for human use, and humans exist for humans, to help one another, we should follow nature as our guide: bring common goods into the common pool by an exchange of services — giving and receiving — and bind human society together by arts, effort, and resources.\n23. The foundation of justice is good faith — keeping your word and agreements. So — though it may seem odd — let us follow the Stoics in tracing words to their roots: they hold that \"faith\" (fides) comes from \"what is done is done\" (fiat). There are two kinds of injustice: doing wrong, and failing to stop it when you could. Whoever attacks someone out of anger or passion is like one raising a hand against a friend; but whoever fails to defend, or won't block a wrong he could block, is as guilty as if he abandoned his parents, friends, or country.\n24. Wrongdoing done deliberately often springs from fear — the attacker fears that if he doesn't strike first, he'll suffer himself. But most people attack to grab what they covet, and that's where greed shows widest.\n25. Riches are sought for life's necessities and for pleasure's sake. In greater minds, the desire for money aims at power and influence — M. Crassus used to say no fortune was big enough for the man who wanted to be first in the republic, unless the profits of it could feed an army. Magnificent living, elegance, and abundance delight too — and so the hunger for money becomes endless. Growing one's estate isn't blameworthy when no one is harmed — but wrong must always be avoided.\n26. Most people slide into forgetting justice when they fall into the hunger for power, office, and glory. What Ennius said — \"No holy fellowship, no loyalty, exists in kingship\" — is broad and true. Where many can't all excel, there's usually such contention that it's hardest to keep a holy bond. C. Caesar's recklessness just proved it: he trampled every law, human and divine, for the throne he'd imagined for himself. The trouble with this kind is that in the greatest minds the desires for honor, command, power, and glory usually burn hottest — so we must guard all the harder against fault here.\n27. But not all injustice is equal: there's a big difference between wrong done on sudden impulse (usually brief and passing) and wrong planned deliberately. Sudden wrongs are lighter than the calculated kind.\n28. More often people fail to defend and abandon their duty. They won't take on enemies, effort, or expense; or carelessness, laziness, and inertia — or absorption in their own studies and pursuits — leaves those they should protect undefended. So we must ask whether Plato's philosophers are excused enough: absorbed in seeking truth, they despise and count as nothing the things most people fight over — and so they are just. They achieve one kind of justice — harming no one — but stumble into the other: love of learning makes them neglect those they should protect, and they'll only serve the republic if forced. Fairer to serve freely: that is truly justice, done willingly.\n29. There are also those who, guarding their estates or disliking people, claim to mind their own business and wrong no one. Free from one kind of injustice, they fall into another: they abandon the fellowship of life, contributing no energy, no effort, no resources.\n30. So when we've added the causes of both kinds of injustice to the two kinds themselves, and laid out what justice consists in, we can easily judge our duty in each situation — unless we love ourselves too much. Caring for others' affairs is hard. Yet because we feel what happens to us more keenly than what happens to others — which we watch, as it were, from far off — we judge them differently. So the advice is good: never do anything you're unsure is fair. Fairness shines by itself; your doubt is the warning sign of wrong.\n31. But time often changes things: what seems most worthy of a just man — returning a deposit, keeping a promise, everything of truth and faith — sometimes becomes the opposite, and it becomes right to break them. The test is the foundation of justice I began with: first, harm no one; second, serve the common good. When those change with time, duty changes — it isn't always the same.\n32. A promise can become useless to keep, either for the person it was made to or for the one who made it. If — as the fables say — Neptune had granted what Theseus asked, Theseus wouldn't have lost Hippolytus: of his three wishes, the third, made in anger, was for his son's death — and when it was granted, it broke him. So promises that would harm the person they were made to shouldn't be kept; and if keeping a promise hurts you more than it helps him, it isn't against duty to put the greater before the lesser. Suppose you've promised to appear as an advocate at a set time, and your son falls gravely ill: not going isn't against duty — in fact the one who complains was abandoned has failed his own duty. And who doesn't see that promises made under threat or by fraud don't bind? Such things are mostly freed by the praetor's law, some by statute.\n33. Wrongs also come from a kind of quibbling and over-clever but dishonest reading of the law — hence the worn proverb: \"supreme right, supreme wrong.\" In that class fall many public wrongs: as when, after a thirty-day truce was agreed with the enemy, someone raided their fields by night — because the truce covered days, not nights! Nor would even ours be approved, if it's true that Q. Fabius Labeo (or whoever — I only have hearsay), appointed by the senate to arbitrate a boundary dispute between Nola and Naples, met each side separately and told them both not to be greedy but rather to yield than to push forward. Both yielded; some land was left in between — and he fixed their boundary as they had each said, and awarded the middle strip to the Roman people. That's trickery, not judgment. So flee that kind of cleverness in everything.\n34. Duties are owed even toward those who have wronged you. There is a limit to revenge and punishment, and I'm not sure it isn't enough that the offender regret his wrong — so he won't do it again and others will be slower to offend. But in public life the laws of war must be held above all. Since there are two ways of contesting — by argument and by force — and argument belongs to man, force to beasts, we must resort to force only when argument is impossible.\n35. Wars, then, should be fought only so that we may live in peace without wrong. Once victory is won, those who were not cruel or savage in war must be spared — as our fathers admitted the Tusculans, Aequi, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernici to citizenship; but they razed Carthage and Numantia. I wish Corinth had been spared — I think they followed the place's strategic value, so it could never stir up war again. My opinion: always aim for a peace with no treachery in it. Had that been followed, we might have — if not the best — at least some kind of republic, which today we don't have. And care must be given to the conquered, and those who drop their arms and flee to the general's good faith — even after the battering ram has struck the wall — must be received. Our fathers held justice in war so highly that anyone who received a surrendered city or nation became, by custom, that people's patron.\n36. Indeed the fairness of war is most solemnly laid down in the Roman people's fetial law. From it we can see that no war is just unless it's declared, or restitution demanded first. Popilius commanded a province in which Cato's son served as a soldier. When Popilius decided to discharge one legion, he discharged young Cato too. But Cato, who loved fighting, wrote to Popilius that if he still wanted him, he should administer a second military oath — since the first having lapsed, he couldn't lawfully fight the enemy.\n37. So careful were our ancestors about starting wars. The elder M. Cato wrote to his son Marcus that he'd heard he was discharged by the consul when serving in Macedonia against Perses; he warns him to stay out of battle — for no one who isn't a soldier may fight the enemy. And notice: our fathers called the man we now call a foreigner by a name meaning \"just enemy\" (hostis) — softening the harshness of the fact with the gentleness of the word. The Twelve Tables show it: \"or a set day with a foreigner,\" and \"everlasting right against a foreigner.\" What could be kinder than calling the man you're waging war against by such a gentle name? Age has since hardened the word; it slipped from \"foreigner\" and came to mean only the man in arms against you.\n38. But when the contest is for empire and glory is the prize of war, the causes should still be the just ones I described. Wars fought for empire should be waged less bitterly. As we deal with a citizen differently if he's an enemy than if he's a rival — one contest is over honor and standing, the other over life and reputation — so with the Celtiberians and Cimbrians the war was over which nation would survive; with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites, Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus, it was over who would rule. The Carthaginians broke treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the rest were more just. Of Pyrrhus, on returning prisoners, the famous words: \"I ask no gold, and you shall pay no price; not like merchants at war, but like warriors, with iron, not gold, let us fight for life together. Whether you or I rule, or whatever fortune brings, let us try it with courage. And take this word with you: those whose courage the fortune of war has spared, I mean to spare in their freedom. Give them up; lead them away; I give them freely to the great gods.\"\n39. A truly royal judgment, worthy of the house of the Aeacidae. And even if individuals, forced by circumstance, promised something to an enemy, good faith must be kept even there — as in the first Punic war, when Regulus, captured by the Carthaginians, was sent to Rome to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, having sworn to return: first, on arriving, he advised the senate not to return the prisoners; then, held back by kin and friends, he chose to return to punishment rather than betray his sworn word to the enemy.\n40. But in the second Punic war, after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent ten men to Rome under oath to return unless they won the ransom of the captives: the censors kept every one of them in custody as long as each lived, because they had sworn falsely — and no less the man who had tried to cheat his oath. Allowed out of camp by Hannibal, he went back a little later, claiming he'd forgotten something; then, leaving camp again, he considered himself released by his oath — released in words, not in fact. In good faith, what you MEANT, not what you SAID, must always be weighed. The greatest example of justice toward an enemy came from our fathers, when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate he would poison the king. The senate and C. Fabricius handed him back to Pyrrhus. So they refused to approve even the death of an enemy — powerful, and waging unprovoked war — when it was tied to a crime.\n41. Of military duties, enough. Remember too that justice must be kept even toward the lowest. The lowest condition and fortune is that of slaves, for whom we're rightly taught to give the commands we give hired workers — work to demand, justice to give. But since wrong is done in two ways — by force or by fraud — fraud resembles a little fox, force a lion: both are alien to man, but fraud deserves the greater hatred. And of all injustice none is deadlier than that of those who, when they most deceive, contrive to seem good men. Of justice, enough.\n42. Next, as proposed, generosity and liberality — nothing more in harmony with man's nature; but it has many cautions. First, our kindness must not harm those to whom it seems given, nor anyone else; second, it must not exceed our means; and third, it must be given to each according to his worth — for that is the foundation of justice, to which all this refers. Those who gratify someone with what will harm him, seeming to help, should be judged not generous but dangerous flatterers; and those who harm some to be generous to others are in the same injustice — as if converting another's goods into their own.\n43. Many, indeed, hungry for splendor and glory, snatch from some what they give to others, and think they'll seem generous to their friends if they enrich them by any means. But that's so far from duty that nothing could be more contrary. So use that liberality which helps friends and harms no one. That's why the confiscations of money by L. Sulla and C. Caesar from rightful owners for strangers should not be called generous: nothing is generous that isn't at the same time just.\n44. The second caution: kindness must not exceed our means. Those who want to be more generous than their property allows wrong their kin first — for supplies that more justly belong to these, to be provided and left to them, they transfer to strangers. Such generosity usually hides a desire to seize and take by wrong, so the supplies for giving suffice. You can see too that most are not generous by nature but driven by a kind of hunger for glory, doing things to seem generous — things that spring from showing off more than from will. Such pretending belongs to vanity, not to generosity or goodness.\n45. The third aim: in generosity, choose by worth. Consider the character of the one receiving, his spirit toward us, the commonness and fellowship of life, and any benefits he's given us before. It's best when all these meet; if not, the more numerous and weightier reasons should carry the day.\n46. But since we live not with perfect and perfectly wise men, but with those who do well if they have images of virtue, this too must be understood: no one at all should be neglected in whom any mark of virtue shows. But cultivate most the one in whom those gentler virtues shine most — modesty, self-control, and this very justice I've discussed at length. For boldness and great spirit in someone not yet perfect or wise are usually more fiery; those virtues seem rather to befit the good man. That much on character.\n47. Of the goodwill anyone has toward us, the first duty is to give most to the one by whom we're most loved — but judge goodwill not like the young, by a flash of passion, but by stability and constancy. And if the merits are so great that gratitude isn't to be begun but repaid, the greatest care must apply: no duty is more necessary than repaying a kindness.\n48. Hesiod says to return with larger measure whatever loan you received, if you can. Then challenged by a kindness, what should we do? Imitate the fertile fields, which yield far more than they received? For if we don't hesitate to help those we hope will profit us, how should we treat those who already have? Since there are two kinds of generosity — giving, and repaying a kindness — giving is in our power; but a good man cannot fail to repay, if he can without wrong.\n49. A choice must be made among kindnesses received too, and no doubt the most is owed to each according to his greatness. But above all weigh with what mind, what zeal, what goodwill he did it. Many do much with a certain recklessness, without judgment — driven by an unhealthy urge toward everyone, or by a sudden gust of passion like a wind. Such kindnesses count for less than those given with judgment, deliberately, and steadily. But in giving and in repaying gratitude, if all else is equal, it's most a duty to help chiefly the one who most needs help — contrary to what most do: they wait most eagerly on the one from whom they hope the most, even if he needs nothing.\n50. Human society and union will be kept best if, as each is most closely joined to us, to him we give the most kindness. But what the principles of natural community are must be sought deeper. First is that seen in the fellowship of the whole human race: its bond is reason and speech, which by teaching, learning, communicating, disputing, and judging reconcile us to one another and join us in a natural society. Nothing separates us from the nature of beasts more than this: we grant that horses and lions may have courage, but never that they have justice, fairness, or goodness — for they lack reason and speech.\n51. Widest of all among men is this society, shared by all. In it, keep the communion of everything nature made for common human use; and hold what statute and civil law assign so as that law provides — and the rest too, as the Greek proverb says: friends hold all things in common. To men of that kind everything seems common that Ennius placed in one verse, transferable to many: \"The man who kindly points the way to one astray / lights, as it were, his lantern with his own: / no less does it shine for him, having lit the other.\" By one example he teaches enough: whatever can be given without loss to yourself should be given even to a stranger.\n52. From this come the commons: don't bar running water; let fire take from fire if someone wishes; give faithful counsel to one who's deciding — useful to the receiver, no burden to the giver. So use these, and always add something to the common good. But since individuals' means are small and the needy are countless, common generosity must be kept within Ennius's limit — \"no less does it shine for him\" — so there's means left to be generous to our own.\n53. Human society has many degrees. Set aside the infinite one: nearer is that of the same people, nation, and tongue, which joins men most. Closer still is that of the same city: citizens share many things — forum, temples, colonnades, roads, laws, rights, courts, votes — besides customs, friendships, and many contracts with many. A closer bond is kinship: from the immense society of the human race it narrows into a small circle.\n54. Since the desire to reproduce is common to all living things, the first society is marriage itself; the next, children; then one household, everything shared — that is the beginning of a city and, as it were, the seedbed of the republic. Then come the unions of brothers, then of cousins, who, when one house can no longer hold them, move out into other houses like colonies. Then marriages and alliances bring more kin: that propagation and offspring is the origin of republics. The bond of blood ties men by goodwill and affection.\n55. Great it is to share the same ancestral monuments, to use the same sacred rites, to have common tombs. But of all societies, none is more excellent, none firmer, than when good men of like character are joined in intimacy. That honorable thing we keep speaking of shines even in another person, and moves us, and makes us friends with the one in whom we see it dwell.\n56. Though every virtue draws us toward itself and makes us love those in whom it seems to dwell, justice and generosity do it most. Nothing is more lovable, nothing more uniting, than the like character of good people: when the same pursuits and the same wills meet, each delights in the other as in himself — achieving what Pythagoras wanted in friendship: that one be made of many. Great too is the communion formed by kindnesses given and received back and forth, which, while mutual and pleasing, bind the parties in a firm bond of society.\n57. But when with reason and spirit you survey everything, no society is weightier, none dearer, than each of ours with the republic. Dear are parents, dear children, kin, friends — but one fatherland embraces all our loves: which good man, if it profited her, would hesitate to give his life? So much more detestable are the monsters who have torn their fatherland with every crime and are engaged in her total destruction.\n58. But if some comparison must be made, to whom most duty is owed: first the country and the parents, by whose benefits we're most deeply bound; next, children and the whole household, who look to us alone and have no other refuge; then the well-matched kindred, whose fortune is usually shared with ours. So the necessary defenses of life are owed chiefly to those first named; but the communion of living and living together — counsel, conversation, encouragement, consolation, sometimes even reproach — flourishes most in friendships: and that friendship is most pleasant which is joined by likeness of character.\n59. But in all these duties of giving, consider what each most needs and what each could or couldn't get without us. So the degrees of need won't match the degrees of circumstance, and some are owed more duty than others: you'd sooner help a neighbor gather his harvest than a brother or friend; but in court you'd rather defend a kinsman or friend than a neighbor. Watch for these and similar things in every duty, and practice and exercise them, so you become good reckoners of duties — by adding and subtracting, see what remains of the sum, and understand how much is owed to each.\n60. But just as doctors, commanders, and orators, however well they've learned their art's precepts, can't achieve anything worthy of great praise without practice and exercise, so the rules of keeping duty are handed down — as I'm doing — but the greatness of the matter requires practice and exercise too.\n61. Understand that, though four kinds were set out from which honorableness and duty flow, that seems most splendid which is done with a great and lofty spirit and in contempt of human affairs. So in reproaches it's most visible, if anything of the kind can be said: \"You, young men, have a woman's spirit; that maiden, a man's\" — and anything like: \"Salmacis has spoils without sweat and blood.\" And on the contrary, whatever was done with great spirit, bravely, excellently — we somehow praise with a fuller mouth. Hence the rhetoricians' training exercises on Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, Leuctra; hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Cn. and P. Scipiones, M. Marcellus, and countless others; and above all the Roman people itself excels in greatness of spirit. The zeal for military glory shows too, because we see statues adorned mostly in military dress.\n62. But that elation of spirit seen in dangers and labors, if it lacks justice and fights not for the common safety but for its own advantage, is in fault: not only is it not virtue — it's rather savage inhumanity, repelling all humanity. So the Stoics define courage well: virtue fighting for fairness. So no one who won the glory of courage by treachery and malice has earned praise: nothing can be honorable without justice.\n63. Glorious, then, is Plato's saying: \"Not only,\" he says, \"must knowledge cut off from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom — but even a spirit ready for danger, if driven by its own greed and not the common good, should have the name of recklessness rather than courage.\" So we want brave and great-souled men to be the same good and straightforward men, lovers of truth, deceivers in no way — which flows from the middle place of justice.\n64. But this is odious: in this elation and greatness of spirit, stubbornness and an excessive lust for primacy are most easily born. As in Plato the whole Spartan character blazed with the desire to win: so whoever most excels in greatness of soul wants most to be first of all — or rather alone. But it's hard, when you long to excel everyone, to keep the fairness that belongs most to justice. From this come those who won't be beaten in argument or by any public and lawful right, and in the republic there usually arise donors and faction-makers, so they can reach the greatest power and be superior by force rather than equal by justice. But the harder, the more glorious: at no time should that which ought to lack justice be tolerated.\n65. Brave and great-souled men should be held those who REPEL wrong, not those who DO it. But true and wise greatness of spirit judges that honorable thing — which nature chiefly follows — lies in deeds, not in glory, and prefers to BE first rather than to SEEM first. Whoever hangs on the opinion of an ignorant crowd should not be counted among the great. And whoever is of the highest soul is most easily driven to injustice by the desire for glory — a slippery place: scarcely is he found who, having undertaken labors and approached dangers, doesn't want glory as the payment for his deeds.\n66. Altogether the brave and great soul is seen chiefly in two things. One lies in the contempt of outward things, when it's believed that man should admire, wish for, or desire nothing except what's honorable and seemly, and yield to no man, no passion of mind, no fortune. The other: that when the soul is so disposed, you perform things great indeed and most useful, but exceedingly hard — full of labor and danger, both of life and of many things pertaining to life.\n67. All the splendor of these two, their amplitude — I add even utility — is in the second; but the cause and efficient reason of great men is in the first. For there lies what makes excellent minds and despisers of human affairs. And this appears in two things: if you judge only the honorable a good, and are free from every disturbance of soul. For it belongs to a brave and great soul to count small those things that most men think eminent and glorious, and to despise them with settled and firm reason; and to bear so the things that seem bitter — many and various in human life and fortune — that you depart nothing from the state of nature, nothing from the dignity of the wise: that belongs to a robust soul and great constancy.\n68. Nor is it consistent for one who isn't broken by fear to be broken by desire, or for one who proved himself unconquered by labor to be conquered by pleasure. So both must be shunned, and the desire for money fled: nothing is so narrow-souled and small as to love riches; nothing more honorable, more magnificent than to despise money if you don't have it — and if you do, to turn it to generosity and kindness. The desire for glory must also be shunned, as I said: it strips away liberty, which great souls should strive for with all their might. Commands, too, shouldn't be sought; rather sometimes refused, sometimes laid down.\n69. But one must be free of every disturbance of soul — desire and fear, and also grief, excessive pleasure, and anger — so tranquility of soul and security are present, bringing both constancy and dignity. Many seek that tranquility I speak of, withdrawing from public business into leisure — among them the most noble philosophers by far, and certain stern, grave men who couldn't bear the ways of peoples or princes, and lived some in the countryside, delighted with their own family.\n70. These had the same purpose as kings: to want nothing, to obey no one, to enjoy liberty — whose property is to live as you will. Since this is common to the power-hungry and to those I called at leisure — the former think they can attain it with great resources, the latter content themselves with their own and with little — neither judgment is wholly to be despised. But easier, safer, and less burdensome to others is the private life; more fruitful for the human race, and apter for glory and greatness, that of those fitted for the republic and great deeds.\n71. So perhaps it should be granted to those of excellent genius who gave themselves to learning, that they don't undertake the republic; and to those who withdrew from it through poor health or some graver cause, once they conceded its administration and glory to others. But those with no such cause, who say they despise what most admire — commands and magistracies — deserve not only no praise but even blame. Their judgment in despising glory and counting it nothing is hard not to approve; but they seem to fear labor and trouble, then offense and setbacks as a kind of disgrace. For some are inconsistent in opposites: they condemn pleasure most sternly, yet soften in grief; they neglect glory, yet break under infamy — not very consistently.\n72. But those whom nature has equipped for doing things must cast aside all hesitation, undertake magistracies, and govern the republic: for otherwise neither can the city be governed nor greatness of soul be shown. Those who enter public life must apply no less — I know not whether even more — magnificence and contempt of human affairs, of which I often speak, and tranquility of soul and security: if indeed they're neither anxious, and live with gravity and consistency.\n73. Which is easier for philosophers, since less of their life lies open to fortune's blows, they need fewer things, and if anything adverse happens, they can't fall so gravely. Wherefore greater motions of soul are stirred, and greater zeal required, in those governing the republic than in those at rest — by so much the more must greatness of soul and freedom from care be applied. Whoever enters administration must beware of thinking only how honorable it is, but also of whether he has the ability to carry it out — in which he must consider, lest he despair through sloth or trust too much through desire. In all undertakings, careful preparation must come before the start.\n74. But since most think military affairs greater than civil ones, that opinion must be reduced. Many have often sought wars from hunger for glory — which happens in great spirits and talents, especially if they're suited to war and eager for it. But truly, if we judge rightly, many civil things have proven greater and more glorious than military ones.\n75. Though Themistocles is justly praised and his name more illustrious than Solon's, and Salamis is cited as the witness of the most famous victory, preferred to Solon's counsel by which he first constituted the Areopagus — this too must be judged no less glorious. That helped the city once; this will help always: by this counsel the Athenians' laws and the ancestors' institutions are preserved. And indeed Themistocles could say nothing by which he helped the Areopagus; but he was truly helped by it: that war was conducted by the counsel of the senate Solon had constituted.\n76. The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander, by whose deeds empire is thought won for the Spartans — yet they're not to be compared in the least part with the laws and discipline of Lycurgus: by those very causes their armies were more obedient and braver. To me, when we were boys, M. Scaurus didn't seem to yield to C. Marius; nor, when we were serving the republic, did Q. Catulus yield to Cn. Pompeius: for the arms abroad are small, unless there's counsel at home. Nor did Africanus, a singular man and commander, benefit the republic more by destroying Numantia than P. Nasica at the same time, a private citizen, when he killed Ti. Gracchus. That deed indeed isn't only from a civil reason — it touches even the military, since it was done by force and hand — but it was done by urban counsel, without an army.\n77. But that thing is best, against which I hear the wicked and envious usually rush: \"let arms yield to the toga, let the laurel yield to praise.\" For, to omit others, when we governed the republic, didn't arms yield to the toga? Never was there in the republic a graver danger, nor a greater peace. So by our counsels and diligence the arms quickly slipped from the hands of the most daring citizens, and they themselves fell. What deed in war was ever so great? What triumph compares?\n78. For it's permitted me, my Marcus, to boast before you, to whom both the inheritance of this glory and the imitation of my deeds belong. To me indeed — a man abounding in military praises, Cn. Pompeius — said this with many listening: that he would have carried his third triumph in vain, unless by my service to the republic he had a place where he could triumph. There are, therefore, domestic virtues not inferior to the military ones — in which even more than in those, labor and study must be placed.\n79. Altogether that honorable thing we seek from a lofty and magnificent spirit is made by the strength of the mind, not of the body. Yet the body must be exercised and so disposed that it can obey counsel and reason in carrying out business and enduring labor. But the honorable thing we seek lies wholly in the care and thought of the mind — in which those who preside over the republic in the toga bring no less utility than those who wage war. Wherefore by their counsel wars are often either not undertaken or finished; sometimes even such are brought on: as the third Punic war by M. Cato, in which even dead his authority prevailed.\n80. Wherefore the reason of deciding is indeed more to be desired than the courage of fighting — but take care not to do it more from fleeing war than from the reason of utility. But war must be so undertaken that nothing else may seem sought but peace. And it belongs to a brave and constant soul not to be disturbed in hard things, nor — as they say — thrown from one's post into tumult, but to use a present mind and counsel, and not depart from reason.\n81. It takes a great spirit to see the future in advance, to decide beforehand what could happen on either side and what to do if it does — and never to have to say \"I didn't see that coming.\" Rushing into the battle line to fight the enemy hand to hand is monstrous, beastlike; but when time and necessity demand, you must fight hand to hand and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.\n82. In overthrowing and plundering cities, take the greatest care to do nothing rash or cruel. It's the mark of a great man, in troubled times, to punish the guilty, hold the crowd together, and keep to what is right and honorable in every turn of fortune. For just as some prefer military to civil affairs, so many find dangerous, hot-headed plans more splendid than calm, deliberate ones.\n83. Never flee danger so much that you seem idle and cowardly — but also don't offer yourself to danger without cause, which is the height of foolishness. In entering danger, imitate doctors: they treat mild illness gently, but resort to risky, doubtful cures for graver disease. Wishing for a storm in calm weather is madness; helping in a storm by any means is wisdom — especially when the good you'll win clearly outweighs the risk. Dangerous undertakings affect some people personally, others the whole state.\n84. Some risk their lives, others their reputation and their fellow citizens' goodwill. We should be readier to fight for our own dangers than the common ones, and more prepared to fight for honor and glory than for mere convenience. Many have poured out not only money but life itself for their country, yet wouldn't give up the tiniest scrap of glory even when the state demanded — like Callicratidas, the Spartan commander in the Peloponnesian War, who did many excellent things but at the end ignored the advice that the fleet should withdraw from Arginusae and avoid battle with the Athenians. He replied that the Spartans could build another fleet if this one were lost, but that he could not flee without disgrace. That blow was bearable for Sparta; the other was ruinous — when Cleombrotus, fearing envy, rashly joined battle with Epaminondas, Spartan power collapsed. How much better was Q. Maximus, of whom Ennius wrote: \"One man by delay restored the state. He put no rumor before safety. And so now, more and more, his glory shines.\" That kind of fault must be avoided in politics too: some, though they think a course best, dare not say it for fear of envy.\n85. Whoever is going to govern the republic should hold Plato's two rules: first, to guard the citizens' interests so completely that whatever he does serves them, forgetting his own convenience; second, to care for the whole body of the state — not, while protecting one part, to abandon the rest. Guardianship, like administration of the republic, exists for the good of those entrusted to you, not of the guardians. People who favor one faction abandon another, bringing the most ruinous things into the city: sedition and discord. From this comes the split between \"men of the people\" and \"men of the best\" — few care for everyone.\n86. Hence the great discords at Athens, and in our republic not only faction but deadly civil wars — which a serious and strong citizen, worthy of leadership, will flee and loathe, devoting himself wholly to the state, pursuing neither wealth nor power, guarding the whole of it for all. He'll never stir up hatred or envy against anyone by false charges, and he'll cling so firmly to justice and honor that, if he errs gravely, he'll rather meet death than abandon those principles.\n87. Nothing is more wretched than the scramble for offices — Plato puts it beautifully: that such men quarrel like sailors over who should steer the ship. And he says: \"count as your enemies only those who bear arms against you — not those who want, by their own judgment, to protect the republic\" — like the disagreement without bitterness between P. Africanus and Q. Metellus.\n88. Don't listen to those who say a great and brave man must burn with anger at his enemies: nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing more worthy of a great man, than patience and mercy. But in free states with equal rights, we must also practice that openness and loftiness of soul — called \"affability\" — lest, if we grow angry at untimely or shameless petitioners, we fall into a useless, hated sourness. And yet that gentleness must be tempered: for the sake of the state, severity must sometimes be applied — without it, a city cannot be governed. And all punishment and rebuke should be free of insult, aimed not at the punisher's satisfaction but at the state's good.\n89. Beware, too, of punishment exceeding the fault, and of some being punished while others aren't even charged for the same offense. Above all, ban anger from punishment: the angry man never keeps the moderation between too much and too little that the Peripatetics rightly praise — provided they don't praise anger itself as nature's useful gift. That must be rejected everywhere, and we should pray that those who govern be like the laws, which punish not from anger but from fairness.\n90. In prosperous times too, when things flow our way, we must flee pride, disdain, and arrogance. Bearing bad fortune badly is flightiness; bearing good fortune immoderately is the same. A splendid quality is evenness throughout life — always the same face, the same bearing — as we hear of Socrates and of C. Laelius. Philip of Macedon, beaten in deeds and glory by his son, was I think superior in courtesy and humanity. So one was always great; the other often shameful. Rightly do counselors warn: the higher we stand, the more humbly we should carry ourselves. Panaetius used to say of his student Africanus that he quoted the image of horses — made wild and fierce by constant battle — being handed over to trainers so they could be managed more easily: so men unbridled by success and self-confidence should be led, as it were, in the ring of reason and teaching, to see the weakness and variety of human affairs.\n91. In the height of success we should use our friends' counsel most, and give them even greater authority than before. At the same time, guard against opening your ears to flatterers or letting yourself be flattered — it's easy to be fooled. Men come to believe they deserve praise; then countless faults follow, as the inflated are basely mocked and stay lost in the deepest errors.\n92. But enough of that. This much must be said: the greatest deeds, of the greatest souls, belong to those who govern republics, since their administration reaches the widest and touches the most. But many great-souled men have lived — and do live — in private life, investigating great questions, or undertaking them, staying within their own means — some between philosophy and public service, delighting in their own estate: not squeezing it by every device, nor barring their own people from its use, but sharing it with friends and with the republic, if ever needed. Above all, it should be gotten honestly, not by a shameful or hateful trade; then it should offer itself usefully to many, if they're worthy; then let it grow by reason, diligence, thrift — and serve generosity and kindness, not lust and luxury. Keeping these rules, one can live magnificently, gravely, bravely — and simply, faithfully, and kindly toward people.\n93. One part of the honorable remains: where we find modesty and a kind of polish of life, self-control, restraint, and the calming of every disturbance of the soul, and the measure of all things. In this place lies what in Latin we call decorum — in Greek, to prepon.\n94. Its force is such that it cannot be separated from the honorable: what is proper is honorable, and what is honorable is proper. The difference between the honorable and the proper is easier to feel than to explain. Whatever is proper appears once the honorable has gone before. So not only in this part of the honorable, but in all three previous parts too, propriety shows itself: it is proper to use reason and speech prudently, to act with care, and in everything to see and hold to the truth — and, on the contrary, to be deceived, to err, to be led astray, to be fooled is as unbecoming as to rave or be out of one's mind. All just things are proper; unjust things are improper — shameful and unbecoming alike. The same holds for courage: what is done manfully and with great spirit seems worthy of a man and proper; the opposite is unbecoming as well as shameful.\n95. So this \"decorum\" I speak of belongs to all of honorableness — so much so that it isn't seen by some hidden reason but stands in plain sight. There is something that is understood in every virtue: what is fitting, which can be separated from virtue more in thought than in reality. As bodily beauty and comeliness can't be separated from health, so this propriety is wholly blended with virtue — but distinguished in thought.\n96. It divides in two. We understand a general propriety, covering all of the honorable, and another under it, touching the individual parts. The general one is defined: propriety is what agrees with man's excellence, in the very thing in which his nature differs from the beasts. The part under it is defined: whatever agrees so with nature that moderation and self-control appear in it, together with a kind of gentlemanly grace.\n97. This can be grasped from the decorum poets follow — of which more is said elsewhere. We say poets keep what is fitting when what each character does and says is worthy of that character. If Aeacus or Minos said \"Let them hate me, so long as they fear me,\" or \"The father himself is a tomb to his sons,\" it would seem unbecoming — we've heard they were just. But when Atreus says it, applause follows: the speech fits the speaker. Poets judge what suits each of their many characters, even the wicked. But nature has assigned us our character, with great excellence and preeminence over the beasts.\n98. So the poets, with their wide variety of characters, will judge what fits even the vicious. But to us, since nature has given the parts of constancy, self-control, temperance, and modesty, and since the same nature teaches us not to neglect how we appear to men, it follows both that the general propriety covering all of honorableness shows itself as widely as it does, and that this propriety is seen in each particular virtue. As the beauty of the body, in the right arrangement of limbs, draws the eye and delights simply because all the parts agree with a certain grace — so this propriety, shining in life, wins the approval of those we live with, by the order, consistency, and moderation of everything we say and do.\n99. A certain respect is owed to people — to the best, and to everyone else. To ignore what each person thinks of himself is not only arrogant but thoroughly dissolute. There's a difference, too, between justice and modesty here: justice forbids harming people; modesty forbids offending them — and that is where the force of propriety shows most clearly. Once this is laid out, I think it's clear what we mean by \"fitting.\"\n100. The office that comes from propriety has this first road, leading to the keeping of what is fitting: follow it as a guide and you'll never stray — you'll keep both the sharpness and insight nature gave you, and that fitted to the society of men, and that vehement and strong. But the greatest force of propriety lies in this part we're discussing: not only must the motions of the body, which suit nature, be approved, but far more the motions of the soul, which likewise suit nature.\n101. The force and nature of the soul is twofold: one part is appetite — Greek horme — which pulls man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and avoided. So reason comes first; appetite obeys. And every action should be free of rashness and carelessness — never do anything for which you can't give a reasonable account: that is almost the very definition of duty.\n102. See to it that appetites obey reason, neither running ahead of it nor deserting it out of laziness or cowardice — and that they stay calm, free of every disturbance of soul. From that comes all consistency and all self-control. Those whose appetites run too far, exulting — whether in desire or in flight — and aren't reined in by reason, pass the end and limit without doubt. They cast off obedience to reason, to which they're subject by nature's law; and that disturbs not only souls but bodies. You can see it in the faces of the angry, the lustful, the fearful, the overjoyed: the countenance, voice, posture, and bearing of all of them change.\n103. From this we understand — to return to the shape of duty — that every appetite must be drawn in and calmed, and alertness and diligence aroused, so we do nothing rashly, by chance, carelessly, or negligently. Nature did not make us for play and jest — rather for seriousness and for certain greater, heavier studies. But play and jest may be used, like sleep and other rest — after we've done enough for serious things. The very kind of joking shouldn't be extravagant or shameless, but noble and witty. As we don't give boys unlimited license in play, only what suits honorable conduct, so in the joke itself some light of an honest nature should shine.\n104. There are two kinds of joking: one vulgar, wanton, disgraceful, obscene; the other elegant, urbane, clever, witty — with which not only our Plautus and the old Athenian comedy are filled, but the books of the Socratic philosophers too, and the witty sayings collected by the elder Cato, called apophthegms. The distinction between noble and vulgar joking is easy. One kind, if made at the right moment, with a relaxed mind, suits even the gravest man; the other doesn't suit a free man at all, if the vileness of things and the obscenity of words are added. A measure must be kept in joking too: don't pour everything out, and don't be carried away by pleasure into some vileness. Our campus games and hunting give honest examples of clean fun.\n105. But every inquiry into duty must keep one thing always in view: how far man's nature outranks cattle and the other beasts. They feel nothing but pleasure, and throw everything into it. But man's mind is nourished by learning and thinking — always seeking or doing something, drawn by the delight of seeing and hearing. Indeed, if anyone leans a bit toward pleasure — provided he's not beastly (there are some who are beasts in name only) — if anyone is at all upright, even when seized by pleasure, he hides and conceals his appetite for it out of a sense of propriety.\n106. From this it's clear that bodily pleasure isn't worthy enough for man's excellence and should be despised and rejected. But if anyone grants something to pleasure, he must carefully keep the measure. So food and care of the body should aim at health and strength, not pleasure. And if we consider what excellence and dignity nature holds, we'll see how shameful it is to dissolve in luxury, to live delicately and softly — and how honorable to live thriftily, temperately, severely, soberly.\n107. Understand also that nature has, as it were, clothed us in two roles: one common, from the fact that we all share in reason and in that excellence by which we outrank the beasts — from which flows everything honorable and proper, and the whole reason for finding duty; the other, given individually to each person. As bodies differ greatly — some are strong for running, others for wrestling; some forms have dignity, others charm — so souls hold even greater variety.\n108. There was much charm in L. Crassus and L. Philippus; even more, and deliberately, in C. Caesar the son; in the same era M. Scaurus and young M. Drusus had singular severity; C. Laelius much cheerfulness; his close friend Scipio greater ambition, a graver life. Of the Greeks we're told Socrates was sweet and witty, festive in conversation, playing the dissembler in all speech — what the Greeks call an \"ironist.\" The opposite: Pythagoras and Pericles reached the greatest authority without any cheerfulness. Hannibal we hold as clever among the Carthaginians; among our generals, Q. Maximus — good at hiding, keeping silent, dissembling, laying snares, forestalling the enemy's plans. In this kind the Greeks set Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above the rest, and above all Solon's shrewd stroke, who feigned madness to make his life safer and serve the republic a little more.\n109. Others are very unlike these — plain and open men, who think nothing should be done by stealth or snares: lovers of truth, enemies of fraud. And others again who will endure anything, serve anyone, to get what they want — as we saw in Sulla and M. Crassus. In this kind the Spartan Lysander was held most shrewd and most patient; the opposite was Callicratidas, fleet commander after Lysander. Likewise in speech: each powerful man is made to seem like several different men — as we saw in Catulus and in father and son, and the same in Q. Mucius Mancia. I've heard from my elders that P. Scipio Nasica had this same charm; on the contrary, his father — who avenged the failed attempts of Ti. Gracchus — had no charm of speech, not even Xenocrates, the most severe of philosophers; and for that very reason was great and famous. Countless other differences of natures and characters exist, and none of them blameworthy.\n110. But everyone should hold to his own nature — not vicious, but his own — so the propriety we seek is kept more easily. Do it this way: don't fight against universal nature, but, keeping it, follow your own — so that, though others may be graver and better, you measure your pursuits by the rule of your own nature. It's not for us to fight nature or to chase what we can't attain. From this the nature of propriety emerges all the more clearly: nothing is \"fitting,\" as they say, \"with Minerva unwilling\" — that is, with nature opposing and resisting.\n111. In short, if anything is proper at all, nothing is more so than evenness throughout the whole of life, and in each action — which you cannot keep if, imitating another man's nature, you abandon your own. Just as we should use the speech we were born to, lest — like certain people who stuff in Greek words — we be rightly laughed at, so in actions and the whole of life we should admit no inconsistency.\n112. And this difference of natures has such force that sometimes one man ought to take his own life in a certain cause, while another, in the same cause, ought not. Was M. Cato in a different cause than the others who surrendered in Africa to Caesar? The others might perhaps have been forgiven if they'd killed themselves, since their lives were gentler and their characters more yielding; but Cato — nature had granted him incredible sternness, and he had strengthened it with lifelong consistency, always standing by his purpose and his plan — such a man had to choose death over the face of the tyrant.\n113. How much did Ulysses endure in that long wandering — serving women, if Circe and Calypso deserve the name — affable and pleasant in every conversation! At home, too, he endured the insults of slaves and maids, so that at last he might reach what he sought. But Ajax, with the spirit we know, would rather have met death a thousand times than bear such things. Weighing these examples, each of us must consider what he has of his own and govern it — and not try how well things that belong to others fit him: for what is most one's own is what becomes one most.\n114. Let each man know his own talent and show himself a sharp judge of both his strengths and his faults, so the actors don't seem wiser than we are. They don't choose the best plays, but the ones that suit them: those who trust their voice pick Epigonus and Medus; those who trust gesture, Melanippa or Clytemnestra — always Rupilius, as I remember, in Antiope, and rarely Aesopus in Ajax. Will actors see this on the stage, and the wise man not see it in life? So labor hardest at what we're most fitted for. But if necessity ever pushes us into things outside our nature, all care, thought, and diligence must be applied, that we can do them, if not fittingly, at least as little unbefittingly as possible — nor should we so much strive after goods we weren't given, as flee from vices.\n115. To the two roles I described before, a third is added, imposed by some chance or time — and even a fourth, which we choose for ourselves by our own judgment. Kingdoms, commands, nobility, honors, wealth, power, and their opposites rest on chance and are governed by times; but how we carry ourselves — the role we wish to play — comes from our own will. And so some turn to philosophy, some to civil law, some to eloquence, and among the virtues themselves one man excels in one, another in another.\n116. But those whose fathers or ancestors won some glory usually strive to excel in the same kind — as Q. Mucius, son of Publius, in civil law; Africanus, son of Paulus, in war. Some add their own to the praise they inherited — the same Africanus piled eloquence onto his military glory, as Timotheus, son of Conon, did, who, no lesser than his father in war, added to that glory the fame of learning and genius. Sometimes some, setting aside imitation of their ancestors, follow a course of their own — and usually labor hardest at it who, born of obscure fathers, set great things before themselves.\n117. All these things we must hold in mind and thought when we ask what is fitting. Above all we must settle whom we wish to be, what kind of person, and in what kind of life — the hardest deliberation of all. For at the entrance of youth, when judgment is weakest, each of us fixes on the kind of life he most loves — and so we're caught in some fixed course before we could judge what was best.\n118. What Prodicus says of Hercules — in Xenophon — that when he first came of age, the time nature gave for choosing which road of life to enter, he went into solitude, sat long, doubting, and saw two roads — one of Pleasure, one of Virtue — wondering which was better: that might have worked for Hercules, \"begotten of Jove's seed,\" but not for us, who imitate whom we please and are driven to their studies and teachings. Usually we're led by our parents' precepts into their habits and ways; others follow the crowd's judgment and desire most what seems grandest to the many. Some, however, by good luck or good nature, have followed the right road of life without a parent's teaching.\n119. But that is the rarest kind of man: those with either excellent greatness of genius or splendid learning and teaching — or both — who even had the space to deliberate which course to follow. In that deliberation, the whole counsel must return to each one's own nature. For in everything we do, we seek what fits — as I said — from how each was born; so in choosing the whole course of life, far greater care must be taken, that we can stand in the consistency of life and never limp in any duty.\n120. But since nature has the greatest force in this, and fortune the next, both must be weighed in choosing the course of life — nature more, for it is far firmer and steadier, so that fortune sometimes seems, like a mortal, to fight with immortal nature. Whoever carries the whole counsel of life to the course of his own nature — not a vicious one — let him keep consistency, for that is most becoming — unless he realizes he has erred in choosing. If that has happened (it can), a change of habits and institutions must be made — which, if the times favor, we'll make more easily; if not, gradually and step by step: friendships that please less and are approved less should, the wise think, be loosened gradually rather than cut off suddenly.\n121. But when the change of life has been made, all care must be taken that it seem done with good judgment. Since I said a while ago that we should imitate our ancestors — first excepting that vices aren't to be imitated; then, that if nature won't allow it, some things can't be copied: as the former Africanus's adopted son, this Paullus, couldn't be like his father because of weak health, though he had been like his own father — still, whatever lies in his own power must shine out: justice, faith, generosity, modesty, temperance — so the less he has, the less is required. But the best inheritance fathers hand down to children, better than all property, is the glory of virtue and of deeds — disgracing which must be judged crime and vice.\n122. And since different duties belong to different ages — some to the young, some to the old — something must be said of that distinction too. It belongs to the young to respect their elders and choose from them the best and most approved, leaning on their counsel and authority; for the inexperience of entering life should be governed by old men's wisdom. Above all this age must be guarded from appetites, and exercised in labor and endurance of both mind and body, so their industry can flourish in both military and civil duties. And even when they want to relax and enjoy themselves, let them watch for excess, remember modesty — which will be easier if the elders don't forbid such things altogether.\n123. For the old, bodily labor should lessen, but mental exercise grow; and they should give all the help they can to friends, to the young, and above all to the republic, with counsel and wisdom. But nothing must old age guard against more than laziness and sloth: luxury, shameful in every age, is foulest in old age. And if intemperance of appetite is added, the evil is doubled — old age itself conceives disgrace, and makes the young's intemperance more shameless.\n124. Nor is it out of place to speak of the duties of magistrates, private citizens, citizens, and foreigners. The magistrate's proper duty is to understand that he represents the city, to uphold its dignity and honor, to keep the laws, define rights, and remember what was entrusted to his faith. A private citizen should live with his fellow citizens on equal and fair terms — neither servile and degraded, nor carrying himself above them — and in the republic to will what is peaceful and honorable (that's what we call a good citizen).\n125. The foreigner and resident's duty is to mind nothing beyond his own business, ask nothing of others, and be no busybody in a republic not his own. That's how duties will usually be found when we ask what suits each person, time, and age. But nothing is more becoming than consistency in every undertaking and decision.\n126. Since that propriety shows in every act and word, and finally in the movement and posture of the body, and rests on three things — beauty, order, and ornament fitted to action (hard to express in words, but enough to understand) — and since in these three also lies that care to be approved by those we live among — a few things must be said here too. Nature herself seems to have had great design about our body: she set our face and the rest of our figure in view, where honorable beauty lies; but the parts given to nature's necessity, which would have had a deformed look, she covered and hid away.\n127. The modesty of men copied nature's careful work. What nature hid, everyone of sound mind removes from sight, and attends to bodily needs as hiddenly as possible; and the parts whose uses are necessary, neither those parts nor their uses they call by their own names — and to do what isn't shameful to do, if only done hiddenly, to say is obscene. So neither the open act nor the speech is free of coarseness.\n128. Nor should we listen to the Cynics — or the near-Cynic Stoics — who mock us because we judge shameful in words what isn't shameful in fact, and call by their true names things that ARE shameful in fact. To rob, defraud, commit adultery is shameful in fact but said without obscenity; to attend free boys is honorable in fact but obscene in name; and more in that vein is argued by them against modesty. But let us follow nature and flee whatever shocks the eyes or ears of others; let propriety hold in posture, walking, sitting, leaning, countenance, eyes, and the movement of the hands.\n129. Two things must chiefly be fled here: anything effeminate or soft, and anything harsh or rustic. Nor should actors and orators have these skills while we lack them. The stage's manner has such modesty from the old discipline that no actor comes on without undergarments — they fear that some part of the body might be seen unseemly if exposed. In our own custom grown sons don't bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with fathers-in-law. This kind of modesty must be kept, with nature herself as teacher and guide.\n130. Since there are two kinds of beauty — one of charm, one of dignity — we should hold charm womanly, dignity manly. So all ornament unworthy of a man must be stripped from his form, and the like vice watched for in gesture and movement. The gymnast's movements are often odious, and some actors' gestures have no inelegance; in both kinds, the straight and simple are praised. But dignity of form must be kept by good complexion, and complexion by bodily exercise. Modest cleanliness must also be applied — not odious or over-fussy, just enough to avoid rustic and inhuman neglect. The same reason applies to dress, where, as in most things, the middle way is best.\n131. Care must be taken not to walk too slowly, like procession carts, nor to hurry too fast — which stirs the breath, changes the countenance, twists the face: a great sign that composure is lacking. But we must labor far more that the motions of the mind never depart from nature — which we'll attain if we guard against falling into disturbances and dejection, and keep attentive minds fixed on preserving propriety.\n132. The motions of the soul are of two kinds: some of thought, some of appetite. Thought chiefly concerns the search for truth; appetite drives to action. So see to it that in thought we use the best material, and that appetite obeys reason. And since speech's power is great and twofold — one kind of disputation, one of conversation — let disputation be given to the courts, assemblies, and senate; let conversation be practiced in circles, discussions, gatherings of friends, and even at dinner parties. The rules of disputation belong to the rhetoricians; of conversation there are none — though perhaps there could be. But teachers are found wherever students exist; no one studies this kind — everything is stuffed with a crowd of rhetoricians — though the rules for words and thoughts are the same, and would apply to conversation.\n133. Since we hold the voice as speech's signal, and in the voice we seek two things — clarity and sweetness — both should come from nature, but one is enlarged by exercise, the other by imitating the concise and gentle speakers. There was nothing in the Catuli that suggested exquisite literary judgment, though they were lettered — and yet they were thought the best speakers of Latin. The sound was sweet, the letters neither over-pronounced nor mumbled, lest they be unclear or insipid; a voice without strain, neither weak nor sing-song. L. Crassus's speech was fuller, no less witty — but the Catuli were thought no less eloquent. In wit indeed Caesar, brother of the elder Catulus, surpassed everyone: in that very forensic kind, he beat the contentious by conversation.\n134. In all these we must labor, if we seek what becomes us in everything. Let conversation, in which the Socratics excel, be gentle and in no way stubborn; let it have wit. Nor, as if he owned the conversation, should anyone shut others out — but as in other things, so in common talk, a fair turn belongs to each. And above all let him watch what he talks about: if serious, gravity; if witty, wit. Above all, let him guard against the conversation exposing some fault in someone's character — which most often happens when, studiously, to run down the absent, slanderous and insulting things are said, whether in jest or in earnest.\n135. Conversations are usually about domestic business, about the republic, or about the study and teaching of the arts. Care should be taken that if the talk starts to wander to other things, it be brought back to these — but as they arise; for we don't delight in the same things, nor at all times, nor in the same way. Notice too how far the conversation pleases, and as there was a manner of beginning, let there be a manner of ending.\n136. But as in all life it's most rightly taught to flee disturbances — that is, excessive motions of mind that don't obey reason — so conversation should be free of such motions: let no anger, no desire, no laziness, no listlessness, nothing of the kind appear. And take care chiefly that we seem both to respect and to care for those we talk with. Rebukes sometimes come that are necessary, in which a greater heat of voice and sharper weight of words may be used — we may even seem angry when we do it. But as with cautery and cutting, so with this kind of correction: we should come to it rarely and unwillingly, never unless necessary, when no other cure is found — but anger must be far away, with which nothing can be done rightly, nothing carefully.\n137. Yet much of gentle correction may be used, with gravity joined to it — so severity is applied and insult warded off, and even that bit of bite in rebuke must be shown to be for the sake of the man himself being corrected. It's right, too, even in quarrels with the bitterest enemies — even if we hear things unworthy of us — to keep our dignity and drive away anger. Things done under disturbance can neither be done steadily nor approved by those watching. It's ugly, too, to praise oneself — especially falsely — and imitate the boasting soldier to the mockery of the hearers.\n138. And since we pursue everything — certainly we wish to — we must also say what kind of house suits an honorable man and a leader, whose end is usefulness, to which the design of building must fit — and yet care for comfort and dignity must be applied. For Cn. Octavius, the first consul of that family, it was an honor, we're told, that he built a splendid and dignified house on the Palatine — which, when the crowd toured it, was thought to have canvassed the consulship for its new-man master. That one Scaurus demolished, and folded the acquisition into his own house. And so the one first brought the consulship into his own house; the other, son of a most illustrious man, brought into a multiplied house not only rejection but disgrace and ruin.\n139. For the dignity of the owner should adorn the house, not the house be sought from the house; nor the master from the house, but the house from the master be honored. And as in other things we must consider not only ourselves but others, so in the house of a famous man — into which many guests and all kinds of people must be admitted — spaciousness must be provided. Otherwise a spacious house often becomes a disgrace to its owner, if it holds solitude — and worst of all if it was once frequented by another owner. It's ugly when passersby say: \"O ancient house, alas, how unlike a master do you rule\" — which indeed may be said of many houses in our own times.\n140. Care must be taken — especially if you build yourself — not to go beyond measure in expense and magnificence, in which much evil lies even in the example. For most people diligently imitate the deeds of the great in this part above all: the virtue, say, of L. Lucullus, a great man — what of it? But how many imitate the magnificence of his villas! A limit must surely be set there and recalled to moderation. The same moderation must carry into every use and culture of life. But this much on these things.\n141. In every undertaking three things must be held: first, that appetite obey reason — nothing is better fitted for keeping duties; second, that we observe how great the thing is we want to accomplish, so we take neither too much nor too little care and effort for the cause; third, that we ensure whatever belongs to a liberal appearance and dignity be moderate. But the best measure is to hold the propriety itself, of which I spoke before, and go no further. Of these three, the most excellent is that appetite obey reason.\n142. Next we must speak of the order of things and the opportunity of times. That knowledge is contained in what the Greeks call eutaxia — not this which we translate \"modesty,\" in which the word \"measure\" lies, but that is eutaxia, in which the keeping of order is understood. So, though we might call the same thing \"modesty,\" the Stoics define it: modesty is the science of placing in their proper places the things done or said. And so it seems the same force belongs to order and arrangement — for they define order as the arrangement of things in apt and fitting places. But the place of action they call the opportunity of times; and the right time of action in Greek is eukairia, in Latin occasio. So it results that this modesty, as we translate it, is the science of the opportunity of times fit for action.\n143. It can be the same definition as prudence, of which I spoke at the beginning; but in this place we're asking about moderation and temperance and the virtues like them. So the things proper to prudence were said in their own place; but the things of these virtues, which belong to modesty and the approval of those we live with, must now be said.\n144. Such an order of actions should be kept that, as in a consistent speech, so in life everything fits together and agrees; for it's foul and a great fault to bring into a grave matter a conversation fit for a dinner party. Well did Pericles answer, when he had the poet Sophocles as colleague in office, and they had agreed on their common duty, and by chance a beautiful boy passed by, and Sophocles said: \"O the beautiful boy, Pericles!\" — \"But it befits a magistrate, Sophocles, to keep not only his hands but his eyes abstinent.\" And yet this same thing, if Sophocles had said it in praising athletes, would not be without just reproach. So great is the force of place and time. As if anyone, while walking or taking a stroll before pleading a case, were mulling over his speech or thinking intently of something else — he wouldn't be reproached; but doing it at a dinner party would seem inhuman, ignorant of the time.\n145. But things that differ greatly from humanity — like someone singing in the forum, or any other great perversity — are easily seen and need little teaching; but those errors that seem small and can't be understood by the many must be avoided more carefully. As in strings or pipes, though they differ ever so little, the trained ear usually notices — so we must see in life that nothing differ, all the more since the concord of deeds is greater and better than of sounds.\n146. And as musicians' ears feel the very least miss-tuning of strings, so we, if we want to be sharp and careful judges and noticers of faults, shall often understand much from small things. From the look of the eyes, from the raising or lowering of brows, from sadness, cheerfulness, laughter, speech, silence, the raising or lowering of the voice, and other such things, we shall easily judge which of these is done fittingly and what departs from duty and nature. In this it's not inconvenient to judge of others — that if anything unbecoming appears in them, we avoid it ourselves; for somehow we see more in others than in ourselves when anything offends. So those are most easily corrected in learning whose faults the teachers imitate for the sake of correction.\n147. Nor is it out of place, in choosing what brings doubt, to bring in learned men, or those experienced by practice, and ask what they think of each kind of duty. For the greater part usually follows what nature herself draws toward. In this we must consider not only what each says but what each thinks, and for what cause. For as painters, sculptors, and even poets want their work seen by the crowd — so that if anything is criticized by many, it's corrected — and they both ask of themselves and of others what they did wrong: so much should be done by us through the judgment of others — many things done and not done, changed and corrected.\n148. But things done by the custom and institutions of civil society need no prescription; those very customs are the precepts — and no one should be led into this error: that if Socrates or Aristippus did or said anything against the custom and usage of civil society, the same be thought allowed to him. Those men earned that license with great and divine goods. But the whole system of the Cynics must be cast out; for it's hostile to modesty, without which nothing can be right, nothing honorable.\n149. But those whose lives have been spent in honorable and great things, who think well of the republic and have deserved well of it — or deserve it — so as to be touched with some honor or command, we should observe and cultivate; we should give much to old age, yield to those holding magistracies, make a distinction between citizen and foreigner — and among foreigners, whether they came privately or on public business. In sum — not to enumerate each — we should cultivate, guard, and keep the conciliation and consociation of the whole human race.\n150. Of the arts and trades, which are to be held liberal and which vulgar, we have this teaching, more or less. First, trades that arouse men's hatred are rejected: tax collectors, moneylenders. Vulgar and ungentlemanly are the trades of all hired laborers, whose work, not their skill, is bought; for in their case the wage itself is the payment of servitude. Also to be judged vulgar are those who buy from merchants what they immediately resell: they profit nothing unless they lie enormously — and nothing is fouler than lying. And all workmen are engaged in a vulgar trade: nothing can be gentlemanly in a workshop. Least approved of all are the arts that serve pleasure: fishmongers, butchers, cooks, poulterers, fishermen, as Terence says. Add perfumers, dancers, and the whole dice-table crew, if you like.\n151. But the arts in which greater wisdom lies, or no small utility is sought — like medicine, architecture, the teaching of honorable things — those are honorable for those to whose class they belong. But merchandise, if small, must be judged vulgar; if great and rich — bringing much from everywhere and distributing to many without vanity — it's not to be much reproved. And even if, sated with profit — or rather, content — it has carried itself from the open sea into the harbor, and from the harbor into lands and estates, it seems it can be praised with the best reason. But of everything from which anything is acquired, nothing is better than agriculture, nothing more productive, nothing sweeter, nothing more worthy of a free man. Of which, since I said enough in Cato the Elder, there you may find what belongs here.\n152. But from those parts of honorableness, how duties were derived, has seemed enough said. Of the honorable things themselves, however, a comparison can often arise — between two honorable things, which is MORE honorable — a place Panaetius skipped. For since all honorableness flows from four parts — one of knowledge, one of community, a third of greatness of spirit, a fourth of moderation — these are often necessarily compared with one another in choosing a duty.\n153. It pleases, then, that those duties fit nature better which are drawn from community than those drawn from knowledge — and this can be confirmed by this argument: that if a wise man's life should fall so that, with everything overflowing in abundance, he might consider and contemplate in the greatest leisure whatever is worthy of knowledge — nevertheless if so great a solitude should fall that he could not see a human being, he would go out of life. That wisdom, the chief of all virtues, which the Greeks call sophia — for prudence, which they call phronesis, we understand as something else: the science of things to be sought and avoided — but that wisdom I called chief is the science of things divine and human, which contains the community of gods and men, and the society between them. If that is the greatest — and it is — then necessarily the duty drawn from community must be the greatest. For the knowledge and contemplation of nature is in some way maimed and unfinished if no action follows. But action is seen chiefly in guarding human welfare — it therefore belongs to the society of the human race — therefore that is to be preferred to knowledge.\n154. And every best man shows and judges this in the fact itself. For who is so greedy in beholding and knowing the nature of things that, if — while studying and contemplating things most worthy of knowledge — the peril and crisis of his country were suddenly brought before him, to which he could come to aid, he would not leave all those things and cast them away, even if he thought he could count the stars or measure the size of the world? And the same he would do in the danger or business of a parent or friend.\n155. From these things it's understood that the duties of justice must be placed before the studies and duties of knowledge, which pertain to human welfare — than which nothing should be dearer to man. And those very men whose study and whole life was spent in the knowledge of things did not yet withdraw from increasing the welfare and convenience of men. For they taught many, so they'd be better citizens and more useful to their states — as the Theban Epaminondas by the Pythagorean Lysis, the Syracusan Dion by Plato, and many by many; and we ourselves, whatever we brought to the republic — if we brought anything — approached it instructed by teachers and doctrine, equipped.\n156. Nor do only the living and present teach and instruct students: they achieve the same even after death, by the monuments of letters. For nothing concerning laws, morals, or the discipline of the republic has been left unwritten by those who could serve it — so they seem to have given their leisure to our business. So those very men devoted to the studies of doctrine and wisdom carry their understanding and prudence chiefly to human welfare; and for that reason it's better to speak copiously, provided wisely, than to think even most sharply without eloquence — for thought turns within itself, but eloquence embraces those joined to us in community.\n157. And as swarms of bees don't gather to build honeycombs, but since they're by nature gregarious, they build them — so men, and far more, gathered by nature, apply the sharpness of acting and thinking. And so unless that virtue, which consists in guarding men — that is, in the society of the human race — joins the knowledge of things, solitary knowledge seems empty and barren; and likewise greatness of spirit, far from community and human fellowship, is a kind of savagery and brutishness. So it comes to pass that the association and community of men outranks the pursuit of knowledge.\n158. Nor is what some say true — that because of the necessities of life, since we couldn't attain and accomplish what nature desired without others, therefore human community and society began; as if, if everything for food and living were supplied to us, as it were by a divine wand, as they say, then every best mind, laying aside all business, would give its whole self to knowledge and learning. Not so. He would flee solitude and seek a partner in study; then he would wish to teach, then to learn; then to hear, then to speak. Therefore every duty that serves the joining of men and the keeping of society is to be preferred to the duty contained in knowledge and science.\n159. That perhaps must be asked — whether this community, which is most fitted to nature, should always also be placed before moderation and modesty. I don't think so. There are certain things partly so foul, partly so atrocious, that even for the sake of saving his country the wise man would not do them. Posidonius collected very many of these; but certain things are so foul, so obscene, that they even seem shameful to say. These, then, he will not do for the republic's sake — nor would the republic, for its own sake, even wish them done. But this much has been gained: that no time can come when it would be in the republic's interest for the wise man to do any of those things.\n160. Wherefore this at least has been established: in choosing duties, that class of duties excels which is held by the society of men. For knowledge and prudence will follow the considered action; so it comes to pass that to act considerately is worth more than to think prudently. And this much, indeed, so far. The place itself has been laid open, so that in seeking duty it isn't hard to see what is to be preferred to each. In community itself, however, are the degrees of duties, from which it can be understood what is owed to each: first to the immortal gods, second to the country, third to parents — and then, by degrees, the rest.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-officiis-1/translations/trn_cicero_officiis_1_plain.txt"}],"retex_markdown_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-officiis-1/retex.md"}}