{"schema_version":1,"access":"public","rights":"Public-domain or compatibly licensed source editions; provenance is retained per record.","work":{"slug":"apology","title":"Apology","author":"Plato","tradition":"greek","language":"grc","genre":"philosophical dialogue","period":"c. 399 BCE","source_url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-greekLit/a065c359aab33c33bd17ddc2cac7d27fdc9cd870/data/tlg0059/tlg002/tlg0059.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml","original":{"text":"### Stephanus 17a\n\nὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δʼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε\n\n### Stephanus 17b\n\nὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων,\n\n### Stephanus 17c\n\nῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλʼ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου διʼ ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε\n\n### Stephanus 17d\n\nθαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ\n\n### Stephanus 18a\n\nἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.\nπρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς\n\n### Stephanus 18b\n\nὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω\n\n### Stephanus 18c\n\nποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ\n\n### Stephanus 18d\n\nὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον—οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τʼ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδʼ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 18e\n\nτοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.\nεἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον\n\n### Stephanus 19a\n\nὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.\nἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς\n\n### Stephanus 19b\n\nἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω\n\n### Stephanus 19c\n\nποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι— ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.\n\n### Stephanus 19d\n\nμάρτυρας δὲ αὖ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου—πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν— φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου, καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.\nἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδέ γʼ εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα\n\n### Stephanus 19e\n\nπράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τʼ εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος.τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τʼ ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους—οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι\n\n### Stephanus 20a\n\nτὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ὑεῖ— ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ ὑεῖ πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι ὃς\n\n### Stephanus 20b\n\nἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν, ἦν δʼ ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑέων κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς. τίς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς\n\n### Stephanus 20c\n\nἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.\nὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί\n\n### Stephanus 20d\n\nἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν· εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὗτοι δὲ τάχʼ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι\n\n### Stephanus 20e\n\nἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλʼ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδʼ ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος\n\n### Stephanus 21a\n\nἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφʼ ὅτι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.\n\n### Stephanus 21b\n\nσκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει· ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς\n\n### Stephanus 21c\n\nἐνταῦθα εἴπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δʼ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ—ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δʼ οὔ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δʼ οὔ.\n\n### Stephanus 21d\n\nἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δʼ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλον ᾖα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καί\n\n### Stephanus 21e\n\nμοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε, καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.\nμετὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ᾖα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιὼς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι—ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τούς τι\n\n### Stephanus 22a\n\nδοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι— δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν—ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ᾖα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν\n\n### Stephanus 22b\n\nδιθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἅ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵνʼ ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρʼ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν\n\n### Stephanus 22c\n\nἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες, καὶ ἅμα ᾐσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῇα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ᾧπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.\nτελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ᾖα· ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ\n\n### Stephanus 22d\n\nσυνῄδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γʼ ᾔδη ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλʼ ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν\n\n### Stephanus 22e\n\nἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.\nἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,\n\n### Stephanus 23a\n\nπολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 23b\n\nτῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλʼ ἐν\n\n### Stephanus 23c\n\nπενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.\nπρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες—οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων—αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα οἶμαι εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὑτοῖς,\n\n### Stephanus 23d\n\nκαὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλʼ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ οἴομαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν οἶμαι φιλότιμοι\n\n### Stephanus 23e\n\nὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ\n\n### Stephanus 24a\n\nτῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ οἷός τʼ εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδʼ ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια\n\n### Stephanus 24b\n\nταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἐάντε νῦν ἐάντε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.\nπερὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις\n\n### Stephanus 24c\n\nνομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.\nφησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι. καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ\n\n### Stephanus 24d\n\nπερὶ πλείστου ποιῇ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;\nἔγωγε.\nἴθι δή νυν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμέ, εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστιν. —ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλʼ εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ;\nοἱ νόμοι.\n\n### Stephanus 24e\n\nἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους;\nοὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί.\nπῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν;\nμάλιστα.\nπότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δʼ οὔ;\nἅπαντες.\nεὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δή; οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν\n\n### Stephanus 25a\n\nἢ οὔ;\nκαὶ οὗτοι.\nτί δέ, οἱ βουλευταί;\nκαὶ οἱ βουλευταί.\nἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;\nκἀκεῖνοι.\nπάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις;\nπάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.\nπολλήν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἦ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν\n\n### Stephanus 25b\n\nβελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τʼ ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ συνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζῴων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι\n\n### Stephanus 25c\n\nὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.\nἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω αὑτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;\nπάνυ γε.\n\n### Stephanus 25d\n\nἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθʼ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;\nοὐ δῆτα.\nφέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;\nἑκόντα ἔγωγε.\nτί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον\n\n### Stephanus 25e\n\nἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλʼ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω,\n\n### Stephanus 26a\n\nἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατʼ ἀμφότερα ψεύδῃ. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλʼ οὐ μαθήσεως.\nἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν ἤδη δῆλον\n\n### Stephanus 26b\n\nοὑγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω;\nπάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.\nπρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν\n\n### Stephanus 26c\n\nτουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς—καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ —οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους, ἢ παντάπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.\nταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς.\n\n### Stephanus 26d\n\nὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;\nμὰ Δίʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.\nἈναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε; καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρʼ ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς\n\n### Stephanus 26e\n\nἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα; ἀλλʼ, ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;\nοὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.\nἄπιστός γʼ εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι.\n\n### Stephanus 27a\n\nἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ ἆρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντίʼ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.\nσυνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ\n\n### Stephanus 27b\n\nκατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.\nἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔσθʼ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι·\n\n### Stephanus 27c\n\nἔσθʼ ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;\nοὐκ ἔστιν.\nὡς ὤνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῄς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτʼ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλʼ οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ. τοὺς δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 27d\n\nδαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ;\nπάνυ γε.\nοὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δʼ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ\n\n### Stephanus 27e\n\nἂν ἄτοπον εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε\n\n### Stephanus 28a\n\nδαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.\nἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλʼ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς\n\n### Stephanus 28b\n\nἄνδρας ᾕρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.\nἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἶτʼ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι\n\n### Stephanus 28c\n\nγὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ—αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθʼ Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος —ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον\n\n### Stephanus 28d\n\nδείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. ὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;\nοὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπʼ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες\n\n### Stephanus 28e\n\nἈθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον\n\n### Stephanus 29a\n\nἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότʼ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδʼ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δʼ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες\n\n### Stephanus 29b\n\nὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδʼ εἴ\n\n### Stephanus 29c\n\nμε νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ ὑεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, —εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλʼ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφʼ ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 29d\n\nἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ —εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα,\n\n### Stephanus 29e\n\nκαὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ἄπειμι, ἀλλʼ ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν,\n\n### Stephanus 30a\n\nφάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων\n\n### Stephanus 30b\n\nἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μή, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ\n\n### Stephanus 30c\n\nἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδʼ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.\nμὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλʼ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφʼ οἷς ἂν λέγω ἀλλʼ ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐφʼ οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐάν με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο—οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν\n\n### Stephanus 30d\n\nεἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὑτοσὶ νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτεινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ\n\n### Stephanus 30e\n\nθεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γάρ με ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν—προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος, οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον\n\n### Stephanus 31a\n\nοὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δʼ ἴσως τάχʼ ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δʼ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε\n\n### Stephanus 31b\n\nἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ πάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι\n\n### Stephanus 31c\n\nπαρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.\nἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ\n\n### Stephanus 31d\n\nδαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν, καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη\n\n### Stephanus 31e\n\nοὐδὲν οὔτʼ ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ\n\n### Stephanus 32a\n\nἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.\nμεγάλα δʼ ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους ἀλλʼ ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μοι τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν\n\n### Stephanus 32b\n\nπώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἁθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότʼ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ\n\n### Stephanus 32c\n\nνόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθʼ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι, οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ\n\n### Stephanus 32d\n\nοὐ λόγῳ ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδʼ ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ\n\n### Stephanus 32e\n\nτούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.\nἆρʼ οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ὥσπερ χρὴ τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος\n\n### Stephanus 33a\n\nἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὓς δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτʼ ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι\n\n### Stephanus 33b\n\nμὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρʼ ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.\nἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετʼ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν\n\n### Stephanus 33c\n\nχρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δʼ οὔ. ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων\n\n### Stephanus 33d\n\nτοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι συνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης\n\n### Stephanus 33e\n\nκαὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι δʼ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—καὶ Παράλιος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 34a\n\nἈδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ\n\n### Stephanus 34b\n\nἌνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχʼ ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι συνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;\nεἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμʼ ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δʼ ἄν τις\n\n### Stephanus 34c\n\nὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῒ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὑτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχʼ ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετʼ\n\n### Stephanus 34d\n\nὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δʼ οὖν—ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδʼ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ ὑεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες\n\n### Stephanus 34e\n\nἈθηναῖοι, οὐδʼ ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δʼ οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτʼ οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτʼ οὖν ψεῦδος, ἀλλʼ οὖν δεδογμένον\n\n### Stephanus 35a\n\nγέ ἐστί τῳ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ᾑτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἵουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστʼ ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων\n\n### Stephanus 35b\n\nὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁπῃοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτʼ, ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.\nχωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ\n\n### Stephanus 35c\n\nεἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε\n\n### Stephanus 35d\n\nδίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουΐ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.\n\n### Stephanus 35e\n\nτὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ\n\n### Stephanus 36a\n\nτῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾠόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρʼ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε\n\n### Stephanus 36b\n\nχιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.\nτιμᾶται δʼ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τ τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλʼ ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν\n\n### Stephanus 36c\n\nῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτʼ ἰόντα σῴζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ᾖα οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ᾖα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν\n\n### Stephanus 36d\n\nαὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 36e\n\nεἶναι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου\n\n### Stephanus 37a\n\nτιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.\nἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα. ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν\n\n### Stephanus 37b\n\nμόνον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτʼ εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτʼ εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἕλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;\n\n### Stephanus 37c\n\nκαὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἕνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσω; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτείσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μεντἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς\n\n### Stephanus 37d\n\nδιατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδʼ ὅτι ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους·\n\n### Stephanus 37e\n\nἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες δὲ καὶ οἰκεῖοι διʼ αὐτοὺς τούτους.\nἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον\n\n### Stephanus 38a\n\nἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάντʼ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δʼ ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ\n\n### Stephanus 38b\n\nοὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δʼ ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι.\nΠλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.\n\n### Stephanus 38c\n\nοὐ πολλοῦ γʼ ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν—φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μή εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν— εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ\n\n### Stephanus 38d\n\nπρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλʼ ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷʼ ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν— θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ\n\n### Stephanus 38e\n\nλέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλʼ οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτʼ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτʼ ἐμὲ οὔτʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ\n\n### Stephanus 39a\n\nτοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφʼ ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτʼ ᾖ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν·\n\n### Stephanus 39b\n\nθᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δʼ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών, οὗτοι δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.\n\n### Stephanus 39c\n\nτὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμῳδῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς\n\n### Stephanus 39d\n\nοἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθʼ αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν ἀλλʼ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.\n\n### Stephanus 39e\n\nτοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῒ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν\n\n### Stephanus 40a\n\nγὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι συμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι· ἐμοὶ δὲ\n\n### Stephanus 40b\n\nοὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτʼ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτʼ ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν,\n\n### Stephanus 40c\n\nὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.\nἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀλλʼ\n\n### Stephanus 40d\n\nοἷον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδʼ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος—ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους\n\n### Stephanus 40e\n\nἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας—εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δʼ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις\n\n### Stephanus 41a\n\nἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτʼ ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ\n\n### Stephanus 41b\n\nἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη—καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστιν δʼ οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δʼ ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα\n\n### Stephanus 41c\n\nτὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.\nἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι\n\n### Stephanus 41d\n\nοὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλʼ οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν·\n\n### Stephanus 41e\n\nτοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς ὑεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν\n\n### Stephanus 42a\n\nταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/apology/original.txt"},"translations":[{"id":"trn_apology_mouseia","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"curated","note":"Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete Ancient Greek text across all 125 Stephanus sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, Socratic voice, legal clarity, and structure.","text":"### Stephanus 17a\n\nWhat effect my accusers have had upon you, men of Athens, I do not know. For my own part, I was almost made to forget who I was by them, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, to put it plainly, scarcely a word they have said is true. But of all the many falsehoods they told, the one that astonished me most was their warning that you must take care not to be deceived by me,\n\n### Stephanus 17b\n\nsince I am a formidable speaker. Their utter lack of shame in knowing that I would at once refute them by the facts, when I proved myself not in the least a formidable speaker—this seemed to me the most shameless thing about them, unless, perhaps, by a formidable speaker they mean one who speaks the truth. For if that is what they mean, I would admit that I am an orator, though not after their fashion. They, then, as I say, have spoken little or no truth; but from me you shall hear the whole truth—not, by Zeus, men of Athens, speeches adorned with elegant phrases, like theirs,\n\n### Stephanus 17c\n\nor embellished with carefully chosen words and expressions. No, you shall hear things spoken simply, in whatever words occur to me—for I trust that what I say is just—and let none of you expect anything else. For surely, gentlemen, it would not become a man of my age to come before you like a youngster fashioning elaborate speeches. And there is one thing, men of Athens, that I earnestly ask and beg of you: if you hear me making my defense in the same language I have been accustomed to use in the marketplace, at the bankers’ tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not\n\n### Stephanus 17d\n\nbe surprised or raise an uproar on that account. The fact is this: I have now come before a court of law for the first time, though I am seventy years old; so I am quite simply a stranger to the manner of speaking used here. If, then, I were in fact a foreigner, you would surely pardon me if I spoke in the accent and manner\n\n### Stephanus 18a\n\nin which I had been brought up. And so now I ask of you what I believe to be just: disregard my manner of speaking—it may be worse, or it may be better—and consider this alone, fixing your attention upon it: whether what I say is just or not. For that is the virtue of a judge, while the virtue of an orator is to speak the truth.\nFirst, then, men of Athens, I am entitled to defend myself against the earliest false accusations brought against me and my earliest accusers, and afterward against the later accusations and the later\n\n### Stephanus 18b\n\naccusers. For many have been accusing me before you for a long time now, for many years, without saying anything true; and I fear them more than Anytus and his associates, formidable though these men are. But those others are more formidable, gentlemen: they took hold of most of you from childhood and persuaded you, accusing me with no more truth than this—that there is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a thinker about things in the heavens, one who has investigated everything beneath the earth, and one who makes the weaker argument the stronger.\n\n### Stephanus 18c\n\nThese men, men of Athens, who spread this report abroad, are my formidable accusers; for those who hear them suppose that men who investigate such matters do not even believe in the gods. Furthermore, these accusers are numerous, and they have been making their accusations for a long time; and they spoke to you at an age when you were most ready to believe them, when some of you were children and youths, prosecuting their case quite literally in the absence of the accused, with no one making a defense. And what is most unreasonable of all is that it is not even possible to know and state their\n\n### Stephanus 18d\n\nnames, unless one of them happens to be a comic poet. But all those who, moved by envy and slander, persuaded you—and some who, having themselves been persuaded, went on to persuade others—all these are the most difficult to deal with. For it is impossible to summon any of them here or cross-examine anyone; instead, in making my defense, I must quite literally fight with shadows and cross-examine with no one there to answer. You must therefore recognize, as I say, that I have had two sets of accusers: one consisting of those who have accused me just now, and another consisting of those long ago\n\n### Stephanus 18e\n\nof whom I speak; and you must agree that I ought first to defend myself against the latter. For you heard them making their accusations before these men, and far more often than you have heard these later accusers.\nVery well, then. I must make my defense, men of Athens, and attempt\n\n### Stephanus 19a\n\nin so short a time to remove from your minds the slander that you have held there for so long. I would wish this to come about, if it is in any way better for both you and me, and I would wish to accomplish something by my defense. But I think it is difficult, and I am well aware of the nature of the task. Nevertheless, let the matter proceed as the god may favor; I must obey the law and make my defense.\nLet us therefore take up the matter from the beginning: what is the accusation from which\n\n### Stephanus 19b\n\nthe slander against me arose, and in reliance upon which Meletus brought this indictment against me? Very well. What, then, did my slanderers say in slandering me? I must read out their sworn charge, as though they were formal accusers: “Socrates commits an injustice and meddles in things beyond his concern by investigating what is beneath the earth and in the heavens, and by making the weaker argument the stronger,\n\n### Stephanus 19c\n\nand by teaching these same things to others.” Something of that kind is their charge. For you yourselves saw such things in Aristophanes’ comedy: a certain Socrates carried about on the stage, claiming that he walks in the air and babbling a great deal of other nonsense about matters of which I understand nothing whatsoever, great or small. I do not say this to disparage knowledge of that sort, if anyone is wise in such matters—may I never have to defend myself against so many charges from Meletus—but the fact is, men of Athens, that I have no part in any of these things.\n\n### Stephanus 19d\n\nAnd I offer most of you yourselves as witnesses. I ask all of you who have ever heard me conversing—and there are many of you who have—to instruct and inform one another. Tell one another whether any of you has ever heard me discussing such matters, either at length or briefly; and from this you will recognize that the other things the multitude says about me are of the same sort.\nBut the truth is that none of these claims is true. Nor, if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to educate people and charge money\n\n### Stephanus 19e\n\nfor it, is that true either. Though this, too, seems to me an admirable thing, if someone is capable of educating people, as Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gentlemen, is capable of going into any city and persuading the young men—who are free to associate without payment with whichever of their fellow citizens they choose—to leave those associations and associate with them instead, paying them money and feeling grateful besides.\n\n### Stephanus 20a\n\nIndeed, there is another wise man here from Paros whose presence in the city I happened to learn of. For I chanced to meet a man who has paid more money to sophists than all other men put together—Callias, the son of Hipponicus. Since he has two sons, I asked him, “Callias,” I said, “if your two sons had been born colts or calves, we would know how to find and hire a trainer for them, one who\n\n### Stephanus 20b\n\nwould make them fine and good in the excellence proper to them; and he would be some expert in horses or in farming. But now, since they are human beings, whom do you have in mind to take charge of them? Who has knowledge of the excellence proper to a human being and a citizen? I assume you have considered the matter, since you have sons. Is there such a person,” I asked, “or not?” “Certainly,” he said. “Who is he,” I asked, “where does he come from, and how much does he charge for his teaching?” “Evenus,” he replied, “Socrates—Evenus of Paros, for five minas.” And I counted Evenus blessed, if he truly\n\n### Stephanus 20c\n\npossesses this art and teaches it for so moderate a fee. I myself would certainly take pride and glory in it if I possessed such knowledge; but I do not possess it, men of Athens.\nPerhaps, then, one of you might reply: “But Socrates, what is your occupation? Where have these slanders against you come from? Surely, if you had not been doing something more unusual than other men, so great a reputation and so much talk would never have arisen, unless you were doing something different from most people. Tell us, then, what\n\n### Stephanus 20d\n\nit is, so that we may not form hasty judgments about you.” Whoever speaks in this way seems to me to speak justly, and I will try to show you what it is that has given rise both to my reputation and to the slander against me. Listen, then. Perhaps some of you will think I am joking; but be well assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, men of Athens, have acquired this reputation for no other reason than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is that? Perhaps it is merely human wisdom; for it seems that I really am wise in this respect. But those men of whom I was just\n\n### Stephanus 20e\n\nspeaking may perhaps be wise in some wisdom greater than human; otherwise, I do not know what to say. For I certainly do not possess it, and whoever says that I do is lying and speaks only to slander me. And now, men of Athens, do not raise an uproar, even if I seem to you to be saying something boastful. For the account I shall give is not my own; rather, I shall refer you to a speaker whose authority you will trust. As a witness to my wisdom—whether I possess any, and what sort it is—I shall present to you the god at Delphi. You surely know Chaerephon. He\n\n### Stephanus 21a\n\nwas my companion from his youth, and a companion of your democratic party as well; he shared your recent exile and returned with you. And you know what sort of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous he was in whatever he undertook. Once, when he went to Delphi, he even dared to ask the oracle this question—and, gentlemen, as I said, do not raise an uproar—he asked whether anyone was wiser than I. The Pythian priestess replied that no one was wiser. His brother here will testify to these things before you, since Chaerephon himself is dead.\n\n### Stephanus 21b\n\nConsider, then, why I am telling you this; for I am about to explain to you where the slander against me arose. When I heard these things, I reflected in this way: “What in the world does the god mean, and what is his riddle? For I am conscious of possessing no wisdom, great or small. What, then, can he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? Surely he cannot be lying; that would not be lawful for him.” For a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant. Then, with great reluctance, I turned to an inquiry into the matter, in some such manner as this. I went to one of those reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should\n\n### Stephanus 21c\n\nrefute the oracle and declare to the prophecy, “This man is wiser than I am, though you said that I was.” So I examined this man—I have no need to mention his name; he was one of our politicians, and it was while examining him and conversing with him that I had the following experience, men of Athens. It seemed to me that this man was thought wise by many other people, and most of all by himself, but that he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but was not.\n\n### Stephanus 21d\n\nAs a result, I became hateful both to him and to many of those present. But as I went away, I reasoned with myself: “I am wiser than this man. For it may well be that neither of us knows anything noble and good; but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, just as I do not know, do not think that I know. At any rate, I appear to be wiser than he in this one small respect: that what I do not know, I do not think I know.” From there I went to another of those reputed to be wiser than the first, and\n\n### Stephanus 21e\n\nI formed the very same judgment; and there too I became hateful both to him and to many others.\n\nAfter that I proceeded from one man to another. I perceived, with distress and alarm, that I was making myself hated; nevertheless, it seemed necessary to regard the god’s command as of the highest importance. So, in seeking to discover what the oracle meant, I had to go to everyone who seemed to know anything.\n\n### Stephanus 22a\n\nAnd by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must tell you the truth—I truly had an experience of this sort: as I investigated in accordance with the god, those held in the highest esteem seemed to me to be, with few exceptions, the most deficient, while others, reputed to be inferior, seemed to be more sensible men. I must describe to you my wandering, as though I were performing certain labors, so that the oracle might prove irrefutable to me. After the politicians, I went to the poets—the writers of tragedies and dithyrambs and the\n\n### Stephanus 22b\n\nother poets—expecting that there I should catch myself in the very act of being more ignorant than they. So I would take up those of their poems that seemed to me to have been most carefully composed, and ask them what they meant, so that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, gentlemen, to tell you the truth; nevertheless, it must be told. Almost everyone present, so to speak, could have discussed the poems better than the men who had composed them. Thus I soon discovered this about the poets as well: they did not compose what they composed through wisdom,\n\n### Stephanus 22c\n\nbut through a certain natural gift and under divine inspiration, like prophets and those who deliver oracles; for these too say many fine things, but understand nothing of what they say. The poets, I saw, had undergone something of the same sort. At the same time, I perceived that because of their poetry they thought themselves the wisest of men in other matters as well, though they were not. So I left them too, believing that I had the same advantage over them as I had over the politicians.\n\nFinally, then, I went to the craftsmen; for I was conscious that I myself knew practically nothing, but I knew that I should find them possessed of much fine knowledge.\n\n### Stephanus 22d\n\nAnd in this I was not mistaken: they knew things I did not know, and in that respect they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets. Because each of them practiced his craft well, each claimed to be exceedingly wise in the greatest matters as well; and this error of theirs obscured the wisdom they did possess.\n\n### Stephanus 22e\n\nSo, on behalf of the oracle, I asked myself whether I would prefer to remain as I am, possessing neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to possess both as they do. I answered myself and the oracle that it was better for me to remain as I am.\n\nFrom this examination, then, men of Athens,\n\n### Stephanus 23a\n\nmany hatreds have arisen against me, and of the most bitter and burdensome kind, so that many slanders have sprung from them, and I have acquired this reputation of being wise. For on each occasion those present suppose that I myself am wise in the matters in which I expose another man’s ignorance. But the truth is likely this, gentlemen: it is the god who is wise, and in this oracle he means that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he appears to mention this man Socrates, but merely to have made use\n\n### Stephanus 23b\n\nof my name, making me an example, as if he were to say: “That one among you, human beings, is wisest who, like Socrates, has recognized that in truth he is worth nothing where wisdom is concerned.” And so even now I continue to go about searching and examining, in obedience to the god, any citizen or foreigner whom I think wise; and whenever he does not seem so to me, I come to the god’s aid by showing that the man is not wise. Because of this occupation, I have had no leisure to accomplish anything worth mentioning either in public affairs or in my own private business, but I live in\n\n### Stephanus 23c\n\nutter poverty because of my service to the god.\n\nBesides this, the young men who follow me of their own accord—those who have the most leisure, the sons of the wealthiest families—take pleasure in hearing people examined. They themselves often imitate me and then attempt to examine others; and afterward, I suppose, they find a great abundance of people who think they know something but know little or nothing. Consequently, those whom they examine become angry with me rather than with themselves,\n\n### Stephanus 23d\n\nand say that there is a certain Socrates, a most abominable man, who corrupts the young. And whenever someone asks them what he does or what he teaches to corrupt them, they have nothing to say, because they do not know. But so that they may not appear at a loss, they repeat the accusations readily available against all who pursue philosophy: that he studies things in the heavens and beneath the earth, does not acknowledge the gods, and makes the weaker argument the stronger. For I imagine they would be unwilling to tell the truth: that they are plainly exposed as pretending to know when they know nothing. And so, being, I suppose, ambitious,\n\n### Stephanus 23e\n\nvehement, and numerous, and speaking about me with determination and persuasiveness, they have filled your ears for a long time now with their fierce slanders. From among them Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon have attacked me: Meletus aggrieved on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and\n\n### Stephanus 24a\n\npoliticians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. And so, as I said at the beginning, I should be amazed if I were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a slander that has grown so great. This, men of Athens, is the truth for you. I speak without concealing or holding back anything, great or small. And yet I know perfectly well that this very frankness makes me hated—which is also proof that I speak the truth, that this is indeed the slander against me, and that these are its causes.\n\n### Stephanus 24b\n\nWhether you investigate the matter now or later, this is what you will find.\n\nLet this, then, be a sufficient defense before you against the charges brought by my first accusers. Next I shall try to defend myself against the good and patriotic Meletus, as he calls himself, and against the later accusers. Once again, then, as though these were a different set of accusers, let us take up their sworn indictment in turn. It runs approximately as follows: Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not acknowledging the gods whom the city\n\n### Stephanus 24c\n\nacknowledges, but other, new divinities instead. Such is the charge. Let us examine each part of this charge separately.\n\nHe says, then, that I am guilty of corrupting the young. But I, men of Athens, say that Meletus is guilty of treating serious matters as a joke, lightly bringing men to trial and pretending to be earnest and concerned about matters for which he has never cared in the least. That this is so, I shall try to show you as well. Come here, Meletus, and tell me: do you not consider it\n\n### Stephanus 24d\n\nof the highest importance that the younger men should be as good as possible?\n\nI do.\n\nCome then, tell these gentlemen who makes them better. Clearly you know, since you care about it. For you claim to have discovered the man who corrupts them—me—and you bring me before these men and accuse me. Come now, identify the man who makes them better, and reveal to them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothing to say? And does this not seem shameful to you, and sufficient proof of precisely what I say: that you have never cared at all? But tell us, my good man, who makes them better?\n\nThe laws.\n\n### Stephanus 24e\n\nBut that is not what I am asking, my excellent fellow. I am asking what person—someone who, first of all, knows this very thing, the laws.\n\nThese men, Socrates—the jurors.\n\nWhat are you saying, Meletus? Are these men capable of educating the young and making them better?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAll of them, or some of them but not others?\n\nAll of them.\n\nWell said, by Hera! You have found a great abundance of benefactors. And what of the audience here? Do they make the young better\n\n### Stephanus 25a\n\nor not?\n\nThey do too.\n\nAnd what of the members of the Council?\n\nThe members of the Council as well.\n\nBut then, Meletus, surely those in the Assembly—the Assemblymen—do not corrupt the young? Or do they too, all of them, make them better?\n\nThey do too.\n\nThen all Athenians, it seems, make them fine and good except me, while I alone corrupt them. Is that what you mean?\n\nThat is exactly what I mean.\n\nYou have condemned me to great misfortune indeed. Now answer me: does the same seem to you to hold true in the case of horses—that some\n\n### Stephanus 25b\n\nwith all mankind making them better and only one person corrupting them? Or is the very opposite true: that one person, or a very few—the horse trainers—are able to improve them, while most people, if they associate with horses and make use of them, corrupt them? Is that not how matters stand, Meletus, with horses and with every other kind of animal? Surely it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or admit it. For the young would indeed enjoy extraordinary good fortune if only one person corrupted them, while all the others\n\n### Stephanus 25c\n\nbenefited them. But in fact, Meletus, you have shown well enough that you have never given any thought at all to the young, and you plainly reveal your own indifference: you have cared nothing about the matters for which you are bringing me to trial.\n\nAnd tell us this as well, Meletus, in Zeus’s name: is it better to live among good citizens or bad ones? Come, my good man, answer; I am asking you nothing difficult. Do not bad people always do some harm to those who are nearest to them, while good people do them some good?\n\nCertainly.\n\n### Stephanus 25d\n\nIs there anyone, then, who wishes to be harmed rather than benefited by those with whom he associates? Answer, my good man; the law requires you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be harmed?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nCome, then: are you bringing me here on the charge that I corrupt the young and make them worse deliberately, or unintentionally?\n\nDeliberately, I say.\n\nWhat then, Meletus? Are you, at your age, so much wiser than I am at mine that you have recognized that bad people always do some harm to those nearest\n\n### Stephanus 25e\n\nto them, while good people do them good, whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this: that if I make one of my associates wicked, I shall run the risk of suffering some harm at his hands? And so, according to you, I deliberately commit this very great evil? I do not believe you, Meletus, and I think no other human being does either. No: either I do not corrupt them, or, if I do,\n\n### Stephanus 26a\n\nI do so unintentionally; and thus you are lying in either case. But if I corrupt them unintentionally, the law does not require that a man be brought here for such errors; it requires that one take him aside privately, teach him, and admonish him. For it is clear that once I have learned better, I shall cease doing what I do unintentionally. But you avoided associating with me and teaching me, and refused to do so; instead you bring me here, where the law requires men to be brought who need punishment, not instruction.\n\nBut indeed, men of Athens, what I was saying is already clear:\n\n### Stephanus 26b\n\nMeletus has never cared about these matters in the least. Nevertheless, tell us, Meletus: how do you say that I corrupt the young? Is it not plainly, according to the indictment you filed, by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other, new spiritual things? Is this not what you say I teach, and thereby corrupt them?\n\nYes, most emphatically, that is exactly what I say.\n\nThen, Meletus, by those very gods who are now the subject of our argument, explain yourself still more clearly, both to me and to these gentlemen\n\n### Stephanus 26c\n\nhere. For I cannot determine whether you mean that I teach people to believe that certain gods exist—in which case I myself do believe that gods exist, am not altogether an atheist, and do no wrong in that respect—though they are not the same gods as those recognized by the city, but others, and this difference is what you charge against me; or whether you say that I myself believe in no gods at all and teach others the same.\n\nI say that you do not believe in gods at all.\n\n### Stephanus 26d\n\nExtraordinary Meletus, why do you say this? Then I do not even believe, as other men do, that the sun and moon are gods?\n\nNo, by Zeus, gentlemen of the jury; for he says that the sun is stone and the moon earth.\n\nDo you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus? Do you have so little regard for these gentlemen, and do you suppose them so ignorant of books that they do not know that the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these doctrines? And are the young really learning these things from me, when they can sometimes buy them in the orchestra for a drachma at most\n\n### Stephanus 26e\n\nand then laugh at Socrates if he claims they are his own—especially when the doctrines themselves are so outlandish? But in Zeus’s name, is that truly what you think of me? Do I believe that no god exists?\n\nNo, by Zeus, you do not—not in the least.\n\nYou are not to be believed, Meletus—not even, it seems to me, by yourself. For this man, men of Athens, appears to me thoroughly insolent and undisciplined, and to have filed this indictment simply out of a kind of insolence, lack of restraint, and youthful rashness.\n\n### Stephanus 27a\n\nFor he seems to have composed a riddle in order to test me: “Will the wise Socrates discover that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and everyone else who hears me?” For he seems to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as though he had said: “Socrates does wrong by not believing in gods, but by believing in gods.” Yet that is the work of a man at play.\n\nConsider with me, gentlemen, how he seems to me to be saying this; and you, Meletus, answer us. And you gentlemen, remember what I asked of you at the beginning: do not make an uproar if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.\n\n### Stephanus 27b\n\nIs there any human being, Meletus, who believes that human affairs exist but does not believe that human beings exist? Let him answer, gentlemen, and do not keep raising one disturbance after another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses but does believe in equestrian matters? Or who does not believe that flute players exist but does believe in matters of flute playing? There is no such person, excellent sir. Since you are unwilling to answer, I shall tell you, and these gentlemen too. But at least answer the next question:\n\n### Stephanus 27c\n\nIs there anyone who believes that spiritual things exist but does not believe in spirits?\n\nThere is not.\n\nHow helpful of you to answer at last, though only under compulsion from these gentlemen. So you say that I both believe in and teach spiritual things, whether new or old; at any rate, according to your statement, I believe in spiritual things, and you have sworn to this in your formal accusation. But if I believe in spiritual things, then surely it is absolutely necessary that I also believe in spirits. Is that not so? It is so; for since you do not answer, I take you to concede it. And do we not consider\n\n### Stephanus 27d\n\nspirits to be either gods or children of gods? Do you agree, or not?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen if I believe in spirits, as you say I do, and if spirits are a kind of god, this would be precisely what I say you were hinting at in your riddle and joking about: you say that I do not believe in gods and then, once again, that I do believe in gods, since I believe in spirits. But if, on the other hand, spirits are illegitimate children of gods, born of nymphs or of certain others who are said to be their mothers, what human being could believe that children of gods exist, but not gods? For that would be just as\n\n### Stephanus 27e\n\nabsurd as believing in the offspring of horses or donkeys—the mules—but not believing that horses and donkeys exist. No, Meletus, there is no possible explanation except that you filed this indictment either to test us or because you were at a loss to find any genuine wrongdoing with which to charge me. But there is no conceivable way you could persuade any human being with even a little sense that it is not for the same person to believe both in spiritual and divine things, and, conversely, for the same person to believe in neither\n\n### Stephanus 28a\n\nspirits, nor gods, nor heroes.\n\nBut indeed, men of Athens, that I am not guilty under Meletus’s indictment seems to me to require no lengthy defense; what has been said is sufficient. Yet what I said earlier—that I have incurred great hostility, and from many people—you may be certain is true. And this is what will convict me, if I am convicted: not Meletus or Anytus, but the slander and envy of the many. These have already convicted many other good\n\n### Stephanus 28b\n\nmen, and I think they will continue to do so. There is no danger that they will stop with me.\n\nPerhaps someone might say: “Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have pursued a way of life that now puts you in danger of death?” But I should answer him justly: “You do not speak well, sir, if you think that a man worth even a little should calculate the danger of living or dying, instead of considering one thing alone whenever he acts: whether what he is doing is just or unjust, and the work of a good man or a bad one.” For by your account, all those demigods who died at Troy would have been worthless,\n\n### Stephanus 28c\n\nthe others as well as the son of Thetis, who so despised danger in comparison with enduring any disgrace that, when he was eager to kill Hector, his mother, being a goddess, said to him, as I believe, something like this: “My son, if you avenge the murder of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die—for straightway after Hector,” she says, “your death awaits you.” But when he heard this, he made light of death and danger, fearing far more\n\n### Stephanus 28d\n\nto live as a coward and fail to avenge his friends. “Let me die at once,” he says, “after exacting justice from the wrongdoer, so that I may not remain here, a laughingstock beside the curved ships, a burden upon the earth.” Do you imagine that he gave any thought to death and danger?\n\nFor this is how matters truly stand, men of Athens: wherever a man stations himself because he considers it best, or wherever he is stationed by his commander, there, in my judgment, he must remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before dishonor. I should therefore have acted terribly, men\n\n### Stephanus 28e\n\nof Athens, if, when the commanders whom you elected to command me assigned me my post at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, I remained where they stationed me, as any other man would, and ran the risk of death, but when the god assigned me my post—as I believed and understood that he had—requiring me to live philosophizing and examining myself and others, I then abandoned my station through fear of death\n\n### Stephanus 29a\n\nor of anything else whatsoever. That would indeed be terrible, and then someone might truly and justly bring me to trial on the charge that I do not believe in gods, since I would be disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing other than to seem wise without being so; it is to seem to know what one does not know. No one knows death, or even whether it may in fact be the greatest of all blessings for a human being, yet people fear it as though they knew perfectly well.\n\n### Stephanus 29b\n\nthat it is the greatest of evils. And yet how is this not that most disgraceful ignorance—the belief that one knows what one does not know? In this respect, gentlemen, I may perhaps differ from most people; and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in any respect, it would be in this: that since I do not know enough about the things in Hades, I also do not suppose that I know. But I do know that to commit injustice and to disobey one’s superior, whether god or man, is evil and shameful. Therefore, before evils that I know to be evils, I shall never fear or flee from things that I do not know to be evils and that may, for all I know, actually be good. And so, not even if\n\n### Stephanus 29c\n\nyou were now to acquit me, refusing to believe Anytus, who said that either I should never have been brought into court in the first place, or, once I had been brought here, it was impossible not to put me to death—telling you that if I escaped, your sons would at once practice what Socrates teaches and would all be utterly corrupted—if, in answer to this, you were to say to me, “Socrates, this time we shall not listen to Anytus, but shall acquit you, on this condition, however: that you no longer spend your time in this inquiry or practice philosophy; and if\n\n### Stephanus 29d\n\nyou are caught doing this again, you shall die”—if, then, as I said, you were to acquit me on these terms, I would tell you: “Gentlemen of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you; and so long as I draw breath and am able, I shall never cease practicing philosophy, exhorting you, and showing the truth to any one of you whom I happen to meet, saying, as I am accustomed to say: ‘My good sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city, the one most renowned for wisdom and power; are you not ashamed to care for money, that you may possess as much as possible,\n\n### Stephanus 29e\n\nand for reputation and honor, while you neither care nor give thought to wisdom and truth and to making your soul as good as it can be?’” And if any one of you disputes this and claims that he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I leave him; rather, I shall question him, examine him, and put him to the test. And if he does not seem to me to possess virtue,\n\n### Stephanus 30a\n\nthough he claims that he does, I shall reproach him for attaching the least value to the things of greatest worth and greater value to inferior things. I shall do this to anyone I meet, young or old, foreigner or fellow citizen, but especially to my fellow citizens, since you are nearer to me by birth. For this, you may be sure, is what the god commands; and I believe that no greater good has ever come to you in this city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else but persuading you, young and old alike, not to care for your bodies\n\n### Stephanus 30b\n\nor your money before, or so intensely as, you care for your soul, that it may become as good as possible, telling you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue come money and all the other good things enjoyed by human beings, both privately and publicly. If, then, by saying these things I corrupt the young, these things must be harmful; but if anyone says that I teach anything other than these things, he is talking nonsense. In view of this, I would say, gentlemen of Athens, whether you listen to Anytus or not, and whether you acquit me or not, understand that I shall not\n\n### Stephanus 30c\n\nact otherwise, even if I must die many times over.\n\nDo not make an uproar, gentlemen of Athens, but abide by the request I made of you: do not shout at what I say, but listen. For I believe that listening will benefit you. I am now going to tell you certain other things at which you may perhaps cry out; but by no means do so. Be well assured that if you put me to death, being the sort of man I say I am, you will do greater harm not to me but to yourselves. For neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me at all—nor could they—for I do not believe it is permitted\n\n### Stephanus 30d\n\nfor a better man to be harmed by a worse one. He might perhaps kill me, or banish me, or deprive me of civic rights. He and perhaps someone else may regard these things as great evils, but I do not. I regard it as a far greater evil to do what this man is now doing: to attempt to put a man to death unjustly. And so, gentlemen of Athens, I am now far from making my defense for my own sake, as someone might suppose; I am making it for yours, so that you may not commit an offense against the god’s\n\n### Stephanus 30e\n\ngift to you by condemning me. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another man like me, one who—though it may sound rather ridiculous—is quite literally fastened by the god to the city as though to a great and noble horse that has grown sluggish because of its size and needs to be roused by a gadfly. It is as such a man, I believe, that the god has fastened me to the city: I never cease, the whole day long, to rouse, persuade, and reproach each one of you,\n\n### Stephanus 31a\n\nsettling beside you everywhere. Another man like this will not easily arise among you, gentlemen; but if you listen to me, you will spare me. Yet perhaps, annoyed like drowsy people awakened from sleep, you may strike at me and, persuaded by Anytus, easily put me to death; then you might spend the rest of your lives asleep, unless the god, in his care for you, should send someone else upon you. That I am in fact the sort of man given to the city by the god, you may understand from this:\n\n### Stephanus 31b\n\nit does not seem human that I should have neglected all my own affairs and endured the neglect of my household for so many years, while always attending to yours, approaching each of you privately like a father or an elder brother and persuading you to care for virtue. If I profited in any way from doing this, and offered these exhortations in return for pay, there would be some explanation for my conduct. But as you yourselves can plainly see, my accusers, though they have accused me of everything else with such shamelessness, have not been able to carry their shamelessness so far\n\n### Stephanus 31c\n\nas to produce a witness claiming that I ever demanded or asked anyone for a fee. For I believe that I can produce a sufficient witness that I speak the truth: my poverty.\n\nPerhaps, then, it may seem strange that I go about offering this advice privately and interfering in other people’s affairs, yet do not venture to come before your Assembly and advise the city publicly. The reason is something you have often heard me say in many places: that something divine and\n\n### Stephanus 31d\n\nspiritual comes to me, the very thing that Meletus made sport of in his indictment. This has been with me since childhood: a kind of voice that comes to me and, whenever it comes, always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never urges me forward. This is what opposes my taking part in politics, and it seems to me entirely right that it should oppose me. For you may be sure, gentlemen of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in political affairs, I would long ago have perished and would have benefited neither you\n\n### Stephanus 31e\n\nnor myself in any way. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth: no human being will survive if he genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and prevents the many unjust and unlawful things that occur in the city. Rather,\n\n### Stephanus 32a\n\nanyone who truly fights for justice must, if he is to survive even a short time, act as a private citizen and not hold public office.\n\nI shall offer you compelling evidence of this—not words, but what you value: deeds. Listen, then, to what has happened to me, so that you may know that I would never yield to anyone against what is just out of fear of death, and that by refusing to yield I would be willing even to perish. What I shall tell you is commonplace courtroom talk, but it is true. Gentlemen of Athens, I have never held any other public office\n\n### Stephanus 32b\n\nin the city, but I did serve on the Council. It happened that my tribe, Antiochis, held the presidency when you decided to try collectively the ten generals who had failed to recover the men lost in the naval battle—an illegal procedure, as all of you came to recognize afterward. At that time I alone among the presiding officers opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. Though the orators were ready to denounce and arrest me, and though you were shouting and ordering them to do so, I thought that I must take my stand with\n\n### Stephanus 32c\n\nthe law and justice and face the danger, rather than join you when you were resolving to act unjustly, out of fear of imprisonment or death. This happened while the city was still under democracy. But when the oligarchy came to power, the Thirty in turn summoned me and four others to the Tholos and ordered us to bring Leon of Salamis from Salamis so that he might be put to death. They gave many such orders to many others, wishing to implicate as many people as possible in their crimes. On that occasion, however, I\n\n### Stephanus 32d\n\nshowed again, not in word but in deed, that death is something I care not the slightest about—if it is not too blunt to say so—but that my entire concern is not to do anything unjust or impious. For that government, powerful as it was, did not terrify me into doing an unjust deed. When we came out of the Tholos, the other four went off to Salamis and brought Leon back, while I went home. And I might perhaps have been put to death for this, if the government had not soon afterward been overthrown. And\n\n### Stephanus 32e\n\nyou will have many witnesses to these events.\n\nDo you suppose, then, that I would have survived all these years if I had taken part in public affairs and, acting as a good man should, had come to the aid of justice and regarded that, as one ought, as the matter of highest importance? Far from it, gentlemen of Athens; nor would any other\n\n### Stephanus 33a\n\nhuman being. But throughout my whole life, if I have ever performed any public action, I shall be found to have been such a man; and in private life I have been the very same, never conceding anything contrary to justice to anyone at all—neither to anyone else nor to any of those whom my slanderers call my pupils. I have never been anyone’s teacher. But if anyone, young or old, desires to listen while I speak and go about my own affairs, I have never denied him the opportunity; nor do I converse only when I receive money\n\n### Stephanus 33b\n\nI take no payment; rather, I make myself equally available to rich and poor alike for questioning, and anyone who wishes may answer me and listen to whatever I have to say. And whether any of these people becomes a good man or not, I could not justly be held responsible, since I have never promised anyone any instruction, nor have I taught any. If anyone claims that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private that all the others did not hear as well, you may be sure that he is not telling the truth.\nBut why, then, do some people take pleasure in spending so much\n\n### Stephanus 33c\n\ntime with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth: they enjoy hearing those who suppose themselves wise, but are not, being examined. For it is not an unpleasant thing to hear. But as I maintain, I have been commanded by the god to do this, through oracles, through dreams, and in every way in which any other divine dispensation has ever commanded a man to do anything at all. These things, men of Athens, are both true and easily tested. For if I am indeed corrupting some of the young\n\n### Stephanus 33d\n\nand have already corrupted others, then surely, if any of them, on growing older, had realized that I had ever given them bad advice when they were young, they themselves ought now to come forward, accuse me, and seek vengeance. Or if they were unwilling to do so themselves, then some of their relatives—fathers, brothers, or others close to them—ought now to remember it and seek vengeance, if their own kin have suffered any harm at my hands. At all events, many of them are here present, and I can see them: first, Crito here, my contemporary and fellow demesman, the father of Critobulus here; then Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus here, the father of Epigenes. Here, furthermore, are others whose brothers have joined me in this occupation: Nicostratus, son of Theozotides, the brother of Theodotus—and Theodotus is dead, so he at least could not have begged his brother to refrain—and Paralus here, the son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and here is\n\n### Stephanus 33e\n\nAdeimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Aeantodorus, whose brother is Apollodorus here. I could name many others to you, some one of whom Meletus ought above all to have produced as a witness in his own speech. If he forgot to do so then, let him produce one now—I yield the floor—and let him say whether he has any such evidence. But you will find quite the opposite of this, gentlemen: all of them are ready to come to my aid—the aid of the man who corrupts and works evil upon their own relatives, as Meletus and\n\n### Stephanus 34a\n\nAnytus assert. Those who have themselves been corrupted might perhaps have some reason for coming to my aid; but those who have not been corrupted, men already advanced in years, the relatives of these young men—what other reason can they have for aiding me except the right and just one: that they know Meletus is lying and that I am telling the truth?\nVery well, gentlemen. This, more or less, is what I can offer in my defense, together perhaps with other arguments of the same kind. But perhaps someone among\n\n### Stephanus 34b\n\nyou may feel indignant when he recalls his own conduct—how, when standing trial in a contest less grave than this one, he begged and implored the jurors with many tears, bringing his little children into court so that he might arouse as much pity as possible, along with many other relatives and friends—whereas I, it seems, shall do none of these things, though I am facing what might be thought the utmost danger. Someone, then, reflecting on this, might take a harsher view of me and, angered by these very things, cast his\n\n### Stephanus 34c\n\nvote in wrath. If any of you is so disposed—and I do not think that any of you is, but if one is—I believe I should be speaking reasonably to him if I said: My good sir, I too have relatives, I suppose. For in the very words of Homer, I too am not sprung from an oak or a stone, but from human beings; and so I have relatives, and sons as well, men of Athens—three of them, one already a youth, and two still children. Yet I shall not bring any of them up here and beg you to vote for my acquittal. Why, then, shall I do none of these things? Not from stubbornness, men\n\n### Stephanus 34d\n\nof Athens, nor from any contempt for you. Whether or not I face death with courage is another question; but with regard to the reputation of myself, of you, and of the whole city, it does not seem honorable to me to do any of these things, at my age and with the name I bear—whether that name is deserved or not. At any rate, it is generally believed\n\n### Stephanus 34e\n\nthat Socrates is in some way superior to the multitude of men. If, then, those among you who are thought to excel in wisdom, courage, or any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a fashion, it would be shameful. I have often seen men of some reputation behave astonishingly when they were on trial, as though they believed they would suffer something dreadful if they died, and as though they would be immortal if only you did not put them to death. Such men, in my judgment, bring disgrace upon the city, so that even a foreigner\n\n### Stephanus 35a\n\nmight suppose that those Athenians who excel in virtue, whom the citizens themselves select from among their own number for offices and other honors, are no better than women. Such displays, men of Athens, should not be made by those of you who are thought to be men of any distinction at all; nor, if we make them, should you permit us to do so. On the contrary, you should make it plain that you will condemn far more readily the man who stages these pitiful dramas and makes the city ridiculous than the man who keeps his composure.\nApart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, it does not seem to me just\n\n### Stephanus 35b\n\nto beg favors of a juror and escape conviction by entreaty, rather than to instruct and persuade him. For a juror does not sit here to bestow justice as a favor, but to judge what is just; and he has sworn not to grant favors to whomever he pleases, but to render judgment according to the laws. We ought not, then, to accustom you to perjury, nor should you allow yourselves to become accustomed to it; for neither we nor you would be acting piously. Do not therefore expect me, men of Athens, to behave toward you in ways that I consider neither honorable nor\n\n### Stephanus 35c\n\njust nor pious—especially, by Zeus, when I am being prosecuted for impiety by this very Meletus. For clearly, if I were to persuade you by entreaty and compel you to violate your oaths, I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods; and in the very act of defending myself, I should be accusing myself of not believing in them. But that is very far from the truth. I believe in the gods, men of Athens, as none of my accusers does; and I entrust it to you and to the god to judge my case in whatever way will be best for both me and you.\n\n### Stephanus 35d\n\nThat I am not indignant, men of Athens, at what has happened—\n\n### Stephanus 35e\n\nat your having voted to convict me—has many causes;\n\n### Stephanus 36a\n\nand what has happened was not unexpected by me. Rather, I am far more surprised at the number of votes on either side. I certainly did not think the margin would be so narrow; I thought it would be wide. But now, as it appears, if only thirty votes had changed sides, I should have been acquitted. As far as Meletus is concerned, then, I believe that even now I have been acquitted; and not only acquitted, but it is plain to everyone that if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, Meletus would even have been fined\n\n### Stephanus 36b\n\na thousand drachmas for failing to receive one-fifth of the votes.\nThe man therefore proposes death as my penalty. Very well. What counterpenalty, then, shall I propose to you, men of Athens? Clearly, what I deserve. And what is that? What do I deserve to suffer or pay because I did not choose to lead a quiet life, but neglected the things most men care for—making money, managing a household, military commands, public speeches, the other offices, political alliances, and factions that arise in the city—because I thought myself\n\n### Stephanus 36c\n\nin truth too decent a man to enter into these affairs and survive? I did not go where I could have been of no benefit either to you or to myself. Instead, I went where I could confer upon each of you privately what I maintain to be the greatest benefit. I went about trying to persuade each one of you not to care for any of his possessions before caring for himself—how he might become as good and wise as possible—nor to care for the city’s possessions before caring for the city itself, and to care for all other things in the same\n\n### Stephanus 36d\n\nway. What, then, do I deserve to suffer for being such a man? Something good, men of Athens, if the penalty is truly to be assessed according to what I deserve—and moreover, some good suited to me. What, then, is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor and who needs leisure to exhort you? Nothing is more fitting, men of Athens, than that such a man should be maintained at public expense in the Prytaneum—far more fitting than for any one of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a single horse, a two-horse chariot, or a four-horse team. For such a man makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you\n\n### Stephanus 36e\n\nhappy in reality; and he has no need of maintenance, whereas I do. If, then, I must assess my penalty justly according to what I deserve, this is what\n\n### Stephanus 37a\n\nI propose: maintenance in the Prytaneum.\nPerhaps in saying this I seem to you to be speaking in much the same spirit as when I spoke about pity and supplication—as though I were being stubborn. But that is not so, men of Athens. The truth is rather this: I am convinced that I have never willingly wronged any human being, but I cannot persuade you of it, for we have had only a short time to converse with one another. If, as I believe, you had a law, as other peoples do, that trials involving death should not last merely one day—\n\n### Stephanus 37b\n\nnot merely to judge, but many, you would have been persuaded; but as it is, it is not easy in so short a time to free oneself from great slanders. Since I am convinced that I wrong no one, I am far from willing to wrong myself, to declare against myself that I deserve some evil, and to propose some such penalty for myself. What am I afraid of? That I may suffer the penalty Meletus proposes for me—a thing of which I say that I do not know whether it is good or evil? Instead of that, am I to choose something I know perfectly well to be evil and propose it as my penalty? Imprisonment, perhaps?\n\n### Stephanus 37c\n\nAnd why should I live in prison, enslaved to the authority appointed from time to time, the Eleven? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until I pay it? But that comes to the same thing I was just saying, for I have no money with which to pay. Shall I then propose exile? Perhaps you would accept that penalty for me. I would indeed be possessed by a great love of life, men of Athens, if I were so unreasoning as not to be able to reckon that you, though you are my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure my discussions\n\n### Stephanus 37d\n\nand arguments, but have found them so burdensome and offensive that you are now seeking to be rid of them; and yet others will endure them easily? Far from it, men of Athens. A fine life it would be for a man of my age to leave here and live by moving from city to city, forever being driven out. For I know very well that wherever I go, the young men will listen to me when I speak, just as they do here. If I drive them away, they themselves will have me driven out by persuading their elders;\n\n### Stephanus 37e\n\nand if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out on account of these very young men.\nPerhaps someone may say, “But Socrates, if you leave us, will you not be able to live in silence and keep quiet?” This is the hardest thing of all to make some of you understand. For if I say that to do so would be to disobey the god, and that for this reason it is impossible for me\n\n### Stephanus 38a\n\nto keep quiet, you will not believe me, thinking that I am being ironical. And if I say, in turn, that this happens to be the greatest good for a human being—to discuss virtue every day, and the other matters about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being—you will believe me still less when I say this. Yet the matter stands as I say it does, gentlemen, though it is not easy to persuade you. At the same time, I am not accustomed to considering myself deserving of any evil.\n\n### Stephanus 38b\n\nIf I had money, I would have proposed a fine of as much as I could expect to pay, for that would have done me no harm. But as it is, I have none—unless you are willing to set my fine at whatever amount I could pay. Perhaps I could pay you one mina of silver. I therefore propose that amount.\nBut Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus urge me to propose thirty minas, and they themselves offer to stand surety. I therefore propose that amount, and these men will be sufficient guarantors to you for the money.\n\n### Stephanus 38c\n\nFor the sake of no great span of time, men of Athens, you will acquire a name and bear the blame among those who wish to revile the city: they will say that you put Socrates to death, a wise man—for those who wish to reproach you will indeed say that I was wise, even if I am not. If you had waited only a little while, this would have happened for you of its own accord; for you see that my age is already far advanced in life and close to death. I say this not\n\n### Stephanus 38d\n\nto all of you, but to those who voted to condemn me to death. And I have this also to say to those same men. Perhaps you think, men of Athens, that I have been convicted for want of arguments of the sort by which I might have persuaded you, if I had believed that I must do and say anything whatever to escape conviction. Far from it. I have been convicted for want, certainly—but not for want of arguments. It was for want of audacity and shamelessness, and because I was unwilling to say to you the things you would have found most pleasant to hear: to weep and lament, and to do and\n\n### Stephanus 38e\n\nsay many other things unworthy of me, as I maintain—things of the sort you are accustomed to hearing from others. But neither then did I think that because I was in danger I ought to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now regret having defended myself as I did. I would much rather die after making this defense than live after making one of that kind. For neither in court nor in war should I, or anyone else,\n\n### Stephanus 39a\n\ncontrive to escape death by doing anything whatever. In battles it often becomes clear that a man might escape death by throwing down his weapons and turning to supplicate his pursuers. And in every kind of danger there are many other devices for escaping death, if a man has the audacity to do and say anything whatever. But perhaps the difficult thing, gentlemen, is not to escape death; it is far more difficult to escape wickedness,\n\n### Stephanus 39b\n\nfor it runs faster than death. And now I, being slow and old, have been caught by the slower pursuer, while my accusers, being formidable and swift, have been caught by the faster one—wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to pay the penalty of death, while they depart condemned by truth to pay the penalty of depravity and injustice. I abide by my sentence, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to turn out this way, and I think the outcome is fitting.\n\n### Stephanus 39c\n\nBut now I desire to prophesy to you who voted to condemn me; for I am already at that point when human beings are most given to prophecy—when they are about to die. I tell you, men who have put me to death, that immediately after my death a punishment will come upon you far harsher, by Zeus, than the punishment by which you have killed me. For you have done this thinking that you would be released from having to give an account of your lives; but the result will be exactly the opposite, as I maintain. More numerous will be those who examine you,\n\n### Stephanus 39d\n\nwhom until now I was holding back, though you did not perceive it. And they will be harsher because they are younger, and you will be more indignant. For if you think that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living rightly, you do not reason well. That mode of escape is neither truly possible nor honorable. The noblest and easiest escape is not to cut others down, but to prepare oneself to become as good as possible. With this prophecy for those of you who condemned me, I take my leave.\n\n### Stephanus 39e\n\nBut with those who voted to acquit me, I would gladly discuss what has now happened, while the magistrates are occupied and before I go to the place where I must die. Stay with me, then, gentlemen, for this short while. Nothing prevents us from talking together while it is permitted. To you,\n\n### Stephanus 40a\n\nas my friends, I wish to explain what this thing that has now happened to me can mean. For something remarkable has happened to me, gentlemen of the jury—and in calling you jurors, I would be calling you by your proper name. The prophetic sign of the divine thing, which is familiar to me, was at all earlier times constantly very frequent, opposing me even in the smallest matters if I was about to act wrongly. But now there have befallen me the things you yourselves see—things one might suppose, and which are commonly held, to be the very worst of evils. Yet for me,\n\n### Stephanus 40b\n\nthe god’s sign did not oppose me when I left my house at dawn, nor when I came up here to the court, nor at any point in my speech when I was about to say something. And yet in other speeches it has often stopped me in the very midst of speaking. But now, nowhere in this affair, in no deed and in no word, has it opposed me. What, then, do I take to be the reason? I will tell you. What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and there is no possibility that those of us are right who suppose\n\n### Stephanus 40c\n\nthat being dead is an evil. I have received powerful evidence of this: my accustomed sign could not possibly have failed to oppose me unless I was about to meet with something good.\nLet us also consider in this way how great a hope there is that death is a good thing. For being dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing, and has no perception of anything at all, or, as the stories say, it is some sort of change and a migration of the soul from this place here to another place. And if there is no perception, but death is\n\n### Stephanus 40d\n\nlike a sleep in which the sleeper sees not even a dream, then death would be a marvelous gain. For I think that if someone were required to choose the night in which he slept so soundly that he saw not even a dream, and then, setting all the other nights and days of his life beside that night, were required to consider and say how many days and nights in his own life he had lived better and more pleasantly than that night, I think that not merely a private citizen, but even the Great King himself, would find them easy to number\n\n### Stephanus 40e\n\nin comparison with all the other days and nights. If death is like that, then I call it a gain; for in that case the whole of time appears to be no more than a single night. But if death is instead like a journey from here to another place, and the stories are true that all the dead are there, what greater good could there be than this, gentlemen of the jury? For if a man,\n\n### Stephanus 41a\n\non arriving in Hades and being released from these men here who claim to be judges, will find the true judges—the very ones who are said to render judgment there: Minos, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just in their own lives—would that journey be a paltry thing? Or again, how much would any of you give to associate with Orpheus and Musaeus, and with Hesiod and Homer? For my part, I am willing to die many times over if these things are true. For\n\n### Stephanus 41b\n\nFor me, too, the life spent there would be marvelous, whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax son of Telamon, and any other man of old who died because of an unjust judgment, and compared my own sufferings with theirs—which, I imagine, would be no unpleasant thing. And most important of all, I could spend my time examining and questioning the people there, just as I do those here, to discover which of them is wise and which thinks he is but is not. What would a man not give, gentlemen of the jury, for the chance to examine the man who led the great army against Troy,\n\n### Stephanus 41c\n\nor Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless other men and women one might name? To converse and associate with them there and examine them would be happiness beyond measure. At any rate, they surely do not put a man to death there for doing that. For in every other respect those who dwell there are happier than those here, and henceforth they are immortal for all time, if indeed the tales we are told are true.\n\nBut you too, gentlemen of the jury, must be hopeful in the face of death and keep this one truth in mind:\n\n### Stephanus 41d\n\nnothing evil can befall a good man, either in life or after death, nor are his affairs neglected by the gods. What has happened to me now has not come about by mere chance; rather, it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and be released from troubles. That is why the divine sign never once turned me back, and for my part I bear no great anger toward those who voted to condemn me or toward my accusers. And yet it was not with this intention that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought they were doing me harm;\n\n### Stephanus 41e\n\nfor that they deserve reproach. This much, however, I ask of them: when my sons come of age, punish them, gentlemen, by troubling them in the very same way that I troubled you, if they seem to you to care for money or anything else before virtue; and if they imagine themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I reproached you, because they do not care for what they ought and think themselves important when they are worth nothing. And if\n\n### Stephanus 42a\n\nyou do this, both I and my sons will have received just treatment at your hands. But now the hour has come to depart: for me, to die; for you, to live. Which of us goes to the better fate is unknown to everyone but the god.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/apology/translations/trn_apology_mouseia.txt"},{"id":"trn_apology_plain","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"plain","note":"Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 125 Ancient Greek Stephanus sections.","text":"### Stephanus 17a\n\nWhat effect my accusers have had on you, men of Athens, I do not know. For my part, even I was almost made to forget who I was by them, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, to put it plainly, they have said virtually nothing true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular amazed me: when they said that you had to be careful not to be deceived by me,\n\n### Stephanus 17b\n\nbecause I am a formidable speaker. Their not being ashamed that they would immediately be exposed by me in practice, as soon as I proved to be not the least bit formidable at speaking, seemed to me the most shameless thing about them—unless, perhaps, they call anyone who tells the truth a formidable speaker. For if that is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator, though not in their sense. They, then, as I say, have said little or nothing true, but from me you will hear the whole truth—not, by Zeus, men of Athens, in speeches adorned with elegant language like theirs,\n\n### Stephanus 17c\n\nor embellished with carefully chosen phrases and words. Instead, you will hear things said plainly, in whatever words occur to me—for I trust that what I say is just—and let none of you expect anything else. Surely it would not be fitting, gentlemen, for someone of my age to come before you like a young man composing elaborate speeches. And so, men of Athens, I earnestly ask and beg this of you: if you hear me making my defense in the same kind of language I normally use in the marketplace by the bankers’ tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not\n\n### Stephanus 17d\n\nbe surprised or create an uproar on that account. The situation is this: I am now appearing before a court for the first time, at the age of seventy, and so I am completely unfamiliar with the manner of speaking used here. Now, if I really were a foreigner, you would surely excuse me if I spoke in the language and manner\n\n### Stephanus 18a\n\nin which I had been raised. So now as well, I ask of you what I think is a fair request: disregard my manner of speaking—whether it happens to be worse or better—and consider and pay attention only to this: whether what I say is just or not. For the excellence of a judge is to judge justly, and that of a speaker is to tell the truth.\nFirst, then, men of Athens, it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me and my first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the\n\n### Stephanus 18b\n\nlater accusers. For many people have accused me before you for many years now, without saying anything true, and I fear them more than Anytus and his associates, formidable though these men also are. But the earlier accusers are more formidable, gentlemen. They took hold of most of you when you were children and tried to persuade you, accusing me with no more truth than this: “There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a thinker about things in the heavens, one who has investigated everything beneath the earth, and who makes the weaker argument the stronger.”\n\n### Stephanus 18c\n\nThese, men of Athens, the people who spread this report, are my formidable accusers. For those who hear it assume that people who investigate such matters do not even believe in the gods. Moreover, these accusers are numerous and have been accusing me for a long time. What is more, they spoke to you at the age when you were most likely to believe them—when some of you were children and adolescents—bringing their case entirely by default, with no one offering a defense. Most unreasonable of all is that it is not even possible to know and state their\n\n### Stephanus 18d\n\nnames, except when one of them happens to be a comic playwright. All those who used envy and slander to persuade you—and those who, once persuaded themselves, went on to persuade others—are the hardest of all to deal with. For it is impossible to bring any of them up here or cross-examine them; instead, in making my defense I must quite literally fight with shadows and conduct a cross-examination when no one answers. You should therefore recognize, as I say, that I have had two sets of accusers: one consisting of those who have just accused me, and the other of\n\n### Stephanus 18e\n\nthose who accused me long ago, whom I have been discussing. And you should understand that I must defend myself first against the earlier ones, since you heard them making their accusations first, and far more often than you heard these later accusers.\nVery well, then. I must make my defense, men of Athens, and try\n\n### Stephanus 19a\n\nin so short a time to remove from your minds the slander that you have absorbed over so long a time. I would certainly like this to happen, if it is in any way better for both you and me, and I would like to accomplish something by making my defense. But I think it is difficult, and I am fully aware of the nature of the task. Nevertheless, let this turn out as the god sees fit; I must obey the law and make my defense.\nLet us take up from the beginning, then, the accusation from which\n\n### Stephanus 19b\n\nthe slander against me arose, and on which Meletus relied when he brought this formal charge against me. Very well. What did my slanderers say when they slandered me? We must read their statement as though it were an accusers’ sworn affidavit: “Socrates commits an injustice and busies himself investigating things beneath the earth and in the heavens, making the weaker argument the stronger,\n\n### Stephanus 19c\n\nand teaching others to do these same things.” The accusation is something like that. You have seen it yourselves in Aristophanes’ comedy, where a certain Socrates is carried around, claiming that he walks on air and spouting a great deal of other nonsense about matters of which I understand absolutely nothing, great or small. I do not say this to disparage such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such things—may Meletus never prosecute me on so many charges—but the fact is, men of Athens, that I have no part in any of them.\n\n### Stephanus 19d\n\nAgain, I call most of you as witnesses, and I ask those of you who have ever heard me in conversation—and many of you have—to inform and tell one another. Tell one another whether any of you has ever heard me discussing such matters to any extent, great or small. From this you will recognize that the other things most people say about me are of the same kind.\nBut none of these claims is true. Nor, if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to educate people and charge\n\n### Stephanus 19e\n\nmoney, is that true either. Still, I think it is an admirable thing if someone is capable of educating people, as Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis are. Each of these men, gentlemen, can go into any city and persuade the young men—who are free to associate without charge with whichever of their own fellow citizens they wish—to leave those men’s company, associate with them instead, pay them money, and be grateful besides.\n\n### Stephanus 20a\n\nThere is also another wise man here, from Paros, whose visit I happened to learn about. I had gone to see a man who has paid more money to sophists than all the others combined, Callias son of Hipponicus. Since he has two sons, I asked him, “Callias,” I said, “if your two sons had been born colts or calves, we would be able to find and hire a supervisor for them who\n\n### Stephanus 20b\n\nwould make them both fine and good in the excellence appropriate to them; this person would be an expert in horses or in farming. But since they are human beings, whom do you have in mind to supervise them? Who possesses knowledge of the appropriate excellence, human and civic excellence? I assume you have considered the question because you have sons. Is there such a person,” I asked, “or not?” “Certainly,” he said. “Who is he,” I asked, “where is he from, and how much does he charge for teaching?” “Evenus, Socrates,” he replied, “from Paros, five minas.” And I counted Evenus fortunate if he truly possessed this art\n\n### Stephanus 20c\n\nand taught it at so reasonable a price. I myself would certainly be proud and carry myself grandly if I knew such things—but I do not know them, men of Athens.\nPerhaps one of you might respond: “But Socrates, what is this activity of yours? Where have these slanders against you come from? Surely this great reputation and all this talk did not arise while you were doing nothing more unusual than other people, unless you were doing something different from most people. So tell us what\n\n### Stephanus 20d\n\nit is, so that we do not improvise our own judgment about you.” Whoever says this seems to me to speak fairly, and I will try to show you just what it is that has given me both this reputation and this slanderous image. Listen, then. Some of you may perhaps think I am joking, but be assured that I will tell you the whole truth. The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation for no other reason than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Perhaps merely human wisdom. For it seems that I really am wise in this kind of wisdom. But those whom I mentioned just now\n\n### Stephanus 20e\n\nmay perhaps be wise in some wisdom greater than human wisdom, or else I do not know what to say. I certainly do not understand it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks in order to slander me. And, men of Athens, do not create an uproar, even if I seem to you to be making an extravagant claim. For the statement I am about to make is not my own; rather, I will refer you to a speaker you will consider trustworthy. As a witness to my wisdom—whether it is wisdom at all, and what kind—I will present to you the god at Delphi. You surely knew Chaerephon. He\n\n### Stephanus 21a\n\nwas my companion from his youth and a companion of your democratic party. He shared your recent exile and returned with you. And you know what Chaerephon was like—how impetuous he was in whatever he undertook. Once he even went to Delphi and dared to ask the oracle this question—and, as I said, do not create an uproar, gentlemen—he asked whether anyone was wiser than I was. The Pythia replied that no one was wiser. His brother here will testify to you about these things, since Chaerephon himself is dead.\n\n### Stephanus 21b\n\nNow consider why I say this, for I am going to explain to you where the slander against me came from. When I heard these things, I reflected as follows: “What can the god mean, and what is he hinting at? For I am conscious that I am not wise in anything, great or small. So what can he mean by saying that I am the wisest? Surely he cannot be lying, for that is not permitted to him.” For a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant. Then, very reluctantly, I turned to an investigation of the matter along these lines. I went to one of those reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere,\n\n### Stephanus 21c\n\nI would refute the oracle and show its pronouncement, “This man is wiser than I am, but you said that I was.” So I examined this man—I do not need to mention his name, but he was one of our politicians, and it was while examining him and conversing with him that I had the following experience, men of Athens. It seemed to me that this man appeared wise to many other people, and especially to himself, but that he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought he was wise but was not.\n\n### Stephanus 21d\n\nAs a result, I became hated both by him and by many of those who were present. But as I went away, I reasoned to myself: “I am wiser than this man. It is likely that neither of us knows anything admirable or worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, just as I do not know, do not think that I do. It seems, then, that I am wiser than he is by this one small thing: what I do not know, I do not think I know.” From there I went to another of those reputed to be wiser than the first man, and\n\n### Stephanus 21e\n\nI came to the same conclusion. There too I became hated by that man and by many others.\nAfter this, then, I went from one person to another in turn. I realized with distress and fear that I was becoming hated, but nevertheless it seemed necessary to regard the god’s command as the most important thing. So, in investigating what the oracle meant, I had to go to everyone who had any reputation for knowing anything.\n\n### Stephanus 22a\n\nAnd by the dog, men of Athens—for I must tell you the truth—I certainly had an experience something like this: those with the highest reputations seemed to me, as I investigated in accordance with the god, to be almost the most deficient, while others who were thought to be inferior seemed to be more sensible men. I must show you my wandering course, as though I were performing certain labors, so that the oracle might prove irrefutable to me. After the politicians, I went to the poets, those who wrote tragedies and dithyrambs and the others,\n\n### Stephanus 22b\n\nthinking that there I would catch myself red-handed as being more ignorant than they were. So I took up those of their poems that seemed to me to have been composed with the greatest care and asked them what they meant, so that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, gentlemen, to tell you the truth, but it must be said. Almost everyone present, so to speak, could have explained the poets’ own compositions better than the poets themselves could. So I soon recognized this about the poets as well: they did not compose what they composed through wisdom,\n\n### Stephanus 22c\n\nbut through a certain natural gift and while inspired, like prophets and those who deliver oracles. For these people too say many fine things, but they understand nothing of what they say. It seemed to me that the poets had undergone something of this sort. At the same time, I realized that because of their poetry they thought they were the wisest of men in other matters too, though they were not. So I left them as well, thinking that I had the same advantage over them as I had over the politicians.\nFinally, then, I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious that I myself knew practically nothing,\n\n### Stephanus 22d\n\nbut I knew that I would find that they knew many fine things. And in this I was not mistaken: they knew things I did not know, and in that respect they were wiser than I was. But, men of Athens, it seemed to me that the good craftsmen had the same fault as the poets. Because each of them practiced his craft well, he claimed to be extremely wise in the most important matters as well, and this error of theirs obscured the wisdom they did possess.\n\n### Stephanus 22e\n\nSo, on behalf of the oracle, I asked myself whether I would prefer to remain as I am, possessing neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to possess both things they possess. I answered myself and the oracle that it was better for me to remain as I am.\nAs a result of this investigation, men of Athens,\n\n### Stephanus 23a\n\nI have incurred many hatreds, of the harshest and most burdensome kind, and many slanders have arisen from them, including this reputation of being wise. For on each occasion those present suppose that I myself am wise in the matters in which I refute someone else. But the truth is likely to be, gentlemen, that the god is wise, and that in this oracle he is saying that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. He appears to be speaking of this man Socrates, but merely to have made use\n\n### Stephanus 23b\n\nof my name, making me an example, as if he were to say: “That one among you, human beings, is wisest who, like Socrates, has recognized that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom.” So even now I continue to go around searching and investigating in accordance with the god, whenever I think that some citizen or foreigner is wise. And whenever he does not seem so to me, I assist the god by showing that he is not wise. Because of this occupation, I have had no leisure to accomplish anything worth mentioning either in public affairs or in my private affairs, but I live in\n\n### Stephanus 23c\n\nextreme poverty because of my service to the god.\nIn addition, the young men who follow me of their own accord—those who have the most leisure, the sons of the wealthiest families—enjoy hearing people being examined. They themselves often imitate me and then try to examine others. And then, I think, they find a great abundance of people who think they know something but know little or nothing. Consequently, those whom they examine become angry with me rather than with themselves,\n\n### Stephanus 23d\n\nand say that there is a certain utterly vile Socrates who corrupts the young. And whenever someone asks them what he does or what he teaches to corrupt them, they have nothing to say because they do not know. But so that they will not appear at a loss, they repeat the accusations readily available against all philosophers: “things in the sky and beneath the earth,” “not believing in the gods,” and “making the weaker argument stronger.” For I think they would not want to tell the truth: that they are plainly exposed as pretending to know when they know nothing. So, since they are, I think, ambitious,\n\n### Stephanus 23e\n\nvehement, and numerous, and speak about me persistently and persuasively, they have filled your ears for a long time now with their fierce slanders. From among them Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon have attacked me: Meletus because he is offended on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and\n\n### Stephanus 24a\n\nthe politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. And so, as I said when I began, I would be astonished if I were able, in so short a time, to remove from your minds this slander that has grown so great. These are the facts, men of Athens. I speak without concealing anything from you, great or small, and without holding anything back. And yet I know quite well that these very statements make me hated. That too is evidence that I am telling the truth, that this is the slander against me, and that these are its causes.\n\n### Stephanus 24b\n\nWhether you investigate these matters now or later, you will find them to be so.\nLet this, then, be a sufficient defense before you against the accusations made by my first accusers. Next I will try to defend myself against the good and patriotic Meletus, as he calls himself, and against the later accusers. So once again, since these are a different set of accusers, let us take up their sworn charge in turn. It goes something like this: “Socrates commits an injustice by corrupting the young and by not believing in the gods in whom the city\n\n### Stephanus 24c\n\nbelieves, but in other new spiritual beings.” Such is the charge. Let us examine each part of this charge one by one.\nHe says, then, that I commit an injustice by corrupting the young. But I, men of Athens, say that Meletus commits an injustice because he treats serious matters frivolously, lightly bringing people to trial and pretending to be seriously concerned about matters for which he has never cared at all. I will try to show you that this is so. Come here, Meletus, and tell me: Is it not true that\n\n### Stephanus 24d\n\nyou consider it supremely important that the younger men should be as good as possible?\nI certainly do.\nCome, then, tell these men who makes them better. Clearly you know, since you care about it. For you claim to have discovered the person who corrupts them—me—and you bring me before these men and accuse me. Now come, tell them who makes the young better, and reveal who it is. You see, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothing to say? And does this not seem shameful to you and sufficient evidence of what I am saying, that you have never cared about it at all? But tell us, my good man, who makes them better?\nThe laws.\n\n### Stephanus 24e\n\nBut that is not what I am asking, excellent man. I am asking what person, who in the first place knows this very thing, the laws?\nThese men, Socrates, the jurors.\nWhat do you mean, Meletus? Are these men capable of educating the young and making them better?\nCertainly.\nAll of them, or some of them but not others?\nAll of them.\nWell said, by Hera! That is a great abundance of people who benefit them. What about the members of the audience? Do they make them better\n\n### Stephanus 25a\n\nor not?\nThey do too.\nAnd what about the members of the Council?\nThe Council members too.\nBut then, Meletus, surely the people in the Assembly, the Assembly members, do not corrupt the young? Or do all of them make the young better too?\nThey do too.\nThen all Athenians, it seems, make them fine and good except me, while I alone corrupt them. Is that what you are saying?\nThat is exactly what I am saying.\nYou have certainly condemned me to great misfortune. Now answer me: does the same seem to you to be true of horses as well? That the ones\n\n### Stephanus 25b\n\nDoes everyone make them better, while only one person corrupts them? Or is the exact opposite true: only one person, or a very few—the horse trainers—are capable of improving horses, while most people, if they associate with horses and make use of them, corrupt them? Isn’t that how it is, Meletus, both with horses and with every other animal? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or admit it. Young people would certainly be extraordinarily fortunate if only one person corrupted them while everyone else benefited them.\n\n### Stephanus 25c\n\nBut in fact, Meletus, you have sufficiently demonstrated that you have never given any thought at all to the young, and you clearly reveal your own negligence: you have no concern whatever for the matters about which you are prosecuting me.\n\nAnd now, for heaven’s sake, Meletus, tell us this too: is it better to live among good citizens or bad ones? My good man, answer me; I’m not asking you anything difficult. Don’t bad people always do some harm to those nearest them, while good people do them some good?\n\nCertainly.\n\n### Stephanus 25d\n\nThen is there anyone who would rather be harmed than benefited by the people around him? Answer, my good man; the law requires you to answer. Is there anyone who wants to be harmed?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nCome then: are you prosecuting me here on the charge that I corrupt the young and make them worse intentionally, or unintentionally?\n\nIntentionally, I say.\n\nWhat then, Meletus? At your age are you so much wiser than I am at mine that you understand that bad people always do some harm to those closest to them,\n\n### Stephanus 25e\n\nwhile good people do them good, but I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this: that if I make one of the people around me wicked, I will run the risk of suffering some harm from him? And so I intentionally do this great evil, as you claim? I do not believe you, Meletus, and I don’t think any other human being does either. Either I do not corrupt the young, or, if I do corrupt them,\n\n### Stephanus 26a\n\nI do so unintentionally; so in either case you are lying. But if I corrupt them unintentionally, the law does not require that a person be brought to court for such unintentional offenses. Instead, you should have taken me aside privately, instructed me, and corrected me. For clearly, if I learned better, I would stop doing what I was doing unintentionally. But you avoided associating with me and teaching me, and you were unwilling to do so. Instead, you bring me here, where the law requires people to be brought who need punishment, not instruction.\n\nBut indeed, men of Athens, what I was saying is already clear:\n\n### Stephanus 26b\n\nMeletus has never cared in the slightest about any of these matters. Nevertheless, tell us, Meletus: how do you say that I corrupt the young? Is it obviously, as stated in the indictment you filed, by teaching them not to believe in the gods the city believes in, but instead in other, new divine beings? Isn’t this what you mean when you say that I corrupt them by my teaching?\n\nYes, that is exactly and emphatically what I mean.\n\nThen, Meletus, by those very gods we are now discussing, explain yourself still more clearly, both to me and to these gentlemen.\n\n### Stephanus 26c\n\nFor I cannot understand whether you mean that I teach people to believe that certain gods exist—in which case I myself do believe that gods exist, am not an atheist at all, and am not guilty in that respect—though not the same gods as the city believes in, but others, and that this is your charge against me, that they are different; or whether you mean that I do not believe in gods at all myself and teach other people the same thing.\n\nThat is what I mean: you do not believe in gods at all.\n\n### Stephanus 26d\n\nExtraordinary Meletus, why do you say this? So I do not even believe, as other people do, that the sun and moon are gods?\n\nBy Zeus, gentlemen of the jury, he does not, since he says the sun is stone and the moon is earth.\n\nDo you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus? Do you have so little respect for these men, and do you think them so unfamiliar with books, that they do not know the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of such claims? And are the young really learning these things from me, when they can sometimes buy them in the orchestra for a drachma at most\n\n### Stephanus 26e\n\nand then laugh at Socrates if he pretends the ideas are his own—especially since they are so strange? But for heaven’s sake, is this really what you think of me? Do I believe that no god exists?\n\nNo, by Zeus, you do not believe in them in any way whatever.\n\nYou are not credible, Meletus—not even, it seems to me, to yourself. For this man, men of Athens, appears to me to be thoroughly insolent and undisciplined, and to have filed this indictment simply out of a certain insolence, lack of restraint, and youthful recklessness.\n\n### Stephanus 27a\n\nHe seems to be testing me by composing a riddle, as if to say: “Will the wise Socrates notice that I am joking and contradicting myself, or will I deceive him and everyone else listening?” For he seems to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as though he were saying: “Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods, but of believing in gods.” Yet that is the behavior of someone playing games.\n\nExamine with me, gentlemen, how he seems to me to be saying this. And you, Meletus, answer us. As for you, remember what I asked of you at the beginning:\n\n### Stephanus 27b\n\ndo not make an uproar if I conduct my argument in my customary manner.\n\nIs there any human being, Meletus, who believes that human activities exist but does not believe that human beings exist? Gentlemen, make him answer, and don’t let him keep making one uproar after another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses but does believe in equestrian activities? Or who does not believe that flute players exist but does believe in flute-playing activities? There is not, best of men. If you do not want to answer, I will tell you and these others. But at least answer the next question:\n\n### Stephanus 27c\n\nIs there anyone who believes that activities involving divine beings exist but does not believe in divine beings?\n\nNo.\n\nHow helpful of you to answer at last, though you were forced to by these gentlemen. So you say that I both believe in and teach things involving divine beings, whether new or old; in any case, according to your statement, I do believe in things involving divine beings, and you also swore to this in your written indictment. But if I believe in things involving divine beings, then surely it is absolutely necessary that I also believe in divine beings. Isn’t that so? It is; I take your silence as agreement, since you will not answer. And don’t we consider\n\n### Stephanus 27d\n\ndivine beings to be either gods or children of gods? Do you agree or not?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen if I believe in divine beings, as you claim, and if divine beings are some kind of gods, this would be exactly what I say you are hinting at in your riddle and joking about: claiming that I do not believe in gods and then again that I do believe in gods, since I believe in divine beings. But if, on the other hand, divine beings are illegitimate children of gods, born either from nymphs or from some of the others who are said to be their mothers, what human being could believe that children of gods exist but not gods? That would be just as\n\n### Stephanus 27e\n\nabsurd as believing that the offspring of horses and donkeys—mules—exist, but not believing that horses and donkeys exist. No, Meletus, there is no possible way you could have filed this indictment except either to test us or because you were at a loss to find a genuine offense to charge me with. But there is no way you could persuade any human being with even a little intelligence that one and the same person can believe in things involving divine beings and gods, and at the same time believe in neither\n\n### Stephanus 28a\n\ndivine beings, nor gods, nor heroes.\n\nBut, men of Athens, I do not think it takes much of a defense to show that I am not guilty under Meletus’s indictment; what has been said is enough. But you should know very well that what I said earlier is true: I have incurred a great deal of hostility from many people. And this is what will convict me, if I am convicted—not Meletus or Anytus, but the slander and envy of the many. These have convicted many other good\n\n### Stephanus 28b\n\nmen, and I think they will continue to do so. There is no danger that they will stop with me.\n\nSomeone might perhaps say, “Aren’t you ashamed, Socrates, to have followed a way of life that now puts you in danger of death?” But I would be right to answer him: “You are not speaking well, sir, if you think that a man who is of even the slightest worth should take into account the risk of living or dying, rather than consider only this whenever he acts: whether what he is doing is just or unjust, and whether his actions are those of a good man or a bad one.” For by your argument, worthless\n\n### Stephanus 28c\n\nwould be all the demigods who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis. He so despised danger in comparison with enduring any disgrace that, when he was eager to kill Hector, his mother, who was a goddess, said to him something like this, as I recall: “My child, if you avenge the killing of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die—for immediately after Hector, she says, your own death is waiting.” When he heard this, he made light of death and danger, and was much more\n\n### Stephanus 28d\n\nafraid of living as a coward and failing to avenge his friends. “Let me die at once,” he says, “after inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, so that I do not remain here as a laughingstock beside the curved ships, a burden on the earth.” Do you think he gave any thought to death and danger?\n\nFor the truth is this, men of Athens: wherever a man stations himself because he believes it best, or wherever he is stationed by his commander, there, in my opinion, he must remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before disgrace. So I would have done something terrible, men\n\n### Stephanus 28e\n\nof Athens, if, when the commanders whom you elected to command me stationed me at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, I remained where they stationed me, like anyone else, and risked death, but when the god stationed me—as I believed and understood—requiring me to live as a philosopher, examining myself and others, I then abandoned my post because I feared death\n\n### Stephanus 29a\n\nor anything else whatever. That would be terrible, and then someone really could justly bring me to court on the charge that I do not believe the gods exist, since I would be disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not. For fearing death, gentlemen, is nothing other than thinking oneself wise when one is not; it is thinking one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not in fact be the greatest of all goods for a human being, yet people fear it as though they knew very well\n\n### Stephanus 29b\n\nthat it is the greatest of evils. And yet how is this not the most disgraceful ignorance—the belief that one knows what one does not know? But, gentlemen, in this respect and on this point I may differ from most people; and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in any way, it would be in this: since I do not know enough about what happens in Hades, I also recognize that I do not know. But I do know that doing wrong and disobeying one’s superior, whether god or human being, is evil and shameful. So I will never fear or avoid things that I do not know may actually be good rather than evils that I know are evil. Therefore, not even if\n\n### Stephanus 29c\n\nyou were to acquit me now, refusing to believe Anytus, who said that either I should never have been brought into court in the first place or, once I had been brought here, it was impossible not to put me to death—telling you that if I escaped, your sons would all be utterly corrupted by practicing what Socrates teaches—if, in response to this, you were to say to me, “Socrates, this time we will not listen to Anytus but will acquit you, on this condition, however: that you no longer spend your time on this investigation or practice philosophy; and if\n\n### Stephanus 29d\n\nyou are caught doing this again, you will die”—if, as I said, you were to acquit me on these terms, I would say to you: “Gentlemen of Athens, I respect and love you, but I will obey the god rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I will never stop practicing philosophy, urging you, and showing the truth to any one of you I happen to meet, saying what I am accustomed to say: ‘My excellent friend, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city and the one most renowned for wisdom and power. Are you not ashamed that you take care to possess as much money as possible,\n\n### Stephanus 29e\n\nand to gain reputation and honor, but do not take care or give thought to wisdom and truth and to making your soul as good as possible?’” And if any of you disputes this and says that he does take care of these things, I will not immediately let him go or walk away. Instead, I will question him, examine him, and test him; and if he seems to me not to possess virtue,\n\n### Stephanus 30a\n\nthough he says that he does, I will reproach him for placing the least value on the things worth the most and greater value on things of less worth. I will do this to anyone I meet, young or old, foreigner or fellow citizen—but especially to my fellow citizens, because you are closer to me by birth. For this is what the god commands, you may be sure, and I believe that no greater good has ever come to you in this city than my service to the god. For I go around doing nothing other than trying to persuade all of you, young and old alike, not to care for your bodies\n\n### Stephanus 30b\n\nor your money before, or as intensely as, you care for your soul and how it may become as good as possible, telling you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue come money and every other good for human beings, both privately and publicly. If by saying these things I corrupt the young, then these things must be harmful; but if anyone says that I say anything other than this, he is saying nothing. In light of this, gentlemen of Athens, I would say: whether you listen to Anytus or not, and whether you acquit me or not, understand that I will not\n\n### Stephanus 30c\n\nact any differently, not even if I am to die many times over.\n\nDo not make an uproar, gentlemen of Athens, but keep the promise I asked of you: not to make an uproar at what I say, but to listen. For I think you will benefit by listening. I am about to say some other things to you at which you may perhaps shout out; but do not do that under any circumstances. Be assured that if you put me to death for being the kind of man I say I am, you will harm yourselves more than me. For neither Meletus nor Anytus could harm me at all—they would not be able to—because I do not believe it is permitted\n\n### Stephanus 30d\n\nfor a worse man to harm a better one. He might perhaps kill me, exile me, or deprive me of my civic rights. He and perhaps someone else may consider these great evils, but I do not. I consider it a far greater evil to do what this man is doing now: to attempt to put a man to death unjustly. So now, gentlemen of Athens, I am far from defending myself for my own sake, as someone might suppose; I am defending you, so that you do not make a mistake concerning the god’s\n\n### Stephanus 30e\n\ngift to you by finding me guilty. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another man like me, quite literally—though it may sound rather ridiculous—attached to the city by the god as to a large and noble horse that, because of its size, is somewhat sluggish and needs to be roused by a gadfly. It seems to me that the god has attached me to the city as just such a person, one who never stops rousing, persuading, and reproaching each one of you\n\n### Stephanus 31a\n\nall day long, everywhere, constantly settling down beside you. Another man like this will not easily come to you, gentlemen, but if you listen to me, you will spare me. Yet perhaps, annoyed like drowsy people being awakened, you might strike out at me and, listening to Anytus, easily put me to death. Then you might spend the rest of your lives asleep, unless the god, in his concern for you, sends someone else to you. That I am in fact the sort of person given to the city by the god, you might recognize from this:\n\n### Stephanus 31b\n\nIt does not seem human for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have endured the neglect of my household for so many years now, while always attending to your affairs, approaching each of you privately like a father or an older brother and trying to persuade you to care for virtue. If I gained anything from doing this, and if I gave this advice while receiving payment, there would be some explanation for my behavior. But now you yourselves can see that my accusers, though they have accused me so shamelessly of everything else, have not been able to become shameless enough in this matter\n\n### Stephanus 31c\n\nto produce a witness claiming that I ever charged or asked anyone for payment. For I think I can produce sufficient evidence that I am telling the truth: my poverty.\n\nNow, it might seem strange that I go around giving this advice and involving myself in other people’s affairs in private, yet do not dare to come forward before your assembly and advise the city in public. The reason for this is what you have often heard me say in many places: that something divine and\n\n### Stephanus 31d\n\nspiritual comes to me, the very thing that Meletus mockingly referred to in his indictment. This began for me in childhood: a kind of voice comes to me, and whenever it comes, it always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never urges me forward. This is what opposes my taking part in politics, and it seems to me entirely right that it does so. For you may be certain, gentlemen of Athens, that if I had tried long ago to take part in political affairs, I would have died long ago and would have benefited neither you\n\n### Stephanus 31e\n\nnor myself at all. And do not be angry with me for telling the truth: no human being will survive if he genuinely opposes you or any other popular majority and prevents many unjust and unlawful things from happening in the city. Instead,\n\n### Stephanus 32a\n\nanyone who truly fights for justice must lead a private rather than a public life, if he is to survive even for a short time.\n\nI will give you powerful evidence of this—not words, but what you value: deeds. Listen, then, to what has happened to me, so that you may know that I would never yield to anyone against what is just because I feared death, and that by refusing to yield I might actually die. What I am going to tell you is commonplace courtroom talk, but it is true. Gentlemen of Athens, I have never held any other office\n\n### Stephanus 32b\n\nin the city, but I did serve on the Council. It happened that my tribe, Antiochis, held the presidency when you decided to try collectively the ten generals who had failed to recover the men from the naval battle, contrary to law, as all of you later came to recognize. At that time I alone among the presiding officials opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. Although the public speakers were ready to denounce and arrest me, and although you were calling for it and shouting, I thought that I should take my stand\n\n### Stephanus 32c\n\nwith the law and justice and face the danger, rather than join you in making an unjust decision because I feared imprisonment or death. This happened while the city was still under democracy. Later, when the oligarchy came to power, the Thirty in turn summoned me and four others to the Tholos and ordered us to bring Leon of Salamis from Salamis so that he could be put to death. They issued many such orders to many other people as well, because they wanted to implicate as many people as possible in their crimes. But at that time I\n\n### Stephanus 32d\n\nagain demonstrated, not by words but by deeds, that death was not the slightest concern to me, if it is not too blunt to put it that way, but that my entire concern was not to do anything unjust or impious. That government, powerful as it was, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust. When we left the Tholos, the other four went to Salamis and brought back Leon, but I left and went home. I might have been put to death for this if that government had not soon been overthrown. And\n\n### Stephanus 32e\n\nyou will have many witnesses to these events.\n\nDo you think, then, that I would have survived for so many years if I had taken part in public affairs and, acting as a good man should, had come to the defense of justice and, as one ought, treated that as the most important thing? Far from it, gentlemen of Athens; nor would any other\n\n### Stephanus 33a\n\nhuman being. But throughout my whole life, whenever I have done anything in public, I will be shown to have been this kind of man, and the same in private: I have never conceded anything contrary to justice to anyone, neither to anyone else nor to any of those whom my slanderers call my students. I have never been anyone’s teacher. But if anyone, whether younger or older, wants to listen while I am speaking and going about my own affairs, I have never denied him the opportunity. Nor do I converse only when I receive money\n\n### Stephanus 33b\n\nBut I do not charge a fee; I make myself equally available to rich and poor for questioning, and anyone who wishes may answer my questions and listen to what I say. Whether any of these people becomes a good person or not, I could not justly be held responsible, since I have never promised anyone any instruction or taught anyone. And if anyone claims that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private that all the others did not also hear, you may be sure that he is not telling the truth.\nBut why, then, do some people enjoy spending so much\n\n### Stephanus 33c\n\ntime with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth: they enjoy hearing those who think they are wise, but are not, being examined. For it is not unpleasant. But as I maintain, I have been commanded by the god to do this, through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any other divine dispensation has ever commanded a human being to do anything at all. These things, men of Athens, are both true and easy to verify. For if I am indeed corrupting some of the young men\n\n### Stephanus 33d\n\nand have already corrupted others, then surely, if any of them, on growing older, had realized that I had ever given them bad advice when they were young, they themselves ought now to come forward to accuse me and seek my punishment. Or if they themselves were unwilling, then some of their relatives—fathers, brothers, and other family members—ought now to remember it and seek my punishment, if their own relatives have in fact suffered any harm at my hands. In any case, many of them are present here, and I can see them: first, here is Crito, my contemporary and fellow member of my deme, the father of Critobulus here; next, Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here; and here too is Antiphon of Cephisus, the father of Epigenes; then here are others whose brothers have spent their time in my company: Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus—and Theodotus is dead, so he at least could not have begged Nicostratus not to testify—and here is Paralus, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and here is\n\n### Stephanus 33e\n\nAdeimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Aeantodorus, whose brother is Apollodorus here. I could name many others for you, some one of whom Meletus certainly ought to have produced as a witness in his own speech. But if he forgot to do so then, let him produce one now—I yield the floor—and let him say whether he has any such evidence. But you will find quite the opposite of this, gentlemen: all of them are ready to come to my aid, though I am supposedly the one who corrupts and harms their relatives, as Meletus and\n\n### Stephanus 34a\n\nAnytus claim. The corrupted men themselves might perhaps have some reason for coming to my aid; but the uncorrupted ones, now older men, who are their relatives—what other reason could they have for helping me except the right and just one: that they know Meletus is lying and I am telling the truth?\nWell then, gentlemen, this is more or less what I can offer in my defense, along with perhaps other arguments of the same kind. But perhaps one of\n\n### Stephanus 34b\n\nyou may become indignant when he remembers his own conduct: how, when facing a trial less serious than this one, he begged and implored the jurors with many tears, bringing his little children into court so that he might arouse as much pity as possible, as well as many other relatives and friends—whereas I apparently will do none of these things, even though I face what might be thought the greatest danger of all. Someone considering this might perhaps take a more hostile attitude toward me and, angered by these very things, cast his vote in\n\n### Stephanus 34c\n\nanger. If any of you feels this way—I do not suppose that anyone does, but if someone does—I think I would be speaking reasonably to him if I said: My good sir, I too presumably have relatives. For, as Homer says, I was not born “from an oak or a rock,” but from human beings; and so I have relatives and indeed sons, men of Athens—three of them, one already a young man and two still children. Nevertheless, I will not bring any of them into court and beg you to acquit me. Why, then, will I do none of these things? Not out of arrogance, men\n\n### Stephanus 34d\n\nof Athens, nor because I dishonor you. Whether or not I face death courageously is another matter. But with regard to the reputation of myself, of you, and of the whole city, it does not seem honorable to me to do any of these things, at my age and with the reputation I have acquired, whether that reputation is true or false. At any rate, it is generally believed\n\n### Stephanus 34e\n\nthat Socrates is in some way different from most people. If, then, those among you who are thought to stand out in wisdom, courage, or any other virtue whatsoever are going to behave like that, it would be shameful. I have often seen men of some reputation behave astonishingly when they are on trial, because they think they will suffer something terrible if they die—as though they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men, it seems to me, bring disgrace upon the city, so that even a foreigner might\n\n### Stephanus 35a\n\nsuppose that those Athenians who stand out in virtue, whom the Athenians themselves select from among their own people for public offices and other honors, are no better than women. Men of Athens, neither should those of you who are thought to be of any distinction whatsoever do such things, nor, if we do them, should you permit it. Instead, you should make it clear that you will be much more likely to convict the man who stages these pitiful dramas and makes the city ridiculous than the man who remains calm.\nApart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, it does not seem just to me\n\n### Stephanus 35b\n\nto beg a juror for acquittal or to escape conviction by begging, but rather to instruct and persuade him. For a juror does not sit here to give justice away as a favor, but to decide what is just. He has sworn not to favor whomever he pleases, but to judge according to the laws. Therefore, we should not get you into the habit of violating your oath, nor should you allow yourselves to acquire that habit, for neither of us would then be acting piously. So do not expect me, men of Athens, to behave toward you in ways that I consider neither honorable nor\n\n### Stephanus 35c\n\njust nor pious—especially, by Zeus, when I am being prosecuted for impiety by this man Meletus. For clearly, if I persuaded you and, by my begging, pressured you despite your oaths, I would be teaching you not to believe that gods exist; and in the very act of making my defense, I would simply be accusing myself of not believing in the gods. But that is very far from the truth. I do believe in them, men of Athens, as none of my accusers does, and I leave it to you and to the god to judge me in whatever way will be best both for me and for you.\n\n### Stephanus 35d\n\nAs for my not being indignant, men of Athens, at what\n\n### Stephanus 35e\n\nhas happened—that you have found me guilty—many considerations contribute to that, and what has happened was not unexpected by me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes on each side. I certainly did not think the margin would be so narrow, but much wider. As it is, apparently, if only thirty votes had changed sides, I would have been acquitted. As far as Meletus is concerned, then, I believe that even now I have been acquitted; and not only acquitted, but this much is obvious to everyone: if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, Meletus would even have been fined\n\n### Stephanus 36a\n\na thousand drachmas for failing to receive one-fifth of the votes.\nThe man proposes the penalty of death for me. Very well. What counterpenalty, then, shall I propose to you, men of Athens? Clearly, one that I deserve. What, then? What do I deserve to suffer or pay because I did not choose to live quietly, but neglected the things most people care about—making money, managing a household, holding military commands, speaking before the Assembly, and taking part in the other public offices, political clubs, and factional conflicts that arise in the city—because I considered myself\n\n### Stephanus 36b\n\ntoo decent a man in truth to enter into those activities and survive? I did not go where I would be of no benefit either to you or to myself. Instead, I went to each person privately to confer what I maintain is the greatest benefit. I tried to persuade each of you not to care for any of his possessions before caring for himself—how he might become as good and wise as possible—nor to care for the city’s possessions before caring for the city itself, and to care for all other things in the same\n\n### Stephanus 36c\n\nway. What, then, do I deserve for being such a man? Something good, men of Athens, if I am truly to be assessed according to what I deserve—and indeed, a kind of good appropriate to me. What, then, is appropriate for a poor man who is your benefactor and who needs leisure to keep urging you on? Nothing is more appropriate, men of Athens, than for such a man to receive his meals in the Prytaneum—far more appropriate than for one of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a single horse, a two-horse chariot, or a four-horse chariot. For such a man makes you appear to be happy, while I make you\n\n### Stephanus 36d\n\nactually happy; and he has no need of support, while I do. So if I must propose what I justly deserve, I propose\n\n### Stephanus 36e\n\nfree meals in the Prytaneum.\nPerhaps, in saying this, I seem to you to be speaking in the same arrogant spirit as when I spoke about pity and supplication. But that is not the case, men of Athens. Rather, the situation is this: I am convinced that I have never intentionally wronged any human being, but I cannot persuade you of this, because we have had only a short time to discuss the matter with one another. For I believe that if you had a law, as other peoples do, requiring trials involving death to last not one day\n\n### Stephanus 37a\n\n### Stephanus 37b\n\nto judge not for just one day but many, you would have been persuaded. But as it is, it is not easy in a short time to clear oneself of serious slanders. Since I am convinced that I have wronged no one, I am far from intending to wrong myself, to say against myself that I deserve some harm, and to propose some such penalty for myself. What would I be afraid of? That I might suffer what Meletus proposes as my penalty—something that I say I do not know to be either good or bad? Instead of that, am I to choose one of the things I know perfectly well to be bad and propose it as my penalty? Imprisonment, perhaps?\n\n### Stephanus 37c\n\nAnd why should I live in prison, enslaved to the authority that is appointed from time to time, the Eleven? Or should I propose a fine and imprisonment until I pay it? But that comes to the same thing I was saying just now, since I have no money with which to pay it. Should I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that proposal. I would have to be very attached to life, men of Athens, if I were so irrational as to be unable to reason that you, my fellow citizens, have not been able to endure my conversations\n\n### Stephanus 37d\n\nand arguments, but they have become too burdensome and offensive to you, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them; and yet other people will endure them easily? Far from it, men of Athens. A fine life it would be for a man of my age to leave here and live by moving from one city to another, always being driven out. For I know very well that wherever I go, the young men will listen to me when I speak, just as they do here. And if I drive them away, they themselves will have me driven out by persuading their elders;\n\n### Stephanus 37e\n\nbut if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out because of those very young men.\n\nPerhaps someone might say, “But Socrates, if you leave us, won’t you be able to live quietly and keep silent?” This is the hardest thing of all to make some of you understand. For if I say that doing so would be disobeying the god, and that for this reason it is impossible for me\n\n### Stephanus 38a\n\nto live quietly, you will not believe me, thinking that I am being ironic. And if I say in turn that this is actually the greatest good for a human being—to discuss virtue every day, as well as the other subjects about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being—you will believe me even less when I say that. Yet things are as I say, gentlemen, though it is not easy to persuade you. At the same time, I am not accustomed to considering myself deserving of any harm.\n\n### Stephanus 38b\n\nIf I had money, I would have proposed a fine in an amount I could pay, since that would not have harmed me. But as it is, I do not have any—unless you are willing to set my penalty at whatever amount I could pay. Perhaps I could pay you one mina of silver. So that is the penalty I propose.\n\nBut Plato here, men of Athens, along with Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, urges me to propose a fine of thirty minas, with them acting as guarantors. So that is the penalty I propose, and these men will be reliable guarantors to you for the money.\n\n### Stephanus 38c\n\nFor no great length of time, men of Athens, you will have the reputation and bear the blame among those who wish to denounce the city for having killed Socrates, a wise man—for those who wish to reproach you will say that I was wise, even if I am not. If you had only waited a little while, this would have happened for you naturally. For you can see that my age is already far advanced in life and close to death. I say this not\n\n### Stephanus 38d\n\nto all of you, but to those who voted to condemn me to death. And I also say the following to those same people. Perhaps you think, men of Athens, that I have been convicted because I lacked the sort of arguments with which I could have persuaded you, if I had believed I should do and say anything to escape conviction. Far from it. I have been convicted because of a lack, certainly, but not a lack of arguments; rather, a lack of boldness and shamelessness, and because I was unwilling to say to you the things you would have found most pleasant to hear—with me wailing and lamenting and doing and\n\n### Stephanus 38e\n\nsaying many other things unworthy of me, as I maintain, the sort of things you are accustomed to hearing from others. But neither then did I think I should do anything degrading because I was in danger, nor do I now regret having defended myself as I did. I would much rather die after defending myself in this way than live by behaving in that way. For neither in court nor in war should I or anyone else\n\n### Stephanus 39a\n\ncontrive to escape death by doing absolutely anything. Indeed, in battles it often becomes clear that a person might avoid death by throwing down his weapons and turning to beg mercy from his pursuers. And in every kind of danger there are many other ways of escaping death, if someone is willing to do and say anything. But perhaps the difficult thing, gentlemen, is not to escape death; it is much more difficult to escape wickedness,\n\n### Stephanus 39b\n\nfor it runs faster than death. And now I, being slow and old, have been caught by the slower of the two, while my accusers, being clever and swift, have been caught by the faster one, corruption. And now I depart, condemned by you to the penalty of death, while they depart, condemned by the truth to wickedness and injustice. I abide by my sentence, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to turn out this way, and I think the outcome is fitting.\n\n### Stephanus 39c\n\nNext, I want to prophesy to you who voted to convict me. For I am now at the point when people are most likely to prophesy: when they are about to die. I declare, you men who have killed me, that immediately after my death a punishment will come upon you far harsher, by Zeus, than the punishment of death you have imposed on me. For you have done this now because you thought you would be freed from having to give an account of your lives, but the result will be exactly the opposite, as I maintain. There will be more people\n\n### Stephanus 39d\n\nto examine and reproach you, people whom I have held back until now without your realizing it. And they will be harsher because they are younger, and you will be even more indignant. For if you think that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living rightly, you are not thinking well. That way of escape is neither truly possible nor honorable. The best and easiest way is not to silence others, but to prepare yourselves to be as good as possible. With this prophecy for those of you who voted to convict me, I now take my leave.\n\n### Stephanus 39e\n\nBut I would gladly discuss what has happened here with those who voted to acquit me, while the officials are occupied and before I go to the place where I must die. So stay with me for this short time, gentlemen. Nothing prevents us from talking together as long as we are permitted. To you,\n\n### Stephanus 40a\n\nas my friends, I want to explain what the event that has just happened to me may mean. For something remarkable has happened to me, gentlemen of the jury—and I would be right to call you judges. My customary prophetic sign, the divine sign, was always very frequent throughout all my earlier life and opposed me even in very small matters whenever I was about to do something wrong. But now what you yourselves see has happened to me—something that a person might think, and that is commonly believed, to be the worst of evils. Yet for me,\n\n### Stephanus 40b\n\nthe god’s sign did not oppose me when I left home early this morning, or when I came up here to the court, or anywhere in my speech when I was about to say something. And yet in other speeches it has often stopped me in the middle of speaking. But now, throughout this entire affair, it has not opposed me in any action or statement. What do I take to be the reason? I will tell you. What has happened to me is likely to be a good thing, and there is no way that those of us who suppose\n\n### Stephanus 40c\n\ndeath to be an evil are thinking correctly. I have received powerful evidence of this: my customary sign would certainly have opposed me if I had not been about to accomplish something good.\n\nLet us also consider in the following way how much reason there is to hope that death is a good thing. Death is one of two things. Either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything at all, or, as people say, death is some kind of change and a relocation of the soul from this place to another. And if there is no perception, but death is\n\n### Stephanus 40d\n\nlike a sleep in which a sleeper does not even see a dream, then death would be a marvelous gain. For I think that if someone had to choose the night on which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream, set all the other nights and days of his life beside that night, and after considering them say how many days and nights in his life he had lived better and more pleasantly than that night, I think that not merely an ordinary person, but even the Great King himself, would find those days and nights easy to count\n\n### Stephanus 40e\n\nin comparison with all the others. So if death is like that, I call it a gain, because all of time appears in this way to be no more than a single night. But if death is like traveling from here to another place, and the things people say are true—that all the dead are there—what greater good could there be than that, gentlemen of the jury? For if someone\n\n### Stephanus 41a\n\narrives in Hades, freed from these people here who claim to be judges, and finds the true judges who are said to judge there—Minos, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just during their own lives—would that be an insignificant journey? Or again, how much would any of you give to meet Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer? For my part, I am willing to die many times over if these things are true. For then\n\n### Stephanus 41b\n\nFor me personally, spending my time there would be wonderful whenever I met Palamedes, Ajax son of Telamon, or anyone else among the men of old who died because of an unjust judgment, and compared my own sufferings with theirs—which, I think, would not be unpleasant. And most important of all, I could spend my time examining and questioning the people there, just as I do those here, to discover which of them is wise and which only thinks he is but is not. How much would anyone give, gentlemen of the jury, to examine the man who led\n\n### Stephanus 41c\n\nthe great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless other men and women one could name? To talk and associate with them there and examine them would be an unimaginable happiness. In any case, they surely do not put anyone to death there for doing that. In every other respect those there are happier than those here, and for all the rest of time they are immortal, if what we are told is true.\nBut you too, gentlemen of the jury, must be hopeful in the face of death and keep this one truth in mind:\n\n### Stephanus 41d\n\nnothing bad can happen to a good man, either in life or after death, and the gods do not neglect his affairs. What has happened to me now has not come about by chance either; it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is why the sign never turned me away, and I am not very angry with those who voted to convict me or with my accusers. And yet they did not vote against me and accuse me with this intention, but because they thought they were harming me;\n\n### Stephanus 41e\n\nfor that they deserve blame. Still, I ask this much of them: when my sons come of age, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them in the very same ways I troubled you, if you think they care about money or anything else more than virtue; and if they think they are something when they are nothing, reproach them as I reproached you, because they do not care about what they should and think they are something when they are worth nothing. And if\n\n### Stephanus 42a\n\nyou do this, both I and my sons will have received just treatment from you. But now it is time to leave: for me to die, and for you to live. Which of us is going to the better fate is unknown to everyone except the god.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/apology/translations/trn_apology_plain.txt"}],"retex_markdown_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/apology/retex.md"}}